IR 05000269/1995030
| ML15118A089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15118A088 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-95-30, 50-270-95-30, 50-287-95-30, NUDOCS 9603260269 | |
| Download: ML15118A089 (1) | |
Text
17 cabinets. However, some steps involve work in the 'A'
cabinet for calibration of the 'B' Channel per calibration procedure, IP/O/A/0310/004B, Engineered Safeguards System Analog Channel B RC Pressure Channel Calibratio The licensee determined that the root cause of this event was inadequate: (1)
work practice; (2) error detection; and (3) self checking. A deficient procedure contributed to the event in that some relevant information should have been provided. This included the need for a caution statement alerting the individuals that work in both cabinets was required for the calibration of the 'B'
trai The licensee's corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence included adding a caution to IP/0/A/0310/004B, Change #31, to require technicians to return to the proper cabinet after work in another cabinet. Applicable procedures, IP/0/A/0310/14B and IP/0/A/0310/04B, were revised to reference channel and cabinet locations for the appropriate steps. Additional labels were added on the cabinets to enhance identification and add awarenes Based on these corrective actions, this LER is close (Closed) LER 269/93-06, Design Deficiency Results in a Condition Outside the Design Basis of Containment for a Main Steam Line Break This LER addresses the potential of over pressurizing the containment during a main steam line break (MSLB) inside containment without the integrated control system or operator action. Accordingly, the licensee made supplemental responses to IE Bulletin 80-04 (dated August 19, 1993 and June 14, 1995)
addressing planned system modifications to automatically isolate feedwater to the steam generators during a MSLB, and block the start of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump. As indicated in Inspection Report 50-269,270,287/95-31, this modification (NSM ON-2873) was verified to be implemented on Unit 1 during the End Of Cycle (EOC) 16 refueling outage. Through a review of the Oconee commitment tracking list and 3-year NSM schedule, the inspector confirmed the licensee's commitment to install modification NSM ON-2873 during the upcoming Unit 2 EOC 15 and Unit 3 EOC 16 refueling outages. Commitments to reflect the MSLB modification in TS and the 1995 FSAR update were also confirmed by the inspector. The inspector had no further concerns after verifying that the MSLB modification was appropriately addressed in the Unit 1 operating procedures (i.e.,
OP/1/A/1102/01, Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup; OP/1/A/1102/10, Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown; and OP/1/A/1102/02, Reactor Trip Recovery) and PT/1/A/600/01, Periodic Checks Schedule Sheet. This LER is close ENCLOSURE 3 9603260269 960308 0&
PDR ADOCK 05000269 G