ML100271264
| ML100271264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2010 |
| From: | Ring M NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Pardee C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-09-005 | |
| Download: ML100271264 (45) | |
See also: IR 05000254/2009005
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352
January 27, 2010
Mr. Charles G. Pardee
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2009005;
Dear Mr. Pardee:
On December 31, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
integrated inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed
report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 5, 2010, with
Mr. T. Tulon and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, three self-revealed findings of very low safety
significance were identified. Two of the findings involved a violation of NRC requirements.
However, because of their very low safety significance, and because the issues were entered
into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issues as non-cited violations
(NCVs) in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Additionally,
a licensee-identified violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
If you contest the subject or severity of an NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days
of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a
copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III,
2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector
Office at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with the
characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of
the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional
Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power
Station. The information that you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection
Manual Chapter 0305.
C. Pardee -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark A. Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000254/2009005; 05000265/2009005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos: 50-254, 50-265
Report No: 05000254/2009005 and 05000265/2009005
Licensee: Exelon Nuclear
Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Cordova, IL
Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2009
Inspectors: J. McGhee, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Cushman, Resident Inspector
R. Orlikowski, Senior Resident Inspector - Duane Arnold
M. Bielby, Senior Operations Engineer
C. Moore, Operations Engineer
M. Mitchell, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector
R. Jickling, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
C. Mathews, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved by: M. Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...........................................................................................................1
REPORT DETAILS .......................................................................................................................4
Summary of Plant Status...........................................................................................................4
1. REACTOR SAFETY .......................................................................................................4
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)..............................................................4
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ........................................................................5
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) ...................................................................................6
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)......................................7
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)..............................................................11
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ........12
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15) ....................................................................12
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ...............................................................13
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ........................................................................14
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04) ................15
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06).................................................................................17
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES.....................................................................................................18
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) .......................................................18
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ............................................21
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ...............27
4OA5 Other Activities ...................................................................................................30
4OA6 Management Meetings ......................................................................................30
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations ............................................................................31
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ...............................................................................................1
Key Points of Contact ................................................................................................................1
List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed............................................................................1
List of Documents Reviewed .....................................................................................................2
List of Acronyms Used ..............................................................................................................8
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000254/2009005, 05000265/2009005; 10/01/09 - 12/31/09; Quad Cities Nuclear Power
Station, Units 1 & 2; Other Activities.
This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by regional inspectors. Three Green findings were identified by the
inspectors. Two of the findings were considered Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) of NRC
regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,
Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process
(SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity
level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance and a NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the
installation of an inappropriate component into the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator
coolant system. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly perform a part evaluation for
a replacement temperature indicator (TI) designated as augmented quality. This
resulted in the TI probe shearing off in the coolant flow stream and causing foreign
material to enter the coolant system. Immediate corrective actions included the
installation of an appropriately approved TI and recovery of foreign material from the
system.
The same part evaluation process was used for risk-significant components independent
of the system being worked. Therefore, this finding was more than minor because, if left
uncorrected, this performance deficiency could lead to unplanned unavailability of
safety-related or risk-significant equipment and would become a more significant safety
concern. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SDP screening and concluded that the
issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the failure of the TI did not
result in unplanned inoperability or loss of function of the diesel generator. The
inspectors determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect. This
performance deficiency is not indicative of current licensee performance. The decision
to install this type of TI was made in October 2007. The process which allowed this
performance deficiency was identified and corrected through procedure and policy
revisions in February 2008. (Section 4OA2)
- Green: A finding of very low safety significance and a NCV of TS 3.6.2.4,
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray, was self-revealed for the
licensees failure to meet the Technical Specification (TS) limiting conditions of operation
(LCO) requirement prior to transitioning into an operating mode where the LCO was
required to be satisfied. Specifically, Motor Operator (MO) 1-1001-37B for the Unit 1
RHR torus (suppression pool) spray isolation valve was found to have been inoperable
when the operating crew transitioned Unit 1 from Mode 4 to Mode 2 on May 30, 2009.
The valve actuator had been inadvertently declutched (i.e., motor disengaged) and the
valve was not demonstrated operable by stroking the valve electrically after the actuator
1 Enclosure
motor was declutched. Inspectors determined that the finding was cross-cutting in the
area of Problem Identification and Resolution - Corrective Action (P.1(a)) because plant
personnel failed to identify the physical contact with the valve actuator that resulted in
the valve being declutched; therefore, operators incorrectly assessed the system
condition as in compliance with TS 3.6.2.4. Immediate licensee corrective actions
included engagement of the motor and stroke testing of the valve.
The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment
performance quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the
objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to verify
system availability and capability prior to entering the required modes resulted in fewer
available mitigating systems than assumed in the operating risk evaluations. The
inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with
IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial
Screening and Characterization of findings, Table 4a. Inspectors answered all of the
questions for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone No. Therefore, the finding screened
as Green or very low safety significance. (Section 4OA3)
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to
perform maintenance that would ensure the portable emergency flooding pump (Darley
pump) was in a standby condition and readily available to accomplish the requirements
of QCOA 0010-16, Flood Emergency Procedure. Specifically, the failure to perform
adequate maintenance resulted in the need to replace the battery and gasoline for the
pump and, upon pump start, fuel sprayed out of the fuel pump. Although the staged
portable pump would not have supported the external flooding emergency response
procedure, no violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors did not
identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the issue is not
reflective of current licensee performance. Immediate corrective actions included
replacement of the degraded battery and overhaul of the pumps fuel pump. Other
actions included identification of preventative maintenance tasks and establishing a
program owner of the pump and support equipment.
This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the Structures,
Systems, and Components (SSC) Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity
Cornerstone objective of maintaining the functionality of spent fuel pool cooling.
The finding affected the cornerstone objective of providing assurance that physical
design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by events including
external flooding. Specifically, the pump could fail due to maintenance preventable
component failure resulting in inadequate or degraded makeup to the spent fuel pool
during an external flooding event. The inspectors determined the finding could be
evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination
Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of
findings, Tables 4a and 4b. The inspectors determined that even though this equipment
is assumed to completely fail, the licensee could provide an alternate portable pump
already located on site and capable of performing the safety function during this slow
developing event. Since alternate equipment was available and the delay in mobilizing
the alternate equipment would not have resulted in loss of capability to mitigate the
2 Enclosure
impact of the flooding event, the issue is of very low safety significance or Green.
(Section 4OA2)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee was
reviewed by inspectors. Corrective actions planned or taken by the licensee have been
entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and associated
corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
3 Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1
Unit 1 operated at 100 percent thermal power throughout the evaluated period from October 1
until December 31, 2009, with the exception of planned power reductions for routine
surveillances, planned equipment repair, and control rod maneuvers.
Unit 2
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent thermal power from October 1 until December 16 with
the exception of planned power reductions for routine surveillances and control rod maneuvers.
On December 16, 2009, operators attempted to replace a light bulb in the indication circuit for
the extraction steam check valve A on the 2D feedwater heaters. The light bulb separated with
the base remaining in the socket. During the evolution the D heaters tripped, resulting in a
partial loss of feedwater heating and a resulting change in reactor power. Operators lowered
power about 150 MWth (50 MWe) by inserting one high reactivity-worth control rod. Power
increased by 0.59 percent during the loss of feedwater heating transient. By 10:45 a.m. that
same morning, feedwater heaters had been restored and the control rod was withdrawn to
restore the unit to 100 percent thermal power. The unit remained at 100 percent power for the
duration of the evaluated period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1 Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees preparations for winter conditions to
verify that the plants design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient
to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for
selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would
remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the
inspectors focused on plant-specific design features and the licensees procedures used
to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and performance
requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were
appropriate as specified by plant-specific procedures. Cold weather protection, such as
heat tracing and area heaters, was verified to be in operation where applicable. The
inspectors also reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the
licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and
entering them into the CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this
report. The inspectors reviews focused specifically on the following plant systems due
to their risk significance or susceptibility to cold weather issues:
4 Enclosure
- heating steam, and
- circulating water/de-icing valve.
This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparations sample as
defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant
systems:
- 1/2 B diesel driven fire pump; and
- Unit 1 emergency diesel generator and diesel generator cooling water pump.
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety Cornerstone at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted
to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system, and, therefore,
potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,
system diagrams, UFSAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work
orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant
trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems
incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down
accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment
were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of
the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there
were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly
identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events
or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP
with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted two partial system walkdown samples as defined in
IP 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
5 Enclosure
.2 Semi-Annual Complete System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
On November 5, 2009, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment
inspection of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator to verify the functional capability of
the system. This system was selected because it was considered both safety significant
and risk significant in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. The inspectors
walked down the system to review mechanical and electrical equipment lineups;
electrical power availability; system pressure and temperature indications, as
appropriate; component labeling; component lubrication; component and equipment
cooling; hangers and supports; operability of support systems; and to ensure that
ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation. A review of a
sample of past and outstanding work orders was performed to determine whether any
deficiencies significantly affected the system function. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed the CAP database to ensure that system equipment alignment problems were
being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted one complete system walkdown sample as defined in
IP 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant
plant areas:
- Unit 2 Reactor Bldg. El. 5540, NW Corner Room - 2A Core Spray, Fire Zone
11.3.3;
- Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 5950, Diesel Generator, Fire Zone 9.1;
- Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 5950, Reactor Feed Pumps, Fire Zone 8.2.6.A;
- Crib House Bldg. El. 5598, Basement, Fire Zone 11.4.A; and
- Crib House Bldg. El. 5950, Ground Floor/Service Water Pumps, Fire Zone
11.4.B.
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire
protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within
the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained
passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate
compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection
equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk
6 Enclosure
as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later
additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a
plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event.
Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that
fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for
immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient
material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration
seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor
issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted five quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in
IP 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope
On November 4, 2009, the inspectors observed licensed operator continuing training to
verify that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and
documenting crew performance problems, and training was being conducted in
accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crews communications and accuracy of documentation;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement Emergency Plan actions and notifications.
The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
expectations and lesson objectives. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to
this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program
sample as defined in IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7 Enclosure
.2 Facility Operating History (71111.11B)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plants operating history from January 2007 through
September 2009 to identify operating experience that was expected to be addressed by
the Licensed Operator Requalification Training (LORT) program. The inspectors verified
that the identified operating experience had been addressed by the facility licensee in
accordance with the stations approved Systems Approach to Training (SAT) program to
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59(c). The documents reviewed during this
inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Licensee Requalification Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an inspection of the licensees LORT test/examination
program for compliance with the stations SAT program which would satisfy the
requirements of 10 CFR 55.59(c)(4). The reviewed operating examination material
consisted of two operating tests, each containing two dynamic simulator scenarios and
five job performance measures (JPMs). The two biennial written examinations reviewed
consisted of two parts. Each written examination contained 30 questions consisting of
15 written exam questions and 15 static exam questions. The inspectors reviewed the
annual requalification operating test and biennial written examination material to
evaluate general quality, construction, and difficulty level. The inspectors assessed the
level of examination material duplication from week to week during the current year
operating test. The examiners assessed the amount of written examination material
duplication from week to week for the biennial written examination administered in
calendar year 2009. The inspectors reviewed the methodology for developing the
examinations, including the LORT program 2-year sample plan, probabilistic risk
assessment insights, previously identified operator performance deficiencies, and plant
modifications. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Licensee Administration of Requalification Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the administration of a requalification operating test to
assess the licensees effectiveness in conducting the test to ensure compliance with
10 CRF 55.59(c)(4). The inspectors evaluated the performance of one operating crew in
parallel with the facility evaluators during four dynamic simulator scenarios and
evaluated various licensed crew members concurrently with facility evaluators during the
8 Enclosure
administration of several JPMs. The inspectors assessed the facility evaluators ability
to determine adequate crew and individual performance using objective, measurable
standards. The inspectors observed the training staff personnel administer the operating
test, including conducting pre-examination briefings, evaluations of operator
performance, and individual and crew evaluations upon completion of the operating test.
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the simulator to support the examinations.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Examination Security
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and reviewed the licensees overall licensed operator
requalification examination security program related to examination physical security
(e.g., access restrictions and simulator considerations) and integrity (e.g., predictability
and bias) to verify compliance with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests.
The inspectors also reviewed the facility licensees examination security procedure and
the implementation of security and integrity measures (e.g., security agreements,
sampling criteria, bank use, and test item repetition) throughout the examination
process. No examination security compromises occurred during these observations.
The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this
report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Licensee Training Feedback System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the methods and effectiveness of the licensees processes for
revising and maintaining its LORT program up-to-date, including the use of feedback
from plant events and industry experience information. The inspectors reviewed the
licensees quality assurance oversight activities, including licensee training department
self-assessment reports. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to assess the
effectiveness of its LORT program and their ability to implement appropriate corrective
actions. This evaluation was performed to verify compliance with 10 CFR 55.59(c) and
the licensees SAT based program. The documents reviewed during this inspection are
listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
9 Enclosure
.7 Licensee Remedial Training Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedial training
conducted since the previous biennial requalification examinations and the training from
the current examination cycle to ensure that they addressed weaknesses in licensed
operator or crew performance identified during training and plant operations. The
inspectors reviewed remedial training procedures and individual remedial training plans.
This evaluation was performed in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(c) and with respect to
the licensees SAT based program. The documents reviewed during this inspection are
listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Conformance With Operator License Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the facility and individual operator licensees' conformance with
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55. The inspectors reviewed the facility licensee's
program for maintaining active operator licenses and to assess compliance with
10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors reviewed the procedural guidance and the
process for tracking on-shift hours for licensed operators and which control room
positions were granted watch-standing credit for maintaining active operator licenses.
The inspectors reviewed the facility licensee's LORT program to assess compliance with
the requalification program requirements as described by 10 CFR 55.59(c). Additionally,
medical records for 10 licensed operators were reviewed for compliance with
10 CFR 55.53(I). The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Annual Operating Test Results and Biennial Written Examination Results (71111.11B)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the individual JPM operating
tests, the simulator operating tests, and the biennial written examination (required to be
given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee from September 2009
through November 2009 as part of the licensees operator licensing requalification cycle.
These results were compared to the thresholds established in Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance
Determination Process (SDP)." The evaluations were also performed to determine if the
licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in
NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and
10 Enclosure
IP 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The documents reviewed
during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one inspection sample as defined in IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following
risk-significant systems:
- Z2900; Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump, and
- Z4700; Instrument Air.
The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had
resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and
independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition
problems in terms of the following:
- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(2)
or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified
as (a)(1).
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,
and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance
effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance
characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined
in IP 71111.12-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
11 Enclosure
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related
equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed
prior to removing equipment for work:
- Work Week 45 - 1A residual heat removal (RHR) room cooler, 1A RHR service
water (RHRSW) loop, 1B RHR seal cooler, 1-1001-16A boroscope and Votes
testing, 1-1001-37A MOV equipment qualification inspection; and
- Work Week 51 - Unit 1 250 Vdc battery reconfiguration using Unit 1 125 Vdc
alternate battery with emergent Unit 2 125 Vdc battery low specific gravity
problems, 2A RHR loop and 2B RHRSW pump unavailability.
These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate
and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the
plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope
of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's
probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were
consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and
walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk
analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted
two samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
.1 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- IR 987904: 1A RHR Room Cooler Tube Sheet Has Pitting, and
- IR 994823: TS SR 3.8.4.8 Frequency Not Met.
The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance
of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical
adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the
subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in
12 Enclosure
risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the
appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine
whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures
were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures
in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the
evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action
documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies
associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This operability inspection constituted two samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
.1 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that
procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional
capability:
- WO 1121775, 250 Vdc Battery Charger #2 4-Hour Load Test;
- WO 1261246, Replace Battery Changeover Relay R12 EC 376690;
- QCMMS 4100-33, 1/2-4101B Diesel Driven Fire Pump Annual Capacity Test;
- WO 1130535, OP PMT Filter B Train Control Room HVAC; and
These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability
to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate
for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated
operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as
written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was
returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers
required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test
documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against
TS, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various
NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the
equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to
determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP
and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to
safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
13 Enclosure
This inspection constituted five post-maintenance testing samples as defined in
IP 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
.1 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether
risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety
function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural
and TS requirements:
- QCOS 1400-01, 2A Core Spray Pump Performance Test (IST);
- QCIS 0300-02, Unit 1 Division 1 Scram Discharge Volume Calibration and
Functional Test (Routine);
- QCOS 7500-05, 1/2 B Standby Gas Treatment Operability Test (Routine);
- QCOS 1600-07, Reactor Coolant Leakage in the Drywell (RCS);
- QCEMS 0230-11, Modified Performance Test of Unit 1(2) 125 Vdc Normal or
Alternate Battery (Routine); and
- QCOS 6900-14, Station Battery Allowable Value Verification Surveillance
(Routine).
The inspectors observed in plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated
records to determine the following:
- did preconditioning occur;
- were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel
or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and
consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges, and the calibration frequency were
in accordance with TS, the UFSAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy, applicable
prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;
tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other
applicable procedures, jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored
where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in
accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of
14 Enclosure
Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the
system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed
with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was
declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests,
reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical
contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems
encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the
performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and
dispositioned in the CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted four routine surveillance testing samples, one inservice
testing sample, and one reactor coolant system leak detection inspection samples as
defined in IP 71111.22, Sections -02 and -05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
.1 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, Emergency Plan Annex,
Revisions 26 and 27 were implemented based on the licensees determination, in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in
effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan as changed continues to meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors
conducted a sampling review of the Emergency Plan changes and a review of the
Emergency Action Level (EAL) changes to evaluate for potential decreases in
effectiveness of the Plan. However, this review does not constitute formal NRC approval
of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in
their entirety.
This emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection constituted one
sample as defined in IP 71114.04-05.
15 Enclosure
b. Findings
(1) Unresolved Item (URI) 05000254/2009005-01: Changes to EAL HU6 Potentially
Decrease the Effectiveness of the Plans without Prior NRC Approval
Introduction: The inspectors reviewed changes implemented to the Quad Cities Station
Radiological Emergency Plan Annex EALs and EAL Basis. In Revision 26, the licensee
changed the basis of EAL HU6, "Fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection
within the protected area boundary, by adding two statements. The two changes added
to the EAL basis stated that if the alarm could not be verified by redundant control room
or nearby fire panel indications, notification from the field that a fire exists starts the
15-minute classification and fire extinguishment clocks. The second change stated the
15-minute period to extinguish the fire does not start until either the fire alarm is verified
to be valid by additional control room or nearby fire panel instrumentation, or upon
notification of a fire from the field. These statements conflict with the previous
Quad Cities Station Annex, Revision 25, basis statements and potentially decrease the
effectiveness of the Plans.
Description: Quad Cities Station Radiological Emergency Plan Annex, Revision 25,
EAL HU6, initiating condition stated, "Fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of
detection, or explosion, within the protected area boundary." The threshold values for
HU6 were, in part: 1) Fire in any Table H2 area not extinguished within 15 minutes of
control room notification or verification of a control room alarm; or 2) Fire outside any
Table H2 area with the potential to damage safety systems in any Table H2 area not
extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control
room alarm. Table H2, Vital Areas, were identified as main control room, reactor
building, diesel generator rooms, 4 kilovolt switchgear area, battery rooms, B train
control room heating-ventilation and air conditioning, service water pumps, and turbine
building cable tunnel. The basis defined fire as "combustion characterized by heat and
light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment
do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is not required if large
quantities of smoke and heat are observed."
The basis for Revision 25, EAL HU6 thresholds 1 and 2 stated, in part, the purpose of
this threshold is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially
significant precursors to damage to safety systems. As used here, notification is visual
observation and report by plant personnel or sensor alarm indication. The 15-minute
period begins with a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire
detection system alarm. A verified alarm is assumed to be an indication of a fire unless
personnel dispatched to the scene disprove the alarm within the 15-minute period.
The report, however, shall not be required to verify the alarm. The intent of the
15-minute period is to size the fire and discriminate against small fires that are readily
extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket, etc.).
Revision 26 of the Quad Cities Station Radiological Emergency Plan Annex, changed
the threshold basis for EAL HU6 by adding the following two statements: 1)"If the alarm
cannot be verified by redundant control room or nearby fire panel indications, notification
from the field that a fire exists starts the 15-minute classification and fire extinguishment
clocks," and 2) "The 15-minute period to extinguish the fire does not start until either the
fire alarm is verified to be valid by utilization of additional control room or nearby fire
panel instrumentation, or upon notification of a fire from the field."
16 Enclosure
The two statements added to the basis in Revision 26 conflict with the Revision 25
threshold basis and initiating condition. The changed threshold basis in Revision 26
could add an indeterminate amount of time to declaring an actual emergency until a
person responded to the area of the fire and made a notification to the control room of a
fire in the event that redundant control room or nearby fire panel indications were not
available.
Pending further review and verification by the NRC to determine if the changes to EAL
HU6 threshold basis potentially decreased the effectiveness of the Plans, this issue was
considered an unresolved item (URI 05000254/2009005-01; 05000265/2009005-01).
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of an after-hours licensee emergency drill on
November 11, 2009, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,
notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The
after-hours drill was preceded by an unannounced, after-hours drive-in drill.
The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the Technical Support
Center to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action
recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also
attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with
those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify
whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into
the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill
package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report.
This emergency preparedness drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in
IP 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Emergency Preparedness Termination and Recovery Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of an emergency preparedness termination and
recovery drill on December 2, 2009, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the
conduct of the drill and to assess the licensees ability to assess performance via a
formal critique process in order to identify and correct Emergency Preparedness
weaknesses. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the Technical
Support Center to determine whether the recovery and termination activities associated
with the drill were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also
attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with
those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify
whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into
17 Enclosure
the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill
package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report.
This emergency preparedness drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in
IP 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Emergency Alternating Current Power System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance
Index (MSPI) - Emergency Alternating Current (AC) Power System performance
indicator for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2008 through
the 3rd quarter 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator (PI) data
reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline, Revision 6, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator
narrative logs, MSPI derivation reports, issue reports, event reports and NRC integrated
inspection reports for the period of October 1, 2008, through September 30, 2009, to
validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component
risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the
previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable
guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to
determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted
for this indicator, and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI emergency AC power system samples as defined
in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - High Pressure Injection Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance
Index - High Pressure Injection Systems performance indicator for Quad Cities Units 1
and 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2008 through the 3rd quarter 2009. To
determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and
guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance
18 Enclosure
Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
operator narrative logs, issue reports, MSPI derivation reports, event reports and
NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of October 1, 2008, through
September 30, 2009, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors
reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more
than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in
accordance with applicable guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue
report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data
collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI high pressure injection system samples as defined
in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Heat Removal System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance
Index - Heat Removal System performance indicator for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 for
the period from the 4th quarter 2008 through the 3rd quarter 2009. To determine the
accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance
contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline, Revision 6, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator
narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, MSPI derivation reports, and NRC integrated
inspection reports for the period of October 1, 2008, through September 30, 2009, to
validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component
risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the
previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable
guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to
determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted
for this indicator, and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI heat removal system samples as defined in
IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Residual Heat Removal System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance
Index - Residual Heat Removal System performance indicator for Quad Cities Units 1
19 Enclosure
and 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2008 through the 3rd quarter 2009. To
determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the PI definitions
and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, were used. The inspectors reviewed the
licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, MSPI derivation reports, event reports
and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of October 1, 2008, through
September 30, 2009, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors
reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more
than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in
accordance with applicable guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue
report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data
collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI residual heat removal system samples as defined
in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Cooling Water Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance
Index - Cooling Water Systems performance indicator for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 for
the period from the 4th quarter 2008 through the 3rd quarter 2009. To determine the
accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance
contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline, Revision 6, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator
narrative logs, issue reports, MSPI derivation reports, event reports and NRC integrated
inspection reports for the period of October 1, 2008, through September 30, 2009, to
validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component
risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the
previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable
guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to
determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted
for this indicator, and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI cooling water system samples as defined in
IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
20 Enclosure
.6 Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Radiological Effluent Technical
Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Radiological Effluent
Occurrences performance indicator for the period of December 2008 through
November 2009. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the
NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
Revision 6 to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees issue report database and selected individual
reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed to identify any potential
occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent
releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous
effluent summary data and the results of associated offsite dose calculations for selected
dates between December 2008 and November 2009 to determine if indicator results
were accurately reported. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees methods for
quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent dose. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one RETS/ODCM radiological effluent occurrences sample
as defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)
a. Inspection Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of
this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities
and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees CAP at
an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective
actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed
included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; that timeliness was
commensurate with the safety significance; that evaluation and disposition of
performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root
causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and
adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective
actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.
Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations
are included in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.
21 Enclosure
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute
any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an
integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in
Section 1 of this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific
human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of
items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through
inspection of the stations daily condition report packages.
These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant
status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection
samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to
identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The
inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues and associated corrective
actions, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed
in Section 4OA2.2 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance
results. The inspectors review nominally considered the 6-month period of
January 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009, although some examples expanded beyond
those dates where the scope of the trend warranted.
The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major
equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental
problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance
reports, self assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors
compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees
CAP trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues
identified in the licensees trending reports were reviewed for adequacy. Additionally,
the inspectors reviewed CAP open priority 1, 2, and 3 corrective actions for timeliness.
In addition, all open priority 4 action tracking items (ACITs) were reviewed to ensure they
were properly categorized and that the justifications for extension were appropriate and
properly documented.
22 Enclosure
This review constituted a single semi-annual trend inspection sample as defined in
IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Selected Issue Followup Inspection: Issue Report 966501, Darley Pump Leaking
Gasoline from the Fuel Pump
a. Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensees CAP, the inspectors followed up on a
corrective action item documenting gasoline leaking from the fuel pump of the portable
emergency flooding pump (Darley pump) on September 17, 2009, during preparations
for a pump capacity demonstration run. The pump capacity demonstration was a new
procedure developed in response to a non-cited violation (NCV) documented in
Inspection Report 05000254/2007005.
This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as
defined in IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to
maintain the portable emergency flooding pump and supporting equipment in a condition
required to support implementation of QCOA 0010-16, Flood Emergency Procedure.
Description: In Inspection Report 05000254/2007005, inspectors documented a NCV of
TS 5.4.1 for the licensees failure to develop adequate surveillance procedures for
equipment used during an external flooding event. Corrective action for this issue
included revising the external flooding procedure and developing and implementing a
procedure to test a portable pump used as the sole source of makeup water to the spent
fuel pool following an external flooding event. The action to develop and implement the
pump test procedure was issued in May and stated, Develop test procedure and
conduct test to confirm flow of greater than or equal to 200 gpm by mid-July. Brief
NRC Resident as appropriate. The action was closed to an Engineering Change (EC) 366481, on July 18, 2007, with no actual test performed. The documented justification
for this closure stated that discussions with the NRC resident clarified the intent of the
action and no physical testing needed to be performed. Followup discussions with the
resident inspectors stationed at Quad Cities in July 2007 had no recollection of the
conversation and their understanding of the intended action remained unchanged from
the original report.
Licensee staff generated Issue Report (IR) 738335 in February 2008 to document the
review of the NCV response and generate a closure package of all related IRs. The lack
of preventative maintenance (PM) testing was identified and an action tracking item was
generated to Develop PM/testing requirements for the Darley pump associated with the
external flooding event. The original corrective action due date was July 16, 2008.
The action was extended several times, and on May 18, 2009, during a review of
corrective actions for NRC-identified issues, the licensee staff identified that a CAP
23 Enclosure
action item (ACIT 624645-03) had been inappropriately closed. In addition, the licensee
determined that ACIT 624645-03 was inappropriately tagged as an Action Tracking Item
(ACIT) and should have been a corrective action. Issue Report 921197 was generated
and ACIT 624645 was upgraded to a corrective action with a July 31, 2009, due date.
The test procedure was developed and the pump was scheduled to run on
September 17, 2009.
The capacity test was implemented with WO 01247374. When mechanics pulled the
pump and support components from the storage location, they found that the engine
battery had to be replaced and the gasoline stored with the motor had to be replaced.
Since the mechanics performing the test had never operated the pump, they decided to
run it in the weld shop before taking it down to the river. When the mechanics started
the pump, fuel was spraying out of the fuel pump. They immediately shut down the
pump and contained the fuel leak (IR 966501).
The Darley pump fuel system was repaired and the capacity test was completed
satisfactorily on September 25, 2009. Review of recent pump operating history and
PM tasks revealed that the pump had not been operated since the NCV was identified in
2007. The annual maintenance performed under PM 164250 in July of 2009 changed
the oil and inspected the filters and spark plugs with no post-maintenance operation
required. The PM also failed to identify that the battery was beyond the expected life
and did not determine that the battery would maintain its charge.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to perform maintenance that would
ensure the pump was in a standby condition and readily available to accomplish the
requirements of QCOA 0010-16 was a performance deficiency fully within the licensees
ability to control, and therefore a finding. This issue was more than minor because it
was associated with the SSC Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone
element of maintaining the functionality of spent fuel pool cooling. The finding affected
the cornerstone objective of providing assurance that physical design barriers protect the
public from radionuclide releases caused by events including external flooding.
Specifically, the pump could fail due to a maintenance preventable component failure
resulting in inadequate or degraded makeup to the spent fuel pool during an external
flooding event. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with
this finding because the maintenance issue is a legacy issue and not reflective of current
licensee performance. The pump and PM tasks had been in place for several years.
Inspectors reviewed maintenance requirements for other temporary equipment staged in
support of external events and emergency operating procedures, some of which was put
in place after the Darley pump was staged, and did not identify any similar issues.
The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance
with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of findings, Tables 4a and 4b. The inspectors
determined that even though this equipment is assumed to completely fail, the licensee
could provide an alternate portable pump already located on site and capable of
performing the safety function during this slow developing event. The alternate pump
had maintenance and test procedures in place to provide a basis for reliability. Since
alternate equipment was available and the delay in mobilizing the alternate equipment
would not have resulted in loss of capability to mitigate the impact of the flooding event,
the issue is of very low safety significance or Green.
24 Enclosure
Enforcement: Technical Specification 5.4.1 required that written procedures be
established, implemented, and maintained for the items specified in Regulatory
Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements. QCOA 0010-16,
Flood Emergency Procedure, was the licensee procedure used to meet the
Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement for an emergency flooding event. The procedure
specified that the portable pump staged in the protected area warehouse is to be used to
respond to the event. Although the regulatory guide did not specifically require
maintenance procedures for portable equipment, failure to maintain the staged
equipment in a condition to be used to mitigate the event does not support timely
implementation of the procedure to provide spent fuel pool makeup and is a finding.
Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiency did not involve a
violation of a regulatory requirement. Because the finding does not involve a violation of
regulatory requirements and has a very low safety significance, it is identified as
(FIN 05000254/2009005-02; 05000265/2009005-02). The issue was added to the
licensees CAP program as IR 966501 and IR 968809. Immediate corrective actions
included replacement of the degraded battery and overhaul of the pumps fuel pump.
Other actions included identification of preventative maintenance tasks and establishing
a program owner of the pump.
.5 Selected Issue Followup Inspection: Incident Report 984769, Temperature Indicating
Probe Found Broken in the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Coolant System
a. Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensees CAP, the inspectors followed up on a
corrective action item documenting a failed temperature indicating probe (TI) in the
Unit 2 diesel generator coolant system on October 27, 2009, during planned
maintenance on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG).
This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as
defined in IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV were
self-revealed when a TI failed in the Unit 2 diesel generator coolant system.
Description: On October 27, 2009, while performing corrective maintenance on
TI 2-6641-8205, technicians noted that the tip had broken off the probe when comparing
it to the length of the new TI. This TI provides local indication of the jacket coolant water
temperature at the inlet to the diesel engine and provides no alarm function.
The TI was scheduled for replacement in October 2008 when Operations identified the
TI reading abnormally at zero degrees. A work order was written and scheduled for
October 2009. During the performance of the maintenance, it was noted that the new TI
was longer than the one recently removed. A new work order was written to retrieve any
foreign material from the system. The broken tip was recovered from the diesel
generator coolant system.
25 Enclosure
The licensee investigation discovered that the installation analysis for this TI was
approved under the non-safety below level of design detail (NSBLD) process in October
2007 under Revision 3 of SM-AA-300, Procurement Engineering Support Activities.
Using this provision, NSBLD changes must be documented and shall identify the
change with justification of the changes technical acceptability. The length of the probe
was the only difference to the previously installed TI. The TI was installed with a
3.25 inch probe, which was longer than the previous 2 inch probe. The added length
increased the shear force from the coolant flow and caused the probe to break off.
An operating experience (OPEX) review would have revealed an event at another
nuclear facility where the same make and model TI experienced the same failure
mechanism in a diesel generator coolant system. Under Revision 3 of SM-AA-300,
OPEX reviews for NSBLD were not required, nor were additional peer reviews required.
The lack of an OPEX review was an identified vulnerability by the licensees corporate
supply organization in a common cause analysis which was performed for a lack of
technical rigor issued in February 2008. A corrective action from this common cause
analysis was to implement Revision 4 of SM-AA-300 which limited NSBLD reviews to
non-safety host component applications. Revision 4 was implemented at Quad Cities in
February 2008. Since this specific TI is classified as augmented quality, Revision 4
would prevent use of the NSBLD process of a non-identical replacement. A full item
equivalency evaluation would be required for any non-identical replacement.
An extent of condition review is scheduled to be performed at Quad Cities by
Procurement Engineering for all NSBLD reviews that were performed under Revision 3
of SM-AA-300 from August 2007 through February 2008.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the approval of an inappropriate component
designated as augmented quality was a performance deficiency and a finding. The
same parts evaluation process was used for risk-significant components independent of
the system being worked. Therefore, this finding was more than minor because, if left
uncorrected, this performance deficiency could lead to unplanned unavailability of
safety-related or risk-significant equipment and would become a more significant safety
concern. This performance deficiency challenged the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
attribute of Equipment Performance by challenging equipment availability and reliability.
The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SDP screening and concluded that the issue was
of very low safety significance (Green) because the failure of the TI did not result in
unplanned inoperability or loss of function of the diesel generator. The inspectors
determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect. This performance
deficiency is not indicative of current licensee performance. The decision to install this
type of TI was made in October 2007. The process which allowed this performance
deficiency was identified and corrected through procedure and policy revisions to
SM-AA-300 in February 2008.
Enforcement: The TI was designated augmented quality in the licensees quality
assurance program. The licensees quality assurance program applied controls
equivalent to safety-related components for Class 1E equipment qualification to
augmented quality equipment and systems. This correlation is applicable to several
Appendix B criteria included in the program such as both Section 3 - Design Control,
and Section 5 - Instructions Procedures and Drawings, of the licensees Quality
Assurance program for augmented quality.
26 Enclosure
Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V states in part that activities affecting quality
shall be prescribed by instructions and procedures of a type appropriate to the
circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or
procedures.
Contrary to the above, on October 30, 2007, SM-AA-300 was not appropriate to the
circumstances in that it did not require an approval process with technical rigor
equivalent to the process used for safety-related components when a non-identical
temperature indicating probe designated augmented quality was approved for use.
That part was approved for use through a NSBLD review per Revision 3 of SM-AA-300
instead of undergoing a full item equivalency evaluation, and the part subsequently
failed resulting in foreign material in the diesel generator coolant system. The foreign
material did not cause any adverse consequences in this instance.
Because this issue is of very low safety significance, and this issue has been entered
into the licensees corrective action program as Issue Report 984769, this issue is being
treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
Corrective actions for this event included replacement of the TI with an appropriately
approved TI. The licensee has also scheduled to perform an extent of condition review
of NSBLD reviews performed under Revision 3 of SM-AA-300 from August 2007 through
February 2008.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000254/2009-003-00: Failure of RHR Torus Spray
Isolation Valve to Open Due to Declutch Mechanism Problems
a. Inspection Scope
Inspectors reviewed the event, evaluation, and corrective actions for the motor operated
valve failure reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000254/2009-003. Documents
reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. This LER is
closed.
This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
b. Findings
Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and an NCV of Technical
Specification (TS) 3.6.2.4, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray,
was self-revealed for the licensees failure to meet the TS limiting condition for operation
(LCO) requirements prior to transitioning into an operating mode where the LCO was
required to be satisfied. Specifically, MO 1-1001-37B, motor operator for the Unit 1 RHR
torus (suppression pool) spray isolation valve, was found to have been inoperable when
the operating crew transitioned Unit 1 from Mode 4 to Mode 2 on May 30, 2009. The
valve actuator had been inadvertently declutched (i.e., motor disengaged) and the valve
was not demonstrated operable by stroking the valve electrically after the actuator motor
was declutched.
27 Enclosure
Discussion: On June 4, 2009, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power following
startup from a forced outage, MO 1-1001-37B, torus spray shutoff valve, was determined
to be inoperable because it would not open remotely using the control switch during
performance of the residual heat removal power operated valve test surveillance.
The torus spray valve had been closed using the motor and a clearance order had been
placed on the valve during the outage. Another motor operated valve in the residual
heat removal system on that same clearance, MO 1-1001-7C, RHR C torus suction line
isolation valve, had failed to open on May 28, 2009, when the clearance tag was
removed and valve stroking was being performed to restore the component to a standby
configuration. Operators reported manually declutching (disengaging the actuator
motor) the 7C valve while placing the clearance tag in order to verify the valve was
closed. Inspectors identified that the action of manually verifying valve position was not
a normal practice as supported by OP-AA-103-105, Limitorque Motor-Operated Valve
Operations, and Operations department management. Investigation into the 7C failure
revealed that the actuator lubricant was degraded in the area of the clutch return spring
preventing the motor from engaging when called upon from the control circuit. The
RHR C valve actuator was rebuilt using MOV Long Life grease, new tripper cams, new
trip lever assembly, and a new outer declutch arm snap ring. The rebuilt actuator was
verified to operate correctly in all modes and returned to service prior to unit restart on
May 30, 2009.
Inspectors interviewed operating personnel regarding the positioning of MO 1-1001-37B
torus spray valve. Operators stated that they did not manually declutch the 37B valve
since the valve was already closed (normal position) when they hung the tag. The
licensees investigation attempted to identify both how the motor on the 37B valve was
declutched and why the actuator did not return to the motor mode of operation
automatically as designed. The licensee verified that the actuator was not able to
transition from the motor mode to the manual mode without external (human)
intervention.
Although the licensee could not identify how or when the valve actuator motor was
declutched, the licensees investigators concluded that the declutch lever was most likely
bumped during work activities on top of the Torus during the recent outage with the unit
in Mode 4. Investigation further determined that with the valve motor disengaged,
increased friction in the actuator caused by degraded lubricant in the area of the clutch
return spring prevented the engagement of the motor to open the valve. The actuator
motor was engaged by manually manipulating the declutch lever and stroke testing the
valve.
Inspectors reviewed the grease sampling methodology and the preventative
maintenance frequency for the SMP-00 type actuators and determined that both were
conducted in accordance with the industry standards for these type valves.
Analysis: The failure of plant personnel to demonstrate operability of MO 1-1001-37B by
stroking the valve electrically prior to changing modes was a performance deficiency.
The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment
performance quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the
objective of ensuring availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to verify
system availability and capability prior to entering the required modes resulted in fewer
28 Enclosure
available mitigating systems than assumed in the operating risk evaluations. Inspectors
determined that the finding was cross-cutting in the area of Problem Identification and
Resolution - Corrective Action because plant personnel failed to identify the valve
actuator contact that resulted in the valve being declutched; therefore, operators
incorrectly assessed the system condition as in compliance with TS 3.6.2.4 (P.1(a)).
The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance
with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 -
Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a. Inspectors answered all of
the questions for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone No. Therefore, the finding
screened as Green or very low safety significance.
Enforcement: Technical Specification 3.0, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
Applicability, LCO 3.0.4 stated in part that when an LCO is not met, entry into a mode in
the Applicability shall only be made:
- when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation while in
the mode or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited time;
- after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and
components, and acceptability of entering the mode; or
- when an allowance is stated in the specification.
Technical Specification 3.6.2.4, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool
Spray, required two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems to be operable in
Modes 1, 2 and 3.
Contrary to the above, on May 30, 2009, the licensee changed operating modes from
Mode 4 to Mode 2 with the MO 1-1001-37B valve inoperable in violation of TS 3.6.2.4
LCO conditions since only one RHR suppression pool (Torus) spray subsystem was
operable. Specifically, TS 3.6.2.4 had no allowance provided to permit mode change
with less than two subsystems operable, no prior risk assessment was performed, and
the specification did not permit operation for an unlimited time, the mode change
resulted in non-compliance with TS LCO 3.6.2.4.
Because this finding is of very low safety significance, and this issue has been entered
into the licensees corrective action program as IR 928048, this violation is being treated
as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
Immediate corrective actions for this event included engagement of the actuator motor
by manually manipulating the declutch lever and stroke testing the valve. Since the
hardened grease in this area of the actuator assembly was only an issue if the actuator
was manually declutched, the valve was left in standby, and overhaul of the valve
actuator was scheduled for the next refueling outage.
29 Enclosure
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 World Association of Nuclear Operators Plant Assessment Report Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the final report for the World Association of Nuclear Operators
plant assessment conducted in February 2009. The inspectors reviewed the report to
ensure that issues identified were consistent with the NRC perspectives of licensee
performance and to verify if any significant safety issues were identified that required
further NRC followup.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force
personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee
security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities
did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an
integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On January 5, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to T. Tulon and
other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
considered proprietary.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exits were conducted for:
- The results of the licensed operator requalification training program inspection
and with the site vice president, Mr. T. Tulon, on October 2, 2009.
- The licensed operator requalification training biennial written examination and
annual operating test examination materials were discussed with the training
manager, Mr. K. Moser, on November 12, 2009.
30 Enclosure
- The licensed operator requalification training program annual inspection results
with operations training manager, Mr. D. Snook, on November 20, 2009, via
telephone.
- The results of the Radiological Effluent TS/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences performance indicator verification program
inspection with the plant manager, Mr. R. Gideon, on December 16, 2009.
- The annual review of Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes
with the licensee's emergency preparedness coordinator, Mr. F. Swan, via
telephone on December 21, 2009.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned
to the licensee.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee
and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the
NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
- Technical Specification 5.5.1 requires implementation of the Offsite Dose
Calculation Manual. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 8, Part 12.2.1,
Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation, Section C requires that
when the service water effluent gross activity monitor is operated with less than
the minimum number of operable channels, the licensee shall collect and analyze
grab samples for beta or gamma activity once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the
above, grab samples were not collected while the Unit 1 service water effluent
gross activity monitor was inoperable from June 2-20, 2009. Specifically,
following fuse replacement, the licensee failed to recognize that the instrument
remained uninitialized; therefore, that compensatory samples were required. The
finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as
IR 933472. Corrective actions included returning the monitor to service and
reviewing captured monitor data from June 2-20, 2009, to ensure that no release
events occurred during the monitor outage, revising the monitor repair and
maintenance procedures to clear direct communication with the Chemistry
Department subject matter experts during work on the system, and reinforcing
the expectation that control room operators turn over all abnormal indications to
supervisors each shift. The finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance because, although the finding related to the effluent release
program, it was not a failure to implement the effluent program or an event that
resulted in a dose to the public in excess of Appendix I criterion or
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
31 Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
T. Tulon, Site Vice President
R. Gideon, Plant Manager
D. Kimler, Shift Operations Superintendent
S. Darin, Engineering Manager
W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance Manager
J. Burkhead, Nuclear Oversight Manager
J. Garrity, Work Control Manager
K. Moser, Training Manager
V. Neels, Chemistry/Environ/Radwaste Manager
D. Collins, Radiation Protection Manager
D. Thompson, Security Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
M. Ring, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
R. Zuffa, Unit Supervisor, Resident Inspector Section
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000254/2009005-01; URI Changes to EAL HU6 Potentially Decrease the Effectiveness05000265/2009005-01 of the Plans without Prior NRC Approval
05000254/2009005-02; FIN Darley Pump Leaking Gasoline from the Fuel Pump
05000265/2009005-03 NCV Temperature Indicating Probe Found Broken in the Unit 2
Diesel Generator Coolant System
05000254/2009005-04 NCV Failure of RHR Torus Spray Isolation Valve to Open Due to
Declutch Mechanism Problems
Closed
05000254/2009005-02; FIN Darley Pump Leaking Gasoline from the Fuel Pump
05000265/2009005-03 NCV Temperature Indicating Probe Found Broken in the Unit 2
Diesel Generator Coolant System
05000254/2009005-04 NCV Failure of RHR Torus Spray Isolation Valve to Open Due to
Declutch Mechanism Problems05000254/2009003-00 LER Failure of RHR Torus Spray Isolation Valve to Open Due to
Declutch Mechanism Problems
1 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
Section 1R01
- QCOP 0010-01; Winterizing Checklist; Revision 48
- QCOP 0010-02; Required Cold Weather Routines; Revision 28
- WC-AA-107; Seasonal Readiness; Revision 06
- IR 99493; U-2 FW Heater LCV Response to Lowering Circulating Water Inlet Temp
- WO 1183498; Cycle CW De-Ice Valve
- WO 1282535; Ice Melt Valve Stuck Shut
- QCOP 4400-06; Circulating Water System De-icing; Revision 14
- ECR 59777; Design Alternate Method for Operation of Ice Melt Valve
- IR 993018; Wire Rope Rating on Ice Melt Valve
- IR 986355; Ice Melt Valve Stuck Shut
- WO 01194645; MM Union Leaking Inside U1 Cond Demin Vault (HTG STM)
- WO 01215488; MM Repair Piping Leak Underground Next to Cribhouse
- WO 01242820; MM Seal Cracks in Ceiling Above Bus 23-1
Section 1R04
- QCOP 4100-01; Firewater System Lineup for Standby Operation; Revision 4
- QCOP 6600-01: Diesel Generator 1(2) Preparation For Standby Operation; Revision 38
- WO #01272234; EM Change RMS-9 Setting at SWGR 19 CUB 5D Per EC 377092
- WO #01107582; EM Replace U2 DGCWP Alternate Feed Contactor
- WO #920850; IM CAL DG HX 2-6661B Cooling Water Inlet PI 2-3941-67A
- WO #945963; IM CAL DG HX 2-6661B Cooling Water Outlet PI 2-3941-67B
- WO #01107581; EM Replace U2 DGCWP Normal Feed Contactor
- WO #01245102; EM Support OP QCOS 6600-17 U2 DGCW Pump Alternate Feed Test
- QCOS 6600-17; Operating Cycle Diesel Cooling Water Pump Alternate Power Feed Test for
Appendix R; Revision 15
- EC 360507; Unit 2 EDG Voltage Regulator (Place EDG in Droop Mode Prior to
Synchronization to the Grid)
- EC 377665; TMOD to Bypass Faulty SSES Switch Local/Remote Contact at U2 Diesel
Generator
Section 1R05
- OP-AA-201-008; Pre-fire Plan Manual Index - Pre-Plan RB-16; Revision 2
- Pre-plan TB-74; Fire Zone 9.1, Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 595-0, Diesel Generator; Revision 24
- Pre-plan TB-73; Fire Zone 8.2.6.A, Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 595-0, Reactor Feed Pumps;
Revision 24
- Pre-plan CH-44; Fire Zone 11.4.A, Crib House Bldg. El. 559-8 Basement; Revision 0
- Pre-plan CH-45; Fire Zone 11.4.B, Ground Floor/Service Water Pumps; Revision 22
2 Attachment
Section 1R11
- SY-AA-101-132; Assessment and Response to Suspicious Activity and Security Threats;
Revision 14
- QCOA 0010-20; Security Event; Revision 25
- EP-AA-1006; Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station; Revision 27
- Requalification Examination Results/Calendar Year 2009
- Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2 NRC Integrated Inspection Reports; dated various from
January 2007 through September 2009
- OP-AA-105-102; Attachment 1; Active License Tracking Log (for 1st & 2nd Quarters of 2009);
Revision 9
- OP-AA-105-102; Attachment 2, Reactivation of License Log (2 for LSRO, 2 RO); Revision 9
- Quad Cities Classroom Sample Plan for Training Years 2008 and 2009; 6/18/2009
- Quad Cities Simulator Sample Plan for Training Years 2008 and 2009
- 71111.11 Appendix C Responses/Justifications; 9/28/2009
- TQ-AA-224-F070; Evaluation Feedback Summary, LORT Cycle 08-1 through 08-5; LORT
Cycle 09-1 through 09-4
- TQ-AA-1002; Attachment 3; LORT Quarterly Curriculum Review Committee Meeting Minutes;
all of 2008 and first two quarters of 2009
- Special LORT CRC Meeting Minutes; 1/23/2009
- TQ-AA-150; Operator Training Programs; Revision 2
- TQ-AA-150-F07; Simulator Evaluation Form - STA or IA
- TQ-AA-150-F08; Simulator Evaluation Form - Individual
- TQ-AA-150-F09; Simulator Evaluation Form - Crew
- TQ-AA-210-5101; Training Observation Forms; dated various
- TQ-AA-306; Simulator Management
- TQ-AA-306-F06; BWR Critical Condition for Cold Startup; Revision 0
- TQ-AA-306-F07; BWR Power Coefficient of Reactivity and Control Rod Worth; Revision 0
- TQ-AA-306-F08; BWR Xenon Worth; Revision 0
- TQ-AA-306-F06; BWR Site Specific Shutdown Margin and Reactivity Anomaly Tests
- TQ-AA-306-JA-02; Simulator Testing Report Update
- Differences between the Quad Cities Simulator and Quad Cities U-1 & U-2; Revision 14;
7/17/09
- Differences between the Quad Cities Simulator and Quad Cities U-1 & U-2; Revision 15;
9/29/09
- LS-AA-126-1005; Attachment 2; Check-In Self-Assessment Report Template
- LS-AA-126-1001; Attachment 2; FASA Self-Assessment Report
- Simulator Malfunction Test Procedure, Grid Frequency Disturbance (ED16)
- Simulator Malfunction Test Procedure, Reactor Building Instrument Air System (IA02)
- Simulator Malfunction Test Procedure, Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure (MS01)
- Quad Cities Simulator Malfunction Testing Schedule; Revision 8; 5/5/2008
- Simulator Transient Tests; dated various
- Safety System Functional Failure, Rolling Twelve Months Unit 1 and Unit 2; 9/28/09
- Action Request Reports; various dates for LORT 2009
- LORT Attendance Sheets; 2009
3 Attachment
Section 1R12
- Enterprise Maintenance Rule Production Database for the following systems:
- Z2900; Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump
- Z4700; Instrument Air
- System Engineer Notebook and Accountability Logs for the following systems:
- Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump
- Instrument Air
- IR 712670; Safe shutdown makeup pump failed surveillance; 12/17/07
- IR 713041; Broken SSMP part not found during repairs; 12/18/07
- IR 711934; SSMP Suction line did not fill during fill; 12/14/07
- IR 712059; SSMP fails to sustain flow and pressure; 12/15/07
- IR 731013; SSMP Sparking on Startup; 2/4/08
- IR 729984; SSMP failed operability test per TIC-1982; 2/1/08
- IR 729951; SSMP Local FIC failed PMT; 1/31/08
- IR 734472; MRULE A-1 determination for SSMP required; 2/11/08
- IR 741838; SSMP feed breaker problems during system restoration; 2/27/08
- IR 787063; Local SSMP flow controller not reading correctly; 6/16/08
- IR 890904; SSMP controller connector degraded; 3/10/09
- IR 930013; Historical FME identified in SSMP piping inspection; 6/10/09
- IR 956294; SSMP FIC Valve position discrepancy with local valve indication; 8/21/09
- IR 947201; FPI - SSMP Breaker and fuse coordination for CT-2; 7/29/08
- IR 1003024; SSMP Draws a vacuum when starting for PMT; 12/09/09
- IR 1002036; Drain valve for SSMP room cooler may be blocked; 12/06/09
- IR 991490; NCV 09-006-02 Closure package - SSMP Breaker coordination 11/10/09
- IR 673268; 1B Instrument Air Compressor Excessive Leakage; 9/20/07
- IR 762652; 1A Instrument Air Compressor Trip; 04/12/08
- IR 856509; Red Trend Code for 1/2B Instrument Air Compressor - EC 364602
- IR 871161; 1A Instrument Air Compressor Trip; 01/24/09
- IR 871939; 1A Instrument Air Compressor Trip; 01/26/09
- IR 977823; 1A Instrument Air Compressor Tripped Due to Low Oil Pressure; 2/7/09
- IR 936122; Compressor does not auto start; 6/27/09
Section 1R13
- WO #01075655; EM Perform Boroscope INSP of MO 1-1001-16A MOV
- WO #01120751; EM MOV 1-1001-37A MOV EQ Inspection
- WO #01123089; MM Inspect/Clean 1B RHR Pump Seal Cooler
- WO #01131318; EM Votes Test MOV 1-1001-16A
- WO #01190642; MM U-1A RHR HX Room Cooler Air/Water Side Clean Inspect
Section 1R15
- IR 849245; 1B RHR Room Cooler Heat Exchanger Has Tube Sheet Pitting
- WO 862709; 1B RHR Air/Water Side Room CLR CLN/INSP
- IR 987904; 1A RHR Room Cooler Heat Exchanger Tube Sheet Has Pitting
- WO 01190642; MM U-1A RHR HX Room Cooler Air/Water Side Clean Inspect
4 Attachment
- IR 849681; 1B RHR Room Cooler Reassembled at Risk
- EC 373177; Determination of Minimum Wall Thickness of Tubesheet for RHR Room
Cooler 1-574B
- IR 994823; TS SR 3.8.4.8 Frequency Not Met
- QC-SURV-01; Risk Assessment for Missed Surveillance for U2 125 Vdc Battery
Section 1R19
- QCMMS 4100-32; 1/2 -4101A Diesel Driven Fire Pump Annual Capacity Test; Revision 24
- WO 1261246; Replace Battery Changeover Relay R12 EC 376690
- EC 376690; 1/2 A Fire Pump Controller Replace Battery Changeover Relay R12; Revision 1
- QCOS 4100-01; Monthly Diesel Fire Pump Test; Revision 28
- QCOP 4100-03; Diesel Fire Pump Operation; Revision 17
- QCMMS 4100-33; 1/2 - 4101B Diesel Driven Fire Pump Annual Capacity Test; Revision 24
- WO 1121775; 250 Vdc Battery Charger #2 4 Hour Load Test
- WO 1130534; Control RM HVAC Air Filter Unit In Place DOP LK Test
- QCOS 5750-02; Control Room Emergency Filter System Test; Revision 45
- QCIS 5700-04; Main Control Room Air Filter Unit DOP-Freon Test; Revision 0
- QCOS 6600-17; Operating Cycle Diesel Cooling Water Pump Alternate Power Feed Test for
Appendix R; Revision 15
- QCEPM 0400-15; Emergency Diesel Generator Transfer Panel Inspection; Revision 9
- WO 01107582; Replace Unit 2 DGCWP Alternate Feed Contactor
Section 1R22
- QCOS 1400-01; Quarterly Core Spray System Flow Rate Test; Revision 38
- QCOS 1400-07; Core Spray Pump Performance Test; Revision 10
- QCOS 7500-05; Standby Gas Treatment System Monthly Operability Test; Revision 30
- QCIS 0300-02; Unit 1 Division 1 Scram Discharge Volume Rochester Instruments Calibration
and Functional Test; Revision 09
- QCOS 1600-07, Revision 027; Reactor Coolant Leakage in the Drywell
- QCEMS 0230-11; Modified Performance Test of Unit 1(2) 125 Vdc Normal or Alternate
Battery; Revision 0
- QCOS 6900-02; Station Safety Related Battery Quarterly Surveillance; Revision 33
- QCOP 6900-24; Transfer of Unit 2 125 Vdc Battery Bus Between Normal and Alternate
Battery; Revision 12
- QCOS 6900-14; Station Battery Allowable Value Verification Surveillance; Revision 13
Section 1EP4
- Quad Cities Station Radiological Emergency Plan Annex; Revisions 25, 26, and 27
Section 1EP6
- EP-AA-1006; Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station; Revision 27
- Quad Cities Generating Station 2009 Termination and Recovery Drill Briefing Package;
December 2, 2009
- EP-AA-115; Termination and Recovery; Revision 7
- EP-AA-111-F-01; Termination/Recovery Checklist; Revision A
5 Attachment
Section 4OA1
- CY-QC-120-724; Continuous Liquid Effluent Analysis; Revision 1
- CY-QC-120, 723; Allocation of Radioactive Liquid Discharges; Revision 0
- CY-QC-120-720; Plant Effluent Dose Calculations; Revision 4
- CY-QC-120-725; Gaseous Release of Tritium Calculation; Revision 1
- Cy-QC-120-726; Fe-55, Sr-89, Sr-90 and Gaseous Alpha Release; Revision 3
- NEI 99-02; Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6
- Enterprise Maintenance Rule Production Database for the following systems:
- Z2300; High Pressure Coolant Injection System
- Z1000; Residual Heat Removal System
- Z6600; Diesel Generator System
- Z1300; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
- Z9700; 345 kV Switchyard
- System Engineer Notebook and Accountability Logs for the following systems:
Section 4OA2Q
- IR 984769; Well Broke Off TI in Diesel Generator Coolant System
- WO 1198663; U-2 EDG Eng Temp Indicator TI-2-6641-8205 Not Working
- WO 1280197; Well Broke Off TI In U2 Diesel Generator Coolant System
- SM-AA-300; Procurement Engineering Support Activities; Revision 5
- IR 624645; Flood Emergency Pump Testing Documentation; 05/02/07
- IR 638004; Clarify UFSAR 3.4.1.1 Required Flow Rate to SFP During Flood; 06/07/07
- IR 738335; NCV 07-005-02 GR NCV & X-cutting WRT External Flooding Event; 02/19/08
- IR 921197; Inappropriate ACIT Closure of Darley Pump NCV; 05/18/09
- IR 927463; Request For Darley Pump Testing in On-line Schedule; 06/03/09
- IR 966501; Darley Pump Leaking Gasoline from the Fuel Pump; 09/17/09
- IR 968809; Adequacy of Preventative Maintenance on Darley Pump; 09/22/09
- WO 01247374; Darley Pump Baseline Testing; 9/17/09
- QCOA 0010-16; Flood Emergency Procedure; Revision 12
- QCMMS 1500-12; Portable Emergency Flood Pump Capacity Test; Revision 0
- QCOP 4100-19; Emergency Portable Pump Operations; Revision 7
- PMID/RQ 164250; Perform Maintenance on the External Portable Pump; 09/17/09
Section 4OA3
- 10 Medical Files for Licensed Operators; Various Dates
- Licensee Event Report 254/09-003; Failure of RHR Torus Spray Isolation Valve Due to
Declutch Mechanism Problems; 8/3/09
- IR 928048; MO 1-1001-37B Failed to Open During QCOS 1000-09; 6/4/09
- IR 924666; 1-1001-7C Will Not Open; 5/28/09
- OP-AA-103-105; Limitorque Motor-operated Valve Operations; Revision 1
6 Attachment
Section 4OA7
- AR 933472, Service Water Effluent Radiation Monitor Inoperable; 6/20/09
7 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AC Alternating Current
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System
ACIT Action Tracking Item
CAP Corrective Action Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DGCWP Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump
EAL Emergency Action Level
EC Engineering Change
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IP Inspection Procedure
IR Issue Report
IST Inservice Test
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report
LORT Licensed Operator Requalification Training
MO Motor Operator
MOV Motor Operated Valve
MSPI Mitigating System Performance Index
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSBLD Non-Safety Below Level of Design Detail
OP Operations
OPEX Operating Experience
ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
PARS Publicly Available Records
PI Performance Indicator
PM Planned or Preventative Maintenance
PMT Post Maintenance Test
RETS Radiological Effluent Technical Specification
RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water
SAT Systems Approach to Training
SDP Significance Determination Process
SSC Systems, Structures, and Components
TI Temperature Indicator
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved Item
Vdc Volt direct current
WO Work Order
8 Attachment
C. Pardee -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark A. Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000254/2009005; 05000265/2009005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\1-Secy\1-Work In Progress\QUA 2009005.doc
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl
"E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII E RIII
NAME MRing:cms
DATE 01/27/2010
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Letter to C. Pardee from M. Ring dated January 27, 2010
SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2009005; 05000265/2009005
DISTRIBUTION:
Susan Bagley
RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2 Resource
RidsNrrPMQuad Cities
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Cynthia Pederson
DRPIII
DRSIII
Patricia Buckley
ROPreports Resource