IR 05000443/1993010
| ML20045D895 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1993 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045D894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-93-10, NUDOCS 9306300182 | |
| Download: ML20045D895 (17) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Number:
93-10 Docket No.:
50-443 i
License No.:
NPF-86 Licensee:
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Facility:
Seabrook Station Dates:
May 11 - June 14,1993 Inspectors:
Noel Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector Richard Laura, Resident Inspector b ZE!93 Approved By:
e
/ Datd ohn F. Rogge, Chief h l
Reactor Projects Section 43, DRP Insoection Summary: This inspection report documents the safety inspections conducted during day shift and back shift hours. The inspections assessed station performance in the
areas of plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance and surveillance, engineering and
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technical support, security, and safety assessment and quality verification.
i Results: North Atlantic operated the facility safely. Licensee event reports described three violations for inadequate testing of reactor coolant system temperature detectors. The violations were not cited based on the low safety significance of the testing errors, and the licensee identifying and correcting the inadequate test methodology. See executive summary for assessment of performance.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I
SEABROOK STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-443\\93-10 Qoerations: Operators exhibited a proper safety perspective during power operations, a reactor trip, and reactor startup. However, operator errors caused two unnecessary safety j
system actuations. Plant management exhibited a proper safety perspective by aggressively resolving emergent safety issues before restarting the plant. Operators responded well to small secondary plant steam leaks by promptly isolating the affected components.
Radiolonical Controls: Health physics (HP) personnel conducted routine activities well. HP technicians' poor judgement, in assuming a spill from the steam generator blowdown sample j
sink was not contaminated, resulted in eight workers becoming slightly contaminated.
Subsequent HP actions prevented the spread of contamination.
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l Maintenance / Surveillance: Maintenance technicians were experienced and used good procedural adherence. Poor work practices contributed to the failure to identify and determine the cause of a bent valve position indication actuator arm on a main steam isolation valve. During the second refueling outage, a technician's failure to comply with programmatic procedures contributed to the installation of an incorrect positioner for an atmospheric steam dump valve.
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Operators, maintenance technicians, and technical support engineers demonstrated excellent understanding of surveillance requirements while successfully completing surveillance procedures.
Security: The security force performed routine activities well. Licensee's actions taken in response to a fitness-for-duty (FFD) failure conformed with the FFD program.
Eneineerine/ Technical Support: The technical support and engineering staffs effectively j
supported plant operations.
Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification: North Atlantic's indegndent review team conducted a thorough review of the weaknesses in the corrective action program and developed comprehensive recommendations. Audits of technical specification compliance and corrective action program timeliness were self-critical and directed toward improving organizational performance. Quality control inspectors provided aggressive coverage of maintenance activities.
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EX ECUTIVE S U M M AR Y....................................... il 1.0 OPERATIONS (71707, 92700, 92701, 93702).....................
I 1.1 Plant Activities.........................
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1.2 Routine Plant Operations..............................
i 1.3 Reactor Trip.............................
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1.4 Plant Restart Activities...............................
1 2.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROIE (71707).........................
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2.1 Rou ti n e Tou rs.....................................
2.2 Personnel Contaminations..............................
l 3.0 MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE (61726, 62703, 92701)
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3.1 M ai n te nance......................................
l Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch....................
Atmospheric Steam Dump Positioner.......................
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3.2 S u rveillan ce......................................
4.0 SECURITY (71707)
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5.0 ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT (71707)
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j 6.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707,40500,92702).. I1 l
6.1 Corrective Action Program.............................
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l 6.2 Nuclear Safety and Assessment Audits...................... 12
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6.3 Review of Licensee Event Reports........................ 12
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7.0 M EETI NG S (30702).....................................
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DETAILS 1.0 OPERATIONS (71707, 92700, 92701, 93702)
1.1 Plant Activities At the beginning of the period, the reactor was operating at 100% power. On May 20, the operators manually tripped the reactor due to decreasing steam generator water levels caused by a main steam isolation valve slow closure. The operators brought the reactor critical on May 21, and reached full power on May 24.
l 1.3 Routine Plant Operations The inspector conducted daily control room tours, observed shift turnovers, attended the morning s.ation manager's meeting, and monitored plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspector reviewed plant staffing, safety system valve lineups, and compliance with technical
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specification requirements. The inspector conducted tours of the primary auxiliary building,
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the emergency diesel generator rooms, the residual heat removal vauks, the turbine building,
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the condensate storage tank building, and the service water pump house. During the tours and attendance at the various meetings, the inspector noted good performance by the operations staff.
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Opwtors removed the 'C' and 'D' moisture separator reheaters (MFRs) from service due to l
a small steam leak in a weld on the 'C' MSR drain tank bottom level tree tap. Maintenance technicians ground out a crack in the weld and completed a weld repair. North Atlantic had
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an ongoing review in process to identify the failure mode of similar MSR drain tank butt welds. Operators placed the 'C' and 'D' MSRs back into service.
The inspector identified that the operators did not log the return to service of the MSRs in the unit journal. The inspector also reviewec auxiliary operator (AO) logs, which were generally l
complete and accurate. The inspector identified a few minor AO log discrepancies similar to log discrepancies documented in Section 1.3 of NRC Inspection Report 50-443/93-05. The inspector discussed the log discrepancies with the operations department manager. The
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manager initiated further corrective actions including additional shift training sessions and a review of the program requirements to identify areas in need of improvements. The inspector
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assessed that the previous corrective actions taken to improve log entries were less than fully effective.
The licensee identified two steam leaks in the 'A' heater drain pump discharge header.
While at 100% reactor power, the operators secured and isolated the pump in accordance with Procedure ON1040.04, " Heater Drain and Feedwater Heater Vent Operation." As a precaution to ensure adequate feed pump suction pressure, the operators placed the third condensate pump in service before securing the heater drain pump. The inspector noted that plant management exhibited a proper safety perspective by promptly removing the pump from service.
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2 Quality control inspectors performed an inspection to identify the source of the steam leaks.
One leak originated from a titreaded pipe plug installed in an unused test connection on the pump discharge piping. The plug had loosened causing steam leakage. The maintenance staff seal welded a new plug in the test connection. A second leak originated at the bottom of the pump discharge head. North Atlantic identified the leak as a 6.35 centimeters [2.5 inches] long longitudinal subsurface manufacturing flaw. The maintenance staff ground out the flaw and completed a weld repair.
When performing a routine surveillance test, the operators identified that a half inch, solenoid operated, pressurizer liquid sample line containment isolation valve, RC-V2831, did not meet
the acceptance criteria. When operators opened the valve, the position indication light beside the control switch indicated open, while the position indicating light on the main control
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board indicated closed. The inspector verified that the operators entered the proper technical
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specification action statements.
Instrument and control (I&C) technicians entered the containment to repair the valve position indication but were unsuccessful. Plant management decidw to cut out the valve and weld in The inspector reviewed the tagging order that relied, in part, on single valve a new one.
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protection. The inspector verified that the operators adhered to the general tagging requirements contained in MA 4.2, " Equipment Tagging and Isolation," concerning use of single valve isolation on high energy piping systems. The maintenance technicians replaced the valve. The inspector reviewed the post maintenance tests that included a local leak rate test, a non-destructive examination of the welds, an operational pressure test, timing of valve closure, and a valve position indication verification. The inspector assessed that the operators performed well by identifying the problem, by supporting the troubleshooting process, and by
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entering the applicable technical specification action statements.
The inspector concluded that merators exhibited a proper safety perspective during response to minor steam leaks and eq r ~nt failures. The operators demonstrated sound knowledge of and proper compliance w icel specification requirements. The inspector identified 4 9 continuing minor deficiencies it. e grating logs.
1.3 Reactor Trip
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On May 20, the operators manually tripped the reactor due to decreasing steam generator water levels resulting from the slow closure of the 'D' main steam isolation valve (MSIV).
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The inspector observed the post trip review team's discussions with the operating crew and portions of the troubleshooting activities. The inspector reviewed the post trip review package that included a sequence of events, a root cause analysis, and a human performance evaluation system (HPES) review. The inspector reviewed the MSIV surveillance procedure c.nd walked down the MSIV test panel. The inspector discussed the event with operations department management and operators.
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The slow closure resulted from a component failure in the MSIV actuator during the performance of a quarterly surveillance test. The plant equipment responded properly to the reactor trip. The emergency feedwater system automatically started on a steam generator low-low water level actuation signal caused by the shrink in the steam generators. The operators followed the emergency operating procedures, stabilized plant conditions, and supported the subsequent troubleshooting activities.
The MSIV test circuitry is designed to stroke the MSIV 10% in the closed direction and then fully open the valve. During the test, the 'D' MSIV reached the 10% closed position and over the next four minutes continued to the full closed position. Control room operators tried to stop the MSIV from closing by pressing the associated 'A' and 'B' train MSIV test buttons several times, and by placing the 'D' MSIV control switch in the open position. When the
'D' steam generator water level approached the low-low level reactor trip setpoint, the shift superintendent ordered the operators to trip the reactor.
When executing the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) after the reactor trip, an operator communications error caused an unnecessary emergency feedwater system ar.omatic actuation. The unit shift superintendent (USS) directed the control room operator to open the feedwater isolation valves and feed the steam generators using the start-up feed pu:np. The control room operator did not hear the USS and the feedwater isolation valves remained shut.
When the operators secured the running emergency feedwater pump by procedure, the steam generator water levels decreased until the emergency feedwater system actuated. The operators identified the closed feedwater isolation valves and followed the EOPs to restore a normal feedwater lineup.
The technical support and maintenance staff determined that the 'D' MSIV closed due to a malfunctioning solenoid operated valve on the MSIV actuator. North Atlantic replaced two solenoid valves and returned the failed valve to the vendor for analysis.
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The HPES review concluded that operators performed well by identifying the MSIV slow closure and by manually tripping the reactor before any automatic actions. The evaluation determined that the unnecessary emergency feedwater actuation resulted from poor communications.
The inspector assessed that the operators quickly identified the MSIV slow closure and responded properly by manually tripping the reactor. An unnecessary second automatic emergency feedwater initiation resulted from operator error. The North Atlantic post trip review thoroughly evaluated the reactor trip and the operator error.
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1.4 Plant Restart Activities Plant management resolved several emergent safety issues before authorizing plant restart.
The plant staff replaced circuit breakers in two non-safety related power panels located inside containment in response to concerns raised by an NRC electrical distribution safety functional inspection.
North Atlantic addressed the issues of NRC Bulletin No. 93-02, " Debris Plugging Of i
Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers," dated May 11, 1993. The bulle. tin discusses the potential for containment cooling units fibrous filter material becoming dislodged and clogging the emergency core cooling suction strainers during a loss of coolant accident.
d North Atlantic removed the containment coolers inlet filters and eliminated the potential concerns discussed in the bulletin.
The plant staff performed an operability determination on a 10 CFR Part 21 report issued by Limitorque Corporation on May 13, 1993. The report identified that motor actuator starting torque decreases with increasing temperature tnereby decreasing actuator output torque. The preliminary operability determination identified that there is sufficient margin available to bound the conditions identified in the Part 21 report.
With one exception, the operators returned the unit to full power in a cautious and coatrolled manner. While transferring from the bypass valves to the feedwater regulating valves, at approximately 15% reactor power, an automatic feedwater isolation occurred due to a high steam generator water level in the 'B' steam generator. The feedwater isolation signal tripped the turbine and the feed pumps, started the start-up feed pump, and closed the feedwater isolation valves. The operators lowered the reactor to 2.5% power, which is within the capacity of the start-up feed pump, and restored steam generator water level. North Atlantic made a 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC to report the engineered safety feature actuation.
The inspector responded to the site and discussed the event with the reactor operator stationed at the feed controls. The operator had successfully transferred control to the feedwater regulating valves several times in the past. The operator stated that he opened the ' A' main feed regulating valve too far, which caused the 'A' steam generator water level to increase.
When the operator took manual control of the 'B', 'C', and 'D' steam generators feedwater regulating valves, the water levels decreased. A second operator, who began to assist the feed station operator, recovered level in the three steam generators too quickly. The addition of cold water to the three steam generators increased reactor power causing a swell in the 'A'
steam generator. The swell caused water level in the 'A' steam generator to exceed the feedwater isolation setpoin. - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _.
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The inspector observed the initial management response to the unnecessary isolation and reviewed the event evaluation report. The feedwater regulating valve controls and indications at low power levels are sluggish. The operating procedure does not adequately develop the precautions and methodology for transferring from the bypass valves to the feedwater regulating valves. The feed station operator did not inform the unit shift superintendent or other crew members of the difficulties encountered in contmiling steam generator water level.
The operators indicated that the simulator controls for the feedwater regulating valves respond differently than the actual controls.
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the off-going crew and briefed the on-coming crew on the event. The operations department l
personnel planned to enhance the operatint justructions to include additional guidance for l
operating the feedwater regulating valves.
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The inspector assessed that plant management exhibited a proper safety perspective by
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aggressively resolving emergent safety issues before restarting the unit. When an operator l
error caused an unnecessary automatic feedwater isolation, North Atlantic thoroughly analyzed the error and developed detailed corrective actions.
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2.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)
2.1 Routine Tours During routine tours of the plant, the inspector observed proper radiological controls implemented by personnel entering, exiting, and working in the radiological controlled area.
i The inspector verified proper postings for radiation and contaminated area, calibration of radiological monitoring equipment, and locking of high radiation area doors. The inspector determined that health physics personnel conducted routine activities well.
2.2 Personnel Contaminations On May 12, approximately 75 liters [20 gallons] of water spilled from the secondary sample sink onto the floor of the primary auxiliary building. A utility maintenance worker saw the spill and identified the cause as a crimp in a short tygon tube extending from the end of the hard piped drain line. Eight workers became contaminated while identifying, stopping, and cleaning up the spill.
The inspector discussed the contamination event with the health physics (HP) department supervisor, observed the initial corrective actions taken by HP technicians, and reviewed the l
eight personnel contamination reports.
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The HP technicians and utilities workers treated the spill as ntn-contaminated due to previous experience. Steam generator blowdown sample lines continually flow to the sample sink and occasionally overflow the sink. However, in this event, primary coolant How leaking by chemical and volume control system component vent lines mixed with the sample sink flow in the common hard pipe drain line and over00wed the sample sink.
The HP technicians recognized a problem when people leaving the radiological controlled area began alarming the exit monitors. Eight people were contaminated before HP technicians realized the spill consisted of contaminated water. The two utilities workers, who cleaned up the spill with mops and buckets, and a chemist, who cleaned up the sample sink, received skin contamination up to 2000 corrected counts per minute (ccpm) per 20 centimeters squoted (cm2). HP technicians decontaminated the three workers to below background levels. Five other workers received clothes or shoe contamination.
The HP technicians cordoned off the contaminated Door in the primary auxiliary building and surveyed the exit routes from the contaminated area to the control point. Although the HP technicians found no contamination, utility workers wet mopped the exit routes. Workers decontaminated the Door below the sample sink and the sample sink. The highest contamination levels found were 25,000 ccpm per 100 cm2 behind the sample sink panel. An HP supervisor initiated a radiation occurrence report.
Construction workers installed minor modification 91-516 that separated the sample sink drain
'line from the chemical and volume control system component vent lines. The minor modification redirected the steam generator sample line purge water to a Door drain in the boric acid tank room. Leakage by the chemical and volume control component vent lines drained through the original hard pipe to a floor drain in the primary sample room.
The inspector concluded that the HP technicians used poor judgement in assuming the spill was not contaminated. The inspector noted that the HP supervisor's actions, taken, after identifying contaminated personnel, prevented the spread of contamination and ensured the removal of skin contaminations.
3.0 MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE (61726, 62703, 92701)
3.1 Maintenance The inspector attended morning planning meeting held by the different maintenance departments, reviewed work request packages, and observed the following maintenance activities:
93WR1421 Installing Temporary Gauge on DG-B Air Receivers 93WR1338 Installing MMOD 91-516 Reroute Drain Line From Steam Generator Sample Sink 93WR1276 Perform Corrective Maintenance On Control Room A/C Compressor y
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93WR1299 Drain Oil From Control Room A/C Compressor 'B'
93WR1373 Repair Control Room A/C Compressor 'A'
93RM2236601 Replace EDG Rocker Arm Lubricating Oil Duplex Oil Strainer 93RM2237101 Replace EDG Fuel Oil Duplex Oil Strainer 93RM1792501 Inspection and PM 480 Volt Molded Case Circuit Breakers The inspector verified that tagging orders provided proper mechanical and electrical isolation, configuration control was maintained, torque wrenches were properly calibrated, and replacement parts met the procurement specifications. The inspector determined that technicians properly verified procedure acceptance criteria and post maintenance test results.
Quality control inspectors monitored work activities, discussed areas of minor concerns with maintenance workers, and documented their observations. The inspector assessed the maintenance technicians were experienced and used good procedural adherence.
Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch The inspector observed instrument and control (I&C) technicians troubleshoot and repair the limit switches on 'B' main steam isolation valve (MSIV) MS-V88. The associated 'A' and
'B' train 10% closed lights remained lit during a 10% valve closure test. The technicians used work request package 93WR1476 to conduct the troubleshooting and repairs. A quality control (QC) inspector and I&C supervisor monitored the work.
The I&C technicians inspected the 'A' train 10% closed limit switch,1-MS-ZS-88A-2, and identified that the actuator arm roller did not contact the striker plate that is threaded onto the valve stem. The technicians adjusted the actuator arm to allow the roller to contact the striker plate. The QC inspector noticed that the limit switch actuator arm was bent, causing the actuator arm roller edge to contact the striker plate. The QC inspector stated that the bend in the arm could have caused the limit switch misalignment and raised the concern to the I&C supervisor. After contacting the system engineer, the I&C supervisor indicated that the condition was acceptable because the edge of the roller still contacted the striker plate.
After discussions with the inspector, the QC inspector again expressed his concern to the I&C supervisor. The I&C supervisor had the bent arm removed and straightened. After I&C technicians reinstaller' the arm and reset the limit switch, the actuator arm roller fully contacted the striker plate.
The technicians inspected the 'B' train 10% closed limit switch,1-MS-ZS-888-2, and identified that the actuator arm roller did not contact the striker plate due to a loose operating lever pipe plug. The plug threads into the limit switch shaft, causes the shaft to expand, and secures the shaft to the actuator arm. The I&C technicians speculated that the plug had never been tightened because a blue coating on the plug threads remained unblemished. The technicians also identified a loose locking allen set screw on the split hub lever assembly.
The technicians adjusted the limit switch, installed a new pipe plug, and verified the pipe plug and faskners on the other three MSIVs were tight.
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The inspector discussed the limit switch repair with the QC supervisor. The supervisor indicated that the QC inspector had identified three maintenance findings that would be documented in two quality assurance inspection reports. North Atlantic initiated an operational information report to evaluate how the arm plug became loose and how the lever
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The inspector assessed that the failure of the I&C maintenance personnel to identify, fix, and determine the cause of the bent actuator arm and the failure to tighten the pipe plug indicated
poor maintenance practices. The inspector noted that the quality control department's questioning of the maintenance work assured proper repair of the limit switch.
Atmospheric Steam Dump Positioner I&C technicians replaced the 'D' atmospheric steam dump valve Bailey positioner on November 1,1992, near the end of the second refueling outage. The new model positioner did not have the auto / hand lever feature of the original positioner. In February 1993, operators noticed the missing auto / hand lever feature and developed a special procedure for taking local control of the valve. On April 29,1993, technicians replaced the positioner with the correct model of the Bailey positioner that had an auto / hand lever.
The inspector discussed the installation of the incorrect positioner with I&C, technical
support, engineering, and material requirements personnel. The inspector reviewed l
operational information report 93-011, minor modification (MMOD) 92-0507, work requests 92WR4256 and 93WR0459, control loop diagrams, and detailed installation prints for the atmospheric steam dump valve actuator system.
Construction workers installed the original positioners as non-safety related components.
MMOD 92-0507 stated that the positioners did not affect the safety related control of the atmospheric steam dump valves and removed the positioners from the environmental qualification program.
The atmospheric steam dump valve vendor, Control Components Inc. (CCI), supplied the wrong moden of Bailey positioner to North Atlantic. CCI had removed the Bailey part number from the positioner and had labeled the positioner with the component number specified in the vendor manual. Since the positioner was not safety-related, receipt inspectors checked the part number, waived the receipt inspection, and issued the positioner to the I&C technicians. The I&C technician, who acted as a temporary man-in-charge, completed a like-for-like check and noticed the difference in the new component. The technician called the material requirement department (MRD), but did not document the problem in the work request or require an MRD evaluation of the new positioner as required by Procedure MA 3.1, Section 4.1.2.2.4, " Material Control."
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The MRD has written a non-conformance report against the incorrectly supplied positioner.
The MRD plans to review the receipt inspection manual to identify changes that could prevent a similar problem. Engineering began an evaluation of the non-conforming component for 10 CFR Part 21 reportability. The I&C department supervisor plans to review the incorrect installation with his department und stress the need for better documentation of work requests so that an adequate review of potential problems can be performed by supervisors.
The inspector concluded that the installation of the incorrect positioner resulted from poor work practices. The I&C technicians did not require MRD to prepare a written evaluation of the differences between the positioners as required by procedures, and did not document the differences in the work package. As a result, supervisory review of the work package did not identify the procurement problem. The inspector determined that plant safety was not degraded since safety-related components were unaffected and operators could take local control of the atmospheric steam dump valves.
3.2 Surveillance The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance or special test activities.
OX 1426.05 D/G 1B Monthly Operability Surveillance LX 0563.03A RCP Underfrequency Quarterly Surveillance IX 1680.921 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Train A Actuation OX 1436.02 Quarterly Emergency Feedwater Pump Surveillance During performance of surveillance OX 1436.02, I&C technicians vented the recirculation line flow gauge for 45 minutes before operators verified the pump flow rate. The inspector asked the auxiliary operator whether there was sufficient flow through the pump to prevent pump damage. The auxiliary operator was unsure what parameters should be monitored when the flow gauge was unavailable. Technical support engineers stated that the pump could run at shut off head for only a few minutes before pump damage would occur. Before the next performance of the surveillance, technical support engineers plan to evaluate what parameters or indications could be used to assure sufficient pump flow.
The inspector noted good control of the surveillance activities and excellent cooperation between departments. The inspector concluded that the operators, maintenance technicians, and technical support engineers demonstrated an excellent understanding of surveillance requirements while successfully completing surveillance procedures.
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4.0 SECURITY (71707)
The inspector toured the protected area, observed security guards on patrol, and monitored activities in the secondary alarm station. The inspector observed the security staff check intrusion systems and control a chlorine truck inside the protected area. The security force monitored people and packages entering the protected area. The inspector assessed that the security force conducted routine activities well.
A North Atlantic supervisor failed a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The individual had a 0.04% blood alcohol content, which exceeded the FFD program limit. Neither the individual's supervisor nor the security staff noticed any behavioral abnormalities before the FFD test failure. North Atlantic suspended the individual's site access for two weeks and
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entered the individual in the employee assistance program. Although the supervisor was not
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directly involved in safety related activities, North Atlantic reviewed the individual's work and identified no problems. North Atlantic made a report to the NRC according to 10 CFR 26.73(a)(2). The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by North Atlantic and determined that the actions were in accordance with the FFD program.
5.0 ENGINEERING /TECIINICAL SUPPORT (71707)
The inspector observed technical support participation in the plant manager's morning
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meetings and in meetings between engineering, licensing, and maintenance that concerned l
plant ventilation effects on safety equipment operability. The inspector reviewea the post trip review team report and the control room temporary modification log. The inspector observed technical support engineers participate in the repairs of the steam leaks in the heater drain pump discharge header.
The technical support staff prepared a detailed troubleshooting plan for identifying the failure mechanism for the MSIV slow closure, which led to a reactor trip. Technical support personnel led the event evaluation team review of the reactor trip and the event evaluation of feedwater isolation event that occurred during plant restart.
The inspector determined that the proper safety reviews were performed for temporary modifications. The inspector observed good performance by technical support and engineering personnel. The inspector concluded that the technical support staff effectively
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supported plant operations.
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6.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707,40500,92702)
6.1 Corrective Action Program Due to audit and surveillance findings dating from 1989, North Atlantic requested a third party audit of the corrective action program in May of 1992. Because of the third party report, the independent review team formed a corrective action task force, which issued a report on May 12, 1993.
The inspector reviewed the task force report, and met with the director of quality programs and the independent review team manager. The corrective action task force evaluated corrective action program requirements, North Atlantic programs, and other utility corrective action programs. The task force determined that North Atlantic's corrective action process resolved most issues requiring corrective action. However, the task force identified numerous programmatic weaknesses and opportunities for improving the North Atlantic corrective action system.
The task force noted that regulatory requirements, industry standards, and Seabrook commitments do not clearly define management expectations or the phrase "significant conditions adverse to quality." The present North Atlantic corrective action program consists of seven different programs and 21 different documents used to report and resolve problems.
The task force concluded that the numerous specialized programs work independently with no programmatic tie to a cohesive system.
The task force proposed four options to address the identified weaknesses and recommended the option for a single centralized corrective action program. Problems below the defined threshold for a condition advelse to quality would be handled by existing programs. A corrective action review committee, consisting of a multi-discipline team of individuals, would facilitate the implementation of the new program.
The task force lead the effort to revise North Atlantic Management Manual (NAMM) Chapter 12700, " Corrective Action System." North Atlantic plans to phase in the new corrective action program over six months and provide training on the corrective action system.
The inspector noted that the task force completed an extensive review of industry corrective action programs and a thorough evaluation of the present North Atlantic program. The inspector determined that the new program provided a defined process for evaluating the safety or regulatory significance of identified problems.
The inspector concluded that North Atlantic's independent review team conducted a thorough review of the weaknesses in the corrective action program and developed comprehensive recommendations.
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6.2 Nuclear Safety and Assessment Audits The inspector attended the exits for two nuclear safety and assessment group audits, and reviewed the audit reports' observations. By the nuclear safety audit review committee (NSARC) charter, all teams that audit technical specification compliance include an NSARC member.
In one audit, the nuclear safety and assessment group reviewed technical specification Section 6.0, " Administrative Requirements," compliance. Four audit observaions identified the need to revise program procedures to define responsibilities or requirements contained in the technical specifications.
In the second audit, the nuclear safety and assessment group reviewed the timeliness of responses to corrective action program findings. An audit observation noted that responses to findings were not completed by self imposed deadlines. The audit report recommended that the new corrective action program focus on the timeliness of responses and of implementing corrective actions. The audit noted that the completed responses and corrective actions were good. The ensuing discussion between station staff and the auditors included the exchange of ideas and perceptions on the meaning of timeliness and the potential generation of unnecessary paperwork. At the end of the meeting, the quality assurance manager stated he was responsible for the timeliness issue and that the new corrective action program would develop reasonable timeliness goals and meaningful thresholds for reviewing significant conditions.
The inspector noted that the audits were self-critical and strove to improve organizational performance. The inspector assessed that the meeting discussions were open, frank, and indicative of a healthy organization.
6.3 Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed the following licensee event reports (LERs) to verify that they conform to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73. Those requirements include a proper narrative description of the event, the cause of the event, an assessment of the safety consequences, and corrective actions.
Manual Reactor Trip Due To A Loss Of Feedwater. LER 93-01 (Closed)
The inspector documented and assessed this reactor trip event in NRC Special Safety Inspection Report No. 50-443/93-01. The inspector noted that the LER did not contain all the information in the North Atlantic station information report or the NRC inspection report.
Contributing causes to the event not mentioned in the LER included inadequate main control room verification of operator actions, operator system knowledge weaknesses, and training deficiencies. Nevertheless, the inspector concluded that the LER contained a good level of detail, which met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This LER is close ~
Automatic Reactor Trip Due To.An Electrical Fault. LER 93-03 (Closed)
The inspector documented and assessed this reactor trip event in NRC Inspection Report No.
50-443/92-24. North Adantic performed a thorough post trip review. The inspector assessed that the related events section of the LER was an improvement over previously reviewed LERs. The inspector determined that the LER was well written and met the requirements specined in 10 CFR 50.73. This LER is closed.
Missed Chemistry Samole. LER 93-04 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed LER 93-04, which reported a missed chemistry sample due to personnel error. The inspector determined that the event had minor safety significance and the corrective actions listed in the LER were adequate. The inspector assessed that the LER was well written and met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This LER is closed.
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Inadvertent Energization of Two Accumulator Isolation Valves. LER 93-05 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed LER 93-05, which reported the inadvertent energization of two accumulator isolation valves during valve stroke surveillance test. North Atlantic determined the root cause was a control room operator's failure to perform a step in the surveillance procedure. The inspector assessed that the LER met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
This LER is closed.
Delta T/Tavg Protection Channel Ooerational Test. LER 92-19 and Suoplement 1 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed LER 92-19 and Supplement 1, which reported an inadequate loop delta temperature / average loop temperature protection surveillance test methodology. 'Ihe surveillance methodology did not consider the effect of the ohmic value of the decade box on the calibration. North Atlantic identified this deficiency during a review conducted as part of the corrective actions for LER 92-09.
The inadequate test methodology caused a violation of technical specification surveillance requirements 4.3.1.1 (overtemperature and overpower delta temperature channels) and
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4.3.2.1 (feedwater isolation on low average temperature coincident with a reactor trip).
North Atlantic also identified a similar inadequate test methodology used on wide range reactor coolant temperature channels, which caused a violation of technical specification i
surveillance requirement 4.4.9.3.1 (low temperature overpressure protection).
For corrective action, North Atlantic changed the surveillance test procedures to consider the effect of the ohmic value of the test box on the calibrations. North Atlantic completed
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channel calibrations on the affected channels during the second refueling outage using the proper test methodology.
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North Atlantic determined that in the worst case scenario the delta temperature / average temperature protection channel drift caused one instrument to be inoperable. Three channels remained operable to perform the intended safety function. Technical specification requires as a minimum, three operable channels. The low pressure overpressure protection circuit did not experience drift beyond the allowed tolerances. The inspector assessed that the safety significance of the inadequate testing was low.
The inspector assessed that the LER contained the information required by 10 CFR 50.73 and
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clearly defined the root cause and corrective actions. The inadequate test methodology caused three technical specification violations. The violations will not be subject to enforcement action because North Atlantic's efforts in identifying and correcting the violations meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the enforcement policy. This LER is closed.
7.0 MEETINGS (30702)
Two resident inspectors were assigned to Seabrook Station throughout the period. The inspectors conducted back shift inspections on May 12 and 17, and deep back shift inspections on May 13,30, June 6, and 12.
Throughout the inspection, the inspector met with station management to discuss inspection findings. At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector met with the station manager and his staff to discuss the inspection findings and observations. Licensee comments concerning the findings are documented in the applicable sections of this report. No proprietary information was covered within the scope of the inspection. No written material regarding the inspection findings was given to the licensee.
Region based inspectors conducted the following exit meetings during this inspection period.
DATE SUBJECT REPORT NO.
INSPECTOR May 21 EDSFI 93-80 N. DellaGreca June 11 Radiological Controls 93-11 L. Eckert l
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