IR 05000336/2007002

IR 05000336-07-002 & 05000423-07-002, on 01/01/2007 - 03/31/2007; Millstone Power Station, Unit 2 and Unit 3; Surveillance Testing, Problem Identification and Resolution - NRC Integrated Inspection Report

ML071340363
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/14/2007
From:	Paul Krohn Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Christian D Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Dominion Resources
KROHN P, RI/DRP/PB4/610-337-5120
References
IR-07-002
Download: ML071340363 (40)

Text

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2007002 AND 05000423/2007002

Dear Mr. Christian:

On March 31, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Millstone Power Station, Unit 2 and Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 11, 2007, with Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). Both of these findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs), in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.:

Document Control Desk, Washington D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Millstone Power Station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Paul G. Krohn, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-336, 50-423 License Nos.: DPR-65, NPF-49 Enclosure: Inspection Reports 05000336/2007002 and 05000423/2007002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl:

J. A. Price, Site Vice President, Millstone Station C. L. Funderburk, Director, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support D. W. Dodson, Supervisor, Station Licensing L. M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel C. Brinkman, Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company First Selectmen, Town of Waterford B. Sheehan, Co-Chair, NEAC E. Woollacott, Co-Chair, NEAC E. Wilds, Director, State of Connecticut SLO Designee J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control G. Proios, Suffolk County Planning Dept.

R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff G. Winslow, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)

S. Comley, We The People D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)

R. Bassilakis, CAN J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York M. Balboni, Deputy Secy, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, SLO Designee, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000336/2007-002, 05000423/2007-002; 01/01/2007 - 03/31/2007; Millstone Power

Station, Unit 2 and Unit 3; Surveillance Testing, Problem Identification and Resolution The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional inspectors. Two (Green) non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified.

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or may be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A Green self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures, was identified because Dominion did not adequately implement procedures while performing a surveillance to test containment isolation slave relays. This resulted in three containment isolation valves repositioning, which caused pressurizer level to increase above of the normal operating band and an isolation of containment cooling.

Corrective actions for this issue included performing a level one root cause, revising the surveillance procedure to remove a potential human performance error trap, coaching of the individuals involved, and reinforcing good human error prevention techniques to both Maintenance and Operations departments.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in pressurizer level increasing above the TS allowed band and a temporary loss of containment cooling.

The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)through performance of a Phase 1 SDP, in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A,

Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.

Specifically, this finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and that mitigating systems would not be available. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources component, because Dominion did not ensure that the slave relay testing procedure was adequate and complete since the procedure contained details in a permission step that could be incorrectly perceived as an action step. (Section 1R22)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

A Green NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,

Corrective Action, was identified for failure to promptly correct a degraded condition associated with the air conditioning (A/C) for the B61 480 volt alternating current (VAC)iii motor control center (MCC). Corrective actions included the B51 and B61 A/C units, implementation of compensatory cooling, restoring both A/C units by adding freon, and changing the vendor technical manual and equipment drawings to reflect the proper amount of freon charge.

The finding is more than minor because the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and the objective of ensuring the availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable circumstances was affected. Specifically, the 480 VAC MCCs provide vital power to a number of safety-related systems designed to mitigate design basis events. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) through performance of a Phase 1 SDP, in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A,

Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.

Specifically, the finding did not result in a loss of function because the 480 VAC MCCs would have been able to perform their function of providing electrical power to their respective emergency loads over a probablistic risk assessment mission time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution in that Dominion did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the degraded A/C units in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance and complexity of the issue. (Section 4OA5.1)

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

iv

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 26, 2007, Unit 3 reduced power to 30 percent to enter the primary containment to identify and characterize the source of an approximate 0.1 gallon per minute (gpm) increase in reactor coolant system unidentified leakage. On January 28, Dominion performed a reactor shutdown to Mode 3 (hot standby) to repair the leak, which was associated with an isolable flexitalic tube fitting. A reactor startup was performed on January 29, and the reactor was returned to 100 percent power on January

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - Two Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the readiness of Unit 2 and Unit 3 structures containing safety-related equipment for cold weather conditions. The inspection was intended to ensure that Dominion had configured the indicated equipment, instrumentation, and supporting structures in accordance with procedures, and that adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and conducted walkdowns of the systems. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - Four Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns during this inspection period.

The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to determine the correct system alignment. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the critical portions of the selected systems to verify that they were aligned in accordance with the procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that could have an effect on operability.

The inspectors verified that equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events, impact mitigating system availability or function, or affect barrier functions, were identified and resolved.

The following systems were reviewed based on their risk significance for the given plant configuration:

Unit 2 C Emergency Boration System on February 2, 2007; and C #1 Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Control Valve on March 5, 2007.

Unit 3 C Containment Radiation Monitoring System on January 23, 2007; and C Containment Underdrain Sump System on February 21, 2007.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S - One Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a detailed review of the Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)system. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the system to verify that the critical components such as valves, switches, and breakers were aligned in accordance with procedures and to identify any discrepancies that could have an affect on operability.

The inspectors also conducted a review of outstanding maintenance work orders to verify that the deficiencies did not significantly affect the AFW system function. In addition, the inspectors discussed system health with the system engineer and reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q - Fourteen Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed fourteen walkdowns of fire protection areas during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed Dominion's fire protection program to identify the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for the selected areas. The inspectors walked down these areas to assess Dominion's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression systems, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors compared the existing conditions to the fire protection program requirements to ensure all program requirements were being met.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The fire protection areas reviewed included:

Unit 2

• Auxiliary Building, General Area, -45'6" Elevation (Fire Area A-1, Zone A);

• Auxiliary Building, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Pump and Heat Exchanger Area, -25'6" Elevation (Fire Area A-1, Zone B);

• Auxiliary Building, General Area, -5'0" Elevation (Fire Area A-1, Zone G);

• Auxiliary Building, B Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump Room, -45'6" Elevation (Fire Area A-3);

• Auxiliary Building, B High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pump Room, -45'6" Elevation (Fire Area A-4);

• Auxiliary Building, Charging Pump Room, -25'6" Elevation (Fire Area A-6, Zone A);

• Auxiliary Building, Degasifier Area, -25'6" Elevation (Fire Area A-6, Zone B); and

• Auxiliary Building, A Containment Spray and HPSI/LPSI Pump Room, -45'6" Elevation (Fire Area A-8, Zone A).

Unit 3

• Cable Spreading Area, 24'6" Elevation (Fire Area CB-8);

• Base Floor Area of the Turbine Building, 4'7" and 14'6" Elevations (Fire Area TB-2);

• North Floor Area, Auxiliary Building, 4'6" Elevation (Fire Area AB-1, Zone A);

• West Switchgear Area Control Building, 4'6" Elevation (Fire Area CB-1);

• East Switchgear Area Control Building, 4'6" Elevation (Fire Area CB-2); and

• Battery Room 1, 3'8" Elevation (Fire Area CB-3).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - Two Samples)

Internal Flooding Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two samples of flood protection measures for equipment in the areas listed below. This review was conducted to evaluate Dominions protection of the safety-related systems from internal flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area and reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the internal flooding evaluation, and related documents. The inspectors examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk analysis assumptions. The inspectors also interviewed Dominion engineers and other staff. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

Unit 2

• Turbine Building, Zone E3 (Turbine Hall, Elevation 14'6") for Impact on Main Feedwater and DC Switchgear Ventilation.

Unit 3

• Auxiliary Building 4'6", 24'6" and 43'6" Elevations, including the Fuel Building Pipe Chase on Elevation 4'6".

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07B - Three Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Dominions programs for maintenance, testing, and monitoring of risk significant heat exchangers (HXs) to determine if potential HX deficiencies could mask degraded performance, and to assess the capability of the HXs to perform their design functions. The inspectors assessed whether the Millstone Unit 3 HX programs conformed to Dominions commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment." In addition, the inspectors evaluated whether any potential common cause heat sink performance problems could affect multiple HXs in mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. Based on risk significance and prior inspection history, the following HXs were selected:

• Unit 3 A Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System (RPCCW) HX;

• Unit 3 "B" Recirculation Spray System (RSS) HX; and

• Unit 3 "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Intercooler HX.

Each of these HXs transfers its heat load directly to the service water (SW) system. The SW system was designed to supply water from Long Island Sound (the ultimate heat sink) to various heat loads to ensure a continuous flow of cooling water to systems and components necessary for plant safety both during normal operation and under abnormal conditions.

The inspectors reviewed system health reports, HX inspection records, eddy current test results, performance and surveillance test results, as-left HX tube plugging, and design specifications and calculations. The inspectors compared surveillance test and inspection data to the established acceptance criteria to verify that the results were acceptable and that operation was consistent with design.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the methods for controlling biological fouling to verify that the SW hypochlorite injection system was implemented effectively. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of the accessible portions of the selected HXs, the SW system, and the SW hypochlorite injection system to assess the material condition of these systems and components.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CRs) related to the selected heat exchangers and service water systems, to verify that Dominion was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - Two Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training at Unit 2 on February 6, 2007, and at Unit 3 on January 23, 2007. The inspectors verified that the training evaluators had adequately addressed the applicable training objectives, that the operator performance was adequate, and that the evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - Three Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three samples of Dominion's evaluation of degraded conditions involving safety-related structures, systems, and components for maintenance effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed licensee implementation of the Maintenance Rule (MR), 10 CFR 50.65, and verified that the conditions associated with the referenced CRs were appropriately evaluated against applicable MR functional failure criteria as found in licensee scoping documents and procedures. The inspectors discussed these issues with the system engineers and MR coordinators to verify that they were appropriately tracked against each system's performance criteria, and that the systems were appropriately classified in accordance with MR implementation guidance. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following conditions were reviewed:

Unit 2

• Vital Switchgear Emergency Cooling (CR-06-11638).

Unit 3

• Service Water Strainer Pin Arm Welds (CR-07-00086); and

• Service Water System (3326) Classified Maintenance Rule (a)(1) for Strainer Failures and Piping Failures (CR-02-11761).

b. Findings

Unit 2 The inspectors reviewed Dominions MR (a)(1) evaluation for the vital switchgear cooling system following the determination that two air conditioners (A/C-3 B51, and A/C-4 B61)had insufficient refrigerant charge as documented in CR-06-01138, dated November 21, 2006. The evaluation concluded that there was no functional failure because, in accordance with MP-24-MR-FAP710, Maintenance Rule Functional Failures and Evaluations, the failures were considered design deficiencies that could not have been prevented by post-modification testing or predictive maintenance. The inspectors reviewed Dominions MR procedure, CRs, and work orders applicable to the maintenance on the switchgear cooling system. In order to fully understand whether prior opportunities existed to prevent the A/C unit failures, the inspectors will conduct additional interviews and investigation into the maintenance rule and design control processes. As such, this issue remains an unresolved item (URI) pending further NRC investigation into prior A/C unit maintenance practices and review of Dominions maintenance rule and design control processes for these A/C units.

(URI 05000336/2007002-01, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation of Unit 2 Vital Switchgear Emergency Cooling Failure).

Unit 3 No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - Eight

Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed eight samples concerning the adequacy of maintenance risk assessments for emergent and planned activities during the inspection period. The inspectors utilized the Equipment-Out-of-Service quantitative risk assessment tool to evaluate the plant configurations and compared the results to Dominion's stated risk.

The inspectors verified that Dominion entered appropriate risk categories and implemented risk management actions, as necessary. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors verified the conduct and adequacy of scheduled and emergent maintenance risk assessments for plant conditions affected by performance of the following maintenance and testing activities:

Unit 2

• "F" Instrument Air Compressor availability, week of January 1, 2007;

• Spent fuel pool moves and inspection activities on January 22 and 23, 2007;

• A EDG being declared inoperable following a SW leak on January 24, 2007;

• "B" EDG, "C" HPSI check valve in-service testing and "C" charging pump unavailable, yellow risk condition, on February 8, 2007; and

• Unplanned high reactor trip risk due to transmission line outage on February 22, 2007.

Unit 3

• Cumulative work activities on February 1, 2007;

• Failed containment sump pump 3SRW-P5 and unplanned entry into TS action statement 3.6.1.6 on February 21, 2007; and

• Turbine-driven AFW minimum flow restricting orifice repairs on March 5, 2007.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - Ten Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed ten operability determinations associated with degraded or non-conforming conditions to ensure that operability was justified and that mitigating systems, or those affecting barrier integrity, remained available and that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory measures to ensure that they were in place and were appropriately controlled. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance to ensure all related TS and FSAR requirements were met. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:

Unit 2

• B Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Surge Tank Overflowed During Surveillance Testing (CR-07-02244);

• 2-CH-512 Blended Makeup Valve Failed in Mid-Position (CR-07-00877);

• Containment Sump Design Assumption Does Not Meet the Unit 2 Licensing Basis (CR-07-00905);

• Unexpected Conditions Found During Inspection of Spent Fuel Assembly T-35 (CR-07-00704); and

• Non-conforming Service Water Piping to Vital Switchgear Cooling (CR-06-10055).

Unit 3

• Part 21 Potentially Affecting Hydraulic Snubber Performance (CR-07-00231 and CR-07-00234);

• "A" Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooling Leak (CR-07-01532);

• "B" and "D" Service Water Strainer Blowdown Line Crack (CR-07-01821);

• Recirculation Spray System MOV23B Stripped Flange Bolt (CR-07-02187); and

• Station Containment Gaseous Radiation Monitors Credited for Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection (CR-07-01379 and CR-07-01380).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - Six Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six post-maintenance tests (PMT) to determine whether the PMT adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied, given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as TS requirements. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following maintenance activities and their post-maintenance tests were evaluated:

Unit 2

• Service Water Leak from Strainer Gasket on A Emergency Diesel Generator (M2-06-09114);

• Diesel Air Start Solenoid Operated Valve (AS2) Replacement (M2-00-10298); and

• B Emergency Diesel Generator Two Year Preventive Maintenance (various work orders).

Unit 3

• Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) Alarm Card Replacement (M3-07-01200);

• "A" Quench Spray Pump Cross Connect 3QSS*V42 Refurbishment (M3-03-14188);and

• 3FWA*P2 Minimum Flow Restricting Orifice Repair (M3-06-12272).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20 - One Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed activities for a forced outage following a Unit 3 shutdown associated with an approximate 0.1 gallon per minute (gpm) increase in reactor coolant system (RCS) unidentified leak rate on January 28, 2007, for compliance with TS and approved procedures, configuration control, risk management, and maintenance practices. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

During this forced outage, the inspectors monitored Dominions control of the outage activities listed below:

• Corrective actions to repair RCS flexible hose downstream of 3RCS*V999;

• As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning and management;

• Shutdown risk evaluations;

• Reactor Shutdown to Mode 3;

• Plant startup; and

• Power ascension.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - Seven Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed seven surveillance activities to evaluate whether the testing adequately demonstrated equipment operational readiness and the ability to perform the intended safety-related function. The inspectors attended pre-job briefs; ensured that selected prerequisites and precautions were met; and verified that the tests were performed in accordance with the procedural steps. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to verify consistency with associated design bases, licensing bases, and TS requirements, and to verify that the acceptance criteria were satisfied. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following surveillance activities were evaluated:

Unit 2

• Boric Acid Pumps and Discharge Check Valves In-Service Testing (IST)

(SP-2601L);

• Diesel Generator Slow Start Operability Test (SP-2613L);

• A Diesel Generator Slow Start Operability Test, Facility 1 (SP-2613K); and

• B Charging Pump and Discharge Check IST (SP-2601K).

Unit 3

• "A" Quench Spray Pump 3QSS*P3A Operational Readiness IST (SP-3609.1);

• Containment Isolation Phase A K623 Slave Relay (SP-3646A.8); and

• Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operational Readiness IST (SP-3623.3).

b. Findings

Unit 2 No findings of significance were identified.

Unit 3

Introduction.

A Green self-revealing NCV of TS 6.8.1, Procedures, was identified because Dominion did not adequately implement procedures while performing a surveillance to test containment isolation slave relays. Specifically, instrumentation and control (I&C) technicians misinterpreted a permission step as an action step, resulting in the repositioning of three containment isolation valves.

Description.

On January 31, 2007, Operations was restoring from containment isolation Phase A K623 slave relay testing, in accordance with surveillance procedure SP-3646A.8, Slave Relay Testing - Train A. The purpose of the surveillance was, in part, to satisfy TS 4.3.2.1, Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, slave relay testing requirements by verifying that a given slave relay operated properly following a simulated engineered safety feature actuation.

During the system restoration portion of the surveillance, I&C technicians incorrectly performed step 4.9.15, such that, terminal jumpers were removed prior to removing the testing sliding links. The technicians misinterpreted this permission step as an action step, since the step provided the technical details necessary to carry out the action. As a result, three containment isolation valves repositioned to their closed safety-related position (3IAS*PV15, 3CDS*CTV39A and 3CDS*CTV39B). This had the following plant impacts:

• A portion of the instrument air system was isolated from containment. This caused an isolation of letdown flow, which resulted in pressurizer level increasing above the TS allowed band. Operations entered TS action statement 3.4.3.1(b) for a high pressurizer level and restored pressurizer level to within the normal band.

• Chill water was isolated from the "A" and "B" containment air coolers. This resulted in a temporary loss of containment cooling. Operations took action to limit the increase in containment pressure by starting the "A" and "B" containment vacuum pumps. Containment pressure and containment temperature did not increase beyond the TS allowed bands.

The performance deficiency is that Dominion did not properly implement a safety-related surveillance procedure to test containment slave relays. Specifically, I&C technicians misinterpreted a permission step as an action step, resulting in the repositioning of three containment isolation valves.

Analysis.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in pressurizer level increasing above the TS allowed band and a temporary loss of containment cooling.

The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)through performance of a Phase 1 SDP, in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.

Specifically, this finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and mitigating systems would not be available. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources component, because Dominion did not ensure that the slave relay testing procedure was adequate and complete since the procedure contained details in a permission step that could be incorrectly perceived as an action step.

Enforcement.

TS 6.8.1, requires, in part, that written procedures be implemented covering surveillance activities on safety-related equipment. Contrary to the above, on January 31, 2007, I&C technicians did not adequately perform Surveillance Procedure SP-3646A.8, Slave Relay Testing - Train A," Revision 021-03, Step 4.9.15. This resulted in a temporary loss of containment cooling and a pressurizer level increase above the TS allowed band. Corrective actions for this issue included performing a level one root cause, revising the surveillance procedure to remove a potential human performance error trap, coaching of the individuals involved, and reinforcing good human error prevention techniques to both Maintenance and Operations. The violation has been determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into Dominions corrective action program (CR-07-01045). Therefore, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000423/2007002-02, Failure to Implement Surveillance Procedure Resulted in a Temporary Loss of Containment Cooling and High Pressurizer Level TSAS Entry).

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - Two Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two temporary modifications to verify that they did not affect the function of important safety systems. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and their associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against FSAR and TS requirements to ensure the modifications did not affect system operability or availability.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

Unit 2

• Temporary Pressure Gage at FT-341 for Monitoring Reactor Coolant System Backleakage into #4 Safety Injection Tank.

Unit 3

• Control Building Service Water Enclosure Habitability Seal.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - Two Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the conduct of licensed operator simulator training for Unit 2 on February 6, 2007, and for Unit 3 on January 23, 2007. The inspectors evaluated the Operations crew activities related to evaluating the scenario and making proper event classification determinations. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of Dominions evaluators to adequately address operator performance deficiencies identified during the exercise. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - Eleven Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period February 12-15, 2007, the inspector conducted the following activities to verify that Dominion was properly implementing physical, administrative, and engineering controls for access to locked high radiation areas, and other radiologically controlled areas, during power operations. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, the TSs, and Dominions procedures. This inspection activity represents the completion of eleven samples relative to this inspection area. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

Plant Walkdown and Radiation Work Permits (RWP) Reviews

• The inspector toured accessible radiologically controlled areas in Unit 3, and with the assistance of a radiation protection technician, performed independent radiation surveys of selected areas to confirm the accuracy of survey data, and the adequacy of postings.

• The inspector identified activities in Units 2 and 3 where radiologically significant work was being performed. These activities included transferring a filled resin cask from the -45' level of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building to the truck bay, cleaning a floor sump on the 4' level of the Unit 3 Engineered Safeguards Facility (ESF), and rearranging of spent fuel in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool. The inspector reviewed the applicable RWPs for these activities (RWP Nos. 207-0017, 307-0003, and 307-0016), and electronic dosimeter dose/dose rate setpoints for the associated tasks, to determine if the radiological controls were acceptable and if the setpoints were consistent with plant policy.

• During 2006, there were no internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposures greater than 50 mrem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The inspector reviewed the CEDE dose assessments for the highest internal exposure for 2006; no CEDE exceeded 10 mrem.

• The inspector also reviewed a recent Personnel Contamination Report (PCR M3-07-001) and the shallow dose equivalent exposures for 2006, and determined that no exposure exceeded the occupational exposure control effectiveness performance indicator screening criteria.

Problem Identification and Resolution

• The inspector reviewed a licensee self-assessment, (MP-SA-06-74) and Nuclear Oversight Audit (06-08) to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

• Seven CRs associated with radiation protection control access, initiated between October 1, 2006, and February 11, 2007, were reviewed and discussed with the Dominion staff to determine if the follow-up activities were being conducted in an effective and timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls

• Changes made to high radiation area and very high radiation area procedures, since the last inspection, were reviewed and management of these changes were discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager.

• Keys to locked high radiation areas (LHRA) were inventoried, and accessible LHRAs were verified to be properly secured and posted during a plant tour in Unit 3.

Radiation Worker and Radiation Protection Technician Performance

• Several radiologically-related CRs were reviewed to evaluate if the incidents were caused by repetitive radiation worker errors or if an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause was evident.

• Radiation Protection Technicians were questioned regarding their knowledge of plant radiological conditions and associated controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - Nine Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period, February 12-15, 2007, the inspector conducted the following activities to verify that Dominion was properly implementing operational, engineering, and administrative controls to maintain personnel exposure ALARA for activities performed in 2006. The inspector also reviewed were the dose controls for current activities and the dose forecast for the spring 2007 Unit 3 outage. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and Dominions procedures. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the

.

Radiological Work Planning

• The inspector reviewed pertinent information regarding cumulative exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing activities to assess the performance during the 2006 Unit 2 outage, current exposure trends, and the challenges for the Unit 3 refueling outage.

• The inspector reviewed the exposure status for tasks performed during the Unit 2 outage and compared actual exposure with estimates contained in ALARA reviews.

Outage jobs reviewed included the pressurizer replacement (Review 2-06-20),emergency core cooling system sump modification (Review 2-06-30), and outage scaffolding construction (Review 2-06-13).

• The inspector evaluated the departmental interfaces between radiation protection, operations, maintenance, and engineering to identify missing ALARA program elements and interface problems. The evaluation was accomplished by attending a Unit 3 outage challenge board meeting and various pre-job briefings; reviewing recent Station ALARA Council Committee meeting minutes, post-job ALARA reviews, Nuclear Oversight Department Field Observation reports; and interviewing the station ALARA coordinator.

Verification of Dose Estimates

• The inspector reviewed the assumptions and basis for the 2007 site collective exposure projections for site operations and the spring Unit 3 refueling outage.

• The inspector reviewed Dominions procedures associated with monitoring and dose estimates when the forecast cumulative exposure for tasks was approached. The inspector reviewed the dose/dose rate alarm reports and exposure data for individuals receiving the highest total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), CEDE, and shallow dose estimate (SDE) exposures for 2006 to confirm that no individual exposure exceeded the regulatory annual limit.

Jobs-In-Progress

• The inspector observed the pre-job briefings for de-sludging the Unit 3 ESF building sump and for rearranging spent fuel in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool. The inspector also reviewed the pre-job briefing materials for transferring a filled resin liner from the -45' level of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building to the 14'6' level truck bay.

• The inspector reviewed the ALARA Evaluations (AEs 3-07-02/03//04/05/06) and the Post-Job ALARA Review related to investigating and stopping a leak of a Unit 3 post-accident sampling system valve (3RCS*V999) on January 27, 2007. The inspector reviewed the dose estimates, final actual doses, use of robotic equipment, and operational measures taken to reduce dose rates to limit personnel exposure.

Declared Pregnant Workers

• The inspector reviewed the procedural controls for managing declared pregnant workers (DPW) and determined that no DPWs were employed during 2006.

Problem Identification and Resolution

• The inspector reviewed elements of Dominions corrective action program related to implementing the ALARA program to determine if problems were being entered into the program for timely resolution. The inspector also reviewed seven CRs related to controlling individual personnel exposure and programmatic ALARA challenges, a Departmental Self-Assessment (MS-SA-06-74), minutes from ALARA Council meetings, four Nuclear Oversight field observation reports, and an audit report to evaluate the threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving radiological control issues.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

[OA]

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 - Two Samples)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

The inspectors sampled Dominion submittals for two Unit 3 PIs. The inspectors reviewed data from the first quarter 2004 through the fourth quarter 2006 to verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during these periods. Definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 4, were used to verify the reporting basis for each data element.

Unit 3

• Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity

• Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate The inspectors reviewed portions of the operations logs and raw PI data developed from monthly operating reports and discussed the methods for compiling and reporting the PIs with cognizant licensing and engineering personnel. The inspectors compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify that the data was correctly reflected in the report. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Dominion's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new CR and attending daily management review committee meetings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

.2 Annual Sample Review (71152 - One Sample)

Unit 3 - Repetitive Leaks in Safety-Related Air Conditioning Units

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Dominions actions in response to repetitive minor leaks in the safety-related air conditioners which cool the engineered safety features building (System 3HVQ). The system consists of four similar Freon-based units. The inspectors reviewed Dominions identification of these problems, the related evaluations and operability determinations, the extent-of-condition review, the corrective actions specified, and their prioritization. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the systems and interviewed applicable system engineers.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The basis for the classification of the HVQ system as non-risk-significant with respect to the maintenance rule was that temperatures would likely not exceed a 120 degree Fahrenheit (°F) requirement in the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of operation, the point to which the relevant probabilistic risk assessment models are compiled. However, the inspectors identified that the equipment protected by the air conditioners would be subject to elevated temperatures after the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and during its design mission period. Another evaluation, however, showed that the equipment would survive the design mission run time at the calculated elevated temperatures, so the classification of the HVQ system as non-risk-significant was acceptable. A review of the use of an initial 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period of evaluation when later consequences develop, is being examined by Dominion.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 Containment Radiation Monitor Particulate Alarm

a. Inspection Scope

On January 25, 2007, at 11:33 p.m., Operations personnel responded to a Unit 3 containment radiation monitor (3CMS*RE22) particulate alarm and 0.04 gpm increase in leakage into the containment unidentified leakage sump. Operations entered two Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP): AOP-3573, Radiation Monitoring Response, and AOP-3555, Reactor Coolant Leak. Operations concluded there was a small leak in containment, less than the TS limit of 1 gpm for unidentified RCS leakage. On January 26, 2007, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Dominion reduced power to 30 percent and made a containment entry to identify and characterize the leak. The leak was discovered to be coming from an isolable flexitalic tube fitting connecting the A loop drain to the RCS sample and post accident sampling system. On January 28, 2007, at 9:51 a.m., Dominion commenced a reactor shutdown to Mode 3 to repair the leaking fitting. The leak was repaired and tested satisfactorily. On January 29, 2007, at 3:53 p.m., a reactor startup was commenced and Unit 3 returned to 100 percent power on January 31, 2007, at 4:18 p.m. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of operator actions in response to the RCS leak and reviewed TS and emergency action level considerations. In addition, the inspectors observed and evaluated Operations implementation of station procedures for the reactor shutdown and startup.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Inadvertent Closure of Three Containment Isolation Valves

a. Inspection Scope

On January 31, 2007, at 11:24 p.m., Operations responded to the inadvertent closure of three Unit 3 containment isolation valves as a result of improper system restoration following slave relay testing (SP 3646A.8-009). The inspectors reviewed operator logs, technical specifications, primary plant computer containment parameters and reactor coolant system parameter traces, and evaluated the adequacy of operator actions in response to the event.

b. Findings

No findings of significance relative to event response were identified. See Section 1R22 for further details.

.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000336/2006-003-00, Technical Specification

Shutdown On April 1, 2006, Unit 2 completed a TS required shutdown from 100 percent power due to inoperability of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFW). During surveillance testing the pump outboard thrust bearing had failed, causing the equipment to be inoperable. Dominion determined that pump balance drum/sleeve misalignment during pump assembly at the manufacturing facility, or during shipping, caused the bearing failure. The issue was reviewed by the NRC during the component design basis inspection and documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000336/2006010 and 05000423/2006010. No findings of significance were identified. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI)05000336/2006005-03, Failure to Correct a Condition

Adverse to Quality affecting the B51 and B61 Enclosures

Introduction.

A Green NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for not promptly correcting a degraded condition associated with the safety-related B61 480 VAC motor control center (MCC) enclosure.

Dominion did not implement corrective actions subsequent to the identification of a condition adverse to quality which resulted in declaring the B61 and the B51 480 VAC MCC enclosures inoperable. This issue was documented as an URI in NRC Inspection Report 05000336/2006-005, pending the review of Dominions corrective actions and evaluations, including Dominion's review of a prior issue associated with the associated air conditioning units initially discussed in URI 05000336/2004008-02, and closed in NRC Inspection Report 05000336/2005004.

Description.

On November 18, 2006, Unit 2 Operations identified a degradation of the B61 480 VAC MCC enclosure A/C unit, noting that the temperature in the enclosure was 96 degrees Fahrenheit (EF), and that the A/C unit did not appear to be loading properly.

This was documented in Dominions corrective action program as CR-06-11540. Unit 2 has two 480 VAC MCCs (B51 MCC and B61 MCC) which supply power to various safety-related motor-operated valves and containment cooling fans. Each MCC is housed in a self-contained enclosure with a dedicated A/C unit to control temperature.

The enclosures protect the MCCs in the event of a high energy line break in the auxiliary building.

On November 19, 2006, the inspectors identified that the temperature in the B61 MCC enclosure appeared to be abnormally high and reported this condition to Operations personnel in the control room and the Outage Control Center, questioning the ability of the A/C units to perform their design function. Operations personnel assured the inspectors that the A/C unit was operable, based on being able to start and provide cooling prior to the MCC enclosure reaching an operability temperature limit (104 °F).

The inspectors informed Dominion management of their concern with the apparent equipment degradation. Subsequently, on November 21, 2006, Engineering determined that neither of the A/C units (B51 or B61) were functioning properly. Operations declared both A/C units inoperable and entered TS 3.0.3, Conditions Prohibited by Technical Specifications, until compensatory actions could be completed. Dominion entered into the corrective action program as CR-06-11638. Dominion subsequently determined that this condition had existed since November 15, 2006, when the plant was starting up from the refueling outage, and that corrective maintenance performed during the outage had resulted in an insufficient freon charge of the A/C units.

Corrective actions included implementation of compensatory cooling, adding freon to the A/C units, and changing the vendor technical manual and equipment drawings to reflect the proper amount of freon charge.

The performance issue associated with this finding is that Dominion did not promptly correct a known degraded condition affecting safety-related equipment. Specifically, Dominion did not adequately evaluate the A/C units as being unable to perform their safety-related function, or take corrective actions to implement compensatory cooling, when the problem was first identified on November 18, 2006, and then again on November 19, 2006.

Analysis.

The finding was more than minor because the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and the objective of ensuring the availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable circumstances was affected in that the 480 VAC MCCs provide vital power to a number of safety-related systems designed to mitigate design basis events. In addition, if left uncorrected, both divisions of the 480 VAC MCCs may not have been able to respond to design basis events due to room temperatures exceeding the switchgear design temperature limits and subsequent failure of the switchgear.

Traditional enforcement did not apply to this issue because there were no actual safety consequences, impacts on the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, or willful aspects to the violation.

This finding is concerned with the enclosure room cooling system for the 480 VAC MCCs, therefore, an evaluation of the impact on this system due to the degraded cooling system was performed. Dominions Engineering evaluation determined that the MCCs would have been able to perform their function of providing electrical power to their respective 480 VAC emergency loads despite the degraded condition of the A/C units over a probabilistic risk assessment mission time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Since the actual room temperature did not exceed 122 °F, it was reasonable to conclude that although the corrective actions for the room cooling were not promptly initiated, the MCCs remained functional. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by performing a Phase 1 SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.

Specifically, the finding was not related to a design or qualification deficiency; did not result in a loss of function; and was not related to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution in that Dominion did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the degraded A/C units in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance and complexity.

Enforcement.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, on November 18, 2006, and again on November 19, 2006, Dominion did not adequately evaluate or promptly correct the degraded condition of the B61 480 VAC MCC enclosure A/C unit in order to assure that the affected systems were capable of performing their intended functions. Both the B51 and B61 units were subsequently declared inoperable on November 21, 2006. This violation is determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into Dominions corrective action program (CR-06-11638). Therefore, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000336/2007002-03, Failure to Promptly Correct the Degraded Condition of the 480 VAC MCCs)

.2 (Closed) URI 05000336/2006004-02, Application of TS 3.0.5 for Emergency or Normal

Power Source Inoperable The URI was opened to review Dominions determination of what constitutes a normal power supply and their evaluation of the acceptability of a three-hour delay time for providing a backup power supply. During a previous inspection, the inspectors questioned Operations on whether removing the reserve station service transformer (RSST) from service while the B train of control room emergency ventilation was unavailable was a violation of TS 3.0.5, Limiting Condition of Operation, which precluded removing the emergency or normal power supply from a train of equipment when its redundant train was unavailable. At the time, Dominion had entered a short term action statement for the A Train transfer to the RSST being inoperable while engineered safeguards actuation system under voltage relay surveillance testing was in progress.

The inspectors reviewed Dominion Memorandum RA-06-041, Millstone Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.0.5 Response to NRC, and Engineering Record of Correspondence 25203-ER-99-0092, Revision 3, Appendix R Cooldown Analysis Assumptions and Results, and concluded that Dominions definition of normal power supply (RSST and the backup power cross-connect from Unit 3) was consistent with General Design Criteria 17, Electric Power Systems. In addition, the inspectors noted that the TS Bases assumption that three hours was required to lineup the backup power cross-connect from Unit 3 was bounded by Dominions 10 CFR 50, Appendix R analysis.

The inspectors had no further questions on this issue, URI 05000336/2006004-02 is closed.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Heat Sink Performance The inspectors presented the results of the inspection to Mr. A. Skip Jordan, Plant Manager - Nuclear, and other members of the staff, on January 12, 2007.

Access Controls and ALARA Planning and Controls The inspector presented the results of the inspection to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President - Millstone, and members of his staff on January 15, 2007.

Integrated Report

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 11, 2007, the inspectors presented the overall inspection results to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President - Millstone, and members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked Dominion whether any of the material examined during the inspection period should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

A. Airas, System Engineer

W. Brown, Licensing Engineer

F. Cietec, Maintenance Rule Coordinator

A. Chyra, PRA Analyst

T. Cleary, Licensing

G. Closius, Licensing

D. DelCore, Supervisor, Health Physics Operations

P. Dillon, System Engineer - SBO Diesel

D. Dodson, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Licensing

R. Griffin, Director - Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing

P. Grossman, Manager-Nuclear Design Engineering

R. Hoffman, I&C Supervisor

A. Jordan, Director - Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance

E. Laine, Manager, Radiological Protection & Chemistry

L. Loomis, System Engineer - RSS

M. Nappi, Supervisor, Radiation Protection - ALARA

D. Owens, Coatings Specialist

A. Price, Site Vice President - Millstone

W. Saputo, System Engineer - RPCCW

W. Spahn, Supervisor - Systems Engineering

M. Stark, Heat Exchanger Program Owner

S. Turowski, Supervisor-HP Technical Services

L. Wagnecz, System Engineer - SW

NRC Personnel

J. Benjamin, Resident Inspector, DRP

L. Cheung, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS

K. Diederich, Reactor Inspector, DRS

R. Fernandes, Resident Inspector, DRP

D. Johnson, Reactor Inspector, DRS

T. Moslak, Health Physicist, DRS

S. Ng, Headquarters

W. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim, DRP

S. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone, DRP

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000336/2007002-01 URI Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation of Unit 2 Vital Switchgear Emergency Cooling Failure (Section 1R12)

Opened and Closed

05000423/2007002-02 NCV Failure to Implement Surveillance Procedure Resulted in a Temporary Loss of Containment Cooling and High Pressurizer Level TSAS Entry (Section 1R22)

05000336/2007002-03 NCV Failure to Promptly Correct the Degraded Condition of the 480 VAC MCCs (Section 4OA5.1)

Closed

05000336/2006003-00 LER Technical Specification Shutdown (Section 4OA3.3)

05000336/2006005-03 URI Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality affecting the B51 and B61 Enclosures (4OA5.1)

05000336/2006004-02 URI Application of TS 3.0.5 for Emergency or Normal Power Source Inoperable (Section 4OA5.2)