IR 05000382/2021013
| ML21063A502 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/2021 |
| From: | Ryan Lantz NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Ferrick J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EA-20-114 4-2017-033, IR 2021013 | |
| Download: ML21063A502 (10) | |
Text
March 5, 2021
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2021013 AND NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2017-033
Dear Mr. Ferrick:
This letter refers to the investigation completed on September 23, 2020, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford). The investigation was conducted, in part, to determine if a contract superintendent assigned to Entergy Operations, Inc. (licensee) working at Waterford, willfully directed employees to disengage an equipment protective device and continue drilling into a safety-related concrete structure containing embedded items without first obtaining required engineering evaluation, approval, and documentation, in violation of a quality-related licensee procedure. Enclosure 1 provides a factual summary of the basis for the NRCs concern that willfulness was associated with an apparent violation in this case. The issue was discussed with you and other members of your staff during a telephone conversation February 9, 2021.
Based on the information acquired during the investigation, one apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violation is against Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures The circumstances surrounding the apparent violation, the potential significance of the issue, and the need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with you at the inspection exit meeting on February 9, 2021. Further details regarding this apparent violation are documented in Enclosure 2 to this letter.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:
(1) respond in writing to the apparent violation addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter; or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC).
Although the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) should normally be offered for cases that fall within the programs scope, the staff may, with the prior approval of the Director, Office of Enforcement, decide not to engage in ADR with a licensee if the issue is of a similar type previously addressed in ADR and the staff believes that an additional ADR is not an effective means to resolve the issue. Therefore, in consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement ADR will not be offered in this case.
If a PEC is held, the NRC may issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference; however, the PEC will be closed to public observation since information related to an Office of Investigations report will be discussed and the report has not been made public. If you decide to participate in a PEC, please contact Mr. John Dixon, Chief, Projects Branch D, at 817-200-1574 within 10 days of the date of this letter. A PEC should be held within 30 days of the date of this letter.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to An Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2021013; EA-20-114 and should include for the apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response.
Additionally, your written response should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76011-4511 and emailed to R4Enforcement@nrc.gov within 30 days of the date of this letter. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a PEC does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation described in the Enclosure 2 may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your responses, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. However, you should be aware that all final NRC documents, including the final Office of Investigations report, are official agency records and may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act, subject to redaction of certain information in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. John Dixon of my staff at 817-200-1574.
Sincerely, Ryan E. Lantz, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000382 License No. NPF-38
Enclosures:
1. Factual Summary 2. Inspection Report 05000382/2021013
Ryan E. Lantz Digitally signed by Ryan E.
Lantz Date: 2021.03.05 08:32:23-06'00'
ML21063A502 SUNSI Review:
ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: JGK Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002 OFFICE SES:ACES TL:ACES C:DRP/PBD RC OE NRR NAME JKramer JGroom JDixon DCylkowski PSnyder BHughes SIGNATURE
/RA/ E
/RA/ E
/RA/ E
/RA/ E
/RA/ E
/RA/ E DATE 02/08/21 02/08/21 02/09/2021 02/11/21 02/24/21 02/25/21 OFFICE OGC D:DRP
NAME LBaer RLantz
SIGNATURE
/NLO/ E
/RA/
DATE 03/01/21 03/05/21
Enclosure 1 FACTUAL SUMMARY OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2017-033
On June 30, 2017, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI)
initiated an investigation to determine if a contract superintendent assigned to Entergy Operations, Inc. (licensee) working at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 willfully directed employees to disengage an equipment protective device and continue drilling into a safety-related concrete structure containing embedded items without first obtaining required engineering evaluation, approval, and documentation, in violation of a quality-related procedure.
The investigation was completed on September 23, 2020.
Based on the information obtained during the investigation, the NRC determined that on November 9, 2016, contract workers were drilling into concrete into the east wall of the bravo vault and stopped drilling when the stop box (protective device) disengaged the drill after hitting an obstruction, in a
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000382
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-013-0004
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location:
Killona, LA 70057
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2021 to February 9, 2021
Inspectors:
A. Sanchez, Senior Project Engineer
P. Vossmar, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects or Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an NRC inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Procedure Violation During Fuel Oil Storage Tank Replacement Project
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Not Applicable
Open
Not Applicable
The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V for the
licensee's failure to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with Procedure
PMC-002-003, Concrete Cutting, Revision 3. Specifically, on November 9 and 10, 2016, a
licensee contract superintendent directed employees to disengage an equipment protective
device and continue drilling into a safety-related concrete structure containing embedded
items without the required engineering evaluation, approval, and documentation. This
resulted in the inappropriate cutting of structural rebar in the B1 diesel fuel oil storage tank
vault.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated the circumstances surrounding the inappropriate cutting of
structural rebar during a diesel fuel oil storage tank replacement project at the
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, on November 9 and 10, 2016.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Procedure Violation During Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) Replacement Project
Cornerstone
Significance/Severity
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Not
Applicable
Apparent Violation
Open
Not
Applicable
The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V for the
licensees failure to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with Procedure
PMC-002-003, Rev. 3, Concrete Cutting. Specifically, on November 9 and 10, 2016, a
licensee contract superintendent directed employees to disengage an equipment protective
device (EPD) and continue drilling into a safety-related concrete structure containing
embedded items without the required engineering evaluation, approval, and documentation.
This resulted in the inappropriate cutting of structural rebar in the B1 diesel FOST vault.
Description: On November 9, 2016, as part of the FOST replacement project, contract
workers were drilling into the east wall of the Bravo vault. The drilling operation was to
support the installation of dowels and anchorage in the concrete walls of the vault for the
safety-related diesel FOSTs. Waterford site procedure PMC-002-003, Revision 3, Concrete
Cutting, step 10.2.4 required that drills be connected to an EPD, which automatically shuts
off power to the drill if it comes into contact with any grounded metal object. The EPD may
be eliminated only at the direction of an engineering document that allows the cutting of
grounded embedded items and completion of a Job Safety Hazard Analysis (JSHA), in
accordance with EN-IS-124, Revision 4. Manual EN-IS-124, Revision 4, which is
incorporated by reference to Procedure PMC-002-003, requires, in part, that if the EPD trips,
Engineering shall be engaged in the identification of the object that was contacted and must
approve in writing the continued drilling without use of the EPD.
During the November 9, 2016 drilling operations, the contract workers were using the EPD
and stopped drilling when the EPD disengaged the drill after hitting an obstruction, in
accordance with site procedures. The workers informed the foreman on duty that they had hit
an obstruction, and the foreman took the information to the superintendent. The
superintendent provided the foreman with a rebar eater drill bit, which was kept in a locked
storage box in his office and instructed the workers to continue drilling through the
obstruction.
On November 10, 2016, a contract worker began drilling in the bravo vault with the rebar
cutting bit with the direction to cut through inconsequential metal embedded in the concrete.
The worker shined a flashlight in the hole and saw what appeared to be a piece of rebar. The
worker immediately stopped and notified the foreman that he had cut through rebar. The
foreman then notified the superintendent that had provided the rebar eater drill bit. Shortly
thereafter, the superintendent went to the vault and examined the hole. The daily
construction report for November 10, 2016, signed by the superintendent, documented in the
work completed section, Working the East wall having issues. Need to cut rebar and
documented in the probable future delay section, Its slow cutting thru the rebar.
On November 14, 2016, the field engineer received a call from the Bravo vault to examine an
obstruction. He in turn called civil engineer, who confirmed that the obstruction was structural
rebar. During the NRCs subsequent review of this issue, the civil engineer confirmed that he
would not have approved cutting through rebar. The superintendent did not obtain the
required engineering evaluation, approval, and documentation authorizing the drilling through
the rebar.
Corrective Actions: The licensee evaluated the cut rebar and the associated structure for
functionality, established additional controls in the form of a rebar eater drill bit checkout and
log sheet, and performed a stand-down with the contract workers to reinforce the
requirements of the procedure.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-WF3-2016-07183
Performance Assessment: The Reactor Oversight Process does not specifically consider
willfulness in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address
this violation which involves willfulness using the traditional enforcement process.
Enforcement: The severity of this apparent violation will be determined in accordance with
the Enforcement Policy pending a final enforcement determination.
Apparent Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that
activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures of a type
appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these
procedures.
Licensee Procedure PMC-002-003, Concrete Cutting, Revision 3, step 10.2.4 requires, in
part, that drills be connected to an EPD. The EPD may be eliminated only at the direction of
an engineering document that allows the cutting of grounded embedded items and
completion of a Job Safety Hazard Analysis, in accordance with EN-IS-124, Industrial Safety
Planning & Job Safety Hazards Analysis, Revision 4. Manual EN-IS-124, Revision 4, which
is incorporated by reference to Procedure PMC-002-003, requires, in part, that if the EPD
trips, Engineering shall be engaged in the identification of the object that was contacted and
must approve in writing the continued drilling without use of the EPD.
Contrary to the above, on November 9 and 10, 2016, licensee contract employees performed
concrete drilling, an activity affecting quality, and failed to connect the drill to an EPD and did
not have an engineering document that allowed the cutting of grounded embedded items with
the EPD disconnected. Specifically, during concrete drilling in the safety-related B1 FOST
vault cubicle, workers disengaged an EPD and continued drilling into a structure containing
embedded items without the required engineering documentation. This resulted in the cutting
of structural rebar without an engineering evaluation.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an apparent violation pending a final
significance (enforcement) determination.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On February 9, 2021, the inspectors presented the NRC inspection results to Mr. J. Ferrick, Site
Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff in a telephonic exit meeting.