IR 05000348/1979017
| ML19225C126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1979 |
| From: | Blake J, Herdt A, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19225C114 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-79-17, 50-364-79-7, NUDOCS 7907260542 | |
| Download: ML19225C126 (11) | |
Text
,
.
y,
,
NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,
$j\\[y/cf',/
e'
n
,
E REGION il
d 101 M ARIETT A sT., N W, sulTE 310o o,, 3 4fg[
h As ATLANTA, GEORGI A 3C303
- ....
Report Nos. 50 348/79-17 and 50-364/79-7 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and CPPR-86 Inspection at F ey Si e near Dothan, Alabama Inspectors:
/
~ f~
'Date Si rad
/
s~-L 6 )i-79 k'./P/ d einso rge 11 24-26, 1979)
Date Signed
.
T. E. Conlon (May 16-19, 1979)
Accompanying Pers ne Approved by:
_ SB Date Signed A. I'. lierdt, RC SUMMARY Inspection on April 24-26 and May 16-18, 1979 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 54 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of ultrasonic inspection of flow-splitters in Unit 1 main loop elbows and investi-gation of allegations concerning construction problems in Units 1 and 2.
Results Of the 2 sreas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
q 907 26 osQ AI3 208
-.
._
.
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Emplovees
- W.
G. Hairston, Plant Manager
- R. Hollands, QA Supervisor, Construction
- J. Payson, QA Staff Engineer, Construction
- R. Fucich, QA Engineer, Construction
- R.
D. Hill, Jr., QA Engineer, Operations
- F. Wurster, QA Engineer, Operations
- L.
M. Stinson, Start-up Supervisor
- J. D. Woodward, Assistnat Plant Manager
- J. A. Mooney, Project Manager, Construction Other licensee and contractor employees contacted included several construc-tion craftsmen, technician, and officer personnel.
- Attended exit interview April 26, 1979 only.
- Attended exit interview May 18. 1979 only.
- Attended both exit interviews.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 26 and May 18, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. On April 26, the Plant Manager, Mr. Hairston discussed the APC0 position relative to the flow splitter inspection results. On May 18, the primary item of discussion was the unresolved item concerning the piping stress analysis documentation.
Mr. Hairston stated that the APC0 position at the time of the exit interview was that so far it was only a paperwork problem with no hardware affected, but if the status changed Region II would be notified.
,
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to dete rmine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 6.
5.
Ultrasonic Inspection of Main Coolant Loop Flow Splitters (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the results of the special ultrasonic inspection
-
(UT) of the flow splitter elbows in the main coolant loops.
AI3 209
.
-
.
.
-
-2-
.
The procedure for this inspection was Farley Nuclear Plant Engineering Technical Procedure FNP-1-ETP-110, Rev. O, dated April 18,1979, " Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Loop Flow Splitter Plate." The inspector reviewed the procedure, the celibration data, the inspection data and the certifications for the inspectors.
The inspection data showed that one inspection crew had found a one-inch long area on lonp "B" which resulted in a back reflection with a magnitude of 50% of DAC at about the correct metal path distance to be at the juncticn of the inner surface of the elbow and the splitter plate. This signal was not detected by a second crew performing an independent inspection of the same elbow; and the outer surface of the elbow was found to be irregular in the area where this signal was detected. This irregularity of surface could have caused a part of the ultrasonic signal to be reflected from the ID surface of the elbow adjacent to the connection of the splitter plate.
The licensee concluded that this one signal was not significant.
The inspector discussed the results of this inspection and plans for future inspections with the Plant Manager, Mr. Hairston. Mr. Hairston stated that the licensee's position was that there were no indications in the Farley flow splitters and that APC0 would repeat this UT inspection during the next two refueling outages to ensure that no problems were being developed during plant operations.
(This commitment to do additional inspections was modified by the APCO position that Farley inspection effort would not exceed that of the VEPCO inspection at North Anna 1).
There were no items of noncompliance or deviations in this area of inspection.
The inspector informed the licensee that the follow-up inspection during the next refueling outages would be tracked as inspector follow-up item 50-348/79-17-01, Flow Splitter Inspections.
6.
Investigation of Allegations Concerning Construction Problems (Units 1 and 2)
Region II was ontacted by a former employee of the constructor (Daniels Construction Company) of the Farley plant.
The stated reason for the contact was that this person knew of several problems which had occurred during the construction of both Units 1 and 2 that, if left uncorrected, could possibly affect the safety of the public during operation of the plant. The person's concern was whether the construction problems had been properly documented and corrected.
The concerns and the results of the inspection concerning these items are as follows:
a.
Vben Steam Generator No. 3 was being installed in Unit 2, the column caps on the steam generator supports would not allow the steam generator to be installed.
The (Daniels) Engineer, to the scene. alleger called a Daniel Construction Company The engineer instructed the alle er to grind or cut the column caps to remove the interference.
Tne E
Ah
- m:
,
l; J
h
.
'
.
.
3-alleger cut out two pieces of metal (which he supplied to the investiga-tor).
Before performing the work, the alleger requested a design change notice t.o authorize it and was given a " speedy memo" (copy furnished to the investigator) and does not believe the modification was ever documented.
The inspector reviewed the installation documentation for the steam generators in Unit 2 and visually inspected the support column caps.
The inspection showed that the support caps for steam generators 1 and 3 in Unit 2 were modified by cutting the corners from the caps. In both cases the modifications were documented with properly documented and reviewed field change requests and change notices. Steam generator No. 3 was done first and documented by field change request No. 2C-436 dated November 20, 1975 and change notice No. 2BC-387 dated November 21, 1975. Steam generator No. I was done later and documented by field change request No. 2C-439 dated November 25, 1975 and change notice No. 2BC-389 dated November 25, 1975.
The modifications were further documented for cost purpose on steam generator work order No. M5125.
b.
Unit I containment pipe supports on the reactor coolant hot and cold legs and the containment spray syste=s were cut out and when they were replaced, black iron scrap was used instead of code traceable plates.
The inspectors reviewed the two piping systems mentioned with the following results:
(1) There are no permanent pipe supports on the reactor coolant hot and cold legs so that any untraceable material used to support these lines was in the form of temporary supports which have been removed.
(2) The containment spray system pipe supports under went many documented field changes, some of which involved material substitutions. A review of the documentation turned up one material subsitution on Hanger No. CS2-R-6, Sketch No. 3005 Rev. 3, Iso 81 which involved 4" x 4" x 1/2" tube steel. The installation documentation listed the heat number for the tube steel as Ht. No. 278891. The licensee was not able to find documentation for this material prior to the exit interview on May 18, 1979 but had not exhausted all possibi-lities. The inspector informed the licensee that this item would be carried as an Unresolved Item until this hanger material can be properly traced.
This will be item 50-348/79-17-02, Hanger Material.
Pink copies of the Form 101 for a weld which had been accepted and c.
signed off were codified later by an inspector because another inspector had identified a bad place in the veld. A welder who was working nearby, was instructed to lay another bead over the bad weld and did The weld was Q-1-P16-HBC-29-EG698, Weld 2 IS0698, weld cocpletion so.
date on Form 101 was changed and weld rod requisition added on pink copy (copy furnished to the investigator).
' D#,
413 211
~~
.
-4-
.
The weld in question was a field weld in a 12-inch diameter,.375-inch wall, carbon-steel service water line in Unit 1.
The inspectors reviewed the final documentation for this weld which showed the following:
(1) The final controlled weld joint record F-101 contained a statement that the original F-101 copy was lost. The record copy contained the san.e information as the one furnished by the alleger with the addition of another weld rod requisition number and the results of the final RT inspection.
(2) All of the weld rod issue slips were issued to the same welder.
The issue slip added to the pink copy of the F-101 was issued for the welding of FW-3 of this same line. (This supports the statement that a welder, working nearby, was asked to add weld metal to W-2. )
(3) The final acceptance of the weld was by 100% radiographic inspection.
The RT film was reviewed by the Code Authorized Inspector as well as the constructor. (The inspector also reviewed it during this inspection).
(4) The piping in question has a design pressure of 150 lb and was hydrostatically tested to a test pressure of 190 lb on 9/26/76.
There appears to have been some documentation problems during the welding of this weld joint, but it appears that the same welder was involved from start to finish and that the weld was properly tested after it was completed.
d.
Weld rod requisition authorizations were being signed by individuals who were not authorized to sign them. Rods were being signed out to non-welders.
Rods were found by the alleger at a trade school in Dothan, Alabama, the same heat number was being used at the site.
The concerns addressed in this item are primarily matters of fiscal concern rather than matters concerning quality.
The welding material field requisition form (W-100 form) contains spaces for the name of the welder, an authorization signature and an issue clerk's signature.
These W-100 forms are serialized and in triplicate with one copy to welding supervision, one copy lef t in issue room, and one copy to the welder. During the welding of a weld joint the welders name and the serial number of his W-100 are entered on the joint control form. The results of this area of inspection are as follows:
(1) The qualification of the authorizing person is not an item requiring verification by anyone in the QC/QA circuit for a given veld.
..h\\b L
.
.
.
-5-
.
(2) Rods issued to non-welders could only have been used in non-safety related applications due to the documentation requirements of safety related work.
(3) The welding electrodes at the site were purchase through a local supplier in Dothan, Alabama which could account for the same electrode being used at the trade school.
The inspector was informed by the licensee that a similar allegation had been brought to the attention of the APC0 Construction Management early in 1976. A special audit conducted as a result of the allegation resulted in a change to Field Quality Control Procedure No. 5.5.1.1
" Welding Materials" requiring tighter controls in the area of spooled wire.
A welder was performing welds on the Unit 1, Steam Generator No. I hot e.
leg, or it may have been on the main coolant pump on the cold leg side, vben it was determined that the individual had not qualified for the particular type of welding. He was pulled off and sent to the test shop to qualify. The alleger believes the individual failed the test and stated be could not prove it but he believes either one of two other welders velded the test coupon for the original welder. The alleger said this was brought to the attention of Alabama Power Company and Daniels but he did not know if the NRC was aware of it.
The inspector reviewed the documentation for the main loop welding of Unit I and determined that Nonconformance Report No. Q-1-W126 dated March 5,1974 was written concerning the fact that a welder welded on FW-3 of traveler Q-1-B13-CCA-10, 11, and 12 - E307, Rev. 4 when he was not qualified to do so.
(This weld is the outlet side of the steam generator to cross-over loop weld). There was no way to substantiate whether or not another welder took the qualification test.
The record does show that because of this unqualified welding the welding inspector, the Nuclear Piping Welding Supervisor, the Craf t Foreman and the Nuclear Piping Superintendent were all fired for allowing it to happen; the welder also resigned af ter taking the test to establish the qualifi-cation for the reo red wall thickness.
The inspector reviewed the final radiographs for the weld joint in question with no further questions.
f.
An individual was installing cold leg pising on the Reactor Coolant Pump No. 2 in Unit I and rammed the pipe into the coolant pump " landing" and " hair lipped" it causing a small fracture in the pipe. When the alleger walked up, the individual was repairing damage by beating it out with a hammer.
This event was kept quiet by the individuals involved, including the alleger, and subsequently passed x-ray examina-tion.
A review of the documentation for the number two loop in Unit I showed that a nonconformance report NCR No. QlM-481 documented the fact that
^\\1 k\\,j diJ
.
-6-
,
the vild prep area of the pi.e had been damaged. The damaged area was t
weld v ? paired and inspected prior to the welding of the weld joint.
The nonconformance report does not state what caused the damage to the end prep nor how the damage was discovered; it only documents the fact that the damage was discovered and repaired.
The inspector reviewed the documentation cf the weld repair and also reviewed the radiographs for the weld joint g.
Heavy I pads were welded to embedded plates on Elevation 105 in Unit I and as many as seven to ten, ten-ton chain falls were connected at one time. Welding of the I pads to the plates required so much heat that the concrete behind the embeds was spalling. Location is as follows:
Enter the Unit I hatch, going across containment, down the south stairvell to the bottom elevation, from there to the No. 2 loop area.
The embeds are located above tie rods to reactor coolant pump to the left or north of the hot leg pipe.
A review of constru: tion QA/QC records showed that concrete adjacent to an embeded plate (in the area described in the allegation) was damaged by excessive heat applied to the plate. The damage was documented on Nonconformance Report No. Q-IC-471 dated May 5,1976 and repaired in accordance with Field Change Request (FCR) No. C-1446 and Design Change Notice (DCN) No. BC-2236.
The inspectors reviewed the documentation for the repairs.
h.
A beam was welded to the cavity liner plate. This was a temporary installation and subsequently removed.
The implication here is that the cavity liner may have been damaged in the process and not repaired.
The inspector found two instances where materials were welded to the containment or cavity liner plates without proper authorization.
These instances were documented by Nonconformaice Reports No. Q-1-W251 dated May 1, 1975 and No. Q-1-W276 dated Janua q 22, 1976. Both cases were fully evaluated by Bechtel and CB&I and necessary repairs performed.
These two cases were incidents involving someone other than CB&I personnel weldin<; sttachments to CB&I installed and warranted items at some location other than an imbed plate designed for welded attachments.
During the erection of the containment and installation of the cavity liners CB&I personnel welded temporary attachments to the liners but in all cases after removal of the temporary attachment the removal site was required to be inspected.
Without further description of the alleged attachment, (i.e.
Location, Site, Approximate date of installation and Removal) this item cannot be inspected further.
!)))
.
.
.
-
i.
Helicoils may not be installed in the steam generator to support column cap bolt holes. This applies to all steam generators in both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The alleger described the belicoil as a device that is screwed up into the bolt hole which has been over tapped and the bolt is screwed in af ter inntallation of the belicoil. The indivi-dual stated that it was to allow for thermal expansion of the bolt; however, he later spoke of seismic movement.
The alleger further explained that the helicoils were installed in two parts and during installation, the inner belicoil would jump threads which would cause the bolt to jam during installation. The alleger believes the problem was solved by eliminating the inner helicoil. During the installation of support bolts on Unit 1, Steam Generator No. 3, the tolt jammed and would not go in or out. Daniels Construction Company's Civil Superin-tendent was informed and a special wrench was made, but it would not work. The alleger was told to cut the bolt skank off and have the welder tack weld the bolt head in place to look like it had been installed properly, but he would not do it.
Daniels then roped off the area and brought in an outside contractor (unknown) to fix the bolt and the alleger does not know how it was fixed.
The inspector reviewed the installation documentation for the steam generators in both Units 1 and 2.
This documentation contained the following:
(1) For each steam generator there was a QC inspection point signed stating that the helicoils were prop 'ly installe d.
(2) Nonconformance Report NCR No. Q1M-50 (for Unit 1) documented 'he fact that a bolt broke off in #3 steam generator's north west support cap and was subsequently drilled out and replaced.
A review of the installation procedure for the helicoils showed that the helicoils are in fact installed in two parts.
The procedure further states that af ter the belicoils are inserted the bolts are to be installed for a trail fit-up and removed to ensure that the coils properly installed. As a final check of the documentation the are inspector picked three bolts (one in each generator) in Unit 2 and requested that they be removed for inspection of the helicoils.
During the removal and inspection operations the mechanic doing the removal stated that he had been the mechan.c that installed the helicoils and bolts in all of the steam generators at that site. Further questioning of this man provided the assurance that he was extremely knowledgeable about the installation procedures ano the precautions necessary to properly install the helicoils and the bolts. Inspection of the three sample bolt holes showed the helicoils to be properly installed.
Based on the results of the random sample testing in Unit 2; the QC Inspection documentaion for the helicoil installation; and the discts-sion with the mechanic who installed the helicoils, the inspector decided that additional testing in Unit I would only result in unneces-sary radiation exposure for the personnel involved.
-
,
n, p
-
.g.
.
j.
A 1 " bolt through the sliding support of the Unit 1 Loop 3 main coolant pump was cut and may not have been properly replaced.
The inspector reviewed the plans for the rain coolant pump supports for both units and inspected the supports in Unit 2 (they are identical to Unit I supports) and could not find any 1 -inch bolts in these supports.
The inspector did note that there were 2-inch diameter bolts in the base plates for the column supports. These bolts are used to position the column base in its propar lateral position after which the column base is staked iato position and the bolts are remeved and discarded.
k.
Unit 1, Steam Generator No. 3, had a defect in the steam generator outlet nozzle and was repaired by the vendor, Westinghouse.
The alleger is concerned that the repair by Westinghouse was not properly documented.
The inspector reviewed the documentation for the weld in que<, tion (Q-1-B13-CCA-10, 11, 12, E309 FW3). The documentation included Noncon-formance Reports (NCR) No. Q-1-W163 and NCR No. Q-1-W166 which documented the discovery and repair of the parent metal defect in the steam generator nozzle.
The support documentation for the two CR's provides assurance that the defect was properly removed and tne excavation repaired.
The documentation also shows that Westinghouse analyzed the defect and found it to be smaller than other primary boundary indications which had been appraised for brittle fracture, crack growth and f atigue behavior and found to be acceptable.
1.
Welding of the hot leg of Unit 1 of the Steam Generator No. 1, started with the generator off vertical alignment by as much as l\\ feet.
Welds had to be cut and the generator realigned. Welds were rewelded with open. butt welding procedures causing six months delay in project.
Vertical alignment problem was caused by the Project Manager of Nuclear Power Piping, who verbally instructed the velder to start the welding process on the hot leg.
The installation documentation for the Unit I steam generator No. I confirmed that welding was started with the generator out of tolerance on plumbness (vertical alignment) This is documented in NCR No. QlM-462 dated 10/30/73.
The documentation does not indicate any personal blame for the alignment problem but does require that plumbness be checked on other generators immediately prior to the start of welding.
m.
Containment 2, possibly the Loop 1 bot leg I.D. tag was located so that it would have been covered up after installation. Alleger was told to grind it off and relocate it.
The alleger had the 1.D. tag ground off and relocated by spot welding in a position where it would not be covered up after installation.
-
^4
/
t
"
.
.
,
-9-
.
A review of the documentation showed that the data plate location was changed for the Loop 1 and Loop 2 bot leg spool pieces.
Work order M5120 documented the change on Loop 1 and work order M5121 documented the change on Loop 2.
In both cases the data plate was attached at the new location with a continuous fillet veld and the removal site was liqtid penetrant inspected. The code data report was modified to show the change in both cases. The location and appearance of the data plates were verified by the inspector.
Welding of the fuel transfer tube bellows on Unit 1 involved two craf ts, n.
the pipefitters had the inner welds and either the boiler-makers or mi11 rights had the outer welds. The pipefitters' weld was acceptable but the other crafts' welds were questionable because the crafts "did not know what they were doing". The outside weld should be checked.
The inspector reviewed the documentation for the installation welding of the transfer tube bellows. The documentation shows that all of the installation welds were radiographically inspected af ter welding.
This inspection was adequate to show that the other crafts welds were acceptable.
In Unit 1, the supports for the six-inch line from the hot leg to the o.
accumulator were moved. The alleger was told by Westinghouse that the supports were installed in a different location than required and may not have been analyzed in their new location.
During the initial discussion of this item with the licensee it was pointed out that the lines from the hot leg to the accumulator were 12-inch lines and that the 6-inch lines were the high pressure safety injection lines. To ensure that the alleger's concerns were properly answered the inspector stated that the location of supports on both 12-inch accumulator lines and the 6-inch high pressure safety injection lines would noth be compared to the configuation described in the final stress analysis to ensure that the as-built locations of Caese supports were accounted for.
During the licensee's review of the stress analysis data the following discoveries were made:
(1) The Bechtel Isometric Drawings included in the stress report for the six-inch safety injection lines do not reflect the as-built hanger locations.
(2) The Westinghouse stress report for the accumulator lines references Grinnell sketches and revisions used in the analysis; In 13 of 47 cases the revision number listed by Westinghouse did not coincide with the latest as built revision number listed by the constructor.
This information was forwarded to the Plant Manager of Unit 1 for information and action on May 7,19/9, by the Construction QA Supervisor.
On May 8, 1979, the plant manager signed Production Change Request No.
.413 217
.
.
-10-
.
79-4020I requiring a full review of Bechtel and Westinghouse stress At the time of the exit interview on May 18, 1979 the verbal reports.f rom Bechtel was that the discrepancy was a paper problem and report that the stress analysis reflected the as-built conditions.
The inspector informed the plant r.anager that a documentation review alone would not be adequate to resolve the questions raised by this allegation.
In that the question still remained as to whether this was only a documentation problem or if there was a hardware involvement the inspector informed the licensee that this item would be carried as an unresolved item No. 50-348/79-17-03, Hanger Stress Analysis Review.
During installation and positioning of Steaci Generatcr No. 3 on Unit p.
No.1 for hot leg installation, the base plates under the sliding feet were bowing.
The crossover support was cut loose and I-beams and shims were forced under the base plates. These were left in place when the concrete was pcured.
This item was discussed with the licensee and contractor personnel involved with the project at the time that this type of activity could have taken place.
A number of people remembered that wide-flange beams and shims were used under all of the support base plates. This was done to provide additional support during leveling operations for all of the generators.
There was also a general agreement among those involved that the beams and shims were lef t ir. place when the concrete was poured.
The inspector asked the licessee to provide an analysis of the affect, if any, of this additional '.aterial being in place under the supports.
This item will be carried an unresolved item No. 50-348/79-17-04 and 50-364/79-07-01, Additional Material under the supports.
Within these areas examined, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
413 218