IR 05000348/1979026
| ML19208B828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1979 |
| From: | Handin A, Verdery E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B823 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-79-26, NUDOCS 7909210465 | |
| Download: ML19208B828 (6) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
'o 8\\,,7[,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11
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AT L ANT A, GEORGI A 30303 Report No. 50-348/79-26 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Facility Name: Farley Unit 1 Docket No. 50-348 License No. NPF-2
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Inspection at r y
'te near Dot.han, Alabama II 7f I
r Inspector:
'eate Gi ned
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[ 79
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Approved by:
'H. Verdery, Ac g Section Chief, RONS Branch
/ Date ' Signed SUmfARY Inspection on July 9-13, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 36 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of IE bulletins and circulars, plant operations, licensee event reports, unresolved and open items and allegations.
Results In the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager
- K. W. McCracken, Technical Superintendent
. D. C. toole, Operations Superintendent
J. E. Garlington, Operations Superintendent
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D. N. Morey, Maintenance Supervisor H. McClellan, Technical Staff L. S. Williams, Training Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians and operators.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 13, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector enumerated the items inspected which were considered closed and those items for which questions remained for resolution.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved item (348/79-18-01):
The subject unresolved item dealt with the emergency escape hatch in Unit 2.
The licensee stated they are having Bechtel review the obstruction to the emergency lock and to make corrections. A design proposal had not been made at the time of the inspection. This item is being closed on Farley Unit 1 because the problem exists only on Unit 2.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Inspection and Tnforcement Bulletins Bulletin 79 03, " Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA 312 Type 304 a.
Stainless St eel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company" The licenset's record file on the above subject was reviewed. The records indicate that:
(1) Youngstown mill test reports on file in Document Control all specify ASME SA-358 pipe which is welded with the addition of filler material, (2) Westinghouse had reviewed the bulletin 990.tC3
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for this facility and reported that to the best of their knowledge the subject piping was not utilized in safety related piping supplied by Westinghouse.
The licensee stated that No. SA 312 or other welded (without filler material) pipe manufactured by Youngstown has been received nor does the licensee plan on using any in the future. This item is closed.
Bulletin 79-04, " Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured b.
by Velan Engineering Corporation" The inspector reviewed the licensees record file on bulletins to ascertain the source of the information on which the licensee based his response.
The number of Velan valves listed in a letter from Westinghouse to Southern Services did not agree with the number listed The licensee stated they had compiled in the licensee's response.
their reported listing by telephone communication with Southern Services and this apparently resulted in a difference between their submittal to the NRC and a later written list of tha valves submitted by Westing-house to Southern Services.
The licensee stated they would review the bulletin response again and would contact the inspector. On July 12, 1979, the licensee told the inspector that the list from Westinghouse to Southern Services contained This accounted for the a valve which should not have been considered.
difference in the number of valves. This item is closed.
Bulletin 79-06 and 79-06A, Revision 1, " Review of Operational Errors c.
and System Misalignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident" The following inspection results pertain to the licensee's response to items in the subject bulletin not previously covered by IE Inspection Reports 50-348/79-22 and 23. The inspection results are keyed to the same number as the bulletin and the licensee's response.
Item 1: The inspector reviewed the licensee administered training
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program related to the TMI incident. Through review of training material and discussions with the Training Supervisor, the inspector verified that commitments made by the licensee in response to bulletin 79-06A were met.
Licensee records show that seven lecture sessions were held lasting about seven hours each and that 110 plant personnel attended the sessions.
Item 3:
Administrative Procedure AP-16 requires the operator to
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manually initiate Safety Injection upon low pressurizer pressure if not automatically initiated. A design change (PCR 382) has been implemented to delete automatic initiation of Safety Injection on coincident low pressurizer level and pressure and to add automatic initiation of safety injection on two out of three low pressurizer pressure signals.
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Item 6: Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 1.0 was revised on
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May 18, 1979 to list parameters to be monitored which indicate whether a PORV is open or leaking.
In a supplementary response to the bulletin dated June 22, 1979 the licensee provided a description of their low temperature overpressure protection system including control room indications that the system is isolated, leaking, or operating.
At the exit interview, the inspector stated there were no further questions on this item at this time.
are three areas for which additional information is required.
There These are items 2, 7, and 12. On Jene 22, 1979, the licensee stated, in a supplemental response, that an owners group would submit a generic response and procedure revisions to the NRC. The inspector discussed the bulletin with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRE). NRR stated they have received a response and are evaluating it.
These areas will be designated as an open item (348/79-26-01)
Item 11: The licensee has revised several procedures to require
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one (1) hour notification and establishment of an open communication channel to the NRC in the case of a significant problem.
The procedures revised were Emergency Implementing Procedures Nos.
EIP 2, 3, 12, 17, 18, and 19. These revisions were reviewed by the inspector and generally stated as in EIP 12. "If an Emergency Alert is declared because the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition, the NRC must be notified within one (1) hour and a continuous communication channel established".
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Bulletin 79-09, " Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breakers in Safety Related Systems" On site records related to this bulletin were reviewed by the inspector.
The inspector verified that the maintenance procedure necessary to This was implement their responce to the bulletin has been issued.
MP-28.7 " Preventative Maintenance of General Electric Type AK-2 DC Circuit Breakers". This item is closed.
Bulletin 79-10, Requalifications Training Program Statistics" e.
The subject bulletin required the licensee to submit certain statistics regarding their requalification training program. The information was submitted on May 22, 1979 and was considered by the inspector to meet the requirements of the bulletin. The item is closed.
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Bulletin 79-11, " Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safeguard Systems" The licensee reported that the circuit breakers under consideration in the bulletin are not used at Farley. This item is' closed.
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6.
Tool and Material Control la Containment The inspector reviewed the following procedures related to tool and material accountability control in containment:
FNP-1-FHP-1.1, " Controlling Procedures for Initial Fueling".
This issued in early 1977, several months before initial
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procedure was and contains in section 3.12 and 3.13 requirements designed fueling, to control tools and equipment in the reactor cavity and to prevent articles from falling into the reactor vessel.
FNP-1-FHP-1.0,." Controlling Procedure for Refueling". This procedure was issued in March, 1979 prior to the first refueling outage and
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contains in Sections 3.11.3, 3.11.4, and 3.11.5 requirements designed to control tools and equipment in the refueling cavity and to prevent articles from falling into the reactor core. The inspector stated at the exit interview that he had no further questions on these procedures.
7.
Open Items Non-Conservative Single Rod Drop Analyses The licensee has submitted a proposed Technical Specification change which Until the resetting of certain rod control parameters.
would authorize Technical Specification is approved, the rod control system will be operated in manual. The licensee has made temporary revisions to Unit Operating Procedures 1.2,1.3, 2.1, and 3.1 to specify manual control of the rod control system. These temporary changes were reviewed by the inspector.
The operation of the rod control system in manual is authorized by Technical Specifications and adequately compensates for the non-conservatism in the single rod drop analyses. Open item 348-79-18-03 and Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 017 issued on April 14, 1979 and Supplemental LER No. 017 issued on June 18, 1979 are closed.
8.
Seismic Qualification of Diesel Generators On June 22, 1979 Southern Company Services (SCS) reported to* Alabama Power Company that sufficient documentation did not exist to ensure compliance SCS with purchase specifications and FSAR committment to IEEE-344 (1971).
met with Fairbanks Morse (F-M) who affirmed that the diesel generators are On June 28, 1979 Alabama Power authorized SCS to seismically qualified.
retain F-M to prepare the necessary documentation to demonstrate seismic This item will qualification of Farley Units 1 and 2 diesel generators.
remain open pending completion of F-M's study (348/79-26-02).
9.
Main Feedwater Line to Steam Generator B During radiography of feedwater lines inside containment the licensee found interference had occurred between the feedwater (FW) line to the B that steam generator and a support beam for the B steam line.
At operating Some damage to temperature the FW line had expanded upward to the beam.
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the FW line has occurred. The licensee stated that the nominal wall thickness (W) of the pipe is 0.938 inches. The minimum W at the damagcd areas was found by UT to be 0.751 indes. In the cold condition the FW line is about There are two gouges one and three quarter (1 3/4) inches from the beam.
in the pipe, about 14 inches apart, where the flanges of the beam meet the The gouges are 2 to 3 inches in pipe du;ing high temperature operation.
length, 3/8 to 7/16 inches wide, and have a maximum depth based on nominal The licensee is continuing wall thickness of 0.187 inches to 0.062 inches.
evaluation of corrective measures and Las stated the occurrence will be fully evaluated and the corrective measures completed prior to startup.
Circular No. 79-04, " Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators" 10.
The licensee has inspected about 150 limitorque valve operators.
Four locking nuts were found to be loose.
With six exceptions, all lock nuts all have been staked. Four of the locking nuts not staked were those in which the local leak rate test (LLRT) would have to be run again and two The licensees for which a special wrench would need to be fabricated.
position is that based on the low failure rate experienced, the probability that one of the six locking nuts had moved to a position where the valve would not operate is very low. The inspector stated the item would be left Following in open pending the inspector consultation with his management.
office review, the inspector concluded the licensee's approach was satisfac-tory.
The licensee agreed to inspect the locking nuts before the next LLRT.
Circular 78-05, Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors" 11.
Review of the licensee's records on this item indicated that the licensee is taking sufficient action to preclude moisture into stranded wire conductors.
12. Operations Review The inspector toured portions of the plant, discussed the plant status with No items shif t foreman and operators and reviewed Control Room operat ions.
of noncompliance or deviation were observed.
13. Inaccurate Barton Gauges Through communication with contractors, the licensee identified three Barton Transmitters on the steam generators which might exhibit inaccurancies The three affected transmitters up to 30 percent at operating temperatures.
all Model 764 with serial numbers 131, 132, and 134. These three transmitters have been replaced with transmitters having serial numbers are 137, 162, and 163. The potentially inaccurate transmitters have been sent via Westinghouse to Barton. This item is closed.
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14.
Licensee Event Reports (LER)
The following licensee went reports were reviewed on site:
a.
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LER No. 19 "High Chloride and Fluoride Concentrations in the Reactor Coolant" On April 20, 1979, during an extended period at cold shutdown, the licensee found chlorides exceeding the transient limit and fluorides exceeding the steady state limit. The licensees evalua-tion of the event was reviewed by the inspector. The conclusion was made by the licensee, based on Westinghouse laboratory studies, that the structural integrity of the system is not impaired.
This item is closed.
LER No.17 "Nonconservative Single Rod Drop Analyses"
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This LER reported the potential for nonconservative safety analysis of the effects of a single rod drop. The licensee has committed to operation of the rod system in manual until a Technical Speci-fication (TS) change is approved and certain trip settings revised.
The licensee has submitted a TS change. The TS change and trip setting revisions will be inspected following completion (348/79-26-03).
LER No.15, " Linear Surface Indications on ECCS Piping"
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The affected piping on the two inch ECCS line to loop 1 cold leg has been replaced. Indications in loop 2 and 3 have been ground out. Tests indicate that all lines are acceptable. LER No. 15 and Open Item 348/79-18-02 are closed.
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The following reports were reviewed in the Regional Office:
LER No.18 " Personnel Hatch Doors Open During Fuel Movement"
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The corrective actions proposed by the licensee are considered satisfactory. This item is closed.
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LER No. 88 " Train "A" River Wat er Pumps Tripped" The licensee reported this event in late November 1977. At that time, the cause was unknown. The licensee submitted a supplemental report stating that Level Switch 511 faulted due to moisture accumulation in the switch box. The licensee has taken action to prevent recurrence.
This LER and Open Item 348/79-02-03 are closed.
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