IR 05000348/1979002
| ML19261B886 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1979 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Hardin A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261B884 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-79-02, 50-348-79-2, NUDOCS 7903070469 | |
| Download: ML19261B886 (6) | |
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8 Rf 0 UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. : 50-348/79-2 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Facility Name: Farley Unit 1 Docket No. : 50-348 License No. : NPF-2 Inspection at Farley Sit ?
Inspector:
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A. K. Hardih Da'te Signed Approved by:
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/[3th f F.S.Cantrell,Act%/SectionChief,RONSBranch Date' Signed Summary
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InspectiononJanuah 8-12, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 37 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee event reports; unresolved and open items and followup on noncompliance.
- Results Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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RII Report No. 50-348/79-2 1-1 DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager
- J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager
- K. W. McCracken, Technical Superintendent
- D. C. Poole, Operations Superintendent
- D. L. Cox, Operations Quality Assurance
- J. W. Kale, Operations Quality Assurance
- F. Wurster, Operations Quality Assurance
- R. Hill, Operations Quality Assurance L. W. Enfinger, Document Control Supervisor J. E. Garlington, Operations Supervisor T. C. Grozan, Technical Staff H. McClellan, Technical Staff Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included plant operators, shif t foreman and supervisors.
- Attended exit interview.
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Exit Interview '
The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with those persons denoted by an asterisk in paragraph 1.
The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection. The licensees comments relative to a review of the completeness of LER reports are contained in paragraph 6.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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a.
(Closed) Noncompliance (348/78-32-02):
The licensee's actual plant organization was not the same as shown in, and as required by, Technical Specification (TS) 6.2-2, in that a maintenance superintendent position has been created. On December 21, 1978, the licensee responded to the noncompliance stating that a TS change to update facility organization had been submitted and that neither approval of safety-related procedures nor voting as a Plant Operations Review Committee member would be done by the maintenance superintendent position until the new technical specification is approved. The inspector verified the submission of the Technical Specifications change request.
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(Closed) Unresolved (348/78-12-03): This unresolved item dealt with the question of whether work requests were being written
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RII Report No. 50-348/79-2 I-2 which contain safety-related procedural steps in the work sequence.
The inspector has discussed this potential problem area and based on the licensee intent and position as discussed in paragraph 7 stated the item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Item There were no unresolved items identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Event Reports LER No. 48
" Containment Atmosphere Monitors R11 and R12 Inoperable" LER Number 48 is the third LER of 1978 dealing with failure of Contain-ment Atmosphere Monitors R11 and R12 and caused by vibration in the unit. The licensee has stated that a design change to shock mount the relay panel to reduce vibration would be requested. (348-78-02-01)
LER No. 85
" River Water Pump No. 9 Removed from Service Due to High Vibration" Removal of River Water Pump No. 9 from service due to high vibration, with No. 10 already out of service made Train A of the river water pumping system inoperable. Normally for Unit 1, two river water pumps (Nos. 4 & 5) are operable in train B and three pumps (Nos. 8, 9 and 10) are operable in train A.
The licensee defines two operable pumps in train B and two operable pumps in train A as equivalent to the two independent river water loops required by Technical Specification 3.7.5.
Thus loss of pump 9 and 10 put the plant into an action state-ment of Technical Specification 3.7.5.
A contributing cause of the high vibration is believed to be due to bearing damage which in turn was caused by fouling of the lube / cooling piping.
This event resulted in the licensee preparing a design change request
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to evaluate fouling of the lube cooling piping. The inspector reviewed the record copy o' Production Change Request No.78-264 requesting an evaluation of the river water pump problem with an engineering design for correction. (J48-79-02-02)
LER No. 86
" Cross Connect of Component Cooling Water (CCW) at Charging Pump IB" During verification of the CCW flow path (STP-23.7) the component cooling water w:s cross connected at charging pump IB through a 1 1/2 inch cooling line. The event occurred because Surveillance Test 23.7 was written as if the test would always be run with charging pump 1B aligned to the "A" train CCW. When charging pump 1B was not aligned to train "A" CCW, verificatio.t of the CCW flow path in accordance with
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RII Report No. 50-348/79-2 I-3 STP 23.7 resulted in a cross connect oi Trains "A" and "B" CCW. The licensee has revised STP 23.7 to show Alignment of Charging Pump 1B to either train.
The procedure change, Revision 2, dated December 6, 1978, was verified by the inspector.
LER No. 87
" River Water Pump No. 4 Removed From Service Due to fligh Vibration" This problem is the same as described in event No. 85 above with the exception that the pump involved No. 4 in train B.
The corrective action being taken by the licensee is the same as in event No. 85.
LER No. 88
" Train "A" River Water Pumps Tripped" This event has occurred previously because of failure of level switch No. LS 511. In this event the licensee verified LS 511 to be operable.
The cause of the event has not teen determined and further investiga-tion will be mad according to the licensee. A supplemental report will be issued. (348-79-02-03)
6.
LER Nos. 66, 72, 79, 83 and 84 A number of LER's previously issued by the licensee and typified by the five above were discussed with the licensee. The discussion dealt with errors of omission or commission in the format of the event report. Typical' of the items were; LER No. 66 - Cause Code Incorrect.
LER No. 72 - Cause Code Incorrect.
LER No. 79 - System Code Incorrect.
LER No. 83 - Overdue Report Date.
LER No. 84 - No Report Date Entered.
The licensee agreed that LER No. 66 probably should have been coded as
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personnel error, but maintained that the basic underlying cause of the event was component failure.
The licensee stated the reason event No. 72 was coded "other" was that they were uncertain whether the cause was defective procedure or personnel error.
On LER No. 79, the licensee stated they had overlooked the fact that a code existed for the fire protection system. On LER No. 83 the licensees position was that the 30 day period ending on a Friday had caused the report to be held over the weekend resulting in the observed late report date.
On LER No. 84 the licensee stated failure to enter a report date was an oversite. The inspector stated his review of LERs did not indicate a trend in late reports or other errors. At the exit interview the licensee agreed that a revision of the cause code for LER No. 66 and a correction to the eystem code for LER No. 79 was in
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RII Report No. 50-348/79-2 I-4 order.
On LER No. 72 the licensee stated they had doubt that the cause was personnel error and preferred to leave the cause code as stated in the LER. The needed change to 66 and 79 were discussed with the licensee by telephone on January 16, 1979. The licensee agreed to issue supplemental reports correcting the cause and system code.
(348-79-02-04)
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Maintenance Procedures Unresolvec Item 348-78-12-03 dealt with the finding that some work requests appear to have step by step maintenance procedures written in the work sequence section and could be considered to be maintenance procedures requiring approval at a higher level of management than required for work requests. During the current inspection the inspector discussed the licensees position and intent with plant management.
The licensee stated that safety-related maintenance procedures would not be issued except as approved in accordance with Technical Specifi-cations. Plant management stated discussions would be held with plant supervisory personnel emphasizing that safety-related work procedures were to be formulated and approved in accordance with Technical Speci-fications and that care must be exercised in preparation of work requests to assure that work requests were not being used as a substi-tute for approved procedures. The item is closed.
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Diesel Generator,s
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Open item 348-78-29-02. This item concerns a Part 21 report by Colt Industries on potential defects in the exhaust rocker arm for PC-2 diesels. Farley Units 1 and 2 have three PC-2 diesels. The status of exhaust rocker arm investigation is as follows. Inspection of rocker arms has been completed for DG-2B. Two rocker arms were considered to have minor defects and are being replaced. Replacement was started on Janua ry 11, 1979. A full set of new rocker arms is on site and inspec-tion will be started on DG-1-B when 2B is completed. About 3 days per
diesel is estimated for each diesel.
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Loop Operating Temperature Below 541*F Following failure of a steam generator safety valve to rescat Tavg dropped below 541 F for about five minutes. The valve was sent to the manufacturer to ascertain the cause of the failure. It was known at the time of failure that the valve did not rescat because of a broken lower adjusting ring loc 3 'ng pin. Further analyses by the manufacturer resulted in the conclusion that the pin had failed due to fatigue caused by local stresses induced during machining.
According to the licensee, the vendor considers the potential for like failures to be very small. To reduce further the likelihood of the potential failure mechanism occurring, the vendor modified his inspection procedur '
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RII Report No. 50-348/79-2 I-5 Farley Unit 1 intends to replace all of the existing ring pins during the refueling outage. Open item 348/78-19-02 is closed.
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