IR 05000341/1985011
| ML20212K793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Fermi |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1985 |
| From: | Weil C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Pawlik E NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212J657 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-202 NUDOCS 8701290202 | |
| Download: ML20212K793 (1) | |
Text
/
,
s
_
4 gA taru UNITED STATES
+*
'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
,
f
e(
REGIONlli 3-799 ROOSEVELT RO AD g
d,ee GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOt$ 60137
,5
%
.....
March 25, 1985
.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
E. T. Pawlik, Director, Office of Investigations Field Office, RIII FROM:
Charles H. Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist SUBJECT:
ALLEGATION RE:
CUT RADIOGRAPHS AT FERMI DOCKET NO. 50-341 (ATS NO. RIII-84-A-0175)
The enclosed Inspection Report is forwarded for the use by your staff in 01 Report No. 3-84-019.
-
Charles H. Weil (
Investigation and Compliance Specialist
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
No. 50-341/85-11
l
l
l
EXHIBIT 29
8701290202 870116
CARDE86-202
/
i
.
. - -
-
?W
'
o
.s
hwy ( 191985
'
.
Docket No. 50-341
The Detroit Edison Company
ATTN:
Wayne H. Jens
Vice President
Nuclear Operr.tions
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166
Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. P. D. Kaufman
and J. W. Muffett of this office on February 19-22 and March 4,1985, of
activities at Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, authorized by NRC Construction
Permit No. CPPR-87, and to the discussion of our findings with you and others
of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during
the inspection.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective
cxamination of procedures and representative records, observations, and
l
interviews with personnel.
During this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in non-
compliance with NRC requirements, as specified in the enclosed Appendix.
A written response is required.
In a
REGION III==
Report No. 50-341/85011(DRS)
Docket No. 50-341
License No. CPPR-87
Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48224
Facility Name:
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2
Inspection At:
Enrico Fermi 2 Site, Monroe, Michigan
Inspection Dates:
February 19-22 and March 4, 1985
/
/
3 /f M
Inspectors-
. D. Kaufman
//
Date
jdh
3 e/e.s
.
J. W. Muffet
Date
k
_
Approved By:
D.
. Danielson, Chief
3 / 9!/f
Materials & Processes Section
Date'
Inspection Summary
Inspection on February 19-22 and March 4, 1985 (Report No. 50-341/85011(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced safety inspection to review licensee
action on IE Bulletin 79-02 and to review a reactor internal welds allegation.
The inspection involved a total of 63 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors,
including 9 inspector-hours during offshifts,-and 10 inspector-hours of
in-office review.
Results:
In the areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were identified.
(Failure to take appropriate corrective action - Paragraph 2.b.(3); inadequate
design control - Paragraph 2.c.)
-
.
-.
-
-- -
-
.
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Detroit Edison Company (Deco)
- W.
H. Jens, Vice President
- 0. K. Earle, Supervisor / Licensing
- J. E. Conen, Engineer / Licensing
- F. Schwartz, Supervisor NQA
- W. M. Street, Supervising Engineer / Civil
- A. F. Colandrea, Principal Civil Engineer
- J. F. Malaric, Supervisor / Field Engineering
G. M. Trahey, Director NQA
F. Agosti, Manager / Nuclear Operations
S. Noetzel, Assistant Man.ager, E.F.2.
- Denotes those attending the onsite exit interview of February 22, 1985.
2.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins
(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-02 (341/79-02-BB, 341/79-02-1B, 341/79-02-2B,
341/79-02-3B):
" Pipe Support Base Plate Designs using Concrete
Expansion Anchor Bolts."
a.
RIII Inspection Report No. 50-341/84-59 addresses certain remaining
open items to be accomplished by the licensee.
The following actions
were to be performed by the licensee:
(1) Verify that the as-built reconciliation stress report
loads have been accounted for in the reduced capacity
anchor qualification calculations.
(2) Perform an anchor bolt surveillance walkdown of the
drywell area.
l
(3) Demonstrate that the minimum anchor bolt spacing vio-
l
1ations observed during the NRC inspector's walkdown on
January 22, 1985 are fully QC documented, and that
qualification calculations account for the reduced
capacities of the anchor bolts.
(4) Compile the 885 Anchor Bolt Surveillance Reports (ABSRs)
generated by the Systems Completion Organization and all
necessary qualification calculations.
i
b.
The status of licensee actions regarding the above items was
determined to be as follows:
.
.
.
.
.
l
(1) A review of anchor spacing violation qualification cal-
'
culations revealed that the licensee has and is using
the latest as-built reconciliation stress report loads
in its evaluations.
l
i
(2) The licensee conducted an anchor bolt surveillance walk-
!
down of the drywell area on February 14 and 15, 1985.
'
The following supports were found which had minimum
expansion anchor spacing violations, but were neither
documented nor qualified:
l
l
- T23-12837-39-G10
- G33-3096-G30
- B21-2587-G21
B21-2588-G06
T23-I2837-43-G37
T23-12837-39-G01
T23-12837-39-G38
- 0bserved by the NRC inspector during a field walkdown
conducted on February 5, 1985.
The above supports have since been qualified and fully
documented.
No rework was required.
(3) The licensee was unable to provide adequate documentation
(
on the NRC inspector's observed anchor bolt spacing vio-
lations.
The licensee initiated a sample walkdown looking
for 50 apparent anchor spacing violations and determining
if the violations had been appropriately QC documented and
qualified as requested by the Region III office.
The
supports listed below, which were found that had anchor
spacing violations, were neither documented nor qualified:
- P44-3368-G12A
P44-3368-G11
E11-3154-G10
G33-3244-G35
T50-7114-G39
The following support anchor spacing violations were
documented, but never technically qualified as acceptable
in any design calculations:
E41-3163-G14
T50-7432-G03
T50-7431-G07
- E11-3178-G06
- E11-3154-G20
E11-3152-G23
E51-3175-G30
W-P42-5242-G04
GWI-E21-7005-G05
_.
.
.
- 0bserved by the NRC inspector during a review and
field walkdown on January 22, 1985.
Calculations have since been completed for the above
anchor spacing violations and confirm the acceptability
of the as-installed conditions.
l
The inspector, after reviewing the installation documen-
tation packages of these supports determined that the
majority of these concrete anchors were installed prior
to the licensee's March 1982 System Completion Organi-
t
zations (SCO) anchor violation surveillance walkdown.
The anchor violation surveillance program was conducted
to facilitate closure of the licensee's reported
March 26, 1981, 50.55(e) deficiency report, Item #42,
on this matter.
Upon completing their review and analyses of 885 Anchor
Bolt Surveillance Reports (ABSRs) generated by the SCO
groups walkdown of the site, without any deviations
requiring anchor relocation to achieve IE Bulletin 79-02
safety factors, the licensee submitted their final 50.55(e)
report, dated June 3, 1983.
This 50.55(e) report was
subsequently closed in Region III Inspection Report
No. 50-341/83-19.
However, this NRC inspection revealed
a significant amount of anchor bolt installations which
i
deviated from the minimum anchor design spacing require-
ments specified in DECO Project Specification 3071-226,
>
Revision F, Paragraph 3.3.3, that were neither documented
nor qualified.
Based on these findings, the inspector concludes that
the licensee did not take appropriate corrective action
regarding the reported 50.55(e) on the spacing of con-
crete anchors.
This constitutes an item of noncompliance
with Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (341/85011-01).
The following design deficiencies were noted by the NRC inspector
c.
while reviewing ABSR qualification calculations:
(1) The licensee lowered the average ultimate tensile loads
for Phillips Wedge anchor sizes 3/8",
1", and 1k", as,
indicated in DECO Project Specification 3071-226, Revision F,
Table 1-B.
This change constituted design evaluations to
verify the acceptability of anchors to the slightly lower
tensile loads.
However, these verifications were never
performed as evidenced by Stone and Webster's pipe support
calculation No. Z-E11-129, Revision 7, for support
E11-3154-620, which still shows the higher average ultimate
tensile loads being applied from Revision E of Specification
3071-226.
.. -
-.
.
.
-
- - -.
-.
. _ -
-_. _
-
-
.
.
l
~
.
-
i
.
(2) Specification 3071-226, Revision F, and Deco drawing
SC721-2002, Revision H. Note 11, requires that the Torque
and Tension Test Load be specified on the installation
.
drawing if a designer utilizes the higher tension loads
from Table 1-B of Specification 3071-226 in his calcu-
-
lations.
However, the installation drawings and all
'
applicable change documents relative to pipe support
l
E11-3154-G20 were reviewed by the NRC inspector and none
'
contained the required special installation torque and
tension note.
(3) Design Change Request (DCR) No. P-5299, Revision B,
reconciliation calculation prepared by DECO-Troy design
,
office on February 14, 1985, to resolve an anchor bolt
spacing violation utilized the incorrect higher tensile
load values from the superseded Revision E of Specifi-
cation 3071-226.
.
Failure to assure adequate control of design activities or methods
constitutes an item of noncompliance with Criterion III of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B (341/85011-02).
d.
To minimize the effects of expansion anchor bolt spacing violations,
the licensee has taken the following actions:
- Utilized the concrete compressive test results and a
g
regression analysis to enable an increase in concrete
!
compressive strength (f'c) to 5900 psi.
Shear-tension interaction evaluations utilizing a "5/3
power."
Used a shear cone reduction method instead of the straight
line reduction method.
The licensee's utilization of the above data in anchor bolt spacing
assessments will result in no modifications or reduction in safety
!
factors.
3.
Allegation (RIII-84-A-175)
An allegation received by the Fermi 2 Safeteam on August 12, 1983,
concerning radiography of reactor internal welds was reported to the
NRC resident inspector as follows:
The NDE contractor was asked to
radiograph the field installed jet pump diffuser to adapter weld on
jet pumps #2, #7, #11, and #18.
Oversize film was used and the shop
tailpipe to diffuser weld was also inadvertently radiographed.
Upon
developing the film, a decision to trim the unwanted portion, which
included the tailpipe to diffuser weld, was made.
The inadvertently
radiographed tailpipe to diffuser weld contained indications of porosity.
',
l
l
4
.. -.,,,-,_.- - _.
, _ _ _ _, - -, - - _ -
_,. -... _, -.,.., -. - _ _ -,
,. - -
- - -.,., -. _,
- - -.,,..
.
___
= _.. =--
.
- _ ___
.
_ - -.
_-
.
?
.
,
.
The alleger stated that the film was trimmed to hide unacceptable
welding.
Subsequent to the initial allegation, the alleger also stated
that the diffuser to adapter weld also contained rejectable indications
of various types.
Concerning the inadvertently radiographed tailpipe to diffuser shop welds,
only dye penetrant and visual examinations are required.
The welds in
question have passed the required acceptance standards..To provide added
assurance regarding these welds, the radiographs of the tailpipe to
diffuser welds were evaluated by both the licensee and the NRC inspector
and found to be acceptable to the extent reviewed.
However, the bases
i
for acceptance of the tailpipe to diffuser welds are the dye penetrant
and visual examinations, not the inadvertent radiographs,
i
Concerning the allegation of rejectable indications of the radiographs
of the diffuser to adapter welds, an additional inspection was performed.
During this inspection, radiographs of these welds were reviewed and
l
rejectable indications were found.
The radiographs of these welds were
.
rejected by the licensee and referred to General Electric (GE) on
'
March 31, 1982.
GE decided that radiographic acceptance standards for
these welds were inappropriate.
GE performed a fracture mechanics
evaluation and determined that ultrasonic testing and dye penetrant
-
examination were appropriate in this instance.
The welds in question
are not pressure boundary welds and, therefore, the change in acceptance
standards was appropriate and is acceptable.
Ultrasonic testing and dye
,
{
penetrant examinations were performed and indications found by dye
penetrant were removed by grinding.
The bases for acceptance of the
diffuser to adapter welds are the dye penetrant examination, visual
!
examination, ultrasonic testing and the fracture mechanics evaluation.
The rejectable radiographs of the diffuser to adapter welds were reported
j
to the NRC as a 50.55(e) deficiency.
This item was closed in RIII
Inspection Report No. 50-341/82-09.
Also, the portion of the allegation
concerning the trimming of film was closed in RIII Inspection Report
No. 50-341/84-59.
The inspection substantiated the alleged cutting of the film and
j
substantiated the rejectable indications in the radiographs of the
diffuser to adapter welds.
However, neither the governing code nor
the applicable procedures were violated by the licensee or its agents.
Based on satisfactory completion of appropriate examinations and
resolution of the radiographic issue, these welds are acceptable.
This allegation is considered closed.
4.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the onsite portion of the inspection and discussed
the scope and concerns of this inspection.
The inspectors also discussed
the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to
documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
- -
. - - - -
_.
.. - -.
...... -. -.
.
- - -
. - -
-
- -
.
-
.
-.
.
.-
.. -
,..,,
-
.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
Additional information was discussed telephonically with a licensee
representative on March 4, 1985.
%
e
t
i
!
i
'
.
. -
. -_--_ -__.,..,._...
..,, _. _ _ _ -, _
.
..
- - -.... -.
. -
. -
. -. - -
.
-
..