IR 05000341/2025001
| ML25132A227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/2025 |
| From: | Sanchez-Santiago E NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
| References | |
| IR 2025001 | |
| Download: ML25132A227 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2-INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2025001
Dear Peter Dietrich:
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. On April 10, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
May 12, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43 Enclosure:
As stated cc: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Sanchez Santiago, Elba on 05/12/25
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115
List of Findings and Violations
Safety-Related Control Air Relief Valve Lifts During Scaffold Construction Activity Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500101 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.13 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4, Procedures, occurred when contact was made with the division 2 safety-related non-interruptible air system (NIAS) receiver relief valve during scaffold construction activities. The relief valve lifted and did not reseat, resulting in several supported safety-related systems being declared inoperable. Contrary to procedure MGA24, Human Performance Program and Field Worker Tools, workers failed to realize fall protection equipment could make contact with the relief valve.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000341/2024002-00 LER 2024002-00, Primary Containment Isolation Valve Declared Inoperable for a Period Prohibited by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent power. On January 12, 2025, in response to spurious actuation of the east turbine bypass valve, power was lowered to approximately 85 percent power. Power was restored to 100 percent on January 13, 2025, following initial troubleshooting of the east turbine bypass valve and its subsequent removal from service. On February 14, 2025, power was reduced to approximately 70 percent for a routine rod pattern adjustment and surveillances. Power was restored to 100 percent on February 16, 2025, and remained there for the rest of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe cold weather on January 22, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Division 1 core spray system during division 2 maintenance, completed the week ending January 18, 2025
- (2) High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) prior to reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)maintenance, completed the week ending January 25, 2025
- (3) Nitrogen bottle supply to hardened containment ventilation post-division II control air relief valve repairs, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during full walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the reactor core isolation cooling system, completed the week ending March 29, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Reactor building second floor north fire zone on January 23, 2025
- (2) Reactor building second floor south fire zone on January 23, 2025
- (3) Emergency diesel generator (EDG) 11 engine room, completed the week ending January 25, 2025
- (4) EDG 12 engine room, completed the week ending January 25, 2025
- (5) Reactor building CO2 cardox tank, compressor level, and pressure during cold weather, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on January 23, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power ascension from 83 percent to 100 percent following shutdown of the east turbine bypass valve unitized actuator on January 3, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated training in the control room simulator associated with a failed jet pump and loss of all reactor level indication on February 5, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Safety-related battery chargers, completed the week ending March 8, 2025
- (2) Residual heat removal (RHR), and an in-depth review of capacitor, inverter, and relay replacement preventive maintenance (PM) frequencies, completed the week ending March 22, 2025
- (3) Scheduling and execution of EDG maintenance activities in accordance with technical requirements, completed the week ending March 29, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Response to, and repair of, steam leak from the north reheater seal tank emergency drain piping, completed the week ending February 15, 2025
- (2) Oil leak on 120 kV transformer 1, completed the week ending February 15, 2025
- (3) Division 2 safety-related air receiver relief valve lift during scaffold-building activities, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
- (4) Spurious opening of the east turbine bypass valve, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
- (5) Elevated temperatures on fuses for 120VAC instrumentation power supply MPU3, completed the week ending March 29, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Division 2 control center heating ventilation and cooling (CCHVAC) lower chill waterflow, completed the week ending February 8, 2025
- (2) Review of increased reactor water cleanup system leakage in terms of alternate source term dose assumptions, completed the week ending February 15, 2025
- (3) RCIC flow switch past operability review, completed the week ending March 29, 2025 (4)
(Partial)
Degraded linkage pin associated with the HPCI pump governor valve
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
- (1) RCIC steam exhaust master trip unit perceived failure and subsequent functional testing on January 14, 2025
- (2) Division 2 core spray safety system outage on January 22, 2025
- (3) Reactor protection system (RPS) B agastat relay replacements on January 23, 2025
- (4) EDG 12 auxiliary motor control center hot spot repair, completed the week ending February 1, 2025
- (5) RCIC maintenance outage, completed the week ending February 22, 2025
- (6) Preventative maintenance on breakers and mechanical components associated with the B mechanical draft cooling tower fan, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
- (7) RPS A motor generator set replacement, completed the week ending March 22, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) EDG 12 24-hour surveillance run on January 14, 2025
- (2) Emergency equipment service water B heat exchanger differential pressure measurements, completed the week ending February 15, 2025
- (3) Standby feedwater (SBFW) B test, completed the week ending February 22, 2025
- (4) Division 1 emergency equipment cooling water testing, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
- (5) Division 1 core spray pump and valve test, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) HPCI testing, completed the week ending February 28, 2025
- (2) Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) testing, completed the week ending February 28, 2025
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) FLEX N and N+1 550 kW diesel generator full load test, completed the week ending March 29,
OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1,2024, through December 31, 2024)
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) A history of spurious nuclear steam supply shutoff system channel D signals for group 1 (main steam) isolation, most recently documented in CR202545091, completed the week ending March 15, 2025
- (2) Design question regarding interaction of the core spray (CS) pump circuits with EDG load-shedding circuits, completed on March 24. 2025
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 2024002-00, Primary Containment Isolation Valve Declared Inoperable for a Period Prohibited by Plant Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML24137A008). The issue involved a licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance associated with the initial operability determination. The results are documented in this report under Section 71153. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Safety-Related Control Air Relief Valve Lifts During Scaffold Construction Activity Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500101 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.13 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4, Procedures, occurred when contact was made with the division 2 safety-related non-interruptible air system (NIAS) receiver relief valve during scaffold construction activities. The relief valve lifted and did not reseat, resulting in several supported safety-related systems being declared inoperable. Contrary to procedure MGA24, Human Performance Program and Field Worker Tools, workers failed to realize fall protection equipment could make contact with the relief valve.
Description:
On February 6, 2025, Work Order (WO) 950011441, Scaffold Support for WO 65211150 T82N455D, RBFD, RB Zone 4 Ionization Fire Detector Sensitivity Test, was being performed to build scaffold near the division 2 NIAS receiver tank to facilitate an upcoming surveillance for a fire detector near the ceiling of the room. While assembling upper levels of the scaffold, workers heard a noise and discovered valve P5000F223B, NIAS control air receiver P5002A002 relief valve, leaking. Operations staff were promptly informed and work was stopped. The division 2 NIAS supplies various safety-related division 2 systems, such as the reactor building to torus vacuum breakers, the standby gas treatment system (SGTS), and the control center heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (CCHVAC) systems.
Pressure in the system started to lower slowly as operations and mechanical maintenance staff arrived at the component location. Maintenance personnel attempted to manually operate the valve to get it to reseat but were unsuccessful. Operations staff elected to start the associated safety-related air compressor to maintain system pressure above the setpoints where compressors would auto-start and automatic isolations between safety and non-safety portions of the air system would occur. This was successful; however, approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later, a high-temperature alarm was received for the running division 2 safety-related air compressor. Operations secured the air compressor and in accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for a loss of station and/or control air, opened the crosstie between the non-safety-related instrument air system and the division 2 NIAS. This restored and maintained pressure to the division 2 safety-related air loads until the relief valve was repaired later that evening.
No spurious actuations of equipment occurred; however, as a result of the above events, several TS action statements were entered for division 2 NIAS supported systems, including a 72-hour shutdown action for the reactor building to torus vacuum breakers, and 7-day shutdown actions for secondary containment (railway airlock door seal), SGTS, and CCHVAC. Following relief valve replacement, inspections and tests were performed on the division 2 control air compressor. No abnormalities were noted, and surveillance tests were completed satisfactorily. The machines are not expected to operate continuously while performing their safety functions, therefore the high aftercooler temperature was expected for the particular circumstances.
Work Order 950011441 directed the scaffold be constructed in accordance with numerous site procedures, including MGA24, Human Performance Program and Field Worker Tools.
Procedure MGA24 contains requirements and tools for personnel to use while performing work to prevent impacts to the plant. Specifically, Section 4.1.8 of MGA24 directs workers to use human performance tools rigorously, to anticipate problems and take precautions or countermeasures before and during activities individuals perform or supervise, and to watch for incorrect conditions or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant performance.
To facilitate implementation of those steps, Appendix F of MGA24 describes tools to accomplish those steps, including questioning attitude/take two, which involves improving situational awareness at the jobsite to gain an accurate understanding of the work environment and hazards. The post-event licensee investigation documented in CR202545501 concluded that during scaffold construction, a workers fall protection equipment contacted the relief valve and caused it to lift. The cause documented was that a human performance tool was not properly used, specifically in terms of situational awareness and risk perception. The potential interaction of fall protection equipment and plant equipment was not recognized while assessing and performing work in the vicinity of the air receiver.
Corrective Actions: The relief valve was replaced, restoring the functionality of the division 2 NIAS.
Corrective Action References: CR202545497, CR202545501
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to properly use a human performance tool, to recognize the potential interaction between fall arrest equipment and the relief valve during scaffold construction in accordance with MGA24, Human Performance Program and Field Worker Tools, was a performance deficiency that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and the issue of concern should have been prevented.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a safety-related valve was damaged, resulting in an abnormal operating procedure entry and several safety-related TS systems to be declared inoperable pending emergent repair work.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, all questions in Exhibit 2 for Mitigating Systems were answered no.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the nuclear safety risk associated with working around a passive component, such as a relief valve, was not apparent to the work group.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9 addresses Procedures for Performing Maintenance and Section 9.a addresses maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment.
Since WO 950011441, Scaffold Support for WO 65211150 T82N455D, RBFD, RB Zone 4 Ionization Fire Detector Sensitivity Test, involved scaffold construction in close proximity to safety-related equipment, it involved maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. and directed procedure MGA24, Human Performance Program and Field Worker Tools, to be followed as part of the scaffold construction activities. MGA24, Revision 14, issued April 3, 2023, has a stated purpose to address prevention and minimization of the adverse impact of human error on the physical plant. Procedure MGA24, Step 4.1.8 requires workers to, in part, anticipate problems and take precautions or countermeasures before and during activities individuals perform or supervise. Further, that workers watch for incorrect conditions or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant performance.
Contrary to the above, on February 6, 2025, the licensee failed to implement a TS 5.4 required procedure. Specifically, the licensee did not implement Step 4.1.8 of procedure MGA24 to anticipate problems and take precautions or countermeasures before and during activities individuals perform or supervise. Further, the licensee did not watch for incorrect conditions or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant performance. Specifically, while utilizing fall protection equipment in close proximity to safety-related relief valve P5000F223B while constructing scaffold, the licensee failed to recognize the equipment could contact the relief valve. As a result, an appropriate countermeasure was not instituted to prevent the relief valve from being actuated during the maintenance activity.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3 states, Each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be operable.
TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition C states that if the following condition exists, One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except due to leakage not within limits then perform the required action to isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange in the required completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed system.
A further required action states to verify the affected penetration flowpath is isolated with a required completion time of once per 31 days.
TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition E states that if the following condition exists, required action and associated completion time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met in Mode 1, 2, or 3, then perform the required action E.1 to Be in Mode 3 in the completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and perform the required action to Be in Mode 4 in the completion time of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from May 26, 2023, to March 19, 2024, the licensee failed to perform the required actions within the associated completion times of TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Conditions C and E. Specifically, on May 26, 2023, the licensee did not recognize valve E4150F042, high pressure coolant injection booster pump suction valve from the suppression pool, was inoperable when operators had to hold the close pushbutton down to make the valve close (versus one momentary push of the button). When identified by licensee staff on March 19, 2024, the appropriate TS LCO condition was entered, the valves circuit was repaired, and the TS LCO condition was subsequently exited.
Significance/Severity: Green. The finding was screened to Green under the barrier integrity and mitigating systems cornerstones using IMC 0609 App A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings AtPower. For barrier integrity, all questions in Exhibit 3, Section C, Reactor Containment, were answered no due to no actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. For mitigating systems, the Exhibit 2 screening questions in Section A were answered no due to no impact on the PRA functionality of the HPCI system.
Corrective Action References: CR202436970
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 10, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to P. Dietrich, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
X4103
Design Basis Document for the Residual Heat Removal
Complex Heating and Ventilating System
B
6M7312034
Diagram Core Spray System (CSS) Reactor Building
M2043
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Barometric
Condenser (HPCI) Reactor Building
AJ
M2044
Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
M2045
Diagram RCIC System Barometric Condenser
AT
M57081
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Functional
Operating Sketch
M57082
HPCI Turbine Lube Oil/Control Oil Functional Operating
Sketch
L
M57091
RCIC System Functional Operating Sketch
Drawings
M57371
Hardened Containment Vent System for Standby Gas
Treatment Purge System Functional Operating Sketch
B
Miscellaneous
E21D2000039
Perform MOV Thermal O/L Test E2150F004B
(MCC 72F4A POS 4B). (C983)
01/14/2025
23.203
Core Spray System
23.203 Att. 1A
Core Spray System Division 1 Initial Valve Lineup
Procedures
EF-PRA005.27
Containment Venting System Information Notebook
CR202444028
RB Cardox Level is LOOS Red Reading
11/29/2024
CR202544930
RB Cardox Compressor is Cycling On and Off
01/10/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202545188
RB Cardox Issues
01/22/2025
M4548
Fire Protection Diagrams CO2, Halon & FM - 200 Systems
for Auxiliary Service, Radwaste, Security Diesel Generator
Buildings, Guardhouse and Security Building
S
M5050
Low Pressure CO2 Fire Protection System General
Schematic Arrangement
C
Drawings
M57733
CO2, Halon & FM - 200 Systems for Auxiliary Service,
Radwaste, Security Diesel Generator Buildings, Guardhouse
and Security Building Functional Operating Sketch
N
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
FP-RB210a
Reactor Building Emergency Equipment Cooling Water,
North, Zone 10, EL. 613' 6"
FP-RB210b
Reactor Building, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water,
South, Zone 10, EL. 613' 6"
Fire Plans
FP-RB210c
Reactor Building, 2nd Floor Cable Tray Area, Zone 10,
EL. 613' 6"
Miscellaneous
LP-FP9401013
Fire Drill Guide/Evaluation: Main Turbine Generator TB3
FP-RHR111-
RHR Complex, EDG 11 Room, EL 590' 0"
FP-RHR112-
RHR Complex, EDG 12 Room, EL 590' 0"
Procedures
MOP23
Plant Storage
Work Orders
Perform Fire Drill for Operations Shift Number 3
01/23/2025
Miscellaneous
SS-OP2022451
License Operator Requalification Simulation Lesson Plan
2.000.03
Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%
108
Emergency
Procedure
Appendix B, Vol 2
Emergency Procedure Guidelines for Hot Conditions
Procedures
EP101
RERP Pan Implementing Procedure: Classification of
Emergencies
27914
High Voltage Shutdown Card Failed on Battery Charger
2A12 R3200S020C During PM Testing
07/13/2022
CR 1928886
The As-Found Was Out of Tolerance. Adjusted Relays to
Acceptance Criteria
09/12/2023
CR 2024630
As-Found Testing Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria
09/08/2023
CR202333588
E1150F016A Grade 3 and 4 Grease
10/08/2023
CR202437487
E11A-K067B HFA Relay Failed As-Found Testing
03/29/2024
CR202442192
Blown Fuse E41F2B in H21P081 Panel
09/12/2024
Cr-202442809
Load Bank Not Working Properly
10/09/2024
CR202442844
Phasing Balance Acceptance Criteria Unsat for 2A2 Battery
Charger
10/10/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202544897
10D68 Div II ESS 130V Battery 2PB Trouble
(2B1 Battery Charge)
01/09/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202545366
Multiple Issues with EDG PM Events
01/30/2025
CR-202546155
Discrepancy in 35.307.010 Rev 30
03/11/2025
6SD7212530-10
One-Line Diagram 260/130V Ess. Dual Battery 2PA
Distribution Division I
6SD7212530-11
One-Line Diagram 260/130V Ess. Dual Battery 2Pb
Distribution - Division II
EFA-E1116-004
Impact of Additional Containment Penetration Min-K on
ECCS Suction Strainer Design
A
Drawings
I220505
Schematic Diagram RHR Relay Logic B Circuit Part 1
Y
Miscellaneous
Residual Heat
Removal System
Health Report
Residual Heat Removal System Health Report
24
34.307.001
Emergency Diesel Generators - Inspection and Preventive
Maintenance
34.307.010
Emergency Diesel Fuel Injector Maintenance
35.309.010
Division 1, 130 Volt Battery Charger Testing, Calibration and
General Maintenance
Procedures
MMR Appendix E
Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions
44151708
Functional Testing Clean and Inspection of HFA Relay
E11A-K067B at H11P618
03/27/2024
44151943
Test E11A-K7B 125V HFA Relay in H11P618 RHR Logic B
04/16/2020
50171383
Inspect and Test Relays at Breaker Position 65E-E5
11/19/2019
57862577
Test Div. 1 130VDC Spare Battery Charger 2A12
2/03/2025
57862577
Test Div. 1 130VDC Spare Battery Charger
2A1207/05/2022
2314076
Perform 24-Month PM Tasks per 34.307.001 on Emergency
Diesel Generator 14
03/25/2025
Work Orders
67331003
Perform 44.030.252 ECCS Reactor Water Level 1, 2 and 8
Division 2 Channel B Functional
09/17/2024
Calculations
DC4931
Non-Interruptible Control Air System (NIAS) Calculations
04/12/2019
CR202444994
East Turbine Bypass Valve Spurious Opening
01/13/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202544778
N22-F413 (N Reheater Seal Tank EDL Valve) Leaking
01/01/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202544865
NQA - Concerns on Weld Procedures Specifications Used to
Replace N22F413 in 2020
01/07/2025
CR202545182
Control Room Not Receiving Alarm from Transformer One
Low Oil
01/22/2025
CR202545400
Potential Electrical Hot Spot on MPU 3
2/01/2025
CR202545497
Div-2 NIS Receiver Relief Valve Failed Open
2/06/2025
Cr-202545501
Div. 2 CA P5000F223B Receiver Relief Valve Identified by
Crew Having Leak By During Scaffold Installation
2/06/2025
CR202545506
Div-2 Control Air Compressor-Loaded Run
2/06/2025
Cr-202545528
P5000F223B Failed As-Found Testing
2/07/2025
Drawings
6SD7212530-02
One-Line Diagram 120V AC Inst. & Cont. Power Feeders
BOP1 & BOP2 Reactor Building
Engineering
Changes
250001
Online Leak Repair of N22F413
ACMP 25002
Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan - MPU 3
DBD: P5002,03
Design Basis Document: Control Air and Breathing Air
System
Notice 961057: Adequacy of the Control Air Compressor to
Perform their Function
08/29/1996
ODMI25001
East Turbine Bypass Valve Spurious Opening
01/13/2025
Miscellaneous
TSC 18191011
NIAS Operability and Compliance of Limiting Condition for
Operation
20.129.01
Loss of Station and/or Control Air
23.129
Station and Control Air System
25
23.129.01
Alternate Air Supply System
23.308
20V AC Instrument and Control Power System
24.129.01
Station and Control Air System Valve Operability Test
ARP 7D52
Division II Control Air System Trouble
EF2-PRA005.23
System Information Notebook: Compressed Air Systems
MES 90
Standard Design Process Interface
4.3
MGA 24
Human Performance Program and Field Worker Tools
Procedures
MMA 08
2.1
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
VMB114.1
Vendor Manual: Joy Manufacturing Class WGO9 5" Stroke
Oil Free Air Compressor
B
950008550
Repair Flange Gasket Containment Leak on XFMR 1
11/05/2024
Work Orders
950011441
Scaffold Support for WO 65211150 T82N455D, RBFD,
RB Zone 4 Ionization Fire Detector Sensitivity Test
01/28/2025
DC0758
CCHVAC System Chilled Water Pump Head
03/28/2016
Calculations
DC4321
Control Center Complex HVAC Cooling Heating Loads
Trend Only
27219
Suspect Leakage from RWCU Demin A Vessel
09/12/2016
28212
RWCU A Demin Pit Inspection Results
11/15/2017
1730418
Flange Face of Demin A Dome Needs Repair
2/27/2017
23545
E51N002 Barton HI/LOW Flow Switch Found Broken during
PM E830
06/24/2019
CARD 0721255
2007 RCIC Safety System Outage
03/03/2007
CARD 0728005
Revise Design Calculations to Support IST Criteria
(RHR/LPCI, CCHVAC, EECW MU)
2/13/2007
CARD 0828226
Request PM Deferral for Event E830 (WO 26004245)
2/09/2008
CARD 1021478
February 2010 RCIC SSO Work Lost
2/17/2010
CARD 1324395
AFCC 4 for E51N002 during PM E830
06/19/2023
CARD 1625792
E51N002 RCIC Pump Discharge Hi/Low Flow Switch Found
Broken (AFCC 2)
07/21/2016
CARD 1923545
E51N002 Barton Hi/Low Flow Switch Found Broken during
PM E830
05/07/2019
CARD 2320880
RCIC Discharge Pump D/P Switch As-Found Outside of
APT (AFCC 3)
2/01/2023
CR202330577
G3300F165A(RB4) Leak Contributing to Water on Floor on
RB3
06/28/2023
CR202442203
D076 Input Continues to Increase RWCU F/D A Vessel Leak
and/or Valve Leak Continues to Worsen
01/02/2025
CR202444477
TMTE240026 ERVR127: Prioritize Correction of Leakage
Reduction Program External Leak from RWCU
2/16/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202545084
Division 2 CCHVAC Chill Water Pump Flow Lower than
Expected
01/16/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202545303
During Performance of WO 67010395, E51N002, the Low
Switch Never Changed States during Cal/Functional
01/18/2025
CR202545556
Tie Pin for HPCI Control Valve Rod Linkage Broke while
Disassembling
2/10/2025
CR202546070
Failure Analysis Findings for HPCI Pilot Valve Pin
03/06/2025
CR202545090
NRC Identified: Program Administrative Limit May Have
Been Exceeded
01/23/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202545196
NRC Identified - Page 11 of Most Recent Performance of
24.413.01 Section 5.2 Division 2 CCHVAC Chillwater Pump
and Valve Operability Test (WO 68215566) Missing from
Record
01/16/2025
6M7215710-2
Sump Pumps System Functional Operating Sketch
Drawings
M57362
Control Center A/C Water System Functional Operating
Sketch
S
IST Evaluation
17023
Revise CCHVAC Chillwater Pump IST Criteria
Engineering
Evaluations
TE-E4125-005
HPCI Past Operability-Pilot Valve Pin on Governor Oil Relay
and Linkage System
03/06/2025
24.206.01
RCIC System Pump and Valve Operability Test
24.413.01
Division 1 and 2 Control Center Chilled Water Pump and
Valve Operability Test
43.707.001
RWCU Leakage Monitoring Test
33A
Procedures
MES 28
Leakage Reduction and Primary Containment Leakage Rate
Programs
48000508
Clean and Lubricate External Portions of Control and Stop
Valves and Linkages
03/19/2019
68147634
NEIL REQD-Clean and Lube External Portions of Control
and Stop Valves
2/11/2025
Work Orders
215566
Perform 24.314.01 Section 5.2 Division 2 CCHVAC Chilled
Water Pump and Valve Operability Test
01/16/2025
CARD 0928198
Should EDGs be Considered Inoperable During Core Spray
Surveillance while the CS CMC Switches are in Run
10/20/2009
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202441113
07/23/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202444655
Division 2 EECW HX Service Water dP Lower than
Expected During ST 0135 Performed 12/11/2024
01/15/2025
CR202544802
2D5 Due to Gross Failure of E51N655B
01/03/2025
CR202544851
Infrared Identified Hot Spot Found in Advisory Range,
MCC 72EB2D Position 5A
01/06/2025
CR202544999
Unbalanced Live Loading Washers Found on Gland
Follower
01/13/2025
CR202545249
E5150F012 Does Not Easily Declutch into Hand Operation
01/27/2025
CR202545257
E51N006 Switch Out of APT
01/27/2025
CR202545262
Missed Bundling Opportunities for RCIC SSO Due to Lack of
Engineering Involvement in Readiness Meetings
01/27/2025
CR202545271
Degraded Friction on As-Found Trace for E5150F025
01/27/2025
CR202545273
RCIC SSO Work Delays
01/27/2025
CR202545278
Short Brush on Motor for E5101C003
01/27/2025
CR202545303
During Performance of WO 67010395 E51N002, RCIC
Pump Discharge HI/LO Flow Switch) the Low Switch Never
Changed States During Cal/Functional
01/28/2025
CR202545456
RPS MG Set A Exhibits Abnormal Noise After Replacement
2/04/2025
CR202545858
While Performing 24.208.02 Step 5.4.23, the Voltage From
The Temporary Differential Pressure Transmitter Installed
for P44-N444A was Below Those Listed in Enclosure C
2/24/2025
CR202546192
Request Update to PMs W689, W690, W691 and W692
03/12/2025
6M7215357
Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Division II
6M721N2053
P&ID RHR Service Water System Division 2 RHR Complex
Drawings
M57291
Division I EECW Functional Operating Sketch
24.107.03
Standby Feedwater Pump and Valve Operability and Lineup
Verification Test
24.202.01
HPCI Pump and Valve Operability Test at 1025 PSIG
27
24.203.02
Division I Core Spray System Pump and Valve Operability
and Automatic Actuation
Procedures
24.204.06
Division II Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Suppression
Pool Cooling/Spray Pump and Valve Operability Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
24.205.10
Division 2 RHR Cooling Tower Fan Operability and RHRSW
Valve Line-Up Verification
24.207.08
Division I EECW Pump and Valve Operability Test
24.208.03
Division 2 EESW and EECW Makeup Pump and Valve
Operability Test
24.307.31
Emergency Diesel Generator Number 12 24-Hour Run
Followed by Hot Fast Restart
55158151
Perform 24.307.32 EDG12 24-Hour Run Followed by Hot
Fast Restart
01/06/2025
59896755
Inspect and Test Relay at Breaker Position 65E-E10
01/14/2025
60194452
Test 4160V Breaker 65F-F10
01/14/2025
60194461
Perform Test on Medium Voltage Breaker 65E-E10
01/14/2025
60904479
Perform MOV Thermal O/L Test-E2150F036B
01/14/2025
61739631
Inspect and Test 480 VAC MCC 72E5A Position 3D-R
01/14/2025
61750603
Inspect and Test 480 VAC MCC 72F4A Pos 4B
01/14/2025
290607
Perform Electrical and Mechanical Checks on Lubrication of
2/07/2025
67332131
Perform 24.206.01 RCIC System Pump Operability and
Valve Test at 1000 PSIG
1108/2024
67332639
Perform 550kW North Diesel K1101S001A Full Load Test
887200
03/17/2025
67338833
Perform 550kW N+1 North Diesel K1101S001B Full Load
Test 887201
03/19/2025
67339658
Check Torque on Blade clamping Hardware Bolting, Clean
Blades, Lubricate MO
03/11/2025
67340023
Perform 24.208.03 D2 EESW Pump and Valve Operability
(SEC5.1)
08/20/2024
67340026
Perform 24.208.03 D2 EESW Pump and Valve Operability
(SEC 5.1)
2/01/2024
67761592
Replace RPS Channel B Reactor Vessel High Steam Line
Pressure Agastat Relay
01/22/2025
Work Orders
67761668
Replace RPS Channel B Main Steam Line Leak Agastat
Relays
01/23/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
67790553
Perform 24.206.01 RCIC System Pump Operability and
Valve Test at 1000 PSIG
01/31/2025
67878622
Perform 24.107.03 Section 5.3 SBFW Pump B Flow Test
2/07/2025
67906861
Perform 24.202.01 HPCI Pump Flow Test and Valve Stroke
at 1025 PSIG
2/12/2025
67967167
Perform 24.204.06 Division II Low Pressure Coolant
Injection and Suppression Pool Cooling Pump and Valve
Operability Test
2/19/2025
68028897
Perform 24.207.08 Section 5.1 Division I EECW Pump and
Valve Operability Test
2/25/2025
68101668
Perform 24.203.02 Section 5.1 Division I Core Spray System
Pump and Valve Operability
03/04/2025
68922454
Perform Test on 480V Breakers 72EC2A and 72EC2B.
Test Power Shields
03/11/2025
70637840
Perform 10 Year Motor Condition Inspection and Test
01/14/2025
950010281
Hot Spot at MCC 72EB2D Pos. 5A (Feeds EDG12 Auxiliary
Skid R1600S047)
01/28/2025
Perform NSSS-
RCIC Turbine
High Exhaust
Pressure Division
Functional Test
Perform NSSS-RCIC Turbine High Exhaust Diaphragm
Pressure Division 2 Functional Test
01/03/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202333564
WO Request to Repair Condenser Tubes for CW Leak
10/06/2023
Operating Data Report
01/2024 -
2/2024
24 Safety System Functional Failure Report
01/07/2025
Miscellaneous
ODMI23003
Condenser Tube Leak
71151
Procedures
20.125.02
Main Condenser Tube Leak
20892
NSSSS Half MSIV Isolation Signal
09/13/2023
2032278
Received Spurious Half MSIV Isolation
11/18/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CARD 0928198
Should EDGs be Considered Inoperable During the Core
Spray Surveillances While the CS CMC Switches are in Run
10/20/2009
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202545091
2036 - NSSSS Isolation Channel D Trip Came in Spuriously
2/14/2025
CR202545166
NSSSS Test Box Did Not Indicate Off as Expected in
6.4.11 (44.020.068)
01/22/2025
6I7212095-15
Schematic Diagram Nuclear Steam Supply Shut Off System
Trip System B
6I7212095-17
Schematic Diagram NSSSS System Main Steam Line
Inboard Isolation Valves B2103F022A, B, C & D
W
6I7212095-33
Schematic Diagram Nuclear Steam Supply Shut Off System
Trip System A and B
S
I221101
Schematic Diagram Core Spray Pump A E2101C001A
O
I221502
Elementary Diagram Core Spray System Relay Logic
Systems 1 and 2 and Relay Schedules
AE
I257228
Schematic Diagram 4160V ESS Buses 64B and 64C
Load-Shedding Strings
V
I271425
EDG Loading Sequence List Division I EDG #11 and #12
L
SD250003
One-Line Diagram 4160V System Service Buses 64B and
64C
S
SD254803
Internal Schematic Diagram ITE Circuit Breaker K-Line Type
480 Switchgear
E
Drawings
SD254804
Internal Schematic Diagram ITE Circuit Breaker Type
5HK350 and -250 4160V Switchgear
C
Engineering
Evaluations
50.59 Screen
50.59 Screen for Core Spray System Procedure Change
2/31/2009
ERE 33991
Agastat Relay Equivalency Evaluations
06/14/2006
ODMI20007
Spurious NSSSS Channel D Isolation Signal
ODMI25002
Spurious NSSSS Channel D Isolation Signal
Miscellaneous
VMR13.6
Amerace (Agastat) Control Relays
E
44.020.438
NSSSS - Turbine Building Area Temperature Trip System B,
Channel D B21-N616D Calibration/Functional
Procedures
ARP 2D36
NSSSS Isolation CH B/D Trip
59463857
Troubleshoot/Repair Spurious NSSSS ISO Logic Chanel D
Trip (ODMI Action 2032336-09)
04/05/2022
Work Orders
65902308
Replace HFA Relay A71B-K10D at Panel H11P611
08/01/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
65915792
Replace Agastat Relay C7100M222D and Inspect and if
Required Replace Relay Base
09/14/2022
Procedures
IST Program
Valve Basis
Fermi Unit 2 IST Program Valve Basis
3