IR 05000327/1979025
| ML19249A781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1979 |
| From: | Cottle W, Donat T, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249A771 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-79-25, NUDOCS 7908240316 | |
| Download: ML19249A781 (13) | |
Text
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Report No. 050-327/79-25 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
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500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah Unit #1 Docket No. 50-327 License No. CPPR-72 Inspection at Sequoyah Site near Daisy, Tennessee Inspectors:_N hu/S C /'/ M
T.(J. Donat
/ Dat.e Signed
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d b, /9D W. T. Co't (May 8&9, p79{' '
g e SFgned Approved by:
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R. D. Mapin, Section i
RONS Branch e Signed'
SUMMARY Inspection on April 17-22,1979, April 30,1979, and May 6-11, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 115 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of preoperational test procedure review, proposed technical specification review, preoperational test witnessing, completed preoperational test package review, independent review of plant surveillance procedures, review of plant readiness for issuance of an operating license, and review of licensee's security and health physics training programs.
Results Of the 7 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent
- W. F. Popp, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Operations
- C. E. Cantrell, Assistent Plant Superinterdent - Construction
- W. A. Andrews, Site QC Staf f Supervisor
- W. S. *iilburn, Assistant Preoperational Test Section Supervisor R. Mooney, Hot Functional Test Coordinator E. Sepuda, Hot Functional Test Director R. Pierce, Thermal Expansion Test Director J. Lyons, Mechanical Engineer - Engineering Design Section C. Meyers, Supervisor - Engineer Design - Mechanical Section W. H. Kinsey, Jr., Results Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included technicians, cperators, security force members, and of fice personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 20, 1979, and May 11, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The initial exit meeting was held on April 20, 1979, while the plant was still in its first heatup. The final exit meeting wat held on May 11, 1979, when the plant had reached normal operating temperature and pressure and t.ad completed an initial set of thermal expansion measurements. Also discussed at the May 11, 1979 exit meeting were the inspector's findings concerning the licensee's surveillance procedures. Subsequent to the exit meeting the inspector contacted the licensee on May 15, 1979, concerning what corrective action would be taken on reviewing surveillance procedures and their commit-ments are identified in paragraph 8.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved iteas were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review The inspector reviewed preoperational test procedures W-3.3B, "CVCS Functional Test" Rev. O, dated 3/27/79 amd W-6.1A3, " Integrated Check Valve Flow and Integrity Test", Rev. O, dated 4/21/79 for compliance with FSAR sections 5.3,
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6.3, and 14.1 and Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.68, Rev. O.
The inspector had no comments on W-6.1A3 and had the following comment on preoperational test W-3.3B, "CVCS Functional Test".
a.
Section 5.3, " Verifying Individual Letdown Orifice Flow Rates", sts, 5.3.1.,
refers to the operation of the charging system in accordance
~ with System Operating Instruction 62.1B, which requires that the positive displacement pump be in operation and two letdown orifices be online.
Step 5.3.2 checks the orifice flow rate for only orifice #2.
Af ter several discussions the licensee agreed to issue Change Notice 11 which requires a centrifugal charging pump be in operation per G01-1, and which ensures that only letdown orifice #2 is in service, b.
Data sheet 5.6.10 aad the wrong reactor coolant pump seal flow meter identified.
The licensee issued Change Notice 10 to specify the correct flow instrument.
6.
Proposed Unit #1 Technical Specification Review In accordance with the requirements of the inspection cadule program a review of the proof and review copy, of the proposed Unit #1 Technical Specifications was performed.
The areas of concern during the review included:
a.
Omission of items from Technical Specification, b.
Incorrect values for parameters, c.
Inconsistencies between dif ferent specifications, and d.
Enforceability of specification surveillance requirements.
The results of this review were referred to IE Headquarters.
One item of concern, which was identified, was the maximum reactor coolant system flow implied in Technical Specification 3.2.3., "RCS Flow Rate and R".
Figure 3.2.-3, has values for R and R (m dified fluid enthalpy
values)astheabscissaandRCStotal21owrateastheordinateandaccep-table regions for reactor operation are indicated on the figure. Based on the minimum value shown for RCS flow (37.84 X 10 GPM) a minimum loop flow of 94.6 X 103 gpm is obtained. The best estimate loop flow per section 5.1 ef the FSAR os 91.4 X 103 gpm and the thermal design flow per the same FSAR section is 88.5 X 103 gpm/ loop. Also the latest revision to W-1.8, "RCS Flow Measurement", lists as its acceptance criteria 88.5 X 103 gpm/ loop.
All of these values are below the minimum value of the proposed Technical Specification, and a conflict exists which must be resolved before issuance of the technical specifications. The inspector will follow this as open item (79-25-01).
7.
Hot Functional Test Witnessing The inspector witnessed the performance of a portion of five hot functional test procedures. His activities included:
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Reviewing the chronological log of the test for clarity, correct dating and signing by persons making entries; b.
Reviewing the test prerequisite section to insure that all items had been signed and dated or that an exception had been issued justifying
, that the item was not needed; Where possible, performing an independent verification of test prerequi-c.
sites; d.
Reviewing test instrumentation tests and verifying that test equipment being used was on the test instrument list and that the calibration date on the instrument agreed with that listed in the procedure, Reviewing the procedure steps to verify that they had been properly e.
signed; f.
Reviewing test data to verify that it was in specification or a test deficiency had been written concerning it; g.
Verifying that all test and operations personnel had been briefed on the portion of the test to be performed; and b.
Verifying that the test director was conducting the test in accordance with the approved test proc edure.
The tests witnessed were:
W-1.2
" Reactor Coolant System Heatup" a.
Section 5.3/4 "Heatup to 250*F Plateau",
Section 5.5/6 "Heatup to 350 F Plateau",
Section 5.7/8 "Heatup to 450 F Plateau",
Section 5.9/10 "F.eate.p to 350 F Plateau".
The licensee identified and resolved num-rous problems during the heatup phase of the hot functional test program. These included:
(1) Numerous binding problems were encountered during the heatup with mirror insulation contacting pipe rupture restraints, snubbers becoming fully extended or fully compcessed, the crossover leg seismic restraint strand turnbuckles contacting the crossover leg piping, and numerous seismic restraints not moving as planned.
All items were properly recorded as deficiencies, examined by a licensee engineering representative, and resolution obtained prior to beating up to the next temperature plateau.
(2) A problem was encountered with pressurizer spray flow at the 250*F plateau. Pressurizer spray could only be obtained if the loop 2 reactor coolant pump was operating.
In this case spray could be obtained from either loop 1 or loop 2 cold leg. When 7-
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the loop 1 reactor coolant pump was secured pressurizer spray could still be obtained from loop I cold leg, but at reduced rate. When the loop 2 reactor coolant pump was secured pressurizer spray could not be obtained from either cold leg.
The NSSS vendor stated this had been observed at previous facilities, and provided the inspector a copy of report WIN:249-4325, dated 1/14/76, which showed that the velocity head on the surge line
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was the driving force for pressurizer spray in the absence of the reactor vessel core pressure drop.
According to the report, satisf actory pressurizer spray operation was obtained for all pump combination after core installation.
(3) Problems were encountered during the first and second heatup at 350*F and 450 F with silica coming out of solution in collodial form. The licensee started a program of continous letdown of the reactor coolant system to the mixed bed demineralizer and continuous blowdown of the steam generators. The problem was not encountered during the third heatup due to the minimal amount of new water added.
(4) The reactor coolant system first reached the no load operating temperature of 547 F on April 22 at 0800.
At about 0930 the packing on the RHR hot leg isolation valve FVC-74-1 blew out, and discharged reactor coolant water into the containment floor drain piping. This resulted in hot water and steam exiting the ficor drains. The steam and water mixture was also discharged around the loop 4 and loop 1 reactor coolant pump service platforms and onto the pump's seal housings. Pumps 1 and 4 were secured because of erratic seal flow indications and high lower motor bearing temperatures. Efforts to secure the leak by opening valve FCV-74-1 and placing it on its backseat were unsuccessful, and the actuator failed with the valve in a partially open position. As a result the plant was cooled down, depressurized and drained. The valve, FCV-74-1, was disassembled and the shaft, Donnet, lantern ring, and actuator were replaced. The valve was reassembled sad repacked with vendor assistance.
The reactor coolant pump seals were replaced in loop 4 and loop 1 reactor coolant pumps, and the steam leakoff line was rerouted to the pressurizer relief tank through an isolation valve instead of to the containment floor drains. No further problems were encountered with FCV-74-1.
(5) On the second and third heatup, problems were encountered with reactor coolant pump seal leakoff. During the se:ond heatup, the leakoff was indicating greater than 3 gpm on seal ll3 for loop 2 and loop 4 reactor coolant pumps. Reactor coolant pressure was increased to 1300 psig in an attempt to seat the seals, but the attempt was unsuccessful. The reactor coolant system was cooled down, depressurized, and the seals removed from loop 4 and loop 2 reactor coolant pumps.
The seals were reinstalled into the pumps, and the plant was heated to a temperature sufficient to draw a pressurizer bubble. During the subsequent heatup, high
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seal leakoff flow was again indicated until reactor coolant system pressure reached 1500 psig at which time the seals seated, and proper leakoff was obtained.
It was later discovered by the licensee that the reactor coolant pumps seal supply flow indication in the control room was in error due to the instrumentation having been aligned assuming a
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flow sensiag orifice different from the one installed.
This resulted in in indicated flow of 8 gpm when the actual flow was 10 gpm to the reactor coolant pump. The licensee had the instruments recalibrated and the seal flow readjusted.
(6) With the plant at 250 F during the third heatup, one of the /
Ferlock fittings for the reactor coolant full flow core filter d/p gage failed at the seal table. After removing the gage and capping the line the reactor coolant system was repressurized and the heatup restarted.
b.
W-1.7 "RCS Thermal Expansion" Section 5.1 " System Heatup Measurements" (Change No. 6 added safety system, piping and all piping being operated at 200 F or higher to the test). Two problems encountered during the test were:
(1) Following the cooldown and depressurization for repair of RHR isolation valve FCV-74-1 the licensee station and preoperational test personnel did not plan on taking a new set of baseline readings on pipe hangers, snubbers, and piping rupture restraints.
Following discussions between the inspector, the licensee's engineering department and the test personnel, the need was recognized to make measurements prier to the heatup, at normal operating temperature, and following the cooldown in orhr to deteru.ine typical piping movement associated with normal operation.
It was also agreed that this had to be one continuous sequence of measurements since the plant would not return to the exact same configuration upon cooling down.
New baseline readings were taken.
(2) Severe problems were encountered with the thermal expansion of the steam dump.
Rigidly mounted air lines to valve actuators broke, drain lines which passed underneath the steam dump header bent, header movement caused spring hangers to become fully loaded or completely unloaded and valve movement caused the handwheels to strike the grating. The licensee provided temporary corrective actions to provide air to the valve actators and to reroute the drain lines to remove any interferences. A long-term solution to the hanger problem was being developed, but had not been implemented at the site.
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W-11.3 "Incore Thermocouples and RTD Cross-Calibration" c.
Section 5.20-5.22 " Thermocouple Cross Calibration at 350 F" Section 5.23-5.25 " Thermocouple Cross Calibration at 450 F", and Section 5.26-5.28 " Thermocouple Cross Calibration at 547*F"
~ The inspector witnessed recording of RTD resistances and temperatures and thermccouple temperatures. He verified by independent calculation that the system average temperatures obtained by the licensee at each plateau were correct.
d.
W-1.5 " Pressurizer Spray Verification" Section 5.1 " Setting Continuous Spray Flow Valves" Setting of bypass valves68-552 (Loop 1, valve PCV-68-3400) and 68-555 (Loop 2, valve PCV-68-340B) was witnessed.
c.
W-6.1A3 SIS Integrated Check Valve Flow and Integrity Test Section 5.1 Check Valve Flow Test The test verifying opening of high pressure injection check valves, the safety injection hot leg check valves, and cold leg check valves was observed.
The inspector had no coments on the conduct of any of these tests.
8.
Plant Procedures Review The inspector selected twenty-two Surveillance Instructions issued by the licensee pertaining to safety systems. These procedures were reviewed to determine (a) whether they were consistent with plant conditions, (b)
whether they could be performed as written, (c) whether the procedure returned the system to the correct configuration, and (d) whether the test adequately met the Technical Specification surveillance requirements.
Of the twenty-two procedures, the inspector had no coment on the following twelve procedures:
SI-34, SI-37, SI-40, SI-45, SI-72, SI-74, SI-109, SI-119, SI-129, SI-138, SI-159.1, and SI-159.2.
The inspector did have coments on the remaining procedures as follows:
a.
SI-5, " Auxiliary Feedwater Valves", Rev. 2 Valve Checklist 5-4 does not contain the values for steam generator No. 1 (3-869, LCV-3-174, 3-877).
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b.
SI-12, "ECCS Valve Alignment Verification", Rev. 2, and SI.13, "Verifi-cation of ECCS Valves with Power Removed", Rev. 2 (1) Valve 1-FCV-63-1, "RHR Suctior from RWST", not listed as well as 1-FCV-63-5, "SI Suction f rom RWFT", and 1-FCV-63-22, "SI Discharge to Cold Leg Injection".
If any one of these valves were to be mispositioned both trains of either SI or RHR would be disabled.
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(2) Valves 1-FCV-63-93 and 1-FCV-63-94 which are the RHR Train A and Train B safety injection discharge-isolation valves are not listed in either procedure and must be open in order to have low pressure safety injection.
c.
SI-31 " Accumulator Isolation Valve Auto-Open", Rev. 4 The Technical Specification requirement, 4.5.1.1.1.d requires verifying at least every 18 months that each cold-leg injection-accumulator isolation valves open automaticall-upon receipt cf a safety injection signal.
The test as written verities continuity through a set of safety-injection contacts.
However, there are at least twc alternate parallel paths which could result in false readings. The tes* should be written to actually stroke the valves when the plant is in modes 5 or 6.
d.
SI-15, "fugineering Core Cooling System, RHR Loop 4 RCS Isolation and Containment Sump", Rev. 2 As written, the procedure does not insure that steam voids are not generated in the core. Precaution 2.5 states " Ensure RC system temp ra-ture does not exceed 440 F during the test to prevent flashing in the loops when pressure is decreased to $380 psig".
Step 3.1.3 of the procedure reduces RC system pressure to $380 psig. Since the saturation temperature for 380 psig is 443.28*F and since the procedure states this is to be the maximum pressure, the possibility of voids being formed exists. The procedure should specify a minimum pressure and maximum temperature so that, even with instrument error, no possibility of void formation exists.
SI-118, " Auxiliary Feedwater Auto Actuation f rom SI Signal", Rev. O e.
Step 4.2 of procedure closes eight auxiliary feedwater manual valves, 3-834 to 3-837 and 3-875 to 3-878, which isolates the auxiliary feedwater system from all four steam generators. The procedure never reopens the se valves.
f.
SI-128, "ECCS, PHR Pumps", Rev. 3 The test does not recognize that valves FCV 74-16 and FCV-74-28 (RHR heat exchanger discharge throttle valves) are to be normally open in accordance with GOI-ID, "ECCS Checklist", item II.D.15 and II.D.16.
The procedure " verifies" the valves to be closed and never reopens them.
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SI-130, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Rev. 1, Steps 4.1.2, 4.1.7, 4.2.2, 4.2.7, 4.3.2, and 4.3.7, do not recognize that there are two separate parts to the controllers - a mode selection (Auto / Manual) portion and a valve position (raise / lower) portion.
h.
SI-33, "ERCW and Auxiliary ERCW Valves Servicing Safety Related Equipment",
- Rev. 3 The procedure does not address the valves for following safety train A and B loads:
instrument room coolers and electric board room air conditioning condenser.
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SI-68, " Functional Test of Containment Spray Pumps and Associated Valves", Rev. O The test states to perform "G0 TEST sal" of IMI-99-SGT.
This test provides a signal to start the containment spray pumps and to open the containment spcay header isolation valves. The test as written verifies that the isolation valve is closed but does not rack open the breaker to either the p:unp or the valve to prevent operation of one while the other is being tested. Therefore, as written, the containment spray system would be actuated upon performance of the Surveillance Instruction.
On a subsequent visit with the licensee, the operations supervisor stated that a review of all engineered saf ety feature equipment related Surveillance Instructions would be made to insure that similar problems did not exist with them. The site QC staff supervisor stated that an audit of all other Surveillance Instructions would be performed to see if similar problems existed there. The inspector stated that he would consider this item as open until be had had reviewed the revised copies of the Surveillance Instructions identified in this report and the res.ults of the licensee's audit and review (79-25-02).
9.
Review of Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 78-21-01: Preoperational test procedures not reviewed by Westingho:2se as required by FSAR Chapter 14, Section 14.1.1.1.
Revised procedures have been implemented so that now the Westinghouse Site Manager is provided a copy of the test procedures and is requested to acknowledge receipt of each test procedure and provide any coments by return niemorandum to the Plant Superintendent.
The inspector ceviewed two memoranda, NCD/TVA-SQ-798 and NCD/TVA-SQ-808, in which Westinghouse acknowledged receipt of the latest revisions of W-1.11, W-5. 2A, W-8. 5, W-10. 4, W-1.1, W-1. 5, W-5.1, and W-11.1.
No concents were made on any of the procedures. This item is closed.
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b.
(Closed) Open Item 79-12-11:
Construction deficiency report (NCR5P)
on relay tachometer failure on diesel generators.
The inspector reviewed the completed workplan No. 2567, " Modification of Diesel Generators per FCR No. EPP-194", for diesel generators IA-A.
The workplan documented the replacement of defective DYNALCO
- Speed Switches with a SYNCO-START Speed Switch and the post-modification testing performed on the unit.
The inspector also verified that completed work packages had been assembled for diesel generators 1B-B, 2A-A, and 2B-B.
The licensee's final report on NCR5P dated 4/30/79 was reviewed by the inspector with no further questions. This item is clo sed.
c.
(Closed) Open Item 78-11-02: Verify use of work plans for work /modifi-cations on transferred systems.
The inspector reviewed Standard Practice SQA 65, which has been revised to require that, for any work to be performed by construction on a transferred system, the wo;ks plan must be reviewed by the preoperational test section supervisor to determine if a preoperational test is affected. If a preoperational test is affected, the supervisor insures that the affected preoperational test instructions are repeated or additional preoperation test instructions are approved.
The inspector discussed the review of work plans is:;ued prior to the implementation of the above requirement and the current program of review on current workplans with the preoperational test aupervisor.
The inspector had no further questions in this area and the item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Open Item 78-37-01:
Update FSAR 5.5.1.3.8 regarding RCP Cavitation Curves The inspector reviewed amendment 60 of the FSAR Section 5.5.1.3.8.
This items is closed.
e.
(Closed) Open Item 78-04-02: Record retention periods for completed General Operating Instructions not defined.
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The inspector reviewed Revision 9 to AI-7, which specifies that the most recently completed copies of GOI-1, 2, 3, and 5 shall be retained and maintained as a QA record. This item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Open Item 78-45-01: Inconsistencies between PORC Charter and proposed Unit 1 Technical Specifications The inspector reviewed and approved revision to Standard Practice SQA-21 dated 5/9/79, which had revised PORC membership appointnent and quorum requirements consistent with those in the proposed Unit #1 Technical Specificaitons. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 78-26-01: Inconsistencies between Diesel Generator Battery Test and FSAR Chapter 8.3 The inspector reviewed Revision 60 to the FSAR Section 8.3.
The section on " Diesel Generator Control Power" has been revised to state that the control power battery system is capable of supplying control loads for 30 minutes when the battery is at its lowest expected temper-ature. This description is consistent with the scope of preoperational test TVA-14D, " Diesel Generator Battery", and this item is closed.
h.
(Closed) Open Item 79-22-01: Need for a thermal expansion measurement program for ASME Section III, Class 1, 2, and 3 systems and high energy piping during the hot functional test sequence The inspector reviewed change notice 6 to preeperational test W-1.7,
"RCS Thermal Expansion".
This change added all ESF system piping inside containme nt, all piping systems whose fluid temperature exceeded 200 F, and all high energy lines instae containment to the scope of the test. The inspector reviewed an approved copy of the test change, and noted that measurements were being made at 140 F, 250 F, 350 F, 450 F and 547(F, and that data reviews were required before increasing plant temperature. The inspector, as noted in sections 7.a.(1) and 7.b. of this report, followed the performance of this test and observed the recording of piping expansion data, resolution of out of specifica-tion data, and review of data before resuming teatup. This item is closed.
i.
(Closed) Open Item (77-27-03): Licensee's Response to IEB 77-03 The inspector reviewed IEB:77-03, " Westinghouse On-Line Solid State Protective System Testing" to ascertain that the licensee's response was adequate, that it satisfied the requirements of the IEB and that it represented the actions taken at the facility. A draft of revision 1 to IMI-99-SSPS was reviewed and determined to satisfactorily incorpor-ate the solid state protective system testing requirements of IEB 77-03. The revision 1 to IMI-99-SSPS was approved on May 9, 1979, and this item is considered closed, j.
(Closed) Open Item 79-19-06:
Concerns about vague prerequisites and acceptance criteria in preoperational test W-1.9, "RTD Bypass Loop Flow Verification".
The inspector reviewed approved chtnge netice 2 dated 4/21/79 to test procedure W-1.9.
This change notice revised the acceptance criteria to require documentation of the licensee's having received and accepted coaluations of the RTD bypass flows from the NSSS vendor and it revised the prerequisites to require that the ccre har been installed and the necessary test instrumentation associated with FE-68-7, -30, -49, and-72, has been installed and calibrated.
Based on these changes the
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10.
Review of Completed Preoperational Test Packages The inspector reviewed three completed preoperational test packages. The review included:
Verification that all test change notices had been properly generated a.
and incorporated into the procedures; b.
Verification that all exceptions had reasonable basis and that all deficiencies had been resolved or would be resolved by a future preoper-ational test; c.
Verification that approval signatures from construction, engineering design, and power production departments were on each of the test record drawings; d.
Verification that all prerequisites had been signed and dated prior to commencing the test or that an exception had been entered; Verification that signatures and dates had been entered for each step e.
in the procedure, each data sheet, and the temporary condition log; and f.
Performance of a review of recorded test data against the test's acceptance criteria.
Three tests were reviewed:
W-1.2, " Reactor Coolant System Functional Test" a.
The licensee's engineering design group noted some wires had been incorrectly terminated, and designated part of the test to be repeated.
Test exception 1 (EN-1) refers to W-1.2B, " Reactor Coalant System Heatup" when in fact, the temperature elements in question will be tested in W-11.1, "RTD - T/C Crosscorrelation". Also change notice 10 concerns adjusting the derivative portions of the pressurizer pressure signal out of the circuit when checking the setpoints for pressurizer spray and heaters, but did not address restoring the derivative portion of the circuit after the test.
b.
W-82, " Reactor Protection System Operational Test" Eight temperature elements, TE-68-2B, 14A, 25B, 37A, 44B, 56A, 67B, and 79A, were not available at the time the test was performed. Exception I recognized this and that test W-8.1, " Reactor Protection System Time Response-Sensor", performed during hot functional testing could also do the necessary functional test.
c.
W-8.4, " Turbine Runback Functional Test" The inspector has no additional comments on the completed test packages for the three tests.
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11.
Review Licensee Health Physics and Security Training
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The inspector attended a security and health physics training class and monitored the material being presented. The health physics presentation was made using video cassettes and covered the following topics:
a.
~ Radiation Fundamentals b.
Radiation Dose Limits c.
SWP's (Special work permits)
d.
ALARA Programs Dosimetry and Anti-Contamination Clothing e.
f.
Federal Regulations Also, as part of the Health Physics program each attendee was required to don an MSA Full Face Respirator, have a whole body count, and pass a written examination covering the six topics listed above. The security portion of the.ourse was presented by one of the site security officers. The presenta-tion covered:
a.
Badge color codes, b.
Search requirements on items entering the plant, Random pat down procedures on personnel entering secured area, c.
d.
Escorted and unescorted visitors, e.
Emergency r'sponse assembly areas, f.
Key card s:; stem - who will receive cards and when system will start operation.
The inspector had no comments on the content or presentation of either the security training or health physics training.
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