IR 05000327/1979030
| ML19261E546 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1979 |
| From: | Donat T, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261E545 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-79-30, NUDOCS 7908280778 | |
| Download: ML19261E546 (8) | |
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o Report No.
50-327/79-30 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility N:me:
Sequoyah Unit 1 Docket No.
50-327 License No.
CPPR-72 Inspection at Sequoyah Site near Chattanooga, Tennessee
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~eM Inspector:
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T. J. Dona
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gateSigned N
Approved by:
- e Si'gned Y D. Tiartin, Section ief, RONS Branch SUMARY Inspectiot on May 15-18 and 22-25, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 82 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of hot-functional test witnessing, plant-surveillance procedure review, completed preoperational test package reviews,.and followup on previously identi-fied open items.
Results Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent
- W. E. Andrews, Plant QA Staff Supervisor W. Guinn, Plant Operations Supervisor
- E. A. Condon, Preoperational Test Supervisor
- W. S. Wilburn, Assistant Preoperational Test Supervisor
- C. R. Brimer, Plant Outage Ter.t Supervisor R. Mooney, Hot Functional Test Coordinator S. Macher, Hot Functional Test Coordinator J. Holland, Preoperational Test Engineer J. A. Vantresse, Preoperational Test Engineer E. Sepuda, Preoperational Test Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included operators, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 18 and May 25, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee committed at the exit interview to perform a review of each of the Surveil-lance Instructions to assure that each was compatible with plant conditions, did not create any unsafe conditions during its execution and returned the system under test to its original configuation upon completion.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Hot Functional Test Witnessing The inspector witnessed the conduct of portions of seven bot-functional preoperational tests. His activities included:
Reviewing the Tests' Chronological Log for clarity, correct dating and a.
signing by persons making entries.
b.
Reviewing the test prerequisite section to insure all items had been signed and dated or an exception issued justifying that the item was not needed.
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Where possible, performing an independent verification of test prerequi-c.
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d.
Reviewing test ins?.rumentation lists, and verifying that test equipment being used was on the test instrument list and that the calibration data on the instrument agreed with that listed in the procedure.
Reviewing the procedure steps to verify that they had been properly e.
signed.
f.
Reviewing test data to verify that it was in specification or a test deficiency had been written concerning it.
g.
Verifying that all test and operations personnel had been briefed on the portion of the test to be performed.
h.
Verifying that the test director (engineer) was conducting the test in accordance with the approved test procedure.
The tests witnessed were:
A.
W-1.3-RCS at Temperature Section 5.2
" Pressurizer Pressure Control System Response Test",
Sectior 5.3
" Pressurizer Pressure Control System Alarm and Setpoint Test",
Section 5.4
" Pressurizer Level Control System Alarm and Setpoint Verification",
Sectior. 5.6
" Pressurizer Power Relief Valve Response Time, Leak Integrity, and Dynamic Response Test", and Section 5.10
" Verification of Steam Generator Safety Valves Settings and Leakage Monitoring".
Several problems were encountered while performing these sections of the test, specifically:
1)
Both pressurizer power-operated relief valves had initial opening and clc, sing times in excess of 4 seconds, whereas the test required travel times below 2 seconds.
The original 3/8" air line to valve PCV-68-334A was replaced with a 5/8" diameter line, and the valve was retested on 5/23/79. The valve opening line was 2.6 secondr. which was Lcceptable to TVA Engineer Design group based on a 3.0 second value used by Westinghouse in their accident analysis. The air line to valve PCV-68-340A has been replaced, but the valve has not been retimed.
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2)
When charging is being accomplished by means of either of the centrifugal charging pumps, valve FCV-62-93 is throttled to maintain proper level in the pressurizer. The licensee found that this valve fully closes on a high-level deviation of 5% or greater.
Since the charging line for the reactor-coolant pump seals branches off of the header downstream of this valve, its closure secures all RC pump seal water. TVA Engineering Design has issued a design change to provide a minimum valve opening, but further testing is needed to assure pump seal requirements are meet.
3)
Proper operation of the reciprocating charging pump could not be achieved. After filling, venting, and running the pump in recir-culatioa mode, one of the pump's cylinders would become air bound when the pump was aligned for normal charging operations. TVA is still investigating this problem.
4)
Steam generator safety valves were tested per Surveillance Instruc-tion SI-111, " Testing and Setting of Main Steam Safety Valves".
Initially the test results were not repeatable due to the test equipment operators tending to raise the test pressure in discrete steps rather than continuously. By continuously raising pressure, at a rate of about 1/2 PSIG per second, the desired repeatability was achieved.
B.
W-3.3-CVCS Functional Test Section 5.5
" Excess Letdown Line Operation", and Section 5.7
" Chemistry Control" - Operation of Blender in " Dilute" and " Alt Dilute" modes The inspector had no comment on the co'nduct of this test.
C.
W-8.1A-Reactor Protection System Time Response Test Section 5.2
" Resistance Temperature Detector Time Response Measure-ment".
Witnessed testing of RTD's # TE-68-67A,68-67B, 68-79A, and 68-79B by vendor personnel. Inspector had no comment on procedure or conduct of test.
D.
W-6.1A3, SIS-Integrated Check Valve Flow and Integrity Test This test has been monitored on a spot basis since it started on 5/15/79. Initially problems were encountered in obtaining steady flow readings. After the entire SI system and the check valve test lines were revented, the flow-meter indication was steadier. The acceptance criteria for this test is that each check valve have less than 0.1 gpm backleakage.
However upon initially closing all of the test-line
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isolation flow-control valves, which should have resulted in zero leskage, a leakage rate of 0.41 gpm was indicated. Opening FCV-63-163 which unisolated check valve 1-63-641 from the leakage monitor resulted in the indicated leakage decreasing to 0.27 gpm. Similar results were obtained for check valves 1-63-642 and 1-63-586 through 1-63-589.
The leakage rate with all check valves isolated also varied from a minimum of 0.04 gpm to a maximum of 1.7 gpm. The licensee then measured the combined leakage from all check valves, which wits determined to be 3.0 gpm. On May 23, 1979, the low range flow indicator was found to be inoperative. Af ter removal from the system, cleaning, and reassembly the low range flow indicator showed leakage rates about 0.2 to 0.3 gpm with all isolation valves closed.
The licensee is repeating the previous measurements. The inspector has no comments on the conduct of this test to date, but has two items of concern related to the SI system:
1)
The Technical Specification 3/4.5.1.1.c requires the SI accumulators contain between 6919 gal and 7597 gal of water. The plant's system operating instruction, SOI 63.1A-U#1, step V.C.17 requires the flasks to be filled to an indicating level of 45 to 52% (925 ft to 1009 ft ) whereas the plant's Technical Instruction No. 28, Plant Curves, figure C-14 (Rev, 6 dated 1/2/79) shows a indicatica level of 50% as corresponding to the Technical Specification maximum and an offscale low indication ( -30%) as corresponding to the Technical Specification nimimum. Until the acceptability of this Technical Specification minimum accumulator volume and the associated level indication can be resolved, this item will be considered open (79-30-01).
2)
The repeatability and accuracy of the float-type flow-measuring device being used has not been demonstrated in the testing performed to date.
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E.
V-10.3-Steam Dump Control Functional Test Section 5.4
" Valve Response Time Testing".
The Inspector witnessed successful retest of valve 1-FCV-1-104 which was timed at less than 3.0 seconds and the retest of FCV-1-114 which was timed at greater than 3.0 seconds. Inspector had no comments on conduct of retest.
F.
W-10.4-Initial Turbine Roll Section 5.1
" Initial Turbine Roll at 250 RPM",
Section 5.2
" Initial Turbine Roll at 1100 RPM",
Section 5.3
" Initial Turbine Roll at 1800 RPM", and Section 5.4
" Initial Generator Adjustment at 1800 RPM".
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5-The inspector had no comment on the conduct of this test.
G.
TVA-22B-Auxiliary Feedwater System Test Section 5.2.3
" Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S in Minimum Recirculation Mode", and Section 5.4
" Auxiliary Feedwater Hot Functional Tests".
The inspector witnessed the setting of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine controller so as to achieve the design response of a flow rate of 880 gpm in one minute. Also witnessed were the full flow and minimum recirculation flow tests of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the combined response of all three auxiliary feedwater pumps to a safety injection signal and the monitoring of auxiliary feedwater valves and piping for vibration during varicus pump starts and in the different flow modes. The inspector had no comments on the conduct of the test.
H.
TVA-40 Main Steam Isolation Valve Functional Test Section 5.0
" Valve Response Time Test" The inspector witnessed the retiming of Hain Steam Isolation Valves 1-FCV-1-4 (S/G No 1) and 1-FCV-1-11 (S/G No 2). Closing times of 6.16 seconds and 6.25 seconds respectively were obtained which exceed the test acceptance criteria of 5.0 seconds maximum. The inspector noted that deficiencies were written on the out of specification closing times and resolution from Engineering Design was needed. The inspector had no comments on the test.
6.
Plant Procedures Review
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Three surveillance procedures (a) SI-46 Component Cooling Water Pump Rev.
2 dated 1/8/79, (b) SI-26 Loss of Offsite Power with a Safety Injection Rev.
2 dated 12/6/77, and (c) SI-100 Vital Battery Operability Rev.
dated 1/11/79 weae reviewed to insure that the procedures (a) recognized plant conditions or configuration during performance of the Surveillance Instruction (b) did not compromise plant safety while being performed, (c)
returned the system to its original configuration upon completion ::d (d)
verified the correct Technical Specification requireuent.
The inspector had no comments on these Surveillance Instructions.
7.
Completed Preoperational Test Package Review The following completed Preoperational test packages were reviewed:
(A). NCS-2, Central Lubricating Oil System 2021 330
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(B). NCS-13, 250V Station Battery System (C). NCS-30, Sewage Treatment System (D). W-6.1A1, SIS Integrated Flow Test (E).
W-8.4, Control System Test for Turbine Runback (F). W-2.1C, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (0 pen Core Cooling)
(G). W-6.1D, SIS - Safety Injection Pump and Related Injection System Performance Test The review included verification that all pre-requisites had been signed off as having been satisfied or a Test Change Notice was written against the pre-requisite; verification that all change notices to the procedure had been reviewed and approved by at least a DPP representative, the Test Program Coordinator, and the Plant Superintendent; verification that all procedural steps requiring a sign-off had ber.a signed and dated; verification that the final data package included the signed-off procedure, a copy of all test change notices, and test deficiences together vith their resolution, and a copy of the chronological test log; and verification that all data had been recorded, were within specification, or that discrepancies had been identified by the licensee and resolved.
The inspector had no comments on packages (A) through (E). Preoperational Test W-2.1C had two outstanding deficiencies concerning the nonperformance of the Refueling Cavity Purification Test and the Dewatering Capability Test. The licensee acknowledged that these items were outstanding but did not have a time scheduled for their resolution. Preoperational Test W-6.10 had an outstanding deficiency, DN#24, og SIS pump 1A-A not meeting the minimum performance curve criteria during Cold Leg Injection. A Preopera-tional Test Deficiency, PT#145, was written concerning this item to the licensee's Engineering Design Group on 3/19/79 requesting resolution and a response has not been received to date. The inspector intends to monitor the resolutien of these test deficiencies and considers them as an Open Item (79-30-02) to be resolved prior to 0. L.
8.
Independent Inspection Effort (A). Open, Followup Item 79-30-03, Preoperational Test TVA-13 (2) "AC Distribution, Loss of Offsite Power" for unit 2 will require the Unit i 2 diesel generator being tested to be placed in a " Test" mode for that period of time during which the loss of offsite power and/or initiation of a safety injection on the Unit i 2 side is being simulated.
During this interval the diesel under test would not respond to an actual loss of offsite power or a Unit f 1 Safety Injection Signal.
The proposed Technical Specifications for Unit i 1 require (T.S. 3/4.8.1)
all four diesel generator sets (two for Unit # 1 and two for Unit i 2)
to be operable when in Modes 1, 2, 3 or 4 since some of the Unit i 1 2021 331
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loads are powered from the Unit #2 diesel generator set. A conflict between the Unit #2 preoperational test requirements and the Unit #1 Technical Specification requirements appears to exist. The inspector advised the licensee that he should consider contacting the appropriate licensing people and together determining how they can safely perform the test, and then notify, in writing, the Commission about this conflict between the Unit #2 Preoperational Test and the Unit #1 Technical Specifications and how they propose to conduct the test so as to maintain plant safety at all times. The licensee acknowledge the potential conflict and and the need to obtain a resolution as soon as possible. The inspector stated be would mcider this as an open item (79-30-03) until a final resolution had 'en obtained.
(B). Closed, Followup Item (79-19-03) Part 4 of the TVA to Reactor Systems Branch Question 25 identified that procedures would be written for normal and alternate methods of Emergency borating the RCS.
The inspector has reviewed Section A and B to E0I-4, Rev. 3 dated 4/13/79.
Section 4A contains the normal Emergency Boration through valve FCV-62-133 while Section 4D contains the Alternate Emergency Boration through the B.I.T.
The inspector considers that this completes the licensee's commitment and the item is closed.
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