IR 05000327/1979043
| ML19275A741 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1979 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Gouge M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19275A732 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-79-43, 50-328-79-24, NUDOCS 7910190063 | |
| Download: ML19275A741 (7) | |
Text
-
.
/
'o UNITED 3TATES
~,,
!?
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
n
$
E REGION 11
- '#
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 31("J o
ATLANTA, G EORGIA 30303
.....
Report Nos. 50-327/79-43 and 50-328/79-24 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street, Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant License Nos. CPPR-72 and CPPR-73 Inspection at Sequoyah site near Daicy, Tennessee Oh/
Inspector:
gum -
M. J. Gouge
/
y Date Signed Approved by:
de 6/.3/ Me
'
F. S. Cantrell, Acting Section Chie'f, RC&ES Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on August 13-16, 1979 Areas Inspected:
This routine unannounced inspection involved 31 inspector-hours on site in the areas of 10 CFR 50.55(e) items, sa'
related pipe welding (Unit 2), preven-tive maintenance (Unit 2) and IEB's.
Results:
Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were ident.-
fied in three areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infractt,n -
Inadequate Welder Qualification paragraph 7.b).
1179 092 7910190
-
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G. G. Stack, Project Manager J. E. Wilkins, Construction Engineer R. W. Olson, Assistant Construction Engineer
- D. W. Mack, Assistant Construction Engineer
- J. L. Smith, Assistant Construction Engineer
- J. M. Munns, Supervisor, Construction QA Unit
- L. W. Jones, Supervisor, Welding Inspection Unit E. L. Burke, Jr., Supervisor, Elec. and Inst. Inspection Unit J. M. Boone, Welding Inspection Unit J. A. Hauefter, Welding Inspection Unit T. L. Baumgartner, Mechanical Inspection Unit
- E. C. Pendergrass, Engineer, QC Records Unit
- R. W. Farrell, Supervisor, QC Records Unit H. R. Burgiss, Assistant Steamfitter Superintendent M. A. McBurnett, Nuclear Engineer, Regulatory Staff
- W. I. Dothard, Nuclear Licensing, ENDES D. J. Record, Acting Operations Superintendent
- W. E. Andrews, Supervisor, QA Staff, Sequoyah Nuclear Station Other licensee employees contacted included various construction craftsmen, technicians and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector W. T. Cottle
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 16, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the infraction discussed in Paragraph 7.b.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
1179 093
.--..
.
-2-
,
5.
Licensee Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)
TVA has reported a number of items to Region II as reportable items in compliance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The inspector reviewed the items listed below and the supporting documentation, and discussed the items with respon-sible licensee staff during the inspection.
a.
(Closed) Item 50-327/78-38-01 and 50-328/78-27-01 Spent Fuel Make-up System Seismic Qualification. The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated November 3, 1978, NCR MEB 1010, closed ECN 2051, and work plans 1938 and 3400. All required work has been completed and the above work plans require QC inspection for final completion. The work plans are on the outstanding work items list (0WIL) and this system will ensure satisfactory completion of the required QC inspections.
b.
(Closed) Item 50-327/78-38-06 and 50-328/78-27-06: Automatic Control Circuitry for Emergency Sump Valves. The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated October 26, 1978, NCR MEB 1012, closed field change request EEP 131 and work package 1-236E063-008. The required work has been done for Unit 1 and the project inspector verified that the wiring change to the subject valves' control circuitry had been accom-plished in accordance with the drawings as revised by the field change request. The circuit change will be tested as part of the work package listed above. The work on Unit 2 valves will be accomplished in accordance with the revised drawings and work plan.
c.
(Closed) Item 50-327/79-12-05 and 50-328/79-07-05: Additional Fire Doors and Fire Dampers in the Control and Auxiliary Buildings. The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated February 20, 1979, NCR SWP-78-S-2, closed ECN 2121, applicable works plans, and discussed the item with responsible engineers. All work has been completed and the dampers / doors are awaiting QC inspection.
The required inspections will be documented on the work plan and the status is monitored through the OWIL.
d.
(Closed) Item 50-327/79-12-07 and 50-328/79-07-07: Metal Shavings in Valve Operators. The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated February 28, 1979, NCR 1354, and inspected the two electric-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge pressure control valves in Unit 1.
Modifications to the valve's hydraulic control system discussed in the final report have been completed in Unit 1 and the hardware is on site for modification of the Unit 2 valves. Vendor drawings have been revise 6 to reflect the modification of the hydraulic control system of the ele tric driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge pressure control valves.
1179 094
.
.
-
-3-e.
(Closed) Item 50-327/79-20-03 and 50-328/79-11-03: Pipe Seismic Analysis; Velan Valve Weights. The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated July 5, 1979. The report stated that reanalysis has indicated that the increased loads resulting from the increased valve we % hts are acceptable.
This analysis only extended to the problems ioentified b" NCR MEB 79-13.
Item 327/79-36-01 and 50-328/79-21-01 (NCR MEB 79-20) also involves Velan valve weights and remains open.
f.
(Closed) Item 50-327/79-20-04 and 50-328/79-11-04: Stress Analysis Inadequate for ERCW Piping System.
The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated May 17, 1979 closed ECN 2301, work plans 4318, A, B, C, D and E and discussed the work progress with responsible engineers.
Installation of additional supports is nearing completion and final closure and inspection of this item will be accomplished througn completion of the above work plans. The status of this item will be indicated on the OWIL.
g.
(Closed) Item 50-327/79-29-02 and 50-328/79-16-02: Fire Load Not Considered in the Fire Hazard Analysis.
The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated May 4, 1979, closed ECN 2311, closed NCR MEB 79-16, and work plan 3533. Work is nearing completion on Unit I and the applicable drawings have been revised by ECN 2311.
Work on Unit 2 will be accomplished through the use of a work plan that will reference the revised drawings.
h.
(0 pen) Item 50-327/79-43-01 and 50-328/79-24-01: Missing Support for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip and Throttle Valve. On July 6, 1979, TVA informed Region II of this reportable item identified as NCR MEB 79-35.
TVA stated in a final report dated August 1, 1979 that correc-tive action will be completed before fuel loading of the respective units.
i.
(0 pen) Item 50-327/79-43-02 and 50-328/79-24-02: Hydrogen Detection System Environmental Qualification. On July 9, 1979, TVA informed Region II of this reportable item identified as NCR EEB 79-10.
TVA stated in an interim report dated August 2, 1979 that a subsequent report will be submitted by September 18, 1979.
j.
(0 pen) Item 50-327/79-43-03 and 50-328/79-24-03:
Inadequate Design of Three Quarter Inch Test Lines on Safety Injection Header. On July 27, 1979, TVA informed Region II of this reportable item identified as NCR SWP-79-S-9.
A 30-day written report is due August 27, 1979.
k.
(0 pen) Item 50-327/79-43-04 and 50-328/79-24-04: Electrical Cocduit Qualification. On July 30, 1979, TVA informed Region II of this reportable item identified as NCR CDB-79-04. A 30-day written report is due August 29, 1979.
1179 095
'
.
-4-1.
(Open) Item 50-327/79-43-05:
Chattering of Underfrequency Relay Contacts. On August 2, 1979, TVA informed Region II of this reportable item identified as NCR EEB 79-13. A 30-day written report is due August 31, 1979.
m.
(Open) Item 50-328/79-24-05:
Co;rosion of Terminal Blocks in Junction Boxes. TVA initially reportco this item for Unit 1 only (50-327/79-36-14) and identified it as NCR 9P.
The applicability has been extended to Unit 2 and the scope increased to include corrosion problems inside Foxboro transmitters. TVA stated in an interim report dated July 24, 1979 that a subsequent report will be submitted by September 5,1979.
6.
IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2)
Discussions conducted with management personnel at the site indicated that IE Bulletins are being reviewed by both site and corporate design personnel for site applicability and the need for a response. The status of the following IE Bulletins (IEB's) are indicated below.
(Closed) IEB 79-07:
Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping.
The licensee's final response dated May 31, 1979, has been reviewed by Region II and IE:HQ. The licensee's method of seismic stress analysis of safety related piping was correct and all actions specified by the bulletin have been com-pleted. This item is closed.
(Closed) IEB 79-11: Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems. The licensee's response dated July 20, 1979, stated that none of the subject breakers with faulty overcurrent trip devices have been used or are planned for use at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
This item is closed.
7.
Independent Inspection Preventive Maintenance on Safety Related Pumps (Unit 2)
a.
The inspector examined safety injection pumps 2A and 2B, auxiliary feedwater pumps 2A and 2B, and containment spray pumps 2A and 2B.
These pumps are installed on their foundations. Several deficiencies were noted during the visual inspection. These are indicated below:
(1) Auxiliary feedwater pump 2B had no oil bubbler on the thrust bearing housing; (2) Dirt and grease had accumulated within the thrust bearing housing on auxiliary feedwater pump 2B; and (3) Several open ended carbon steel and stainless steel pipes were noted in the area around the pumps with no protective caps or tape on the exposed pipe ends.
1179 096
._
-
.
-5-
.
Items (1) and (2) had been identified previcusly by the licensee on nonconformance reports and measures were in progress to correct these items.
Item (3) was corrected during the course of the inspection and appears to be an isolated incident.
The inspector reviewed the preventive maintenance forms (SNP CP P-6)
'.or the above safety related pumps. All required preventive maintenance had been accomplished at the specified intervals on the pumps listed above In accordance with Construction Procedure P-6.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Safety-Related Pipe Welding (Unit 2)
The inspector observed in process welding of various 3 inch and 4 inch Class A welds in the safety injection (SI) and cbemical and volume control (CVC) systems. Weld 2-CVC-163 was chosen for an in-depth inspection of the licensee's welding program. This is a Class A weld joining 3 inch, schedule 160 CVC piping to a nozzle on cold leg #3.
Areas inspected included weld technique, control of preheat and inter-pass temperatures, completion of all QC hold points, welder qualification, purge gas control, and certification of the welding filler materials.
The certified material test reports were reviewed for ER308 filler material heat numbers 760284 and 462317 for conformance to applicable chemical specifications of SFA 5.9.
All QC hold points had been signed off in the proper sequence and control of purge gas, preheat temperature and interpass temperatures was proper.
The inspector reviewed the welder qual'_ication and noted that the applicable qualification test was GTSJ-7-5-0-3-H(a).
This is a combination test using a gas tungsten rc (GTA) weld for the root and a shielded metal arc (SMA) weld for the remainder.
This test qualifies a welder to use the GTA process to a maximum thickness of three-eights of an inch based on the definition of root given in paragraph 17.1 of process specification 1.M.I.2(b).
The welder that was welding on weld number 2-CVC-163 was therefore qualified to use the GTA process to a thickness of.375 inches. The applicable weld procedure was GT-88-01, R5 which is a pure GTA procedure. The operations check list indicated a wall thickness of.404 inches (3" schedule 160 pipe is.438 inches; the pipe was counterbored to.404 inches). The welder had also performed welds 2CVC 164, 165 and 166. These Class A, 3 inch welds also had wall thicknesses of.404 inches.
In summary, it was noted that four Class A welds had been performed by a welder not qualified to use the weld procedure specified (GT-88-01, R5) to the thickness required to complete the welds.
The licensee is evaluating this problem to determine if any additional welds or welders are involved. Paragraph 4.1 of Process Specification 1.M.1.2(b) states in part "Each welder or welding operator 1179 097
_
-
.
,
-6-
.
shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX (Process Specification 1.M.2.2) prior to performing welds to the requirements of the particular ASME code.
Failure to
"
.
..
follow procedures that require adequate qualification of a welder per-forming Class A welds to the procedure specified is in noncompliance with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and is identifed as infraction 50-328/79-24-06, Inadequate Welder Qualification.
1179 098
,