IR 05000327/1979046
| ML19253C495 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1979 |
| From: | Cottle W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19253C452 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-79-46, NUDOCS 7912050628 | |
| Download: ML19253C495 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 Y
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Report No. 50-327/79-46 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattacooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Sequcyah Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-327 License No. CPPR-72 Inspection at Sequoyah Site near Chattanooga, Tennessee and TVA Corporate Offices in Knoxville, Tennessee
!f [ A [g f.,-
';/.3hf Inspector:
W. T. Cottle*-1
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Date Signed
/2 [
Approved by:
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H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SITdMARY Inspection on August 6-31, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 78 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant tours, followup of plant incidents, readiness of the facility for issuance of an operating license, plant reporting requirements, and fo'lowup of previous inspector identified items.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in four areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one area (infraction - failure to follow procedure for making temporary alteration on a safety related system, paragraph 5).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent W. F. Popp, Assistant Plant Superintendent C. E. Cantrell, Assistant Plant Superintendent W. E. tMdrews, Quality Assurance Supervisor W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor D. J. Record, Assistant Operations Supervisor E. A. Condon, Preoperational Test Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included 2 construction craftsmen, 2 operators, 2 shift engineers and 4 corporate office personnel.
Other Organizations V. Brownlee, USNRC T. Burdette, USNkC H. Dance, USNRC T. Donat, USNRC M. Gouge, USNRC 2.
Exit Interview The inspectioi. scope and findings vere summarized with the Plant Superin-tendent and members of his staff on August 10, 16, 27 and 31, 1979. The apparent item of noncompliance was discussed in the exit meeting on August 31 and was acknowledged by the Plant Superintendent.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Plant Tours The inspector toured various areas of the Unit 1 Reactor, Control and Auxiliary Buildings on August 9,13, 23, 26 and 31. The tours were conducted such that all accessible areas of these buildings were inspected at least once during the inspection period. The following activities were observed /
reviewed:
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a.
Housekeeping practices.
b.
Protection of installed instrumentation.
c.
Inplace storage of auxiliary feedwater and safety injection pumps.
d.
Ability to hear PA system announcements in plant areas.
e.
Fire prevention / protection measures for hot work.
f.
Posting of hold tags, caution tags and alteration tags.
g.
Posting of status control tags on systems and components.
h.
Shift personnel response to annunciators.
i.
Measures to exclude foreign material from entry into clean systems.
j.
Unit operator and shift engineer log books.
k.
Condition of installed fire protection equipment.
The inspector noted that the level of activity on housekeeping practices, specifically the removal of con :ruction scaffolding, temporary equipment and temporary welding leads, power cables and air lines, did not seem to be adequate to support licensee's established fuel load date. This was discussed with licensee management representatives as an area which would receive incraasing inspection effort prior to fuel loading.
During a tcur of the Control Room on August 31, 1979, the inspector noted that the control switch for FCV-30-8, Upper Containment Purge Isolation Valve, was held in the "open" position by a rubber band. This control switch is a three position (close-automatic-cpen) switch which is normally spring-returned to the automatic position. Holding the switch in the open position defeats any automatically actuated closure signal to the valve and thus constitutes an alteration to the valve control circuitry. This was brought to the attention of the Shift Engineer who took immediate corrective action to restore the control switch to the automatic position.
Further review of this incident revealed that the component was under the control of the Power Production Staff and that no provisions had been taken for approval, documentation and tagging of this alteratien contrary to the requirements of Administrative Instruction AI-9, Temporary Alterations.
Failure to control this temporary alteration to a safety related component is an apparent item of noncompliance (327/79-46-01).
In subsequent discussions of this apparent item of noncompliance with the Plant Superintendent and the Quality Assurance Supervisor, the inspector emphasized that his primary concern was the failure of plant personnel to adhere to the established system of controls for temporary alterations.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items (Closed) Open Item (327/78-39-29) Control of food and drink in warehouse area. The inspector toured the warehouse area and noted that administrative controls had been established to prohibit food and drink from all actual storage areas. The inspector had no further questions.
(0 pen) Open Item (327/79-42-01) Inspector comments on shift operations.
The inspector noted that the unapproved operating instructions had been removed from the main control board and the 2pper head injection test 1504 070
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In addition, a corrective action report had been initiated to address each of the identified items. The completion of the corrective actions wili be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
7.
Readiness of the Facility for an Operating License The inspector continued the review of the facility to provide an update to NRC management on the readiness of the facility to receive an operating license. The areas review by the inspector included:
a.
Unresolved items b.
Outstanding 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports c.
Inspector followup items d.
Preoperation test program status e.
Preoperational test deiiciencies f.
Surveillance instruction development g.
Security instruction development h.
Construction outstanding work items The states in each of these areas and any identified items which might affect the issuance of an operating license were identified in a letter to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Headquarters, on August 31, 1979.
The inspector discussed his findings in the above areas with licensee representatives on several occasions during the inspection period. The licensee's responsibilities in preparing a similar type report on readiness for receipt of an operating license were also discussed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 Reporting Requirements The inspector reviewed Standard Practice SQA 84 which describes the respon-sibilities of plant personnel in recognizing, reporting and reviewing potential reportable occurrences. Standard Practice SQA 94 which addresses 10 CFR 21 evaluation and reporting requirements was also reviewed. These procedures appeared to adequately address the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)
and 10 CFR 21. The inspector reviewed three nonconformance reports (NCR's)
which had been reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) and three NCR's which had been determined to not be reportable. In each case, the evaluations appeared to have been adequately addressed and for those determined to be reportable, appropriate action was taken in the initial and written notifi-cations to the NRC Region II Office.
This effort was continued with a review of thc: 10 CFR 21 reporting program at the Engineering Design and Construction offices in Knoxville, Tennessee on August 30 and 31. Details of this inspection effort are contained in IE Report 50-327/79-45.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup on Plant Incidents The following incidents were reviewed by the inspector during the inspection period:
NCR 12P, 13P - Violation of heatup and cooldown rates for the reactor a.
ecolant system (RCS) and the pressurizer during hot functional testing.
The inspector reviewed the General Operating Instructions and the Surveillance Instructions concerned with controlling and monitoring RCS and pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates. The failure of the Unit Operators and the Shift Engineers to recognize that the limits violated and their apparent failure to follow the precautions and
. imitations of the General Operating Instructions were discussed with the Plant Superintendent. Licensee's final report on NCR's 12P and 13P will be reviewed by the inspector and the adequacy of actions taken to prevent reoccurrence will be evaluated at that time (327/79-46-02 and 327/79-46-03).
b.
Personnel Injuries - The inspector reviewed the circumstances involving injuries received by a licensee employee in a fall into the Unit I reactor vessel refueling cavity.
The inspector also reviewed the circumstances involving injuries received by a licensee employee in a fall from a Unit 2 steam generator enclosure ladder. Hospitalization was required in both instances. Neither incident involved radiological contamination.
c.
Byproduct Material License - On August 9 the Plant Superintendent informed the inspector that due to a discrepancy in the receiviug documentation for incore flux detectors, the plant might have more U235 in possession than allowed by the 10 CFR 30 license. The inspector reviewed a letter from Westinghouse which indicated that the U235 content of the incore flux detectors was such that the 10 CFR 30 license limit was not exceeded. Licensee's efforts to substantiate the information received from Westinghouse and demonstrate that the license limits have in fact been complied with will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (327/79-46-04).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Independent Inspection Effort The following topics were discussed with the Plant Superintendent and members of his staff during the inspection period:
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-5-Clarification of the term " degraded mode" as used in Regulatory Guide a.
1.16 in determining the reportability of an event and the report type.
The inspector utilized the interpretation of paragraphs C.I.a(2) and C.2.b(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.16 issued April 1, 1979 as the basis for the discussion.
b.
The proposed supplement to IEB 79-13 which would require radiographic examination of portians of the main feedwater system piping prior to Unit 1 fuel loading.
The status of corrective actions on 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports which have c.
been identified as requiring completion prior to fuel loading. Licensee's method of tracking outstanding report commitments was also discussed.
d.
Current guidance on the use of the emergency telephones to be installed at the facility and the schedule for rewaining review and inspection of the Sequoyah emergency plan.
The increased emphasis which is being placed on any event which cha11anges e.
the reactor protection or the engineered safety features systems.
The inspector attended a management meeting with NRC Region II and TVA management personnel at the TVA Corporate Offices in Chattanooga on August 23, 1979 pertaining to emergency planning. Summary of this meeting is contained in a RII letter to TVA dated September 7,1979.
The inspector and the Reactor Projects Section Chief toured the Unit I facility on August 24 with the Plant Superintendent and Chairman Hendrie of the NRC.
The inspector conducted detailed walk-throughs of the reactor coolant system, the low head safety injection accumulator system, the reactor coolant drain system, and the pressurizer and pressurizer relief tank system.
Following the walk-throughs, the inspector reviewed licensee's construction punchlist and found that the incomplete items noted during the inspection were documented and were scheduled for completion prior to fuel loading.
The inspector reviewed the current reports on NCR's MEB 78-2 and MEB 79-4 pertaining to ERCW to the Component Water Heat Exchangers and concluded that the proposed interim actions committed to in the reports were adequate for Unit 1 fuel loading.
The inspector reviewed the Unit Operator's Hot Functional Test Log for familiarization with system problems experienced during the hot functional testing program.
Notifications were received during the inspection period that the following NCR's had been identified as potentially reportable per 10 CFR 50.55(e):
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NEB 77-1 Ice Condenser Glycol Cooler Capacity (327/79-46-05)
a.
b.
NCR 1780 Violation of Cable Separation Criteria (327/79-46-06)
NCR ISD Failure of Diesel Generator Field Flashing Relay Coil (327/
c.
79-46-07)
These items have been assigned item numbers as indicated above and will be reviewed in subsequent inspections.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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