IR 05000285/1992033
| ML20127K095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1993 |
| From: | Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127K074 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-92-33, NUDOCS 9301260037 | |
| Download: ML20127K095 (14) | |
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APPENDIX _0 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N RLGION IV NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/92-33 Operating License: DPR-40 Licensee: Omaha Public power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247
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facility Name: , ort Calhoun Station Inspection At: Blair, Nebraska inspectton Conducted: November 22, 1992, through January 2, 1993 Inspectors: R. Mullikin, Senior Resident inspector R. Azua, Resident Inspector 1.Reis.PojpqtEngineer,ProjectSectionB
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Approved: I b -
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P 71CHii'F61 " ~~C k'l e T~~4e chiiTE a T ~ 5 u p p a r f~ 5Iif f- DiT Division of Reaptor Projects N
trLspection Summary Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite followup of events, operational safety verification, safety system walkdown,- maintenance
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and surveillance observations, and followup of licensee event reports. . .
Results:
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- Inadequate attention to detail by a licensed senior operator and a nonlicensed operator, during the development of a danger tagout, resulted in the overpressurization of-the steam generator blowdown processing. system. As a result, a violation was identified (Section 2.1).
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- Housekeeping is generally good but some areas continue to require additional management attention (Section 3.2).
- Response by radiological protection personnel to an elevated airborne ,
activity event was-thorough and. conservative (Section 3.3).
- -Performance by security personnel-during nondesignated vehicle inspections was excellent'(Section 3.4).
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9301260037 930119 PDH ADDCK 05000205 O PDH a
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- Prestaging of equipment by maintenance personnel to minimize exposure time in an airborne contamination area was very good (Section 5). E e Good questioning attitude by electrical maintenance-personnel was.noted during surveillance testing activities (Section 6).
Summary of Inspection findings,:
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Violation 285/9233-01 was identified (Section 2.1).
. Licensee Event Reports 92-14 and 92-25 were closed (Section 7).
Attachment:
- Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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1 PLANf STATUS ,
The licensee operated the Fort Calhoun Station at 100 percent power throughout ,
this inspection perio "
2 ONSITE RESPONSE TO EVENTS (93702)
' Inoperability of Fire Suppression Water System
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On December 3, 1992, Danger Tagout 92-2455 was generated by the operations department to isolate Steam Generator Blowdown Flow-Transmitter FT-1392 and the electric / pneumatic controller on Valve HCV-1390 for maintenance. This ,
tagout was reviewed and approved and the licensed senior operator was' issued to the field for installation. After maintenance on the components was completed, an instrument and control technician requested that_the danger tagout be cleared and the system be placed in service for postmaintenance testin During.the tag clearance process, an equipment operator called the control room to determine the return-to-service position of the four valves associated with the tags that he was to clear. In accordance with-the tagout sheet, the control room operator stated that all four of the valves (FW-1055, -183 -605, and -606) were to be placed in the open position. The equipment operator then cleared the tags, opened each of the four valves, and called the control-room to inform them that the tags were clear. .Once all'the other tags had been cleared, the instrument and control technician performed the postmaintenance testing satisfactorily and reported the results to the control roo Later that same day, the control room received fire detector alarms for Zone 4, which provides detection in the air compressor bay-.in Room 19. Major equipment located in Room 19 consists of the plant air compressors, air-dryers / receivers, two auxiliary feedwater pumps, and steam generator blowdown heat exchanger. In addition, motor-driven Fire Pump FP-1A automatically started due to a decrease in the iire protection system pressur Shortly after Fire Pump FP-1A started, a control room operator directed the water plant operator to close Recirculation Valve FP-300 for Fire Pump FP-1 This action was-taken based on the instructions provided-in Operations i
Memorandum 92-09, Revision 1, dated October 15. 199 Valve FP-300 is i-normally locked open, but is to be closed under certain circumstances ,
specified in the_ operations memorandu This memorandum was. implemented,'as '
an interim measure, to address a potential concern regarding the-ability of l Fire Pump FP-1A to provide adequate firH to the sprinkler systems under i - certain unique conditions. The operat,ons memorandum indicated that L
Valve FP-300 was to be closed if diesel-driven Fire Pump FP-1B is inoperable,_
river level is below 985.6 feet elevation, Fire Pump FP-1A starts, and flow of 1000' gallons per minute is initiated through sprinkler actuation or hose'
demand. As Fire Pump FP-1B was inoperable, river level was reported as 984.25 feet, and _the control room had indication of sprinkler _ system flow in
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-4-Room 19, the conditions were present for the licensee to take the action '
specified in the operations memorandu A fire brigade was dispatched to Room 19 to investigate the cause of the fire detector alarm. Upon arriving, the fire brigade encountered _a significant amount of steam and initially could not ascertain the source of the steam or if the fire protection system was spraying down an actual fire. This
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information was relayed to the control room operators, who realized that the *
steam generator blowdown system had just been placed in service and suspected i it as being the source of the steam, thus the operators isolated blowdown from ':
both steam generators. The steam laak diminished and.the fire brigade was i able to identify the source of the steam as a blown diaphragm on steam generator blowdown processing system Drain Valve FW-131 Once appraised as '
to the source, operations personnel closed Valve FW-1055 to further isolate the lea The steam and high humidity conditions in Room 19 had activated the fire i detectors, which signaled the deluge valve on the preaction sprinkler-system
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to trip and fill the sprinkler dry-pipe syste This caused a-decrease in the '
fire protection system pressure, which automatically started Fire Pump FP-1 Because there was no fire present, the sprinkler head fusible links remained .
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intact and no sprinkler flow was discharged to the room. When it was apparent that no fire existed in Room 19, the fire pump was secured. The pump ran for approximately 7 minutes under no flow condition .
Actions were taken to remove the steam / tumidity and clear the fire detector al arms . Valve FP-300 was locked open r.nd the fire protection system was returned a norma Following an inspection of Fire Pump FP-1A, the water plant operator reported to the control room that water _had been found in the lower motor bearing of ;
the pump. The pump was declared ino)erable. With both fire pumps declared inoperable, the licensee entered Tec anical Specification 2.19(4)b, which applies to situations when no suppression water systems are operable. This Technical Specification requires.that a backup fire suppression water system be established within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a reactor shutdown be initiate Upon declaring both fire pumps inoperable, the fire protection system was E immediately cross-tied to the_ station demineralized water system to' provide _ a partial backup fire suppression system. Efforts began.to' restore both fire
_ pumps to an operable status. _ Fire-Pump FP-1B was declared operable before'the Technical Specification. deadline, thus Technical Specification 2.19(4)b' was-exite ,
A review of Danger Tagout 92-2455 determined that the return-to-service position specified on the tago_ut sheet for Valve FW-1055 was open but should have stated that the valve was to be' closed. This valve is an isolation valve between the steam generator blowdown system and the steam generator blowdown processing system. Opening Valve FW-1055 allowed the.high temperature ,
(500aF)/high pressure (820 psia) blowdown water to fill and pressurize:a
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portion of the steam generator blowdown processing system, which was designed )
for 150af/150 psig. As a result, the diaphragm on Valve FW-1314 failed, which l resulted in the steam leak in Room 1 ]
The failure to identify the proper return-to-service valve position for i Valve TW-1055 is contrary to the requirements set forth in Standing l Order S0-0-20, " Equipment Tagging Procedure," Revision 28. This is an
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i apparent violation of NRC requirements (285/9233-01).
2.2 Waiver of Compliance :
On December 23, 1992, the licensee made_a containment entry as part of its periodic containment pressure reduction evolution. Once-the licensee ;
personnel had exited containment, a 5-psig, Type-B leak rate surveillance test ;
was performed on beth the inner and outer personnel access door seals, as '
required by the Technical Specifications. During performance of this test, it was determined that at least one of the two inner door seals was leaking. As a result, the door was declared inoperable. The outer personnel air lock door was found to be within specifications,-and was administrative 1y locked. Th ;
test was performed. from outside the air-lock and containment integrity was maintained throughout the tes ,
To repair the inner personnel air lock door, the licensee would have to open '
the outer door. This would have been in violation of Technical Specification 2.6.(1)a, which prohibits the violation of containment integrity unless the reactor is in a cold shutdown condition. As.a result, the licensee requested a temporary waiver of compliance from the arovisions of the !
Technical Specification 2.6.(1)a; On-December 24, tie NRC cranted the ,
licensee a 24-hour temporary waiver of compliance that commenced when the licensee initiated repair On December 26, the licensee proceeded to repair the inner personnel air lock door seal. The licensee prestaged all the equipment necessary to repair the -
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inner door in an effort to minimize the opening of the outer door. This effort was completed the same da Once completed, the-licensee retested the inner door seals and found that they were within specifications. The -
personnel air lock assembly was declared operabl *
- Conclusions Operations personnel response to the steam generator blowdown event was y considered to be good, but the failure of the nonlicensed operator and a *
licensed senior operator to identify the incorrect return-to-service valve >
position indicated a lack of attention to detail l
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6-3 OPERATIONAL. SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707) Routine Control Room Obstrvations lhe inspectors observed operational activities throughout this inspection period to verify that proper control room staffing and control room professionalism were m intained. Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a manner that providec ' proper communication of plant status from one shift to the other. Disct , ns with operators indicated that they were aware of plant and equipment s.atus and reasons for lit annunciators. The inspectors observed that Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations were properly documented and tracked. Operators were observed to properly control access into the control room operating are .2 Plant Tours lhe inspectors toured various areas of the plant to verify that proper housekeeping was being maintained. Housekeeping was generally good throughout the vital areas. However, an area near the south door of the east switchgear room was accumulating plastic wrappers from ear plugs. This area had been .
properly maintained after the inspectors had previously noted it to the licensee. Further action is apparently needed to eliminate this-housekeepin concer The inspectors verified, during plant tours, that various valve and :; witch positions were correct for the current plant conditions. Personnel were observed obeying rules for personnel safety and rules for escorts, visitors, entry, and exits into and out of vital area On December 3, 1992, the inspector toured with'an auxiliary building operator during the performance of-his routine rounds. The operator demonstrated a good knowledge of his responsibilities and dutie .3 Radiological Protection program Observations The inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were properly implemented. Radiation and contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled. Health physics personnel were observed routinely touring the controlled areas.-
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On December 6, 1992, following.the initiation of maintenance activity to replace a filter drain valve and reroute piping to theLion exchanger in_the-
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spent fuel pool cooling s/ stem, an increase in airborne activity in.the spent fuel pool cooling room (Room 5) was- noted, specifically the. activity level of alpha particles. This was the result of.the licensee having breached the-spent fuel pool cooling system and the presence of a failed fuel pin-in the spent, fuel poo Due to the potential for high alpha activity in adjacent systems, the radiation protection department began taking confirmatory measurements of
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those adjacent systems. The activity levels in Room 5 were found to slightly exceed the protection f actor of the standard full-face respirators, which have a protection factor of 50. As a result, the radiation protection department required the use of powered-air purifying respirators, which have a protection factor of 1000. This requirement was extended to all adjacent systems until the results of the confirmatory measurements could be evaluated The licensee's efforts during this evolution were found to be thorough and ,
conservativ .4 Security program Observattoms 3. Search of Nondesignated Vehicles The inspector observed security personnel search several nondesignated vehicles entering into the protected area through the sally port, including a truck carrying washed protective clothing, which required a survey :by radiological personnel prior to a security inspection. Orce the radiological survey had been completed, a security officer proceeded to inspect _the truc The inspector noted that the officer had the proper dosimetry and verified that she had read and signed the appropriate radiological work permit to perform this effort. The inspector also noted that the security officer performed a thorough inspection of both the cab arf the trailer, while adhering to good radiological protection practices. Nondesignated vehicles entering the protected area were also found to be properly escorted by armed security personne . Unattended Neapon On December 4, 1992, the inspector, while preparing to enter a vital area, encountered a security officer exiting the vital area through the same doo Upon entering through the door, the inspector noted that a black nylon bag, normally used by security personnel to carry- their assigned shotguns, was lying on a security lock box. The inspector examined the bag and verifie that it contained a shotgun. 1he inspector remained in the area to maintain positive control of the weapon. Approximately 1 minute and 40 seconds after the inspector had noticed the bag, the security of ficer that had earlier been identified leaving the area returned, looking for-the weapon he had left
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behind. The security officer explained that he had momentarily been
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distracted by some of his other duties and absentmindedly forgot to carry his .
weapon when he left the area but, within a short period of time, had realized his mistake and immediately returned to retrieve it. The security' officer
- also noted that the shotgun was not loaded and that he had the shells on his person, which is a standard practic Security management personnel, upon being notified of this event,-took actions to preclude recurrence. Although the weapon was not loaded, security i management considered this to be a serious event. The immediate action taken by security management was to issue a memorandum describing the event to all security personnel and instructing them on the importance of maintaining positive control of their weapon The_ licensee was reviewing the acti_ons
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-8-taken by the security of ficer prior to leaving his weapon unattended to determine what action, if any, should be taken to preclude recurrence of this even Security management personnel, even though they considered this to be a serious event, stated that it had minimal safety significance due to the fact that the weapon was unloaded; was left unattended in a vital area, thus restricting access to it; was under positive control of an NRC inspector; and was left unattended for a very brief period of time. The licensee determined this to be a recordable even .5 Conclusions plant housekeeping, in general, was maintained in a good condition, but some areas appeared to continue to need additional manages:nt attentio Radiological protection department performance, folim .ng the discovery of higher than normal alpha activity, was very good. Security personnel performance in the area of nondesignated vehicle inspections was excellent, with very good adherence to radiological protection practices. The security event involving an unattended weapon had minimal safety impact and appeared to be an isolated incident. prompt licensee action was notabl ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM WALK 00WN (71710)
4.1 4160-Volt System - Normal Ogeration Switch positions in the 4160-volt system were verified using Operating Instruction 01-EE-1, "4160 Volt System Normal Operation,"
Checklist 01-EE-1-CL-A. The inspector noted that all breakers were in the proper positio .2 480-Volt System - Normal Operation Switch positions in the 480-volt system were verified using Operating Instruction 01-EE-2, "480 Volt AC System Normal Operation,"
Checklist s 01-EE-2-CL-A, -B, and - The inspector noted that all breakers for safety-related equipment were in the proper position. However, four breaker positions for some nonsafety-related loads were contrary to the checklist. The shift supervisor was informed of these discrepancies. The licensee verified that the four breaker positions were not in accordance with the checklist; however, the licensee stated that these are breakers that are seldom used and can be-in either the on or off position. The licensee stated that a procedure change would be submitted to ensure that certain breakers were positioned at the shift supervisor's discretion. The inspector verified that the incorrect breaker positions were not caused by the failure to follow tagging procedure No problems were noted during the review of tagging procedure _ _ - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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i lhe inspector verified the proper valve alignment of the raw water system by checking the as-found position of the valves against the valve position requirements set forth in Operating instruction Procedure 01-RW-1, " Raw Water System Normal Operation," Revision 12. In addition, the inspector verified that the piping and instrumentation diagram, Drawing Il405-H-100, " Raw Water flow Diagram,' was consistent with the installed system configuration. No anomalies were noted with the valves or system piping inspecte Seismic supports for the raw water system were also inspected against various drawings (Drawings D-4251, Sheets 1-5, and D-4253) to verify the proper location and orientation and no anomalies were noted. Additionally, a walkdown of control room Panel CB-1 identified that all of the lights and -
switches were consistent with the valve positions and pump conditions noted in the fiel '
5 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION (62703) Inspection and Repair of Chargina Pump CH-1A Rydraulic Section On December 14, 1992, the inspector witnessed portions of the preventive maintenance activity that was performed on Charging Pump CH-1A. This activity was being performed in an effort to identify and repair the_ source of unknown leakage from the reactor coolant system. This effort was performed under Preventive Maintenance Order 930369 The inspector reviewed the preventive maintenance order work package, *
including attached Maintenance Procedure MM-RR-CH-0001, " Inspection and Repair of Charging Pump Hydraulic Section," for technical adequacy, it was determined that both had been reviewed and approved, as noted by the appropriate signatures. The work package was found to be complete. The procedure was noted to be detailed in nature with sign offs for all the steps performed and with quality control hold points at_ appropriate steps-within the procedur The work effort was performed in the charging pump room (Room 6), which is within the' radiation controlled area of the plant.- The room in question was designated as an airborne contamination area, thus requiring that the maintenance personnel performing this effort wear powered-air purifying respirators. The inspector noted that the maintenance personnel's efforts to prestage all the equipment necessary to perform this effort was excellen Personnel- knowledge and experience in performing this effort was also noted to be very good, Quality control personnel were on hand during this effort-to witness the appropriate hold points. -The maintenance personnel adhered to good radiological protection practices throughout this effor __ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - _ _
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5.2 Conclusions I Maintenance personnel efforts in prestaging equipment to minimize exposure l time in the airborne contamination area was excellent. Knowledge displayed by I the maintenance personnel in performing this effort clearly indicated that i this activity was within the skill of the craf $URVEILLANCE OBSERVATION (61726)
6.1 [1onthly Station Battery Test ;
1 1 On December 14, 1992, the inspector monitored portions of the electrical j maintenance personnel's performance of Surveillance Test ,
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Procedure EM-ST-EE-0001, " Monthly Station Battery 1 (EE-BA) Test." The '
surveillance procedure provided instructions for_ obtaining and recording the voltage, specific gravity, and temperature of the pilot cell The inspector reviewed the surveillance procedure for clarity and technical _,
adequac The procedure had been reviewed and_ approved, as indicated by the_ '
appropriate signatures. The procedure was found to provide good step-by-step instructions, delineating the order in which data was to be collected. in .
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addition, the procedure provided appropriate precautions for personnel-safety, it must be noted, though, that the procedure depended on the skill of the craft, for it did.not instruct the electrical maintenance personnel on how to operate the digital multimeter or read the float hydrometer. For this reason,- '
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one of the precautionary statements required that the lead man performing this '
procedure be qualified to Electrical Category 1. A review of the licensee's i
training records indicated that the electrical maintenance personnel involved-in performing this surveillance were qualified to this categor .
The electrical maintenance personnel performance during this effort.was found to be very good. Maintenance personnel. wore the appropriate safety equipment
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and took steps to prevent spillage of- the electrolyt In addition, the meticulous manner in which they. took the data was found to be notable. They also displayed a good questioning attitude. This was apparent when the electrical maintenance personnel noted that the hydrometer readings for all ,
the cells tested were unusually low. Questioning the validity of this-data, the electrical maintenance personnel retrieved another hydrometer and notified the instrumentation and controls department of the possible deficiency. After taking a second set of hydrometer readings, the results of the two hydrometers-were compared. The results of the second hydrometer were found to be consistent with the results of previous monthly surveillance tests. - Thus, the
- electrical maintenance personnel determined that the first hydrometer was deficient and returned-it to the instrumentation and controls departmen This hydrometer-was then tagged as deficient, ,
The instrumentation and controls department then requested other electrical maintenance personnel performing-a separate surveillance to run comparative A tests between the deficient hydrometer and another hydrometer. The results of-the comparison provided additional evidence that the hydrometer in question-
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-11-was deficient, thus it was set aside for further inspection by instrumentation and controls personnel. In addition, the licensee proceeded to review the l logs to determine when and where the deficient hydrometer had been used since t its most recent calibration date. The licensee determined, as a result of their review, that no problems existed with respect to previous use of the deficient hydromete The inspector reviewed the results of the surveillance test and verified the accuracy of the calculated values. The final results were within the acceptance criteria set forth in the procedur .2 [gnclusions The surveillance procedure was found to be technically adequate for the task and experience level of the personnel involved. Personnel performance during this effort was very good. The questioning attitude displayed by the electrical maintenance personnel was found to be goo ONSITE REVIEW 0F LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700) (Closed) licensee Event Report 92-014: Reactor Trip following -
Maintenance on a Moisture Separator level Instrument lhis licensee event report documented an unplanned reactor trip following maintenance on a moisture separator level instrument. On May 14, 1992, a steam leak was identified coming from a capped connection on the turbine trip switch (LA-1303B) on Moisture Separator ST-3C. The level float chamber associated with tnis switch was valved out and the connection repaired. The -
upper isolation valve for the float chamber was then cracked open as the first step to returning the float chamber to service. Condensed steam trapped above the upper isolation valve drained into the float chamber causing a falso high moisture separator level indication, which resilted in a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor trip on loss of loa The licensee determined that the root cause of this event was the shift supervisor's decision not to disable the turbine trip circuit prior to opening the float chamber's upper isolation valve. The applicability of Standing Order 50-G-87, "Non-Routine Activities Requiring formalized Plans " which addresses the need for Plant Manager approval of very high risk maintenance activities, was not considered during the event. Utilization of Standing Order 50-G-87 would have provided a mechanism for clarification of communication and resolution of the perceived high risk of lif ting the lead for restoring the transmitter to an operable statu The licensee's corrective actions included:
- The definition of a priority 1 maintenance work order and the applicability of Standing Order 50-G-87 to-maintenance work orders was reviewed and clarifie .
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- the maintcnance work order planning and review process was reviewed to determine its responsiveness to operations department needs with respect to timely completion of Priority I and Priority 2 maintenance work order * Standing Order 50-G-87 was reemphasized in departmental meeting * Training was provided to maintenance and operations supervisory and support staff, with a discussion of Standing Order 50-G-87 as a lessons learned topi The inspector reviewed documentation for the completion of the corrective actions taken by the licensee. Based on the review performed by the inspector, it appeared that the licensee had taken appropriate actions to preclude repetition of this even .2 1 Closed) Licensee Event Report 92-25: Inadvertent I;ianual Start of an EmergencyJiesel Lenerator ai the local Control Panel Licensee Event Report 92-025 reported an event in which a nonlicensed operator inadvertently started Emergency Diesel Generator 2 to idle speed during the performance of a surveillance test. As part of the test, the Channel B containment pressure high signal was actuated. An automatic emergency diesel generator start would be derived from this actuation; therefore, Procedure OP-ST-ESF-0010, " Channel B Safety injection, Containment Spray and Recirculation Actuation Signal Test," provides instructions to transfer the emergency diesel generator from the emergency standby mode to the local control mode to prevent an automatic start from occurring during the tes A nonlicensed operator performed the transfer, as directed by the procedure, at the local control panel and, as designed, received an alarm, which he was to acknowledge and silence. The alarm startled the individual and, instead of pushing the alarm acknowledge button, he inadvertently pushed the local start button. Tae licensee determined the primary cause of the event to be a lack of self checking to ensure the intended action was correc As corrective action, the licensee committed to incorporate training on the importance of self checking into the next operator training cycle, to be completed by November 15, 1992, and perform an evaluation of human factors considerations on the local control pane The inspector verified that all operations personnel, both licensed and nonlicensed, had received training on the event and the importance of self-checking. The inspector found that one of the training sessions had been video-taped and viewed the training. The inspector found that the importance of self-checking / verification was stressed and there was significant classroom exchange on how self checking / verification could be performed. The inspector considered the training to have adequately communicated the importance of self-checking to the attendees. The inspector randomly interviewed five
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trained on the event and the importance of self-checkin !
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j The inspector reviewed the licensee's human factors review of the local i i
control panel, which is documented in Internal Memorandum PED-fC-92-238 !
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The review concluded that modifications to the panel were not necessar The t
! inspector performed a walkdown of the panel to evaluate-tie-layout of the :;
controls and annunciators and noted no problem ;
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ATTACitMENT 1
- PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel
- R. Andrews Division Manager, Nuclear Services
- J. Chase, Manager, fort Calhoun Station
- G. Cook, Supervisor, Station Licensing
- M. Frans, Supervisor, Systems Engineering
- S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering
- J. Casper, Manager, Training
- W. Gates, Vice President, Nuclear
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- R. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering
- L. Kusek, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Group
- W. Orr, Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control
- T. Patterson, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
- J. Sefick, Manager, Security Services
- R. Short, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industry Affairs D. Lippy, licensing Engineer ,
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting. In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection perio '
2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on January 8, 199 During this meeting, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to,-or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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