IR 05000213/1987021

Insp Rept 50-213/87-21 on 870715-0825.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Outage Activities, Radiation Protection,Fire Protection,Security,Maint, Surveillance & Events Occurring During Insp Period

ML20235H454
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	09/10/1987
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235H423	List: IR 05000213/1987021 ML20235H421 ML20235H448
References
50-213-87-21, NUDOCS 8710010058
Download: ML20235H454 (18)

Text

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-1 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOW {

REGION I

i Report No.: 50-213/87-21 j Docket No.: 50-213 i i

License No.: DPR-61 j

Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company 1 P. O. Box 270  !

Hartford, CT 06101 )

Facility: Haddam Neck Plant, Haddam, Connecticut Inspection at: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection dates: July 15, 1987 through August 25, 1987 )

Inspectors: Andra A. Asars, Resident Inspector John T. Shediosky, Senior Resident Inspector Approved by: bO s 9 /'ol 67 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects 3B Date Summary : Inspection 50-212/87-21 (7/15/87 - 8/25/87)

Areas Inspected : This was a routine resident inspection (192 hours0.00222 days <br />0.0533 hours <br />3.174603e-4 weeks <br />7.3056e-5 months <br />). Areas reviewed included plant nperations, outage activities, radiation protection, fire protection, security, inaintenance, surveillance, events occurring during .

this inspection period, and open items from previous inspection Results : One violation was identified relating to a failure to report a loss of spent fuel pool cooling. An isolated instance of operator inattention to control panel annunciators was identified (Detail 6.3). Multiple instances of contractor personnel failing to comply with work controls were identified I (Details 6.8.2 and 6.9). Three previously unresolved items were closed.

i 0710010050 870911 PD3 ADOCK 05000213 g I'DR :

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. S umma ry o f Fac i l i ty Ac t i v i ti e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Review of Plant Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ;

3. Plant Operations' Review Committee ............... 3 4. Followup on Previous Inspection Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.1 Reanalysis of Three Loop Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 l 4.2 Evaluation of Low Temperatur9 Overpressure l

Protection Heat Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3 Control of Transient Equipment .............. 4 5. Followup on Information Notices Related to Loss of Decay Heat Removal . . . ........ .......... 5 6. Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection . . . . . . . 6 6.1 Licensee Event Reports .................. -6 6.2 Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator . .......... 6 6.3 Inoperable Control Room Annunciators ........... 7 l

6.4 Identification of Hot Particles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.5 Containment Penetration Leak Testing ........... 9 f.6 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Inspection . ._. . . . . . . . . 9 6,7 Collision of Polar Crane and Fuel Manipulator Crane . . . . 10'

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6.8 Fire Protection Deficiencies ............... 10 6.9 Contrector Personnel Errors During Plant Modifications .. 14 6.10 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling . . . , . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.11 Inoperable ENS Hotline Phone ................ 16 l

l 7. Review of Periodsic and Special Reports ............ 16 8. Exit Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 t

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DETAILS

1 1, Summary of Facility Activities The plant operated at full power until the fourteenth refueling outage, which began on July 18. During the plant couldown, the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable due to a speed sensing relay ;;

failure (Detail 6.3). An Unusual Event was declared on July 20 because of I a loss the balance of phnt control room annunciators due to an operator 2

> tagging error (Detail 6.3). Mode 6, refueling, was entered on July 2 On July 30 the licensee identified crack indications on the No. 3 Reacto Coolant Pump (RCP) motor resistance rings. Subsequently, all four RCP ,

motors were removed and shipped to the vendor for repair (Detail 6.6). On August 2, the polar crane collided with the fuel manipulator crane, causing damage to the upper structure of the manipulator crane (Detail 6.7). The l core off-load began on August 1. Cooling to the spent fuel pool was tem- 4 porarily lost on August 14, when two non-vital buses were inadvertently de-energized (Detail 6.10). During removal of the core barrel for.in-service inspection on August 15, it became bound due to an apparent lifting rig misalignment. On August 19, an Unusual Event was declared due to an

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inoperable ENS hotline phone. The core barrel was removed on August 24 l after a successful alignment of the lift ri I Review of Plant Operations

The inspector observed plant operation during regular and back shift tours i

i of the following plant areas:

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Control Room --

Security Building l --

Primary Auxiliary Building --

Protected Area Fence Line

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Vital Switchgear Room --

Yard Areas i

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Diesel Generator Rooms --

Turbine Building ';

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Control Point --

Intake Structure and Pump Building Control room instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements. The inspector observed various alarm condition Operator awareness and response to these conditions were reviewed. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory requirements. Posting and control of-radiation and high radiation areas were inspected. Compliance with Radia-tion Work Permits and use of appropriate personnel monitoring devices were checked. Plant housekeeping controls were observed, including control.and I storage of flammable material and other potential safety hazards. The-inspector also examined the condition of various fire protection system During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to determine if' entries were properly made and communicated equipment status / deficiencies. These-records included operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, process computer printouts, and Plant Information Reports. The inspector l

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observed selected aspects of plant security including access control, physical barriers, and personnel monitoring. In addition to normal working hour inspections, review of plant operations was conducted from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, July 19, 1987. Operators were generally alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigue. An instance of operat r inattention was, however, identified (see Detail 6.3).

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l Plant Operations Review Committee The inspector attended several Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)

meeting Technical specification 6.5 requirements for required member {

attendance were verified. The meeting agendas included procedural changes, proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and field changes to design change packages. The inspectors also attended i special meetings for plant design change records (PDCRs). The meetings were characterized by frank discussions and questioning of the proposed ,

change In particular, consideration was given to assure clarity and consistency among procedure Items for which adequate review time was ;

not available were postponed to allow committee members time to review and comment. Dissenting opinions were encouraged During the outage, the licensee began holding a short PORC meeting immediately following the routine morning meeting. The agenda included reviews of outage related procedurc changes, temporary procedure changes, and PDCRs. These meetings usually last less than 30 minutes. The J

i inspectors found this an effective method of reducing the work load for the regular PORC meetings while ensuring thorough review i No deficiencies were identified.

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Followup on Previous Inspection Findings 4.1 Reanalysis of Three Loop Flow; High Core Differential Temperature Alarm l (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-20-04) Licensee reanalysis to deter-mine if sufficient margin exists in the safety analysis to justify three loop operation, and determination of the cause of the high core differential temperature alarm which occurred during the startup from the last outage (July 1986). The licensee completed their three loop study and mbmitted a Technical Specification (TS) Change Request which changes the three loop flow rate specification to require at least 197,200 gpm of flow. This request was approved by the NRC. TS Amendment 91, reflecting this change, was issued on July 6, 198 The licensee submitted an LER 86-34-01 (updated) describing these changes. With the initial change request, the licensee stated that the surveillance procedure would be revised to allow confirma-tion of the three loop flow rate based on.a proportion to the four loop flow surveillance result The inspector verified that SUR-5.3-45, Four Loop Reactor Coolant Flow Measurement and Three Loop Flow Verification, Rev. 3, has been revised accordingl The second-

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part of this item concerned a high core differential. temperature alarm received during the startup. This alarm was later determine to be caused by changes in indicated operating temperatures due to relocation of the reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature detectors to the discharges of the reactor coolant pumps. Licensee. review of-the core thermocouple indications confirmed that core temperatures were norma Changes in RCS indicated temperature and design changes associated with core average temperature are being evaluated by the NRC under Unresolved Item 213/87-12-0 .2 Evaluation of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Procedures (Closed) Unresolved Item (87-06-02) Licensee evaluation of Low ,

Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) procedure deficiencies !

and current practices involving control of LTOP motor operated valve breakers. This item resulted from an inspector review of the procedures associated with the LTOP system. Several concerns were identified relating to recorder operability' checks, adequacy of precautions and procedural steps, alarm responses, and limitations on starting pumps with the primary plant filled completely with water (solid water operation). The licensee then revised NOP 2.3-4, Het Standby to Cold Shutdown, Rev. 20, on July 18. The inspector reviewed the changes. The licensee has incorporated prerequisites for assuring that temperature and pressure indicators remain operable throughout the shutdown. Also, statements were added to remind operators of the newly revised heatup and cooldown rates, the necessary precautions to avoid reactor vessel overpressurization, and procedures for placing LTOP into service. During control board reviews, the inspector noted that the block sa've controllers for the LTOP relief valves were de-energized and red-tagged in the open position. The inspector asked if measures were taken in the field to better assure that the valves are not manually operated without control room knowledge. In response, red tags were placed on the valve operator handwheels. The inspector also walked down the open' clearance permits for the LTOP system and found all of the required tags in place as specified by the permit The inspector had no further questions on this item, 4.3 Control of Transient Equipment (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-20-01). Adequacy of anchorage and support of transient equipment temporarily or permanently stored in safety related areas. This item was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-213/86-20 and 86-29. In response to this concern, four procedures were revised to emphasize the appro-priate precautions to be taken when storing transient' equipment

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1 5 1 in safety related areas, both permanently and temporarily. They j are ADM 1.1-83, Reactor Containment Building Storage, ADM 1.1-125, 1 Station Housekeeping and Inspection Program, ADM 1.1-126, Scaf-

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folding, and ACP 1.2-1.5, Automated Work Orders, The inspector-reviewed the revisions and verified that they describe acceptable-

, means of securing transient equipment. The plant began a refueling ,

l outage during this inspection period, and the inspectors have not )

identified any questionable storage of equipment during the past l several months. During future inspections, adherence to these I storage requirements will be routinely monitored. This item is l close i Followup on Information Notices (ins) and Generic Letters Related to Loss of Decay Heat Removal Licensee action on the following Information Notices were. reviewed for forwarding to appropriate management, licensee review for applicability, response timeliness, response appropriateness, response accuracy, cor-rective action commitments, and corrective action completio !

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IN 86-101: Loss of Decay Heat Removal Due to Loss of Fluid Levels in Reactor Coolant System

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IN 87-01: RHR Valve Misalignment Causes Degradation of ECCS in l PWRs  !

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IN 87-23: Loss of Decay Heat Removal' During Low Reactor Coolant Level Operation These three ins were related to loss of the Residual Heat-Removal (RHR)

system during low reactor vessel water level operations and incorrect  ;

valve alignments. Some of the root causes were poor communications,  !

inadequate vessel level indication, inadequate procedures, and poor work .j planning and control, The varying complexities of RHR system design also  !

! contributed. In response, the licensee conducted additional training 19 RHR operations for all operating crews, including auxiliary operators, and reviewed the normal and abnormal operating procedures associated with the RHR syste Emphasis during operator training was placed on reviewing

, known losses of decay heat removal events at other plants.

l Discussions with operators indicated that this training was informative

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- and beneficial. The inspector reviewed the applicable plant procedures, and observea operators place RHR in service during the plant cooldown for the outage and plant operations with RHR in service. No deficien-j cies were identified.

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Recently, Generic Letter (GL) 87-12, Loss of RHR While the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is Partially Filled, was issued to Pressurized j Water Reactor (PWR) licensee This GL addresses the RHR system and the licensing basis of the plant, whether there is an unanalyzed event that may impact safety, and whether there is any threat to safety that warrants ,

further NRC attention. The licensee response to GL 87-12 will be reviewed !

by NR l Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection 6.1 Licensee Fvont Renets (LERs)  !

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The following LERs were reviewed for clarity, accuracy of.the j description of cause, and adequacy of corrective action. .The I inspector determined whether further information was required l and whether there were generic implications. The inspector also 'I verified that the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and

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Station Administrative and Operating P_rocedures had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, and that opera-tion of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification )

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• 87-08 Blown Control Rod Fuse Causes Dropped Rod and Steam J Generator Overfeed  !

87-09 Main Steam Safety Valves Fail' Lift Pressure Test Due to (

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87-10 Safety Injection Check Valve Has Excessive Seat Leakage- i

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l ** 87-11 Containment Penetration Fails Local Leak Rate Test 4 l 86-34-01 Three Loop Flowrate Measurement

• Event detailed in NRC Inspecticn Report 50-213/87-18

• • Event detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-213/87-21 No unacceptable conditions were identifie '

f.2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Inoperable ,

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During preparations for EDG outage maintenance, n July 20, the licensee identified that EDG 2B was inoperable due to what i appeared to be an inoperable coolant water pressure switch. The l outage schedule called for the 2A EDG to be removed from' service, l During testing of the 2B EDG to verify operability per Technical

Specifications (TS) 3.12, the low coolant water pressure annunci-ator alarme The licensee declared the 2B EDG inoperable and, I

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in accordance with TS, started the 2A EDG to verify its operabilit Pressure switch repair / replacement was to be conducted per Author--

ized Work Order (AWO) 87-5725. However, this AWO was cancelled after initial troubleshooting identified that the pressure switch was not the cause of the alarms. A speed sensing relay was identified as the cause of the problem. The relay was adjusted per AWO 87-586 and the EDG was declared operable on July 2 The inspector reviewed the associated AW0s and had no further question .3 Inoperable Con sol Room Annunciators At about 7:45 AM on July 20, with the plant in cold shutdown (Mode 5)

operations personnel observed that power was lost to the balance of piant annunciators. The balance of plant is not safety-related and was secured in cold shutdown at the time. However, in accordance with the emergency plan, an Unusual Event was declared based on the loss of a significant portion of the control room indication cap-ability and the required notifications were made. It was found that an auxiliary operator performing tagging in preparation for PMP

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i 9.5-23, Preventive Maintenance of Reactor Trip and Isolation Breakers, i had de-energized the wrong breaker. Instead of de-energizing the i breaker labeled Rod Control-16 on Main Lighting Panel B, the operator 1 de-energized Main Control Board Distribution Cabinet breaker B-16 on the DC Distribution Panel . The breaker was ra-energized and power was restored to the annunciators at 8:24 AM. The licer.see secured from the Unusual Event at 8:34 A After the event and recovery, the licensee generated a plant informa-tion report (PIR). Inspector review of the PIR noted that the time of the annunciator loss was not specified. The inspector had observed the event recovery and noted that the local power grid (CONVEX) had called and reported losing the protective sequence for one of the two 115 KV offsite power lines for the plant. This indicated to the inspector that the annunciator loss detection may have been delayed. When that was brought to licensee management attention, a more thorough licensee investigation was conducte This revealed that the breaker had been de-energized about one hour earlier than the detection of the associated annunciator los i The licensee concluded that this event involved operator inattention to detail during equipment clearance and turnover activities. An '

equipment tagout was improperly performe Control room personnel did not detect the associated control board indications promptl ,

After their investigation, licensee management strongly I re-emphasized to operations personnel the importance of attentiveness while on duty and the addressal of all details in the evaluation of an even ,

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.i The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation and corrective actions. Discussions with plant operators revealed an acute awareness of their having been slow to detect the indication los In addition, the inspectors noted that the same operating personnel had otherwise exhibited noteworthy alertness during this inspection period, with early detection of fire protection violations being an example of such alertness. (See Detail 6.8). This annunciator i event was evaluated as an isolated instance of operator inattention l to annunciators. The signifi:ance was lessened by the annunciators being for non-safety-related balance of plant equipment. Cold shutdown core cooling requirements were being fulfilled by the safety-related residual heat removal _ system. NRC reporting require-ments were properly met when the annunciator loss was identifie Licensee corrective actions were vigorous and appropriate. There .

was no safety impact from this specific occurrence, which represents j a lapse in operator attention to detail and in initial licensee '

follow-up. These aspects will be further considered, along with I other performance indicators, during the next systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP).

6.4 Identification of Hot Particles During the first week of the outase, .the licensee identified two l

" hot particles" during skin contamination incidents resulting from containment entrie The particles were found with a PCM-1 exit personnel monitor on the skin or clothing or personnel exiting the containment. The particle dose rates were about 1.5 and 8 millirem /

hour when measured with an open window R0-2A. The resulting skin doses were well below the 7.5 rem limit defined by 10 CFR 20.10 The licensee suspects that the particles may have been transferred from previously contaminated protective clothing (PCs) which may not have been adequately cleaned. The cleaning process for the PCs has since been switched from dry cleaning to wet cleaning and clean PCs are randomly frisked to check for additional hot particle ,

By the close of the inspection period, about seventy hot particles had been identified. Personnci exposures in each case were below exposure limits and therefore were not reportable. The licensee analyzed each particle and found that they were primarily Cobalt-6 This increased frequency of hot particle identification in comparison with that of previous outages is being attributed to the use of better, PCM-1 personnel monitors. The PCM-1 monitors were installed in April of 1987. A Region I Health Physics Radiation Specialist was onsite at the time and followed licensee actions on hot particle That inspection is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-213/87-2 _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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o 6.5 Containment Penetration Leakage Testing

During the inspection period, the licensee conducted containment I penetration as-found leakage surveillance tests under-the guidance '

of the Inservice Inspection.(ISI) group. On July 21, the licensee identified that two in-series check vaives in the heating steam supply system to containment (HS-CV-295 and HS-CV-295A) exceeded the leakage limits allowed by Technical Specifications (TS). TS 4.4.II specifies that +he allowable sum of all penetration leakage and isolation valve local leak rate tests be less than or equal to 0.6La. La is the maximum allowable leak rate and is equal to 0.1 weight percent of the air in containment in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period at 40 psig. A retest of this penetration was conducted when ISI person-nel determined that the line had not been completely voided of steam. The second test determined that HS-CV-295 did not leak,  !

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demonstrating that one of the two in-series valves was an effective barrier against containment leakage. However, HS-CV-295A_again failed the leak test with leakage measured at 3.35 weight percent (acceptance criteria is 0.108 weight percent).

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, the licensee notified the NRC, via the ENS line, of the test result LER 87-11 is to be submitted for this penetration, and a supplemental LER will be submitted j with the test results of containment penetration By the close of this inspection period, all containment isolation valves have been tested; 17 failed. The majority of the pene-trations associated with the valves that failed the leak test are undergoing modification during this outage under Plant Design Change Record (PDCR) 878, Appendix A and J Penetration Modifications. The remaining penetrations are being repaired under the Automated Work Order process. The penetrations being modified are those which did not qualify for exemption from meeting 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. This design change involves installation of containment isolation valves, seismic supports, leak test vent and drain valves, leak test bound-l ary valves, seal welds, and relocation of relief valves. A contain-l ment integrated leak rate test is to be conducted before plant start-up. A specialist inspection of containment leakage will be performed at that tim The inspector had no further questions at this tim .6 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Inspection During this outage, the licensee had planned to inspect two reactor i

coolant pump (RCP) motors. However, during inspection of the No. 3 l RCP motor, indications were identified on the resistance rings which suggested possible cracking. Similar indications were identified on the No. 2 RCP motor resf<tance rings. The licensee elected to remove..all four RCP motors fer shipment to Westinghouse for repair The containment equipment hatch was removed and the

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pump motors shipped offsite without incident. Preliminary reports l from Westinghouse are that indications were identified in pump lower guide bearings, flywheels, .rachet plates and oil seals. The indica-tions are being attributed to pump vibrations. At the close of the inspection period, the motors were being repaired by the vendo This matter will be reviewed further incident to routine inspectio .7 Collision of Polar Crane and Fuel Manipulator Crane i On August 2, during preparations for core offload, the polar crane collided with the fuel manipulator cran Damage inspections by the licensee, Dwight-Foote (supplier of the bridge, trolley and superstructure), and Stearns-Rogers (manufacturer of the manipu-lator crane) identified that only the manipulator crane upper structure was damaged. Since the upper structure is required only for core reload, the damtge did not effect the core offloa Modifications to the manipulation crane to prevent its being positioned where the polar crane can contact it are to be made in accordance with Plant Design Change Record (PDCR) 913, Containment Manipulator Crane Modification The upper structure was removed before core off-load to relieva the bridge stresses which caused it to be twisted approximately seven-eighths of an inch. One column was not removed; it was slightly modified and remained as a temporary mast to support cabling during the offload. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was beginning remote construction of the new upper structure. Completion of the repairs and modification will be reviewed incident to routine inspectio .8 Fire Protection Deficiencies During this inspection period, the licensee identified several instances of deficient fire protection measures or unauthorized breaching of fire barrier In each case adequate immediate corrective actions were taken in accordance with the applicable part of Technical Specification (TS) 3.22, Fire Protection. These instances are further described in the followin . Cable Vault Fire Suppression System On August 5, an auxiliary operator on tour identified that Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) personnel working in the cable vault had left the area while the carbon dioxide (CO2) fire suppression system remained disabled. The cable vault CO2 system was disabled per Administrative Control Prriedure (ACP) 1.0-15, Cable Vault Access, to

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ensure safe personnel entry into the are under these conditions, the personnel in the cable vault serve as fire watches, in addition to the hourly tour conducted by qualified fire watches, and are responsible for remaining in the cable vault until the CO2 system is returned'to service. Upon discovery of the unattended cable vault, the operator inimediately returned the CO2 system to servic _

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Licensee investigation revealed that this situation had existed between 4:27PM and 7:15PM. TS 3.22.B.2 requires that whenever the CO2 system is inoperable an hourly fire watch be conducted. In response to this event, the requirements of the ACP were re-emphasized to plant personnel by licensing management. Also, the inspector verified that a plaque was hung on the inside of the cable ;

vault access door to remind personnel that they must call the control room to have the CO2 system reactivated, and that they must remain in the area until the: system is in ]

its normal operating configuratio '

6.8.2 Breached Fire Barriers On August 11, the. shift supervisor identified two unrelated instances of fire barriers being breached without authori-zation by the governing Automated Work Orders ( AW0s) and without posting the. required fire watches. In the first ;

instance, workers installing conduit in the control room floor from the switchgear room ceiling, behind section F of the Main Control Board, removed the foam seal from the !

previously existing floor penetration in order to start the threads o.f the conduit. This work was in support of Appendix 3 J Containment Penetration Modifications. The associated AWO specifically required that the seal not be remove The continuous fire watch in the switchgear room had not been informed of this' breach in the fire barrier and an hourly watch had not been posted in the control room. Upon j discovery, appropriate compensatory measures were take A stop work order was issued by station management for all Appendix J inodifications. (See related incident described in detail 6.9) This order was not lifted until the licensee was satisfied that further events such as this would not occur based on the corrective actions identified belo l The seccnd barrier breach occurred.in the switchgear room

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temporary fire barrier material into the hole in the floor -

i for the transformer power cables without an' approved AWO or l station procedure. Later, contractor perscnnel working in l the switchgear room and the cable spreading area removed i the penetration filling material to facilitate communica-tion Plant operations personnel identified the breache bhrrier while work was in progress. Again,. appropriate compensatory measures were taken when the compromised l barrier was identified, i

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In support of the switchgear room halon fire suppressio system upgrader, a five inch deep hole was drilled into the !

switchgear room ceiling on August 13. The work specification j had called for the hole to be this deep for the installation of maxibolts. However, the ceiling concrete in this area is

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five and one half inches thick. When the drilling was completed, the hole was did not fully penetrate the ceilin The next day, it was discovered that the remaining half inch of concrete had broken away, leaving an opening to the 1 hallway above. Compensatory measures were take On August 17, the project engineer for.the mobile demin-eralizer installation project discovered that the fire I barrier between the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) and'_the l Waste Disposal Building had been breached without fulfillment !

of the fire watch requirements specified by the. project AW I Barrier integrity was restored immediatel The licensee conducted a prompt investigation of these events. Several root causes were identified. These were: l

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Contractor personnel were not sufficiently knowledge-able of station procedure Contractor personnel did not follow instructions provided on the AW0 Copies of the applicable AW0s were not present at the work sit Inadequate supervision and instruction of contractor craf t personne Inadequate training of job supervision in the require- ,

ments for fire barrier l

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Several AW0s did not provide adequate instructions or details pertaining to work on fire barriers and the j requirements associated with' breaching of fire barrier Poor communications between work crews at shift turnover

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and between supervision and craft personne Specific corrective actions were taken for each case of unauthorized fire barrier penetrations. Because the cir-cumstances in these events were similar, the corrective measures were also similar. These actions included the following:

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Generation Construction is reviewing all AW0s and pro-cedures involving work on fire barriers to identify )

any potential problems areas and to assure that appropriate procedural controls are. in plac '

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Disciplinary actions were taken against several, con- i tractor employees who were directly involved with the 1 failures to comply with procedures and AW0 .

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Contractor personnel were retrained in adherence to station procedures and instructions provided by_AW0s,

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Shift turnover time periods have been increased in an i effort to ensure that turnovers are more thoroug AW0s are being more widely distributed to all super-visory personnel involved in the work activities and on each job sit AW0s are being generated for all temporary and permanent fire barrier seals and will contain more details on the requirements associated with the breaching of fire barriers, i

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Plan't management issued a notice to all' station person-nel to re-emphasize the importance of adhering .to q fire protection requirement j In ac'dition to these measures, station management decided to more closely supervise contractors who are not fully familiar with station policies and procedures. Weekend work activities will be carefully selected to ensure that crew turnovers are smoothly executed and that adequate l supervision is availabl I In each of these events, station personnel identified the I deficiencies with the fire protection system and fire barrier j Personnel were aware that TS requirements were not being met and

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promptly took the appropriate corrective actions in accordance with the TS action statement. However, these occurrences constitute a violation of TS 3.2 J The fire protection problems identified during this inspection period were evaluated as not serious because of their nature and relatively short duratio Further, their licensee-identified nature and the corrective actions were evaluated as' reflective of ongoing strong licensee management attention which was effective in in countering the individual instances. No additional licensee measures were identified as being necessary to assure appropriate

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adherence to fire protection requirements during this outage. Also, the licensee's measures were evaluated as appropriate to their ongoing, long-term-effort to assure that individuals adhere to work requirement Therefore, no notice of violation was issued in this cas .9 Contractor Personnel Errors During Plant Modifications On August 12, during core officad, contractor personnel _ performing modifications to containment penetrations cut into penetration piping other than that specified by the AWO. When this was brought to the attention of control room operators, all fuel movement was halted until containment integrity was verifie Earlier, guidelines had been established requiring operations to release only one side of the containment penetration to ensure that containment integrity would be maintained. These preplanning efforts were successful as there was not a breach in integrit Fuel movement was then permitted to continu The design changes were being conducted in accordance with PDCR 878 to bring the station into compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. Preplanning efforts determined tnat each penetration would requirt three AW0s; one each for prefabrication, inside contain-ment, and outside containment. In this manner, operations could assure that containtnent integrity was maintained when require Contractor personnel were beginning' work on penetration P-60 (component cooling water supply to the neutron shield tank) when two cuts were made and a portion of the piping removed from the line in the west pipe trench which'is associated with this penetration. The AWO had been approved for the ' cutting of the line inside ccr,tainment, however, job supervisors were not aware of this approval . All work on this PDCR was suspended until management was assured that situations such as this and the unauthorized breaching of fire barriers do not occur again. (See detail 6.8.2)

Licensee investigation into the circumstances surrounding this event identified that the job supervisors did not follow proce-dures regarding the authorization of work, and did not review the AW0s prior to initiating work. Also, training given to contractor supervision did not adequately address the requirements of AW0s and the consequences of performing work without the proper authorization. Corrective measures were taken similar to those taken for the instances involving the breaching of fire barriers because these events occurred in the same time frame and involved j contractor personnel. (See detail 6.8.2)

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6.10 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

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On August 14, 'during replacement of a relay, a. maintenance'

electrician inadvertently manually tripped relay 27Y 1-8. Thi (

a loss of power from 480 Volt buses 4 and 5 which provide power tol l the spent fuel pool cooling system pumps through Motor Control

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]j Center (MCC) At the time of this event, the core wasif ully

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offloaded to the fuel pool. . Power-was' restored to MCC 2 after about-eighty minutes. .During this time period, the spent fuel pool . heated '

up approximately eight degree The delay in restoration of power was'due to mechanical binding of the lockout relays for buses 4 and-5. .That:resulted'in burnup of-the coils. The licensee. evaluated several options for restoring-power to the buses. Earlier in the outage it had been: determined-that the heatup rate of the pool water would.be approximately. ten degrees per hour.if cooling water flow 'was: lost. Based on this calculation, itiwould have taken approximately twelve. hours before the pool would reach the boiling. point. The-licensee elected to conduct the required reviews and.. safety. evaluations forithe .  ;

corrective action; rather than institute a more immediate fix. LThe option.the licensee elected was to shed the loads from MCC 2 and 3, and then close the 480 volt power supply breaker manually. This required that: opera. tors be aware that should an.undervoltage condition occur they would have to manually-trip this' breake In parallel-with this temporary fix, the. relays were replaced and teste Later'that day the system was returned.to'. normal'-

configuration. The evolution, including: determining which option to use, conducting the required PORC reviews for the. jumper, lifted-lead and bypass safety evaluation, and restoring power to the pumps, l

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lasted about eighty-minutes. The station-superintendent managed the response to this event onsit From a safety response 1 viewpoint, the licensee's handling of this event was evaluated as highly professional.

I Licensee analysis of deportability of this event concluded that Ic

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it was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. The reason for this determination was that the licensee stated'the most relevant reporting requirement is applicable only to losses of.the residual-heat removal system. 'NRC review concluded that'the event was ~

, reportable'because removal of decay heat from spent fuel is removal of residual heat. Part 50.72(a)(2)(iii.)(B) states that any event or condition that alone could have prevented- the. fulfillment' of' the:

safety function of structures or' systems that are-needed to-remove 3 residual heat is to be reported within four hours. 'Therefore, the'

failure to report this event within four' hours is a violation (87-21-01).

.NRC management discussed these reporting requirements with licensee management. The' licensee implemented procedure changes to the '

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Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures to specify that any loss of spent fuel ' pool cooling, whether the plant is operating or in refueling, is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72. Operation personnel were also informed of this procedure revision. These actions were carried out promptly because of grid instabilities which led to an increased i likelihood of. loss of offsite power events during this' inspection period. As planning for future events in.which spent fuel pool cooling could be lost, the. licensee is developing a procedure for tying one of the spent fuel cooling pumps to'an alternate power source (the B-train) through already existing breaker The licensee is currently conducting an investigation into .the

, failure of the relays which compounded-this event and delayed the l restoration of power to the buses. The failed relays are_ General Electric (GE) type HEA-61 relays. Current information indicates that the relays became mechanically bound while cycling to the tripped position. When operators attempted to reset the relays, it was identified that the coils had burned. GE representatives informed the licensee that thay could not determine exactly when the coils burned. The licensee is evaluating a course of action:to I ensure that all of these type relays in the plant are operab'le prior .

to returning to power operation The feasibility of conducting preventive maintenance and testing of these relays is also being evaluated. This ma.tter will be reviewed further incident to routine ,

inspectio '

6.11 Inoperable ENS Hotline Phone l The Emergency Notification System'(ENS) hotline to the '4RC was identified to be inoperable on August 19, at 8:15 AM.- This determination was made because the phone's red light was found to be flashing without the accompanying ring. An Unusual Event was declared in accordance with the plant emergency procedure Required notifications were made. It was determined that the ENS l phone in the Emergency Operations Facility had been' accidentally knocked off the hook by personnel working in the area. The phones were declared operable and the licensee secured the Unusual Event at 8:35 AM.

l 7. Review of Periodic and Special Reports

! Upon= receipt, periodic and'special reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9 were reviewed. This review verified that the reported information was valid and included the NRC required data; that test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and that planr.ed corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

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Monthly Operating Report 87-06, Covering the Period June 1, 1987 through June 30, 1987 Monthly Operating Report 87-07, Covering the Period July 1, 1987 through July 31, 1987 Bimonthly Progress Report No. 5, New Switchgear Building Construction, dated July 31,'198 No deficiencies were identifie . Exit Interview

During this inspection, meetings were held with plant management to

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l discuss the findings. Also discussed was the licensee's policy toward l personnel sleeping while on site. -Licensee management reiterated their- 1 firm policy that it is unacceptable for any employees to sleep while'

on duty and in any case within the plant. No instances of personnel sleeping in the plant have been identified with the exception of one on July 27. In this case, the licensee had found a contractor employee asleep in the radiological controlled area. The individual was fired I

and his site access was terminate No proprietary information-related to this inspection was identified, i

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