IR 05000213/1989007

Insp Rept 50-213/89-07 on 890503-0613.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiation Protection, Fire Protection,Security,Maint,Surveillance Testing,Licensee Events & Open Items from Previous Insps

ML20246N591
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	07/11/1989
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246N573	List: IR 05000213/1989007 ML20246N568 ML20246N577
References
50-213-89-07, 50-213-89-7, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8907190403
Download: ML20246N591 (12)

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U.S.: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

REGION I'

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Docket No.- 50-213

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1 License N DPR-61:

' Licensee: , Con ~necticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O..Bok 270 u ,

, Hartford, C1'06101 Facility: Haddam Neck Plant, Haddam Neck, Connecticut s .In'spection at: Haddam Neck Plant h ' Inspection dates: May 3 through June 13, 1989'

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' Inspectors: Andra'A' Asars,- Resident Inspector

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John T. Shedlosky, Senior. Resident Inspector

' Approved by: d6 )F "7 /81/ 8 7 E.-C. McCabe, Chief,= Reactor Projects 4A Date~

-Summary: . Inspection 50-213/89-07 (5,3/89 - 6/13/89)

Areas Inspected: This was a routine safety inspection by the resident inspec -

tors. Areas reviewed. included plant operations, radiation protection, fire protection, : security, maintenance, surveillance testing,. licenseelevents, and open-items from previous inspection Noteworthy Licensee-Identified Items: Licensee personnel identified a concer involving the installation and use of previously purchased, safety related spare' parts which may not meet current requirements _'(Report Section 4.1.3).

Results: One violation was identified concerning unreviewed material and de-

. sign changes made to the station Service Water pumps over the past five years-(Report Section 4.1.2) No other inadequacies; care ide'ntified. Inspector re-view of safety-related spares found a.high leve' cf licensee attention to de-tail in the procurement are g

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[L TABLE OF CONTENTS

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-PAGEE i- S umma ry o f Fa c i l i ty Ac t i v i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

' Plant 0pr.ations'................. .................................... 1 3.; Plant Operations Review Committee.................................... 1- Maintenance and Surveillance ...................... ............... .' 1 "D" Service. Water Pump Impeller Assembly Replacement............. 2

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4. Review of Maintenance Activities...................... '3 4. , Pump Material and Design Changes...................... '3 4.1.3' Evaluation of Equipment Spare Parts................... 'S 4.2 Inadequate Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Surveillance..... 5 4.3 Containment' Air Recirculation Fan Motor Cooler' Replacement. ... . , 6 Events Occurring During'the Inspection............................... 6 5.1 Li cen see Ev e n t Re po rts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

~5'2- EmergencyLSafeguards System Actuation...........................

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5.3 Power Reduction for _ Replacement of Containment' Air Recirculation -

Fan Motor Coolers............ .........,....................... 8 ReviewLPeriodic and Special Report'..................................

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~7 . . Review of Response to Bulletin 85-03, Motor Operator Valve Common Mo d e - Fa i l u r e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

. . Exit Interview........................................................ 10

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1. --Summary of Facility Activities (71707)'

The plant operated at full power.until May 31 when power was reduced to 30% during correction of erratic operation of the heater drain-tank leve control valve. . Operation at 30% mwer continued during replacement of the Containment Air Recirculation Fan m tor Coolers and overhaul of.the "C" Service Water pump. On June 7, a powec increase at the rate of-5% per day was initiated. At the end of the inspection, period,'the plant was at ap-

, . proximately 65% powe . Plant Operations (71707, 71710).

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The inspectors observed plant operation during regular tours of the fol-lowing plant areas:

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Control Room --

Primary Access Point

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. Primary Auxiliary Building --

Fence Line (Protected Area)

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Yard Areas

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Radiological Control Point --

Intake Structure

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Appendix R Switchgear Building --

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Control room instruments were observed for correlation between channels ard for conformance with Technical Specification requirements. The in-spectors observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged. Operator.-awareness and response to these conditions were reviewed. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory re-quirements. Posting and con rol of radiation and high radiation areas was inspected. . Comp 1_1ance with Radiation Work Permits and use of appropriate personnel monitoring devices were checked. Plant housekeeping controls were observed, including control and storage of. flammable material'and other potential safety hazard The inspectors also examined the condi-tion of various fire protection system During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were properly made and com-municated equipment status / deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, process computer printouts, and Plant Information Reports. The inspectors observed selected aspects of plant security including access control, physical barriers, and' person-nel monitoring. No unacceptable conditions were identified. Operators were alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigue.

i Plant Operations Review Committee (40500)

The inspectcrs attended several PORC (Plant Operations Review Committee)

meetings. Technical Specification 6.5 requirements for required member attendance were verified. The meeting agendas included procedural chan-ges, proposed changes to the Technical Specifications ard Plant Design Change Records. The meetings were characterized by frank discussions and L-___-_-______ _ _ - -

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l questioning of the proposed changes. .In particular, consideration was given to assure clarity and consistency ~among procedures. Items for which adequate review time was'not available were postponed;to. allow committee

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E- members time ~to review and comment. Dissenting opinions were encouraged and~ esolved to the satisfaction- of the committee. The inspectors had no furt ;r-comments.

L Maintenance and Surveillance (61726, 62703)'

The inspectors observed various maintenance and problem investigation'ac-tivit_ies for compliance with requirements and applicable codes and stand-ards,-QSD (Quality Services Department) involvement, safety tags,-equip--

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ment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, radiological-

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controls, fire protection, retest, and deportability. Also, the inspec-tors witnessed selected surveillance tests to determine.whether' properly approved procedures were in use, test instrumentation was properly cali-

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.brated and used, technical specifications were satisfied, testing was per-formed by qualified personnel, proceaure details were adequate, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositione Portions of.the following activities were reviewed:

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SUR 5.1-17A,- Emergency Diesel Generator EG-2A Manual Starting and Load Test

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SUR 5.1-178, Emergency Diesel Generator EG-28 Manual Starting and Load Test

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CMP 8.2-17, Repair or Replacement of Feedwater Valve Positioner

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Replacement-of "D" Sarvice Water Pump impeller assembly

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Replacement of ";" Service Water Pump impeller assembly-

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SUR 5.2-68, Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Calibration

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CMP 8.2-70, Rod Position Indication System Adjustments at Power

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Replacement of "C" Circulating Water pump shaft coupling

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Replacement of Containment Air Recirculation Fan Motor Coolers "D" Service Water Pump Impeller Assembly Replacement During the current operating cycle, licensee ISI (Inservice Inspec- '{

tion) personnel have noted gradually degrading performance for the

"D" SW (Service Water) pump. Due to increased cooling demands on the j SW system during the summer months, the licensee elected to overhaul the pump while three oper;'ing pumps could adequately meet the cooling {

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idemand. There are;five'SW pumps,.four installed and one spar These are two-stage, centrifugal pumps manufactured by Worthington Pump Corporation,.Model 24H-590H.'

4 '. Review'of Maintenance Activities

' The pump wasioverhauled during the week of May'15 under. two

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AW0s (Automated Work Orders). .AWD 84-2723 required pum : removal and reinstallation of the' spare impeller.' assembl AWD 89-3819 ~provided for QSD (Quality Services Division)-

inspection'of the impeller dimensions as'part of the as-sembly upgrade to QA' Category .-

Associated with these AW0s were two NCRs.(Nonconformance Reports). NCR.RC-39-015 upgraded the spare pump rotating-assembly to QA-Category . All.of the parts for the spare pump were QA Category 1 with the exception of two impeller collet pin The upgrade of these col k t-pins was con-

. ducted under NCR RC-88-218. These' i L pins could not be-purchased as QA Category 1 and wern therefore bought as commercial grade. The upgrade to Category 1.was parformed in accordance.with.ACP 1'.2-4.2, Commercial Grade-Procure-ment, Upgrade, and Dedication Proces 'The' inspectors observed portions of pump' removal, rebuild, and installation of the spare impeller assembly. The AW0s, NCRs and associated documentation were reviewed and post maintenance surveillance testing was observe '4. Pump Material and Design Changes

. During pump reassembly,-the inspectors noted that the re-moved impeller assembly was bronze and the new impeller assembly material was stainless steel. This was discussed with Maintenance and Engineering personnel. The inspectors were informed that the "D" SW pump is the last of the five pumps to have the. impeller assembly material changed. ' The other pump impeller assemblies had been replaced during the last three refueling outage In addition to the impeller, other components were changed including the suction bells, which are larger than the previous bell The inspectors reviewed the design change (PDCR 640) which enlarged the screenhouse floor sleeves to accept the larger pump suction bells. This change was completed during the 1987 Refueling Outage. The licensee was unable to locate a l

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design change evaluation for the installation of the new pump rotating assemblies and concluded that none was pre-pare Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures and administrative policies be established, implemented, and maintained that meet or ex-ceed the requirements and recommendations of Sections and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1976 and Appendix A of USAEC Regu-latory Guide 1.3 ANSI N18.7-1976 Section 5.1, Facility Administrative Poli-cies and Procedures, specifies that the licensee establish and adhere to rules and instructions pertaining to the method of conducting operations and preparing and retaining plant document Connecticut Yankee Quality Assurance Procedure QA 1.2-3.1, Plant Design Change Request (PDCR), Revision 17, November 1,1983, details the process by which PDCRs are prepared, reviewed, and dispositioned. This procedure is used for all plant modifications to ensure that a safety evaluation is performed and that the basis for the plant safety an-alysis is not compromised by the change. This revision to the procedure was in effect during the first rep'.acement of a bronze impeller with a stainless steel (SW pump "A")

impeller assembly in May 1984. Between May 1984 and May 1989, the licensee replaced components of five SW pumps, thereby making material and design changes to these pumps, without having implemented the requirements of QA 1.2- This is a violation (89-07-01).

The inspectors determined that the omission of the safety

. evaluation is of relatively low safety significance in that i the stainless steel impeller assemblies have been installed ;

in three SW pumps for several years and have exhibited satisfactory performance. Additionally, ISI evaluation of the rebuilt "D" SW pump post-maintenance test results con-cluded that pump performance has improved. Review of as-sociated documentation indicates that the manufacturer, Worthington, has changed part numbers and component mate- j rials and dimensions. Apparently, these changes have t' ;

tered the pump head flow characteristic After inspector identification of this issue, the licensee j l prepared PDCE CY-89-29, SW Pump Impeller Material Change, l dated June 6, 1989. This PDCE (PDCR Evaluation) evaluated the change in impeller material for the "C" SW pump for which the impeller assembly was replaced during the week of )l l

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. June 6. 'The "C" SW pump impeller assembly. materials ~ had been. changed from. bronze to stainless steel'during the 19871

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Refueling,0utage. ,The spare assembly which was installed

' 1' during this inspection. period'was' stainless steel. Thi PDCE-also applies.to the "A, B and 0"'SW pumps and con .

cluded;that the material change ofLthe SW pum,3-impellers' is -

satisfactory'from a design und operating perspective.

4,1.3- Evaluation of Equipment ~ Spare Parts L

The' inspectors also discussed, with cognizant Engineering

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personnel,- safety related equipment spare part's currently in warehouse storage. Such parts may not meet'currente

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' standards 1for spare / replacement parts. Engineering Pro-

, curement personnel were aware'of this-potential 1and had ,

recently developed a method to assure that inadequate spare:

parts were not incorporated into safety-related equipmen During the next year,' Engineering Procurement personnel plan to review all spare safety-related parts currently in

' stock in the. warehou.a to verify conformance to current standards <for spare parts. The inspector had no further questions on spare parts adequacy.

• 4.2 Inadequate Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Surveillance While performing an audit on May 30 of Technical Specification sur-veillance~ requirements versus I&C (Instrumentation and Control) pro-cedures, the licensee identified an inadequacy in the RWST (Refueling Water Storage Tank)' level instrumentation surveillanc SUR 5.2-10, Refueling' Water Storage Tank' Level Test, was determined to be inadequate to fulfill the quarterly surveillance requirements of TS (Technical Specification) Table 4.2-1-in that it'did not per-form a full channel functional test. Specifically, SUR 5.2-10 did not verify and record the alarm function of the control room annun-ciator However, SUR 5.2-68, Refueling. Water Storage Tank Level Calibration, includes a full channel functional test. This surveillance is'per-formed during refueling outages and was last performed on-September 9, 1988. Portions of this surveillance were performed on May 31 to verify control room alarm operability; the results were satisfactor Additionally, all.of the JAC T3 surveillance were reviewed to ensure that TS requirements were being met. No further inadequacies were ide.nt i fi ed . A Controlled Routing was issued to Engineering to audit the TS surveillance to ensure that all requirements are me __ :__- - _ _ - ._ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ .

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This surveillance inadequacy was licensee identified and of minor safety significance in that Control Room RWST level indication was operable. Immediate corrective actions were taken to verify annunci-ator operability and actions were taken to prevent recurrence. Al-though the failure to perform a TS required channel functional test constitutes a violation, no Notice of Violation is being issued in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1, Exercise of Discretion (NC 89-07-02).

4.3 Containment Air Recirculation Fan Motor Cooler Replacement The licensee determined, through a series of flow measurements, t the CAR (Containment Air Recirculation) cooling coils and the fan motor coolers required cleaning prior to tha warm summer months, These cooling units are supplied by filtered service water and ex-perienced a build-up of corrosion products. Operation at reduced flow with high river water temperature became a recent concer NRC Resident Inspection Report 50-213/89-02 Sections 4.1 and 6,3 ad-dressed the bac'kground and inspection coverage for the cleaning of the CAR cooling coils. Section 5.3 of this report addresses the operational aspects for the replacement of the motor cooler The inspectors observed the licensee's planning for the replacement of the CAR Fan Motor cooling coils along with various aspects of the work in progress. This evolution was performed in the containment at 30*4 power without incident. There were no unacceptable conditions identifie . Events Occurring During Inspection (71707, 92700, 93702)

5.1 Licensee Tvent Reports The iollowing Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for clar-ity, accuracy of the description of cause, and adequacy of corrective action. The inspectors determined whether further information was required and whether there were were generic implications. The in-spectors also verified that the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and Station Administrative and Operating Procedures had oeen met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, and that the continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification Limit Procedure for Use of Containment Spray Determined Inade-quate (NRC Resident Inspection Report Number 50-213/89-05, ,

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89-06 Heating Steam Containment Isolation Valves Failed Surveil-lance Test (NRC Resident Inspection Report 50-213/89-05,

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Section 6.2)

89-07 Potential Cracking of Steam Generator Tube Plugs Identified (NRC Resident Inspection Report 50-213/89-05, Section 9)

89-08 Error Identified in large Break Loss of Coolant Analysis (NRC Resident Inspection Report 50-213/89-05, Section 10)

No unacceptaM e conditions were identifie .2 Emergency Saf a :rds System Actuation On May 23, 1989 at 4:00 pm one of the two 4160 volt safeguards elec-trical buses was deenergized. This occurred at the completion of SUR 5.1-17B,-Emergency Diesel Generator EG-28 Manual Start and Loading Test, when an operator mistakenly opened the normal supply breaker to electrical bus No. 9. The diesel automatically restarted and re-energized the bus. All equipment performed properly following the opening of tie breaker 9T3. Immediate corrective actions included the restoration of the bus to its normal electrical suppl The reactor remained at full power throughout this even The root a sse of this event was determined to be personnel erro The operator failed to check his actions prior to operating the con-trol switch for the electrical bus tie breaker. One of the final restoration steps of SUR 5.1-17B requires the verification of switch position The operator stated that he saw the indication for the 9T3 tie breaker, misinterpreted its meaning, and manipulated the con-trol switc In addition to counseling the operator in the practice'of verifying actions prior to performing them, a HPES (Human Performance Evalua-tion System) root cause review was performed. Several points were made in the report at the conclusion of this review. They included observations as to the location of the control board label. A person standing directly in front of the switch haa an obstructed view of the label; placing a hand on the tie breaker remote switch completely biccks the switch labe The inspector discussed this event with station management, shift supervision and the operator involved. NRC review concluded that the event was thoroughly reviewed both by the station operations line organization and the HPES review. Event records reflected proper operation of safety related equipment and that both near and long term actions appeared proper and responsive. There were no unaccept-able conditions identified.

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5.3 Power Reduction for Replacement of Containment Air Recirculation Fan

' Motor Coolers During May,1989, the licensee cleaned the CAR (Containment Air Re-circulation) cooler coil as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50- !

213/89-02, Detail 6.3. The cleaning was necessary for relief from the restrictions of a JC0 (Justification for Continued Operation)

involving the SW (Service Water) system flow and heat leading. A fouling mechanism different than the expected silting was identified when the coolers were opened; the licensee determhied that the CAR fan motor coolers would also need to be cleaned or replaced. 'Howev-er, the conditions of Operating License Amendment No. 112, which was

, issued on a one-time-only basis, did not include the CAR fan motor cooler I Consequently, the licensee applied for and received Operating License Amendment No.117 on June The amendment permits relaxation of containment integrity for cleaning / replacement of the CAR fan motor coolers once during this operating cycl A reduction to 30% power was commenced on May 31 in response to er-ratic operation of the heater drains tank level control valv Power remained at 30% for the duration of the CAR fan motor cooler replacement (see Detail 4.3 of this report). While power was re-duced, the "C" SW pump was overhauled and the "C" Circulating Water pump was repaired after the shaft broke on June A power increase was initiated on June 6 at a rate of 5% per day for fuel management considerations. At the end of the inspection period, the plant was at approximately 65% powe The design basis of the service water system has been under extensive licensee review to insure that it will meet its assumed post accident performance in cooling the containment atmosphere through the CAR units, and to provide cooling water to safety-related equipmen This equipment includes the Emergency Diesel-Generators, the RHR (Residual Heat Removal) Heat Exchangers, and the Residual Heat Re-moval pumps' bearing oil cooler Additionally, the SW system must provide acceptable cooling to both safety-related and balance-of-plant equipment to support full power operation. The replacement of !

the CAR fan motor coolers cleared the final item necessary to restore the system design basis to 85 F river water temperatur The inspectors have been following the licensee's progress in ad-dresdny this issue (Reference NRC Inspection Reperts 50-213/88-23 and 89-02). No unacceptable conditions have been identifie _ _ _ _

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- Review of Periodic and Special Reports (90712)

Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9 were reviewe This review verified that the reported information was valid and included the NRC required data; that test re-suits and supporting information were consistent with design predictions

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and performance specifications; and that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem, The inspectors also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal. oc-currence. -The following report was reviewed:

Haddam Neck Plant Monthly Operating Report 89-04, for the period April 1, 1989 through April 30, 1989 No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Review of Response to Bulletin 85-03, Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures Periodically, inspections have been conducted relating to the implementa-tion of motor-operated valve testing in accordance with Bulletin 85-03, Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings. A thorough summary of licensee actions in re-sponse to this bulletin is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-213/

87-25, Detail 13, dated October 28, 1987. Portions of these actions were also discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-213/87-22, Detail 5.5, and 50-213/88-08, Detail 5.2, dated December 7, 1987 and May 5, 1988, respec-tively, The NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has conducted a review of, specifically, the licensee's response to Action Item e. of Bulletin 85-03, and subsequently supplied the following inspection report inpu As r2 quested by Action Item e. of Bulletin 85-P , the licensee identified the selected safety-related valves, the valves' maximum differential pres-sures and the licensee's program to assure valve operability in their let-ter dated June 11, 1986. Review of this response indicated the need for additional information which was contained in Region I letter dated March 18, 1988. Review of the licensee's April 18, 1988 response to this re-quest for additional information indi:ates that the licensee's selection ;

of the applicable safety-related valves to be addressed and the valves' i maximum differential pressures meets the requirements of the bulletin and the program to assure valve operability requested by Action Item e. of the bulletin is now acceptabi The licensee submitted the f ,nal report, dated June 27, 1988, in response to Action Item f. of Bullet:n 85-0 There are no further NRC questions at this tim ,

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During this inspection, meetings were held with plant management t'o dis- '

cuss the findings. No proprietary information related to this inspection 't was identified, k

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