IR 05000213/1989011
| ML20247F473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1989 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247F463 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-89-11, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8909180182 | |
| Download: ML20247F473 (9) | |
Text
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _.
- - -
.
_.
_
_ _ _ _ -
..
..
/
U.S. NUCIIAR REGUIA70RY REGICH I Report No.
50-213/89-11 Docket No.
50-213 License No.
DPR-16 Priority-Category C Licensee:
Connecticut Yanime Atomic Power Campany P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101-0270 Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection At: Berlin, Haddam, Middletown and Waterford, Connecticut Dates:
July 31-August 4,1989 Inspector: 1,)[/axMI
/W,8//f/
C. G. Amato, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, ( Ate'
Emergency Preparedness Section, FRSSB, DRSS F
Approved tr]
/
4@M
$9WM /
W./J.JhazqDtus, Chief, Energency Preparedness date Sectdon, FRSSB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on July 31-August 4,19898 (Irspection Report No. 50-213/89-11)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced, safety inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness ptwtam. The inspection areas included: charges to the emergency preparedness program; emergency facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies; organization and management control; knowledge and performance of duties (training); independent reviews / audits; Emergency Action levels; Protective Action R - ndations; off-site activities; dose A - - it; ard the security /energency preparedness interface.
Results: No violations were identified. The licensee demonstrated ability to maintain and implement an acceptable emergency preparedness program.
8909180182 890830 PDR ADOCK 05000213 Q
. _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _.
_ _ _ _
_ -_
\\
- "
..
,
'
DETAILS
!
- 1. 0 '
Persons Contacted L
The following Haddam Neck Plant ' and Northeast Utility Service Company.
. (NUSCO) personnel attended the exit ' meeting.
-
,,
R. Brown, Staff Assistant, Haddam Neck Plant
~ W.' Buch, Senior Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Millstone E.' DeBarba, Superintendent, Station Services, Haddam Neck Plant L:
R. Gill, Security Supervisor, Haddam Neck Plant
~
S. Hodge, Supervisor,' General Nuclear Training, NUSCO D. Miller, Station Superintendent, Haddam Neck Plant W. McCance, Senior Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, NUSCO L. Osiecki, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator. Haddam Neck Plant R. Rogers, Manager, Radiological Assessment Branch, NUSCO'
The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personnel.
2.0 Operational Status of the Emeroency Preparedness Proaram 2.1 Ch'anaes to the Emeroency Preparedness Proaram (EPP)
,
The Emergency Plan (EP), and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were reviewed to determine if they meet the requirements of
10 CFR 50.47(b)(16) and 50.54(q), and the requirements of Section IV.G of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
All Haddam Neck EPIPs have been revised following human factor engineering analysis.
The licensee determined the revisions did not reduce emergency preparedness effectiveness.
All but one procedure has been approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee.
That one procedure was under review during the inspection period.
'
Plans and Procedures were current. Availability of these documents in each Emergency Response Facility (ERF) was checked on a sampling basis with particular attention given to procedures for classification, PAR development and notification.
Current and approved copies of these documents were available in each ERF.
Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
2.2 Emeraency Facilities. Eouipment. Instrumentation. and Sunolies ERFs are designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8)
and (b)(9),Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, Supplement I to NUREG-0737 and Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Equipment, status boards, i
communications systems, plans, procedures, habitability and access control provisions were checked for the control room (CR), Technical
]
Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency i
Operations Center (E0C), Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) and Corporate Emergency Operations Center / Alternate EOF.
l
_ _ - - - _. _ _ - _ - _
_ _ _ - - _
- - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ - _
_ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ -
.
.
-
.
_--
- - -
~~
.,
i
.
.3 Status boards, maps, facility diagrams, plans, procedures, drawings, and' equipment' were in place and maintained, equipment was within the prescribed calibration period and functional,'and communication equipment ' operative at all ERFs.
Portable computers used to calculate' projected doses were properly 7tored and operative.
During past exercises and drills. a mock control room was set up behind control room equipment caisinets.
The area used for this purpose was being reduced by the installation of. additional equipment. The licensee recognizes the ' remaining area may not be adequate for mock control room needs. Consideration is being given to using an exercise room adjacent to the control room for this purpose. The net area of this room was greater than that of the mock control ' room prior to it's reduction. Phone jacks would have to be installed.
Use of the simulator is under review.
The licensee favors this approach in principle, but expressed reservations regarding the effective and safe separation of the simulator from the reactor Safety Parameter Display System and the Off-Site Information System (0FIS) when the simulator is used to drive data terminals in.the ERFs.
Another concern is the ability of the simulator to mimic severe accidents when it is designed to duplicate o
only design basis. accidents.
Communication systems were evaluated to ascertain if the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and (b)(6), Sections IV.D.1 and E.9 of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and IN 86-97 were met.
A check of communication systems in the ERFs showed independent, redundant 'and diverse communication systems were in place and functional.
These include NRC's ENS and Health Physics Network phones, ' commercial phone lines, a microwave link to the Connecticut Valley Power Dispatcher, radios for security, in-plant teams and on and off-site monitoring teams, and a radio in the control room for communicatbn with the Middlesex Hospital and ambulance service.
In addition, there was rapid facsimile and data hard copy capability.
These systems, in addition to linking the ERFs, also provide connections to the Connecticut State Police, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection and the Northeast work station in the State E00. Phone lines from the plant consist of commercial microwave backed up by land lines.
Northeast Utilities owns and operates the pager call-in system which is tested daily. The present system is being replaced by a computerized system which is scheduled for on-line operation early next year. The present and future system activates pagers carried by licensee, Connecticut State government personnel and town government personnel assigned to emergency response duty. The pagers may be selectively activated. A number of site personnel have been qualified as ENS communicators. These personnel include the Site Services Superintendent and the site, Senior Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (SNEPC). Terminals for the Safety Parameter Display System and 0FIS are in place. 0FIS will replace the Nuclear Emergency Status System (NESS) which is being phased out.
<
---
>
.
.
~
...
'
4 Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
2.3 Organization and Manaaement Control The EPP organizational structure was reviewed, personnel were L
interviewed and EPP activities were identified to determine if.the licensee : has developed, maintains and implements an emergency preparedness program (EPP) required by 10 CFR 50.54(t) which meets the. standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
-
-The staffing of the EPP organization and NUSCO management have not changed since the last inspection.
Management involvement at the station superintendent, department director and vice presidential
. levels continues.
These managers:
review plans and procedures; maintain Emergency Response Organization (ER0) qualification; exercise l oversight functions; resolve non-compliance issues raised during audits and reviews; receive and review significant event reports; and maintain interfaces with the State and town governments.
The pilot accident management' program is supported by upper management.
EPP was considered a central office program and not a. site program.
EPP provides six services to.the Northeast Utility organization.
Two nuclear emergency coordinators are assigned to the site.
A contractor employee provides administrative support. The SNEPC is assigned.19 tasks' by corporate administrative procedures including liaison with the Site Services Superintendent. The SNEPC has.been tasked with the responsibility for installation of the computerized call-in system.
In addition, the SNEPC has been trained on the simulator in accident classification, will attend an accident management course and is a' qualified ENS communicator.
Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
2.4 Knowledae and Performance of Duties (Trainina)
Training records, lesson plans, Emergency Response Organization (ER0)
qualification roster, and the training matrix were reviewed, and Training Department (TD) staff interviewed in order to verify that emergency preparedness training is in compliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) and Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
The Nuclear Training Manual (NTM) has been approved.
Training was given in accordance with the policies and procedures of the N'.M.
A 20 (ERO position) by 22 (courses) training matrix for the ERO has been developed. Lesson Plans were current, examinations were given and training records retained for plant life. About 300 Connecticut Yankee staff have been trained for the ERO.
In addition, 70 NUSCO personnel at Northeast headquarters were trained for Corporate Emergency Operations Center positions which support the site ERO.
Reactor operators receive classroom training including simulator
. _ _ _ _
_ ________-_ _ _ _
.---_-
-
..
.
'
training in Emergency Action Level classification.
. Accident management is still in the pilot stage and as such is not yet under the NTM. At least six training drills are conducted each year.
'
Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
2.5 Independent Reviews / Audits An independent review is required at least every twelve months by 10 CFR 50.54(t) which includes determination for adequacy of the licensee State / local government interface and the availability of the results of the interface review to State government.
The audit required by 10 CFR 50.54(t) will be conducted during the fourth quarter of 1989. Procedures for conducting this review / audit are contained in Corporate Organization Nuclear Incidents (CONI)
Procedure Manual 11.0.1, "EP Program Review". Adequacy of the State interface was determined annually.
Results, including non-compliances and their resolution, must be distributed to management up to the Senior Vice President level.
CONI 11.0.1 does not contain procedures for resolving non-compliances.
This is done by discussion and agreement reached generally at the Station Superintendent level.
However, if resolution is not reached at this levei, the issue moves up the management chain until resolution is reached.
This chain will involve the Manager of the Radiological Assessment Branch (RAB).
When EPP is audited, one section of the RAB audits another RAB section. 'If non-compliances arise, resolution of non-compliance issues by the RAB manager may not be appropriate.
The degree of function separation may not meet the independence criteria of 50.54(t).
The licensee has agreed to include non-compliance procedures in CONI 11.0.1 and the RAB manager will defer non-compliances involving the EPP to the Department Director Manager level.
Contractor audits of select EPP activities particularly mathematical model.s and software have been performed.
Based upon the above review, this area is acceptable.
2.6 Emeroency Action Levels (EAls1
_
EALs were reviewed and discussed with reactor operators and Emergency Preparedness Department staff.
This was done to determine if the EALs meet the standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, the guidance of IN 83-28, I
and Planning Standard D and Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654.
The EAL tables have been human factored engineered and color coded.
Symptoms, events, fission product barrier failure, non-plant events and projected doses are listed.
Operators were trained by human factor engineering principles to determine an EAL by beginning with the highest classification, the General Emergency, and working down
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
n- _. _. _ _ -
_
L
..
- -
.
,
p,
to lower classifications.
The EAls.have been discussed with the
. State'of Connecticut.
I The licensee reviewed Unusual Events to identify those-which might be more properly classified as non-emergency events reportable to the NRC per.10 CFR 50.72(b).
If revisions are in order, they will
,
discussed with the NRC prior to submitting a revised table to the (
Plant Operating Review Committee. The State of Connecticut will also.
be advised? of these changes.
The licensee will. add, as another condition,. interfacing loss of coolant accident (Event V) and containment bypass to box C.7 of the Barrier Failure Reference Table.
A senior reactor operator, a shift technical advisor and a simulator trainer did not recognize the initiating conditions stated above even though the ERO successfully responded to them in past exercises.
This. indicates a need to provide training in these concepts.
Based upon.the above review, this area was acceptable.
2.7 Protective Action Recommendations (PARS)
The standards and' requirements for PARS are given in 10. CFR 50.47(b)(10) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. Applicable guidance is found in IN 83-28.
PARS were reviewed and' discussed with. licensee staff in order to verify that the. standard and requirement were met and PARS were consistent with federal guidance.
PARS' are predetermined using Connecticut's Posture Codes.
The extent of protective actions would be based in part on projected dose calculations. PARS had been reviewed with the State of Connecticut.
.l Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
2.8 Off-Site Activities Correspondence, documentation and records were reviewed to determine i
if the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and (b)(12) and the
'
requirements of Section IV.D.3 and IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 were met.
Siren availability during 1988 was 97% Emergency Action Levels and Protective Action Recommendations were discussed with government
officials.
Medical, Health Physics, radiation monitoring and
communication drills were run with State and Town personnel.
Training was also given to these personnel.
A letter certifying l
thesa activities and siren availability has been sent to US FEMA-I l
by the State of Connecticut Office of Emergency Management on January j
27, 1989. The licensee indicated that Evacuation Time Estimates will
)
be updated when 1990 census data is available. All but one Letter j
of Agreement was current and that letter was under revision during l
the inspection period.
j
.
Medical Training for support hospital personnel will be given in
_____-_______-_--- _ ___ __- _ _ -
_ - _.
.
--
-
-
,
-
._ _
- '*=
j
.
-
i
- the fall.
Volunteer Fire Company members have been trained by LNortheast's Fire Training Center staff.
The Radiation Emergency Area (REA) of.'the support hospital was
' inspected.. The Middlesex Hospital'in Middletown is the Haddam Neck-support hospital, the back up hospital for the Millstone Nuclear-
Power Station and the FEMA designated MS-1 hospital.
The REA can accommodate'seven patients at a time. There.is direct access from
.the. street.
Decontamination capability is 'available.
Hospital personnel were-properly trained. Appropriate procedures, supplies and equipment were available. Equipment was operable and calibrated.
Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
.The Nuclear Information Program Coordinator was interviewed and publicly distributed material reviewed to determine if the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) and Section IV.D.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 were met.
Inserts have been placed.in the telephone directories for the communities within the ten mile emergency planning zone- (EPZ).
Brochures or calendars will be mailed to all households within the EPZ.
.Information booklets for farmers and transients have been distributed. Media training will be given in the fall in conjunction with a wire service meeting.
The media information packet was current.
Based on the'above review, this area is acceptable.
'2.9 Dose Assessment The standards, requirements, and guidance for dose assessment are given in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Sections IV.B and IV.E. of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, Section II.f.1(2) of NUREG 0737 (Supplement 1),
Regulatory Guides 1.23 and 1.97, and NUREG-0654, Rev.1, Appendix 2.
Facilities were inspected, records were checked and personnel interviewed to verify that these requirements were met.
Calibration data for the containment high range monitors and vent monitors which would monitor a release under emergency conditions were checked.
Records indicated these monitors were within the calibration period specified in the facility Technical Specification.
Records for the meteorological tower sensors were also reviewed and these sensors were determined to be in calibration.
Field team procedures for iodine collection now reflect a basis document. Collection time minimizes field team dose while samples are collected and meet statistical performance and sensitivity
i l
specification.
Default iodine / noble gas ratios for an unfiltered release are 0.02; This value is in agreement with that given in NUREG-1210 for primary loop activity.
Deployment of field teams along the Connecticut River's west bank will, in the future, reflect
!
,
NRC concerns noted in Section 3.2 of RI inspection report 50-213/89-l
______- _ _ _
___-_-___ _ __-
___
e N;
.
04. The crew size of monitoring teams has been reduced from three to two.
The licensee concluded this reduction will not reduce emergency preparedness effectiveness. Four wheel drive, all terrain vehicles have been purchased and were available for use by these teams.
The number of Health Physics Technicians at Haddam Neck is not adequate for extended coverage in an emergency.
Augmentation is needed, therefore, personnel from the Millstone Nuclear Power Station will be called in to provide additional support in this area.
The licensee will review the desirability of adding the temperature ranges given in A.3 of the Barrier Failure Reference Table to CONI and site dose assessment procedures. The licensee will also consider adding the source term-temperature correlation given in Figure 1.2 of NUREG-1210, Vol. 2.
1nese additions will prompt dose assessors to consider temperature as an index of possible fission product release models.
The need for such a prompt was indicated by the results of one walk through with a dose assessor.
The conventional back up meteorological tower located in Middletown has been replaced by a Doppler acoustic sounder (S0DAR) located on site. SODR transmits a sound pulse upward into the atmosphere. The echoes returning from the pulses are picked up by the receivers and this signal is analyzed as a function of time and atmospheric characteristics. S0DAR will provide wind direction and speed, and stability category.
However, S0DAR will not identify stability categories A and G or temperature differences as a function of height (delta T).
Since CONI and site dose assessment software require input of delta T, the delta T will be correlated with the stability category and keyboard entered so the software will select the indicated stability category. Before designating SODAR as a backup to the tower, the licensee reviewed NUREGS-0654 and 0737, Supplement I and Regulatory Guide 1.23 in addition to correlating long term data from the site's conventional meteorological tower with 50DAR data.
Based on these factors, the licensee concluded S0DAR is acceptable as a backup to the tower and its use will not decrease emergency preparedness effectiveness. The Haddam Neck Emergency Plan was being rewritten to reflect this substitution.
Following review and approval, the revised emergency plan will be sent to the NRC.
Five programs were available at CONI to assess dose including PFAD-RAG (deposition and ingestion dose commitment) and EPA's Air-Rem.
The default release duration in use is ten hours.
The licensee agreed to review the basis for this time and consider shorter values for default release durations.
Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
I
!
_ - - _ _ _
- _ - - - _ --
.- - - - - - -
l
_-
.....
2.10 Security-Emeraency Preparedness Interface To determine if an acceptable Security-Emergency Preparedness interface was in place,Section II.D.59 of Appendix B to 10 CFR 73 and NUREG/CR-3251 were consulted, and security personnel were interviewed.
The Security force coordinates emergency response activities with the control room (CR), and provides the CR with 10 CFR 73.71 notification information. Informal meetings have been held between security, emergency preparedness (EP) and operations, but these were not considered to be coordination meetings and documentation of discussions was not developed.
The licensee is considering strengthening the security-EP interface and clearly documenting topics discussed during coordination meetings.
Based on the above review, this area is acceptable.
4.0 Exit Meetina An exit meeting was held with the licensee personnel identified in Section 1 of this report. The inspector presented the results of the inspection and advised the ' licensee no violations were identified.
Licensee management acknowledged these findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate corrective action regarding the items identified.
At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspector provide any written material to the licensee.
,
l i
I
,
,