IR 05000213/1989004

Insp Rept 50-213/89-04 on 890421-22.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & Observation of Licensee partial-participation,emergency Preparedness Exercise Conducted on 890422

ML20247E823
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	05/12/1989
From:	Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247E793	List: IR 05000213/1989004 ML20247E789
References
50-213-89-04, 50-213-89-4, NUDOCS 8905260346
Download: ML20247E823 (5)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGUIA'IORY CCH4ISSION

REGION I

Report No /89-04 Docket N License N DPR-61 Priority- Category C Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101-0270 Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection At: Haddam, Connecticut Dates: April 21-22, 1989 Inspectors: O ). bd C. G. Amato, Emergency Preparedness Specialist,

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~'pte Emergency Preparedness Section, FRSSB, DRSS A. Asars, RI, Haddam Neck Plant C. Cbnklin, Sr. EPS, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS l W. Raymond, SRI, Millstone l J. Shedlosky, SRI, Haddam Neck i E. Williams, Sr. EPS, PEPB, NRR j Approved by: (4 W f7 f W. J. gIpzarus,) Chief, Emergency Preparedness date Section, FRSSB, DRSS l Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 21-22, 1989 (Inspection Report N /89-04)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced, emertJency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's partial-participation, emergency preparedness exercise conducted on April 22, 1989. 'Ihe inspection was performed by a team of six Region I and headquarters personne Results: No violations were identified. 'Ihe licensee's response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi "

8905260346 890515 PDR ADDCK 05000213 G PNU ,

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DETAILS 1.0 Pereons Contacted me followiry HaMam Neck Plant and Northeast Utility Service Campany (IUSCD) personnel attended the exit meetir W. Buch, Senior Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, NUSCO E. DeBarba, Superintendent, Station Services, Haddam Neck Plant G. Jouchard, Unit Superintendent., Haddam Neck Plant P. Inckey, Senior Trainer, Nuclear Training Department, NUSCD D. Miller, Station Superintcadent, Haddam Neck Plant E. Mroczka, Senior Vice Presidant, Nuclear Engineering and Operations W. McCance, Senior Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, IUSCO E. Molloy, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness, IUSCD R. Rogers, Manager, Radiological Annonnmnnt Branch, NUSOO Rcrnberg, C. Sears, V ice President, Nuclear and environmental DivisionVice President, Nucle W e inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personne .0 Emergency Exercise me Haddam Neck Plant announced, partial participation exercise was conducted on April 22, 1989, 7:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. h e State of Connecticut and 18 Towns participated. S e Federal Emergency Management observed off site activities in Wethersfield, a reception Agency (FEMA)ity, to remediate a previously noted deficiency fram the center ccmmun Millstone exerm se held November 15-17, 198 .1 Pre-exercise Activities

%e exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on nx m har 19, 1988 were reviewed and, following revision, determined to be adequate to test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On January 13, 1989, the licensee submitted the complete emio package for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency pre dier= the scope and content of the scenario. paredness staff toAs a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Haddam Neck Plant Emergency Plan and Procedures and also provided the va;cruanity for the licensee to deaeruLrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action. NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on April 21, 1989. Suggested NRC changes to the scenario made by the licensee were ai m W during the briefing. We licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would interm de in exercise activities to prevent disruption to normal plant activitie l

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3 2.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the foll wing events: Ioss of a Motor Control Panel powering plant systems and controls; Failure of a charging pur:p providing cooling water seals for the Reactor Coolant Punps (RCPs); j RCP seal failure ard leakage inside the containment; Seals on additional RCPs fail increasing f1w and pressure in the return line; Stuck open relief valve releases water to the Volume Control I Tank (VCT) located within the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB); VCr valve ruptures releasirg radioactive gas into the PAB; Filtered release frcxn the stack; and Declaration of an Alert and a Site Area Emergenc I 2.3 Activities Observed During the corduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation ard augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff and actions of ERO staff during operation of the ERFs. The follwing activities were observed: Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; Direction and coordination of emergency response; Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation; Notification of licensee personnel ard off-site agencies of pertinent plant status information: Otrumunications/information f1w, ard record )meping; and Asrxent ard projection of off-site radiological dose and consideration of protective action _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - -_ __ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _- _ _ _ __ _ - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ _ -

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3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency Response Organization, Emergency Response Facilities, and use of these facilities were generally consistent with their Emergency Plan ard Emergency Plan Implement 1rg Procedure .1 Exercise Strurgths The team also noted the followirq actions that provided strorg indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions: Selection and use of the correct Abnormal Operatirg Procedures ard Emergency Operating Procedures through the exercise; Cbrrect Emergency Action level classification and timely notification to off site authorities; Effective command and control within and among Emergency Response Facilities; Timely and effective repairs by in-plant teams which selected the most probable success path solution; Good support of in-plant teams by the Technical Support Center and the Corporate Emergency Operations Center engineering staffs. Priorities were assigned to proposed solutions; A repair team from the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant was requested to augment site resources; and The Duty Officer (DO) while enroute to the site used a cellular phone to maintain contact with the control room. The Do also used this phone to call in ed or EOF managers and alert alternates to stard b .2 Areas For Improvement Although these findings did not have a significant negative impact on overall performance during the exercise, they should be evaluated and corrected by the license . Operations Support Center (OSC) functions while acceptable were not conducted in accordance with implementire procedure . The CSC log book ard status board were not maintained in an -l adequate or current manne !

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, All off-site field teams were deployed on the west bank of the Connecticut River. These teams did not traverse the plume or take readings to verify plume release, nor were they optimally deploye . On-site, out-of-plant teams did not take readings during plume releas . While search and rescue operations were acceptable, search time and Health Physics technician response time were sl .0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items The follwing item was identified dur the previcus exercise. Based upon observations made by the resident rs during a drill conducted on March 27, 1989 and reported in NRC RI Inspection Report 50-213/89-02, the following item was not repeated and is close (CIDSED) (50-213/88-20-01) Dispatch of a Jearch and rescue team was not timel .0 Licensee critique The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on April 22, 1989 during which the licensee's lead controllers M a w W observations of the exercise. The licensee's critique was critical and thorough. The licensee indicated that these observations would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions take .0 Exit Meeting Following the licensee's self critique, the NRC team met with the licensee's representatives listed in Section 1 to discuss findings as detailed in this repor The NRC team leader summarized the observations made durirg the exercis The licensee was advisai no violations or exercise weaknesses were identified and the previously identified exercise weakness was adequately addressed. Although areas for improvement were identified, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demoibLrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi At no time during the course cf the inspection did the inspectors provide any written information tc t: iconse i