IR 05000213/1988020
| ML20206G889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1988 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206G607 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-88-20, IEB-88-002, IEB-88-2, NUDOCS 8811230010 | |
| Download: ML20206G889 (7) | |
Text
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
t t
!
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
,
Report No.
50-213/88-20 Docket No.
50 213 License No. OPR-61 Priority Category C Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company t
P. O. Box 2/0 Hartford, connecticut, 06141-0270 l
Inspection At:, Berlin and Haddam Neck, Connecticut
.
I Inspection Conducted: October 14-16, 1988 l
Inspectors:
fNa
//!M82
~
C. G. Amati, Emergency Preparedness Specialist,
' date Emergency Preparedness Section, FRSSB, DRSS A. Asars Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant C.Conkiln RI W. Raymond, Sr. EPSJ Shed'osky,r. Resident Insp S
!
Sr. Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant
C. y n Neil, Chief, NRR
{
W
// / M Approved By:
_ gzg g,EmergencyPreparedness
,
date ~
Ins Inspection on October 14-16, 1988 (Inspection Report No.pectionSummarh:
50-213/88 20
!
r Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced, safety inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness exercise conducted on October 14 16, 1980.
'
Results: No violations, deviations or unresolved it e were identified.
The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement their e,9ergency plan
'
in a manner which would have provided adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
t
,
!
I
$$fl2300!o0021:o Q
OCK 0500op33
PNV
'
i
!
,
...
__
.
.
,.
.
.
,
.
l DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following Haddam Neck Plant and Nartheast Utility Service Company (NUSCO) personnel attended the exit meeting.
D. Aloi.. Senior Scientist, NUSCO
,
C. Borea, Scientist NUSCO
.
W. Buch, Senior Nuclear Emergency Planning Coordinator, Millstone Point
'
E. DeBarba, Superintendent, Site Services, Haddam Neck Plant
,
P. Luckey, Senior Trainer, Nuclear Training Department, NUSCO i
W. McCance, Senior Nuclear Emergency Planning Coordinator, Haddam Neck
,
D. Miller, Site Superintendent, Haddam Neck Plant
Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness, NUSCO
E. Mo11oy3.,M L. Osicck Nuclear Emergen y Planning Coordinator, Haddam Neck i
1.
anager, Rad 310 ical Assessment Branch NUSCO R. Rogers,VicePresident,NclearandEnvironmentalDivision
,
C. Sears, t
'
W. Romberg, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations Division The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee and NUSCO personnel.
2.0 Emergency Exercise j
The Haddam Neck Plant announced, full participation exercise was conducted
on October IS, 1988, 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
The exercise was announced and af ter nornial workin Subsequently, the State of Connecticut and 17 Towns participated.g hours.The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
i observed all off-site activities.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on February 8, 1988 were reviewed and,s Emergency Plan.following revision determined to be ad
test the licensee bnApril1,1988,thelicensee
submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario.
As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed adequate testing of the major portions of
-
the Haddam Neck Plant Emergency Plan and Emer ency Plan Implementing Procedures and also provided the opportunity.or licensee personnel to
'
demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
I
!
i i
J
)
-.._-
..
-
_
_. _ -
_
.
.-
_
,
'..
l
.
-
i
.
f
-
,
NRC observere, attended a licensee briefin 14, 1988, SuggestedNRCchangestothescenariomad!onOctober
!
'
by the licensee were discussed during the briefing.
The licensee stated that certain
,
emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers
would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disruption to normal
plant operation.
j l
2.2 The exercise scenario included the following events:
l l.
Ignition of a flammable gas inside the protected area resulting
!
'
in a fire potentially affecting safety systems;
'
2.
Severe water hammer causing a pressure transient. Steam generator i
tubes then ruptured, overpressurizing the steam generator and
!
shearing off three steam generator safety valves.
l 3.
Loss of all off site electrical power; t
t 4.
Fire in a diesel electric generator (DEG) room which resulteo in
!
>
i loss of all on site AC power (the other DEG was out of service);
j 5.
Station black out;
-
.
l 6.
Simulated station staff fatalities; 7.
Clad damage; 8.
Release of radioactive material off site;
!
I 9.
Repair of DEC and restoration of on site AC p wer; and L
'
.
10. Closure of ruptured steam generator loop stop ialves.
t 2.2 Activities Observed I
Durint the conduct of the licensee's exercise, six MC team members I
I maue detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the
Emergency Res onse Facilities (ERFs) and the Emergency Response staff and actions of ERO staff during operation of i
Organization ERO) lowing activities were observed:
the ERFs.
Th fol
1.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; I
2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
{
3.
Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility
'
activation;
i
!
l
!
!
,
!
!
!
I i
- - - -
- -
-
.
- - - - - - -
-
-
-
- -- O
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
lN
..
,.
.
4.
Notification of licensee personns, and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information:
,
5.
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; 6.
Assessment And projection of offsite radiologi al dose and consideration of protective actions; j
7.
Provisionn for inplant radiation p:otection; i
S.
Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys;
9.
Maintenance of site security and access control;
t 10.
Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions;
11.
Fire Fighting practicos; l
12. Assembly, accountability and evacuation of pertonnel; ad
,
13.
Preparation of infonnation for disssmination at the
,
Joint News Center.
!
'
l 3.0 Exercise Observations
,
3.1 Exercise Strengths.
The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency
Response Organization, Emergency Response Faci'.ities,aad use of these
facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response t
{
plan and implementing procedures. The NRC team also noted the
!
!
following actions that provide strong indication of the licensee's l
j ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
j 1.
Selection and use of the correct Abnormal Operating Procedures I
l and Emergency Operating Prncedures through the exercise;
}
2.
Correct Emergency Action Level classification c.nd timely
!
notification to off site tuthorities;
3.
Effective command and control within and among ERFs;
,
i 4.
Re4 dest by the Technical Support Center (TSC) for Senior Reactor
Operaton support;
,
,
5.
TSC staff review of NRC Bullntin No. 88 02 to insure steps were i
,
taken to minimize the potential far steam generator tube rupture; a
l t
'
i f
i i
.
.
i
-
- -.
.
.
.
.._
_
_ _ _ -.
__
_ __
- - _ - - _ - -.
- _. _
.-
.
..
.
.
c
'
.
.
.
6.
Thermal hydraulic analysis including the use of a computer code, and a recommendation not to place an idle loop in service;
7.
Assembly of an ad hoc Plant Operating Review Comittee to review and approve procedures as needed. A quorum was present which l
reviewed changes in a step wise manner and gave management a good
'
overview; 8.
Good comunication and effective coordination at the Corporate Emergency Operating Center between the engineering and i
dose assessment groups resul(CE00)in release classification based ting
'
on plant conditions and a recomendation to reflood a steam generator to reduce the iodine release rate; and f
station black out, OFIS was unavailable. ystem (OFIS). During Initial use of the Off-site Information S 9.
,
Alternate means were
,
established to move hard copy information among Emergency Response Facilities.
3.2 Exercise Weaknesses The NRC team identified the following exercise weaknesses which need to be evaluated and corrected by the licensee.
The licensee also conducted an adequate : elf crit.ique which identified many of these
weaknesses.
,
,
staff did not The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)ies/ fatalities.
1.
aggressively followup on reported injur The formation and subsequent dispatch of a Search and Rescue Team was
not timely, nor was it balanced against personnel availability and accident priorities.
This is an inspector followup item 50-213/88-20 01.
,
2.
The EOF did not comunicate the declaration of a Geners l
Emergency to the Control Room. The Control Room staff was told
!
of the declaration 45 minutes later by controller intervention.
i i
3.
The dispatch of teams from the Operations Sup) ort Center was not l
always timely, nor comunicated within the ER"s.
For example:
the Control Room was not notified that a Search and Rescue Team j
had been dispatched * and one Repair Team took 72 minutes to accesstheDieselElectricGeneratorroom, j
4.
Not all CEOC personnel were properly badged, resulting in a l
delayed entry. A side access to this center could not be
observed by the security officer
!
I t
!
r
,
f
,
- - - - -, -, -. -, - -..,.,
- - ~,. -,
,,n_,..,
,,,_-n_s.---
-,
-n.
.,.. - -. _, _
- -. - - _ _
_.
,.
.
'
4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified items The following items were identified during the previous exercise. Based review of the upon observations made by the NRC team during this exercise,llowing items scenario and information provided by the controllers, the fo were not repeated and are closed.
all resp)ects.(50-213/87 lL01) The mock control room was not satisfactory in (CLOSED The mock control room used during this exercise was located within the control room habitability envelope behind tne equipment consoles.
This mock control room was a satisfactory substitute for the real control room.
satis f ac) tory.(50 213/87-13 02) In plant radio communication was not (CLOSED Acceptable radio communications were demonstrated.
(CLOSED 50-213 The declaration of a General Emergency was delayed). (Declar/8713-03)
ation of a General Emergency Posture Co@ s Bravo and Alpha were timely.
5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post exercise critique on October 15, 1988 during which key licensee controllers presented their observations of the exercise.
The licensee indicated these observations would be evaluated and appropriate corrective action taken.
Specific improvement areas which were identified by the licensee related to:
1.
Confusion by on site contractor personnel following plant page announcement to evacuate the site, they were not certain as to what
- tas expected of them;
.
2.
Temporary overload of the call back system following activation of the voice pagers; 3.
Inability to draw air samplos under station black out conditions indicating the need to provida vital power access or use of battery operated equipment; and 4.
Players calling the real control room and not the mock control room.
6.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique following the licensee's self critique, the NRC team met and evaluated the licensee s critique.
Subsequently, the NRC team met with the licensee's
.
,.
.
..
,
-
.
.
.
- representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection.
The NRC team lee. der summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was advised no violations were identified and previously identified items were adequately addressed. Although exercise weaknesses were identified, the NRC team determined, that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate action regarding the items identified.
At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
<
[
I I
3
i l
$
i
!
I
!
i l
i l
l I
i
i
!
!
i
!
l
l l
!
a i
a