IR 05000213/1992022

Insp Rept 50-213/92-22 on 921116-20.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Corrective Actions of Previously Identified Insp Items

ML20127P619
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	01/21/1993
From:	Calvert J, Cheung L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127P600	List: IR 05000213/1992022 ML20127P596 ML20127P605
References
50-213-92-22, NUDOCS 9302020016
Download: ML20127P619 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i- - RiiGION 1

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- REl' ORT /DOCI'ET N /92-2?

LICENSE NO, DPR-61 LICENSEE: Connecticu' (ankee Atomic Power Company

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P.O Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141 ,

a FACILITY NAME: lladdam Neck Plam INSPECTION AT: Haddam, Connecticut h

INSPECTIOf: DATES: November 16-20, 1992 INSPECTORS: * lh' _ '

Dllte I.conard Cheimg, Sr. Reactorphineer, Electrical Seedon, EB, DRS J _

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. 'M-- Cr / b s

_ John Calvert, Reactor EngGrer,4 ~ ' Dale Electrical Section, EB, DRS

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APPROVED BY: s/2 /

__W' Mam 11. Ruland, Chief,' IA Y / - /

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/ectrical Section, EB, DRS AttaLin5KCkd: Review licenseeN corrective actions of previously identiGed inspection -

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item Cc51ths: Tbc following eight items were closed:

1. Unresolved item 9180 02, EDG loading and surveillance testing 4 .

2. Unresolved item 91-80 03, Calculations for EDG room and screenhouse ventilation 3. Violation 91-80 04, Environmental qualincation of HPSI motors not established 4. Violation 91-80 06, inadequate acceptance criteria.for battery service test 5. Violation 9140 07, Inadequate degrade voltage relay settings 6. Unresolved item 92 90-01 Environmental qualification of solenoid valves

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7. Violation 92-14-01, Unterminated lead in jimetion box 8. Unresolved item 90-16-03, Oscillation of AFW How instrumentation s

Two violations were identified as a result of unresolved item 92-10-Oh 1) Environmennd qualification of two solenoid _ valves was not established,2) Engineering instructions were not g followed during, cable terminmio ^ -l PDR= ADOCK 0300021d .-i O' PDR2

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2 PUl(POSE

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The purp( se of this inspection was to review licensee actions in response to items 10cntified during the 1991 Electricai Distributbn System Puncti;,nal luspection and other tegion-based inspecrian .0 STATUS OF PitEVIOUSIN IDENTIFIED INSPECTION ITEMS mdl.Un!n?htilltm..EEN, pertaining to emergency diesci generator (EDG)

surveillance test not enveloping maximum accident load condition. In response to this finding, the licensee deseloped test procedures ST 11.7-73 and -75, *EDG A & 11 Maximum load Testing." Accordim to I!DG toad c:dculation PA-90.LOE-1167-GE, dated Fchruary 20,1991, the wcrst case loading would occur duri.q; a large break LOCA coincident with loss of offsite power and the failure of l!DG A. This calculation showed that EDG 11 maximum !eading wouid be 3033 kW for approximately 8 rninute During the November 1991 refueling outage, the licensee tested both EDG A and EDG Lt for 30 minutes each with the nuximtun load ro 3050 kW and '!750 kVAR (pf=0.87). The test records indicated that both dicxis passed the test successfully. The inspector reviewed the test pnKedures and the test results and agreed that the iiDG capability for maximum accident load had been demonstrate The licensee stated that they were revising ther.DG loading calculation. They expected that the maximum accidcnt load would be reduco.i. One of the facters causing the h ad reduction was the containment air recirculatica fan vane adjuument. The licensec stated that the reca'culated maximum liDG loading would be incorporated into the EDG surveillance tests during the next refueling outage seneduled for May 199 The inspector considered the licensee 9 corrective nctions adequate. This item is close IDMdLUnrewlmlituidL-SMG, pertaining to ventilation calculations for the screenhouse and the diesel generator moms The service water pump mottrs are required to run at i15% of rated hersepower. The licensee generated calculation #EIC A2-561, dated November 20,1992, which showed that the pump motors were operable at an ambient temperature of 110*F. The licer,see niso generated a calculation (#90102 040 MY), "CY Screenhouse Maximum Ambient Tem [x:rature," on December 8,1991. This calculation indicated that additional ventilation must oc provided during hot summer months to maimain the temperature of the area where the service water pump motors were located to below 110"F To accomplish this, the lic:nsee implemented the following compensatory measures:

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3 y Attachment 9 of Auxiliary Operctor Procedure SUR S.1-0 required the screenhouse

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- temperature te be checked each shift. If the tempeuture approaches 90*F, Operation T Procedure NOP 2.24-6, " Service Water System Normal Op:: ration" is to be iniplemented.-

The procedun. requires all four roof louvers to be open. When the screenhouse temperature approaches 95'F, security must be notified to open the screenhouse doors for additional ventilation. When the screenhouse temperature approaches 105'F, engineering and station ,

management innst be notined of overheating problem For the diesel generator room temperature, the licensee generated caMulation #91-FAC-114-i GF, dated September 3,199L This calculation determined that the mnimum steady state -

bulk air temperature could reach 130*F in summer, and the maximum air temperature near the engine could reach 135*F. The licensee provided, for NRC's review, a letter dated July 11,1984, from General Motors (diesel genermor manufacturer). Es letter indicated that the diesel generator and skid mounted components and control e( unt wer<: operable at 130 F and the maximum operable ambient temperature for the electrut cabinet would be 140*F. This ambient condition applies when the diesel generators operhte at normal loadi-Since liaodam Neck diesel generators are required to operate at maximum load (3033 kW)

for hut 8 minutes to provide adequate accident load power during the first li minutes following a postulated accident, the abcVe maximum tempemture conditions may cause the diese1 generators to be unable to function properly, The licensee subcontracted MKW, In to conduct a study for the temperature effect on diese! generator output. The MKW- study indicated that the diesel generator room must be maintained beles 101'F during the first -

11 minutes atter a postulated accident. The licensee implemented add _itional compensatry measures to maintain the diesel generator room temperature within the operable limit w'acn the outdoor temperature is above 95"F. This issue was reviewed by the NRC in July 1992, and was documented in Inspection Peport 92-1 The inspector concluded that adequate ventilation calculations had been provided for the .

screenhouse and the diesel generator room. This item is closed.

' LQ9 sed) Vjnlation 50-212!21-80-04, pertaining to the qualification of HPSI pump ;

motors. These motors are required to operate at 114% of rated horsepower based on the-power demands following a LOCA condition. The environmental qualification (EQ) file indicated that these motors were tested at 100% of rated horsepowe '

L In response to this finding, the licensee generated 'an analysis in February 1991, to show that the HPSI motors could be qualified for 114% of rated power during a LOCAc The 3 licensee's analysis indicated that these motors were located in a relatively low temperature -

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(140*F) and non-steam environment, subject to a total integraicd dose (TID) of 9.7 x 10'

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During this inspection, review of the fiQ Die and the SCEW (System Component Evaluation Worksh.ct) sheet indicated that the llPSI motors wene also required to fuaction following a high energy line break (IIELB). During this condition, the ambient temperature could reach 215*F. It was not shown on the SCEW sheet or the EQ file, whether these motors were required to operate into tbc service facmr condition (greater than 100% of rated power).

Although these motors were tested to 225F at 100% of rated power, the small margin (10 F) might not be able to envelope th 14% increase of power cutput, if these motors were required to operate at 114% of rated power. In response to the NRC's question, the licensee generated a calculation (EIC 92-579) on December 16, 1992. The calculation indicated that following a llELil, the llPSI motors were required to operate below 100% of rated powe The SCI!W theets and the Equipment Summary Evaluation la the EQ file wem revised to reflect the changes as the result of calculation ElC-92 57 The new quali0 cation data divided the qualincation into two parts. For the LOCA condition, the qualification was demonstrated by analysis based on tested data. For IIELB condition, Westinghouse test results were usal to demonstrate the quali6 cation of the motors. The inspector determined that qualification of the liPSI rnotors had been establishe This item is close A f.00$tdLY10h11101LSE113/.21mbM, rel'arding inadequate minimum battery voltage cpecified b the hattery smycillance test procedures. Following the inspection finding, the licensee revised Surveillance Test Procedure SUR 5.5-38, "Rattery Service Test,"

Revisicn 2, dated October 4,1991. The acceptance criteria speci0cd in Sectiou 8.0 of the procedure were changed as follows:

DaRcry M m _Y r itan s Ielallibmdlieu HT-1A 108.7 V 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> IIT-1 B i i 1.0 V 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> The revised minimum acceptable voltage conforms with the calculated voltages as ir.dicated in NUSCO Calculation #PA91-LOE-1171-Gl The inyector reviewed the service test record of battery l A conducted on October 24,199 The measured voltage at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> into the 1est was 115.2 V. The service test record for battery 1H was aise reviewed. The measured voltage at two hours into the test was 117.9 Revision 3 of Surveillance Test Procedurc $UR 5.5-38 was issued on February 28,199 The inspector verined that the minimum acceptable voltages were the same as those specified in Revision 2, i.e.,108.7 Y and il1.0 V for battery 1 A and 1D, respectivel This item is closed.

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5 LC10RdLlh1 resolved item 50-213/9J-1410, pertaining to the environmental qualification (EQ) of two pilot r.olenoid valves (CC-SOV-1411 and CC-SOV-608) for two containment isolation valves (CC-TV-1411, CC-FCV+608). These two containment valves are used to isolate the component cooling water retum of the four reactor coolant pumps external motor bearing coolers, lower bearing coolers, and thermal barrier coolers. These valves do not receive an automatic isolation signal on high containment pressure or safety injection actuatic.a because it is desirable to run the mactor coolant pumps for certain accident sequences. Man lal control actions are required to close these valves. The two pilot solenoid valves were not on the EQ Master List when they were identified in April 199 Following the inspection finding, the licensee performed an operability evaluation (REF #92-39). The evaluation indicated that these two valves were operable n1though they ,

were not qualified. The evaluation also indicated that both of these valves must function post-accident since they form one of two containment isolation barriers. The environmental requirements in REF #92-39 showed that the peak temperature was less than 140 F, the total integrated dose (TID) was 1 x 10^ rads, and that these valves must be able to be deenergized 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after an acciden Since these valves and the associated electrical componcats (terminal blocks, cable splices, and cable) were located in a non-steam and radiation-harsh only envircnment, the licensee used analysis to qualify these components. This method is permitted based on DOR guideline During this inspection, the inspector n: viewed the qualification evidence provided by the licensee, and agreed that qualification of the two solenoid valves was established. This item (50-213/92-10-10) is close Nwever, when this item was identified by the NRC in April 1992, qualification of these two solenoid valves had not been established in that: 1) these two valves were not in the EQ Master List, and 2) there were no EQ files containing test or analysis documents to demonstrate the qualification of these valves. Lack of environmental qualification of these two valves constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50.49, Paragraphs f and g, which require that electrical equipment important to safety must be environmentally qualified by testing or analysis and that the qualification must be accomplished before Noverriber 30,1985 (50-213/92-22-01). Since the Feensee's corrective actions have been reviewed and determined to be adequate, no further actions are required from the licensee for this viohtion. This item (50-213/92-22-01) is close .6 (Cload)Dniched item 9%L60), regarding the oscillation of auxiliary feedwater flow indications. This item was identified during the 1990 Regulatory Guide 1.97 inspection and was updated in Inspection Reports 92-08 and 92-10. It involved four flow indications in the control room which oscillated between 50 gpm to 100 gpm. During this inspection, the -

inspector observed that the oscillation had been substantially reduced. Three of the indicators oscillated between .10 gpm and 20 3pm, and the fourth indicator oscillated around ,

50 gpm. The licensee evaluated this issue and determined that the oscillation was due to L

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back pressure noise from the main feedwater line. Wnen the downstream valve was closed,

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the indicator reading went to zero. The licensee also tested the now instruments with an l ultroonic Dow meter, using their test procedure ST 11.7-90, " Test of #AFW Flow Indication." The test results indicated tnat for flow greater than 75 gpm the indicated now responJed to changes of Dow, although with some ire.ccuracies, which were probably due to back pressure noise. When the auxiliary feedwater pump would be running, following o postulated accident, back pressure noise v,ould not be present because the main icedwater pump would be off. Backup information for the auxiliary feedwater flov is provided by the steam generator level narrow range indicator The inspector considered the licensee's corrective action adequate. This item is clase (Cl0StdLYlulalloidhM&EM, pertaining to the setpoints for the emergency bus undervoltage (UV) prmeetion relays in the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System lustrumentation channels. The actual setpoints did not have adequate margin with respect to technical specification (TS) values. This was because the setpoint calculations did not account for uncertainy factors such as accuracy, calibration errors, and lastrament drift, The licensee's corrective action was to determine instrument uncertainties and include these uncertainties in the setpoints The dritt error value was determined from installed instrument measured value The inspector reviewed thc setpoint calculations (PA 76-663-40-GE, Revision 5) for the degraded voltage telay setting. The calculations included the effects of the instrument accuracies, calibration accuracies and instrument drift. The licensee recalculated the relay setpoints using a conservative drift vrlue. The irspector reviewed the reca'cuhted results and found the calculations to be acceptable. The completed data sheets from the last two calibrations were also reviewed and were found to be adequat This item is chse .8 LC!05t:d)lh11all0LLSEll3Hh1Mll, pertaining to untenainated lead in a junction bot The scope of the inspection that identined the violation was concemed with maintenance nrocedures and not the ftmetional engineering ramifications of the vich4 tion. In the reply to the Notice of Violation, the licensee self identified the violation as a lead (cab!e)

that was never terminated properl The inspector found out that the cable was part of Appendix R plant modi 0 cations that involved the safety-related reactor protection system (RPS) and the nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) cabling. During this inspection, the possibility for electromagnetic interference (EMI) cffects on the RPS and NIS channels due to containmerit atmosphere recircuhtion (CAR) fan operation was reviewed and resolvcd. The inspector concluded that adequate measures were esabushed such that the CAR fan EMI effects on the subject RPS and NG channels would not be safety si);nificaa e

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The licensee stated that the cable was a groundmg wire added to reduce the electromagnetic i interference (EMI) effect from the wiring of a CAR fan motor due to an emergency start on neutron instrumentation system (NIS) channel wiring. Electromagnetic interferenc" was a potential concern beceuse it could reduce reliability, induce malfunctions, and cause spurious operation of equipmen The corrective action taken by the licenste was to terminate the special ground cable according to the design documentation. The licensee conducted a test using te.it procedure ST 11.7-16, " Appendix R Duct Bank Noise Test," Revision 2. This test showed that any EMI generated by the CAR fan starting and running did not affect the RPS channels. The licensee stated in the reply to the violation that the special ground cable was not terminated during the test and that the EMI effect did not affect the instrument operation. The inspector reviewed the test record and verified that the RPS channels were not affecte The inspector reviewed the associated Work Ordeis for :he ground cable, Design Change Notices, connection diagrams, raceway / cable routing reports, duct bank details, test results, engineering procedures, and plant operating procedures. In addition, the supervisor of the electrical installation, the design project cngineer, and the plam engineer were imerviewe The inspector agreed that both the RPS channels and the NIS channels would not be affected by the EM The inspector walked down the cable vault terminations to verify the Heensee's corrective action. The special ground cable for one of the NIS channels that was the subjact of the violation (2/0 cable at CllT352) was verified to be terminated correctl The inspector considered this item to be close While in the cable vault, the inspector observed the special ground cable for the other NIS channel (ClIT348) was incorrectly terminated. DCfb407-E-89 speciRcally identiGed this cable to be connected to the base (ground) of the electrical penetration. However, the inspector observed that it was incorrectly connected to the duct bank ground grid. The licensee evaluated the effect of the two grounding and determined that connecting the ground cable to th? duct bank ground grid would not affect its proper funcdon. Subsequently, the licensee generated a Design Change Notice (DCN-S-1781-92) to document the as-built condition. The inspector reviewed the Design Change Notice and determined the justification provided to be acceptabl However, the inspector determined thr.i the failure to terminate the ground cable in a.:cordance with the instruction constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which requires tha+ activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions and shall be acccmplisheri in accorrlance with these inst:uctions (50-213/92-22-02).

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s EXIT MEETING At the conclusion of the inspection on November 20,1992, the iiispector met with the licensee representatives venoted in Attachment 1. At the time, the inspector summarized the scope and Gndings of the inspection.

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A3TACilMENT 1 Conticclicnt.Ximhte.AtwnideretCoon;tnyJED l

• E. Annino, Senior Analyst t * G.11ouchard, CY Unit Director

• M. Ilain, CY Acting Engineering Manager

M. l' irothers, CY System Engineering Sunctvisot T. Cleary, I,icensing

R. Ewing, MP1 PSD Ekctrical Engineer

• M. Lombardi, NUSCO Electricat-Instrumentation & Control Programs Engineer M. long, CY Electrical Engineering

T. McDomdd, CY Maintenance Manager E. Perkins, NtJSCO Licensing G. Pitman, PSD Manager D. Ray, Director of Nuclear Services

M. Samek, CY PSD Electrical Engineering Supervisor

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G. Silberquit, NUSCO PSD Electrical Engineer

P. Smith, NUSCO Electrical-Instrumentatian & Contro! Project Engineer

J. Stanford, Manager, CY instrumentation & Control

• J. Stetx, Station Vice President

G. H. Tylinski, CY Engineering Supervisor LLS&cleadrattlatoryJZomminian P Habighorst, Resident Inspector

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W. Raymond, Senior Resident inspector

Denota those present at the exit meeting on November 20,1992.

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