IR 05000213/1987003

Safety Insp Rept 50-213/87-03 on 870202-05.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Changes to Emergency Preparedness Program,Shift Staffing,Knowledge & Performance of Duties,Dose Calculation Assessment & Licensee Audits

ML20212J221
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	02/27/1987
From:	Conklin C, Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212J214	List: IR 05000213/1987003 ML20212J210
References
50-213-87-03, 50-213-87-3, NUDOCS 8703060358
Download: ML20212J221 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-03 Docket N License N OPR-61 i

Licensee: __ Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101-0270 Facility Name: Haddam Neck Station

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Inspection At: Haddam Neck, Connecticut

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Inspection Conducted: February 2-5, 1987 Inspectors: // i'/ w9 4[A6[<f7 W.' Thomas, Emergency PrepaFednehs date' '

4 Specialist, EP&RPB, DRSS i 0/?dA=,EqP&PB,0 A sk/n Tonklin, EPS S' dat'e '

Approved by: /- @;tre 4 n[ A 47 7

! W. J aarig,) Chief, Emergency date '

Pr edness Section, EP&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on February 2-5,1987 (Report No. 50-213/87-03)

Areas Inspected

Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection. The j inspection areas included: Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program;

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Shift Staffing and Augmentation; Knowledge and Performance of Duties; Dose i

Calculation and Assessment; Licensee Audits; and follow-up on pravious

! inspection findings.

Results

No violations were identified.

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O DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted D. Miller, Station Su;:erintendent

• DeBarba, Station Services Superintendent

• Luckey, Emergency Preparedness Trainer

• McCance, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

• Molloy, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness

• R. Rogers, Manager, Radiological Assessment

• J. LaPlatney, Station Services

• S. Hodge, Supervisor, Nuclear Training

• D. Hersey, NUSCO Licensing

• H. Siegrist, Supervisor, Radiological Protection

• G. Kelly, Emergency Preparedness W. Eakin, Radiological Assessment Engineer N. Young, Shift Supervisor R. Willis, Shift Supervisor P. Rainha, Senior Reactor Operator D. Reilly, Senior Reactor Operator G. Hollberg, Security Supervisor

• Denotes those present at the exit intervie .0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) 84-06-03 IFI: Compare CY and MP dose calculations with the state of Connecticut dose calculation Northeast Utilities (NU) Radiological Assessment Branch has prepared a comparison of the dose assessment models in use. The dose assessment methodologies compared are: NU PUFF Model; State of Connecticut Dose Calculation Procedures; NU Corporate Dose Calculation Procedure (CONI 4.08); and NU Station Dose Calculation Procedures (EPIP 1.5-7 and EPIP 4201). The PUFF Model is driven by meteorology predicted for the site of concern. Individual PUFFS exhibiting a gaussian distribution, from any number of variable emitting point sources, are " tagged" and advected throughout a three dimension region. The amount of radioactivity in each puff is determined from the number of PUFFS generated and the total amount of radioactivity emitted over time. At any given point, the total con-centration at the ground is equal to the sum of the concentrations from all PUFF The methodology used by the State is a combination of Environmental Pro-tection Agency (EPA) procedures and NU Station EPIPs. The EPA procedures utilize X/Q estimates obtained from meteorological studies to approximate ground level concentrations of radionuclides released by accidental gas-l eous emissions. Average dose conversion factors are used to convert l ground concentrations to dose for a typical mix of noble gases and i iodines. Because X/Qs drastically underestimate doses close to elevated l

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releases of noble gases, whole body doses are calculated using station procedures to account for the elevated portion of the plume. NU has made available to the State TRS80-100 microcomputers and yearly training in the use of dose assessment procedures. Training sessiens are generally '

held prior to the annual emergency preparedness exercises _oc during scheduled dose assessment drills with the State Department'of Environ ~

mental Protection (DEP). Discussions with DEP indicate that a good working relationship with NU pre antly exists, with no significant problems relating to dose assessment activitie NU's corporate procedure for hand calculation of off-site doses from airborne releases, CONI 4.08, and Station Procedures EPIP 1.5-7 and EPIP 4201 for Haddam Neck and Millstone respectively, utilize plume size ,

corrected AIREM results to model whole body dose that would be received from releases of noble gases and X/0 estimates from Turners Workbook to model ground level concentrations of Iodine-In Dose Equivalent. All four methodologies are similar. Each utilize X/Q estimates to calculate doses and only the PUFF model does not consider the shine from an overhead plume. When an overhead plume is invelved, calculations are performed using CONI 4.08. A series of 17 comparison scenarios were prepared and  ;

analyzed involving ground, stack and. rooftop releases for Millstone and Haddam Neck out to distances of 10 miles. All four methodologies agree well, usually within a factor of two. Discrepancies between the four models are well known and the reasons are understood by both NU and the Stat ,

Based upon the above review, this item is acceptable, ,.

(Closed) 86-12-06 IFI: The EOF public address system could not be hetrd in the TSC and NRC rooms. The DSEO could not access this syste '

Additional plant speakers have been installed in the EOF. A new, ebarate EOF only public address system has been installed in each of the EOF func-tional areas. The DSE0 accesses the new PA system through a separate telephone located under the DSE0 des .

Based upon the above review, this item is acceptabl (Closed) 86-12-07 IFI: The basis for emergency classificction escalation was not made clear to the Director of the Corporate Emergency Operations Center (CEOC). CEOC personnel thought the basis fer the Site Area Emergency Charlie Two classification was a tornado striking a facility vital area. The correct basis was barrier failur Additional emphasis during training has been directed on communications between the Station and Corporate Office Directors. It is stressed that the Station Emergency Director has the responsibility to keep the Manager, ,

Control Room Operations, and the Manager, CE0C, informed of conditions .

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i outside of the control room, since he has no other way of knowing what is

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happening on or off sit .

Based upon the above review, this item is acceptabl (Closed) 86-12-08 IFI: Posting of information was not always timely and correct in the CE0C and among the emergency response fccilities (ERFs)

within the EO '

,, During training sessions for the respective facility managers, it is emphasized that each ERF manager is responsible for the upkeep of status boards in their respective facilities and should check them often to ensure that all data posted is correc Based upon the above review, this item is acceptabl (Closed) 86-12-09 IFI: Environmental Monitoring Teams controlled from the CEOC were dispatched into heavy scenario thunderstorms during a tornado warning period without being briefed as to these conditions or instructed as to the steps thay could take to protect themselve Additional traini g will be provided for all controllers prior to the next exercise to ensure that conditions are accurately described to the players

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as the exercis'e scen6rio unfolds. In addition, revised procedures EpIP 1.5-22, Rev. 8. Manager of Radiological Consequence Assessment, and

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EPIP 1.5-37, Rev. 8, Panager of Radioingical Dose Assessment, contain specific instructions to brief all teams being deployed outside of the EOF

'. or Control Room on actual or projected meteorological conditions and whether or not protective actions may be require .

Based upon th> above review, this item is acceptabl (Closed) 86-12-10 IFI: Radiologir al Monitoring Teams (RMTs) directed from the E0F were not briefed as to severe weather conditions and possible tornado impact on or near sit See response to item 86-12-0 ,

3.0 Operational Status ot .he_E,iti,gency Preparedness Program 3.1 Cha_ges to the Emergency Preparedress Program The following documents were reviewed: Haddam Neck Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, j ,'

A major revision to the Emergency Plan was completed in 198 The puroose of this revision was to bring all NU stations undo.' a single documen In addition, i,he Emeigency Action Level (EAL) table has been revised, taking into account human factor .

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The inspector determined that the changes to the Emergency Plan involve generic philosophy and site specific information and have not adversely affected the overall state of emergency preparedness. The EAL table changes include the following: a separate barrier failure page; event category consolidation for improved operator usage; and a color code similar to the ERG fault trees to provide a more rapid recognition and classification of emergency events. The revision addresses the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, initiating con-ditions for emergency events. Based upon the above review, these i areas are acceptabl '

The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures which detail actions to be taken for various event classifications to determine if they are adequate in scope and content to ensure that appropriate actions

, would be taken. The following procedures were reviewed: EPIP 1.5-3, Notification of Unusual Event. Rev. 6; EPIP 1.5-4, Alert, Rev. 8; EPIP 1.5-5, Site Area Emergency, Rev. 8; and EPIP 1.5-6, General Emergency, Rev. 8. The inspector noted that during classification of events, there was no indication of possible interface with an NRC response team prior to issuing messages to the State. The inspector indicated that informing the NRC's Site Team Leao'er/ Director of Site Operations is critical to ensure that the NRC will be able to respond to any requests from the State for substantiating information as to reasons for the classification. A second concern involved the incorrect terminology by referring to the NRC Director of Site Oper-ations or Site Team Leader as an " Emergency Response Team Director."

The licensee agreed to make appropriate changes to these procedures to reflect appropriate coordination between the NRC response team and the licensee's response organization and to correct the terminology '

for the title of Director of Site Operations or Site Team Leade This item is unresolved (UNR 50-213/87-03-01).

3.2 Shift Staffing and Augmentation The following documents were reviewed: Haddam Neck Emergency Plan, Section 5.0; ACP-1.0-6, Emergency Planning Responsibilities and Station On-call Organization and Responsibilities; weekly, monthly and quarterly on-call schedules; and various letters concerning personnel qualificatio The emergency response organization, both on-shift and augmentation personnel, are adequately described in the Emergency Plan and ACP 1.0-6. The response organization is trained and has a sufficient depth of personnel to be able to support protracted operations. The licensee utilizes a radiopage system for notification of both local and state organizations, as well as their response organization. The radiopage system utilizes multiple transmission towers and taped mes-sages, and a separate system is provided for response verificatio The licensee conducts monthly radiopager tests with documented response verification. The licensee has not conducted any off-hours, unannounced augmentation drills; however, at least one such

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drill will be scheduled prior to their annual exercise in May 198 The results lof this drill will be evaluated during a subsequent inspectio Based upon the above review, this area is acceptabl .3 Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training)

The following documents were reviewed: Haddam Neck Emergency Plan, Section 8.0; Nuclear Training Manual; selected lesson plans; indi-vidual training records; and the station drill scenarios and result The inspector checked the records of emergency response personnel to verify that training had been performed. The records were current and easi y accessed. A system is in place to notify personnel when

training / retraining is required and to remove personnel from the emergency organization when training is not current or acceptabl The inspector noted that the licensee is in the process of com-puterizing these records to further enhance recordkeeping and documentation. Selected lesson plans were reviewed for content and presentation. Several courses also provide for written tests or practical applications as a requirement for acceptanc The inspector interviewed a select sample of individuals in the emergency organization. Four senior licensed individuals who may be called upon to be DSE0 were chosen. Scenarios were chosen to provide an event with security implications and a fast breaking event, and were given to each operator. Detection, recognition and classifica-tion was prompt and correct for the given situations. Notifications, and any associated protective action recommendations, would have been prompt. The operators were aware of the safety implications of events caused by sabotage. There are security procedures in place and the operator / security interface is established and adequat There were minor inconsistencies between operators on dealing with events with security implications. Although the operators' actions were correct, there was not a strong effort made to ensure that other safety systems / vital areas were cleared by security personnel. The licensee has agreed to provide additional training to address this area. Additionally, the licensee has agreed to-review and consider the findings and recommendations made in NUREG/CR-4093, Safety /

Safeguards Interactions during Safety-Related Emergencies at Nuclear Power Reactor Facilitie The inspector reviewed the licensee's drill program. The licensee conducted several drills throughout 1986. These drills were well prepared and documented, and corrective action was promptly taken in response to findings. The licensee met all commitments for the drill program. Several organizations are responsible for conducting the different drill commitments. Although all commitments were met,

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documentation was not entirely complete. The licensee has agreed to revise their applicable procedures to ensure that all drill commit-ments will be fully documente Based upon the above review, this area is acceptabl .4 Dose Calculation and Assessment The following documents were reviewed: Haddam Neck Emergency Plan and EPIP 1.5- The inspector determined that adequate procedures exist for dose calculations and assessment under all anticipated release conditions and these are consistent with those used by off-site authoritie The differences in the models, and the reasons are well understood by NU and the State. The results of dose calculations are incor-porated into protective action decision making. Dose calculation and assessment equipment and aids are available and maintained and were demonstrated by facility personnel. The dose assessment procedures can promptly and correctly be used in the EOF and CE0C. Initial station dose assessment is performed on a Radio Shack TRS80-100 computer that has been programmed with the EPIP 1.5-7 dose assessment model. These computers are tested monthly by an on-call Manager of Radiological Dose Assessment. After the CEOC is activated, dose assessment is performed at the CE0C using the PUFF computer ,7rogram mode Based upon the above review, this area is acceptabl .5 Licensee Audits The following documents were reviewed: Haddam Neck Emergency Plan, Section 8.3; CONI 11.01, Emergency Plan Audits; and Audit Reports

'(fourteen in number dated 2/26/86 through 12/3/86).

The Rad'ological Protection Section from NUSCO performs audits and appraisals of the emergency plan, EPIPs and CONI procedures. These audits cover all the major elements of the program at least once every 12 months. The review and distribution process is extensiv Adequate administrative controls exist for documentation and follow-up of corrective actions. The actual audits are thorough and detailed, and provide assurance that weaknesses or potential weaknesses would be identified and correcte The licensee experienced a complete loss of all off-site communi-cations equipment, including the ENS, commercial telephones and radiopage system. The only known communications available was the State Police Hotlin The cause of the failure was operator error by the Southern New England Telephone Company. The licensee is taking decisive and aggressive action to prevent a recurrence of the above events. This event has been fully documented by the

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NUSCO audit group, as well as by station management. Due to the potential seriousness of the loss of communications capability, we will review the results of their corrective actions during a subse-quent inspectio Based upon the above review, this area is acceptable.

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4.0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee personnel denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee was informed that no violations were noted. Also, six open items were closed, and one l unresolved item was identified. The inspector also discussed some areas for improvement. The licensee acknowledged the findings and l agreed to evaluate them and institute corrective actions as appropriate.

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