IR 05000213/1989013
| ML20247N315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1989 |
| From: | Anderson C, Cheung L, Julio Lara NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247N294 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-89-13, NUDOCS 8909260188 | |
| Download: ML20247N315 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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. Report No. 50-213/89-13 g
' Docket No.
50-213-License No. DPR-61'
Licensee:
Connecticut' Yankee Atomic Power P. 0. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141 Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection At: Haddam, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: August 14-18, 1989 Inspectors:
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L. S. Lheung, Senior Re r EnDineer date/
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Y4w f+89 J. F( Lara, Reactor Engineer date Approved b -
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'1 7//J/#9 J. Anderson, Chief, PSS, DRS date
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 14-18, 1989 (Inspection Report No.
~50-213/89-13)
Areas Inspected: This routine announced inspection reviewed the construction activities of the new switchgear building constructed to comply with Appendix R requirements.
In addition, the inspection included review of the adequacy and implementation of the licensee's Fire Protection Program.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations were identified. The licensee's. response to a previously issued violation pertaining to emergency lighting was determined to be acceptable and was therefore closed.
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l DETAILS l-l 1. 0 Persons Contacted 1.1 ' Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CY)
- G. Bouchard, Unit Superintendent M. Brothers, Senior Engineer
- C. Gladding, Engineering Supervisor S. Kamm, Engineer
- T. Kazukynas, Fire Protection Engineer D. B. Miller, Plant Superintendent
- R. Rogozinski, Senior Engineer 1.2 Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO)
- M. A. Ciccone, Senior Licensing Engineer J. M. Clark, Principal Engineer
- G. E. Cornelius, Reactor Plant Systems Supervisor B. Coates, Five Training Instructor W. ' Lepper, Electrical Engineer T. Patrizz, Fire Protection Specialist G. R. Pitman, Project Manager B. M. Pokora, Reactor Plant Systems J. J. Roncaioli, Fire Protection Engineering Supervisor G. Townseno, Project Engineer
- D. B. Vail, General Electrical Engineering Supervisor 1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- A. A. Asars, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting.
2.0 Background for the New Swtichgear Building On-November 19, 1980, the NRC published a revised section 50.48 and a new
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Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear i
power plants. The revised section 50.48 and Appendix R became effective on February 17, 1981. The licensee had submitted a request for exemption from the schedular requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c) in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) (V) for a temporary exemption. By a letter dated March 7, 1986 CYAPCO requested another temporary exemption from the
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requirements of section III.G of Appendix R for the switchgear room.
j Rather than relocating redundant electrical divisions for safe shutdown j
equipment within the existing switchgear room, the licensee proposed a new switchgear building be constructed, housing a switchgear room that would accommodate one shutdown division. The licensee made a commitment for the new switchgear room to be operating following the 1989 outage, which is scheduled to start on September 2,1989.
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3.0 New Switchgear Building The new switchgear building is a three story structure, approximately 34 feet hy. 64 feet, located north of the primary auxiliary building and adjacent to the waste disposal building.
The third floor is used as the-
. new switchgear room to house the necessary electrical equipment, which consists of a 480V load center (bus 11), a 480V motor control center (MCC 12-11), a transfer switch panel, a battery room for, battery.18, a battery charger, 2 inverters, an instrument cabinet, and associated 125 VDC and 120 VAC distribution panels.
In addition, a dedicated and safety related air handling unit is provided to cool the new switchgear room.
A total of twenty two Plant Design Change Records' (PDCR) were generated by the licensee as a result of the new switchgear room addition, 16 are to be completed by the Bechtel Power Corporation, and 6 are to be completed by NUSCo. The PDCRs are listed as follows:
PDCRs BY BECHTEL 865 New Switchgear Building 866-New 4160V Bus 9 Circuit Breaker Cubicle 867 Replacement Of Station Service Transformers 484, 485, 496, 497 868 New Switchgear Building HVAC & Aux 111.tries 873 Ductbanks For New Switchgear Building 876 New Switchgear Building Stair Tower & Walkways 900 New Switchgear Building Raceway 901 Raceway to Appendix "R" Loads 902 New Switchgear Building Appendix "R" Equipment 903 DC System Relocation In Old Switchgear Room 904 Metering Pump Speed Control
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905 Appendix "R" Cable Pulling & Sealing 906 New Equipment - Old Switchgear Room 907 MOV's For ECCS Small Break LOCA 910 Appendix "R" Cable Termination & Testing 917 New Switchgear Building Fire Protection
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PDCR's BY NUSCO 908 Cable Vault Appendix "R" Cables i
909 Instrumentation For Appendix "R" l
938 Air. Supply For ADV 278 941 CAR Fans Power 942 Semi-Vital Transfer Switch 943 Security System Additions 4.0 Review of PDCRs,-Drawings, and Procedures Associated with the New Switchgear Building The inspectors selected 7 PDCRs for review to determine whether the design packages. meet the licensee's commitments and whether the electrical installations, including cable nulling, meet the design criteria.
For each PDCR, the inspectors reviewed the design change scope; checked the design review, safety evaluation of the design change, environmental and seismic qualification of the applicable equipment, and fire protection impact; and selectively reviewed the associated drawings and installation procedures. The following PDCRs were reviewed:
4.1 pDCR #866, New 4160V Bus 9 Circuit Breaker Cubicle This new breaker cubicle is located in diesel generating room D2.
It is installed as an extension to existing Bus 9 to provide power feed to 480V Bus 11 in the new switchgear room.
It includes a Westinghouse type 50-DHP-250 circuit breaker, rated at 1200 ampere continuous and 250 MVA interrupting duty.
Seisimic qualification of the cubicle was performed by Westinghouse and documented in Report #WCAP-11507. The licensee performed a technical review of the Westinghouse report and found it to be in conformance with their seismic specification 18691-E-509.
4.2 PDCR #873, Ductbanks for New Switchgear Building This PDCR covers the underground duct banks of:
1) new switchgear building to waste disposal building; 2) new switchgear building to diesel generator building east wall; 3) new switchgear building to the north wall of the primary auxiliary building; and 4) service building to cable vault adjacent to the reactor containment. While installing cables for these ductbanks, the licensee identified two design deficiencies which were documented in their PIR 89-38 and PIR 89-45. See Paragraph 9.2 for more detail.
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'4.3.PDCR'#905, Appendix R Cable Pulling and Sealing This PDCR covers the installation of power, control, and instruments-tion cables for components added or modified as.a result of the new switchgear building addition. The cable installations were based on Bechtel installation specifications 18691-E-99014 and 18691-E-99015(Q)~
for cables pulled by Bechtel, and on NUSCO specification'SP-EE-076 for cables pulled by NUSCO. Section 50 of.this PDCR indicates that all power,. control and. instrumentation cables are purchased. environ-mentally qualified to the Haddam Neck accident = environment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.. The inspector verified that these cables are on the environmental qualification master list.
Review of cable pulling records is discussed in Section 6.0.
4.4 PDCR #910, Appendix R-Cable Termination and Testing
.This ~PDCR covers _the termination and testing of all field cables for both safety related and non-safety related equipment, including the new 4.16 KV breaker, 480V distribution system, 120 VAC and 125 VDC systems; service water pump P-37-ID, RHR pump P-14-18, CCW pump P-13-1C,. metering charging pump P-11-1A, motor operated valve BA-MOV-373, and Appendix R lighting. All terminations are based on Bechte1' specification 18691-E-99015(Q) Section 6, for Bechtel performed activities and NUSCO specification SP-EE-076 Section 5 for NUSCO. performed activities.
Review of cable termination records is discussed in Section 6.0.
4.5 PDCR #941, Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) Fan Power This PDCR covers the alternate power supplies to CAR fans #3 and #4 via transfer switches located in the' cable vault adjacent to the reactor containment. The studies conducted by the licensee indicates that a minimum of two CAR fans out of the four must operate after certain Appendix R fire scenarios to maintain the containment tempera-ture below 140 F.
Currently the power supplies of all four fans are from the old switchgear room. Additionally all four CAR fans are supplied by cables that enter the cable vault in one common duct
' bank. Thus a fire in the old switchgear building or a fire in the vicinity of the cable vault duct bank could result in a loss of all 4 fans, which is unacceptable.
Implementation of this PDCR will provide additional power supplies to CAR fans #3 and #4 from the new switchgear room. Also included in this PDCR is the re-routing of CAR fan #2 cable inside the reactor containment to meet the Appendix R cable i
separation requirements.
During the installation of new power cable from the new switchgear room to the transfer switches located in the cable vault, the licensee identified a potential electromagnetic interference problem between the power cable and the instrumentation cables.
Subsequently the licensee generated PIR 89-45 to document the proposed resolution.
See section 9.2 for a detail discussion of PIR 89-45.
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4.6 PDCR No. 909, Appendix R Instrumentation j
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This design change pertains to the upgrade of certain safe shutdown instrumentation to meet the requirements'for fire protection of
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The changes will provide at least one redundant means of safe shutdown indication during a postulateo Appendix R fire.
4.7 PDCR No. 917, New Switchgear Building Fire Protection This design change pertains to the installation of a fire protection system for.the new switchgear building to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R.
The-fire protection system will provide means of detection, suppression and system alarm annunciation in the control room.
Within the scope of this review, no deficiencies were identified.
5.0 _ Facility Tour and Physical Inspections of Installed Electrical Equipment The inspec*.or performed a walk-through inspection of the new switchgear buiiding, including the new battery room, the cable vault adjacent to the reactor containment, the two diesel generator rooms, the existing switchgear room, and the cable spreading room. The inspector observed the cable separation adequacy, general housekeeping, and the installed i
conditions of the cable trays, conduit and other electrical components.
- i Nc deficiencies were identified.
6.0 Review of Cable-Pull and Cable-Termination Records and Verification of Selected Cable Terminations The inspector reviewed the cable pulling records for 6 cable routings to
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determine that a) cable routing is as specified on the latest approved
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drawings and pull schedule; b) the required inspections were properly performed, recorded, reviewed and evaluated by qualified personnel, and l
c) the documentation of completed installation and inspection activities
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was properly completed in a timely manner. The 6 cable routings reviewed
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are:
Raceway No.
Description
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CB2IT112 Flex Conduit CB2IT117 Conduit CB2PL104 Conduit TB2PLO37 Ladder Cable Tray TB2PLO42 Ladder Cable Tray TB2PLO45 Ladder Cable Tray l
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' The inspector also reviewed the work order (#cy89-03461) dated June 7, 1989 for the termination of the Foxboro FX-200 panel, and the QA termination inspection records for RC TB1 through TB3 and RD TB1 through TB3. The procedure used for the termination and inspection is GC-CY-E-4,~" Internal wiring cable / wire termination and inspection," Revision 0, dated April 19, 1989. The associated drawing.for the termination is DWG No. 16103-31291
" Connection diagram for remote instrument isolation panel, SPEC 200, Racks RC and RD"', dated June 1,1989.
In addition, the inspector also performed a point-to point terminal check for terminal blocks RD TB1 and RT TB2.
No deficiencies were identified during the document review and termination inspection.
7.0 Review of Nonconformance Report The inspector selected the following nonconformance reports (NCR) for review:
1)
MCR#083 dated June 27, 1988, " Conduit supports CS-2-1, CS-2-2, CS-2-5 were installed with weld all the way around instead of 1/4 inch fillet weld 4 inches,long on 4 sides".
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NCR#143 dated September 20, 1988, " Tray support section G was welded all around instead of 3/16 inch fillet weld 2 inches long on 4 sides" 3)
NCR#098 dated August 9, 1988, " Local / remote transfer switch panel was received without fuse and fuse block" 4)
NCR#158 dated November 5, 1988, "120 VAC distribution panel solid neutral bus mounting brackets were broken."
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NRC#166 dated December 15,1988, "AC distribution panel 01 embedded plate support has a broken stud" The inspector noted that the reports were legible, complete, and properly reviewed by qualified personnel. These reports were properly identified, stored, and can be retrieved in a reasonable time. The reports included proper resolution and adequate justification was provided for accept-as-is disposition.
Within the scope of this review, no unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.0 Fire protection / Prevention Program (64704)
The inspector reviewed several documents in the following areas of the program to verify that the licensee had developed and implemented adequate procedures consistent with the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical Specifications (TS). The documents reviewed, the scope of review, and the inspection findings for each area of the program are described in the following sections.
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- L 8.1 Program Administration and Controls for Ignition Sources and l;
Combustible Materials l
The inspector reviewed the following administrative procedures to verify that the Fire Protection Program, as described in the FSAR p
and other licensing documents, is properly implemented.
The documents reviewed were:
Technical Specification (T.S.) Section 3.22, Fire Protection
Systems T.S. Section 4.15, Fire Protection Systems
T.S. Section 6, Administrative Controls L
Procedure ADM 1.1-56, " Control of Ignition Sources," Rev. 2
Procedure ADM 1.1-57, " Control of Combustible Materials, Flammable
Liquids and Gases", Rev. 4
. Procedure ACP 1.0-25, " Fire Protection and Prevention Program",
Rev. 5 Procedure ACP 1.0-29, " Implementation and Control of Fire
Protection Program Rcouirements", Rev. 7 Procedure NEO 2.14,'" Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program",
Rev. 1 The scope of the review was to ascertain that:
Personnel are designated for implementing the program at site;
Qualifications are delineated for personnel designated to
implement the program; Special authorization is required for the use of combustible,
flammable or explosive hazardous material in safety-related areas; Prohibition exits on the storage of combustible, flammable or
explosive hazardous material in safety-related areas; The removal is required of all wastes, debris, rags, oil spills
or other combustible materials resulting from the work activity or at the end of each work shift, whichever is sooner; All wood used in safety-related areas is required to be treated
with flame retardant; Periodic inspections are specified for accumulation of
combustibles; Transient combustibles are restricted and controlled in
safety-related areas; Housekeeping is to be properly maintained in areas containing
safety-related equipment and components;
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Requirements exist for special authorization (work permit) for
activities involving welding cutting,. grinding, open flame or other ignition sources and that they are properly safeguarded in areas containing safety-related equipment and components; Prohibition on smoking exists in safety-related areas, except
where " smoking permitted" areas had been specifically designated by plant management;
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Work authorization, construction permit cr similar arrangement
is provided for review and approval of modification, construction and maintenance activities which could adversely affect the safety of the facility; Fire brigade organization and qualifications of brigade members
are delineated;_
Fire reporting instructions for general plant personnel are
developed; Periodic audits are to be conducted on the entire fire pretection
program; and Fire protection / prevention program is included in the licensee's
QA Program.
The review of these documents and the inspection of the areas described l
did not identify any unacceptable conditions.
8.2 Equipment Inspection and Tests The inspector reviewed the following randomly selected documents to determitie whether the licensee had developed adequate procedures which established inspection and testing requirements for the plant fire protection equipment.
SUR 5.1-156, " Fire Protection System Monthly Valve Lineup
Check", Rev. 2 SUR 5.5-20. " Cable Vault CO2 System, Flow Test, Valve and
Ventilation Damper Test, and Weighing of CO2 Bottles", Rev. 6 SUR 5.5-23, "Switchgear Room Fire Protection System Test",
Rev. 8 SUR 5.5 -24, " Spray and or Sprinkler System Testing
(T.S. 4.15, G.I.b.1)", Rev. 7 SUR 5.5-30, " Inspection of Fire Dampers", Rev. 2
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SUR 5.5-32, " Control Room Fire Protection System Checking Halon
Bottles. Full (T.S. 4.15, C.1, a)," Rev. 2 SUR 5.7-109, "18 Month Inspection of Fire Barrier, Fire Barrier
Penetration Seals, and Misc. Plant Mods Provided To Control Combustible / Flammable Materials," Rev. 8 PMP 9.1 - 27, " Fire Protection System Weekly Test," Rev.1
In addition to reviewing the above procedures, the inspector also reviewed inspection / test records to verify compliance with Technical
' Specifications and established procedures. The records reviewed are
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SUR 5.5 - 30 performed 12/10/87
SUR 5.5 - 30 performed 4/26/88
SUR 5.5 - 23 performed 3/12/87
PiiP 9.1 - 27 performed 8/3/89
During this inspection the inspector performed a physical verifica-tion of certain valve positions as listed in the licensee's valve lineup check procedure SUR5.1-156.
In addition, the inspector also observed portions of the " Fire Protection System Weekly Test" per-formed on 8/17/89. This test included test runs of the electric and diesel driven fire pumps via a pressure drop induced automatic start.
'The inspector also reviewed the maintenance reque.# list to determine
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whether there is a significant amount of fire protection equipment inoperable. The review of this list determined that there are 52 outstanding requests.
Forty (40) of these requests are less than one year old. The F.P. equipment that requires maintenance has no significant impact on plant safety.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Within the scope of this review no unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.3 Fire Brigade Training Procedure Review The inspector reviewed the fire brigade training program to verify that this program fncludes:
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Requirements for announced and unannounced drills;
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Requirements for fire brigade training and. retraining at
prescribed frequencies; c.
Requirements for at least one drill per year to be performed on a "back shift" for each brigade; and,
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Requirements for maintenance of training records.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Records Review The inspector reviewed the training records of the fire brigade members for 1988.to ascertain that they had attended the required quarterly training, participated in-a quarterly drill, received the annual hands-on fire extinguishment practice, and received annual physical s.
The inspector reviewed the documented drill plan and'
results of fire drills. held on January 16 and May 15, 1989.
These reports docur.iented strengths and weaknesses observed during the drills.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
The inspector also monitored an announced fire drill.
The drill was successful in that the fire brigade responded and went through the exercise with competence.
8.4 Quality Assurance Audits The licensee's Technical Specifications require that annual, biennial and triennial audits of the fire protection program be conducted.
The inspector reviewed the reports of the following audits conducted by NUSCO Assessment Services to satisfy some of the T.S. requirements.
Audit Dates
- A25015 9/28/87 - 2/26/88
- A25031 10/20/88 - 11/23/88 These audits docu.nent:.d procedural non-compliances to which responses are requested from CY. The inspector concluded that the audit findings are tracked to ensure timely response and corrective actions.
Within the scope of this review, no unacceptable conditions were icentifie _ _ _ _
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L 8.5 Fire' Protection Facility Tour The inspector examined fire protection water systems, including fire-pumps,- fire water piping and distribution systems, hydrants and contents of hose houses.
The inspector toured accessible vital and nonvital plant areas and examined fire detection and alarm systems, automatic and manual fixed suppression systems, interior hose stations, fire barrier penetration seals, and fire doors. The inspector observed general plant housekeeping conditions and randomly checked tags of portable extinguishers for evidence of periodic inspections. No deterioration of equipment was noted. The inspection tags attached to extinguishers indicated that monthly inspections were performed.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
9.0 Follow-up of Previous Inspection Findings 9.1 (Closed) Violation (50-213/86-l'7-08). Inadequate Emergency Lighting This violation pertains to the lack of permanently installed lighting in'the charging pump cubicles and cable vault identified during an NRC Appendix R inspection conducted in 1986.
The licensee contended that installing fixed emergency lighting on an interim basis is not justified since upon completion of the final Apnendix R modifications in 1989, access to these areas will not be necessary. The licensee's January 9,1987 response to the NRC denies the violation of Section III. J of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
The NRC responded to the licensee in a letter dated April 8, 1987..The NRC stated that since there was no assurance that the flashlights and lanterns in the specified areas were equipped with an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery supply, or available if needed, the emergency lighting provided in those areas was inadequate and therefore not in accordance with Appendix R requirements. The NRC concluded that a sufficient basis was not provided for retraction of the violation.
The licensee's corrective actions included providing portable lanterns at the entrance to the charging pump. cubicles. Additional emergency lighting is also mounted in the instrument cabinet locat;d in the cable vault. These corrective actions were reviewed during a previous NRC inspection (87-05). During this inspection, the inspector verified that the above corrective actions were implemented at the charging
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pump cubicles and cable vault.
This violation is closed.
9.2 (Open) Unresolved Item (89-02-02) pertaining to two design deficiencies identified by the licensee during the installation of electrical equipment for the new switchgear building. As a result, two Plant Information Reports (PIR) were generated by the licensee.
PIR 89-38 concerns inadequate cable separation, and PIR 89-45 involves the
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potential for electrical noise in instrument channels induced by adjacent power cable due to inadequate cable separation between power cable and instrumentation cables.
PIR 89-38 indicates that the cable separation criteria were not met in the handholes and cable chase area. The licensee's corrective actions are:
1) wrap the cables in those areas with Siltemp,' which had been tested to be equivalent to electrical conduit or covered cable tray for fire protection purpose, and 2) to separate the cables of different channels to 1" minimum separation. During this inspection, the inspector observed.that the Siltemp wrapping was in place. The licensee was in the process of separating the cable permanently to 1" or more using rigid clamps to securely hold the cable in place.
In addition, the licensee reviewed the cable routing drawings in other areas and determined no other separation problems exist, and supplemented i
their Electrical Engineer Design Guide for separation with a " Lesson Learned" memo. The licensee also conducted a root cause analysis (dated May 26,1989) and a sign Micant safety hazard evaluation (SSH evaluation #89-06). The inspector considered the licensee's corrective actions adequate and this part (PIR 89-38) of the unresolved item is closed.
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PIR 89-45 reports that the power cables in the duct bank for the CAR fans were not separated adequately from the instrumentation cables such that the electrical noise from the power cables may cause the instruments to function unacceptably.
The po ver cat,1es are for 480 VAC high amperes application (see section 4.5 for more info;mation). The affected instruments include steam generator level (narrow and wide ranges);
reactor coolant flow temperature and pressure; pressurizer level.and pressure; DWST level; core exit thermocouple; and power and wide range nuclear instrumentation. All cables are routed in 4" PVC conduit, 6 1/2 apart center to center. All instrumentation cables are in twisted pairs or shielded, which is considered an effective method to reduce noise susceptibility. The licensee has scheduled a test during the upcoming refueling outage after the new cables are terminated to determine the effect of electrical noise to the affected instruments.
A draft copy of the test procedure was provided for the inspector's review.
If the test result indicates that the noise effect is negligible, then this issue will be resolved. The licensee stated that they do not expect to use the alternate power supply cable during power operation; therefore, the electrical noise will not impose a serious problem to the affected instruments even if the test results are adverse. However, the inspector expressed his concern that the alternate power supply cable may be used inadvertently in the future due to: 1) testing of the alternate power circuit during power operation, 2) temporary use of the alternate power supply when the normal supply power cable requires repair on other services. The licensee stated that if the result indicates that the noise effect is f
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significant, a procedural control will be. instituted'to prohibit the use of the alternate power cable except during plant shutdown. This part.(PIR 89-45) of the unresolved item remains open pending NRC-review of the licensee's test result.
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' 10.0 Exit' Interview.
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At the conclusion'of-the inspection on August 18, 1989, the inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1.0.
The inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection at that time.
At no time during this inspection was written material given to the'
licensee.
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