B11423, Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Re Backfitting Isap Consistent W/Commission Majority View Re Proposed Backfit Rule.Current Plans Re Pilot Program Appropriate

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Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Re Backfitting Isap Consistent W/Commission Majority View Re Proposed Backfit Rule.Current Plans Re Pilot Program Appropriate
ML20197F016
Person / Time
Site: Millstone, Haddam Neck, 05000000
Issue date: 01/23/1985
From: Counsil W
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To: Chilk S
NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20197E978 List:
References
FOIA-85-759, FOIA-86-A-3 11423, B11423, NUDOCS 8605150378
Download: ML20197F016 (4)
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January 23,1985 Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-423 Bil423 Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos.1,2 and 3 Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Backfitting On November 30, 1984, the NRC published (49 FR 47034) a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) concerning revision of the backfitting process for power reactors. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCo) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECo), as licensees of the Haddam Neck Plant and MCistone Unit Nos. I and 2, and license applicant for the Millstone Unit No. 3, ,

are taking this opportunity to comment on the NPR. It is intended that these amments will contribute to a rapid resolution of this long-standing issue and 7 amulgation of a workable backfitting rule.

We are pleased to see the publication of the NPR and the apparent interest on Ca ta:,t:;,gc3 the part of the Commission in addressing this issue in concrete terms. We note, however, that this is only the latest step in a long and tortuous process which has absorbed excessive resources on the part of the nuclear industry and the NRC.

24 J/W E51: 18 The histcry of this issue has included near unanimous agreement that achieving workable backfit controls is the single most important element needed to bring stability to the licensing process. It has also seen unprecedented agreement on the part of the nuclear industry on the specific steps needed (i.e., on a specific proposed rule) to achieve this end. ' Despite this history, the Commission decided, well over a year ago, to publi'th an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) (49 FR 44217, September 28, 1983) rather than the NPR which could have been prepared with the information then available.

Our comments (l) on the ANPR, which in turn referred to earlier correspondence, provided our perspectives in some detali on the ANPR. Having previously discussed the underlying issues related to the need for backfit controls, we do not reiterate that discussion here, but instead ask that it be considered (1) See the W. G. Counsil letter to S. Chilk dated October 28,1983.

86051 _50378 860404 CURRAN 86-A-3 PDR trf

w 2-incorporated by reference. Additionally, we have worked with the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG) and the Atomic Industrial Forum's (AIF) Subcommittee on Backfitting on the comments those organizations are filing with respect to the current NPR, Again, we generally endorse the NUBARG and AIF comments without reiterating them herein. Instead, we limit the discussion below to the principle issues raised in the NPR. This approach is consistent with our attempt to end the practice of needlessly plowing old ground regarding this issue and to encourage, instead, timely resolution.

A major difference between the rule proposed by the, industry and that embodied in the NPR is the means of identifying a backfit. The Commission's proposed rule would control " regulatory requirements" (the cause) while the industry rule would control any impact on a facility (the effect) regardless of its causative agent. In deciding between these two positions, it is important to remember the underlying problem necessitating backfit controls. That problem is the need for stability to enable nuclear power plants to be built and ' operated without continuous and unnecessary changes. It is stability in the effect of the regulatory process rather than in the process itself. To assure that stability, it is surely better to control based on effects directly rather than indirectly by attempting to identify causative elements in a manner which will remain exhaustive despite future evolutions in the regulatory process. To be fully effective, the controls must cover all potential changes or impacts on a facility and its operations or support staffs. The proposed 10 CFR 50.109 requirements for prior analysis and justification of the need for a backfit should thus be applicable to any " modification or addition required by the Commission to the facility or to the structures, systems or components of such facility, the design ,

thereof, or the procedures or organization required to construct or operate such i

facility." Control of requests for new analyses (i.e., effects on the supporting staff) should also be enacted, as embodied in the proposed change to 10 CFR 50.54(f).

In controlling the effects of the regulatory process, the NRC must fully consider all relevant factors, including the important factor of the cost of changes. The arguments of the Union of Concerned Scientists that consideration of costs is precluded by the Atomic Energy Act must be considered specious. While it is true that the Act requires the Commission to establish safety standards which i

licensees must meet, it is also true that the Act requires " reasonable assurance" that reactor construction and operation will not be inimical to the public health and safety or the common defense and security. To interpret this same Act as requiring an endless pursuit of absolute safety is clearly inconsistent and incorrect. Instead, the Act should be interpreted as requiring the Commission to consider the costs of its actions, in addition to their beneficial effects, in deciding when the " adequate" level of safety required by the Act is achieved.

The legal implications of these issues are addressed extensively in the NUBARG and AIF comments.

An issue which has not been a principle concern in the backfitting debate is the effect of remaining plant life. This issue has not been important in the past largely because the vast majority of nuclear power plants were in the early stages of their operating lives. Many facilities, including our own Haddam Neck Plant, are now approaching the mid-pcht of their licensed lifetimes. The

declining number of years of operation remaining must certainly affect both the benefits of backfits (especially as they accomplish continuing reduction of already small"per year" risks) and their costs (as the remaining years over which costs can be amortized decreases). Unless e.xplicit consideration is given to the remaining lifetime of individual facilities, it is quite plausible that many plants would be economically unable to complete their full licensed lifetimes.

Additionally, experience has shown that a period of several years is often required to implement significant changes, thereby making it a senseless exercise to impose such changes on plants with only a few years of operation remaining. The importance of this factor will clearly increase with time, and the regulatory process must be structured to accommodate a population of plants distributed over their design lifetimes. The Commission should not exclude remaining lifetime from explicit consideration in the backfitting rule merely because it has not been particularly significant in backfit decisions reached to date.

We are also compelled to emphasize our commitment to move from the general framework and concepts discussed in the ANPR and the NPR to the truly meaningful application stage by highlighting our participation in the Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP). While we do not believe that backfitting reform should be tied directly to ISAP, we believe that ISAP, as a pilot program,-

will make a significant contribution towards demonstrating the workability of the principles be'Ind industry's proposed backfitting rule. As envisioned by Northeast Utilities,ISAP captures the desirable features of previous and current regulatory processes, and includes the following elements:

o Strong emphasis on the integrated assessment concept utilized with considerable success in Phase !! of the Systematic Evaluation Program,

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i o inclusion of all significant regulatory topics and issues, independent of their origin within the NRC, as determined mutually by the licensee and I the NRC, o Explicit consideration of utility initiatives and priorities, which recognizes the fact that utility projects can either directly or indirectly have a significant impact on plant safety, o Proper use of traditional, time-proven deterministic reviews, o Extensive use of plant-specific, probabilistic safety assessments to supplement the deterministic findings,

! o Recognition that the costs of potential backfits, including dollars, manpower, and man-rem, are considered in the evaluation of individual issues, o Consideration of important, qualitative factors such as operational trends, significant plant events, management effectiveness, SALP results, etc.,

and o An end product which documents the basis for dispositioning virtually all major regulatory and utility issues, and establishes their relative priority.

.t; _

Significantly, at the conclusion of this program a comprehensive framework will exist to facilitate the disposition of future issues as they arise. We believe this progressive, forward-looking program will represent a workable method of implementing the principles of a sound backfitting process, in addition to providing numerous other benefits.

With this backdrop, we invite a comparison between the ISAP concept and the additional views of Commissioner Asselstine. We agree with the perspective of Commissioner Asselstine when he stated that:

"No one ever steps back and looks at the big picture. The Commission's proposed rule merely perpetuates that practice. I would prefer a broader inquiry into whether there is a better approach to regulating our operating plants than simply modifying our backfitting regulation. That inquiry could explore alternative regulatory philosophies, ..."

We believe that ISAP is responsive to this legitimate criticism, while retaining consistency with the views of the majority of the Commission with respect to the proposed backfitting rule. Recognizing that ISAP represents a departure from the traditional regulatory process, it is appropriate that the Commission continue with its current plans regarding a pilot program, if the program is as successful as we envision, we believe that it will make a meaningful contribution to the resolution of the backfitting issue in particular, and regulatory reform in general.

i Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHE'AST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY

}- M4Lk W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President cc: Chairman Nunzio 3. Palladino 4 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts l Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthat Commissioner Lando W. Zech W. 3. Dircks

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