Text

Forwards Addl Info Re Safe Shutdown Capability,In Response to NRC 820903 Request
	ML20063P675
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	10/05/1982
From:	John Marshall; ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Clark R, Stolz J; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	0CAN108203, CAN108203, NUDOCS 8210150073
	Download: ML20063P675 (72)
	v • d • e

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ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 551 LITTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72203 (501)371-4000 October 5, 1982 BCAN198203 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-313 & 50-368 License Nos. DPR-51 & NPF-6 Request for Additional Information to Appendix R Compliance Submittal Gentlemen:

Pursuant to our meeting of August 31, 1982, and your request dated September 3, 1982, (0CNA098201), we have been requested to furnish additional inforr..ation concerning safe shutdown capability as addressed in our July 1,1982, Appendix R compliance submittal (0CAN078202). We have prepared the following response to each of 7 items for which a response was requested at that meeting.

Item 1:

Provide a summary of the methodology used in reviewing ANO-1 & 2 capabilities for hot shutdown and cold shutdown in the event of a fire; and provide some typical examples of the application of your methodology.

Response

The detailed evaluation performed by AP&L to corapare ANO-1 and ANO-2 to the requirements of Appendix R contained several major tasks which are summarized on pages 2 and 3 of Section 1 and Appendix E of our July 1, 1982, submittal. In clarification of that information, the following is provided.

, MO!hoh3f3 PDR MEMBER PMOOLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM

Mr. Robnrt A. Clerk Cctob:r 5, 1982 W-. John F. Stolz The original Fire Hazards Analysis was used as a basis for the review.

The evaluation method for this analysis was described in detail in our February 28, 1978, submittal, and was based on the concept of performing and maintaining three shutdown functions, i.e., reactivity control, primary inventory makeup, and primary heat removal. The individual zone documentation packages from that analysis consist of a description of the zone, a summary of the potential heat load to the zone resulting from complete combustion of combustibles (including an assumed 1 x 105 BTU of

, transient combustibles), a list of redundancies identified, a list of safety grade systems which have circuits or components in the zone, a description of the available fire protection, and a list of raceways in the zone. The raceway list includes a list of circuits in the raceway

and data for heat load calculations for raceways with exposed cables (trays). Recognizing that some of these documentation packages might not

! contain the latest "as-built" information, we conducted a review of l applicable plant design change packages (DCP). No modifications were l necessary as a result.

With this " initial" data in hand and through use of the latest drawings l (P&ID, HVAC, Cable / Raceway, Architectural, etc.) and, where possible, physical observation, each fire zone was reviewed against the Appendix R criteria for fire protection. The basic concept for review consisted of identifying functional redundancies of safe shutdown components located within the zone and determining if the plant could be safely shutdown without those components. If not, then an evaluation was performed to determine if: (1) Appendix R requirements were already met; or (2) some type modification, alternative shutdown, exemption request, etc., would be necessary for compliance. If plant shutdown could be safely accomplished without those components, and since the definition of fire

! zones in the original Fire Hazards Analysis did not require zone boundaries of 3-hour fire rating, adjacent zones as well as zones within 20 feet were considered with regards to their potential effect on

, redundancy to the zone in question for zone boundaries that had less than a 3-hour fire rating boundary.

The evaluations conducted within the methodology described above considered associated circuits. This aspect is addressed in detail in our response to question 5.

In certain cases, credit for manual operation of equipment was taken if l controls (and power for valves) could possibly be damaged by a fire.

! Such credit was taken (and noted in Section 2 of our July 1 submittal) only if:

l a. the component to be operated is not located in the affected j fire zone, although the cable may be damaged by fire;

b. sufficient time is available to perform the required manual actions; and

c. personnel are available, beyond the fire brigade and minimum operations shift crew limitations, to perform the manual actions.

( /

r Mr. R:bsrt A. Clark Octobsr 5, 1982 Mr. John F. Stolz These are~also discu., sed in greater detail in our response to question 2.

t-For redundancies that were still identified ~as potential safe shutdown

, concerns following the above review, specific physical separation, i barriers, intervening combustibles, suppression systems, etc., were

evaluated and required modifications or alternative means for accomplishing necessary functions were identified to bring zones into full compliance, or to a level of fire protection safety judged to be equivalent to alternatives of Appendix R.

! The evaluations described above were performed in accordance with the criteria of Appendix R, including consideration of cable insulation as combustible, taking no credit for cable coatings to act as a thermal or

. radiant-barrier to protect cables, and diverting primary reliance from administrative controls to preclude fires or damage due to fires.

i Attached are documentation packages from one example fire zone from each~

! unit that demonstrate the application of our methodology. These two zones include one which was found to meat Appendix R and one which was found to require an exemption. These packages are from the original fire hazards analysis and are only presented for example of the basis of our methodology. As stated earlier, a review was conducted on these packages to determine all modifications made to these zones subsequent to the Fire Hazard Analysis date. The following paragraph demonstrates the application of our methodology utilizing the example packages attached.

I A comparison of the function which requires each red channel circuit with the function which requires each green channel circuit (pages 63.1 through 63.23 of attachment) resulted in the list of redundancies-

, included in the package (pages I-59 through I-61 of attachment), and a subsequent review of the redundancies identified those involving safe

shui.down functions (utilizing drawings and observation). In zone 149-E, the service water sluice gates were identified as redundant safe shutdown i function equipment. It was also determined that these could be manually operated. As a result of our review of components for spurious actuation problems, the decay heat drop line valves were identified in zone 149-E.

However, it was determined that the control logic for those valves prevented them from being spuriously opened by a fire in this zone.

i After ccmpleting the review process described above, we concluded this zone met Appendix R requirements. In zone 2040-JJ, the charging pumps, RWT discharge valves, and (for cold shutdown) the shutdown cooling water heat exchanger service water valves were identified. An exemption request was developed for the charging pumps (summary of and basis for exemption provided in section E on page 46 of 52 of our July 1 submittal), an alternate source of borated water was identified that was available if the RWT valves were lost, and the shutdown cooling water heat exchanger' service water valves were determined to be manually operable for cold shutdown. The results of this analysis are presented in section 4 of our July 1 submittal.

Item 2:

For the 14 fire zones that you indicate are in full compliance with Appendix R, but require some sort of manual or non-routine operation,

Mr. R:bert A. Citrk Octcbsr 5, 1982 Mr. John F. Stolz describe the safe shutdown equipment and cables that would be effected by j a fire and the specific operator actions that would be required to obviate these effects. In your discussion of this issue discuss the times for required action that the operator has before the plant would f

get into an unrecoverable situation.

Response

Zones 149E, 67U, 68P and 128E Cables for all the Service Water Sluice Gates are in each of these zones.

If hot shorts somehow selectively closed both gates which permit the pump suction bays to be supplied with lake water and left all 3 of the gates closed which permit the pump suction bays to be supplied with emergency cooling pond water, then one gate would have to be manually opened to maintain suction supply for a service water pump.

l With loss of offsite power, the limiting function of service water in relation to promptness is emergency diesel generator cooling. As noted in Appendix A (A-2.1.f) of our July 1, 1982, submittal, the diesel is not required for at least 1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , i.e., until primary system makeup is required.

Zone 170Z The Atmospheric Di.mp Valves and Atmospheric Dump Block Valves are in this zone. They are required only # r cold shutdown. To achieve cold shutdown, one of each in the same loop may have to be manually opened.

Cold shutdown actions can be delayed without limit.

. Zone 38Y l

A cable for CV-1404 (Decay heat drop line from the Reactor Coolant i System) is in this zone. To reach cold shutdown that valve may have to l be manually opened. Cold shutdown actions can be delayed without limit.

Zones 79U and 112I Cables for the "C" Makeup pump lube oil pump and the "B" Makeup pump cooler service water inlet valve are in each of these zones. If "A" Makeup pumps should be out of service (as permitted for unlimited time periods by the technical specifications) and a fire caused hot short causes the "B" Makeup cooler service water inlet valve to close, the "C" l Makeup pump can be used for inventory makeup and/or heat removal by

! overriding the pump lube oil start interlock with a manual Emergency Safeguards initiation or the "B" Makeup pump can be used by manually l opening the pump cooler service water inlet valve. Even so, we consider

! the probability of simultaneous occurrence of this Technical Specification condition and a fire in the same zone extremely small.

Cables for valves CV-1050, CV-1404 and CV-1428 are in each of the zones and Zone 790 has a cable for CV-1401 and Zone 112I has a cable for CV-1410. Valves CV-1050, CV-1410 and CV-1404 are in the Decay Heat drop l line from the Reactor Coolant System and CV-1401 and CV-1428 are in the

Mr. Rsbart A. Clark Oct:bsr 5,1982 Mr. John F. Stolz Decay Heat cooler discharge line back to the Reactor Coolant System. To achieve cold shutdown CV-1050, CV-1404, CV-1401 and CV-1428 may have to be manually opened for.a fire in Zone 790 and CV-1050, CV-1410, CV-1404 and CV-1428 may have to be manually opened for a fire in Zone 112I. Cold shutdown actions can be delayed without limit.

The makeup pumps can operate on the order of an hour before cooling water flow to the pump is essential. In addition, the requirement to use the makeup pumps does not exist until at least 1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after a trip coincident with a loss of offsite power and then required use may be intermittent. If the reactor coolant system is tight (low leakage) the requirement may not exist for many hours. As a result, actions to restore cooling water flow or override pump lube oil start interlocks are not expected to be required at all but would certainly not be required for a least 3 or 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Zones 46Y and 47Y Cables for CV-1050 (Decay heat drop line from the Reactor Coolant System) are in these zones. To reach cold shutdown, that valve may have to be manually opened. Cold shutdown actions can be delayed without limit.

Zones 2084DD and 2111T Cables for the service water outlet valves from both Diesel Gererator jacket coolers are in each of these zones. A fire in either zone along with a loss of offsite power might cause a need for one of those valves to be manually opened. As noted in Appendix A (A-2.1.f) of our July 1, 1982, submittal, the diesel is not required for at least I hours following a loss of offsite power, i.e., until primary system makeup is required, l

Zone 2084DD also has a cable for all but one Emergency Feedwater pump discharge valves and several of the valves themselves are physically in this zone. A fire in this zone might cause a need to use feed and bleed cooling g to manually open 2CV-1039 or to manually open 2CV-1036 and l 2CV-1075. None of those three valves are physically located within Zone

! 208400 nor would a fire in that zone make them inaccessible. Emergency feedwater is required no earlier than 20 minutes on ANO-2.

Zone 2097X t

Cables for the green and swing battery chargers are in this zone. If the red battery charger is out of service (as permitted for unlimited time periods by the technical specifications) and a fire in this zone disabled

'he green and swing battery chargers, the black battery charger would need to be connected to the red battery. Even so, we consider the probability of simultaneous occurrence of this Technical Specification condition and a fire in the same zone extremely small.

l The battery banks will carry their loads for a least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months without charging. Therefore, connection of a battery bank to an alternate operable charger would be needed no earlier than within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

i l

l

Mr. Robart A. C1crk- Octob::r 5,1982

, Mr. John F. Stolz

, Zone 2155A !

The atmospheric dump valves are both in this zone. To achieve cold shutdown one may need to be manually opened. Cold shutdown actions can be delayed without limit.

Item 3:

List all the actions required of the operator including the times in which the operator has to bring the plant to hot and cold shutdown by means of the. alternate shutdown capability independent of the control room and cable spreading room. List manpower requirements for various tasks. Provide a commitment and schedule for implementing procedures for

bringing the plant to hot and cold shutdown.

Response

Actions required of the operator to bring the plant to hot shutdown by means of the alternate shutdown system with a loss of all AC power, except those corrective actions that may be necessitated by random hot shorts in the cable spreading room or control room in order to permit the listed actions to be accomplished, are listed in sections A.2.le and f of Appendix A of our July 1,1982, submittal. The listed components can be 3

operated from the breaker (preferred) or (in the case of valves) by local

, manual valve operator manipulation. The listings include the manpower requirements for the various tasks. It should be noted that these actions are the same as.those required for a loss of all AC power without a fire for the first 1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , with the sole difference being the location at which the necessary process variables are monitored. Step 1 in the list can be delayed in excess of 10 minutes (much longer for 3

Unit 2) without violating margin to saturation limits. Step 2 is stated in the submittal as having an acceptable delay time of 1\ hours. Step 3 timing requirements will depend on how tight the Reactor Coolant System is and, to some extent, how long Step 1 war delayed, but will be required until some time beyond the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months acceptable delay period for Step 2.

Step 4 may be delayed without limit.

To achieve cold shutdown the operator will have to continue Steps 3 and 4 in a manner that will depressurize and cool the Reactor Coolant System to approximately 280'F/250 psig'where the decay heat system can be put into operation to bring the unit to cold shutdown. There is no time limit for this task.

Section A.2.le of our July 1,1982, submittal commits to revisions to existing procedures to address the occurrence of a fire in the control room. These revisions will be implemented after completion of our proposed alternate shutdown design modifications. The schedule for completion of those modifications is addressed in Section 5 of our July 1, 1982, submittal. The procedure revisions will address both hot and cold shutdown.

Item 4:

Mr. R:b*,rt A. Clcrk October 5, 1982 Mr. John F. Stolz With respect to your Section III.L discuss the following:

a. What is the source of borated and makeup water?

b. Will the pressurizer heaters, or some means of pressure control, be used for shutdown? If so, please describe.

c. We understand that you do not currently have and you do not propose to have indication available for source range monitoring and necessary tank levels. It is the staff's position that source range monitoring indication should be available at the remote shutdown panel and the capability be provided to determine the necessary tank levels. We request you to commit to satisfying the staff position.

d. What are the ventilation and electrical distribution systems required for alternate shutdown.

Response

a. Source of Boration and Makeup Water ANO-1 Supply Borated Water Storage Tank or Boric Acid Addition and Condensate Tanks via the Makeup Tank or Boric Acid Addition Tank via the Makeup Tank Motive Any one of the three Makeup Pumps Boric Acid Pump (1 of 2) and Condensate Transfer Pump (1 of 2) (for l

use of Boric Acid Addition and Condensate Tank Sourcds only)

Boric Acid Pump (1 of 2) (for use of Boric Acid Addition tank only) l

! ANO-2 I

Supply Refueling Water Tank or Boric Acid Makeup Tank A or Boric Acid Makeup Tank B l

or Boric Acid Makeup Tank and Reactor Makeep l Water Tank via the Volume Control Tank Motive l

Any one of three Charging Pumps Boric Acid Makeup Pump (1 or 2) and Reactor Makeup Water Pump (1 of 2) (for use of Boric Acid Makeup Tank and j Reacter Makeup Water Tank only) l

Mr. Robart A. Clark Octobor 5, 1982 Mr. John F. Stolz

b. The pressurizer heaters will tie used if available. If not, pressure will be controlled via the shutdown functions, inventory makeup and heat removal. Removing more heat or adding less inventory reduces pressure. Conversely, removing less heat or adding more inventory increases pressure.

c. in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R section III.L.2.d, readings of all process variables necessary to perform and control the shutdown functions are being made available by our proposed alternate shutdown design modification. Tanks relied on in the Fire Hazards Analysis for which level is relevant under the postulated conuitions have level indication available independent of the proposed alternate shutdown design modification. Level indications for the LOCA sized borated water tanks are not required because of the minute quantities of borated water used for normal shutdown makeup as compared to the large volume of water stored in the tanks for LOCA purposes.

Source range monitoring is not a necessary parameter and was not included as a paramet.er whose availability was assured. No fire can prevent the control rods from dropping and all inventory makeup is restricted to borated water or boric acid.

Inadvertent dilution for Unit 1 would require, at a minimum, spurious opening of 3 valves and the continuous spurious operation of one pump. Two of those valves are air operated fail closed valves. Inadvertent dilution for Unit 2 would require, at a minimum, spurious opening of 2 valves and the continuous spurious operation of one pump. Both of the valves are air operated fail closed valves. In addition, at normal full makeup flow rates (1 pump), the continuous injection of i pure water into the Reactor Coolant System would have to occur

! for over 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months to use up minimum shutdown margins available This is true for both units. At such after reactor trip.

continuous makeup rates, overpressurization would become a concern before reactivity would. In addition, in that period of time sources of borated water or boric acid would always be employed to accomplish such large makeup quantities thereby increasing required dilution times by at least several more hours. Such a scenario could not, therefore, occur. As a result, source range monitoring provides no necessary information and does not meet the description of process variables required by Section III.L.2.d of 10CFR50 Appendix R.

d. Assuming manual operation of the required motor operated valves, Electrical Bus 2D03 or MCC 2854 are the only electrical distribution busses required. These are power supplies for the SPDS computer and do not pass through the cable spreading room or control room. The only ventilation system required is the dedicated HVAC unit for the SPDS computer room. This HVAC system is not required during the first hour and a half to two hours, i.e., after the Reactor has been tripped, off site power has been lost, and the control room has been evacuated due l

l

Mr. Rob;rt A. Clark Oct b:r 5, 1982 Mr. John F. Stolz directly to a fire or to inoperability resulting from cable spreading room destruction. The system can be re-energized manually from either diesel generator after safe shutdown (hot shutdown) has been established.

Item 5:

Your submittal did not specifically respond to our May 10, 1982, letter with regard to your method of review for associated circuits. Please expand your di:,cussion and address the specific issues of our May 10, 1982, letter. In addition address the following:

a. Discuss your methodology of associated circuit review. Was it for all areas containing safety shutdown cables, or for only process monitoring cables for alternate shutdown?

b. For the common power source situation, have you addressed the 4kV systems? Is the circuit protection coordinated, and is this an ongoing program?

c. For the spurious signal and common enclosure concerns, demonstrate compliance in these areas by providing a detailed zone by zone analysis, or by providing a description of design philosophy that obviates these concerns.

Response

a. Our associated circuit review was for all areas in the plant whether they contained safe shutdown cables or not. The spurious operation review method used for all but the cable spreading room and control room was as follows. The redundancy checks were based on functional redundancies and included consideration of the potential for spurious operation of a component (or components) disabling one method of accomplishing a shutdown function. For the control room and cable spreading room it was dete' mined that there were no functions that needed to be accomplished dring the time period required to take control from outside the control room and there were no valves whose spurious operation would prevent adequate corrective action and function accomplishment after taking control from outside the control room other than high/ low pressure interface valves which are addressed in response to question 6. All l potential corrective action necessitated by spurious valve operation was determined to be reasonable under the same criteria listed in response to question 1.

Plant design criteria ensure that all power sources feeding i safety grade equipment are electrically protected from all l

circuits by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices.

l For spurious operation and common enclosure concerns see the I response to question 5.c.

In addition, fire zone boundaries that are relied on in the Fire Hazards Analysis have approved fire penetration seals for

Mr. Rrbert A. Clark- Octcbtr 5, 1982 Mr. John F. Stolz all penetrations and circuit overcurrent protective devices prevent electrical distribution of the fire from one zone to another. Additionally, all circuits in the same zone, including those in common enclosures, were assumed to be damaged in the worst failure mode anyway.

b. Statements made in section A-3.d of Appendix A of our July 1, 1982, submittal are applicable to 4kV (4160V) systems as well.

The circuit protection coordination is an ongoing program.

c. Concerning our review for the occurrence and consequences of spurious signals, as illustrated in diagram 2b of the clarification of generic letter 81-12, we considered every component with a connection through the affected zone that could be spuriously operated. In each case, the effect of such spurious operation on safe shutdown capability was evaluated.

The results of the control room and cable spreading room -

evaluation are addressed in our response to 5.a above. For other zones in the plant, details (such as needed for manual operation) are addressed in our response to the individual zones in our July 1,1982, submittal.

Concerning common enclosure associated circuits, all circuits in the same fire zone were assumed to be damaged in the worst failure mode. This is consistent with our overall Appendix R review methodology discussed in our response to item 1.

Therefore, for the cases of common enclosures such as raceways, panels, junction boxes, etc. within a single fire zone, this

" worst failure mode" analysis adequately addresses the concern.

As stated in 5.a above, fire zone boundaries relied on in the Fire Hazards Analysis have approved fire penetration seals for all penetrations and circuit overcurrent protective devices to prevent electrical distribution of the fire from one zone to another.

Item 6:

Have you identified all cables or equipment whose failures due to the effects of a fire may cause spurious operation and violate a high/ low pressure interface, thereby creating a LOCA? If so, please list and identify the resolution of any violations.

Response

A review of the reactor coolant system interfaces reveals only three functional areas that involve a pressure boundary that relies only on power operated valves for pressure boundary integrity. These are:

a. Pressurizer vents and reliefs

b. Letdown

c. Drop line to decay heat or shutdown cooling systems L

Mr. Rob:rt A. Clark Oct:ber 5, 1982 Mr. John F. Stolz The pressurizer vents and reliefs are the normal means for feed and bleed cooling, which is one method used to achieve hot shutdown, and are therefore not of concern.

The letdown lines are flow restricted lines protected by reliefs and would require the failure (in an open position) of at least three valves, one of which is air operated fail closed, to even challenge the relief.

These are, therefore, not of concern.

The drop lines have two motor operated valves which are operated in series. (There is a single line in each unit). No automatic signals are needed to open these valves, which have 480 volt operators. A manual open signal requires both a manual handswitch actuation and a permissive signal on low pressure. For both valves to open, four circuits would, therefore, have to be spuriously completed. The contacts for the circuits for each valve are in cabinets separate from those for the other valve. Therefore, these valves are not of concern.

Item 7:

Can the units be brought to cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ?

Response

Unit 2 can be brought te cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months following a fire and concurrent loss of offsite power. Unit 1, on the other hand, cannot schieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for these conditions because of the additional time required to cool and depressurize the reactor coolant system without pressurizer spray. Unit 2 does have high pressure auxiliary spray, but Unit 1 cannot accomplish this function on loss of offsite power. However, for all initial conditions for which ANO-1 can achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months without a fire, it can also acomplish the same with a fire. It is our interpretation that this meets the intent of Appendix R.

Very truly yours, b

John R. Marshall Manager, Licensing JRM: LVP: sc Attachments

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l liliDliNDANT SAFETY CIRCllITRY l con't)

13. 11 t 2 ptrge 1 cad system exhaust line isolation valve ;

CV7447R (RT) CV7447G t

i

&c 43er (/LT) G c t) r b , E c t.p t t, l Acceptance Criteria: 5,6,7 l

14. Reactor building air particulate monitor CV7453 (RT) CV7454 e e ex o, c e i ra r t itr) c-e e g y , c c tns , c n > sr, cessst.

Acceptance Criteria: 5,6,7 15.

Red stop and Green valve steam line break instrument and main steam -

control t

2L flo o (R7) &c*a/o8 O ,

Acceptance Criteria: 5,6 - All circuits in conduit i

16.

Red and green core flooding valve positions indication, trouble detection and annunciation de f re o (Kr) &c1451 , G;c L 450 Acceptance Criteria: 5,6 l

17 None I

l Accm tance Criteria:

18. !

i

, Acceptance Criteria:

I FIRC HAZARDS ARKANSAS NUCLE / WE PAGE ANALYSIS UNIT 1 I-61 5

- -- - n

l l

t IM.i *

At 1: 1Y :;Y:irlit.15 ANI' CIMS 11. Cllu: lit l' Al i 13: 11 l':

, Decay lleat

2. Reactor iluilcling Spray . Core Flooiline I

i 3, P.mergency Fceiltrat or l

l 1, Intemeiliat e Cooling

5. Sampiing System 6 Chemical Aililition

, 7 Airflow Reat tor linilcling l 3. Reactor Protection 'l

l i 9. lingineereil Safety Features I

10. Flakeup !

l l 11. Iloron !!anagement *

, 12. Die ;cl Generator i t

13. Fire flater i

I

, 11 Penetration Room Ventilation !

15. 11

, 2 Purne

, f Ih. Ac Syr;t.cm i

i 17. Service lYate' i

18. Seconilary Stiram Generator i

! {

i 19. Cont ainment Cool inn i

_o, Seconclary Steam

{

! 21. Railwaste Area Ventilation t

i f ,

L- -. - -

i

. . _ . _.. 8 I I IIE II Al ARil'i AIO:AriS A' fillri I e' on au

, N! Al.Y S 1 S 11t11 I 1 ! " /

-c

)

[. '

t DISfitIPTInti 01: I:lltli Pl!Oll CTION Cut off from other zones by masonry walls. Ihnun tly opera ted closed head sprinkler system. Smoke dcLect ors t'l a nn Cont rol l Room and arms sprinkler control valve for manual operation :ro Control 1toom or manual . pull box in avec. The hot inst , ship ne l Decont aminnt ion Room are prc ected by aut oma t i. wet pip" g i ,

equipment - ordinary hazard - 100 sq. ft head spacing. linn 1

, extinguisher and l'f' fire hose with combination no:7.l e avai l, :!- e l

i t

e

.O '

l .

DISCllSS10Il The Fire I,oad in this zone is low, i

i This zone is neceptable without modificarico.

I t

I i

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ZONE i 2040-JJ ' l 1 LOCATION: Tank Rooms, Pump Rooms, Corridors, etc. Elevation 335'0" DISCRIPTION: Contains electric wiring, motors, and pumps. Completely ' f cut off by masonry walls. 13,022 sq. ft. , t llEAT LOAD:
~~,, Cable Insulation 596ES BTU l Oil, Cleaning solvent, etc. 29E5 BTU '~~
~~Transient Combustibles 1E5 BTU ;~~
*0ther Combustibles 0 BTU Total Combustibles 626ES BTU Total lleat Load 4,807 BTU /FT 2 i, * (discription of other combustibles) l i
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~~FIRE HAZARDS ARKANSAS NUCLEAR DIE PAGE ANALYSIS UNIT 2 II-216 :~~
~~- _I~~
~~e.% 1 REDUNDANT SAFETY CIRCillTRY LCV898*/ svwc_ w~~
1. Charging pumps room cooler and inlet valves and charging pumps ht>ILO,fA50% s i.G'0\* eth% $0 o 60 501, E-t r o 13, (c argy Acceptance Criteria: 5,6 6 *' W T

2. Penetration Room exhaust fans z vs fe.fw 3 gp , f 61l'r e e t , gg =n 0 3 L dt s w ! O' Acceptance Criteria: 5,6 - No credit taken in Safety Analysis

3. RWT Discharge valves & C" 9 9J0 - Y E.C 107, 6=i'1 ,6FS8so Acceptance criterin: 4,5,6 7.R a, IIPSI pump/cooler inlet valves (All 3)***#9f/
I ' ' t) , E c.1. t 3 g Acceptance Criteria: 5 - The valves are normally open which would allow flow even if power is lost y , Shutdown heat exchange room coolers and inlet valves twry e 9 -w 1 v u cm so t
' f.c t o s, , ,c Gn.fo ce fa) 'V ' Y Acceptance Criteria: 5,6 /c,* Shutdown cooling heat exchange service water valves W 34 ,dttoy ,6025o LC U/V f} - /
~~1,, , ,, n _ Acceptance Criteria: 5,7 .R FIRE HAZARDS s~~
~~' mARKANSAS NUCLEAR 0'IE PAGE ANALYSIS UNIT '-~~
~~II-217~~
/N

1 RiiDilNDANT SAFF.TY CIRClllTRY (con't.)
1
~~7. Na0!! Addition pumps (Both)~~
~~'6Cll4,l!Clel 66'Z50 Acceptance Criteria: 5,6~~
~~8. Containment sump suction valves to ECCS pumps (Both)~~
'ac w.rsfc. u l')67 , fazyn **V O /s' W4, Acceptance Criteria: 5,6 9 None Acceptance Criteria:
10 Acceptance Criteria: 11. Acceptance Criteria: 12. Acceptance Criteria: 1 q . FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ) tit pact IINii 2 II-218
~~~~ -. _~~
~~A . [ SAlti:TY SYSTliMS ANI) CLASS 1E CIl!CU1'IS AltiliCTlil):~~
1. Chemical and Volume Control

2. Diesel Generators-

3. Control Room Air Conditioning

4. Turbine Building Ventilation

5. Reheat Steam

6. Containment Spray

7. Service Water

8. Doron Management

9. Safety Injection

10. Sampling System

11. Shutdown Heat Exchanger Roon Cooling p 12. Endi neered Safety Features

13. Post Accident -!! 2

14. Liquid G Gas Radiation Process Monitor

15. Air Flow Auxiliary Building 6 Waste Management Area

16. Nonc 17.
~~18. 19. 20 FIRE HAZARDS ARKANSAS tiUCLEAR ONE PAGE ANALYSIS UNIT-2 II-219~~
~~,es, I~~
DISCRIPTION OF FIRE PROTECTION This zone is completely cut off by masonry partitions. I " fire hose and hand extinguisher in zone. p, g DISCUSSION The Fire Load in this zone is low. This zone is acceptable without modification, k* FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS ARKANSAS NUCLEAR OfiE PAGC' UtilT 2 II-220
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0CAN108203, Forwards Addl Info Re Safe Shutdown Capability,In Response to NRC 820903 Request

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0CAN108203, Forwards Addl Info Re Safe Shutdown Capability,In Response to NRC 820903 Request

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