ML20006E355

Responds to NRC 900103 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-482/89-30.Corrective Actions:Communications Flow Process Between Facilities & Locations of Operations Status Boards Will Be Reviewed to Identify Needed Improvements

ML20006E355
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	02/07/1990
From:	Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
WM-90-0021, WM-90-21, NUDOCS 9002220736
Download: ML20006E355 (4)

Text

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3 M.. l Wt$LF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION -

1 nort D. WNhses u p es n w r omwe e n w February.7, 1990 lE WM 90-0021' 1

l' ' U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-ATTNs. Document Control Desk Mail Station F1-137 -,

Washington, D.' C. 20555 -

Reference:

1' Letter dated January 3, 1990 from S.-J. Collins,' NRC,

-to B. D. Withers, WCNOC  ;

Subject:

Docket.No. 50-482: Response to NRC Inspection Report j 482/8930 .

Gentlemen: ,

1 Attached is Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOC) response to ,

exercise ' weaknesses 482/8930-01 and 8930-02 ~ and open item 482/89-03.

s Exercise = weakness ~.482/8930-01 involved the fallure- of the emergency. 1

-operations. facility staff .to be aware of significant reactor conditions.

LExercise' weakness 482/8930-02 involved-' inadequacies associated with the [

exercise. scenario. . Open. Item 482/8930 involved tho' reliability of:

telephone communications during an emergency. t If you-have any questions concerning this' matter, please contact me or Mr.. .

H. K. Chernoff of my staff.

Very truly yours, P

s' n Bart D. Withers-l~ President and l Ch!.ef Executive Officer i l1 .BDW/aem  !

K i

Attachment:

L.; cc: E. J.-Holler (NRC), w/a s R -D. Martin (NRC), w/a L D. V. Pickett (NRC), w/a

l. H. E. Skow (NRC), w/a  !

9002220736 900207 /

i PDR ADOCK 05000482 I L- O PDC l' '

P.O. Box 411/ Burimglon, KS 66839 / Phosie;(316) 364 8831  ;

An EqualC,J w ;Ernployer t MFtHerVET

+

T Attachment to WH 90 0021

, Page 1 of 3 4

Exercise Weakness (482/8930-01): The failure of the EOF staff to be aware of sinnificant reactor conditions Resnonset The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff was unaware of significant reactor conditions due to incomplete plant information from the Control Room Simulator. Procedures EPP 01-1.1 'WCOS Organisation' and EPP 01-1.2

• Baergency Cperations Facility Baergency Organisation' requires the Operations Status Board Recorders (OSRs) in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and EOF to update the Operations Status Boards from the Emergency Response Facility Infermation System (ERFIS). If the ERFIS is not functioning, the preferred method of transmitting plant information is by the Operations Assessment Coordinator (OAC) via tolerihone to the OSRs. For this exercise, the scenario directed that the ERFIS be out of service. EPP 01-11.2- ' Status Boards' requires-the OAC provide updated plant information to the OSRs at intervals of no more than 15 minutes. The plant information is then posted on the Operations Status Boards in the TSC and EOF. During the exercise, various critical plant parameters were not relayed to the OSRs by the~ 0AC.

This failure to provide these parameters resulted in the EOF staff not recognizing that the core becsme uncovered and the hydrogen levels were increasing.

WCNOC will review the communications flow process between facilities and the locations of the Operations Status Boards to icentify needed improvements.

As part of Emergency Plan Training, WCNOC will emphasize to OAC and OSR

. personnel the process for updating and maintaining the Operations Statut Boards. . Additionally, the Engineering Team will be given training on analysing and trending of critical plant parameters.

These corrective measures will be implemented before the 1990 Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Exercise Weakness (482/8930-02): Inadecuacies eggyciated with the exercise-scenario

Response

WCNOC has reviewed the examples of scenario inadequacien identified in the Peference. This review determined that the lack of specific details and

-insufficient control of the scenario by the controllers led to these inadequacies.

Attachment to WM 90 0021

, Page 2 of 3 WCNOC will assign additional Maintenance and Operations personnel to the t Scenario Development Committee. This will allow greater input for review and development of scenario details. A detailed timeline will be developed for use by the simulator staff to allow them to quickly exert more control over the Control Room Simulator crew. In addition, more simulator time will be scheduled during the scenario development stage to better estimate player actions during the exercise. The controller briefings will be moro detailed to ensure controllers are aware of their responsibilities. Management perconnel have been assigned to the Scenario Development Committee to provide support to the activities needed to build a good scenario.

These corrective measures will be implemented before the 1990 Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Open Item (482/8930-03): Reliability of telechone communications durine an emergency Responset Evaluation of Observations by the NRC and VCNOC During the exercise several telaphones were observed to ring simultaneously at intermittent times starting at approximately 1005 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.824025e-4 months <br /> and lasting for two or three minut es . The affected telephones were eight of the direct outside lines, the ringdown lines to Wichita (to the WOEC), and to Topeka (to the PIO and telecopier), for a total of eleven lines.

The ENS, HPN, verification phone, and the twenty-nine telephone numbers through the Wolf Creek System continued working. All necessary communications by telephone could still be maintained to all facilities and locations. Backup radio communications to the State of Kansas and Coffey County remained available.

The problem lasted a very short amount of time and therefore there was no adverse impact on the exercise. If the problem would have continued the impact would have been miniumi since other telephones were available.

Another telephone problem identified during the exercise occurred at the State Forward Staging Area. One of the two installed lines was not working properly. The Kansas Highway Patrol and National Guard were able to share the remaining telephone line and each had radio communications.

[ Description of similar Problems The only similar problem occurred during a drill on October 26, 1984.

During this drill all telephones through the Wolf Creek System were inoperable for two to three hours. The few direct outside lines present at that time were not affected. Radio communications were operable and utilized by the State.

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+ AttCcheeent to W 90 0021 ,

Fage 3 of 3 l I

This problem occurred when a telephone company work crew cut through the  ;

cable for the Wolf Creek System. The cable was repaired in approximately ,

two hours. l Descrintion of the Cause  !

United Telephone System (UTS) was contacted concerning the telephcne problem during the drill. UTS had installed a new buried cable from the south side i of New Strawn, along Highway 75 to north of the Sharpe Road intersection.

On the morning of December 6, 1989 two UTS technicians were assigned to i splice the new cable to the existing cable that supplies the EOF telephone ,

service. The temporary loss of telephone service and ringing was caused by  ;

the UTS technicians splicing the new cable to the existing cable.

The cause of the State Forward Staging Area problem was a faulty telephone jack, j DescriDtion of Additioaal Testina or Remedial Action I The telephone cable that supplies the EOF emergency plan circuits is located in the Burlington central office where six of the emergency plan telephone  !

numbers are assigned to one line finder group which is made up of one hundred telephone numbers. WCNOC had six emergency plan telephone numbers l in the group along with ninety-four private telephone numbers. A maximum of  !

twelve telephone calls can be made from this one line finder group at any given time, and the remaining attempted calls from the eighty-eight

• telephone numbers would not be processed until one of the twelve line {

finders is disconnected. UTS has relocated our emergency plan telephone ,

numbers and placed them in different line finder groups. This will reduce

• the chance of overloading any line finder group.

l In addition WCNOC will investigate the possibility of placing each emergency plan telephone circuit on its own dedicated telephone cable pair to further l reduce the possibility of losing all emergency plan telephones at the same time.

UTS is scheduled to install a new digital telephone system for Burlington in 1991. This should increase the number of line finder groups available and will decrease the time it currently takes to put a call through. These items will enhance our telephone communications system.  ;

At the State Forward Staging Area a new telephone jack has been installed and tested. Both telephone lines will be tested on a quarterly basis for '

outgoing and incoming calls.

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