ML17347A730
| ML17347A730 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1988 |
| From: | Conway W FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| L-88-180, NUDOCS 8804270172 | |
| Download: ML17347A730 (69) | |
Text
REGULA'I Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM (BIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 8804270172 DOC. DATE: 88/04/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-250 Tur keg Point Plant Unit 3 Florida Power and Light C 05000250 50-251 Turkey Point P lant'nit 4i Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CONWAYi W. F. Florida Power ~c Light Co.
RECIP. NAME RECIP IENT AFFILIATION GRACEi J. N. Region 2> Ofc of the Director
SUBJECT:
Forwards summar g of Mgt-on-shift repts including initial repts of shift supervisors'er 871019 order.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE36D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Immediate/Conf irmatorg Action Ltr (50 Dkt-Other Than Emergency Prepa-NOTES'EC IP IENT COP IES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA 1 0 PD2-2 PD 1 EDISON, G 1 1 INTERNAL: NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 REG F I LE 02 RES/DE/EIB RGN2 'FILE 01 RGN2/DRSS/EPRPB 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDP.
Nuj4 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 11 ENCL 10
h P. X 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 33408 0420 ppgj! g << 1988 L-88-180 Dr. J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator, Region U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission II 101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 Mana ement-on-Shift Weekl Re ort
Dear Dr. Grace:
Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory, Commission Order dated October 19, 1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.
Also included with this report are the initial reports of the shift supervisors. These reports are designed to parallel the current MOS program using the in place shift management.
Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.
Very truly yours, cting Group Vice President Nuclear Energy Department WFC/SDF/gp Attachment CC: J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, USNRC Dr. G. E. Edison, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant R. E. Talion, President, FPL 88P4 7 Q i 7r 8O gQ4i3
+OO>5P PDR *DOCH, PDR R an FPL Group company
MANA EMENT ON SHIFT ( OS)
WEEK STARTING: o4io4<ss WEEKLY
SUMMARY
REPORT PAGE i OF Five MOS Observers were on shift; Neil Roos, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Quality Control Supervisor (04/04-10/88, days), Andrew P.
Drake, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (04/04-11/88, evenings),
Daryle L. Osborn, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Configuration Manager (04/04-05/88, evenings), J. M. Mowbray,,Turkey Point Nuclear Plant JPE Lead Mechanical Engineer (04/05-10/88, evenings) and Steven T. Hale, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Site Project Engineering Supervisor (04/10-11/88, evenings).
During the period, Unit 3 returned to 1004 power on April 4 and operated at that level for the remainder of the week. Unit 4 started and ended the reporting Period at 1004 power, but was shutdown and operated at lower powers between April 6 and 9 as the result of leakage in the Turbine Control Oil System.
No immediate safety problems were identified during the reporting period. One questionable work practice was identified associated with a lack of procedural'ontrol or PWO guidance associated with replacement of the Source and Intermediate Range BFD/NBFD relays. The lack of specifying proper clearance could have resulted in an inadvertent plant trip when replacing a relay on one train.
During the reporting period the MOS Observers noted thirty-five recommendations or areas of improvements. These comments and suggestions included:
Four comments were made concerning the manner in which various plant personnel were performing their duties including the activities of a Health Physics Technician, operator response times to Reactor Auxiliary Building panel alarms and the absence of a Nuclear Operator whose presence was required during Intake Cooling Water (ICW) strainer backwashing.
the ICW strainer backwashing incident above, a I'egarding procedural step required the operator to be in radio contact with the Control Room and in the vicinity of the equipment during the 'evolution and the operator failed to comply. This item was of significant concern to FPL and's a result the operator involved has been counseled regarding his error and this information will be passed on to the operating crews to ensure that they are aware of the importance of procedural compliance.
The Resident Inspector will be briefed on these corrective actions.
ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS
MAN GEMENT ON SHIFT OS)
WEEK STARTING: 04/04/88 WEEKLY SVMMARY REPORT PAGE 2 OF Seven comments were made concerning plant" administrative items such as notifications after plant trips, proper security lighting under trailers, proper acceptance criteria for 100% power calorimetrics and proper computer monitoring of the status of the PWO system.
Nine comments were made concerning procedural items associated with replacing nuclear instrumentation relays, alarm responses for Post Accident Monitoring System heat tracing, independent valve alignment verification methods and a conflict between Interim Technical Specifications and off-normal procedures for Rod Position Indication.
Ten comments were made concerning equipment-related items such as the condition of the 3B Condensate Pump expansion joint, priority for cleaning an ICW strainer, spurious Fire Detection alarms and a couple of secondary plant steam leaks.
Five miscellaneous items were identified such as housekeeping near the Unit 4 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers, a vacuum pump hanging from a conduit, the need for a written guideline for a fire watch briefing and removal of- all Construction QC tags associated with the Unit 4 Post Accident Monitoring System.
During the reporting period, a Plant Supervisors-Nuclear, Management-on-Shift reporting program was initiated. The program reports have three sections identifying questionable work practices, areas for improvement and good practices/professionalism observations.
The PSN's identified four questionable work practices such as the excessive time the Raw Water Pumps are out-of-service, security force responses to spurious alarms from Control Room doors and two instances of improper security of ladders near safety-related equipment.
Additionally, the PSN s identified fifteen areas for improvement.
The suggestions included:
ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS
MANAEMENT ON SHlFT NOS}
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
REPORT WEEK STARTlNG:
PAGE ~ QF 88 Six comments associated with equipment such as length o f time the Laundry and Waste monitor Pumps are out-of-service, steam leak on the Moisture Separator supply valve and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump mechanical overspeed limit switch.
Four comments associated with work control items such as priorities for X&C technician work, ensuring adequate inventory of important items in stores and use of laborers for the Xntake Cooling Water Valve watch were made.
Five miscellaneous comments associated with items such as Main Steam Xsolation Valve position during turbine rolldown, door locks in the Condensate Polisher Building and procedures associated with Rod Position Xndication alignment were presented.
The items associated with PSN-MOS are being handled and tracked in the same manner as other MOS items.
ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS
Page 0-ADM-019 Ma agementon Shift(MOS)
,MOS DAI1.Y REPORT 0: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/04 88 From: N. Roos Shift: Qx Day (M bseruer) Q Night Plant evolutions observed Routine power operations, Unit 4 Down power evolution, Urit 3 Shift turnover Shift briefing B. Immediate safety problems None C. Ouestionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement None E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments None Recommendations None Completed By: Date:
hf bserver
/'p Reviewed By:
Operations uperi ntendent- Nuclear D.~: ~ < /
Management Review By: C /0J gal Date P D e VP D /e 04/04/88 J Ll I W I ill a7'M
0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/04-05/88 From: Dar ie Osborn Shift: . Q Day (M bseruer) Qx Night Plant evolutions observed Unit 3, 70% to 100% power Unit 4, 100% power - Steady State Shift turnover meeting Operations support training Toured secondary side B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement No comment Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments No comment F. Recommendations No comment Completed By: Date:
bseruer Reviewed By: J c'. Date:
/
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By:
M ae te ate 04/04-05/88
0-A DM-019 Ma gement On Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT 0: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/04-05/88 From: Andrew P. Drake Shift: g Day (M seruer Qx Night A. Plant evolutions observed Unit 3 power increase from 750'o to 100O/o 3-OSP-75.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train I Operability Test 3-OSP-75.2, Auxiliary Feedwater Train II Operability Test 3-OSP-59.5 Section 7.1, Power Range Checks 3-OSP-49.1 Sections 3.1 and 7.2, Reactor Protection System Logic Test 3-ONOP-59.5, Source Range Malfunction Unit 4, 100% power 4-OSP-75.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train I Operability Test 4-OSP-75.2, Auxiliary Feedwater Train II Operability Test 4-OSP-59.5 Section 7.1, Power Range Checks Tour Turbine Building B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None
nug>>
0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT D. Area(s) for improvement While I 6 C technicians were performing maintenance procedure MP-0732 to replace relay 3-SRB-1-B per P WO ¹7231, additional relays were actuated. Conversations with Control Room personnel determined that when certain wires were removed from the relay and separated, both source range detectors on Unit 3 re-energized and pegged out high then de-energized. This action can cause severe damage to these detectors.
The operators pulled the fuses on the two source range drawers to prev'ent reoccurrence. Maintenance procedure MP-0732 should be revised so that both source range channels are de-energized with fuses pulled prior to working on 3-SRB-2-B, 3-SRB-I-B, 4-SRB-l-B, 4-SR-2-B or the same relays on the A Train.
- 2. While observing operators performing Section 7 of 3-OSP-049.1, Reactor Protection System Logic Test, a confusing sequence of steps was noted.
Step 7.1.31 has the operator depress and hold the auto shunt test panel B shunt block pushbutton, Steps 7.1.32 thru 7.1.35 must also be performed while holding this button, However this is not evident since each step is numbered separately. Steps 7.1.32 thru 7.1.35 should be made substeps of 7.1.31 to clarify this requirement. 4-OSP-049.1 has this same sequence and should also be revised.
Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments
- l. All operations were performed in a safe, professional manner.
- 2. Peak shift I 6 C Supervisor did an excellent job instructing two recently employed I 6 C technicians in performing the change of the 3-SRB-1-B relay per maintenance procedure MP-0732. He anticipated the need for instruction since they were new to the job. He was very knowledgeable with the relay arrangement.
Recommendations See items in section D.
Completed By: Andrew P. Drake Date: 04/04-05/88 6seruer Reviewea Sy: ( perat>ons upenntendent- Nuclear Date: 5 JV Management Review By:
ae te ate
5 0
D 8 ating PSN d~ PSN MOS PSN Date Finished Completed PSN Jones Initiating APSN APSN Completed APSN A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken Midnight shift
- l. Why has one Laundry Pump been out-of-service for one year?
- 2. Why has one Waste Monitor Tank Pump been out-of-service for one year?
3, Why doesn't stores have Whitey valves (those valves needed for Nitrogen Backup System)? Why don't we have at least one Boric Acid Transfer Pump in stores?
Why don't we have a new Waste Gas Compressor in stores? Why doesn't stores have flow indicators for Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers? Maybe we should do a complete audit of stores and supplies to see if they have what we request them to maintain.
C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Midnight shift Dave Taylor spoke at shift meeting about the DAM Monitoring System. He showed operators valve location and new requirements for isolating. Operators appreciate this information upfront. Operators performed several evolutions in their usual professional manner.
Reviewed By Actions Completed Date
Page 0-ADM-019 agement on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/05/88 From: N. Roos Shift: Qx Day (M 6server) p Night Plant evolutions observed Routine power operations, Units 3 and 4 Shift turnover Shift briefing Reactor Protection Logic Test - partial Control Room response to fire at elevator B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement None Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments None F. Recommendations None Completed By: N. Roos Date: 04/04/88 M 6server
~
Reviewed By: ~
Date:
perations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By:~
PM Il -VP Date D o4/o4/ss
0-A DM-019 Mdgement on Shift (MOS) ~ Peg>>
MOS DAILYREI'ORT 0: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: o4/os-o6/ss From: Andrew P. Drake Shift: Q Day (M server) Qx Night Plant evolutions observed
. Unit 3, 100% power Unit 4, 1009'o power Peak shift
-3rd RCO performed O-OSP-023.1, operability test on "B" Emergency Diesel.
-Turbine Operator, local operations at "B" Emergency Diesel in support of operability test
-End of shift briefing
-Site evacuation alarm test
-O-OSP-200.3 section 7.3, Seal Oil Backup Test o Mid shif
-Shift briefing
-Normal logs/operations
-Toured Radiation Control Area/Reactor Auxiliary Building B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement
- l. Unit- 3 Miscellaneous Relay Rack R-46 (3-QR-46) has an outstanding PWO on the broken door lock since 5/Zs/85, almost 3 years. No record could be found in the computer. A new PWO was initiated by the mid-shift
- PSN (WA880970255). This is supposed to be a locked relay cabinet.
The lock should be replaced. PWO should not take 3 years to correct.
- 2. Attachment Z of O-OSP-OZ3.1 Operability Test of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator is a local data log sheet. One item to be recorded is the Radiator Inlet Temperature using Tl-444B. TI-444B was tagged out-of-service and a PWO iIiWA880712026 written on 3/Il/88 with a "B5n priority (within 14 days). Instead a contact pyrometer had to be used to record this data.
Since the procedure does not state a contact pyrometer can be used in place of TI-444B, an on-the-spot change (OTSC) should have been made. However TI-444B should have been repaired by 3/25/88. Remind operators that even changes in monitoring instruments need to be covered by OTSC before proceeding with the procedure.
e NOci t nJ olioTlee
0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS) Puge MOS DAILYREPORT E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments
~~ ~
Peak and mid shift operations were performed in a professional and safe manner.
- 2. Peak shift 3rd RCO and Turbine Local Operator communicated very well during the Operability Test on the "B" Emergency Diesel.
- 3. 'id shift briefing was extremely informative. Since the shift was coming back from a few days off, the FSN reviewed the last couple days of operations and read the night orders'to the shift.
4, While touring the Reactor Auxiliary Building, I observed the local HP Technician reading a paperback book. I reported this to the mid shift PSN who stated he would check into it on his tour.
Recommendations There seems to be a recurring problem with PWO's.. A PWO can be written and the green PWO tag hung, but the actual PWO information never entered into the computer system. Therefore a problem looks like it has been identified but in actuality will not be worked on. A possible solution may be 'o assign, a licensed operator as the GEMS coordinator/planner for operations on the day shift. This person would be responsible for entering, tracking, and expediting operation PWO's including those written on the mid and peak shifts. The mid and peak shift operators would .be responsible for entering PWO's. on critical items/equipment but could turn over the other items to the GEMS coordinator/planner. At present the work load on the NWE, APSN, and RSN does not allow them to sit at the computer for a couple hours each shift entering and authorizing PWO's, therefore non-critical ones are left out and in time forgotten or lost.
Completed By: Andrew F. Drake Date 04/05-06/88 server
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Reviewed By:
(
IAr~ Date: r erations Superintendent- Nuclear l
Management Review By:
ate ate VP Il'4/O5 O6/88
@Mls I lllhYe'M
0 0-ADM-0)9 Ma gement on Shift (MOS) Page MOS DAILYREPORT 0: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date:
From: J. M. Mowbra Shift: g Day (M seruer) Qx Night Plant evolutions observed Routine Control Room operations
. Feak end-of-shift meeting Peak to midnight shift turnover 3-FMI-28.3, Rod Fosition Indication Hot Calibration, baseline data collection - partial O-OSP-023.1, "B" Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test - partial Tour of Turbine Building, partial tour of Auxiliary Building B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement The 4B Condensate Polisher Vessel is currently indicated as out-of-service on the control panel by a large red duct tape "X". This appears to be a less than desirable method of tagging. This issue previously identified and closed as MOS item ¹88-0492.
- 2. Folyflow tubing is currently used to supply air through hand loaders to the Turbine Plant Cooling Water Intake Cooling Water Strainer Inlet Valves under Temporary System Alteration 4-86-73-63. The tubing is tie-wrapped in overhead locations within the Turbine Building but is laid loose and unprotected under and around the Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchangers. Overhead routing in this area would both clear walkways and protect the tubing.
Note: The Temporary System Alteration tag at valve 4-POV-314 is damaged and illegible.
- 3. Valve 4-30-791, 4A Reheater Drain Tank PE-5120 Bypass Outlet Stop Valve, was observed to have a packing 'leak. PWO 306922 was initiated with the Nuclear Witch Engineer.
- 4. Valve 4-30 2102, Drain Valve for 4A Moisture Separator Reheater Drain to Condenser, was observed to have a packing leak. PWO 306923 was generated.
- 5. Relief valve RV-3-1409, Desuperheater Steam Supply Relief Valve, was observed to be leaking through. FWO 306924 was generated.
- 6. Operability testing of the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator was impacted by two existing FWO's; FWO WA880712026 initiated 3/11/88 on TI-444B and PWO 311621 initiated 2/09/88 on TI-442B. Both PWO's had priorities requiring action prior to this test. A hand held instrument was substituted for the test readings. Both FWO's are related to calibration.
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l)ate Started PSN MOS Date Finished iating PSN
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Schimkus PSN brogan Completed PSN Anderson Initiating APSNMurphy APSN Singer Completed APSN Reese A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations.
None B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken None C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Mike Mowbray,(MOS) assisted PSN with a concern over rattling inside 3B Main Steam Line Safety RV-1407 - Appears jacking screw loose. He will assign an engineer to ttouge sh oot on day shift.
/If
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Reviewed B MJ 2/J Date 4E Actions Completed Date
4 Page 0-A DM-019 nagement on Shift (M OS) /=la'o:
MOS DAII.YREPORT
'pe'rations Superintendent-Nuclear Date:
From: N. Roos Shift: Qx Day t'M bserver) p Night Plant evolutions observed Routine power operation, Units 3 and 4 Shift turnover
'Shift briefing Emergency Diesel periodic. test B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None Area(s) for improvement None Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Observed several operators and training personnel in the Control Room conducting re-qualification walk-throughs; as many as ten at one time during the shift. With these people included, approximately 18 operator/training personnel were in the operator area.
Proper scheduling of activities could help to reduce the effects of these training activities.
Recommendations See E Completed By: N. Roos 'ate:
M bserver Reviewed By: Date: ~ ~5 Operations Superintendent- Nuclear /
Management s ~gV Pl~/
Review By: 1 PM- Dae V Date 0 Ml)8 I i>I ilr M 04/06/88
0-ADM-01 9 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYRE IMPORT 0: Opera tions Superintendent - Nuclear Date. 04 06-07 88 From: Andrew P. Drake Shift: Q Day (M bseruer) Qx Night A. Plant evolutions observed Unit 3, 100ob power
-Normal operation/logs Unit 4, Shutdown from 100'>b to 0",b
-Power decrease to 40% for Turbine Valve Test
-Power reduction to 0'b due to increase leakage on guarded oil system GOP-103 power operation to Hot Standby Mid shift brief Peak shift ending brief Tour Reactor Auxiliary Building B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement Observed an alarm condition on the Unit 3 Post Accident Monitoring Heat Tracing Panel in the Reactor Auxiliary Building. The Nuclear
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Operators (NO's) in the Reactor Auxiliary Building were not sure what this alarm meant and gave a confusing explanation. Neither NO seemed to understand what the alarm meant and did not seem concerned with it. The operating procedure, OP-2500.2, Post Accident Sampling System Heat Tracing Operation, gives no assistance in diagnosing these alarms.
The NO's need additional training on this system and an off normal procedure'eeds to be written to cover alarm conditions and actions to be taken.
- 2. I have noticed on my last trip here and recently a weakness in the area of notification of plant events on some shifts. Training might consider running some senarios for the shifts to exercise the notification procedures.
Puge 0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments The mid shift crew responded very well to the increased leakage on the
¹3 Turbine Control Valve control oil line. The PSN and APSN responded quickly to have the spilled oil contained and cleaned up. A Fire Watch was established where oil had soaked the insulation on hot piping.
'otifications were made in accordance with AP-0103.43, Duty Call Responsibilities.
- z. Mid shift RCO's provided excellent instructions to the operators in training during the power reduction for the Unit 4 Turbine Valve test and subsequent shutdown. They monitored the students closely and asked informative questions prior to authorizing manipulations on the board.
Recommendations See items I and 2 in section D.
Andrew P. Drake Date: 04/06-07/88 Completed By:
M server Reviewed By: Date:
Operations uperintendent- Nuclear Management Review By: i r//~/
'i PM- ae e Zl ate 04/06-07/88 e eel li ~~ ~ .~ ~ ~ ~
0-A DM-019 . M agement on Shift (MOS) Vsg>>
M OS DA I LY RE I'0 RT of Opera t ions Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/06-07/88 From: J: M. Mowbra Shift: g Day (M bserver) Qx Night Plant evolutions observed
. Routine Control Room operation Shutdown of Unit 4, 4-GOP-103, Power Operation to Hot Shutdown, to Mode 2 Shutdown of miscellaneous equipment associated with the Unit 4 shutdown, various procedures Tour of Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building and Intake Peak shift end-of-shift meeting, turnover to midnight shift, midnight shift start-of-shift briefing B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None Area(s) for improvement A crack was observed in a fillet weld to the sockolet upstream of valve 3-30-507, isolation for PX-1461 in the 5A Feedwater Heater drain. This condition was originally discussed in the time frame of the Unit 4A Condensate line support repair. Insulation was already removed but no PWO tag was hung. PWO306925 was originated.
- 2. A packing leak was observed in valve SGB-3-098, Blowdown Tank Level Controller, 6265B, high pressure side isolation. PWO 306926 orginated.
- 3. Fire detection panel 4C284 for fire zones 72 and 74 Emergency Diesel Generators, was observed to spuriously alarm 4 times in a 5 minute period as well as numerous other times over both shifts. Each alarm was a flow alarm. The Turbine Operator is required to reset the trouble alarm and walkdown the area to confirm no discharge. Two PWO's are hung on the panel, PWO 315907 initiated 11/28/87 and PWO 312331 initiated 3/12/88. The TO on the peak shift reported that an initial attempt to repair the panel had not been successful and that he was not aware of any other actions. Each alarm is time consuming for the Turbine Operator to respond to. A higher priority for the PWO's or a review of the cause of the alarms would appear to be appropriate.
Page 0-A DM-019 ,1nage ment on Shift (M OS)
M OS I)A I LY RE PORT D Continued A continuous firewatch is currently assigned to Pire Zones 88 6 89, Unit 3 Blowdown area, by NCR-C-088-88. When approached the firewatch indicated the assignment based on an assignment sheet from the Firewatch Supervisor and an excerpt from the NCR. When questioned as to the specific duties involved, the firewatch generally indicated some blowdown piping as the concern. The NCR addressed conduit related to the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Further discussion with the Firewatch Supervisor indicated that a typical firewatch assignment included a review of the PSN request sheet, the firewatch log form, any special requirements and escort of each firewatch to the assigned post; however, no written guidelines are utilized to insure that each firewatch is specifically briefed.
Based on the Supervisor's input, the situation in the Blowdown area appears to be a unique condition. However, a written guideline for the briefing and some confirmation that the firewatch understands the specific requirements of a post could eliminate similar situations.
- 5. During walkdown of the Auxiliary Building Pan Room, an unidentified vacuum pump and control box was found chained with a substantial chain and padlock to a conduit feeding SV-4-2912, Containment Isolation Valve for the Containment Atmosphere Monitors Rll 6 12. The attachment of this unanalyzed equipment to safety related equipment could result in unacceptable interaction. in a seismic event. The APSN took immediate action to attempt to locate the responsible department for removal of the equipment. No one had been identified at the end of the shift. In general, it is not an acceptable practice to attach temporary equipment to permanent plant equipment without specific procedural guidance.
lt would appear that the responsible work group requires a briefing in order to identify these concerns for application fn their daily work.
aitob:i I'cwlle7
0-ADM-019 anagement on Shift (MOS) Page MOS DAILYREPORT E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Conduct of the Control Room staff, the shift briefings and other plant departments were well organized and professional in addressing the Unit 4 shutdown and subsequent efforts to begin repair of the oil system, Specific response from Mechanical Maintenance in investigation of the leak and control/cleanup of the spill showed excellent support by the operating staff.
Interaction of the shift Reactor Operators and the on-shift trainees during shutdown of Unit 4 is also worthy of specific notice. The shift operators addressed not only the specifics of the shutdown in progress but also included a great deal of practical background to assist the trainees.
Recommendations The Unit 4 High Pressure Turbine leak appeared unchanged when observed prior to Unit 4 shutdown. Examination after shutdown indicated steam cutting adjacent to the cylinder heating tap. I recommend that a permanenet type repair be completed prior to Unit 4 restart based on severity of the leak and the pressure/temperature of the steam involved.
- 2. Information. furnished by the Power Plant Engineering Site Office indicated that a rattling noise in a Unit 3 Main Steam Safety Valve was acceptable and did not impact operation of the valve based on a telecon with the vendor, Dresser Industries. A review of PC/M 86-136, which removed the lifting devices from these valves, and a subsequent walkdown confirmed all valves conform to the FC/M requirements. It appears that no further action is required.
Completed By:
server D I:~/
Reviewed By:
perations Superintendent- Nuclear Management eview By:
PM- D te 04/06-07/88 D F'INAI. PAGE eMllb I md oln)1qe r
1)ate Started 04/06/88 PSN MOS Date Finished Schimkus PSN Wogan Completed PSN Anderson I t g PSN Initiating APSN A PSN Singer Completed APSN Reese A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations Found an extension ladder not wired to an I-Beam directly over Auxiliary Feedwater Valve FCV-3-2817.
Appears it was being used by Electrical Department to test a fire detector for the Feedwater platform.
Had the ladder falleri it would have damaged air/nitrogen piping for FCV-3-2817. Actions taken were to notify Electrical Department to remove the ladder. Recommend PWO work package state to lash ladder down if needed.
B. Areas for ImprovementJRecommendations/Actions Taken Recommend Construction switch to a drilling technique when breaching the control building barriers for conduit runs, etc. The present air hammer method is too distracting.
Control Room door design seems -to be a continuing problem. Need to expedite design 0 change/evaluation.
The way Intake Cooling Water Temperatures look there is a good chance of requiring a 2201 valve watch on both units for the entire summer and Operations can only support this on overtime.
Recommend FPL laborers be used as valve watchers once trained in the duties. Also we need another shelter with air conditioner for the other Unit. The sun is taking its toll on the watch.
4, At 2300 Unit 4 Oil-Controlled 'Breakers opened following turbine trip which removed unit from line for maintenance on ¹3 Turbine Control Valve. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were shut at 2310 by RCO possibly due to low RCS average temperature. The MSIV's should have been maintained open when the Turbine rolled down to allow cooling of Turbine blading i.e less windage on blades. Operators are not trained on'this subject of the proper time for closure of MSIVs and why. Recommend re-qualification training for this subject.
C.. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Praises to the Electrical Department for prompt response and excellent timing of Reactor Trip Breakers during performance of Reactor Protection Test on 4/5/88.
- 2. Observed an excellent well-coordinated shutdown of Unit 4 by all operators. Had no significant event or loss of control at any point. Peak shift did an excellent job analyzing the control valve problem and bringing the unit to Mode 2. This made mid shifts workload an easy evolution.
- 3. APSN/RCOs/NTOs worked a steady fast pace to have Unit 4 Generator degassed and purged with carbon dioxide with all oil system clearances hung ahead of schedule - great work!.
4, Maintenance support has been outstanding during the past week. Good decision,was made concerning the Air Side Seal Oil Pump. Operators addressed concerns for performance of contingency actions during performance of Nuclear Instrumentation System calibration. This shows good Tech. Spec. awareness.
Reviewed By. ' ~::. '. ~ Date '- ~~ Actions Completed
Page 0-ADM-019 nagement on Shift (M OS)
MOS DAILYREPORT To: 'perations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/07/88 From: N. Roos Shift: Qx Day M bserver) Night Plant evolutions observed Routine power operation, Unit 3 Shift turnover Shift briefing B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices 0 None D. Area(s) for improvement None Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments None t:~
Recommendations None Completed By: D bserver Reviewed By:
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By: C N
D e VP DWe vp'ate 04/07/88
0-A DM-019 M agement on Shift (MOS) Vega':
MOS DAILYREI7ORT Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 04 07-08/88 From: Andrew P. Drake Shift: Q Day
( bseruer Qx Night Plant evolutions observed
. Unit 3, 100% power
-Normal operations and logs Unit 4, Critical at near zero power, increase to 1.5-2% power
-Normal operations and logs
-Secondary system warmups and system checks B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement
- 1. Further clarification of the individual who can perform Independent Verification (IV) of steps performed by "trainees in the presence of a qualified operator", is needed. Example: A trainee performs a procedure in the presence of a qualified operator. Seve'ral steps in the procedure must be IV. Can the qualified operator who watched the trainee perform the steps also perform the IV? The shift info book (night order) Item 82 on I/25/88, page 32 (see attached) attempts to address this, however as it is written it can be interpreted both ways. The administrative procedure, O-ADM-031, Independent Verification, does not address this situation. Different shifts are interpreting the shift info book entry both ways.
- a. Clarify the intent of the shift info book entry so that all shifts perform the proper IV procedure.
- b. Revise 0-ADM-031 to specifically address the use of trainees to perform steps requiring IV, and how/who may perform the IV.
The operators should not have to rely on the shift info book for operating guidance of this importance.
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0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOB DAlLYREPORT B. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Items I and 2 in sectiori E of previous days report (4/06-07/88) should refer to ~ak shift crew instead on mid shift crew.
Recommendations See section D Completed By Andrew P. Drake Date O4/O7-OS/SS I, bseruer s
Reviewed By rf; Date:
perations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By:
Page 0-A DM-019 M agement on Shift (M OS)
MOS DA1LY REI'ORT 0: Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 04/07-08/88 From: J. M. Mowbra Shift: p Day seruer) px Night A. Plant evolutions observed Routine Control Room operation Preparation to begin 4-GOF-301, Hot Shutdown to power operation End-of-shift, beginning-of-shift and turnover meetings for peak/midnight shifts Tour of 4160V Switchgear and 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) areas and Radiation Controlled area B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement A number of storage and double wide trailers in the RCA currently have temporary lighting installed for security requirements. Approximately mid-way through the shift all but one of these lights were found out-of-service. The Captain of the Guard was contacted with this information. He stated that these lights are found unplugged periodically and that he would take action to restore the lighting. The lighting was partially restored at the end of the shift. Two potential improvements apply in this area. Security personnel should be apprised of the necessity of the temporary lighting and should take appropriate action upon identification of a problem. The lighting itself including the power
=
connections should be tagged to indicate the purpose/requirement for the lighting to prevent future disruptions.
Ptlgl 0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT B. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Shift meetings and conduct of the operations staff were excellent given the major activities underway. Interface with all maintenance groups was thorough and informative and kept activities well coordinated throughout both shifts.
- 2. Housekeeping in the Switchgear and MCC areas was excellent.
- 3. Item ¹I in my report for the previous night, 04/06-07/88, included a typographical error. The last sentence in the item should have read, "Specific response from Mechanical Maintenance in investigation of the leak and control/cleanup of the spill showed excellent support of the operating staff".
- 4. A "lost" clearance tag was identified in one of the MCC's. The operations staff had already taken appropriate actions to lift the clearance with a "lost" tag. However, the peak shift staff made an additional effort to properly retrieve and dispose of the identified tag.
Recommendations I. The recent cleaning of the Unit 4 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger has allowed some debris to accumulate in that area (i.e., old hydrolaser hose, etc.). A general cleanup appears to be appropriate.
Completed By: Date:
M 6server
~/
Reviewed By; "Ild. r gg~ c(.
Operations uperi ntendent- Nuclear Management Review By:
MN ,ate VJ 1b 04/07-08/88
Date Started 04/07-88 PSN MOS Date Finished 04/08/88 I . ting PSN Schimkus pSN Anderson Com piet d PSN Schimkus 1nitiating APSN Murphy 'PSN Reese . Completed ApSN Murphy A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B. Areas for 1 m provementJRecommendations/Actions Taken Days - None Peaks-The Polishe: Buildings are now required to be locked. The lock can not be defeated while inside the building. (It takes a key to get out). I feel this is unsafe and may be against the fire code.
These doors need to be able to be locked on the outside but able to be opened from the inside without a key.
Mids-Proper utilization of manpower available, and a clear set of true priorities to start up Unit 4, could be of value to IGC on backshifts. On start of the mid-shift, IGC was asked to concentrate all efforts on repair of PT-406 (B-QSPDS) and FT-497 (4C Feed Flow transmitter), These are the only two items holding Unit 4 from returning to power.
Continued on page 2.....
C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Days-None Peaks-None Mids-Maintenance Foreman (Stowe) was exceptional in his support of Operations to allow Operators to warm up the secondary; draw vacuum and continue his work evolutions. At one point the welder refused to work on the east control valve guarded oil line welds due to moisture on deck plate and temperature in Turbine housing. Foreman immediately got air movers positioned to allow cooling and dryout of area. Welder was satisfied with this.
Reviewed B Date ~/ / Actions Completed Date
Page 0-ADM-019 anagement on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT Continuation Page Page ~ of ~ction B Date:
it: p ay P Night At 0100 I requested MOS to tour the work activity areas mentioned above. Once again in the IGC shop, we discussed the work activities needed with the IAC Supervisor. I had to change the IGC work priorities and request that two teams be utilized for Containment entrys.
Each team would stay on B Ouality Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) job until SCBA bottles were expended, then the second team would enter the Containment as relief to continue work. This cut down on the time lost for rest periods. It was noted that the final entry into Contaiment on peak shft was completed at 2330. The next entry was make at 0152. This is approximately a 2$ hour lag time. If IGC manpower can only allow six specialist on mid shift during an outage condition, then lower priority jobs should be dropped to allow critical path jobs full attention. I had to reprioritize usage of IGC manpower to expedite the job.
Recommendations:
- 1. Supply manpower needed to give full coverage on critical path jobs.
- 2. Touch base with Operations Maintenance Coordinator to set priorities.
server
0-ADM-019 h%agement on Shift (M OS) ~
M OS DAI I.Y RE PORT To Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 04/08 88 From: N. Roos Shift: Qx Day (M bserver) N~iht A. Plant evolutions observed Routine power operation, Unit 3 Placing Unit 4 on-the-line Shift turnover B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work problems None D. Area(s) for improvement None Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Ten consecutive hourly calometric power determinations were 100.1 to 100.3 percent power. No stated policy could be located. Reactor Supervisor. indicated it was acceptable. This should be reviewed by management to determine if it is consistant with plant policy.
Recommendations None Completed By: Date:
M bseroer
/
Reviewed By: Date: ~ /'
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management c,"j)
Review By; /.
PM-N ate VP Date VP Date 04/08/88
0 0-A DM-019 Management on Shift(MOS)
M OS DA I LY RE I'0 RT Opera t,ions Superintendent - Nuclear Date. 04/08-09/88 F
From: Andrew P. Drake Shift: Q Day (M bseruer) Qx Night f
A. Plant evolutions observed Peak Shift Unit 3, 100% power, normal operation and logs Unit 4, Power increase 40% to 55%
4-ONOP-OZ8, Reactor Control System Malfunction End of shift briefing Mid Shift Shift turnover, peak to mid Beginning of shift briefing Unit 3, 100% power, normal operation and logs Unit 4, power increase 55% to 80%
B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement While increasing power on Unit 4, the RCO determined that the bank demand step counters and Rod Position Indicators (RFI) for Bank D Control rods did not agree within the required plus or minus 12 steps. Off normal procedure 4-ONOP-028 section 5.1 was referenced and it states "a difference of greater than 12 steps between RPI and group demand counter is acceptable for power operations below 50% power". However Interim Technical Specifications (T/S) 3.1.3.1. RPI group height, which is applicable in Modes 1 and 2, states nail full length (shutdown and control) rods, shall be operable and positioned within plus or minus 12 steps (indicated position) of the reference osftion corresponding to the group demand counter position within one hour after rod motion." The reference osition is offered in Interim T/S as "..for control banks C and D; the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 30 steps withdrawn inclusive and between 150 and Z28 steps withdrawn inclusive. For the withdrawal range of 31 to 149 steps inclusive, the reference position shall be the individual rod calibration curve noting indicated analog rod position versus indicated group demand counter position."
When the RFI/step counter discrepency was first noted, the step counters for control bank D indicated 147 steps and RFI about 174 steps a 27 step deviation. The reactor was held at about 49% power. Per 4-ONOF-028 this would be acceptable since power was less than 50%. Interim T/S 3.1.3.1 however states in action "d", with one rod misaligned from its reference osition by 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 0-A 0 M-019 Management on Shift (MQS) Page MOS DAILYREPORT Since the step counter was at 147 steps, the operators need to use the individual rod calibration curve for the reference positon. However this curve does not yet exist. Instehd the operators used the step counters. Shortly thereafter the rods were moved to maintain the required flux difference in the core and ended up at 156 steps demand (step counter) position and 176 steps indicated. (Still greater than 12 step difference).
In order to show that rod position was within the plus or minus 12 step limit, a Reactor Engineer had to be called in from off site to perform a flux map. Then a PWO had to be written for IGC to adjust the RPI indicators to within plus or minus 12 steps, and an On The Spot Change (OTSC) implemented prior to increasing power above 50',0.
Plant management needs to address this situation in a timely manner, preferably before the next startup. If a change to interim T/S cannot be made, then a Reactor Engineer should be held on site during the entire startup and an active PWO implemented for RPI calibration to minimize the time delay.
1 This incident delayed a power increase for approximately four hours.
Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Peak shift crew responded well to Rod Position Indication problem. Operations personnel kept on top of the situation and requested assistance in a timely fashion. I 6 C and Reactor Engineering were quick to respond when requested to provide assistance.
Recommendations Identify a way to relieve the crew performing a startup from experiencing the RPI/Interim Tech. Spec. problem every time.
Completed By: Andrew P. Drake Date: 04/08-09/88 M server
)
Reviewed By: Date: ~l I I J Operations uperi ntendent- Nuclear Management Review By:
PM>
~' i /<I(AY ate ate VP 1l 04/08-09/88
- M(L1 I Illill'I'8
0-A DM-019 Management on Shift (M OS)
MOS DAILY, RE I'ORT aO: Opera t ions Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/08-09/88 From: J. M; Mowbra Shift: Day (I bseruerj Q
Qx Night A. Plant'volutions observed Routine Control Room operation 0 Power escalation on Unit 4 per 4-GOP-301, Hot Shutdown to Power Operation Shift and shift turnover meetings Tour of Radiation Control Area and Turbine Building B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work problems None D. Area(s) for improvement The dischage lines for the Unit 4 Post Accident Hydrogen Monitoring System in the Auxiliary Building Fan Room are currently tagged nQC Hold" with a handwritten notation that the material is on Temporary Release. A followup review of DR 642-87 has determined that it is closed with a specific directive to remove all hold tags. Tags n22 of 23" and n13 of 30" for this DR are still in place. Construction QC is required to remove the tags. Their procedure should include verification that all tags are removed from Temporarily Released material as well as material in stores.
0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MQS)
MOS DAILYREPORT E. Professionalism Summary of Shift, Comments During walkdown of the Auxiliary Building, the 3A Intake Cooling Water Strainer was found to be in full'flow backwash. The Nuclear Operator (NO) was not in the vicinity as required by procedure TP-430. Upon
'his return, it was also determined that he failed to comply with the requirement for continuous radio contact with the Control Room. When the NO was questioned as to why he dfd not stay in the area and in radio contact, the NO responded "you caught me". The incident was identified to the PSN who had a subsequent discussion with the NO.
Recommendations A lighting fixture immediately over the 'C'uxiliary Feedwater Pump is vibrating with the Main Steam lines. It appears that several of the screws mounting the fixture are missing. I suggest that an Electrical Department representative review the condition to determine if any action is required.
Completed By: J. M. Mowbra Date: 04/08 09/88 M 6server Reviewed By: Date: + I/
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By:
PM- Date ate 04/08-09/88
I)ate Started 04 08 88 PSN MOS Date Finished In ting I'N J PSN Anderson Completed PSN Schimkus Initiating APSN APSN Reese Completed APSN Murphy A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations Typically one of the two Raw Water Booster Pumps is out-of-service. The one out-of-service pump is usually not repaired until the running pump breaks. I have witnessed one of these pumps sitting broken for months at a time leaving only one in service. When both pumps are out-of-service, the service water to all 4 units must be supplied by the High Tower. We must dedicate out entire water treatment output to supply water to keep a level in the High Tower. Recommend ownership of these pumps be taken from Units I 6 2 Maintenance Department or have a requirement that if a pump breaks it must be repaired'immediately.
Continued....
H. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken
- l. Each- time we bring a unit up in power the Rod Position Indicators (RPI) end up greater than 12 steps out of alignment with their step counter below 500'0 power. As per ONOP-028 this is allowed. But as per ADM-021 this is not allowed. Therefore each time we bring a unit up ADM-021 will have to be waivered and OTSC'd. Recommend:
ADM-021 be changed to allow RPI's to be out of the 12 step band at less than 50o,b power.
I think this 'should be allowed since this procedure is not a lawful Tech. Spec. and we cannot live with it.
Continued...
C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed I
Day-The //4 Unit came on the line smoothly this morning. This was due to good communications between the operators.
Peak- The professional response of both the on-shift P.U.P. person and Reactor Engineering to the Rod Position Indication problem on Unit 4 was outstanding.
Mid- Operators reported numerous discrepencies on systems'peration as Unit 4 power was escalated. Various problems encountered were mitigated, allowing smooth
,entry to 100% power level.
Dat sly Actions Completed Date Reviewed B
Puge PSN MOS Continuation Page I'age Z of Section A l)ate: yf@$
- 2. On PSN midshift tour, found a step ladder balanced against conduit approximately one foot from Auxiliary Feedwater Train I Flow Indicators on Unit 3 Feedwater platform. The ladder was not lashed by any means. Requested Mechanical Maintenance remove ladder.
Recommended actions:
Add a section to the scaffolding procedure to address the proper use of ladders and precautions when using them.
- 3. Security Guards have been receiving multiple spurious Control Room door alarms on many doors in the Control Room. The guards have been coming in Control Room approximately every 15-30 minutes requesting the PSN key card number. When questioned why the PSN key card number is required, the reply is that he must be accountable for all persons in the Control Room when an alarm is received. I have observed some guards come in Control Room, get PSN card key number and leave without checking the zone which alarmed.
Actions taken:
Requested Security Supervisor (Captain) conference to discuss actions needed to ensure proper Control Room security. Requested incident report to find out why guards are using different techniques for verifying these alarms. Requested Security Supervisor to have conference with all guards and inform them of our procedure for alarms.
- M().'kl 04 Ouse
Page PSN MOS Continuation Page Page 2 of Section
~~ <
Date: 04 AB
- 2. 4B Steam Generator Feedwater Pump could not be started at 400 MWE due to oil being saturated with water. This is a re-occurring problem due to the design of the seal and its drain characteristics.
The seals stream water into the bearing housing at low loads and adjustment of drains and seal water is not clearly defined by procedure to give a workable technique to prevent future occurrence. A QIP team is presently researching the design and this problem.
On 4/8/88 the problem of oil-water mixture was identified by the Turbine Operator.
Maintenance was requested to change the oil. Unit 4 was restricted to 60% power for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during the oil change evolution.
Recommendations:
- 1. Modify seal drain characteristics.
2, Give better procedural guidance and training to operators on adjustment of seal water and drains for different load conditions.
- 3. Have a method to key Maintenance to observe the idle pumps oil reservoir condition prior to starting second Steam Generator Feedwater Pump, with adequate time to change oil, if necessary.
- 4. Initiate a PCM to install piping and a permanent Delaval oil/water separator in each room with taps to both Steam Generator Feedpumps'il reservoirs.
- 3. On PSN rnidshift tour found "A" Auxiliary Feedwater (AF W) Pump mechanical overspeed limit switch flipped behind roller plate. This is a reoccurring problem which has been addressed numerous times in past years since the trip and throttle valves were installed.
Actions taken; Requested STA to research all logic which this switch controls.
Also requested information into whether this could cause an operability problem with the A AFW Pump. Requested APSN have switch placed into proper position.
This causes the trip and throttle valve to be tripped closed during the process of resetting the switch roller. APSN requested STA to write a Technical Department field report. Placed PWO on problem (PWO ¹WA880409061715) .
Recommendations:
Perform PCM on modifying the switch or the roller plate.
4, Another area for improvement is ensure steam leaks are repaired during short outages rather than depend on Ferminite to take care of the problem when on-line. An example of this is the 4C Moisture Separator Reheater timing valve body-to-bonnet leak which was blowing hard prior to unit shutdown. Now the leak has propagated to a massive leak as it was not repaired during the outage.
Recommendations:
- 1. Schedule adequate manpower to cover jobs needed to be done.
- 2. Utilize construction labor if FPL plant maintenance manpower is not available.
- 3. Establish a tracking system for leaks to be fixed when unit comes down and make one group assume accountability.
- MOB.I IH I+ibe
0-ADM-019 IIOoagement on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAII.YREPORT To: Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 04 09 88 From: Shift: Day (I bseroer)
Qx 0 Night A. Plant evolutions observed Routine power operations, Units 3 and 4 Shift turnover Shift briefings Turbine Trip System Periodic Test B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement None Professionalism, summary of Shift, Comments None Recommendations None Completed By:
I N. Roos bserver Date. 04/09/88 Reviewed By: / )
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Dat- 4 <!
Management Review By:
P PM PD <-VP Date VP Date 04/09/88
- M<L> <<<I.<<1 <<<<
Page 0-A DM-019 M agement on Shift (MOS)
M OS DAILYRE IMPORT Opera t ions Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/09-10/88 From: Andrew P. Drake Shift: Q Day (M bser ver) Qx Night Plant evolutions observed
. Unit 3, 1000'o power Unit 4, 1009b power Normal operation and logs B. Immediate- safety problems None observed C. Questionable work practices None observed D. Area(s) for improvement The PWO system seems to have some serious deficiencies in it. PWO ¹880970255 was entered and approved on 4/6/88 to replace a 3 year old PWO that could not be found in the GEMS computer. Less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> later, Mechanical Maintenance reported that this PWO could not be found in GEMS and another PWO ¹WA880971446 was written in its place. The original PWO was entered and approved by the mid shift PSN on 4/6/88. A search thru the GEMS computer was futile.
A second case is Unit 4 Recorder R-4-1413 which had Il or 12 PWO's on it; all but one were removed earlier this week. A search thru GEMS indicated one active PWO, 2 PWO's "coded out" and one PWO with work completed. However 7 or 8 PWO's are still unaccounted for. The Unit 4 RCO's are re-writing the PWO's since the problems still exist on the recorder.
Numerous other incidents of "vanishing" PWO's exist. This situation is creating a high level of furstration for the Control Room and outside operators.
0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments
- 1. Jim Hendrickson in Reactor Engineering is to be commended for his outstanding attitude and professionalism during the peak shift. He had
. to be called in twice from off-site to perform flux maps due to Rod Position Indication problems on Unit 4.
Recommendations
- l. Modify the current PWO system so that PWO's cannot be removed without notifying the originator. This is not currently being done.
Completed By: w P, Drake Date: 04/09-10/88 M server
/
Reviewed By: i gJ ~/fQ Date: 4 Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By:
PPND'te 1)ate 04/09-10/SS
0-A DM-019 agement on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREIPORT 0: Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 04/09-10/88 From: J. M. Mowbra Shift: Q Day (M bseruer) Qx Night A. Plant evolutions observed Routine Control Room operation Flux map of Unit 4 Shift turnover Tour of condenser pits, Condensate Polishers and Radiation Control Area B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement I. A'eak was identified in the 3A North Inlet-Waterbox upper manway.
PWO 402256 was initiated.
- 2. Valve 3-30-224, ZB Feedwater Heater Tubeside Drain, was identified as leaking through. PWO 402257 was initiated.
- 3. Security lighting under the storage trailers immediately south of the Rad Waste Building was again identified as unlit at approximately 0230.
Following a discussion with the Captain of the Guard, all lighting was restored within ten minutes. The captain indicated he would followup to determine why Security patrols had failed to identify the problem.
See my report of 04/07-08/88 for previously identified concerns.
4, PWO 400636 was generated 4/01/88 to manually clean the 4A Intake Cooling Water Strainer due to high differential pressure (DP). The PWO is still unworked and strainer DP exceeds 3 psi (i.e. nearly pegged'high).
Given both the criticality and high visibility of this system, a higher priority seems to be appropriate.
0-A DM-019 Management on Shift (MOS) Pug MOS DAILYREPORT t'rofessionalism Summary of Shift, Comments Both IGC Maintenance and Reactor Engineering responded well in support of operations. Both of these groups and the Control Room staff responded promptly and properly to the Interim Tech. Spec. on Rod Position Indicators.
Recommendations The expansion joint on the 3B Condensate Pump is operating in a partially collapsed condition. Deterioration of the expansion joint outer jacket and some reinforcing material is already evident. Mechanical Maintenance should review the condition of this expansion joint with the manufacturer and plan appropriate action for the next outage.
Completed By: Date 04/09-10/88 Reviewed By: Date: 4 i/ J (
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By: l<IA4 P ate ate VP '7l 04/09-10/88
l)ate Started 04 09/88 PSN MOS Date Finished Anderson ln ting PSN Jones PSN Anderson Completed PSN Jones Initiating APSN Haley APSN Reese Completed APSN Murphy A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B. Areas for mprovement/Recommendations/Actions 1 Taken one C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Day shift- None Peak shift- Reactor Engineering was called out twice for flux mapping due to Rod Position Indication problems and responded in very good time with a very good attitude. These people are very- professional and anxious to help. Good job!
Reviewed By X tlf Date 4 / iv Actions Completed Date
Page 0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAII.YREPORT 0: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04 From: Shift: Qx Day (M bserver) Night Plant evolutions observed Routine power operations, Units 3 and 4 Shift turnover Shift briefing B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement None E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments None Recommendations None Completed By: Date:
M bserver Reviewed By:
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By: C /I /'IIIIPS P -N evp Date VP Date 04/10/88
0-A DM-019 M agement on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT 0: Opera tions Superintendent - Nuclear Date. 04/10-11/88 From: Andrew P. Drake Shift: Q Day t'I bserver) Qx Night Plant evolutions observed Unit 3, 100% power Unit 4, 100iI'o power Peak shift briefing Peak/Mid shift turnover Mid shift briefing B. Immediate safety problems None observed C. Questionable work practices Unit 4 Intermediate Range Relay IR-B-1 was scheduled to be replaced on the mid shift. During the briefing a concern was raised on the possibility of also de-energizing the second relay. Since I was present at the relay rack on 4/4/88 when the Source Range Relays were replaced, I was also concerned with a similar event. (See MOS report 4/4-5/88, item D.I).
The response to my original MOS item was to point out that step 4.1 of Maintenance Procedure MP-0732, Testing and Replacement of. BFD/NBFD Relays in the Reactor Protection, and Safeguards Systems is to obtain proper clearances. The PWO. for the Intermediate Range Relays was marked no clearance required.
Further conversation with the I 6 C Supervisor on the possibility of opening a trip breaker during the relay work was conducted. It was determined that a clearance should be requested on the trip breaker to prevent an inadvertant trip. s Since rwo incidents of ~ossibie trip breaker acruarion during relay repairs have occurred this week, I would requst a revision to MP-0732 be made, rather than wait for it to be upgraded in 1991.
0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT D. Area(s) for improvement Check Reactor Protection relay wiring diagrams and identify possible situations such as those identified for 3-SRB-2-B and IR-B-1.
- 2. Revise MP-0732 to clearly state when a clearance is required on the
.Reactor Trip Breakers for relay replacement'. Step 4.1 in MP-0732 does not provide adequate guidance.
In order to rack Reactor Trip Breakers in and out for a clearance, the operators must use portions of OSP-049.1 "Reactor Protection System Logic Test". A seperate procedure should be written to cover just racking the breakers in and out. Too many steps in OSP-049.1 must be N/A'd by the PSN and some may be missed.
Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Mid shift APSN, PSN and Unit 4 RCO responded very well as a team to verify the possible hazards associated with the replacement ofthe Intermediate Range Channel relay. They more than likely prevented an inadvertant trip of Unit 4.
Recommendations See section D.
Completed By:
Reviewed By:
~~i ),
M server D t:~
oat: Yi Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By:
04/10-11/88
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Page 0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILYREPORT
'1'o: Opera t i ons Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 04/10-11/88 From: S. T. Hale Shift: Q Day (M bseruer) Qx Night Plant evolutions observed 4 . Unit 3, operation at 100% power Unit 4, operation at 100% power B. Immediate safety problems None C. Questionable work practices None D. Area(s) for improvement None Professionalism, Summary of shift, Comments Two impressions of the plant on my first night on MOS:
- The plant is extremely clean. I was= really impressed with, the cleanliness of the Turbine area, all decks.*
- The shift turnover was done very professionally with a good exchange of information, especially the peak to mid. The PSN was well informed and presented an excellent overview of plant status on objectives for the shift.
- 2. Implementation of the procedure to rack in the B Bypass Reactor Trip Breaker was done with good team work and communication all the way around. Actions by this shift (although not prescribed procedurally) probably prevented a reactor trip.
Recommendations ~
Continue to monitor the steam leak on the sensing line on the Unit 4 High Pressure Turbine.
Completed By: S. T. Hale Date; -04/10-11/88 Reviewed By: Date: M . /P Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Management Review By: /"'//( vg PM N ate ate 04/10-11/88
l)ate Started 04 10/88 PSN MOS Date Finished 04/11/88 Jones Anderson ( ompleted PSN
~ Harpel ln ting PSN PSN Initiating APSN APSN Completed APSN A. Questionable Work Pr actices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None H. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken one C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed None Reviewed By P L .<<C Date +// Actions Completed Date