IR 05000335/2019010
| ML19112A164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/2019 |
| From: | Jonathan Montgomery NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Nazar M Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR 2019010 | |
| Download: ML19112A164 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ril 22, 2019
SUBJECT:
SAINT LUCIE UNITS 1, 2 - NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAM) REPORT NUMBER 05000335/2019010 AND 05000389/2019010
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On March 8, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Saint Lucie Units 1 and2, and discussed the onsite inspection results with Mr. Dan DeBoer and other members of your staff. On April 4, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with Mr. Dan DeBoer and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.
If you contest the violation or significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at Saint Lucie.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 05000335 and 05000389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000335/2019010 and 05000389/2019010
Inspection Report
Docket Number(s): 05000335 and 05000389 License Number(s): DPR-67 and NPF-16 Report Number(s): 05000335/2019010 and 05000389/2019010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0023 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Co.
Facility: Saint Lucie, Units 1 and 2 Location: Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Inspection Dates: February 11, 2019 to March 08, 2019 Inspectors: N. Morgan, Reactor Inspector G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Riley, Reactor Inspector M. Schwieg, Reactor Inspector C. Baron, Mechanical Contractor S. Kobylarz, Electrical Contractor A. Mink, Mechanical Engineer (observer)
Approved By: Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Team) at Saint Lucie Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Consider Valve Stability During Modification to Pressurizer Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Green None 71111.21M Events NCV (05000335,05000389/2019010-01)
Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to include appropriate limitations on their pressurizer safety valve (PSV) ring settings in their design and procurement specifications. Specifically, modification PCM 96139M changed the PSV blowdown to a ring setting that could challenge the PSVs performance, as identified in original testing, without performing additional testing or analysis to justify the new setting. The modification resulted in an equipment configuration contrary to the pre-modification description of the PSV ring setting adjustments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
INSPECTION SCOPE
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) ===
2-HCV-3615, Unit 2 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) for Low Pressure Safety Injection to Loop 2A2
- MOV torque/thrust analysis
- Basis for MOV maximum pressure and pressure differential
- Basis for minimum MOV motor voltage
- Walkdown of MOV and associated equipment
- Basis for inservice test (IST) acceptance criteria
- Results of recent IST
- Limits on frequency of jogging MOV
- Basis for MOV limit stop settings for flow distribution
- Basis for MOV limit stop settings for pump runout protection Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (3 Samples)
- (1) V1200, V1201, V1202, Unit 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves
- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Design Criteria, and other design basis and licensing basis document accuracy
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Component modifications
- Surveillance and IST results
- Procurement and Design Specifications
- (2) 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (Generator and Protective Relaying)
- Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during walkdown)
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Diesel loading and voltage calculations
- Protective device selection and settings
- Surveillance testing and recent test results
- Modifications performed
- Material condition and configuration (e.g., visual inspection during a walkdown)
- Consistency between station documentation (e.g. procedures) and vendor specifications
- Operating procedure
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Operator actions for degraded breaker conditions
- Surveillance and calibration testing and recent test results
- Bus short circuit calculations
- Breaker short circuit capacity
- Overcurrent protection and coordination
- Protective device selection and settings
- Minimum breaker control voltage Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)
- (1) EC 284321, Replacement of Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors
- (2) EC 283579, Replace 125 VDC Reversing Starter for Unit 1 MV-08-3
- (5) EC 284271, Unit 1 AFW MOV Torque Switch Bypass Change from 25% to 95% on MV-08-3, MV-09-10, MV-09-11, MV-09-12, MV-09-9 Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
Information Notice 2016-09, Recent Issues Identified When Using Reverse Engineering Techniques in the Procurement of Safety-Related Components
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Consider Valve Stability During Modification to Pressurizer Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None 71111.21M NCV (05000335,05000389/2019010-01)
Open The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to include appropriate limitations on their pressurizer safety valve (PSV) ring settings in their design and procurement specifications. Specifically, modification PCM 96139M changed the PSV blowdown to a ring setting that could challenge the PSVs performance, as identified in original testing, without performing additional testing or analysis to justify the new setting. The modification resulted in an equipment configuration contrary to the pre-modification description of the PSV ring setting adjustments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Description:
The PSVs at St. Lucie function by lifting to prevent over-pressurization of the reactor coolant system, and by successfully closing without excessive leakage in order to meet the assumptions of the event and accident analyses described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. Licensee's responses to Item II.D.1 of the NUREG were used to re-confirm the General Design Criteria 14, 15, and 30, of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 were met.
Item II.D.1 of NUREG-0737 required licensees to conduct testing to qualify the reactor coolant system relief and safety valves under expected operating conditions for design-basis transients and accidents. To satisfy this, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)performed testing relevant to St. Lucie. The results of this testing were documented in report CEN-227, Summary Report on the Operability of Pressurizer Safety Valves in CE Designed Plants. Report CEN-227 identified three qualified combinations of ring settings (-45, -14), (-
55, -14), and (-95, -14) which corresponded to blowdown settings of between approximately 8 and 15 percent. Blowdown is a term used to describe the closing pressure of PSVs, and was defined in CEN-227 as the difference between the actual opening (pop) pressure and the actual re-seating pressure, expressed as a percentage of the actual opening (pop)pressure. Test results documented in CEN-227 revealed that blowdowns around 5 percent could cause valve flutter and/or chatter (unstable valve behavior) that was inappropriate for St. Lucie, and was a disqualifying characteristic as described in the report. In its resolution to NUREG-0737 item II.D.1, the licensee stated to the NRC that a qualified ring setting of (-55, -
14) would be used; this ring setting corresponded to 10% blowdown.
In 1996, the licensees modification PCM 96139M changed, in part, the ring setting and blowdown percentage from 10 percent to approximately 4 percent. The ring setting change applied to both units at St. Lucie. Prior to the change, the St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR, section 5.4.13.4, "Tests and Inspections" reflected why the ring setting was chosen:
"On the basis of the results of the EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program, which included full scale testing of a St. Lucie 2 model pressurizer safety valve, valve ring adjustments for St. Lucie 2 were selected to assure stable operation. The resulting valve blowdown is approximately 10 percent (2250 psia blowdown pressure)."
Following the modification implementation, the UFSAR was updated to include the following:
"Note: 10% represents the blowdown of the originally installed safety valves. PC/M 96139M installed new valves with an actual blowdown of 4%."
Inspectors review of the modification package and associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation revealed that the licensee did not review or consider the basis or results of the EPRI PSV testing when they developed the modification; rather, it focused on the valves' ability to meet the maximum allowed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers construction code of record, which allowed no more than 5 percent blowdown. The inspectors noted that the specifications used in the modification design and procurement, 13172-PE-701, 00000-PE-701, and JPN-PSL-SEMS-95-026, did not include limitations that would ensure the PSVs would remain stable (not flutter or chatter) during their operation. Specifying stable valve characteristics was necessary to ensure that the design basis assumption of successful closure of the PSVs was met.
The inspectors noted that justification of the appropriateness of this change by analysis or additional test data was not provided. The modification, and its 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, did not address the potential failure mechanisms associated with this modification. Also, the inspectors noted that the UFSAR description change that occurred along with the modification inaccurately reflected the licensing basis once it was incorporated into the UFSAR.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program and determined that the valves were operable, but nonconforming with the current licensing basis commitment that satisfied their closure of NUREG-0737 item II.D.1. The licensee initiated plans to return the valves to the original, qualified blowdown parameters.
Corrective Action Reference(s): ARs 02303872 and 02304431 Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The inspectors evaluated the finding for Initiating Events, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012. Inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding could not, after a reasonable assessment of the degradation, result in exceeding the Reactor Coolant System leak rate for a small break loss-of-coolant accident, and it did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident.
Cross-cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, required, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to the above, since the modification of pressurizer safety valves per PCM 96139M in 1996, the licensee failed to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were translated into specifications. Specifically, the specifications for design and procurement (Specifications 13172-PE-701; 00000-PE-701; JPN-PSL-SEMS-95-026) of the pressurizer safety valves did not include limitations for allowable setup for the blowdown parameter of the pressurizer safety valves, as described in CEN-227.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 4, 2019, the inspector presented the final design bases assurance inspection results to Mr. Dan DeBoer, Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 8, 2019, the inspector presented the design bases assurance inspection onsite results to Mr. Dan DeBoer, Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.21M Calculations 99624-C-001 Weak Link Analysis of MOVs for Hot Shorts Rev. 1
CN-SEE-II-08-17 St. Lucie Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Rev. 2
Fathom Model
CN-SEE-II-09-12 St. Lucie Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) and Rev. 0
Low-Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump Delivery and
Pump Surveillance Requirements
LTR-SEE-II-09- Evaluation of St. Lucie Unit 2 Pressurizer Quench Tank, Rev. 1
Sparger, Rupture Disc and RCS Backpressure at
Maximum PSV Flow
PSL-2-FJE-90- St. Lucie U2 Emergency Diesel Generator 2A and 2B Rev. 11
20 Electrical Loads
PSL-2-J-E-90- GL 89-10 MOV Cable Voltage Drop Rev. 10
003
PSL-2FJM-91- St. Lucie Unit 2 Generic Letter 89-10 Design Basis Rev. 14
046 Differential Pressures for Motor Operated Valves
PSL-2FJM-91- St. Lucie Unit 2 Generic Letter 89-10 Gate and Globe Rev. 30
048 Valve Required Stem Thrust and Actuator Torque Switch
Setting Evaluation
PSL-2FSE-02- MCC Control Circuit Voltage Drop Calculation Rev. 0
2
PSL-2FSE-03- U2 Electrical Computer Model (ETAP) Documentation Rev. 3
010
PSL-2FSE-03- Unit 2 Short Circuit, Voltage Drop, and PSB-1 Analysis Rev. 2
011
PSL-2FSE-08- Unit 2 Electrical Coordination Study; Reg. Guide 1.75 and Rev. 1
001 Appendix R Validation
PSL-BFSM-01- Acceptable Corrosion Allowance on the Units 1 and 2 Rev. 0
014 CCW Surge Tank for a 50 PSI Design Pressure
71111.21M Corrective Action 00443765
Documents 02023558
2042282
2054295
2119272
201793
201795
201800
203330
205200
207758
285892
22188
22191
28877
2076185
2145693
2184476
2198226
200106
203854
268112
299399
Corrective Action CR-97-0753
Documents AR 02301677 DBAI 2019 - Scaffold Program Inconsistency
Resulting from AR 02301831 2019 DBAI Vendor Tech Manual 2998-4244 Needs Update
Inspection AR 02301844 DBAI 2019 - Scaffolding Exceeded 90 Day Walkdown
Requirement
AR 02302033 DBAI 2019- Ladder Secured with Chain to Safety-Related
Cond
AR 02302130 2019 DBAI- Motor Operated Valves Duty Time
AR 02302141 2109 DBAI- Mud Creek Temperature Bases
AR 02302187 DBAI 2019- Document Typo
71111.21M Corrective Action AR 02302193 NRC 2019 DBAI- Electrical Drawing Discrepancies
Documents AR 02302231 NRC 2019 DBAI- U2 Battery Service Testing Acceptance
Resulting from Criter
Inspection AR 02302233 2019 NRC DBAI- Ultimate Heat Sink
AR 02303872 2019 DBAI- Lic/Des Bases Not Updated for Pzr RV
Replacement
AR 02304431 2019 DBAI Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Change in
Blowdown
AR 02304771 Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Maintenance
Rule DBAI 2019
AR 02305144 NRC 2019 DBAI- Typo Rating Error in Calc PSL-2FSE-03-
011
AR 02305580 NRC 2019 DBAI- 4KV BKR PM Proc 0-PME-52.06
Procedure Weakness
Drawings AR 02308334 2019 DBAI URI- U2 LPSI PP Motor Loading at Runout
140050, Sht. 1 Schematic Diagram for 4.16KV, 1200A, Magnum SF6 Rev. 5
Breaker
2998-1219 U2 HCV-3615 Drawing Rev. 10
2998-19690 Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement-Forged Body 5/28/1997
Design Sheet 1 of 2
2998-19691 Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement-Forged Body 5/28/1997
Design Sheet 2 of 2
2998-22561 U2 HCV-3615 Drawing Rev. A
2998-3420 30 IN Piston Operated Tag No. I-TCV-14-4A & 4B Rev. 7
2998-3424 30 IN XSECTN & MATL T. NO I-TCV-14-4A & 4B Rev. 8
2998-B-326, Sht. Schematic Diagram Charging Pump 2A Rev. 15
177
2998-B-326, Sht. EC286079 Charging Pump 2A Rev. 1
177
2998-B-326, Sht. Schematic Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 from Bus 2B2 Rev. 3
937
2998-B-326, Sht. Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start Ckts Sht. 1 Rev. 6
967
71111.21M Drawings 2998-B-327, Sht. Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump 2A Rev. 24
177
2998-B-327, Sht. EC286079 Charging Pump 2A Rev. 1
177
2998-B-327, Sht. EC286079 Sht. 2 Rev. 1
196
2998-B-327, Sht. Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump 2A Bypass Valve Rev. 11
196 V2555
2998-B-327, Sht. CWD-HCV-3615 Rev. 16
257
2998-B-327, Sht. Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 Diff Relay Rev. 3
25
2998-B-327, Sht. Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 (2-20411) Rev. 16
937 Incoming Fdr From Bus 2B2
2998-B-327, Sht. Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Sta Serv Trans 2B2/2B5 Rev. 12
948 4160V Fdr Bkr
2998-B-327, Sht. Control Wiring Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Bkr (2-20401) Rev. 20
963
2998-G-078, Sht. Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System Rev. 24
130A
2998-G-078, Sht. Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System Rev. 37
130B
2998-G-078, Sht. Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System Rev. 24
131
2998-G-078, Sht. Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System Rev. 11
2
2998-G-272 Main One Line Diagram Rev. 29
2998-G-275 4.16KV Switchgear No. 2A3 and 2B3 One Line Diagrams Rev. 7
Engineering 8770-B-326 Sht. Aux Feedwater Pump 1C Turbine and Steam Valve MV- Rev. 14
Changes 631 08-3
EC 221134 Replace HCV-3615 Rev. 0
EC 284271 Unit 1 AW MOV Torque Switch Bypass Change from 25% Rev. 1
to 95%
EC 284321 Replacement of Unit 1 main steam line radiation monitors Rev. 12
71111.21M Engineering EC 286079 Revise Charging Pump 2A Control Circuity Associated with Rev. 0
Changes SIAS
EC 290267 U2 TCV-14-4A Valve Stem Clamp Installation/Removal
Engineering PC/M 96139M Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement - Forged Rev. 0
Evaluations Body Design
475454 Circuit Board Battery Charger Hi/Lo Voltage Alarm 3/18/2017
Reverse Engineering
Miscellaneous 89859 Power Supply 125 DC Converter Reverse Engineering 8/20/2018
03- Safety System Health Report 1/31/2019
Injection
13172-PE-701 Project Specification for Safety and Power Operated Relief Rev. 5
Valves for Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Unit
No. 2
13172-PE-705 MOV Specification Rev. 6
2576C MOV Periodic Verification Classification Rev. 0
2998-4244 Manual for Motor Operated Globe Valves Rev. 10
2998-A-451-1000 Environmental Qualification Report and Guidebook Rev. 12
464761 Item Equivalency Review for Torque Switch Rev. 2
AR 02308334 Review of Motor Protective Relay Device Trips for Unit 1 Rev. 0
Evaluation LPSI Pump Motor Operation at Design Runout at EOG
High Tech Spec (60.6 HZ)
CEN-227 Summary Report on the Operability of Pressurizer Safety December
Valves in C-E Designed Plants 1982
DBD-4160-VAC- 4160 VAC Distribution System Rev. 5
DBD-CCW-2 Component Cooling Water System Rev. 8
DBD-ICW-2 Intake Cooling Water System Rev. 6
DBD-PZR-2 Pressurizer System Rev. 9
DBD-SDC-2 Low Pressure Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling Rev. 9
System
EACE 02042282 MV 09-9 Did not Stroke Fully Open Rev. 0
EPRI NP-2770- EPRI/C-E PWR Safety Valve Test Report Volume 5: Test March 1983
LD, Volume 5 Results for Crosby Safety Valve
ER-AA-204- Motor-Operated Valve Fleet Standard PM Template Rev. 2
2004-F05
71111.21M Miscellaneous Health Report Unit 2 System 52 Health Report System IQ, Q1-2019
I-1105-2 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves 8/21/1997
IN 2016-09 RECENT ISSUES IDENTIFIED WHEN USING REVERSE July 15,
ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES IN THE PROCUREMENT 2016
OF SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS
JPN-PSL-SEMP- NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Summary Report Rev. 2
JPN-PSL-SEMS- PSL 1&2 Pressurizer Safety Valves Forged Body Design Rev. 05
95-026 Requirements, Additional Specification Requirements and
Clarifications to Spec 13172-PE-701, Rev. 05
L-2001-258 Application for Renewed Operating Licenses 11/29/01
L-2011-21 LAR for Extended Power Uprate 2/25/11
LTAM PSL-15- Unit 2 Charging Pump Control Deficiencies Rev. 0
0137
Manual No. IM- Yaskawa Instruction Manual, Troubleshooting Rev. 5
14050-01
ML14188B101 EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Guide Rev. 2
for Application of Valve Test Program Results to Plant-
Specific Evaluations, Interim Report, July 1982
ML17216A456 L-86-114, Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements 3/18/88
ML17222A798 NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, Performance Testing of Relief 5/11/89
and Safety Valves- St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (TAC
Nos. 44617 and 51605)
ML17223A132 EGG-NTA-8332, Technical Evaluation Report TMI Action - December
- NUREG-0737 (II.D.1) Relief and Safety Valve Testing, 1988
St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389
ML17223A221 NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1, Performance Testing of Relief 5/11/89
and Safety Valves- St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (TAC
Nos. 44617 and 51605)
PSL-ENG-SENS- 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Pressurizer Code Safety Rev. 0
97-038 Valve Modification
Qualification Square D Magnum SF6 Circuit Breaker, Florida Power & Rev. 4
Report QR- Light - St. Lucie
140050-1
71111.21M Miscellaneous Section 5.2A Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 23
VTM 2998-2072 Metal Clad Switchgear Rev. 22
VTM 2998-21826 Square D/NLI Magnum SF6 4.16KV, 1200A, 350MVA Rev. 0
Circuit Breakers
Procedures VTM 2998-4508 NY 422537 Henry Pratt Butterfly Valves Rev. 17
0-GME-80.21 Diagnostic Testing of Motor Operated Valves Using the Rev. 4
Votes Infinity Valve Diagnostic System
0-NOP-99.02 Watchstation General Inspection Guidelines Rev. 27
0-NOP-99.05 Valve, Breaker, Motor and Instrument Instructions Rev. 12
0-PME-52.06 Periodic Maintenance of SF6 Switchgear Breakers Rev. 12
0-SME-50.08 Safety Battery Service Test Rev. 9
1-AOP-26.02 AREA RADIATION MONITORS Rev. 4
1-EOP-01 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS SPTA Rev. 35
1-EOP-99 Steam Generator Isolation Rev. 65
Appendix R
2-AOP-03.02 Shutdown Cooling Abnormal Operations Rev. 14
2-AOP-14.01 Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations Rev. 15
2-ARP-01-A00 Control Room Panel A RTGB-201 Rev. 27
2-EOP-03 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Rev. 39
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGTR Rev. 33
2-ONP-01.03 Plant Condition 3 Shutdown Cooling in Operation - No Rev. 42
Reduced Inventory
2-OSP-03.02A 2A LPSI Flow Test Rev. 9
2-OSP-100.13 Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations Week Rev. 76,
performed
09/28/18
2-OSP-100.13 Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations Week Rev. 76,
performed
2/25/18
2-OSP-69.13B ESF - Staggered 36 Month Surveillance for Rev. 27,
SIAS/CIS/CSAS - Train B performed
03/21/17
2-OSP-99.08A A Train Quarterly Non Check Valve Cycle Test Rev. 23
ADM-09.25 Surveillance Frequency Control Program Rev. 19
71111.21M Procedures ADM-29.01A Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps and Valves Rev. 24
CY-SL-168-0003 Alternate Sampling Methods for Effluent and Processing Rev. 4
Rad Monitors
ER-AA-116 Motor Operated Valve Program Rev. 2
IP-ENG-001 Design Equivalent Change Package Rev. C
MA-AA-100-1014 Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Testing and Actuator Rev. 6
Inspections
MA-AA-100-1014 Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Testing and Actuator Rev. 6
Inspections
Work Orders NSC-PP-022 Corporate Procurement Engineering and Dedication Rev. 0
Process for Reverse Engineering Activities
33008835-07
40177137-01
40177137-02
40192600-01
40301055-01
40301984-01
40302524-01
4033306804
40417654-05
40456003-01
40456003-02
40456003-06
40507440-01
40518025-02
40520832-01
40522122-01
40525157-01
40525157-01
40533596-01
40533596-01
40571871
40571871-10
71111.21M Work Orders 40595531-01
40599605
40615767-01
40617480-01
40619748-01
40621444-01