IR 05000335/2019010
| ML19112A164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/2019 |
| From: | Jonathan Montgomery NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Nazar M Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR 2019010 | |
| Download: ML19112A164 (20) | |
Text
April 22, 2019
SUBJECT:
SAINT LUCIE UNITS 1, 2 - NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAM) REPORT NUMBER 05000335/2019010 AND 05000389/2019010
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On March 8, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Saint Lucie Units 1 and2, and discussed the onsite inspection results with Mr. Dan DeBoer and other members of your staff. On April 4, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with Mr. Dan DeBoer and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.
If you contest the violation or significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at Saint Lucie.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 05000335 and 05000389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000335/2019010 and 05000389/2019010
Inspection Report
Docket Number(s):
05000335 and 05000389
License Number(s):
Report Number(s):
05000335/2019010 and 05000389/2019010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2019-010-0023
Licensee:
Florida Power & Light Co.
Facility:
Saint Lucie, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Jensen Beach, FL 34957
Inspection Dates:
February 11, 2019 to March 08, 2019
Inspectors:
N. Morgan, Reactor Inspector
G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Riley, Reactor Inspector
M. Schwieg, Reactor Inspector
C. Baron, Mechanical Contractor
S. Kobylarz, Electrical Contractor
A. Mink, Mechanical Engineer (observer)
Approved By:
Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Team) at Saint Lucie Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Consider Valve Stability During Modification to Pressurizer Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV (05000335,05000389/2019010-01)
Closed None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to include appropriate limitations on their pressurizer safety valve (PSV) ring settings in their design and procurement specifications. Specifically, modification PCM 96139M changed the PSV blowdown to a ring setting that could challenge the PSVs performance, as identified in original testing, without performing additional testing or analysis to justify the new setting. The modification resulted in an equipment configuration contrary to the pre-modification description of the PSV ring setting adjustments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
INSPECTION SCOPE
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===
2-HCV-3615, Unit 2 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) for Low Pressure Safety Injection to Loop 2A2
- MOV torque/thrust analysis
- Basis for MOV maximum pressure and pressure differential
- Basis for minimum MOV motor voltage
- Walkdown of MOV and associated equipment
- Basis for inservice test (IST) acceptance criteria
- Results of recent IST
- Limits on frequency of jogging MOV
- Basis for MOV limit stop settings for flow distribution
- Basis for MOV limit stop settings for pump runout protection
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (3 Samples)
- (1) V1200, V1201, V1202, Unit 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves
- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Design Criteria, and other design basis and licensing basis document accuracy
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Component modifications
- Surveillance and IST results
- Procurement and Design Specifications (2)2B Emergency Diesel Generator (Generator and Protective Relaying)
- Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during walkdown)
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Diesel loading and voltage calculations
- Protective device selection and settings
- Surveillance testing and recent test results
- Modifications performed
(3)2B3-4KV SWGR, Unit 2 4.16KV Switchgear 2B3 (SB)
- Material condition and configuration (e.g., visual inspection during a walkdown)
- Consistency between station documentation (e.g. procedures) and vendor specifications
- Operating procedure
- Maintenance effectiveness
- Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history
- Operator actions for degraded breaker conditions
- Surveillance and calibration testing and recent test results
- Bus short circuit calculations
- Breaker short circuit capacity
- Overcurrent protection and coordination
- Protective device selection and settings
- Minimum breaker control voltage
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)
- (1) EC 284321, Replacement of Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors
- (2) EC 283579, Replace 125 VDC Reversing Starter for Unit 1 MV-08-3
- (5) EC 284271, Unit 1 AFW MOV Torque Switch Bypass Change from 25% to 95% on MV-08-3, MV-09-10, MV-09-11, MV-09-12, MV-09-9
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
Information Notice 2016-09, Recent Issues Identified When Using Reverse Engineering Techniques in the Procurement of Safety-Related Components
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Consider Valve Stability During Modification to Pressurizer Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV (05000335,05000389/2019010-01)
Open None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to include appropriate limitations on their pressurizer safety valve (PSV) ring settings in their design and procurement specifications. Specifically, modification PCM 96139M changed the PSV blowdown to a ring setting that could challenge the PSVs performance, as identified in original testing, without performing additional testing or analysis to justify the new setting. The modification resulted in an equipment configuration contrary to the pre-modification description of the PSV ring setting adjustments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Description:
The PSVs at St. Lucie function by lifting to prevent over-pressurization of the reactor coolant system, and by successfully closing without excessive leakage in order to meet the assumptions of the event and accident analyses described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. Licensee's responses to Item II.D.1 of the NUREG were used to re-confirm the General Design Criteria 14, 15, and 30, of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 were met.
Item II.D.1 of NUREG-0737 required licensees to conduct testing to qualify the reactor coolant system relief and safety valves under expected operating conditions for design-basis transients and accidents. To satisfy this, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)performed testing relevant to St. Lucie. The results of this testing were documented in report CEN-227, Summary Report on the Operability of Pressurizer Safety Valves in CE Designed Plants. Report CEN-227 identified three qualified combinations of ring settings (-45, -14), (-
55, -14), and (-95, -14) which corresponded to blowdown settings of between approximately 8 and 15 percent. Blowdown is a term used to describe the closing pressure of PSVs, and was defined in CEN-227 as the difference between the actual opening (pop) pressure and the actual re-seating pressure, expressed as a percentage of the actual opening (pop)pressure. Test results documented in CEN-227 revealed that blowdowns around 5 percent could cause valve flutter and/or chatter (unstable valve behavior) that was inappropriate for St. Lucie, and was a disqualifying characteristic as described in the report. In its resolution to NUREG-0737 item II.D.1, the licensee stated to the NRC that a qualified ring setting of (-55, -
14) would be used; this ring setting corresponded to 10% blowdown.
In 1996, the licensees modification PCM 96139M changed, in part, the ring setting and blowdown percentage from 10 percent to approximately 4 percent. The ring setting change applied to both units at St. Lucie. Prior to the change, the St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR, section 5.4.13.4, "Tests and Inspections" reflected why the ring setting was chosen:
"On the basis of the results of the EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program, which included full scale testing of a St. Lucie 2 model pressurizer safety valve, valve ring adjustments for St. Lucie 2 were selected to assure stable operation. The resulting valve blowdown is approximately 10 percent (2250 psia blowdown pressure)."
Following the modification implementation, the UFSAR was updated to include the following:
"Note: 10% represents the blowdown of the originally installed safety valves. PC/M 96139M installed new valves with an actual blowdown of 4%."
Inspectors review of the modification package and associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation revealed that the licensee did not review or consider the basis or results of the EPRI PSV testing when they developed the modification; rather, it focused on the valves' ability to meet the maximum allowed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers construction code of record, which allowed no more than 5 percent blowdown. The inspectors noted that the specifications used in the modification design and procurement, 13172-PE-701, 00000-PE-701, and JPN-PSL-SEMS-95-026, did not include limitations that would ensure the PSVs would remain stable (not flutter or chatter) during their operation. Specifying stable valve characteristics was necessary to ensure that the design basis assumption of successful closure of the PSVs was met.
The inspectors noted that justification of the appropriateness of this change by analysis or additional test data was not provided. The modification, and its 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, did not address the potential failure mechanisms associated with this modification. Also, the inspectors noted that the UFSAR description change that occurred along with the modification inaccurately reflected the licensing basis once it was incorporated into the UFSAR.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program and determined that the valves were operable, but nonconforming with the current licensing basis commitment that satisfied their closure of NUREG-0737 item II.D.1. The licensee initiated plans to return the valves to the original, qualified blowdown parameters.
Corrective Action Reference(s): ARs 02303872 and 02304431
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The inspectors evaluated the finding for Initiating Events, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012. Inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding could not, after a reasonable assessment of the degradation, result in exceeding the Reactor Coolant System leak rate for a small break loss-of-coolant accident, and it did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident.
Cross-cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, required, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to the above, since the modification of pressurizer safety valves per PCM 96139M in 1996, the licensee failed to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were translated into specifications. Specifically, the specifications for design and procurement (Specifications 13172-PE-701; 00000-PE-701; JPN-PSL-SEMS-95-026) of the pressurizer safety valves did not include limitations for allowable setup for the blowdown parameter of the pressurizer safety valves, as described in CEN-227.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 4, 2019, the inspector presented the final design bases assurance inspection results to Mr. Dan DeBoer, Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 8, 2019, the inspector presented the design bases assurance inspection onsite results to Mr. Dan DeBoer, Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
99624-C-001
Weak Link Analysis of MOVs for Hot Shorts
Rev. 1
CN-SEE-II-08-17
St. Lucie Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Fathom Model
Rev. 2
CN-SEE-II-09-12
St. Lucie Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) and
Low-Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump Delivery and
Pump Surveillance Requirements
Rev. 0
LTR-SEE-II-09-
Evaluation of St. Lucie Unit 2 Pressurizer Quench Tank,
Sparger, Rupture Disc and RCS Backpressure at
Maximum PSV Flow
Rev. 1
PSL-2-FJE-90-
20
St. Lucie U2 Emergency Diesel Generator 2A and 2B
Electrical Loads
Rev. 11
PSL-2-J-E-90-
003
GL 89-10 MOV Cable Voltage Drop
Rev. 10
PSL-2FJM-91-
046
St. Lucie Unit 2 Generic Letter 89-10 Design Basis
Differential Pressures for Motor Operated Valves
Rev. 14
PSL-2FJM-91-
048
St. Lucie Unit 2 Generic Letter 89-10 Gate and Globe
Valve Required Stem Thrust and Actuator Torque Switch
Setting Evaluation
Rev. 30
PSL-2FSE-02-
2
MCC Control Circuit Voltage Drop Calculation
Rev. 0
PSL-2FSE-03-
010
U2 Electrical Computer Model (ETAP) Documentation
Rev. 3
PSL-2FSE-03-
011
Unit 2 Short Circuit, Voltage Drop, and PSB-1 Analysis
Rev. 2
PSL-2FSE-08-
001
Unit 2 Electrical Coordination Study; Reg. Guide 1.75 and
Appendix R Validation
Rev. 1
PSL-BFSM-01-
014
Acceptable Corrosion Allowance on the Units 1 and 2
CCW Surge Tank for a 50 PSI Design Pressure
Rev. 0
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
00443765
2023558
2042282
2054295
2119272
201793
201795
201800
203330
205200
207758
285892
22188
22191
28877
2076185
2145693
2184476
2198226
200106
203854
268112
299399
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-97-0753
DBAI 2019 - Scaffold Program Inconsistency
2019 DBAI Vendor Tech Manual 2998-4244 Needs Update
DBAI 2019 - Scaffolding Exceeded 90 Day Walkdown
Requirement
DBAI 2019-Ladder Secured with Chain to Safety-Related
Cond
2019 DBAI-Motor Operated Valves Duty Time
2109 DBAI-Mud Creek Temperature Bases
DBAI 2019-Document Typo
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC 2019 DBAI-Electrical Drawing Discrepancies
NRC 2019 DBAI-U2 Battery Service Testing Acceptance
Criter
2019 NRC DBAI-Ultimate Heat Sink
2019 DBAI-Lic/Des Bases Not Updated for Pzr RV
Replacement
2019 DBAI Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Change in
Blowdown
Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Maintenance
Rule DBAI 2019
NRC 2019 DBAI-Typo Rating Error in Calc PSL-2FSE-03-
011
NRC 2019 DBAI-4KV BKR PM Proc 0-PME-52.06
Procedure Weakness
Drawings
2019 DBAI URI-U2 LPSI PP Motor Loading at Runout
140050, Sht. 1
Schematic Diagram for 4.16KV, 1200A, Magnum SF6
Breaker
Rev. 5
2998-1219
U2 HCV-3615 Drawing
Rev. 10
2998-19690
Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement-Forged Body
Design Sheet 1 of 2
5/28/1997
2998-19691
Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement-Forged Body
Design Sheet 2 of 2
5/28/1997
2998-22561
U2 HCV-3615 Drawing
Rev. A
2998-3420
IN Piston Operated Tag No. I-TCV-14-4A & 4B
Rev. 7
2998-3424
IN XSECTN & MATL T. NO I-TCV-14-4A & 4B
Rev. 8
2998-B-326, Sht.
177
Schematic Diagram Charging Pump 2A
Rev. 15
2998-B-326, Sht.
177
EC286079 Charging Pump 2A
Rev. 1
2998-B-326, Sht.
937
Schematic Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 from Bus 2B2
Rev. 3
2998-B-326, Sht.
967
Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start Ckts Sht. 1
Rev. 6
71111.21M Drawings
2998-B-327, Sht.
177
Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump 2A
Rev. 24
2998-B-327, Sht.
177
EC286079 Charging Pump 2A
Rev. 1
2998-B-327, Sht.
196
EC286079 Sht. 2
Rev. 1
2998-B-327, Sht.
196
Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump 2A Bypass Valve
V2555
Rev. 11
2998-B-327, Sht.
257
CWD-HCV-3615
Rev. 16
2998-B-327, Sht.
25
Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 Diff Relay
Rev. 3
2998-B-327, Sht.
937
Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 (2-20411)
Incoming Fdr From Bus 2B2
Rev. 16
2998-B-327, Sht.
948
Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Sta Serv Trans 2B2/2B5
4160V Fdr Bkr
Rev. 12
2998-B-327, Sht.
963
Control Wiring Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Bkr (2-20401)
Rev. 20
2998-G-078, Sht.
130A
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
Rev. 24
2998-G-078, Sht.
130B
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
Rev. 37
2998-G-078, Sht.
131
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
Rev. 24
2998-G-078, Sht.
2
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
Rev. 11
2998-G-272
Main One Line Diagram
Rev. 29
2998-G-275
4.16KV Switchgear No. 2A3 and 2B3 One Line Diagrams
Rev. 7
Engineering
Changes
8770-B-326 Sht.
631
Aux Feedwater Pump 1C Turbine and Steam Valve MV-
08-3
Rev. 14
Replace HCV-3615
Rev. 0
Unit 1 AW MOV Torque Switch Bypass Change from 25%
to 95%
Rev. 1
Replacement of Unit 1 main steam line radiation monitors
Rev. 12
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
Revise Charging Pump 2A Control Circuity Associated with
Rev. 0
U2 TCV-14-4A Valve Stem Clamp Installation/Removal
Engineering
Evaluations
PC/M 96139M
Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement - Forged
Body Design
Rev. 0
475454
Circuit Board Battery Charger Hi/Lo Voltage Alarm
Reverse Engineering
3/18/2017
Miscellaneous
89859
Power Supply 125 DC Converter Reverse Engineering
8/20/2018
03-Safety
Injection
System Health Report
1/31/2019
13172-PE-701
Project Specification for Safety and Power Operated Relief
Valves for Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Unit
No. 2
Rev. 5
13172-PE-705
MOV Specification
Rev. 6
2576C
MOV Periodic Verification Classification
Rev. 0
2998-4244
Manual for Motor Operated Globe Valves
Rev. 10
2998-A-451-1000
Environmental Qualification Report and Guidebook
Rev. 12
464761
Item Equivalency Review for Torque Switch
Rev. 2
Evaluation
Review of Motor Protective Relay Device Trips for Unit 1
LPSI Pump Motor Operation at Design Runout at EOG
High Tech Spec (60.6 HZ)
Rev. 0
CEN-227
Summary Report on the Operability of Pressurizer Safety
Valves in C-E Designed Plants
December
1982
DBD-4160-VAC-
4160 VAC Distribution System
Rev. 5
DBD-CCW-2
Component Cooling Water System
Rev. 8
DBD-ICW-2
Intake Cooling Water System
Rev. 6
DBD-PZR-2
Pressurizer System
Rev. 9
DBD-SDC-2
Low Pressure Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling
System
Rev. 9
EACE 02042282
MV 09-9 Did not Stroke Fully Open
Rev. 0
EPRI NP-2770-
LD, Volume 5
EPRI/C-E PWR Safety Valve Test Report Volume 5: Test
Results for Crosby Safety Valve
March 1983
ER-AA-204-
2004-F05
Motor-Operated Valve Fleet Standard PM Template
Rev. 2
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Health Report
Unit 2 System 52 Health Report System IQ, Q1-2019
I-1105-2
Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves
8/21/1997
RECENT ISSUES IDENTIFIED WHEN USING REVERSE
ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES IN THE PROCUREMENT
OF SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS
July 15,
2016
JPN-PSL-SEMP-
NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Summary Report
Rev. 2
JPN-PSL-SEMS-
95-026
PSL 1&2 Pressurizer Safety Valves Forged Body Design
Requirements, Additional Specification Requirements and
Clarifications to Spec 13172-PE-701, Rev. 05
Rev. 05
Application for Renewed Operating Licenses
11/29/01
LAR for Extended Power Uprate
2/25/11
LTAM PSL-15-
0137
Unit 2 Charging Pump Control Deficiencies
Rev. 0
Manual No. IM-
14050-01
Yaskawa Instruction Manual, Troubleshooting
Rev. 5
EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Guide
for Application of Valve Test Program Results to Plant-
Specific Evaluations, Interim Report, July 1982
Rev. 2
L-86-114, Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements
3/18/88
NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, Performance Testing of Relief
and Safety Valves-St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (TAC
Nos. 44617 and 51605)
5/11/89
EGG-NTA-8332, Technical Evaluation Report TMI Action -
- NUREG-0737 (II.D.1) Relief and Safety Valve Testing,
St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389
December
1988
NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1, Performance Testing of Relief
and Safety Valves-St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (TAC
Nos. 44617 and 51605)
5/11/89
PSL-ENG-SENS-
97-038
CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Pressurizer Code Safety
Valve Modification
Rev. 0
Qualification
Report QR-
140050-1
Square D Magnum SF6 Circuit Breaker, Florida Power &
Light - St. Lucie
Rev. 4
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Section 5.2A
Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Rev. 23
VTM 2998-2072
Metal Clad Switchgear
Rev. 22
VTM 2998-21826
Square D/NLI Magnum SF6 4.16KV, 1200A, 350MVA
Circuit Breakers
Rev. 0
Procedures
VTM 2998-4508
NY 422537 Henry Pratt Butterfly Valves
Rev. 17
0-GME-80.21
Diagnostic Testing of Motor Operated Valves Using the
Votes Infinity Valve Diagnostic System
Rev. 4
0-NOP-99.02
Watchstation General Inspection Guidelines
Rev. 27
0-NOP-99.05
Valve, Breaker, Motor and Instrument Instructions
Rev. 12
0-PME-52.06
Periodic Maintenance of SF6 Switchgear Breakers
Rev. 12
0-SME-50.08
Safety Battery Service Test
Rev. 9
1-AOP-26.02
AREA RADIATION MONITORS
Rev. 4
1-EOP-01
STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS SPTA
Rev. 35
1-EOP-99
Appendix R
Steam Generator Isolation
Rev. 65
2-AOP-03.02
Shutdown Cooling Abnormal Operations
Rev. 14
2-AOP-14.01
Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations
Rev. 15
2-ARP-01-A00
Control Room Panel A RTGB-201
Rev. 27
2-EOP-03
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Rev. 39
2-EOP-04
Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGTR
Rev. 33
2-ONP-01.03
Plant Condition 3 Shutdown Cooling in Operation - No
Reduced Inventory
Rev. 42
2-OSP-03.02A
2A LPSI Flow Test
Rev. 9
2-OSP-100.13
Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations Week
Rev. 76,
performed
09/28/18
2-OSP-100.13
Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations Week
Rev. 76,
performed
2/25/18
2-OSP-69.13B
ESF - Staggered 36 Month Surveillance for
SIAS/CIS/CSAS - Train B
Rev. 27,
performed
03/21/17
2-OSP-99.08A
A Train Quarterly Non Check Valve Cycle Test
Rev. 23
ADM-09.25
Surveillance Frequency Control Program
Rev. 19
71111.21M Procedures
ADM-29.01A
Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps and Valves
Rev. 24
CY-SL-168-0003
Alternate Sampling Methods for Effluent and Processing
Rad Monitors
Rev. 4
Motor Operated Valve Program
Rev. 2
IP-ENG-001
Design Equivalent Change Package
Rev. C
Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Testing and Actuator
Inspections
Rev. 6
Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Testing and Actuator
Inspections
Rev. 6
Work Orders
NSC-PP-022
Corporate Procurement Engineering and Dedication
Process for Reverse Engineering Activities
Rev. 0
33008835-07
40177137-01
40177137-02
40192600-01
40301055-01
40301984-01
40302524-01
4033306804
40417654-05
40456003-01
40456003-02
40456003-06
40507440-01
40518025-02
40520832-01
40522122-01
40525157-01
40525157-01
40533596-01
40533596-01
40571871
40571871-10
Work Orders
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