IR 05000335/2023003
| ML23307A104 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2023 |
| From: | David Dumbacher Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Coffey B Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR 2023003 | |
| Download: ML23307A104 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 & 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000335/2023003 AND 05000389/2023003
Dear Bob Coffey:
On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at St. Lucie Units 1 & 2. On October 13, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Rob Craven, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at St. Lucie Units 1 & 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at St. Lucie Units 1 & 2.
November 6, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, David E. Dumbacher, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000335 and 05000389 License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000335 and 05000389
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000335/2023003 and 05000389/2023003
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-003-0044
Licensee:
Florida Power & Light Company
Facility:
St. Lucie Units 1 & 2
Location:
Jensen Beach, FL
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2023, to September 30, 2023
Inspectors:
J. Diaz-Velez, Senior Health Physicist
J. Hickman, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Rivera, Health Physicist
S. Roberts, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
David E. Dumbacher, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at St. Lucie Units 1 & 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate implementation of procedures resulting in 2C auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump reduced reliability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000335,05000389/2023003-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.12 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specifications 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, were identified for the licensees failure to adequately implement maintenance procedure 2-PMM-08.09, [2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Throttle/Trip] during assembly of the 2C auxiliary feedwater(AFW) pump throttle/trip valve (MV-08-3) during a planned maintenance overhaul. Specifically, during the Unit 2 SL2-27 refueling outage, the licensee failed to properly implement procedure 2-PMM-08.09 during assembly of MV-08-3, causing the sliding nut, integral to the tripping and latching function of MV-08-3 to be installed upside down. Operation of MV-08-3 in this condition resulted in remote latching failure following overspeed trips, adversely affecting 2C AFW pump availability and reliability.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) until the unit was down powered to 75 percent RTP due repair of 4B heater and drain cooler, on July 26, 2023. Unit 1 returned to near RTP on July 30, 2023, and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near RTP for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2, charging system with 2A charging pump out of service (OOS) for planned maintenance, on July 11, 2023
- (2) Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system with 1A AFW pump OOS for planned maintenance, on August 9, 2023
- (3) Unit 1, intake cooling water (ICW) system following replacement of the expansion joint on 1A ICW pump, on September 19, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1, fire zone (FZ) 5, component cooling water (CCW) area, on August 3, 2023
- (2) Unit 2, FZ 3, CCW building, on August 3, 2023
- (3) Unit 2, FZ 22 & 23, electrical penetration room, on September 8, 2023
- (4) Unit 1, FZ 77 & 78, electrical penetration room, on September 27, 2023
- (5) Unit 1, FZ 45, piping penetration room, on September 28, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill, on August 18, 2023
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during:
- A planned power reduction to 75% of unit 1 to support leak repair of the 4B feed water heater, on July 26, 2023
- Power ascension to 100% of unit 1 following repairs to 4B feed water heater, on July 30, 2023
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator continuing training evaluation in the control room simulator, on September 11, 2023
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Action Request (AR) 2450701 and 2457444, 2C AFW pump trip and throttle valve overspeed trip mechanism not latching correctly, and stem collar installed upside down, on August 16, 2023
- (2) AR 2464782, 2023 maintenance rule (a)(3) evaluation, on August 23, 2023
- (3) AR 2458090, 2C CCW metal brass flakes flying off inner pump seal, on September 19, 2023
- (4) AR 2462402, Unit 2 control room air conditioning unit thermal relief valves missed the ASME code testing requirements, on September 29, 2023
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2, elevated risk while the 2A/2C CCW pumps, 2A CCW header, and the 2C AFW pump, were OOS for planned maintenance, on August 17, 2023
- (2) Unit 2, elevated risk while the 2B AFW pump was OOS for planned maintenance, on September 21, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) AR 2462402, Inservice testing of Unit 2 control room air conditioning units' relief valves missed, on July 22, 2023
- (2) AR 2463084, 2B2 fuel oil pressure reading low while the emergency diesel generator (EDG) was running during a monthly surveillance, on July 28, 2023
- (3) AR 2461570, Unit 2 PCV-1100F not fully closing when demanded, on August 11, 2023
- (4) AR 2464483, Unit 1 "A" main feed containment isolation valve accumulator nitrogen pressure below rounds set point, on August 14, 2023
- (5) AR 2463859, Minor oil leak on the 2C AFW pump, on August 17, 2023
- (6) AR 2464708, Unit 2 CCW suction valve declutch lever will not stay in the declutch position preventing manual operation of the valve, on August 18, 2023
- (7) AR 2465144, Unit 1 1B EDG radiator leak, on August 23, 2023
- (8) AR 2466928, Unit 1 ICW leak on the outlet of 1A open blowdown heat exchanger, on September 21, 2023
- (9) AR 2467214, Unit 1 shutdown cooling temperature control valve HCV-3657 outside of allowable stroke time, on September 22, 2023
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) EC 289028, Unit 1 Steam Generators 1A & 1B Level Transmitters LT-9013B, LT-9013C, LT-9013D, LT-9023A, LT-9023B, LT-9023C & LT-9023D Replacement, on September 20, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Work Order (WO) 40847397 Unit 1 ACC-3A, replace all switches, on July 11, 2023
- (2) WO 40813832, Unit 2 V2339 2C charging pump discharge isolation valve clean and repack, on July 17, 2023
- (3) WO 40947369, Unit 1 reactor protection system cabinet "C" Thermal Margin/Low Pressure spiking high, caused by dirty switch contacts, on August 23, 2023
- (4) WOs 40885094 and 40719765, Unit 1 "A" ICW pump repack and motor inspection, on September 18, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)1-OSP-52.01B, Surveillance Test of Degraded Grid Voltage, B Train, on July 19, 2023
- (2) 2-OSP-69.24, Engineered Safeguards Relay Test, Train A, on August 9, 2023
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) On July 18, 2023, the inspectors evaluated a licensed operator continuing training simulator evaluation that included an unidentified reactor coolant leak, 2A main feed water pump trip, manual reactor trip, loss of offsite power, 2B EDG failure, containment spray actuation due to a loss of coolant accident, and containment high range radiation dose rates in excess of levels indicating fuel clad failure. The scenario included situations that resulted in declarations of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency and notification to the Florida State Watch Officer and St Lucie and Martin County Emergency Operations Centers.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
- (1) Units 1/2, Steam Generator Blowdown Line, Trains A & B
- (2) Units 1/2, ECCS Exhaust, Trains A & B
- (3) Unit 2, Plant Vent Stack, Trains A & B
- (4) Unit 2, Fuel Handling Building Vent Stack
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:
- (1) Unit 2, Plant Vent Stack, Train B (Gas, Particulate, and Iodine sampling)
- (2) Unit 2, Plant Vent Stack, Train A (Particulate and Iodine sampling)
- (3) Unit 2, ECCS Radiation Monitor RM-26-70 (Out of Service [OOS]) between 1/8/2023 to 01/12/2023, ODCM Action 51, compensatory actions.
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
- (1) L-23-046-B A Waste Monitor Tank, Liquid Permit, GI-LIi and Total Body
- (2) L-23-045-B B Waste Monitor Tank, Liquid Permit, GI-LIi and Total Body
- (3) G-22-472-B Unit 2 Mini-Purge, Gas Permit, Liver and Total Body
Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following abnormal discharges:
- (1) 1C Gas Decay Tank, between 12/24/2022/0845 and 12/25/2022 /0800. Related to Gas Permit 22-472-B.
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1, July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023
- (2) Unit 2, July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) September 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) During post maintenance test the Unit 2 "C" CCW pump vibrations were in the alert range, caused by the bearing housing bolts not being torqued, documented in AR
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate implementation of procedures resulting in 2C auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump reduced reliability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000335,05000389/2023003-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.12 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specifications 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, were identified for the licensees failure to adequately implement maintenance procedure 2-PMM-08.09, [2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Throttle/Trip] during assembly of the 2C auxiliary feedwater(AFW) pump throttle/trip valve (MV-08-3) during a planned maintenance overhaul. Specifically, during the Unit 2 SL2-27 refueling outage, the licensee failed to properly implement procedure 2-PMM-08.09 during assembly of MV-08-3, causing the sliding nut, integral to the tripping and latching function of MV-08-3 to be installed upside down. Operation of MV-08-3 in this condition resulted in remote latching failure following overspeed trips, adversely affecting 2C AFW pump availability and reliability.
Description:
During the Unit 2 SL2-27 refueling outage from February 17 - March 18, 2023, the 2C AFW pump MV-08-3 throttle/trip valve was overhauled, per 2-PMM-08.09, under work order (WO) 40797727. On March 14, 2-OSP-09.01C, 2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Code Run was performed for post-maintenance testing to verify the safety-related function of providing steam to the 2C AFW pump when initiated by an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AFAS). During this code run, section 4.2 of 2-OSP-09.01C could not be completed when MV-08-3 would not latch following a manual trip. This issue was entered into their corrective action program through action request (AR) 2450701 and corrected under WO 40872608 by adjusting the latching mechanism and linkage. On March 16 the licensee successfully completed 2-OSP-09.01C, declaring the 2C AFW pump operable, noting the overspeed trip would not latch remotely, but could be manually latched locally.
On May 11, the licensee conducted 2-OSP-09.01C for a quarterly code run and declared 2C AFW pump inoperable due to the inability to successfully complete section 4.2 of 2-OSP-09.01C when MV-08-3 would not latch following a manual trip. The licensee replaced the latch and associated pins, and on May 12 the licensee successfully completed 2-OSP-09.01C, declaring the 2C AFW pump operable, again noting that the overspeed trip would not latch remotely, but could be manually latched locally.
On June 13, the licensee removed the 2C AFW pump from service to troubleshoot MV-08-
3. During the process it was discovered the sliding nut was installed upside down. This issue
was corrected and on June 14, the licensee conducted post-maintenance testing, during which the 2C AFW pump failed to trip and only closed to the mid-throttled position. The licensee identified the failure of the trip spring from over-compression as the cause, collateral of the sliding nut installed upside down. The trip spring was replaced under WO 40632525.
On June 15, the post-maintenance test was completed successfully and 2C AFW pump was declared operable.
The inspectors reviewed 2-PMM-08.09 and noted that Attachment 1, Gimpel Trip/Throttle Valve, contained a valve illustration along numbered part locations. This attachment clearly shows the correct alignment of the sliding nut and in which direction it should be installed.
MV-08-3 is closed by a spring mechanism. The valve actuator is designed to open the valve from a normally closed and unlatched position. Starting with the valve in the tripped position, the rotation of the screw spindle will raise the sliding nut and latch-up lever, compressing the trip spring until the latch-up lever engaged the trip hook. When the sliding nut was installed upside down, it changed the action of the trip spring causing the automatic travel to stop before the valve would latch. Operator action was required complete the latching process.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as AR 2469312. The licensee disassembled MV-08-3, correcting the alignment of the sliding nut, and replaced the associated trip spring under work orders 40881043 and 40632525. The licensee additionally initiated a procedural change to 2-PMM-08.09, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2C Throttle/Trip, to prevent a repeat of this occurrence.
Corrective Action References: AR 2469312
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to properly implement maintenance procedure 2-PMM-08.09 during a planned maintenance overhaul of MV-08-3 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the sliding nut, integral to the tripping and latching function of MV-08-3, was installed upside down, resulting in remote latching failure following overspeed trips on March 15, and May 11, 2023.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Although MV-08-3 remained capable of performing its safety-related function when initiated through an AFAS, between March 16 and June 15, 2023, the valves improper operation caused the failure two post-maintenance tests (3/15/23 and 6/14/23) and one quarterly code run (5/11/23). These failures were a direct result of the licensee installing the sliding nut upside down which collaterally degraded the trip spring, which failed preventing MV-08-3 from tripping shut on 6/14/23. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly implement 2-PMM-08.09 during the assembly of MV-08-3, directly resulting in remote latching failure following overspeed trips, causing an adverse impact on the components reliability between March 16 and June 15, 2023.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Because the finding involved a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure, or component that did not impact component operability or Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) functionality, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, even though the performance deficiency directly resulted in remote latching failure following overspeed trips, 2C AFW pump was always able to demonstrate its ability to perform its specified safety function through surveillance testing.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. The licensee was complacent in correcting the sliding nut alignment that presented during two 2-OSP-09.01C procedure failures in March (AR 2450701) and May (AR 2457444). In each instance the licensee failed to correct the root cause of the latching failure and returned the 2C AFW pump to service with an unknown deficiency. Due to the failure to correct the root cause there was over 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of unplanned unavailability before the sliding nut alignment was corrected in June 2023.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, required as recommended by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A, 9.a, in part, maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to this requirement, during the planned maintenance overhaul MV-08-3 of during the Unit 2 SL2-27 refueling outage, the licensee failed to properly implement 2-PMM-08.09 during assembly, causing the sliding nut, integral to the tripping and latching function of MV-08-3 to be installed upside down. Operation of MV-08-3 in this condition resulted in remote latching failure following overspeed trips, adversely affecting auxiliary feedwater (AFW) 2C pump availability and reliability.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 13, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.
Rob Craven, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 15, 2023, the inspectors presented the RP inspection exit meeting inspection results to Rob Craven, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
1C GAS DECAY TANK ABNORMAL RELEASE
2/25/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
ARs 02348455,
2349209,
2381903,
2391141,
2396175,
2404125,
2449739,
2462844,
2410957, and
2375532
Various
Various
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Effluent Management Software Not Calculating Waste Flow
08/10/2023
Miscellaneous
Gas Permit G-22-
2-B
Gas Permit Post-Release Data Report (1C Gas Decay Tank
to U1 Plant Vent)
Work Orders
40850404-01
U1: 1C Gas Decay Tank Pressure Lowering Troubleshooting
Work Orders
4085719301
U2/RIM-26-70 ECCS Rad Monitor Loss of Flow Control
Corrective Action
Documents
ARs 02426281,
2462849,
2463107, and
2462846
Various
Various
Miscellaneous
Tower Systems Inc., Elevator Inspection Report [for
meteorological tower]
10/11/2019
Procedures
0-SMI-57.01
METEOROLOGICAL DATA SYSTEM SEMI-ANNUAL
CALIBRATION
Rev. 11
Work Orders
40827852
U0 - PSL METEOROLOGICAL STATION - 6 MONTH
INSPECTION
01/27/2023
Work Orders
40827852 01
PSL Meteorological Station - 6 Month Inspection
01/27/2023
Work Orders
40828958-01
U0 UFSAR/PM0 110/MET TOWER SEMIANNUAL CAL, 6
06/28/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
MO