IR 05000354/1987020

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-354/87-20 on 870908-10. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation of Licensee Full Participation,Emergency Exercise Conducted on 870909 & Insp of Training Records

ML20236K483
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	11/03/1987
From:	Amato C, Fox E, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236K450	List: IR 05000354/1987020 ML20236K446
References
50-354-87-20, NUDOCS 8711090242
Download: ML20236K483 (7)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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Report No. 50-354/87-20 I

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50-354 Category C

License No. NPF-57 Priority

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I Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company

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_ Post Office Box 236

,4incocks Bridge, New -Jersey 08038-4800 l

l Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating' Station

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Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey i

Inspection Conducted: Septpmber 8-10, 1987 l

Inspectors-

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EPS EP&

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D. Allsopp, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek l

G. Arthur, Sonalyst, Inc.

R. Hogan, NRR W. Thomas, EP, RI T. Tuccinardi, EP, RI K. Chris opher, EP, RI Approved by:

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Chief date V. (/Laza[uJ,RSS EPS, EP&RP F, D uf[h NN k4 e

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 8-10, 1987 (Report No.

30-354/87-20)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced, emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's full-participation, Emergency Exercise conducted September 9,1987 and inepection of the training records for the Artificial Island Emergency Response Organization.

The State of Delaware participated.

Results: No violations were identified.

The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. All Hope Creek exercise related Inspector Follow-up Items were closed.

Four exercise related Salem (E0F) Inspector i

Follow-up Items were also closed, i

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted

• C. Adams, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

• C. Banner, Associate Engineer, Emergency Preparedness

• J. Boettger, Assistant Vice-President, Nuclear Operations Support

• R. Buricelli, General Manger, Engineering and Plant Bettement

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• J. Clancy, Principal Engineer, Radiation Protection Services

D. Fawcett, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness

• L. Fink, Co-owner Representative, Atlantic City Electric Co.

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• J. Kotch, Principle Engineer, Health Physicist.,

S. La Bruna, General Manager, Hope Creek Operations M. Meltzer, Nuclear Training Supervisor

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C. McNeill, Jr.,

Sr. Vice President, Nuclear

• L. Reiter, General Manager, Licensing and Reliability

• E. Riley, Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor, Hope Creek

• J. Schaeffer, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness D. Vito, Senior Engineer, Licensing W. Weckstein, Naclear Training Other licensee personnel were also contacted.

• Denotes those pr!sent at the exit interview on September 10, 1987.

2.0 Emergency Exercise

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The Hope Creek Generating Station announced full-participation (Delaware)

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exercise was conducted on September 9, 1987, 8:00 A.M. to 4:00 p.m.

2.1 Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise bbjectives submitted to NRC Region I on May 22, 1987, were reviewed and, following revision, determined to be adequate to test the licensee's Emergency Plan.

On July 30, 1987, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.

Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. - As a result, minor revisions were made to.the scenario which allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Artificial Island Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.

NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on September 8,1987.

Suggested NRC changes to the scenario made by the licensee were discussed during the briefing.

The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations'or disruption of normal plant operations.

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The exercise scenario included the i~ollowing events:-

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Loss of residual heat removal capability;

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Fire, hydrogen explosion and impact of missile on service

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water building;

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Power surge;

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Anticipated transient wit b ut scram;

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Reactor trip-rods failed to insert completely due'to sabotage:

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Security. response to sabotage; Release of radioactive material to~the environment;

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In-Plant, onsite and offsite radiological monitoring;

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Dispatch of 38 teams from the Operations' Support Center;

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Use of the Event Classification Guide (ECG) and Emergency

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Operating Procedures (EOP);.

Calcub. tion of projected offsite' dose equivalents and dose-

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commitment equivalents; Use of field team data to verify projected doses;-

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Development of Protection Action Recommendations.

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2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team' members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency response organization, activation of emergency-response facilities (ERFs) and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the ERFs. The'following activities were observed.

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Recognition of initiating condition!,, correlation of these with Emergency Action Levels, selection and use of Emergency:

Operation Procedures;.and completion of notification to'offsite governmental authorities; 2.

Staffing and activation of Emergency Response Facilities.;

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Communication between-and within ERFs; p

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Assessments of accident conditions; a

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Technical resolution and application of barrier breech I

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Use of field team data to check and adjust projected dose values; 7.

Development of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) and communication of these to Delaware;

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Security response to sabotage; i

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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection;

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Performance of off-site and in-plant radiological surveys; j

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Performance of technical support, repair and corrective

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12. Assembly and accountability of personnel.

3.0 Exercise Observations I

a The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the j

emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and use of these facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the

following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that

were indical.ive of their ability to cope with the simulated emergency.

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Command and control was excellent.

Technical resolution was

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outstanding.

Internal communications were very good.

The Operations Support Center (OSC) initial condition briefing was

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excellent. Thirty tight (38) teams were dispatched from the OSC throughout the exercise. Teams were given thorough radiation-protection briefings. OSC teams discussed and implemented solutions to problems. Security officers were provided with health physics and operator support when undertaking sabotage sweeps.

The Emergency Response Manager exercised good Command and Control,

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and held frequent staff meetings.

Frequent nd detailed phone discussions were held with Delaware officials.

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Licensee offsite monitoring teams were trained, knowledgeable and well equipped. Use of aerial surveillance greatly enhanced plume tracking capability. The Field Team Coordinator instructed teams, briefed them as to changing conditions and received field. team data.

Licensee Field Team data was used to adjust projected doses.

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a 4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of -

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the exercise the following items were acceptably demonstrated and are

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closed:

(Closed).IFI(50-354/86-51-01).

Emergency Response Organization

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staff in the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the

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Technical Support group within the Emergency Operations Facility did l

not recognize a power surge followed by an Anticipated Transient J

Without Scram (ATWS).

The data were presented manually; a simulator l

was not used.

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(Closed)IFI(86-354/86-51-02).

Control l Room (CR) staff did not declare an Unusual Event (UE) as the result of the transient opening l

of a safety relief valve.

It was classified as a four. hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72. The UE was declared'1ater based on a j

contingency message. This was primarily due to-the scenario data.

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(Closed) IFI (86-51-03). Because the Senior Nuclear ' Shift j

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Supervisor's log book showed the incorrect time for declaration of a i

Site Area Emergency (SAE), the Control Room staff was not aware of

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the SAE' declaration time.

(Closed) IFI (50-354/86-51-04).

Command and control of some teams

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sent from the Operational Support Center (OSC) was weak and at times the OSC was unaware of their location.

(Closed)IFI(50-354/86-51-05).

Cumulative dose records of OSC j

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teams were not maintained; and there were no Status Boards in the

OSC HP area to record and display plant radiation conditions and-team member cumulative doses.

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(Closed)IFI(50-354/86-51-06).

There was a delay.in dispatching a

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search and rescue team due to uncertainty;of the last'known location of this missing person. When this person was found fifteen minutes were required to bring a stretcher to his location.

(Closed)IFI(50-354/86-51-07).

The Dose Assessment staff in the

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Emergency Operations-Facility used a six hour default. time rather than the four hours prescribed in procedures when release duration-was unknown; and failed to use available field team data.

Communication efficiency was reduced when a staff member was assigned another duty by the Vice-President-Nuclear not consistent-with the Emergency Plan.

(Closed) IFI (50-272/86-22-01) and (50-311/86-22-04). :Information.

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on the release duration was not communicated to the necessary technical people. Offsite it'was stated to be less than twelve hours.

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(Closed) IFI (50-272/86-22-03) and (50-311/86-22-03). The Emergency

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Response Manager called seven manager's conferences in the Emergency Opeations Facility (E0F) without designating an individual to take charge of E0F operations.

5.0 Training 5.1 The inspector reviewed training records. About 1330 Artificial Island staff are currently qualified for Emergency Response Organization positions.

This number includes two vice-presidents and four general managers qualified as Emergency Response Managers.

About 640 are trained for Salem and about 590 for Hope Creek; 250 of these are trained for both sites.

5.2 Based upon this review, up-date training in the consolidated plan has been completed. Qualification and requalification on this Plan will begin in 1988.

6.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on September 10, 1987 during which licensee controllers presented and discussed their observations of the exercise. Their critique was adequate.

Licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which

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the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken.

i 7.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self critique, the NRC team members met and

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evaluated the licensee's critique.

Subsequently, the NRC-team met with l

licensee's representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The NRC

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Regional Team Leader summarized observations made during the exercise.

The licensee was informed no violations were observed; and previously j

identified items were adequately addressed.

The NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenh.io, the licensee's performance demonstrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.

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