ML20148D976
| ML20148D976 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1988 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8801250529 | |
| Download: ML20148D976 (25) | |
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DUKE Pownn GoMmxy 18.0. ISOX 33180 CI(AltLOTTE. N.C. 28242 HAL lt Tl*CKER '
TE LE PflONE vue emessor=1 (704) 073-4S31 muuman reoot crio=
January 14, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission y ocument D Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Catawba Nuclear Station Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369, -370; 50-413, -414; 50-269, -270; -287 Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings (NRC/0IE Bulletin 85-03)
Gentlemen:
By Mr. J.M. Taylor's (NRC/0IE) letter dated November 15, 1985 the NRC issued Bul-letin 85-03 concerning motor-operated valve (MOV) common mode failures during plant transients due to improper switch settings. The purpose of this bulletin was to request licensees to develop and implement a program to ensure that switch settings on certain safety-related motor-operated valves are selected, set and maintained correctly to accommodate the maximum differential pressures expected on these valves during both normal and abnormal events within the design basis.
Toward this end, on May 16, 1986 Duke submitted a report (es directed by the bul-letin) outlining our plan to accomplish the requested program for the McGuire, I
Catawba, and Oconee N clear Stations by November 15, 1987. (Note that additional informatioe regarding the May 16, 1986 report for the Oconee Station was provided in my Se- rher 29, 1987 letter in response to an NRC request).
Subsequently, my November 20, 1986 letter Jiscussed a Duke Power Company commit-ment to an expanded scope for our Motor Operated Valve (MOV) improvement program.
l This expansion of scope was based on Duke's in-house investigation initiated in i response to Bulletin 85-03. The scope change included all safety-related M0V's I that are required to be tested for operational readiness at our McGuire, Catawba, and Oconee Nuclear Stations rather than just the Bulletin 85-03 identified MOV's.
l By my February 18, 1987 letter Duke providad the schedule for completion of this operational verification program commitment on all safety-related MOV's for each unit (McGuire and Catawba will require five RFO's per unit and Oconee three RFO's per unit to complete the comprehensive program to ensure safety-related MOV oper-ability is maintained for the hfe of the station). In addition, the February 18, 1987 letter extended our original commitment to complete all actions required by Bulletin 85-03 from the bulletin required date of November 15, 1987 for our Mc-Guire and Catawba Nuclear Stations (generally an extension of cne refueling out-cge; Oconee Nuclear Station was to meet the original commitment schedule). The cubmittal of the bulletin required report (s) following completion of the program on each unit was also adjusted appropriately.
8801250529 880114 PDR Q ADOCK 05000269 PDR l)
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Document Control Desk January 14, 1988 Page 2 Accordingly, attached is Duke Power Company's final response for the Oconee Nu-clear Station (this report meets the requirements of Bulletin Item (f)). The responses fo- McGuire and Catawba will be issued in accordance with the schedule provided in our February 18, 1987 letter which is summarized below:
STATION RF0 AFTER WHICH IEB 85-03 FINAL RESPONSE TO BE SUBMITTED McGuire 1 EOC 5 McGuire 2 EOC 4 Catawba 1 EOC 3 Catawba 2 EOC 2 Should there be any questions concerning this matter or if additional information is required, please advise.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Very truly yours, l , - r' ss&s Hal B. Tucker PBN/71/jge Attachment l .
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Document Control Desk January 14, 1988 Page 3 xc: Mr. Darl Hood Mr. J.C. Bryant Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oc;onee Nuclear Station Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Helen Pastis Mr. P.K. Van Doorn Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Station Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. G.A. Schnebli U.S. Nuc. Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuc. Regulatory Commission Region II Region II 101 Marietta St. NW - Suite 2900 101 Marietta St. NW - Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Atlanta, GA 30323 Dr. K.N. Jabbour Mr. W.T. Orders Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Station Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. T.A. Lordi, Manager Westinghouse Owners Group c/o Westinghouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Services Integration Division Box 2728 Pittsburgh, PA 13230-2728 Mr. R.W. Gantbaer, Manager B&W Owners croup Engineering Services c/o ?abcock and Wilcox Company l Nuclear Power Division l 3315 Old Forest Road i P.O. Box 10935 Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935 j
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DUKE POW 2R COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ,
IE BULLETIN 85-C3 FINAL RESPON!iE ,
INTRODUCTION IE Bulletin 85-03 was issued on November 15, 1985 as a result of numerous motor operated valve (MOV) failures and degradatiens experienced throughcut the industry. Typical problems cited for MOVs are:
- 1. Sympt;matic treating of MOV problems rathor than a thorough root cause problem determination and corrective actions.
- 2. Incorrectly set torque, torque bypass and position limit switches due to deficiencies in station set up procedures, inadequate training for technicians, design deficiencies, or unrealized phenomenon occurring for valves operatitig under flow and 6ifferential pressure canditions.
The intent of the Bulletin is to ensure certain MOVs in the high pressure injection and emergency feedwater systems are properly selected, set and maintained operable for the maximum expc ted design basis conditions. To achieve this intent, the following four action items were specified
- 1. Item a - Review (nd document the design basis for each applic ble MOV.
- 2. Item b - Establish the correct switch settings based on the findit:gs from Item a.
operability.
- 4. Item d - Revise or im91ement procedures to ensure each applicable ,
MOV is maintained operable throughout the life of the plant. ;
j Since the Bulletin was issued, several events have occurred withia Duke Power Company to alter its timing and scope. These alterations are summarized below j with the referenced written correspondence between Duke and the USNRC: )
- 1. May 16, 1986 - Initial respotise to action item a and the plan and
, tJming for comple*ing action items b through d.
- 2. November 20, 1986 - As a result of an identified design defi:ier.cy !
in the selection of Rotork actuator torque switch settings Duke defines an IE Bulletin 85-03 approach to all station safety related MOVs to be completed within approximately 5 refueling outages.
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- 3. February 18, 1987 - Duke requests a one refueling outage extension for the Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations to complete the original IEB 85-03 scope. The reason for this extension was the lack of commercially available equipment to parform signature testing of MOVs equipped with Rotork actuators. Rotork actuators are installed on a majority of the IEB 85-03 valves at these two stations.
- 4. September 29, 1987 - Duke responds to a request for additional information regarding the May 16, 1986 response for the Oconee Nuclear Station.
This response is only for the Oconee Nuclear Station. The response for Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations will be in accordance with the schedule provided in the February 18, 1987 letter which is referenced above.
SUMMARY
OF OCONEE PROGRAM A total of 14 MOVs per unit (42 total) were identified as f alling within the scope of IEB 85-03. The following actions were performed for 39 MOVs equipped with Limitorque actuators:
- 1. Complete actuator refurbishment. This includes disassembly, solvent flush to remove existing grease, inspection of components, reassembly with all necessary new parts, and re-lubrication. In addition, checks were performed to ensure all wiring, limit and torque switch components, motor insulation, motor T-drains and grease reliefs satisfied environmental qualification (EQ) requirements. This was a ongoing program which began prior to the issuance of IEB 85-03.
- 2. Design Engineering review of MOV design basis, including manufacturer and system data. Thrust values were established for field set up of actuator torque switches.
- 3. Field verification of basic valva and actustor data.
- 4. Complete signature analysis testing to ensure proper torque, torque bypass and position limit switch settings.
For the remaining 3 Rotork actuated valves, the same above basic four steps ,
wete performed with the exception that the actuators received a preventative uaintenance (P/M) check instead of reft.rbishment and they were signature tested to the degree possible using commercielly available squipnient.
In addition, 7 Unit 1 MOVs were tested under differential pressure conditions in an effort to verify vendor sizing formulas.
Page 3 SUMMARf 0F OCONEE RESULTS Refurbishmenj Program:
Generally, til refurbished Limitorque actuators were found to contain degraded gear housing grease and some had other minor degraded components, such ast bent de-clutch lever shaf ts, chipped worm or worm gear teeth, limit switch gear grease solidified away from the gears, and improperly adjusted de-clutch tripper fingers. Although there were numerous degradations identified, none were of a severity to have prevented the actuator from operating. Tne majority of actuators had not been completely re-lubed or inspected since they were shipped from the factory.
Action Item c Review and Document the Des'.cn Basis This review found that all 14 M9Vs on each unit were designed to operats in conditions greatsr than or equal to the most severe conditions foe the system 8
which they were installed.
Hp-409 and HP-410 on each unit were identified by Westinghouse prior to issuance of IEB 85-03 ss being marginally sized for their application. These two MOVs were up-sized from SB-00 to SB 3 Limitorque actuators on each unit during the 1986 and 1987 refueling outages.- Both the SB-00 and SB-0 actuators, however, were challenged under maximum differential pressure conditions and each operated successfully.
Table 1 is a summary of this part of the study and contains key valve and actuator data, MOV design or as purchtsad differential pressure, maximum worst case differential pressure within the design basis of the system for which the MOV is installed, MOV safaty function and the calculated stem and sest loads at maximum worst case differential pressure.
Action Item b Establish the Correct Switch Settings Torque Switch All 14 IEB 85-03 MOVs .vte set up using standard MOVATS signature analysis techniques to achieve a specified thrust output at torque switch trip. This thrust value was derived using standard vendor sicing caleslations and contained both a margin and toltrance, since the MOVATS sy9 tem is only &ble to accurately measure the thrust outp"t available above running load, the target open and close set tp thrust was the sut of the stem and seat differential pressure components of the calculated actuator load plus a mar > in. The present l philosophy is to provtan a 10 to 15% m :-in and ' 31erance to the calculated 1 values for field set i.p ;,urposes.
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Page 4 The values listed in Table 1 reflect the most recent calculation methodology utilized for the Fall 1987 Unit 1 refueling outage. The values for Units 2 and 3 differed slightly since they were calculated during a period of time where the level of awareness was not as great. However, in all cases, with the exception of 2MS-82 and 2MS-84, these values were more conservative (higher numerically) than the Unit i values given in Table 1.
To establish the values in Table 1 the following calculation methodology was utilized:
Seat Differential Pressure Component
= Seat Orifice Area (sq.in.) x Valve Factor x Differential Pressure (psid)
Where Valve Factor =
0.3 Wedge Gate Valves (Limitorque actuators) 0.35 Wedge Gace Valves (Rotork actustors) 1.1 Globe Valves Differential Pressurc = Maximum expected worst case design differential pressure.
Stem Differential Pressure Component
= Stem Cross Sectional Area at Packing (sq.in.) x Differential Pressure ,
(psid) l Target Thrust open and Close - Gate Valves
= (Seat + Stem Differential Pressure Components) x (Margin)
A tolerance of 10 to 15% was added to this value for field set up purposes.
Target Thrust Open and Close - Globe Valves
= (Seat Differential Pressure Components) x (Margin)
A tolerance of 10 to 15% was added to this value for field set up purposes.
Though not listed in Table 1, the stem packing load was calculated as fo! lows:
Stem Packing Load
= 1000 (lb/in.) x Stem Dismeter (in.)
Torque switches which had balancing capabilities were balanced to within 500mV difference between open and close worm shaft displacements at identical torque switch settings or as necessary to achieve the specified thrust output.
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Page 5 The as left and as found torque switch trip points, giving the thrust available above running load, are provided in Table 2. The as found torque switch values are based on an extrapolation of the as lef t signature data (taken at 3 torque switch settings) to the recorded as found settinga.
Open Torque Switch Bypass Switch Nuclear Station Modifications (NSMs) were generated to perform the necessary wiring changes for all safety related and key plant gate valves to relocate the open torque switch bypass switch to 25 to 75% of the valve open stroke without affecting control root indication lights. This modification was performed on all IEB 85-03 gate valves in conjtmetion v ith reconnect or signature testing.
For globe valves, this swi*e5 n.8 positior.ed to open after disc unseating and no viring modifications *are performed. Full stroke signature traces were taxen to ensure tha correct position of this switch. Table 2 provides a summary of the location o' the end of disc unseating under no differential pressure and flow condiuns to the opening of the open torque switch bypass switch. Tht: Table 2 per cages are based on open stroke time from the spring pack displacement and sw. .hes signature. For 1HP-24 and 1HP-25 the location of disc unsesting was masked by spring pack preload.
As found positiocing of the open torque switch bypass switch was not recorded since the actuators were removed for refurbishment, refurbished and then reinstalled on the valve prior to signature testing. Existing station procedures were deficient for gate valves in that they specified that this switch open af ter dise unseating under no flow and differential pressure.
Subsequent in house instrumented tes?.ing cf gate valves opening under differential pressure revealed the need to conservatively locate this switch to open at a minimum of 25% of the open stroke. Because of improper positioning of this switch for gate valves in the as found condition, the torque switch was relied upon to overcome the opening differential pressure forces which would occur after the open torque switch bypass switch opened. Wiring modifications and revisions to station procedures have corrected this deficiency.
Open Position Limit Switch The open position limit switch is located at 90 to 95% of the valve opw.
stroke. This allows for actuator coast down to prevent power backseating or coasting into the backseat. Station procedures and signature traces nnsure i that backseating is not occurring.
I In the as found state, station procedures were adequate to ensure power backseating was not occurring. However, procedures failed to ensure that the valve was not coasting into the backseat, as no checks wer9 performed to verify that backseat $ng did not occur during power operation. 0ily FDW-347. HP-409 and HP-410 wete subject to this problem rince they are h.;h speed actuators.
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Page 6 Overload Protection Per FSAR 8.3.1.5.1:
On small engineered safeguard motor loads two of the three overload elements are oversized for cable protection rather than motor protection and are wired in the contactor trip circuit. The third element la sized for motor protection but is wired to alarm only. This is basud on the premise that the motor should operate even if motor damage does occur.
Cable sizing is based on maximum service factor loading of the motor.
Action Item c Field Set 0p_Each MOV and Demonstrate joV Operability
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Each of the 14 HOVs on all three units were set up usina the MOVATS signature !
, analysis testing method to quantify the torque switch trip thrust values and to ensure proper locatiens of the open torque switch bypass and open position limit switches. To vorify the adequacy of the thrwat values used in the est up, 7 of the Unit i MOVs were signature tested under differential preasure canditions. Sinco all 14 of the MOVs which are used in identical sarvice are identical in design between all three units, only the Unit 1 MOVs were tested.
Differential pressure test results are summarized in Table 1. 1HP-20 was tested at two differential pre-sures using a hydro pump. 1HP-?.6,27,409 and 416 were tested using full HPI pump discharge head with a 43 psig reactor coolant system downstream pressure. 1MS-82 and IMS-84 were tested at two diffetential pressures by having main steam header pressure on the valve vpstream side and evacuating the downstream line to the condenser.
Test results for globe valves 1HP-20,26, and 27, which have flow under the seat, are difficult to interpret. The reason for this is that the no flow and differential pressure signatures are similar in magnitudu and shape to the differential pressure signatures. Extension of the unseating duration by several tenths of a second appears to be the primary difference. Even inflection points in the unseating signature are almost identical in thrust magnitude. The seating signatures for 1HP-26 and 1HP-27 are identical in both the no dif ferential pressure and flow signature, aad the signature with differential pressure and flow.
Test results for gate valves 1HP-409,410, IMS-82 and 84 are summarized below.
1 i Test Differential Measured S6at Load Measured Valve Factor Valve Pressure Opening Closing Open Close 1 1HP-409 2900 4427 7503 0.16 0. 4' /
l 1HP-410 2909 5856 7882 0.21 0.28 IMS-82 410 3220 0.28
- 900 9547 0.38 IMS-84 398 4935 0.44 l 900 11773 0.46 1
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Page 7 Frem the above test results the assumed valve factor of 0.3 used in the sizing calculations adequately accounted for the seating and unseating forces which were tealized by the 1HP-409 and 1HP-410 Westinghouse gate velves. However, the valve facter was much higher for the IMS-82 and IMS-84 Crane gate valves.
Additional testing is scheduled for Crane valves of this design to ensure this is not an isolated phenomenon. If additional differential pressure testing reveals that the /alve factors are indeed this large, then the sizing formulas for Crane gate valves of this design will be revised to reflect these new values. By using the worst case valve factor for 1MS-82 and IMS-84, the projected differential pressure zad at the design conditions of 1050 psid ig 13816 lbs. which is still withia the capa'oilities of the SMB-00 actuator,
- 9. specially with the open torque switch bypassed 25 to 75% of the opening stroke.
Suction gate valves C-156, C-391, HP-24 and HP-25 were not differential pressure tested with signature analysis equipment installed for three reasons:
- 1. These valves are operated regularly at their maximum expected A1fferential pressure.
- 2. The spring pack preload would mask the small differential pressure loads these valves are subject to and therefore no quantifiable results could be obtained.
- 3. All four of these MOVs were designed and sized for differential pressures greater than the maximum expected worst case differential pressures.
Letdown cooler valves 1HP-3 and 1HP-4 were net differential pressure tested
. with signature analysis equipment installed for two reasons:
- 1. Differential pressure testing would subject the letdown coolers to shock loading conditions. ;
- 2. 1HP-20, a valve identical in desiga to these two valves was differential pressure tested. The test results of 1HP-20 showed no ,
unusual phenomenon which would warrant additional testing of this '
valvo design.
'B' stear generator inlet valve, 1FDW-347 was not differential pressure tested
- with siras*.ure analysis equipmeat installed for three reasons:
- 1. This valve is e,uipped with a Rotork actuator which does not easily lend itself to instruvented differential pressure testing.
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- 2. The valve is located in the steam gi.nerator cavity area of the reactor building which is difficult to access during most phases of plant operation.
- 3. Design conditions for this MOV far exceed the maximum worst case differential pressure conditions for this application. In addition, the open torque switch is bypassed 25 to 75% of the valve open stroke with more than adequate design output margin available.
Action Item di Ensure the Correct Switch Settinas are Maintained Procedure Revisions Switch set up, refurbishment, preventative .aintenance, and corrective maintenance procedures were revised to correct identifiable dsficiencies.
The procedure revision process is very dynanic due to increased awareness of items affecting MOV operability and reliability. For this reasca, all procedures pertaining to MOVs will be periodically updated to reflect new items of importance.
Post Maintenance Testing All work performed to the IEB 85-03 valves or actuators which could affect available stam thrust, such as stam packing adjustments, or replacament of the torque switch or other major actuator maintenance vill require one of the following retests:
- 1. Complete signature analysis retest, including spri .; pack calibration, to reestablish specified available thrust at torque switch trip. This option is mandatory if the maintenance activity could cause a change in the spring pack calibration value.
- 2. itotor contrcl center (MCC) M0 VATS motor load monitoring to ensure '
established running load threshold value is not exceeded.
- 3. A spring pack displacement signature for actuators which have no spring pack preload to quantify changes in running load.
Preventative Maintenance (P/M)
An 18 month or every refueling outage schedule will be maintained for mechanical and electrical P/M of the IEB 85-03 McVs until enough data is collected to warrant increasing this interval. The interval incraase will be a function of the actuator environment and also what the P/M results indicate.
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Page 9 The mechanical P/M will check for mechanical problems such as broken parts or loosa or frayed wire and also all grease or oil seal areas will be checked for leaks or damage. The lubrication inspection for Limitorque actuators requires grease samples to be taken from two areas of the main gear housing and from the limit switch gear boxes. These samples would be checked fort quantity, to determine if all moving parts are covered contamination, to check for water, dirt or metal particles that would indicate gear failures; and consistency, to determine if the grease is pliabla enough te provide lubrication protection to moving parts. Rotork actuators would require a check for proper oil level. In addition, other checks will be performed to ensure all EQ requirements are satisfied.
The electrical P/M involves checking the overall electrical condition internal and external to the actuator. This inspection consists of
- 1. Verification that relays are securely mounted, clean and that the terminals are tight. l
- 2. Cleaning and inspections of MCC compartment, including contactors, ,
interlocking switches, overload heaters, and electrical terminations.
- 3. Meggar and resistance checks of motor windings. ,
l 4. Cleaning and inspection of limit switch compartment, including the ;
torque switch mechanism, limit switch and torque switch contacts.
T-drain plug verification, verification of wiring condition, and verification of the torque switch settings.
Surveillance Testing Each of the 14 IEB85-03 MOVs on each unit will be stroke tested to verify operability each refueling outage.
Training and Qualification of Technicians See Attachment 1. Training and Qualification.
Follow up and Program Developmant Past Operability Concerns MOVs 1HP-3, 1HP-4, 1HP-20, 2HP 3, 2HP-4 and 3HP-20 were found to have lower 1 than required as found thrust output. Operability statements for these valves are being initiated through Design Engineering.
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Page 10 Oyer Thrustina Concerns MOVs 1HP-3, 2HP-3, 2HP-20, 3HP-3, 3stP-4, 3HP-20 and 3MS-84 are developing as left closing thrust values which exceed the 2000 cycle actuatc r rating.
The following corrective actions will be taken:
- 1. Actuator structural analysis to determine the reduced cycle life due to the over thrusting load.
- 2. Valve structural analysis to determine if valve components are being damaged due to the over thrusting load.
- 3. Additional signature testing to sea if seating loads can be reduced to acceptable values.
Differential Prassure Testing Duke Power has constructed a full flow high pressure MOV test loop at the i Riverbend Fossil Station. The purpose of thir facility is to test MOVs identical in design to those found in the stat' an in a controlled, laboratory environment. Parameters identified for testi g are:
- 1. Seating and unseating loads due to differential pressure. Vender sizing formulas and factors will be verified.
2, Stem packing loads.
J. Under voltage effects.
- 4. Testing of new s.gnature analysis techniques.
Safety related valve designs which are not available for testing at the l Riverbend Facility will be screened for in plant instrumented differential pressure testing. In plant testing will not be performed if plant safety and system integrity will be compromised as a result of that testing. This in plant testing, if necessary, will resume during the upcoming 1988 Unit 3 refueling outage.
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ATTACjiMENT 1 Oconee Nuc r.ar Station WOM Sec io 3. .
Approved ts , t ., s_
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Original Date gi Zh 9 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to describe the Training and Qualification required for all valve operator work, both mechanical and electrical, at Oconee Nuclear Station.
2.0 APP L.ICABII.ITY This directive is applicable to all valve operator work on all systems at Oconee Nuclear Station. This training and qual'ifications are direc ed toward complying with the ETQS program and INPO requirements.
3.0 RESPONSIBIIITIES ,
3.1 The Superin'tendent of Maintenance is responsible for the implementation of the valve operator training and qualification manual.
3.2 The Maintenance Services Engineer is responsible for ensuring all personnel who work on valve operators are sufficiently trained and qualified as set forth in the Employee Training and Qualifications Standards Program (ETQS).
3.3 The Construction Maintenance Department-South Maintenance Manager and the Mechanical Maintenance Engineer are responsible for the training and qualifications of personnel under their jurisdiction who perform mechanical related work on valve operators. ,
1 4.0 TRAINING AND QUAI.IFICATION GOAI.S l
Training and Qualifications requirements are outlined in the applicable ETQS standards and the ONS Maintenance Directives. The following to a description of those requirements for Nuclear Production Department Mechanical Maintenan e, CMD, Mechanical Maintenance contract vendor, support personnel and I&E Maintenance personnel.
4.1 NPD Mechanical Maintenance 4.1.1 Basic Mechanical Training is a prerequisite to the On-the-Job Training (0JT) qualification program which includes topics relevant to valve operators.
4.1.2 OJT is required prior to qualifying to a task to perfers valve operator repair unsupervised. During the OJT process technicians are trained on the actual task (s) that they will be expected to qualify to.
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Pcss 2 4.1.3 -Additional training needs are identified through the OJT process. As special needs are identified, training classes are developed and/or obtained from vendor sources by the Prod 2ction Training Services.
4.1.4 On satisf setory completion of OJT and upon approval of the technician's supervisor, a qualification checkout is per-formed to evaluate actual skills related to the specific tasks. These checkouts are performed by exempt subject-matter-experts who are qualified as Qualifiers through the ETQS program. Also, additional training needs are identified during this process.
4.1.5 Continuing training is provided af ter initia?. qualification to tasks to insure technicians skills are maintained to the required level of expertise. Continuing training will be developed and/or obtained by Production Training Services as identified by the NPD personnel.
4.2 CMD-South Mechanical Maintenance The following guidelines are in effect until the determination is made that CMD personnel vill fully qualify to the ETQS program.
4.2.1 Each technician has complaced the Maintenance Orientation Training. )
4.2.2 Successful completion of General Employee / Radiation Worker "C" Training.
4.2.3 Maet the requirements of Table "A" of Station Directive 4.4.3 (Qualification of Interf acing Individuals) . j 1
4.2.4 Technicians should have a good reading comprehension and a good l understanding of valve operator terminology. 1 4.2.5 Technicians should be technically competent (background experience) and have a minimum of one years experience in the area of valve operators.
4.2.6 Demonstrate good leadership qualities.
4.3 Contract Vendor Personnel 4.3.1 Each personnel has successfully completed the Maintenance Orientation Training (valid for 2 years) .
4.3.2 Successful completion of General Employee / Radiation Worker "C" ,
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4.3.3 Meet the requirement . Table "A" in Station Directive 4.4.3 I j (Qualification of Interf acing Personnel) . j i
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Pcge 3 4.3.4 Vendor shall supply to 'the Station documented verification of the contract personnel's work history and qualifications. This shall include:
A. Education B. Experience C. Training applicable to job D. Previous qualifications at Duke Power Company 4.3.5 Contract vendor personnel shall have good reading comprehension and a good understanding of valve operator terminology.
4.4 The training requirements to qualify an I&E technician to perform MOVATS (Motor Operated Valve Analysis Testing Systen) diagnostic evaluations are conducted through the ETQS program.
4.4.1 IP/0/A/3001/01 - Electrical Preventive Maintenance Precedure for Limitorque Operators.
4.4.2 IP/0/A/3001/03 - Electrical Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Rotork Operators. ,
4.4.3 LP/0/A/3001/10 - Maintenance of Limitorque Operators.
4.4.4 IP/0/A/3001/11 - Testing of Limitorque and Rotork Operators using MOVATS.
In addition to the above training each individual vill have completed the MOVATS signature analysis training conducted by MOVATS, Inc.
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OCONEE IEB 85 TABLE 1 HEADER EKPLANATIONS VALVE DATA Manufacturer, size, type and pressure class of valve.
ACTUATOR DATA Manufacturer (LIM = Limitorque), size and motor rating (motor RPM for Rotorks).
This is the differential pressure that the valve and actuator assembly were designed to operate against.
This is the maximum worst case differential pressure conditions which the valve and actuator assembly will be required to operate against. The value listed here was derived taking into account system conditions which would be present when the valve is required to operate, such as pump head and downstream (i.e. reactor coolant system) pressures.
HOV SAFETY FUNCTION Defines whether the valve is required to open, close or cycle.
C ALCULATED DIFF PRESS LOAD (LBS)- STEM / SEAT Listed here are the calculated loads applied to the valve stem and seat due to the maximum vorst case differential pressure conditions. The maximum worst case differential pressure values were used for these calculations. The stem loads for globe valves are included in the seat load and are therefore listed as O pounds.
TEST DP (PSI) - OPEN CLOSE This defines the differential pressure (s) applied to the valve for testing purposes. For those valves which were differential pressure tested, the loads were extrapolated to the maximum worst casa differential pressure conditions (note 6).
DP LOADS (LBS)-SEAT- OPEN CLOSE The values listed here represent the force applied to the valve seat due to opening or closing at the test differential pressure. Note that this is only the seat differential pressure force component.
I A. . . .
OCONEE IEB 85-03 TABLE 1 NOTES (1) No instrumented differential pressure testing performed. These are suction valves which experience low differential pressures and are operated regularly at maximum differential pressure conditions. In addition, spring pack preload values would mask the minimal differential prcasure loads which can be measured by existing signature analysis techniques.
(2) No instrumented differential pressure testing performed. This valve is sized for 2485 psid, far in excess of the 1450 psid maximum expected differential pressure for the system. In addition, this is a valve has a Rotork actuator which are difficult to differential pressure test using existing signature analysis techniques.
(3) Since these are letdown cooler outlet valves no differential pressure testing was performed to prevent pressure shocking the coolers. In addition, HP-20, en identical valve to HP-3 and 4, was differential pressure tested with signature analysis equipment installed.
(4) Even though these valves were opened and closed under full flow differential pressure conditions, no visible differential pressure effects could be identified from the signatures the static no flow signatures were nearly identical to that of the 2900 psid full flow signatures.
Opening values represent lug engagement and cracking loads and are not representative of opening differential pressure forces.
(5) Since these valves are identical in design to the Unit i valves which were tesced under differential pressure conditions, no testing was performed.
(6) Projected differential pressure load based on a linear extrapolation.
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IW 3 1.tl/6740 1.54/19M0 1.75/ttMO t.*5/13260 di 5.1/23.7 ill tti i t
t o-4 1.00/52M 1.M/!It0 1.75/11516 1.5/litM 171 4.4/14.4 ill tti 14 10 3.00/18817 f.*5/7620 f.75/tt071 f.75/11664 (?) 5.4/11.4 til (t) -
9 IW-24 f Hit 7M 1.H/ttti 1.MillM 1.H/4M0 (71 t'H 9 (Il til tW 25 1.H,56f t 1.M/3979 1.H/5610 1.H/5970 (7) W.4 til til LW-la 1.75/324M 1.50/34894 1.!!$lt5tM 1. Hit?470 On 1.3s t.6 til tti IW-47 1.54/24M0 1.50/14M0 1.25/19210 1.00/13150 di 1.3/4.6 til til !
t@-44 (101 (tel 2.40/ ISMO t.50/tS020 171 7.9/57.9 18) (t)
IW 4l4 (10) (10 2.25/19140 2.25/tt!M til 6.9/ 64.t til it) {
IRS St 3.00/14430 1.5/7570 1.75/134M t.!'ll!6M Op 5.6/et.1 (18 (t) .
' t IR$ 14 3.H/148H i.M/56M t.15/12920 2.125/11660 01 4.5/53.0 til (t) !
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!*-4 1.H/5tte I.M/5240 1.75/150tl f.25/13294 171 4.9/16.6 til 19) i ;
!>8-10 1.*3/170M 1.*1/16857 t.75/17tM 1.75/16457 01 5.1/11.3 181 (11 ;
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tW 17 1.Hn340001.HI13353 1.00/34M3 1.H/13353 t?) 1.1/6.4 til 191 4
& # 4 09 till till I.75/17460 f.54/16tM 01 7.4/30.1 til 19) ;
2 4 -410 (101 (10 !.50/17115 t.5* *17261 01 1.0/63.1 til th IM Il I.Mllt774 1.M/tt308 f.Mll!774 1.H/tt3tl (7) 5.7/!!.1 til til tal.84 f.50/154M t.50l't99 1.*!/10360 1.75/11741 01 4.1/13.7 10 to X 156 f.H/15014 1.?S/mi 1.!!$/6200 1.25/65M (71 4.6/!!.9 til IM ,
K-191 1.H/37t3 1.00/tXI t.75!!M0 1.875/26M di 1.7/54.1 Ili 191 3rW-347 5.M/36450 5. Mitt?50 5.M/35475 5.H/IlWS (M 14.4/51.1 ill 4H M1 2.5/13M0 f.54/14MO t.3*3/ttlM t.25/1294 (M 4.1/7.9 Ill (H i 34-4 f.MI'609 f.H/t!!73 2.75/1543 1.54/14920 (U t.7M.4 (Il 191 l l
, 34 10 1.0t$005 1.M/5716 1.75/13290 f.H/14M4 di 4.6/t.$ til (H I 1
34-24 f H/It06 f Hettli 1.7516M4 1.75/6M4 On 8.8/53.t Ill th l M-t1 1.H/ttt'6 f.H/lCI 1.50/7100 1.50/5tW th 7.8/72.4 til (91
- M 16 1.t1/16432 1.25/t7tti t.M/tr5M 1.H/t3450 th 3.3/3.5 til 191 l
l M-17 1.50/ttl76 1.54/tte's 1.H/ttl70 t.51/tt4M 0) t.fil.14 Ill (H 34 49 till (10 f t1/tp4M t.!5/Il640 til 8.1/52.4 ill (H I
M -410 (101 (101 1.50/ttrM t.375/t?De di 1.2/57.3 (ti 1 91 !
1 345-M t.50/17679 1.N/H31 f.It1/144M t. tint.44 di 3.3/56.4 til to P644 f.54/lbt71 1.50/6M4 f.I!1/11M4 f.25/1340 til 3.1/M.0 (Il .IM
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. .__ __ ________x__________
OCONEE IEB 85 TABLE 2 HEADER EXPLANATIONS I
TORQUE SWITCH SETTING /DP THRUST OUTPUT AS FOUND- OPEN CLOSE The values listed here are the as found torque switch settings and corresponding thrust output available above running load to overcome differential pressure loading conditions. These thrust values are taken at the torque switch trip point. The l
l corresponding thrust outputs are based on signature data taken i
after the actuator was refurbished and reinstalled on the i valve.
l AS LEFT- OPEN CLOSE The values listed here are the as left torque switch settings and corresponding thrust output available above running load to overcome differential pressure loading canditions. These thrust values are taken at the torque switch trip point.
DISC UNSEATING /0 PEN T.S. BYPASS LOC. (% OF OPEN STROKE)- AS FOUND AS LEFT The total valve close to open stroke time based on a spring pack displacement signature is divided into the time required for:
- 1. The spring pack displacement signature to return to a running load value after static valve unseating. For 1HD-24 and 1HP-25 the static unseating load was masked by the spring pack preload.
- 2. The open torque switch bypass switch to open.
The ao found data was not taken due to actuator rsfurbishment.
OPEN LIMIT SWITCH LOC. (% OF OPEN STROKE)- AS FOUND AS LEFT The total valve close to open stroke time based on a spring pack displacement signature is divided into the time required for the open position limit switch to open and de-energize the actuator motor.
___-._._______-._.-_-__._J
. _ _ _ . -~. .. _ _ _ _ . _
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r OCONEE IEB 85-03 TABIA 2 NOTES 3
- 7) Open T.S. bypass switch covered dise unseating with little margin due to deficiency in station set up procedure. .
t j (8) Back seating data not obtained due to ongoing refurbishment program. Valve }
not expected to have been power back seating. ,
(9) Open limit switch set to 90 to 95% of open stroke based on plant procedure. Signature traces were taken to ensure valve is not
'cack seating.
(10) New actuators installed. Old actuators discarded prior to signature testing and the as found data was not available.
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LnXIS lte liMtJAL 644Lflit M TO MR fddflH.
Id-4 i Ll cooler entlet till Ste(IAttts Pital!Liff finit(ni M TO L:s al FDA f.l. SEffit65 1 4 -20 AC pp uet retern till St=Dailt6 ptAAlttlit Statt(af M T0 th al FDLet f,5. Hffigl, 14 24 A nPI ps sect Belf Illilli OPERAM l*P Il C NPI pp sxt Mi tilitti critAkt 1 4 -26 4 lup #! ina till GPilAllt lmP 47 1 lies W! 12) till OPttAkt thP4H Ilup#1 (11 1!) CPitAkt 1 cepect id-4tl 4 lup MP! titilt) CPDAkt I-cenec t 4 1RS il UPf stees sosit titilli lAFiff FUNCf!310 CPtt. LOW Al FOUG CLOSE f.l. Stitles a0f As QPt1Ai!Liff CDettM.
1+14 EFPT stua s pgly titilli lAFEff FUhCfl04 TO OPit. LOW Al FOU4 CLOSE t.l. Stif tet act 4 PitAi!Liff CXtit.
IC-Il6 Ud sactise-nf til Ill DPitekt tC4ft- (FW sutise4stull (11.111 OPitAllt IFH 34f (F# tisen te (II) CP[tAkt l' lil 24 3 4 Ll coolet estlet till Stuttafle6 OPDst!Llff ifatE(si M LOW Al F0Va6 f,5. Stif!Gl.
LtXR60!al St#UCfueAL anALfill M TO MR feelflho.
24-4 i Ll coelee estlet till SEKA4f1tl 0Pt#441Llif ITAtt(si M TO LN Al F0ust 1.5. liffin65.
24 10 BC p seal rotera (lli UtMiloit6 liRVCPA 444Lilli M TO Mi idJIfit6.
t# it & WI p sat Mi titill) OPflatti M-fl C di n set tuli (11.11) OPDAILt
!@ 26 A leep WI ty till GPilmt 2 4 -27 I leep WI to: Ill) PDAkt M-40f I leep di titill) OPitAllt 1-cipec t M 416 4 tus WI tilitti CPtinalt t-coarec t l !+12 UPt stees sast, 111 !!)
l tel-14 EFPf steae s4pt, Illitti Inrtif FXfl0e 70 QPit. LW al 70Utl CLitt f l. Stifles act u t
CPital!Liff CXtH.
X Il6 EFW settensli (11.111 OPitagLt IC lit (FU section-noteell Illil!! OPEletL!
3Flv-34f EFvP tisch to tit) OPitAM l' 1/8 M1 a ti cooler utlet 1111 OPtimt LtMil0!st IttuCTUHL netti!I M TO MR fetulflat.
M4 i Ll cooler utlet till SAFiff FXt!De il CLLE, LN &l F00ml DPts f,1, $tif14 nOf M Grit-Al!Llit CDecth tJettl0!al StuivHt neaLfill M TO Mt tevlf tal.
< M 20 #C n sul return (111 itupAfins GPitellt!Ti ITAttatut M fl LN al 70uti 1,l Stiflesl.
LeMil0!al lituCfuML #a4Lilli M 70 Mt-feulflu6.
M-24 4 dl 33 tat Belf (11.13) QPD68tt 3W tt C =PI as set Isli Illitti OPD&8tt M 26 A lup #1 sq till DPtHILE M-27 I lup #1 iN till DPDOLE [
M 4H I los *! (11,131 QPitsu l-:euett W-til 4leep #1 (11,12) DPDA8Lt .
J 1-ceewt t M-St (FP1 stees $4 pit (11.131 Wiff Futtfl0e 10 GPie. Lh 41 F0Jul CLDlt 1.1. Stif!E a01 as OPD641Llff C0uCDs.
M-84 EFPI stees s4 ply (11 12) 14Fiff FUuC!!0e il DPit, LOW Al FNm) CL0lt f l. Stifles a01 as OPDAllLiff CXIM.
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0C015E IEB 85 TABLE 3 HEADER EXPIANATIOblS (
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VALVE FUNCTION Brief description of the valve service. l DEGRADATIONS Deficiencies noted in the mechanical or electrical components of the actuator in the as found condition.
5 OPERABILITY General statement of valve and actuator assembly operability in ,
the as found or as left condition i
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000 NEE IEB 85-03 TABLE 3 NOTES (11) Degraded gear housing, limit switch gear and stem lubricant. Though i degraded, operability of actuator was not significantly affected.
(12) Open T.S. bypass switch not ideally set to provide double opening coverage of differential pressure valve unseating. That is, the torque switch was probably called upon to overcome differential pressure opening effects after the torque switch bypass switch opened.
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