ML20207E603
| ML20207E603 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1983 |
| From: | Roberts T NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Markey, Udall M HOUSE OF REP., HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204G507 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8607220381 | |
| Download: ML20207E603 (17) | |
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? NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION /
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\; - 4/ E H C E 3 05 W "'Ti csa n October 17,120tified R- zu CX) _
o The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman N Co=ittee on Interior and Insular Aff airs United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your letter of August 1,1983 requested the Commission's response to a number of questions regarding the allegations that leak rate calculations were falsified at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 prior to the 1979 accident. Responses to your specific questions are provided in Enclosure 1. In addition, recent memoranda from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, to Cc=issioner Gilinsky, address some of the same questions you have asked.
They are enclosed for your information and are referenced, when appropriate, in responding to your specific questions.
In addition, in a letter to you dated June 1,1983 then Acting Chairman Ahearne answered Questions 2 through 5 of your February 25, 1983 letter and stated that the answer to Question 1 would be provided later. Enclosed herewith is the Comnission's answer to Question 1. ,
Finally, enclosed for your information are two recent Ecard riotifications from the staff concerning their previously stated position in the IMI-1 restart record regarding the falsification of leak rate data which has proven to be incorrect.
Cc =issioner Gilinsky adds that while the fiRC staff informed the Co =ission of the existence of the Hartman allegations and of the referral to the Department of Justice, the liRC staff did not, until quite recently, share with the Cc=ission its evaluation of the seriousness and significance of these allegations, fio satisfactory explanation has been given for this reticence.
Sincerely, 8607220381 831017 ,
PDR COMMS NRCC CORRE~SPONDENCE POR 7 gg Acting Chairman
Enclosures:
See tiext Face fiote: Identical ltr sent to
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cc: Rep. Manuel Lujan Markey w/same enclosures.
(Originated by JGoldberg: ELD)
Entiosures te Chairman Paiiadino's letter to Congressman Udall
- 1. Answers ;c August 1,1983 Ouestions f rom Congressmen Udall and I;'.arkey
- 2. Answer to Question 1 from Chairman Uc,all's rebruary ,c ,19,:c l e -;e r. ,
- 3. Mem:randum from Commissioner Gilinsky to William J. Dircks, May 21, 1954
- a. Memorancum from William J. Dircks to Commissioner Gliinsky, June 10, 1954, with attachments . .
- 9. Mem:randum f rom Com.issioner Gilinsky to William J. Dircks, June 2g. 198 :
E. Memorandum f rom William J. Dircks to Commissioner Gilinsky, July 1.,1983
- 7. NRC Staff's Memorandum on the Status of its IMI-1 Restart neview, Juiv 21, 19E3
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Memorandum from William J. Dircks to the Commissioners, June 23 ,198,.
8 9 '. TMI-1 Appeal Board Memorandum and Order (ALAB-738), August 31, 1983
- 10. Board Notification 83-138
- 11. Board Notification 83-13SA p
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Distribution on Letter to Chairman Udall & Markey fm Chairman Palladino
- Dated Oct. 17. lost SECY 83-2136 0CA H.Plaine, OGC
- 'Ha hkf01 H. Denton, NRR
- R. DeYoung, IE.
T. Murley, RA/R-1
., l J. Roe, EDO W. Dircks, EDO
, T. Rehm, EDO EDO 13394
! G. Cunningham, ELD J. Goldberg, ELD V. Stello, DEDROGR DEDROGR cf DEDROGR staff Central File l
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ENCLOSURE 1 3
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ANSWERS TO AUGUST 1, 1983 QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMEN UDALL AND MARKEY Ouestion 1.
When did NRC staff first reach a conclusion as to the substance of the Hartman allegations concerning leak rate falsification at TMI-2? What was the basis for any such conclusions? When and by what means were the Executive Director for Operations and the Commission informed of the conclusions? Please provide a complete list of persons who, prior to May 1983, had reached or known of conclusions concerning falsification of leak rate records.
Answer:
The NRC staff has never reached a final conclusion as to the substance of the Hartman allegations concerning leak rate falsification at TMI-2. The NRC investigation of those allegations began in March 1980 and, within a week or so, sufficient information had been gathered to lead the staff to conclude that the leak rate test results had likely been falsified. The primary basis for this conclusion was an interview by NRC inspectors Martin and Christopher with Mr. Hartman, a sworn statement taken at that interview, other interviews of plant personnel, and a subsequent examination of GPU records related to the leak rate tests. Durin Inspector and Auditor (OIA)g the latter exchanged part a few of March, preliminary the NRC's phone Office calls with the of
, Department of Justice (DOJ), informing them of the possibility cf a referral for criminal prosecution. In April 1980, representatives of the NRC met with members of D0J to brief them on all of the information in its possession.
With the referral to D0J , NRC brought its own investigation to a halt and a final staff position on this matter was never formulated.
With respect to when and the means by which the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the Commission were informed about the Hartman allegations and the staff's investigation into them, as best we can reconstruct, the Commission was first informed of this matter in writing in SECY-A-80-74, Memorandum and Order, Motion to Quash Subpoenas Issued by the Director, Inspection and Enforcement (I&E), cated May 23, 1980. A copy of that paper is enclosed. The Commission approved the proposed Memorandum and Order on May 28, 1980 without a staff briefing on the matter. Also, as best we can reconstruct, the Comission was first informed of the general nature of this matter orally in the March / April 1980 timeframe. Victor Stello describes the situation as follows:
- "Due to the sensitivity of this matter, my discussions with various Commissioners and senior staff consisted of oral conversations and briefings. General status of ongoing investigations were reported at weekly EDO staff meetings, some of which included attendance by the Chairman and representatives from other Commission offices.
While information concerning the Hartman allegations was generally desseminated (sic) orally, the Commission's understanding of this matter is reflected in writing, specifically its Memorandum and
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Order of May 18, 1980 which referred to falsified test results and the ongoing Grand Jury investigation. A copy of that Memorandum and Order is enclosed. See specifically page 6. Further, this matter is specifically discussed in Supplement 1 of i;UREG-0680, issued November 1980, and Supplement 2 of NUREG-0680, issued March 1981. All of these documents received wide distribution throughout the agency."
(See attached Memorandum from Victor Stello, Jr. to William J Dircks dated June 10, 1983 (Attached to the June 10, 1983 Memorandum from William J. Dircks to Commissioner Gilinsky)).
The records of Commission meetings around and preceding May 1980 do not reveal any meetings on this subject nor do the Commission's Secretariat files contain documents dated in that timeframe on this matter (other than SECY-A-80-74).
With regard to a complete list of persons who, prior to May 1980, had reached or known of conclusions concerning falsification of leak rate records, as best as we can reconstruct, the following individuals apparently reached a conclusion that the allegations were correct: Mr. Thomas T. Martin, Team Leader of the I&E investigation, and Mr. Harold L. Ornstein of the Special
, Inquiry Group (SIG). Apparently,'the management of the SIG was aware of the conclusien of Mr. Ornstein. With regard to the I&E investigation of March / April 1980, the results and conclusion of that investigation were never documented until June 1983. However, the results of the investigation were discussed in great detail with senior management in I&E and with the Director, 01A in April and May of 1980. Apparently, no one was aware of Mr.
Martin's conclusion prior to May 1983. As best as we can reconstruct, senior members of the Office of the Executive Legal Director (ELD), I&E, Region I, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 01A and the EDO had concluded in March / April 1980 that, although no final staff conclusions had been reached, leak rate test results had likely been falsified prior to March 28, 1979.
Tne Commission was aware of the allegations and of the referral to.DOJ in the April /May 1980 timeframe.
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Question 2.
Af ter concluding in 1980 that TMI-2 leak rates were f alsified, the NRC staff apparently did not inform the ASLB, the Appeal Board, the Commission or the Department of Justice. How does the Commission explain or answer the following:
a) the staff's failure to inform the Commission prior to 1980, of Hartman's leak rate allegations made to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement in May 1979, and then repeated to the NRC's Special Inquiry Group in October, 19797 Answer:
After Mr. Hartman made his allegations in May 1979 and repeated them in October 1979, nothing was done within I&E and OIA on this matter until March 23, 1930. (The reasons for this lapse are given in responses to Questions 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d.) Thus, prior to 1980, staff was aware of the allegations, believed the matter would be pursued in other investigations, and, as best as ~
we can reconstruct, made the judgment that the information in hand prior to
, 1980 was neither suffici.ent enough nor serious enough to warrant calling this particular matter td the attention of the Commission before the Kemeny Commission and Special Inquiry (SIG) had completed their investigations. As it turned out, this matter was not pursued by either of the latter groups (beyonc the write up of the interview conducted by Mr. Ornstein which was not included in the SIG report).
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b) what prompted the Commission to initiate, in early 1980, an inquiry into the Hartman allegations?
Answer:
The investigation into the Hartman allegations began on March 22,1980 in response to the fiRC's contact by Ira Rosen preceding his televised interview of Mr. Hartman on March 24, 1980.
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Ouestion 2 (Continued).
c) the failure of the Office of Inspection and/or the Office of Inspector and Auditor to conduct an investigation after allegations concerning leak rate falsification were' made in May 1979 and October 1979?
Answer:
The purpose of the 1979 I&E investigation was to develop information concerning the events during and immediately after the TMI-2 accident. At that time, I&E apparently believed pursuit of the Hartman allegations would t
not add relevant information to the body of knowledge being developed for that purpose. Also, as best as we can reconstruct it, the staff knew the Kemeny Commission and the SIG were to investigate thoroughly the accident and believed that those investigations would pursue the matter. In fact, the I&E investigators provided the SIG the information they developed on the Hartman allegations (as well as all of the other information that had been obtained during the I&E investigation).
On October 29, 1979 the NRC's Mr. Harold L. Ornstein, detailed to the SIG and assigned to investigate TMI operator training, deposed Mr. Hartman. On December 3,1979 Mr. Ornstein prepared a draft written description of Mr.
Hartman's allegations for inclusion in the final SIG report. (See answer to Question 2.e, below) mem
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Ouestion 2 (Continued).
d) the lapses between: (1) the time when the NRC learned of the Hartman allegations and the time when the NRC inquiry into these allegations was initiated; and (2) the time when NRC staff had concluded that leak rate calculations had been falsified and the time when the Ccmmission learned of this conclusion. Has OIA investigated, or does it plan to invest-igate, whether NRC personnel improperly withheld information?
Who does the Commission believe is responsible for those incidents of apparent withholding of information?
Answer:
The answers to Questions 1, 2.a), 2.b) and 2.c) provide an explanation as best as we can reconstruct it, of the lapses in the investigation. As to whether information was improperly withheld from the Commission on this matter, to the extent to which there is controversy and questions being raised about this matter, the Commission attributes this state of affairs to not aggressively pursuing potentially serious aliegations. Given that the Commission was informed of the existence of the Hartman allegations and of the referral to the DOJ, the Commission does not believe there is any basis to direct DIA to investigate whether there was any improper withholding of information. -
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Question 2 (Continued).
e) Why was the substance of the "Ornstein Draft" concerning Hartman's allegations not included in the repor+ of the Special Inquiry Group?
Answer:
The Commission directed the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to contact appropriate senior members of the SIG and Mr. Ornstein to obtain their responses to this question. We will provide those responses to you as soon as they are obtained.
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l Question 2 (Continued).
f) Were representatives or employees of General Public Utilities (or Metropolitan Edison) permitted to observe and sit in en interviews conducted by the NRC in 1980 concerning Hartman's allegations? If yes, why was this allowed and under whose authority was it permitted?
Answer:
Yes, representatives of Metropolitan Edison Company, in all cases an attorney acceptable to the interviewee, and in some cases also a union representative at the request of the interviewee, were permitted to observe and sit in on )
interviews conducted by the NRC in 1980 concerning the Hartman allegations.
The presence of an attorney retained by the Metropolitan Edison Company was alicwed under the authority of Victor Stello, Jr., then Director, I&E, based ,
on a legal opinion he obtained from the ELD. Mr. Stello was advised by ELD l' that if the interviewee stated that the attorney was his chosen representative, then the NRC investigators were to proceed with the interview with the attorney present.1 Mr. Stello was advised that it was up to the attorney present to decide for himself whether his relationships with Metropolitan Edison Company and the individual interviewee gave rise to c I conflict of interest, and that such an issue was one to be resolved by the attorney under the applicable Code of Professional Responsibility.' Based on
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this legal advice, Mr. Stello dir'ected the investigators that if an interviewee stated that the attordey present represented the interviewee, then the investigator was to proceed with the interview with the attorney present. There was no written policy in 1980 on this aspect of investigations. Since there was no NRC policy then on the presence of third parties during interviews, the presence of third parties was not considered unacceptable. The Commission presently is considering the preparation of written guidance for investigators on the presence of third parties during interviews and has established the Advisory Committee for Review of Investi-gation Policy on Rights of Licensee Employees Under Investigation which has considered the matter and has reported its findings and recommendations to the Commission.
1 This advice was based, in part, on Section 555(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 5555(b), which provides in pertinent part:
A person compelled to appear in person before an agency or representative thereof is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative.
2 In fact, during one interview, the attorney stated that he could no longer represent the interviewee because of his relationship with Met. Ed.
At that point, the interview was concluded after the interviewee declined to answer further questions. From that point on, the operators at TMI declined to be interviewed without subpoena.
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Ouestion 3.
The NRC and the Department of Justice apparently have a difference of opinion as to whether, in October 1981, D0J informed the NRC that it was free to resume its investigation of the Hartman allegations? If yes, why was this allowed and under whose authority was .it permitted?
Answer:
Based upon consultations with the DOJ, we have concluded that there is in fact a disagreement between NRC and D0J, concerning whether the Commission f . was advised in October 1981 that it could proceed with its investigation of the Hertman allegations. Communications between the two agencies concerning the Hartman matter were almost always oral. It appears that a misunderstanding may have emanated from these oral communications. As a result, D0J believed that NRC understood in October 1981 that there was no objection to proceeding with its civil investigation. In contrast, the Commission believed that the D0J wished the NRC to continue to delay proceeding with its civil investigation, and the Commission was aware through inquiries from late 1981 through early 1983 that the DOJ was continuing its investigation.
To avoid repetition of any like misunderstandings, the D0J and the NRC will embark upon a review of referral procedures.
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Question 4.
In a 1981 filing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the staff: 1) stated that the Department of Justice prohibited the staff from disclosing details of the Hartman allegations with the Board; (2) stated that there was no direct relation-ship between the Hartman allegations and the THI-2 accident, and; (3) failed to state that the leak rate calculations had been falsified. The staff wrote:
NRC's investigation effort was suspended pending conclusion of the D0J investigation, at their request, to avoid parallel administrative and criminal proceedings.
The DOJ investigation is still ongoing, and the NRC does not possess any information as to when it may be completed.
NRC personnel involved in the suspended investigation have been requested by D0J not to discuss the details of the matter. However, the staff has reviewed the information that it hac obtained to date on the matter, and has concluced on the basis of information thus far obtained tnat tnere is no airect connection with the TMI-2 accicent.*
! *See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three-Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) LBP-81-32, 14 NRC 381, 557, para. 504 August 27,1981), emphasis added.
Does the Commission believe that the above quoted paragraph written by the NRC staff provided the ASLB with accurate and complete information ? If not, how does the Commission plan to reevaluate the board's decision on management competence in light of new information?
Answer:
The Hartman allegations are the subject of ongoing investigations by I&E and by D0J. In addition, pursuant to an Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Order (ALAB-738), dated August 31, 1983, the Hartman allegations concerning falsification of leak rate test data may be the subject of a reopened evidentiary proceeding before th Licensing Board. It would therefore be inappropriate for the Commission to comment at this time on the accuracy and completeness of the quoted paragraph.
Question 5.
How does the Commission explain the apparent discrepancy between the statement in Inspection Report 50-320/79-10 dated October 25, 1979, concerning the relationship between the effect of~ elevated discharge line temperatures upon the TMI-2 accident, and the staff's statement, quoted in question 4 above, which implies that the elevated discharge pipe temperatures were not a significant factor in the accident.
Answer:
The two statements which are the subject of Question 5 are a part of the record on management issues that is currently pending before both the Commission and the Appeal Board. The relationship between the Hartman allegations and the accident, if any, has yet to be fully analyzed. For the reasons given in the answer to Question 4, it would be inappropriate for the Commission to comment on the two statements cited in Question 5.
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ENCLOSURE 2 s
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ANSWER TO QUESTION 1 FROM CHAIRMAN UDALL'S FEBRUARY 25, 1983 Question 1.
Has the Comission ever received a report on the alleged manipulation of the leak rate calculations performed in the weeks preceding the March 29, 1979 accident? What was the disposition of any such report?
Answer:
Until the end of March,1983, the Comission never received any report on the alleged manipulation of leak rate calculations preceding the March 29, 1979 accident at TMI-2. As explained by Mr. Dircks in a Memorandum to the Commissioners dated June 29, 1983 (attached):
At a March 21, 1983 meeting between Mr. R. Arnold of GPU and members of the NRC team rviewing the B&W-GPU trial court record, Mr. Arnold referred to a GPU investigation into the Hartman allegations and noted that GPU was considering giving that investigation report to D0J.1/ The Report was subsequently forwarded by GPU to DOJ and through D0J to the NRC with the request from DOJ that NRC maintain the Report in confidence. In early April of 1983, the NRC received a copy of the Report directly from GPU with no limits placed upon its use.
1/ The report is entitled "Results of Faegre & Benson Investigtion of Allegations by Harold W. Hartman, Jr.,
Concerning Three Mile Island Unit 2," dated September 17, 1980, hereinafter "the Report."
Finally, on May 4,1983, GPU distributed the Report to the Appeal Board and parties to the management phase of the TM1-1 restart proceeding.
The Report was discussed at a Comission meeting on March 30, 1983.
The Commission requested the staff to determine whether any reporting requirements were violated by GPU's delay of nearly three years in submitting the Report to the Comission. In the June 29, 1983 memorandum from Mr. Dircks to the Comissioners, the Staff concluded that GPU (formerly Metropolitan Edison Cogany) should have made a more~
prompt board notification of that Report 1
- / The Staff has acknowledged that "it might also be subject to criticism for not providing additional information on the Hartman matter. The Staff did not do so in order to avoid any possible interference with the D0J investigation." June 29th memorandum at l
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f e , UNITED STATES P o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{ . W ASHIN GTON,0.C. 20555 Cf%8 CFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER May 31, 1983 -
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. DIRCKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS As you know, during the May 24, 1983, Commission briefing on the staff's revalidation of its conclusions regarding the management competence at TMI-1, Tim Martin statec, with regard to the Hartment allegations, "I can tell you for a fact that the records were falsified, that much we knew."
In its testimony before the Licensing Board, the NRC staff characterized its investigation of the Hartman allegations as having "... identified a number of apparent problems related to procedure adherence..." and stated that it
"...has concluded on the basis of information thus far obtained that there appears to be no direct connection with the Unit 2 accident...."
s- I understand that Tim Ma'rtin will be providing his notes on the case, and on the conclusions-he voiced at the Commission meeting, directly to the Commission.
In addition, I would like the following:
ELD 1. All staff. documents bearing on how this issue was to be
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handled by the staff in the TMI-l restart proceeding.
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- 2. A memorandum answering the following questions:
1 O, (a) Were NRC staff lawyers or any senior members of the NRC staff aware of Tim Martin's views, on whether leak rate data had been falsified, when the NRC staff's case on GPU management competence and integrity was presented to the Licensing Board?
w (b) Were Tim Martin's conclusions about the leak rate falsification ever reported to the Licensing Board?
(c) Were any Commissioners ever informed-of these l conclusions?
pLe 3. A memorandum stating whether Tim Martin was the individual to whom Stello and his group spoke about the Hartman matter, and to whom they refer on page 17 of n
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their report on the GPU vs. B&W transcript; and, if so, whether Martin had reported to them at that time his conclusions about the leak rate falsification.
es 4. A statement on whether anyone else in a senior position
'"'[puF on the staff became aware of these conclusions at that po M time.
In view of the schedule the Commission has set for itself on the TMI case, I would like to have this material as soon as possible. Please let me know right away if you think this will be later than June 10.
I have asked the General Counsel whether, in view of the pending adjudication, this memorandum should be served on the parties to this case.
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sky cc: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Ahearne Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine OGC SECY l
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4 i MEMORANDUM FOR: Comissioner Gilinsky JUN 101983 FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS In a memorandum dated May 31, 1983, you requested certain information concerning Tim Martin's statement at the May 24, 1983 Comission briefing that, with regard to the Hartman allegations, records were falsified.
As you requested, I have asked various senior staff to respond to your memorandum. Their responses are enclosed.
Because the Hartman investigation w'as suspended, a final staff position on i this matter was never formulated. This remains true today. As you are aware the Comission has directed that the Hartman investigation be reinitiated.
Until the results of this investigation are complete, we will not take a final staff position on this matter.
Any public disclosure of this and the enclosed Memoranda should take into account that there is a pending agency investigation and an ongoing Grand Jury proceeding.
(Signes William J.Dircks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
- 1. Response from G. Cunningham, 6/10/83
- 2. Response from V. Stello, 6/10/83
- 3. Response from H. Denton, 6/6/83
- 4. Response from E. Case, 6/10/83
- 5. Response from R. DeYoung, 6/10/83
- 6. Response from J. Sniezek, 6/3/83
- 7. Response from C. Heltemes, 6/6/83 cc: Chairman Palladino ;
Comissioner Ahearne '
Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine OGC .
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Distribution WJDircks TMurley JAllan R-I VStello RHoefling HDenton Central File RDeYoung Margo (13176) JRoe GCunningham JHeltemes TRehm ED0 rf JCraig 0FC : ELD :DEDORGR :EDO : : : :
0____:____..._____:____________:____________: ____________:.___________:__________..:.__________ ;
NAME :RHoefling :VStello :WDircks : : : :
o____: ___________:____________:______ _____:____________:____________:.___________:___________ l TATE :6/10'83 :6/ID/83 :6//0/83 : : : : l
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i MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
- FROM: Guy H. Cunningham, III Executive Legal Director
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS By memorandum dated May 31, 1983, Comissioner Gilinsky requested certain information concerning Tim Martin's statement'at the May 24, 1983 Comission briefing that, with regard to the Hartman allegations, records were falsified.
This memorandum transmits OELD's response to questions 1, 2(a), and 2(b).
- 1. The staff documents presently identified bearing on how the Hartman allegations were to be handled by the staff in the TMI-1 restart proceeding are attached. The staff is not aware of any other documents responsive to your request. If any additional responsive documents are identified, they will be provided to you promptly.
- 2. (a) Both staff attorneys of record who have responsibilities related to management issues in the restart proceeding, as well as their supervisors, were at the Comission's May 24th briefing. All of these attorneys state that they first became aware of Tim Martin's views, on yhether leak rate data had been falsified, at the May 24th briefing.y With respect to the staff attorneys who presented the staff's original case on management compet'ence, one is no longer with the NRC staff and the other is presently on detail outside OELD and has no current responsibilities regarding TMI-1 restart. However, both were contacted and asked to respond to Comissioner Gilinsky's question 2(a). Both ,
stated that they were not aware of Tim Martin's views, en whether leak rate data had been falsified, when the staff's case on management competence was presented to the Licensing Board. Both further stated that they first became aware of Tim Martin's views after the May 24th briefing.
-1/ ' Neither of the staff's present attorneys of record on management issues presented the staff's original case on GPU's management competence.
Both of the attorneys first became involved in the restart proceeding immediately before the commencement of the reopened hearing on cheating in November, 1981.
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Having said that, it perhaps should be added that senior OELO attorneys were present at meetings during April and May 1980 with Mr.
Stello and other senior staff at which the Hartman allegations were discussed. Such meetings included a meeting called for the purpose of referring the Hartman allegations to the Department of Justice. This meeting with two D0J attorneys and other NRC staff took place in April 1980 and presented a suninary of NRC's investigation
- findings developed to that point. The sununary findings indicated that the leak rate allegation appeared from NRC's investigation to have substance.
(b) Tim Martin's conclusions about leak rate falsification were never reported to the Licensing Board. To the best of my staff's knowledge, the only evidence in the record regarding the Hartman allegations are the brief descriptions of the investigation by the NRC and Department of Justice which are contained in NUREG-0680, Supp. No.
1, at 37 (November 1980) and NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 2, at 9-10 (March 1981). This is confirmed by the Licensing Board in its management PID, where it stated that the "only information on the matter we possess" is the brief description in NUREG-0680, Supp. Nos.1 and 2. LBP-81-32,14 NRC 381, 557 (1981).
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, / / Guy H. Cunningham, III I f Executive Legal Director Attachments:
As stated
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May 20, 1980 - --
(i . . . . *';d.Y./ NRC/TMI-80-093 V. HEICRANDUM TOR: Harold R. Dsnton' Director, Office of Nuclear e '~
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Reactor Regulation Victor Stello, Jr. , Director, Office of
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Inspection and Enforcement . . '_ _
B- e H. Grier, Director, Re9 ion I, Office c.. Inspection and Enforcement FROM: John T. Collins, Deputy Program Director, TMI Program Office
SUBJECT:
1E/NRR SUPPORT FOR TMI-l RESTART IMNAGEMENT REVIEW
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REFERENCE:
R. H. Vollmer memorandum for B. H. Grier, and J. T. Collins, dated February 22, 1980; IE Support i for THI-l Restart Management Review.
The referenced memorandum (copy attached) solicited IE input for the forthccming TM1-1 Restart SER, concerning the quality of the management of THI, Unit 1, and the licensee's ability to operate Unit 1 safely.
This input was to be responsive to items 3, 8 and 9 of Comission Order CLI-80-5, dated March 6,1980 (also attached). This matter has since been the subject of numerous discussions between the THI-l Senior Resident Reactor Inspector, the TMI-l Restart Program Project Manager, ntyself and others, during which various options;for handling the TMI-1 iaanagement issues were considered. The purpose of this memorandum is to identify those necessary actions which I feel should be taken to fully address the TMI-1 management issues related to the above and other Coa.ission Order items. These actions include conducting special reviews, inspections and management appraisals by IE and/or NRR staff in order to prepare SER input or hearing testimony as described below, fr; - - % Recommended ,
_~
Recommended ~
Related Action Responsibility Order Item (s)
- 1. Conduct joint Region I/i1RR J. M. Allan, RI 1, 2, 7 management review (similar L. P. Crocker, HRR to NTOL review performed for Salem 2). Submit inspection report to ASLB by g/l/80 cr 7 /s O g ($ O s/ b / J 1, 70d y0 t u p i N' Mi v
2 May 20, 1980 Multiple Addressee Recommended Related Recomended Responsibility Order _ Item (s)
Action _
(cont) .
(
G. H. Smith, RI 4, 5
- 2. Conduct Region I HP appraisal ~-
inspection. Submit report to ASLB by 9/1/80.
~~
Conduct Performance Appraisal H. D. Thornburg, IE 1. 2, 7.
3.
Branch inspection. Submit report to ASLB by 9/1/80. .
J. M. Allan, RI 10
- 4. Conduct followup inspection of
,/
f TMI Unit I concerning corrective Q
/
actions taken in response to IE Investigation Report Number 50-320/79-10. Submit report to ASLB by 9/1/80. _
/- ..
Team Leaders for 3
- 5. Prepare hearing testimony of designated NRC inspectors '
Actions 1-4 above.
regarding the quality of the J. T. Collins TMI nanagement of TMI Unit 1 and A. H. Fasano, TMI the corporate management. . .. O. R. Haverkamp. TMI Submit wri-ten testimony to M. M. Shanbaky, TMI ELD by 9/1/80. L. W. G, age, RI G. Napuda, RI
- 6. Detemine if conclusions can be S. E. Bryan, IE 8 drawn, and conduct comparison of past TMI Units 1 and 2 nonccmpliance i history (from their 0/L date until 12/31/78) with industry-wide statistics. Submit SER input to H. Silver by 6/15/80. .
- 7. Determine if conclusions can be C. H. Berlinger, NRR 9 drawn, and conduct comparison of past TMI Units 1 and 2 LERs
\ with industry-wide statistics.
Submit SER input to H. Silver by 6/15/80.
e' 3
May 20, 1980 '-
Multiple Addressee The TMI-l restart hearing is currently estimated to begin about mid-September, based 'on SER cc:npletion in mid-June. Please advise me of your approval of these or alternative actions, including your designated reponsible. .
individuals. Final approved plans should also be transmitted to H. Silver.
THI-1 Restart Program Project Ma. nager. .
=r -
.n ._ _ 3. . .
+< b6[:
'- -u. . .. .2 .
.l/ John T. Collins -;. ..
Deputy Program Director TMI Program Office
Enclosures:
As stated cc: B. Snyder - -
J. 11=" _
L. Crocker .
G. Smith H. Thornburg - ..
A. Fasano D. Haverkamp -
M. Shanbaky L. Gage -- - - - - - -
G. Napuda S. Bryan ~~ ~~
. C. Serlinger H. Silver '
J. Tourte11otte I
e
- t' , ,
9 i
o
.,...- f i
2- hgg) l' UNITED STATES -. J
' - $\ NUCLEAR REGULATORY Corwidm0!T:
. m s m aton.e.c. m ss di. /g; g i
a 4W j ,
Septer.her 12, 1930 1
- @4.E[y,p g-v ....
Docket No. 50-289 '
4;".
Dan Swanson, Office of Executive Legal DiWet6r . -
& Enforcement, ,
~
MEMORANDUM FOR: .
. J. Allan, Deputy Director, Office of Inspection Region I h Division
^
D. Vassallo, Chief, Licensee Qualifications Branc , _
of Human Factors Safety . . . .
P. Collins, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch.
Division of Human Factors Safety Division T. Murphy, Chief, Radiological Assessment Branc of Systems Integration Division Robert W. Reid, Chief, Operating Reactors Bran FROM: of Licensing
, MANAGEMENT ISSUE-RESPONSIBIL ..
a TMI-1 RESTART PROCEEDING:
SU5 JECT: AND SCHEDULES d verbal comitments regarding This memorandum There have been numerous memorandum, agementmeetings area.ilities and an the revised the responsibility for response in the TMI manis schedules, and to provide additional guidance (SSER).
the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report listedtingin Enclosure 1.
The lead all input in the The responsibilities
' respondent is responsiblefor management for obtaining issuesand areThe first9 d coordina defined area unless otherwise Dan Swansondelegated.t w/cci o HSilver, (0A) format NRR) as by S be submitted to OELD [ ATTN:
discussed previously with the exception 1980.
response referencing the forthcoming SSER. Silver by October 3,1980.
f Section 6 of the THI-1 Rest SSER input should be submitted to the ORPM Harle x.
' ~ \ The format of the SSER will be similar to that o3 provided Evaluation issued in June ;
(HUREG-0680). g !
l l
+w- '
l l 1 1 05wanson, JW. lan, Drassallo, i PCollins, TMurphy Please inform the ORPM Harley Silver (492-8427) or Sheryl Wookey (492-7435) if discrepancies are noted in the enclosures, or when circumstances arise.
which could potentially cause a major slippage in the schedule described above. .;.. ..
a.
\,.. ,, 'b'f- <
~
- - Robert W. Reid, Chief ..
1 Operating Reactors Branch f4 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
- l. Responsibilities for Management issues
- 2. Section 6 Format - SSER },
- 3. Sample SSER Format cc w/ enclosures: - --
JRoe, NRR 4
SWookey, NRR JTourteliotte, OELD .
LCrocker, NER FAllenspach, NRR .
EBrenner, Reg. I RXeimig, Reg. I ,
DNeely, Reg. I l i 'Nehemias, J NRR DHaverkamp, TMI Site . .. .. ..
TFasano, TM1 Site - - - - - - - - -
W5hafer, IE -
DZiemann, NRR JRiesland, IE j CBerlinger, NRR '
JPetersen, NRR j
% H0rnstein '-'
- . .~. ;; . , , , j
)
EBlackwood PCollins 85nyder . .. ..
SHanauer 6
- ~ - - --,,--,c ~n-,,--. - -- ,-,--- ,
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P A m o s p
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. s n " I 0 ATt e o n H l i E T C A T
~
S C
- SSER luput_ Uppit.e June 1980 SCR (5UREG-0600) Section 6 - SSER Input to NRR Project Manager by October 3, Daard Order _Itent_Q/6/80), Lead Resinindent inl3,ut From Coirencn ts 1 L. Crocker, HRit IE: PAD Refer to Sholly 14(a)
NTOL Type Inspection .,
2 L. Crocker, HRR IE:PAB (fhintenance Refer to Sholly 14(b),(e)-Coordinate Arca) with the Response to Contention THIA-5 NTOL Type inspection , i 3 ilaverkamp,RI - Inspection Reports & Sunnary as relates to the management 1ssi.
PAB, NTOL,llP, QC . includes Senior Resident's conments 4 J. Nehemias, NRR llP Inspection Refe'r to Shelly 14(c) 5 De Neely, RI IIP Inspection 6 L. Crocker, NRR 7 L. Crocker, NRR IE:PAB Refer to Sholly lil(d) '
NT0L Type Inspection -
4/6/80 Draft 8 J. Riesland, IE
- 9 ,
C. Berlinger, NRR 6/26/80 Draft' 10 J. Allan, RI .
Brunner/Keimig Awaiting Info. From Licensee Submittal Scheduled 9/17/80 11 L. Crocker : NIOL Type Inspection Refer to Shelly 14(a) 12 J. Petersen
! I Addressed in Section 7 -
n i i 5
g b,
E l l ,
- h. .
7 e- .-
SSER - SECTION 6 FORMAT- Enclosure 2 A.- Introductory,,P_aracraoh (H. Silver)
- Review of Comrnission Order
- Statement that SSER provides evaluation br. sed on assessment of conformance .
to available new & upgraded criteria a standards -- . .
[
- Statement that original Section 6 (NUREG-0680) is modified, clarified or. ,
j expanded based upon review of additional information and site visits (as
.. described below).
- Cross reference of revised Section 6 to 3/6/80 Order Items
- D. Haverkamp)
B. I'.anacement and Technical Capability (L. Crocker - J. Allan -
- Update to include: - NTOL like inspection findings, L. Crocker
- Revised Organization Structure, L. Crocker.
L. Crocker
- 3/6/80 Order Items 1, 2,D.6,11,i:
Haver amp
- 3/6/80 Order Items 3
- 3/6/80 Order item 10 J. Allan C. Safety Review and Ooerational Advic'e (L. Crocker) ,
- Update to include: 3/6/80 Order I. tem 7 .. _
D. Traininc of Operatinc Staff (P. Col, lins)-
- Review (revise) to assure consistency with testimony E. pj;qrational QA
- Review (revise) to assure consistency with QA inspection team findings (G. Mapuda)
- Update to include Q-List evaluation (J. Gilray)
F. Facility Procedures (D. Ziemann) ,
- - Update to include arfditional audit findings
- 3. Health Physics (J. Nehemias)
- Update to include: HP Inspection Findings & 3/6/80 Order Item 4 H. _ Radioactive Wasts System (D. Neely) sAdd new section (prior to plant maintenance Section C6-24) in response to 3/6/80 Order item 5
- 1. Comoarison of Licensee's P_erformance V,ith Industry Data
- Add New Section:
- -- LER's Infraction Statistics 3/6/80 3/6/80 Order Order Item 9Item 8 (J. Rieslan (C. Berlinger 9 Cross Reference to the 3/6/30 Order Items will be included in the introduction.
Tnerefore, it will not be necessary to specify in the narrative on each section what itens are being addressed.
h
)
Enclosure.2-3/6/80 Order Item Apolicable Sub-Sections of Section 5 1, 2, 3, 6,10, il Panagement & Technical Capability' a s- -
. . -e me _.
4 ,
Health Physics U ; . ;, S .
- i: Radioactive Waite System '
- .5 - )
7 Safety Review & Operational Advise
-r. .:a, _ ,
8, 9 Comparison to Industry : 1 12 Refer to Section 7 of SER i
o es eup N
e O
e e
e G
S 0
% em e -
e e ee ee em O O
(. _
. o. - , - --
EXAMPLE OF SSER INPUT Entlosure 3 13.0 CONDUCT OF 0*EILAT10NS i
I 13.1 Oceanira_t_ionel Structure of Aeolicant Since issuance of the safety Evaluation Report, revised information has been received free. the appilcant agarding the station staff organization. For coa-
[.- pisteness and accura:y, the second paragraph in.this section in the $4fety Evalue-tion Report snould be replaced.vish the paragraph below. Our conclusions repart-
- ing the organi2atier.a1 structure and qualifications of personnel remai,A unchanger The sta* ion staff, unoer the direction cf the Station Su,trintencent/ Senior Unit
~
.A - ' "
- Superintendent, is responsible for the operation of both units which are located at the site. 1he s*ation st&ff consists of approxis.ately 146 full-time employees !
f un:tioning ir. four s.ain grou:s- an operating and technical group for each unit (about 34 people in each grou;) responsible f or plant operations and technical support in tne areas of nuclear engineering, instrueent and control engineering, ne:hanicai engineering and elec* rical engineering a naintenan:e group (about 60 persons) responsible for electrical, mechanical and instrumen, s.tintenen:e at the station; and a radiation psotection gacup (about 15 persons) responsible for j sta ior, radiation prete: tion ant cher.istry programs. ,
12.( in=ustrial Se:ecity -
in tne saf ety Evaluation Rep:rt. ve stated that the a:piteant had submittee a physiet.1 secure.y plae, applicanie to Units 1 an: 2, entitlec, "Three P.ile 1siand Incestrial Secu-ity Prograr," as revised thrcegn Eevision 9 catec July 15, 1975, en: founc it acceptatie.
Tnt applicant has since scon.ittec a new physical security plan superseding the above an: eli subsecuent revisions for Unit 2'only. entitle'c, "Three P.ile Island hu: lea- Station, Unit 2 (TM1-2) Interia Physical Se:urity Plan," cated January 24, 1978, anc Revision I to that plan datec January 27, 1978.
Va con:1ude tr.a*. this plan centains the riecessary elements of security, is compgr.
- a. tit to and consistent vith inree file Island Unit i, and incluoes the features anc pro:ecures currently regeire: ty 10 CFR Part 72.15, and is therefers a::e.tasia. This pian is designatec an interic plan since it will be further
..~~~ 1, .. reviste no later ther. August 22, 157E to cor. fore, with all the requirements cf 10 CFR Part 73.5$. .
Taken From NUREG-0107 i Sucolement 2 TM*-2 SER 11 - 1 1
c
.g a w Q,
- UNITED STATES
/g.P' %%, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
! 'f , g g REGION I j s3s > Ann Avenus se lp.
x 3 -
xmG OF PRUS$lA, PENNSYl.VANIA 19406 . . . . _ _ _ . _ _
\;-sr /
Thomas M. Novak, AD/0R, .1X.
MEMORANDUM FOR: .
FROM:
Boyce H. Grier, Director f
SUBJECT:
TMI-1 RESTART:. '
Your memorandum dated September 26, 1980
Reference:
~
Attached s a best estimate schedule for completing IE inputs in the -
Due to the lateness in inputs from other IE sources subject proceedings.in the management capability area and I our limited m However, testimony in this area, additional delay may be encoun With respect to the March 6,1980TheBoard first relates-- Order, Ite other, IE:HQ) which relate directly to this question.
to falsification of RCS leakage rate determinations (as alleged by and the other, whether plant personnel withheld vital core da
' early en in the accident.
pending the outcome of those investigations.
I will notify you immedi-If you need additional information, please call.
ctely upcn identification of additional delays. . . . _ _ .
g .
j%rdyce
.' h ct H. Grier ./
, i Director
Attachment:
As Stated cc:
H. Silver, NRR
- 0. Swanson, ELD S. Wookey, NRR
\ .
bec:
J. M. Allan i J/jf.
3 E. J. Brunner '/fl G. H. Smith R. R. Keimig c[!N fQ*v
/.-
- _ ,/~
J d r
s
~.
, p
. d .- -
e
.,1 . .
~
SCHEDULE FOR IE SUDMITTALS j IN THI-l RESTART
i-CONTENil0N -
LEAD RESPONDENT IMPUT FR0ll INPUT AVAllADLE AAMODT 2 L. P. Crocker, NRR IE:PAB Final Draf t PA8 report evallable and us=Me for input - 10/1/00.
ANGRY 4 4 ,-J,-8rvomer, IE:RI R.R. l'elmfg/D.R. Itsverksg ist Draft testimony to ELO 10/10Tfinsi draft by .
R.R. Kelmig (APPIB) 10/24/80. Awaiting acceptable response from Net-Ed on App. 18. MTOI. type inspection report issued 9/29/80. .
MTOL TYPE INSPECTION Final draft HPA report avsflable and usable for IE: IIP 4 praisal input - 10/1/80. Also, awsfting acceptable (APP.IIF) response frca Met-Ed en App !! F.
THI A 5 -!. J. Srvnne6 IE:RI IE: RI investigators 1st Draft testimony to final draft af ter R. R. Kalett IE: PAB TMIA direct case is pre, ELD sented en10/17110/15/00. (Estimatt IE: RI/h55 llo. 2 that about I sonth tvilutred to finallte testimony.)
5 HOLLY 14 l$ P. Crocker, NRR IE:PA9 d Final draft PAR r t available and usable for in- ..
- (1tems a,b.d and 3) MICI. TYFE INSPEC110M ~ put - 10/1/80. Ili ype inspection report issued 9/29/80.
4 L E trply, NRR IE: HP kpreisel Finsi draft HPA report available and usable for J. llehemias NRC/THI Resident Staff input-10/1/80.
DIERGENCY PLNWilMG ' 5. Cheeinut, NRR IE:lfP k pralsal Ist Oraft testimony to (LD 10/15g fInel droft RELATED D. Donaldson 11/15/80.
~
80ARO ORDERS
- 3/6/80.Iten llo. 3 D. R. Itaverissy Various . p ' - $$tR input by 10/10/00.
55tR Input by 10/3/80. .1.4 .,#*/ AMS =
llo. 5 , D. R. IIcely various
. Ilo.10 R. R. kalmig Various Awalting direction conceming Ispect of Nortman and withholding info lesues.
4/24/80 Regovin/Kemeny R. R. Kolmig R. K. Christopher 55ER Input by 10/10/00. #<< - * / ,W ',# N M <'
- i .
Analysis a s Ratsed by R. R. Kelsig Yarlous (55ER)lnput by 10/10/80.
tenc '
TMIA Depesttlans ll ,
( l l:
- : :: : : l l:
e ,i , e f e e
e I l'
8' 8 . . . . . ,
i -
. Report supplement on management issues, December 3, E. 1980. This was a discovery session, and not part of f . the evidentiary hearing. Sie Licensing Board 7'87 Memorandum and Order of November 19,1980(attach:d).,
structure and Technical Resources.
' ganagement de.
g
'n CHAIRMAN SgITH: Is this referred to in the sir?
3 supplement,
? t MB. CROCKIR: Yes, sir, it is. It is referred to in 4
As a matter of fact, the one 5 the supplement here.
inspection, the joint NBR/IEE inspection was conducted on
~
6 7
the organiration management of Met Ed and it used a i 8 predecessor of this 0731 document, an earlier draft version,
". g if you vill.
- g. 10 CHAIEMAN SMITH: Thank you.
s A
MS. WOOKEY: You might refer to pages 12 and 13 on 4 11 d- 12 Item D, whi=h does discuss the status of some of the i
f 13 management-related reg guides and standards. Additional
~
inf:rmation vill also p'robably be supplied in some of th e g 9 qg O! 35 filings on our testimony in response to Aamodt 2.
'd 16 We vill nove to order Item No. 9 on page 33. Here 17 all of the l'icensee event reports for Three Mile Island,
~
18 Units 1 and 2, were examined and compared with industry-wide P
- 39. statistics to determine what, if any, concluslons could be R.
20 drawn on Met Ed's ability to operate Unit 1 safely. The h
4 21 discussion and evaluation follows in that section.
2 22 Soving to Order Item 10 on page 36, this section !
23 ref erences documents that have been prepared in the past on
-( 24 the subject af plant management's response in connection
$ 25 wi th the a ident at Unit 2. There are two documents l l
1 ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
$ 400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W. WASHINGTON. o.C. 20024 (202) $54 2346
.i
g, -
f_ -
- - 7188 j
- ,gerenced, the NUEEG 0600 evaluation of this issue and also
" $E j re. ,
1 rtk -
5,t i. ven Commission's report.
-he geg N* 2
_~
As a result of these repe rts, there are two .,
ji
.' 3
~
. separate issues relating to this order that are still ,
, 4 .e and under investigation, one by the Office of ]
5 utstanding
- a
- and one by the Department of ,
g Inspection and Enforcement '
lE A description of both investigations is contained
$ , 7 Justice.
h in this section and at this point in the section we draw 3 P 4
'o g really no conclusions on this item since there are those to '
'n' M g'
v 3o inspections outstanding. '4 hen those inspections are
~$' 11 resolved, artion that is under the jurisdiction of the NRC !
12 vill be taken if such action is appropriate and deemed i:
?a 13 D*C*S88EI*
On Order Item No. 11, page 37, it basically refers 3,
,. .45 5h 15 to earlier sections in the report.
.s Page 28, Order Item 12. This item was also N .5 l
g$ 17 r idressed in the original August 9, 1979 Commission order as Our plan for responding to Crder Item 7 (kp 45
,3 Order Item No. 7.
! 3g and this harch 6, 1980 Order Item 12 vill be in the form of
]k..s ,
20 a supplement. _
U 21 CHAIRMAN 5.IDH:
5 Is this a convenient time to take
- N
% 22 a break ? I do not want to miss the opportunity to talk to i.
Q ,
Let's take our cidmorning break, please.
23 Dr. Johnsrud.
ij c 24 (Becess.)
.c> !
25 1
- 1 1 .
\
il i
ALDER $oN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 4 4o0 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345 flj 1
6 4
.I3 -
la
) .
- Bd 11/19/80 j.
, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'fsp NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION V-f i \
\
ATOMIC SAFETY ANiN1.TCENSId6 BOMEb Ivan W. Smith, Chairman [
Dr. Walter H. Jordan {i.0 l P ., Dr. Linda W. Little gge,,,,
reg ._
{u~fe.kis W'* -
i1
-G+d4hff In the Matter of )
) "E METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY W:
) Docket No. 50-289 ',;,'p
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) ( estart) < e .-
}j t Station, Unit No. 1) ) '2 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 1
The NRC staff will present a review of the Safety Evalua-tion Report supplements on management insues at 9:00 a.m. on &: .
li
.s,-
December 3, 1980 at the NRC Hearing Roots, 25 North Court Street, ,E-Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. All parties with an interest in such 4 d
issues are directed to attend. Participation at this session lgg. l pp !
shall be considered an opportunity in the discovery process on management issues.
[
THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND h
n;. '
- c LICENSING BOARD i / "
(
./. . / -. ,6 Wl'$' ~
~
,,Ivan W. Smith, Chairn..
{rj; h rrisburg, Pennsylvania . L,:.- .
-Q November 19, 1980 i
y- e
,,s.
I h
- y c - u p pu ,_ () 3 v ) b g,. t' O+ :
- z. ,
1 kk , . -, g ha- . - - - - - - - - - -
Th%k9 ~ ~. I g UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l r,, .; .; WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 t+
%> . . . . . $,e, <
- Qs;...~,. 1 ca MEMORANDUM FOR
- William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: Victor Stello, Jr., Deputy Executive Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS 9
In a memorandum dated May 31, 1983 to you from Commissioner Gilinsky, certain information was requested concerning Tim Martin's statement at the May 24, ,
1983 Commission briefing that, with regard to the Hartman allegations, records were falsified. This memorandum transmits my response to certain questions raised.
Response to Questions 2(a) and 2(c):
~
I was unaware of Tim Martin's conclusion stated at"the May 24, 1983 Commission meeting that "I can tell.,you for a fact that the records were
,-- falsified, that much we knew." I am also unaware that this particu'ier conclusion was conveyed to any other senior staff member or the Commission.
However, the facts underlying this conclusion, derived from the partial investigation of the Hartman allegations, were discussed with various senior staff members and the Commission as described below.
In summary, I believe that senior members of ELD, IE, Region I, NRR, OIA, the ED0 and the Commission were aware in March / April 1980 that, although no final staff conclusions had been reached, leak rate test results had likely been falsified prior to the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2 and that,this' particular Hartman allegation represented a potentially serious matter.
There were three basic allecations made by Mr. Hartman which were (1) results of reactor coolant surveillance leak rate tests were falsified, (2) emergency feedwater pump test criteria were altered and (3) the estiEated control rod positions for attainment of criticality were recalculated in order to meet procedural requirements.
Following Mr. Hartman's appearance on television, members of IE, Region I and 01A. initiated an investigation into these allegations on March 22, 1980. The investigators' initial results appeared to confirm Mr. Hartman's allegation that leak rate test results had been falsified prior to March 28, 1979.
These initial results carried with them a potential for criminal prosecution.
Accordingly,theDepartmentofJustice(D0J)wasnotified,and,atits request, the NRC investigation was suspended on April 28, 1980.
~7 ,
, \ ,
f '
/
The Cormiission, EDO, 01A, ELD, NRR, IE and Region I were aware of the D0J referral of the allegation concerning leak rate test falsification and the potential seriousness of Hartman allegation. Due to the sensitivity of this matter, my discussions with various Comissioners and senior staff consisted of oral conversations and briefings. General status of ongoing investiga-tions were reported at weekly ED0 staff meetings, some of which included attendance by the Chairman and representatives from other Comission offices.
While information concerning the Hartman allegations was generally des-seminated orally, the Comission's understanding of this matter is reflected in a writing, specifically its Memorandum and Order of May 28, 1980 which referred to falsified test results and the ongoing Grand Jury investigation.
A copy of that Memorandum and Order is enclosed. See specifically page 6.
Further, this matter is specifically discussed in Supplement 1 of NUREG-0680, issued November 1980, and Supplement 2 of NUREG-0680, issued March 1981. All of these documents received wide distribution throughout the agency.
Consequently, the Comission and various NRC senior staff had been generally aware, in the spring of 1980, of the Hartman allegation regarding leak rates and that it had potential for criminal prosecution. It appears that, in that time frame, at least one investigator (i.e., Mr. Martin) had reached more firm and specific conclusions concerning the Hartman allegations. Such conclusions may have been passed on to others and may have formed part of the bases for the conclusion that some of the allegations had merit and that r referral to D0J was appropriate.
However, to the extent that firm and specific conclusions were passed on, these conclusiens were not adopted by senior staff members. Such conclusions were preliminary as they were based upon an incomplete and ongoing investi-gition, which had been called to a halt. Such conclusions also had minimal safety significance at that time since TMI-1 was not likely to resume operation in the near future. The essential decision at that point in time was the appropriateness of a referral to D0J and, for that purpose, it was not necessary to go beyond the conclusions reached by senior staff that, based upon the investigation conducted thus far, the Hartman allegations appeared to have sufficient basis to warrant referral.
Response to Questions 3 and 4: ,
As part of their effort to obtain background information with regard to the leak rate matter, the review team members conducting the review of the B&W-GPU lawsuit documents, except myself, met with Donald Kirkpatrick of the NRC staff. As I was already aware of the leak rate matter by virtue of my position as Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement in 1980, I did not attend the meeting with Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Kirkpatrick was one of the original NRC investigators pursuing the Hartman allegations in 1980 prior to referral to the Department of Justice. Mr. Kirkpatrick briefed the attending review team members on the results of the investigation with which he was familiar. The review team did not speak to Tim Martin regarding the l
3-Hartman matter. Consequently, the review team members were not apprised of any of Mr. Martin's views at that time.
rSh , Jr.
Deputy Executive Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements
Enclosure:
Memorandum and Order of May 28, 1980 i
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UNITED STATES 7 AMERICA ~
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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CD'?.ISS10NERS: 4 4
John F. Ahearne, Chair: nan D Victor Gilinsky 0 y ;
Richard T. Xennedy 2 h8,M 2 BM
- I Joseph M. Hendrie Peter A. Bradford { g g g s g uy -4 p x g g s,se + e sano 4 g '.
NI In the Matter of
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY Docket No. 50-320 (Three Mile Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2)
MEMORANDet AND ORDER -
On May 2,1980, the NRC's Director of the Of fict: of Inspection and Enforcement issued subpoenas to six Metropolitan Edison employees M calling upon them to appear and give testimony on May 20 and May 21, 1980, concerning their knowledge of three particular events which occurred on Ma ch 28, 1979, the first day of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2, accident. Tne subjects at '
issue were: (a) the calculated dose rate of 10 rem /hr in Goldsboro, Pennsy-1vania; (b) elevated in-core themocouple readings; and (c) the pressure spike in the containment vessel.
As explained in more detail below the subpoenas were issued for the purpose of determining whether particular infomation bearing upon the seriousness of the then ongoing accident at TMI-2 should have been reported to the Connission more promptly, and what enforcement action is appropriate .
under the circumstances.
1/ ;
The persons subpoenaed were Messrs. McGovern, Pehler, Wright, Chwastyk, I Kunder, and Zewe.
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2 We now have before us a motion to cuash the subpoenas E on the ground that the Commission's referral of some TMI matters to the Department of Justice for criminal proceedings precludes the Comission from pursuing its civil investigation during the pendency o'f the Grand Jury investigation currently underway in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. It is also contended that the subpoenas are unduly burdensome in light of the nany investigations of the IMI accident which have already been conducted. For the reasons discussed below, we. deny the motion to quash. The matters referred by the Comission to the Department of Justice for criminal proceedings are separate and distinct from the subjects covered by the subpoenas issued by the Director of the l Office of Inspection and Enforcenent, and that referral does not bar The Commission from pursuing its general health and safety and civil enforcement
(
responsibilities through issuance of the subpoenas here.
Moreover, while we are sensitive to the fact that the six persons under subpoena have previously been questioned, some on several occasions, regarding the TMI-2 accident, they are in fact knowledgeable about the three areas covered by the subpoenas and those areas need to be clarified before the Commission settles upon possible l
.. 1 civil enforcement actions. '
- 1. The Director's Subpoenas i,
The Director's subpoenas were issued pursuant to Section 161(c) of the '
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(c)), to assist the Comission in detemining whether three pieces of inforr.htfon bearing heavily 3
M By agreement, the return date of the subpoenas has been changed to May 29 and May 30. In agreeing to the new return dates counsel for the movants specifically kept the motion to cuash as a live issue before us and has not waived any right to contest"the validity of the subpoenas.
/
3 upon the expected seriousness of the then ongoing TPI-2 accident ought to have been more promptly reported to the Commission, and, if so, what civil enforce-ment action should be taken. The investigation into these incidents is a continuation of the NRC's ongoing investigation into the events surrounding the accident at Three Mile Island. which resulted in a civil penalty assessment against Metropolitan Edison on October 25, 1979. In his Notice of Violation detailing the bases of the civil penalties, the Director of I&E explained that additional enforcement action, including further civil penalties and orders to suspend, modify, or revoke the operating license, were under review "with regard to the reportability of several items of infomation following the onset of the accident, including specifically the calculated dose rata of 10-40 R/hr in Goldsboro, the elevated in-core thermocouple indications and P
the pressu,re spike in the containment vessel. letter, Victor Stello to Robert Arnold, dated October 25, 1979.
The Director's decision to defer pressing further enforcement action on th:,3e items pending further review and invEstigacion Was taken in response to the Comission's direction following an October 25 meetinc at which the Director ;
I briefed the Comnission on the enforcement actions he proposed to take against Hetropolitan Edison Company. lhe Commission was of the view that the facts surrounding those three matters had not been established with sufficient clarity, and should not be pursued by way of a civil penalty or license revocation action a't that time. U The Commission instructed the Director to await completion of M For example,10 CFR 20.403 icposes imediate notification requirements on commission licensees for certain specified events. Under Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S. C. 2282, the Commission is empowered to assess civil penalties for violation of such Commission regulations.
Additionally, Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2236, oro-vides the Commission with license revocation powers for failure to observe Commission regulations.
/ '
.. 1 4 I the Report of the President's Commission on the. Accident at Three Mile Island
("Kemeny Report"), and of the Report of the Commission's Special Inquiry Group
("Rogovin Report") to see what light those reports shed, before proceeding further.
After completion of the Rogovin Report earlier this year, and the comple-tion of a Supplemental Report on March 4,1980, looking at the transfer of infomation on the day of the accident in response to a series of questions raised by Congressman Udall, the Commission directed its Office of Investiga-tion and Enforcement to complete its investigation which had been held in abeyance. See Pemorandum, , Chairman Ahearne to William J. Dircks, dtd. ,
March 21,1980. The Commission explained its . plans to Congressman Udall as ,
follows : .
'~
The Co=ission has devoted substantial time to the question of Fet Ed's conduct during the THI-2 accident one year ago.
, Last fall the NRC assessed a civil penalty against Fet Ed.
However, one area was left open, that related to infomation t rans fer. Last fall the Co=nission concluded that area should be examined after the Presidential Corraission and the NRC Special Inquiry Group had completed their work. Shortly before the Special Inquiry Group submitted its report, you sent us the first of two sets of questions relating to infor-mation transfer. As a result, the Comnission continued to defer the I&E review and asked the Special Inquiry Group to -
examine its records further for information pertaining to your .
questions and to conduct su.ch further inquiry as it believed -
wa rranted. Finally, Dr. Myers of your staff has provided us -
with a review of this issue.
The Special Inquiry Group has reported on its reexamination . p 3 '
in detail, indicating that it finds no direct evidence suggest- ~
+
ing intentional withholding of information but that it was not ?
appropriate for the Special Inquiry Group to reach conclusions as to enforcement questions. . . . .We have concluded that the appropriate action is to now direct 1&E to complete the inves-tica tion. This will focus upon the question of whether a further civil penalty of Met Ed is justified in light of the .
facts pertaining to infomation transfer. *
. . . c.
s,.
5 The letter also noted that should the investigation suggest the possibility of criminal prosecution, the case would be referred to the Department of Justice.
In carrying out the Commission's directive, the Director of I&E contacted a numb'er of Met Ed employees concerning their knowledge of the pertinent events on the day of the accident. Six of the individuals contacted, Ngh McGovern, Lynn Wright. Brian Mehler, Joseph Chwastyk, George Kunder, and William Zewe, refused to be interviewed absent a subpoena. The Director's subpoenas -
followed.
Only two of the six individuals subpoenaed by the Director are among the fourteen persons do have been ordered to appear before the Grand Jury. Al Based on past testimony and interviews, the Commission believes that each of these sir. individuals has direct knowledge relating to the transfer of infor-7 mation on March 28, 1979 and can contribute to establishing whether further enforcement action is appropriate.
- 2. Criminal Referral of Hartman A11ecations i The Grand Jury investigation now pending in the Middle District of Pennsyl-vania was triggered by the Conmission's referral to the Department of Justice of a dolly separate and distinct matter -- its investigation of allegations by Harold Hartman, a control room operator at TMI-2, that over a period of several months prior to the TMI-2 accident, employees at TMI-2 may have falsified the s,'esults r of certain tests . .
SI These two, Ngh McGovern and Lynn t!right, are both control room operators .#
with no supervisory responsibility. The other four, Messrs. Mehler, . , i .
Chwastyk, Zewe and Kunder, are shift supervisors at TMI. On May 27 movants' ,
. filed a Supplenent to Motion to OJash Subpoenas advising Us that John G.
Herbein, Vice-President, Metropolitan Edison Company, has also been -
subpoenaed by the Grand Jury. The list of documents called for by the Herbein subpoena relate to the Hartman allegations described infra and are not a basis for granting the motion to quash. ,
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Mr. Hartman's allegations first came to the Commission's attention 22, 1979 during an . interview with nembers of the NRC Office of Inspection &
Enforcement team investigating the accident at THI-2. At that, in time subse-quent interviews with NRC, and in a deposition by the Special Inquiry Grou taken October 29, 1979, Mr. Hartman alleged that (1) results of reactor coo lant ,
surveillance leak rate tests were falsified, (2) emergency feedwater pump criteria were altered, and (3) the estimated control rod positions for attain-ment of r.riticality were re-calculated in order to meet procedural requirarien .
The allegations, if true, could lead to criminal prosecution.
On or about March'22,1980 NRC inspectors talked to Mr. Hartman at his home, where he repeated the same allegations.
On March 26. NRC inspectors Martin, Christopher, and Sincla6 taped an interview with Mr. Hartman and took his sworn statement.
The NRC then took steps to verify fir. Hartman's allegations by examining existing documentation and other records.
During the latter .part of March the NRC's Office of Inspector and Aud exchanged a few preliminary phone calls with the Department of Justice, in -
ing thec of the possibility of a referral for criminal prosecution Finally, on April 2,1980, representatives of the HRC met with members ofof the IDepar Justice to brief them on all of the infomation in its possession , in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act.
42 U.S.C. 2271.
At that time, the NRC brought its ow investigation to a halt ,
e We understand from movents' counsel who is also counsel subpoena by the Grand Jury, that the Grand Jury has subpoenaed i
- thirte employees and one fomer empicyce of THI-2.
Two of the six persons subpoenaed- '
by our Director of I&E, Messrs. Wright and McGovern, are among those by the Grand Jury.
We further understand from novants' counsel that Nr. Wright
7 has already testified and has been excused by the Grand Jury. A date for Mr. McGovern's Grand Jury appearance has not yet been set.
3 Leoal Analysis As the hacts make clear, the Commission's ongoing investiga the reporting of events that occurred on the first day of the THI-2 accident is separate and distinct from the Hartman allegations referred to the Depart-ment of Justice for possible criminal prosecution. Mr. Hartman's allegations go only to events prioI to the accident on March 28, 1979.
He was no.t even present at the TMI-2 site on the day of the accident.
Given these facts there is no basis for requiring the Commission ta await completion of the Grand Jury investigation before proceeding further on the Co.=ission's civil investigation.
The leading case on concurrent criminal and civil investigation is' United States v. LaSalh National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
There the Supreme Court ruled that a summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service was entitled to be enforced so long as it was issued in-geo -
faith pursuant to a legitimate Internal Revenue Service investigation, and prior to a recommendation by the Service to the Department of Justice ft. a criminal prosecution "which reasonably would relate to the subject matter of
'g the summons." Id. at 318. ~
See also Garden State Nationa1 Bank v. United' '
States. 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.1979). This test for the enforceability of '
agency subpoenas reflected the policy interests that the civil investigation -
should be allowed to proceed so long as it was not used to broar'en the Justice
. Department's right of criminal litigation discovery, or to infringe on the role of the grand jury as the principal tool of criminal eccusation.
It is clear from
/
~
8 what we have said earlier that the Director's subpoenas plainly meet the standards established by the Supreme Court for the enforceability of agency subpoenas. E His investigation is being carried out in good faith pursuant )
to the Commission's authority under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act, and ;
has the legitimate purposes of establishing whether further civil enforcement action should be taken in connection with the T!11-2 accident. That ongoing
. investigation into the first day of the TMI-2 accident is not reasonably i
. related to the Hartman allegations which the Commission has referred to the Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution, and which triggered the Grand Jury investigation now in progress. By allowing its Director of 1
Inspection and Enforc'er5ent to proceed with his iny'estigation, the Commission is neither infringing the accusatory role of the" Grand Jury, nor acting as a funnel
( of information to expand the Juitice Department's criminal discovery rights.
Indeed, if the Commission's congressionally mandated authority to investi-gate matters touching the public health and safety is to be effectively blocked every time a Grand Jury is convened on a matter involving the same nuclear power plant, the Cor. mission will be unduly hampered in carrying out its mandate to ,
i protect the public health and safety. The Commission depends upon its licensees l tbe reporting accurately and promptly to the NRC. If we do not have an investigatory j
. and enforcement mechanism to en'sure that reporting, the Commission will be unable to assure compliance with its rules and regulations.
~
N If anything, the Commission's power to conduct concurrent investigatinns I is broader than that of the IRS since the Atonic Energy A-t is "a renulatory scheme which is virtually unique in the degree to which broad responsibil-ity is reposed in the administering agency, free of close prescription in l its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objec-
- tives." Siecel v. Atonic Enerov Cn mission, 400 F.2d 77C (D.C. Cir.1958). .
Moreover, unlike the IRS' subpoena power which is directed at detemining the tax liability of a particular person and thus has " interrelated
~
criminal and civil elements", United States v. LaSalle, supra, 437 U.S.
at 310, the Commission's subpoena power is much nore general in scope.
. 42 U.S. C. 2201. .
J
g We also reject the second ground asserted for quashing the subpoenas, the rDlaim that they are overly burdensome given the~ many investigations of the TMI-2 accident that have already taken place. While we are sensitive to the claim that a person should not be gubjected to rounds of questioning on the'
., same matter, we have satisfied ourssives that there are important reas of questions, limited in time and subject matter to the specific areas covered by;
_ = . x .. ; : . ;. . . . - .
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the subpoenas, which have not yet been answered and are legitimate concerns of -
the Comission in its enforcement responsibilities. Finally, we note that only '
one of the six persons the Commission has subpoenaed is currently under subpoena by the Grand Jury, and his appearance date before that body has not been set.
We do not believe the CIirector's subpoenas are unduly burdensome.
The motion to quash the Director's subpoinas is denied.*
,. It is so ORDERED.
FortheCommissio7 j
v
)_ UllY SMUEL 6. C ILK Secretary of th Comission _.
~
Dated at Washington, D.C. ,
this _28th day of May , 1980.
"Section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5841 provides that action of the i Comission shall be detemined by a " majority vote of the members present." Comissioners Hendrie and Bradford were not present at the mieting at which this Order was approved. Han they been present at the meeting they would have voted with the majority. Accordingly, thG femal vote of the Comission was 3-0 in favor of the Order.
4 9
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[;wy#q) UNITED STATES 8 g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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e WASHINGTCPJ, D. C. 20sss es v4,
\ ' June 6, 1983
. Note to William J. Dircks in response to your request, I have reviewed the extent of NRR's knowledge of Tim Martin's conclusion regarding record falsification, as requested by Commissioner Gillnsky in a memorandum dated May 31, 1983.
NRR's knowledge of this issue at the time of the staff's presentation on management at the TMl-1 restart proceeding is described in the two enclosed memoranda from Harley Silver, t'he then assigned project manager. We knew at that time that the NRC staff investigation had not been completed, that it was being held in abeyance, and that details should not be discussed because DOJ had become involved. No one in NRR management knew at the time whether or not the investigators had formed a final opinion. -
Several months ago, I was given a copy of a GPU investigation of the Hartman allegations, conducted by Faegre and Benson in 1980. After reading this, and reviewing the safety evaluation report description of the issue, which had been presented to the Restart Board, I met with Tim to learn more about the safety implications of the allegations. Tim described the details of the allegations, indicated that the NRC Investigation was only weeks away from completion when it was suspended and said records and interviews did Indicate a lack of adherence to op'erating procedures and tended to support some allegations but not others. For example, he said records had been found indicating the addition of water and/or hydrogen during leak rate testing.
I do not recall Tim saying records had been falsified.
In view of information then available, the fact that the DOJ investigation had not yet been completed, and the lapse of time since the staff's previous testimony to the Restart Board on this issue, I decided to clarify the record and conduct a revalidation effort, as stated in staff comments on the GPU-B&W transcript, dated April 18, 1983.
N / %
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
- 1. Note to Eisenhut fm Silver dtd 6/3/83
- 2. Note to Stolz fm Silver dtd 6/1/83 h-k5 c s p l , .-
cc: G. Cunningham, ELD -
T. Hartin, Reg. I g
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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~%.,Y,. . June 3,1983 NOTE TO: D. Eisenhut THRU: G. Lainas FROM: Harley Silver StBJECT: TELECON WITH SHERYL WOOKEY At your request, I called Sheryl Wookey today to discuss her recollections about the Hartman allegaticns. Ms. Wookey handled the management issues as LPM in SSER No.1 for the TMI-1 restart proceedings. This issue was included in Order Item 10 of CLI-80-5.
As part of her responsibility, Ms. Wookey recalls reading some of the depositions related to the PORY leakage, and remembers that
! there were "off-the-cuff" remarks which may have -been connected with -
the Hartman allegations. She does not recall the substance of these remarks, but states that she has never been aware of any opinion or conclusion regarding the Hartman allegations held or reached by any member of the investigating team.
Harley S Iver s,
Note added by Harold'R.'Denton:
Ms. Wookey was assisting Mr. Silver and Is no longer employed by the NRC.
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NOTE T0: $WSA, Chief,OperatingReactorsBranchf4,DL FROM: Harley Silver, Project Manager, Operating Reactors Assessment Branch, DL
SUBJECT:
TMI-1 HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS ..' ,
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At your request on May 25,.1983, I at. tempted to detertnine if any cont'ributors to .
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the TMI-l restart SER or .to. hearing te.stimon.y~ h'ad knowled.ge" prior to May 24,. Ji. .
-2 1983 of'opinfons'of members of, th'e NRC investigation of 1979.-1980 into what.is. .- ~
.."Tnow known as. the.Ha'rtman allegations regarding:>falsific~ation'of. leak rate dat ~
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As best I can recall, the people still. at NRC who might have been iny'olved in"-
^.. any significant respect .in preparing SER input or testimony on this subject -
were: Larry'Crocker, Fred Allenspach, Rick Keimig, Jim Allen, Tim Martin, and -
mysel f. : f'
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Crocker, Allenspach, and I, while involved to varying degrees in the preparation of the SER and supplements in this general area, had not been directly involved in preparing SER input on this specific matter. None of the three were aware -
that any investigator had formed any opinion' nor had we seen any written matter gg.h
+
on'the subject other than the SER itself. -
Rick Keimig told me on May 25,1983, that first learned of Mr. Martin's opinion on May 24th, even though Keinig, tien, and Martin had prepared or reviewed the SER input. According to .imig, when DOJ became involved, effectively interrupting the IE invest.igation, he 'as told to keep confidential all information on the matter and not to discuss it with anyone. Until May 24th, he apparently did so. Jim Allen told me that.he recalls being aware of early investigator opinions at the time, but since the investigation had not been completed, he ,
attached no weight to comments on the matter. I have not spoken to any fomer. -
NRC employees who might possibly have addjtiongi infognation.
In any event, none of the contributors to the SER on THI-l management in NUREG-0680 Supplements 1 and 2 are aware of any' written input that indicates that at the
. time of the SER preparation the Hartman(alle ations were true. -
. /h Harley ver, Project Manager . : ..
1 Operati'n Reactors Assessment Branch, DL cc: * -
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MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations THRU: Harold R. Denton, Dire Office of Nuclear Rea g ta + 4 -.. v----
FROM: Edson G. Case, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS Discussions on this matter since Mr. Denton's memorandum to you on this subject of June 6, 1983, have refreshed my recollection of my knowledge of this subject during the March / April 1980 time frame. The " Response to Questions 2(a) and 2(c)" of Mr. Stello's memorandum to you of this date accurately reflects my knowledge of this subject at that time.
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EdsonG. Case,baiputyDirector f
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 8
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JUN 101993 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Jr.
Deputy Executive Director Regional Operations and Generic Requirements FROM: Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcer. ant
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS I have read your memorandum of June 10, 1983 to the Executive Director for Operations on the subject allegations.
IconcurcompletelywithyourresponsetoQuestions2(a)and2(c).
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- - Richard C. _foung,D ector
, Office of nspection and Enforcement e
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i 8 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 .-. -. ' * -
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DIRECTOR S OFFICE 6/3/83 .
OFFICE OF .
INS 7ECTION AND ENFORCEMENT .
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. .sK..,M Tom Rehm,. DEDO .
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HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS - MEMO COMMISSIONER GILINSKY TM, ' ~ ' S'8.D-f'2.IE'.N. ~ v .
- 2.~KY TO EDO DATED 5/31/83
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I have canvassed the senior IE staff,and other %c . , . ., . F . s.
than Jane Axelrad,no IE senior staff were M k @.E 4;*.e h.S. W ?-
aware of Tim Martin's conclusions regardingNi-: .
leak rate falsification until the revelation .:e.s.ac. % J . . .m.r W .e:9. e. . @ ',-
at the recent Comission meetin . Jane
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Axelrad's statement is attached. . ;<eic.'n*b,.,
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JANE AXELRAD'S STATEMENT RE HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS r
Sometime in February 1983, I ha'd'a ,co'nversation with Don Kirkpatrick on the Hartman allegations. He describe'd to me the results of the (s i investigation up until it was halted. Although I do not recall exactly what I was told, I believe that I' beca'me aware at that time that he had concluded that some of the Hartman llegations were correct !!n that hydrogen had been added to affect the results and that all of the bad results were i
thrown out and only the good leak rate test results were retained. s In a subsequent meeting in May, Jim Lieberman, Vic Stello, Ed Case, Ed Christenbury and others to discuss whether thd results of GPU's investi-gation were reportable. Tim 11artin was on the speaker. phone, and we discussed when NRC personnel knew that the leak r. ate test results had been. s rigged. We reached no conclusion., 'z r-
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UNITED STATES
[pn Sti ,{og NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
'd
- JUN 6 1983
%..v.../ ,
f MEMORANDUM FOR: Guy H. Cunningham V Executive Legal Director T. A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations Executive Director for Operations FROM: C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluatio'n
, of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS In response to questions posed by Commissioner Gilinsky i'n his May 31, 1983 memorandum to the EDO, I wish to inform you that AE00 does not have any _
documents bearing on how the Hartman issue was to be handled by the staff in the TMI-1 restart proceeding. AE0D has not been involved with this 5 aspect of the TMI-1 restart proceedings. Thus, AE00 personnel were not aware of Tim Martin's view on falsification of leak rate data.
One of r.y staff members (Hal Ornstein) deposed Harold Hartman in October 1979 while he was detailed to the SIG. However, since he joined AEOD in February 1980, he'has not worked on the Hartman issue. Enclosed is a memorandum that
< H. Ornstein has provided regarding his knowledge of Hartman's allegations on falsification of leak rate data and TMI-l's training practices.
4 NN .
C. , e teines r., Director Of a for Anal is and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
W. Dircks J. Roe V. Stello /
O
- V' ' ' \f' H. Denton R. DeYoung e C
J. Allan /