ML20204G502

Forwards Draft Writeup on Hartman Allegations.Writeup Based on H Hartman 791029 Deposition in Lancaster,Pa

ML20204G502
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	06/06/1983
From:	Ornstein H NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To:	Heltemes C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
Shared Package
ML20204G507	List: ML20204G502 ML20204G521 ML20207E603
References
NUDOCS 8306290182
Download: ML20204G502 (6)

Text

. .

p.2 arco UNITED STATES g [e,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

{#

-r. g . WASHINGTON,* D. C. 20555

'T f 1,; -

/ JUN 6 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation

. of Operational Data FROM: Harold L. Ornstein, Lead Engineer Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

SUBJECT:

HAROLDHARTMANALLEGATI0bS

~

In response to numerous questions that have arisen, I wish to explain my involvement in the Harold Hartman case.

In 1979 I was detailed to the Commission's Special Inquiry Group on Three -

Mile Island. '

One of my assignments was to investigate TMI operator training. In carrying out that assignment, I iearned of Harold Hartman. I deposed him under oath at the Holiday Inn, Lancaster, PA, on October 29, 1979.

The issues pursued at the deposition addressed TMI operator training including a discussion of transcripts from "walkthrough" examinations and safety valve

~

leak test falsification.

I provided a writeup on the Hartmen allegations for inclusion in the SIG's report - a copy of my 12/3/79 draft " Allegations.of a former TMI-2 licensed reactor operator in the areas of operator training and noncompliant plant operation" is attached.

When I learned that SIG management was not using the ' attached material, I appealed (on several occasions), but to no avail. It was my contention (which I made .

the SIG management aware of) that the leaking relief valve was an important I factor which affected the course of the accident. (The f act that the plant )

operated for several. months with the leaking valve which resulted in an elevated 1 tailpipe temperature hindered the operators' ability to recognize the open PORV during the accident.)

.f 'n?

,. f' N

,s

'((.

s l [V / ,/

/

f

C. J. 'Heltemes, Jr. - 2-On a Saturday morning about a year after the SIG report was published, I received a call from IE Region I. I was told that Harold Hartman was making allegations on a NY TV talk program, and that Region I was looking for information on Hartman.

Later that day, I met a member of IE headquarters at my office and provided him eith my file on Harold Hartman (my SIG deposition and all exhibits). Subsequently, ,

1 discussed this matter with OIA and provided OIA with some additional material.

The material that I provided to IE and OIA has not been returned to me. My deposition of Hartman and the exhibits associated with it provided a clear picture of what transpired. I believe that Hartman's allegations, which were given under oath, were correct. It should be noted that in 1979 GPU was fined

$155,000 because they operated the plant for several months with the leaking relief valve.

py/

Harold L. Ornstein, Lead Engineer _

Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data -

Attachment:

As Stated '

e S

e t

l

-,.. . . ~

l 1

i

5 e

=

/h3 (1979)s.

M Allegations of a former TMI-2 licensed reactor operator in the areas of operator training and noncomplian I( plant operation Shortly after the accident, one of THI-2's licensed reactor operat6rs (who worked for//h years at THI-2, and was also in the Nuclear Navy for 8 Y years) resigned his position. In discussions with NRC Inspection and Enforcement Personnel and in followpo interviews with the NRC's Special Inquiry Group he noted the following:

• Training - He thought that his training - cold licensing program (at TMI-1) was comprehensive and well done. [I&E tape f254,page31).

His training included 8 weeks on the sim01ator;he had taken mock NR( exams, both written and oral walk throughs which were given by General Phys'ics Corp. He thought that the preliminary training had been quite helpful. However, he did note (ifid p. 32) that the operators that did join TMI-2 after the cold licensing program "are trained to take n oi ,? ed.

They ar(e trai)ned to operate the pla an NRC examination.

A They have copies of HRC tests, the questions..."

He noted that the TMI trainees and operators had a good record on NRC examinations, and that he felt that it was due to the fact that the trainees knew what to expect on

s. ,

the examinations:

"If they know that a certain examiner is going to 9, *-

.

• come, they can dig out all his old tests, they can.

• and we have old interviews that somebody might have Attachment

I I 8, O

- snuck a little tape recorder in their pocket and taped the entire' walk around and you can get the tape conversations of those I've seen th,ose flying around."

Subsequently the operator provided the NRC SIG with a copy of the transcripts from walk-around examinations. He indicated (IE tape #254, p. 34)that he thoughg but was not certain that THI operators had obtained the transcripts from the TMI training department. 1 0 9d- .

f M&rs irppht -

Similarly in an SIG deposition on Q)29/79,(,p.

1 23, he stated that he had no knowledge,of Met Ed ever transcribing walk-through examinations, but.he stated that "...I presented you with a set of documents which I received from training" -

later on he backed off and stated (ibid p. 24)"I assumed that they came from training."

The operator noted (ibid p. 21) that there were a large number of people who had copies of old walk-through exams, and that such practice was commonplace.

Regarding a comparison between Navy nuclear and Met Ed iLid training, he noted (hw +f 9 ugithr p.13) that the Navy training was done by " top notch people, hand picked by the " Admiral ." 'The Navy had a systematic approach in which the learning was, done in progression - each concept was learned, before another one was introduced it was geared to teach the operator to think and be analytical; whereas, ,

3 the Met-Ed. auxiliary operator training program didn't. That training was " haphazard"and not as thorough, Regarding the Met Ed instructors, h'e felt that they were knowledgeable, but that they couldn't put together a program or do as professional a job as the Navy did. Mr ^ %. ;..g wa: W n--969 ' . -

e- -2 : th;.vu3n.

Nonetheless, he felt that Met-Ed had done a " fine job of trainthg us with what they had, and people, material-wise, I think they did a fine job.'.' (ibi.d.p.le Regarding cold licensegpAe training of reactor l operators,(8 week simulator course at B&W, Lynchburg) d6' thought that the program was well coordinated and was considered invaluable. He noted that the operators developed skills during their simulator training program which included applying classroom knowledge to the simulator with simulated casualties. He felt that such simulator training helped him with being able i to recognize and analyze problems quickly. (/I/ 6

=

\

Noncompliant plant operations In his May 22, 1979 interview with I&E, the operator mentioned the fact that for at least three months before the accident, he knew that the pressurizer

\

code safety valves were leaking (I&E tape #254, p.14). He noted that the n.

~ ~

thermocouples downstream of the safety valve were between 150 and 180 degrees, ,

1

['-

fw and sometimes were over 200.

He stated that a leak rate was reqtired every three days; and "That leak rat 9 had to be fudged every time we got, just about everytime we got it, we had to do something to make itright."[gidp.15)

He mentioned that all the shift foremen and shift supervisors that operated the- plant in the three months before the acMdent knew of the leakage.

(Ibid, p.15) '

pdw n The operator mentioned (Ed@i8?f deposition (p. 49)) that upon telling ~ h supervisors about the leaking safety valves, he was just; told to "get a good leak rate."- There were occasions when he' could not get a " good leak rate" all night.

(Ibid p. 50) -The facility was required to get a " good leak rate" once every three days; consequently, frequent testing day and night such that once every three days an acceptable leak rate was c.eas u red. (Ibid, p. 5,0)

Beyond going to the shift supervisor and shift foreman, the operator didn't go to anyone with his concern about the excessive leakage because he th it was such an obvious problem, the people that he would go to were p aware of the problem already. There was/lso A a general fear of rocking the boat and there were apparently no avenues through the Met Ed QA organization that he was aware of which could have been depended upon for resolving leaky safety valve problem. (Ibid p. 51). .  !

mm - . L

)

1

" qu UNITED STATES

["

'%'j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHIN GTON, D.C. 20555 g 4: .E o Cs ,y J'

CFF10E OF THE CC'.iMISSIO N E R June 29, 1983 i

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. DIRCKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SUBJECT:

HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS Since senior NRC staff members apparently believed by March or April of 1980, that leak rate test results had likely been falsified prior to the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2, and that this was a potentially serious matter, why was this belief not communicated to the Licensing Board or the Corcaission? .

/

ictor Gil'. sky cc: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Ahearne Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine SECY OGC OPE Rec'd Off. EDO D :: . . . 4 : ..t 9,'$,l , , ,

Time . . . b ! U . , , , ,, , ,,,

l N

\).

.a

< \

I

)

(} 9/ '

\

1 l