IR 05000382/1997019

Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-382/97-19 on 970922-26 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Support Re Land Vehicle Control Measures & Security Program

ML20217K904
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	10/24/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217K902	List: IR 05000382/1997019 ML20217K896
References
50-382-97-19, NUDOCS 9710300115
Download: ML20217K904 (2)

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DOCUMENT CONTAINS P.AFEGUAHDS INFORMATION

LN.CLOSUBE, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50 382 Ucense No.: NPF 38 Report No.: 60 382/97 19 Ucensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location: Hwy.18 Killona, Louisiana Dates: September 22 26,1997 Inspector: Thomas W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist Plant Support Branch Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT: Supplemental inspection iniormation 0 .

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2-DOCUMENT CONTAINS SAFEGUA90S INFORMATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 NRC inspection Report 50 382/97 19 This was a special, announced inspection of the licensee's implementation of the land

- vehicle control measures implemented in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," utilizing Temporary Instruction 2515/132. " Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," dated January 18,199 Plant Sunnort

The installed vehicle barrier system was consistent with the summary description submitted to the NRC, encompassed all vital areas, and was accurately described in the security plan (Section S1.1 e The installed vehicle barrier system was capable of protecting plant vital equipment from a vehicle bomb blast. The boinb blast analysis was consistent with the summary description. Distances between the vehicle battler system and vital equipment exceeded the minimum standoff distance. The fuel handling building was not included in the bomb blast analysis. (Section S1.2).

Procedures properly addressed security surveillance, maintenance, compensatory measures, vehicle access control, and the safe shutdown of the plant. Access of emergency vehicles in the event of loss of power to the gates was not addressed

& in security procedures (Section S1.3).

An effective security training program had beon implemented (Section SS.1). DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE (S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS

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