ML20234F593
| ML20234F593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Bodega Bay |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1964 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234A767 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-665 NUDOCS 8709230179 | |
| Download: ML20234F593 (25) | |
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SUMMARY
ANALYSIS .
' %, . BY THE g m; a ,-
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.< l PACIFIC CAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY 2 ,
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SUMMARY
ANALYSIS
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[d$d. Summary s [m..A., t
'5hE2h In our review of the application from Pacific Gas andiElectric Company,
.TiMd l'y we have taken into account the reports of the Commission's. Advisory
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Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and information supplied by.our consultants
, in geology, seismology and structural engineering. .We also have had numerous discussions with representatives of the Company and with PG&E's consultants.
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;-[ :, , , We believe that in all respects except one.the proposed design of the
;v r I$;e Bodega Nuclear Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plant can eqq; be built and operat'dd without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The one exception is the uncertainty associated with the proposed
. design concept to safeguard the reactor against the effects of a major earth-d quake involving substantial shear movement of the foundation rock.
y ', ) The proposed reactor site is approximately 1000 feet west of the D: m; # western edge of the San Andreas fault zone. The location has necessitated Wp i-c m jf%w&.a s prolonged and. intensive study of factors affecting the safety of the in . w. 4
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- sta11ation in the event of the occurrence of a severe earthquake at or near
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gjyf2 The fact that the proposed site is adjacent to the San Andress. fault _ d .: . - 1
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sone makea it almost certain that it will be subjected to one or more severe .I
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1ld % . . % h idye rj: 4 seismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While there is a
.y high probability that the plant under'the proposed design could survive t
.;.y the vibrational stresses of even a.very large earthquake without damage, n.. u M'% it must be.recognised.that if such an earthquake should also involve several h
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. feet' of shaar- ground movement. as. well as. ground accelerations as' high as 2/33 to 1.0g.there.is presently no sound experimental'or experience basis
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. containment.. structure and emergency equipment designed'to assure the. safety.
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A novel method.is proposed for safeguarding the Bodega Head reactor w., tN against differential grouad movement'of its foundation rock. This is not
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'i{ Because of the magnitude of possible consequences of a major rupture in the reactor containment accompanied by a failure of emergency equipment, we a
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do not believe that a large nuclear power reactor should be the subject of c:. - , CM] a pioneering construction effort based on unverified engineering principles,
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$Y For these reasons, it is our conclusion that Bodega Head is not a
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4 f - l j History
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The Pacific Gas.and Electric Company of San Francisco on December 28, 1962, d . -
.y r,1 submitted'an application to'the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for a permit to construct and operate a nuclear power plant at Bodega Bay, California, pursuant yl% -
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(10 CFR 50). The application, which includes a " Preliminary Hazards Summary TM4 gg Report," dated December 28, 1962, and Amendments 1 through 9, received during f[ - , the period March 4, 1963,.through September 16, 1964, has been reviewed by the i9 AEC's Division of Reactor Licensing and other members of the Regulatory Staff. > Technical consultants assisted the staff in specialized areas. The application was also considered by the AEC's Advisory Committee on Reactor So.feguards (ACRS).
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The recommendations of the ACRS were' expressed in letters to the Chairman of the : Y. $[ g -AEC dated April'18, 1963, and October 20, 1964,. Wh$ u - , ,, ng ( ' Site
. The nuclear power plant is proposed for construction on Bodega Head, a
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.. W small peninsula in Sonoma County on the Coast of California about 50 miles ,1 w.: i ys .
l Y northwest of San Francisco.' The property owned by Pacific Gas and Electric e
. . ; .s. a Company at the site consists of approximately 225 acres and includes the entire tn
(:ZM southern end of the peninsula. The proposed reactor site is approximately 4N 7, 1000 feet west of the' Western edge of the San Andreas fault zone. aN i 4 1 4.M The nearest residence to the site is approximately 1-1/2 miles away. , 1 2.kko .
%y Bodega Bay (population 350) is the nearest village and is located approxi- +
W2; 3^iL .; , mately 2 miies north-northeast of the reactor site. The total population
.M gg,y 1rithin 5 miles is about 500 and within 25 miles is about~ 114,000. '
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,. 1 Plant Description
[{l ' The nuclear power reactor proposed for construction on Bodega Head is a
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direct. cycle, forced circulation, boiling water type. Reactors of the boiling
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My water type have been operated successfully at Dresden, Illinois, Big Rock, .
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@5 Michigan, and Humboldt Bay, California.' -Design power at Bodega is 1008 thermal.
- megawatts' (Mwt), compared with 700'Mwt for Dresden, 240 Mwe for Big Rock Point Y $.. ~
and-165 Hut,for Humboldt Bay. L Q -
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The reactor core will'have an active fuel length of 125 inches and a
+W; diameter of 137. inches. It will contain 592 fuel assemblies and ,145 movable w
control rods (cruciform blades). The control. rod drives will be similar to the rod drives which have been used at Dresden, Big Rock Point, and Humboldt- {
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For containment'at the Bodega Bay plant the company proposes to utilize j y the pressure suppression concept similar to that already in use at its
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Humboldt Bay plant. The reactor vessel and the coolant recirculation system j are to be enclosed in a dry well vessel, whose volume is about 115,000 cu. ft. 3,,, e ; ;. @. ., The' dry well is connected through eight vent pipes, each eight feet in
, .r j diameter, to a suppression chamber with a volume of approximately 142,000
. :t j% cu. ft. , of which about 62,000 cu. f t. is filled with water . In the unlikely M.ht
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event of a complete severance of a reacter coolant recirculation line, the N. gb-r c pressure build-up in the dry well would be reduced both in magnitude and 1.w. 9
%4 JAd duration as a result of steam flow to the suppression pool where the steam 8;@) would be condensed. (Any fission products released either concurrently or j
, subsequently would be trapped either in the dry well or suppression chamber.)
n .w. p Tests have been conducted that demonstrate the effectiveness of this concept.
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The fuel-handling facilities at this plant provide for underwater transfer
# 'of spent fuel from the reactor vessel to the fuel storage pool .through an N
gg interconnecting pool of water. These operations are to be epoducted inside a 11p . refueling building which will be maintained at a slight negatdye pressure by h L ,pp feas which discharge air through particulate and halogen removal + filters to I[ n a stack, thereby minimizing the possibility sof direct .out-leakage from the Nk@#<vg building. 10d 6 Radioactive ', liquid wastes from the Bodega plant are to be mixed with condenser effluent (about 250,000 gpm) prior to discharge to the Pacific r Ocean. .All solid wastes with radioactive contamination are to be transferred v:.9 ,. q21
~m to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal. Radioactive gases
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gjj , are to b.e vented to a special stack the height of which is to be specified ,j
.on the basis of results of a meteorological survey now in progress. The dis-pos.almf both liquid and gaseous radioactive westes resulting from plant a operations will be. monitored and contr-11ed i a.o.that at any off-site location j
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the concentration of radioactive contaminants 1.will not exceed the ;11: nits set I forth in Title 10, Code.:of Federal Regul,ati.ons , Part .20. i 4._ > 5 -j 3
, t.f.? Important Safety Considerations 9
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Q In our evaluation of this.eppliestion, we.heve give.ntspecial consideration ; D.C. t a
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- to .a number of site and design features >whichahave .important safety implica-
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j :.the following paragspphs. , 1
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Suitability of the Proposed Site , ,'
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M;$ Based.on considerations of-potentialnhazards. Ao u public health 3pnd j
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l , safety, this reactor site is an excellent one in all respects.except I l
.. f E, . one - the possibility of a severe earthquake involving substantial shear 1 siM.. .. l r ,
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. . earth movement at the site. Earthquake problems posed by this location M -
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..y%u jl J: By virtue of property ownership by PG&E, as enhanced by the water j/
4%' M r- a c,y areas on three sides of the peninsula, the applicant can exert positive
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control over an ares.having a minimum radius of about 450 feet from the reactor, and can exert substantial control over an area extending ,
- i out to a radius of about 1300 feet, the nearest point on Doran Beach l
;" across the harbor entrance channel, wC e,
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MQu The population in the vicinity of the site is low and the iso- . i, - ,l
,' lation distances are well within acceptable ranges. The meteorology
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,_ t is as good as or better than that in California generally. The-site c a is not upstream from any drinking water intakes.
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,,j 2. Suitability of the Nuclear Reactor Design n ., !
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The boiling water nuclear reactor proposed for the Bodega plant
.a J;[. is of a type that has been operated safely at a number of other ,
---( locations including Dresden, Big Rock Point and Humboldt Bay. It is
.. a gl[ expected to exhibit negative temperature and void coefficients of l W.1
,[ reactivity at operating conditions. Further, the reactor will be !
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c ,&M , l "j i a., s . T - The Bodega.~ Bay reactor is to be: designed so that at any. time
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D during core life..with all control rods. inserted the k-effective of l/;@3E y% gg the core wil.1.not exceed.0.97 With the most reactive rod fully ,
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T,n.I ~ withdrawn and-the other rods fully inserted, the k-effective-of the '
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,4 .. . The control rod drives proposed for this reactor are similar to, uz R' but include certain improvements over, the locking-piston type rod p j
.4lN p drives that have been used at other plants.. The applicant has stated !
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M., '"% , and endurance tests before reactor startup.
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y;ww - [ $ 3. Suitability of Fuel Handling Facilities ll s.a,.w; s
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.The ~ fuel-handling concept for this facility has favorable safety e
!g.m characteristics. During refueling operations th'e fuel storage pool
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~t y -is connected by a water channel to the reactor vessel, thus providing r> .
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l i 4 .' ..Ades acy of the Radioactive Waste Disposal. Plans.and Desians 1a Radioactive liquid wastes from this plant are to be mixed with _,; condenser affluent prior to discharge-to the Pacific Ocean.. No problem is anticipated in maintaining the concentration of radionuclides in the
%s ^ .inixture_.below the.=mv4=um permissible concentrations specified in
.Q MS <10 CFR 20. ' In addition,'the applicant has stated that a radiological m
- OM..s, l monitoring survey of this site and its environs will be initiated two "go 4
- h years before operation of the. reactor and will continue after operation
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# commences. Details of the compling program have not been completed,.
but it is expected that quarterly samples would be tak'en of marine
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g, , fishes and of the intertidal algae and eel grass. Thus, gh, applicant pg i '
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' would be able to determine any reconcentration of radionuclides that YN dW .
might occur before 'it became a potential safety problem.
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e4 All solid wastes from this plant are to be transferred to licensed iraste disposal agents for off-site disposal. The applicant has stated that gaseous wastes disposal will be monitored and controlled so that a maximum annual exposure at any Mj X@ off-site location will not exceed permissible limits. There appears N 3; 7b.. to be no reason to believe that this objective cannot be met. The I wm - g,g diffusion climatology is expected to be satisfactory and a Q% W . meteorological facility is being installed at the site to developa.
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NhD . 49.t better understanding of the local meteorology, so that an appror. 't A$ i . i l Mb,
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. radioactive gaseous waste stack height may be selected. A radiological !
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- 3 surve3t pr.agram..at the. site is. planned for initiation two years in l l l l advance of reactor operation. Quarterly sampling of soil, vegetation, f local agricultural products, well water, stream water and stream mud, j and weekly sampling of air particulate and air background are also W
ni.sc; . Planned. i c p. s.,,Ly aw ; gy 5. Jadeousey of-Emergency Systems 4;j.y $ The applicant proposes to equip the plant with a substantial 1
'j number of facilities for the safe handling of emergencies. An i ,
.j amarefuscy feedwater pump is provided to assure that the reactor core is always kept submerged in water so long as the reactor vessel and piping beneath it remain intact. Core spray systems are provided to
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cool the core if,.for some reason, such as pipe failure, the core cannot i.@
, s,y be kept submerged. .An emergency condenser with a large water storage 9
capacity and provisions for make-up from the fire system is provided to serve as a heat sink in case the main condenser is damaged. A bleed-and-feed system is available as a backup to the emergency condenser. This system provides for bleeding steam from the main I steam line to the suppression pool, and making up water thus lost _d (s through action of the auxiliary feed water pump or its backup. A
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p, critical if such action becomes necessary for any reason. ::' 1p."-
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.$2 Several sources, of emergency electric power.are available. A 5?h '
j.Q3 startup-standby transformer is provided to supply station service e?:.% .. power during plant startup, or in emergencies, from the 220 KV trans- ;l i d..y$
},g% mission system. An auxiliary standby transformer can supply sufficient
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Mz . . .. O. O' 1, - i - power..for orderly shutdown from a 12 KV distribution 1.ine .from a. i-I j nearby substation.. If both-these sources fail, an engine driven { 1
- 1 generator.can supply power for safe shutdown and decay heat removal.
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,n pg . In adcli. tion to these sources a substantial station battery will l w
.jp S@j supply. power.for control instruments and, through an inverter, WT>y essential AC loads,
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@ 6. Adecuacy of the containment concept This plant is to utilize the pressure suppression concept in its I
containment design. Mockup tests have been conducted by the appli-cant to determine the maximum pressure the containment would 1 experience as a result of the complete severance of one of the
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- 28-inch recirculation loop lines under a variety of reactor coolant
.D, pressures and temperatures,'and dry well temperatures. These tests Wrh -
have provided a suitable basis for designing the system and have also l shown that the steam exhausted to the suppression pool is completely i i condensed beneath the pool surface. The applicant has proposed a number of special provisions to i _. j assure reliable containment performance'in the event of an accident. !
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W/f Redundant isolation valves are to be placed in the main steam lines, d% - 1' (giy Containment leak rate tests are to be conducted after installation w: R of all penetrations by applying dry well design pressure to the Mi ,
.q9 completed dry well and suppression chamber design pressure to the
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W? completed suppression chamber. The containment leaktightness will be
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GAj tested at periodic intervals throughout the life of the ple'nt. I
.t,g Specifications for containment design pressure. and leak rate will W:
J; Q limit potential accident consequences to acceptalile levels, gqp9 ' w s ~
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- 7. Acceptability of' Potential' Exposure to the Maximum Credible Accident j r ,! The applicant has evaluated the consequences.of a number of credible accidents, based on the assumption that;the containment and other safe-guards function as designed. In most cases they would create no jgy significant. hazard to the health and saf.ety of'the public.- Of those al& .
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am > credible accidents which were considered by-the applicant to have a w l Q potential for significant releases of radioactivity to the environment, 1 i
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", x the accident.. categorized as the refueling accident resulted in the highest.
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analysis that a fuel bundle was dropped .into a near-critical reactor, i ' causing a nuclear excursion which releases fission products into the re-I fueling building. .Using standard calculation procedures and realistic r 9 . numbers, the applicant calculated that the maximum off-site potential
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whole body . dose for the duration of this. accident would be less than 1.0
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- yi rem. Noble. gases are the major contributor to the potential whole body
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in excess.of Part 100 guidelines for reactor site criteria.
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) Research and Development Programs
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a:n Pacific Gas and Electric Company and its contractors are planning a 3M j.W number of research and development programs, the results of which will be- 4) 97 -
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r4; . x, j, utilised in final design of the plant. They include the following: JK
.% 1. Radiological Survey ww 9lth ' . f Qp .A preoperational monitoring su y of the site and its environs ll1.'s .
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- .s x to be initiated+ two years before commencement of operation of the
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reactor. Although the details of this program have no't been completed,
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j i l j it is anticipated that.it..will be similar to .that conducted for the
., '. company's Humboldt Bay nuclear unit.
Z 4;.% 2... Meteorology- ' i
.A meteorological facility.is being installed at the site to pro-dh,. ;. -
e :. W . vide necessary data for. atmospheric diffusion studies. Instruments
. ~.3h.
- ..-$;.P -
will be mounted at three.. levels on a 250 ft. tower and will measure e
,q temperature and wind speed and direction. All.. readings will be t . digitized and recorded on paper tape. The results of this program i
i will be used in calculating the potential dilution of radioactive l gases, and.in selecting a suitable stack height.
; 5. i
,? 3. O,,ce anography
.a...
-.m.:V r! The capacity ofithe ocean to diffuse the condenser cooling gr.
.; water and minimize the effects of temperature and radioactivity on j i
. the marine biota is being' investigated ~in a series of experiments j q
at the site. These tests include pse of drift poles and uranine dye as well as measurements of temperature and salinity. They will continue j
. l
., through at least one annual cycle of oceanographic and meteorological
>k,N! ; conditions. .
.$s Q .
1$. P i'WC 4. Marine Biology Survey .'
.k.i r.n.i An ecological survey is being conducted to prepare lists of the marine fauna and flora of Bodega Head and Harbor. .if;W m
dh *
.5. Pressure Suppression Tests
\
M,]. n .. . Extensive tests of the pressure suppression concept have been -l Tr:%
. jjU conducted at the Company's-test facility at its Moss Landing Power
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u & : M,.. a,. ;f a.c. a. . %. - --- i - =:- s._ .- 1:n ~ _ Plant. Additional tests will be conducted at.the company's plant to ( . determine whether or not baffles between vent pipes are required in the Bodega suppression pool.
- 6. . Fuel Development
- f'I.: ., Results from fuel element development tests and experience with Tw
.,;., fuel designs. now employed in existing l reactors will form the basis for 4)
'9 the selection of..the Bodega fuel cladding and its thickness.
l 1
- 7. Instrumentation Development l
- i In-core startup range neutron detectors are being developed as I .
a possible substitute for the presently planned out-of-core detectors. i l l
. h- 8. Control System Development '
s E.)
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..A prototype Bodega' control rod drive will be subjected to extensive developmental testing before the final drive design is released for i manufacture. Several devices which would reduce the lik11 hood or i'
magnitude of a control rod dropout accident are being developed for possible use in the Bodega control system. I Seismic Considerations kS ? The proposed location of the Bodega Nuclear Power Reactor is approxi-d c .', mately 1000 feet west of the Western edge of the San Andreas f ault zone, a , prominent band of seismic activity running generally north and south' along
.,3.i~ most of the State of California. The choice of this location by the NT( applicant has necessitated prolonged and intensive study of factors affecting
.'41 '
35.'[ , the safety .of the installation in the event of the occurrence of a severe ,
- w.
1 ['# ' earthquake at or near the location of the plant.
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Sinceithe fields ofJgeology, seismology and earthquake structural design o ' v..- >
; are highly specialized, it.has been necessary to call upon the services of-expert consultants for help 'in analyzing the various problems involved'in
.j arriving at a. decision on the technical feasibility of building the' Bodega.
' )
.7 .
i.y plant at the proposed. location with reasonable assurance that it will safely ' sm.m J
@5'bf t withstand the maximum earthquake that might credibly occur during the life of s m . ,.
4 the plant. y i.
- .. ~
- n .] .
s C T- The consultants employed by the' applicant (PG&E) include Dr. George W.
. q- ,
Housner, Professor of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics at the California In'stitute of Technology, Dr. Hugo Benioff, prominent West Coast , Engineering Seismologist,~and Mr. E. C. Marliave, Consulting Geologist. l e N The ABC Regulatory Staff has r'etained the services of Dr. N. M. Newmark,
,,; ,y , Professor of Civil: Engineering at the University of Illinois. and Mr. Robert A.'.Williamson of Holmes & Narver. 'The st:aff has been assisted by the U. S.
Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS)'and the'U. S. Geological Survey (USGS)
, on seismicity and geclogy.
, There is a substantial difference between the viewpoint of the applicant
+;, and that of the USC&GS and USGS with respect to the maximum credible earth-
~ ~ ..
$65 a.c quake that should be taken as the design basis for the Bodega Head plant.
. . . ;, m
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' S ii . The PG&E earthquake consultants feel strongly that the maximum ground .
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acceleration to be expected during any credible' earthquake at or near the if W
~W plant site is 0.333, and they consider it incredible that there should eve..
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%;w be more than a few inches of differential ground motion under the site. The
' U6 ~USC6CS, on the other hand, has recommended that the-reactor and its
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Ihh - - 1 'dh1 $$ Nh. !NidMb I h OIN ~ NkhhhE MM hN M 4- . ( (,a . . . x . containment structure be designed to withstand a ground response spectrum of i l ! i 2/3g, with peak accelerations up to 1.0g, together with possible differential
?
- \.
shear ground motion of up to 2-1/2 feet. The USGS, pointing out that the
,, geologic setting of Bodega Head is similar to that of Point Reyes Petiinsula w
>W where bedrock ruptures did occur in the 1906 California earthquake, feels
.01
.that there is a possibility cf a comparable rupture of up to 3 feet at the f
~,,
w, proposed reactor site in the event of a severe earthquake in that area,
.i 2 lg There'is also a wide difference of opinion respecting the size of the l
l tsunamis (seismic induced ocean waves) that may be expected to result from i
; off-shore earthquakes. Consultants to the applicant are firm in their -
i i i opinion, based on all available records along the West Coast, that no
. , tsunami will ever push water more than 15 feet above mean water level at the plant site. However, the USCMS has recommended that protection against )
.+~ -
y . 50-foot tsunamis be provided in the design of the plant. I I l The applicant was made aware of the recommendations of the USCMS and i l USGS, and was asked a number of questions designed to determine whether the i co.npany considered it feasible to design the Bodega plant so as to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of the reactor containment would be
- i 5 I preserved and that the reactor would be shut down and maintained in a safe l
.u 1 ,
l d ' condition in the event of the occurrence of an earthquake of the severity ' ij
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j postulated by the USC(4S and USGS. The technical basis for their conclusion l ' i . was also requested.
;. d .
l l t , y.e1 U1 F' 1l i
. While continuing to disagree strongly.with the credibility of such an ;i f.i !;
'N ' extreme earthquake, the applicant has nevertheless proposed a design which *-
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j the company.and.its consultants feel confident will safely ride through a 2/3g earthquake, with peak ground acceleration up to 1.0g, which is
, accompanied by differential shear ground displacement under the reactor containment of up to 3 feet either horizontal or vertical. If such an earth-e,
,;... quake should occur, the containment might be tipped or totated slightly, but z.'n there would be.no breach in its leak-tightness and no release of fission
~
~se j.'ltj products, in the opinion of the applicant.
.j The postulated earthquake involves a pattern of ground motion generally i I similar to that recorded by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in the El Centro
! Earthquake of May 18, 1940, but with approximately twice the intensity, corresponding to a maximum acceleration of two-thirds gravity, a maximum
~-} velocity of 2.5 ft/sec, and a maxi $um ground displacement of 3 feet, and shd with occasional intermittent pulses of acceleration up to 1.0g. The -
structures are considered to be subjected to simultaneous shear displace-i ments ranging up to 3 feet, along lines extending under the containment structure or other parts of the plant, with motions in either horizontal or vertical directions along the fault. It is also assumed that aftershocks i
, of intensity equal to the El Centro quake might be suffered before remedial J action could be taken.
a e .t q a There are two major problems posed by the postulated earthquake. The ,
-l f most unusual one is that of providing for shear ground displacement of as * .l much as three feet underneath the reactor building. The other is that of 1
A vibrational stresses.
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7 fo Although there is a substantisi design effort involved in computing Ii ; -the vibrational stresses, and judgment has~to be exercised as to the proper vibrational spectrum and structural damping factors to use in assuring
.r, that the reactor containment structure and all the vital equipment 95l .
MK
% inside it will safely withstand'the vibrational aspects of the earthquake, qn 1.
r J the technology'is well-understood. The critical area here is the ability
- cM M
of vital structural' components to withstand the stresses put on them 'by ' c c ' L id:,% - the simultaneous occurrence of the maximum postulated accident. (rupture
?E of, reactor coolant system) 'and~ maximme postulated earthquake. Under these extreme conditions the question focuses on the maximum allowable stresses that should be used in the design computation relative to the yield stress of the various materials under consideration. While many l',,. of these details have nottyet been resolved for the Bodega reactor, par-e ,
- M- >
ticularly with regard to the vibrational stress criteria, there appears to .
, be no reason to believe that anything of a fundamental nature with respect to vibrational problems will arise that cannot be successfully handled.
Building the reactor structure and its foundation in such a way that i
-it will safely survive a shear ground movement underneath it of as much as
,, 3 feet poses a more troublesome problem. The applicant proposes to r 1
(:,"$n accomplish this by a design which provides for a 3 foot unobstructed '
.. 2
- d.n ., radial clearance between the outside of the reinforced concrete contain- j
. w:u s W ment structure and the inside of a containment pit, completely around the ,.
D..a . WP 4 circumference, from elevation -73 feet to yard elevation at +25 feet. The j N., of :i L .i.8,
+.*
walls of the reactor containment pit will be lined with reinforced concrete i1
- 7. R pq
.to prevent possible spalling of material into the pit. The annular space ;
[8fy will be permitted to fill with' water., The reactor containment structure will 5:
&[n 4[ j be founded on a layer of carefully selected sand of characteristics which the e.
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m . ... _3. t nu .. I ! i applicant believes wil.1 permit. horizontal movements up to 3 feet without i impairing the functicn of the containment structure, although the structure I might be shifted or rotated. Differential vertical motions up to 3 feet may cause the containment structure to tilt or shift, but, in the opinion of the
. eA -applicant, in no case will.the containment function be impaired, mc,
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.5 It is proposed that the plant be designed with no rigid structural
^
"U interconnection between any major components. The reactor containment structure will be structurally independent of the turbine generator founda-l tion, the plant control building, the radwaste facility, the stack, and the plant service buildings. Piping and wiring interconnections important to safety between.the reactor containment structure, the control building and
.n /
@ the turbine generator will have sufficient flexibility to accommodate 3 feet
%'in of relative movement. In order to prevent overstress at point of penetration for piping connecting the dry well with the turbine, the company proposes to provide adequate anchors and bracing adjacent to the containment shell and l
beyond the double isolation valves. These anchors will be adequate to withstand all piping loads due to differential motion in any direction up to 3 feet between the reactor containment structure and the turbine generator j foundation.
. 2,- o . .
A The foregoing proposal for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor and its ) l containment structure against the postulated shear differential ground l
g
. motion embodies concepts which are in many respects novel and for which 4M little or no precedent exista. The Regulatory Staff Consultants, Dr. N. M.
m im Newmark and Mr. Robert Williamson have come to the conclusion after carefully 46, i
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1: studying tha. basis of the. proposal, that the structural integrity and
,, . leak-tightness..of the containment building can be maintained under the
. earthquake conditions. postulated.
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@ They--point out, however, that certain precautions must be considered 4@:3 especially.in the design of umbilicals end.of penetrations to the f
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containment.huilding. All attachments and primary system piping must,be u ,, arranged to prevent. failure by shearing or crushing due to contact with l . walls, rock, earth, etc., in the event of major earthquake motions. The
}
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piping would have to be made sufficiently flexible.to accommodate a 1 ..;j relative movement of 3 feet without failure, and at the same time be damped y, y W - l.:l Q,' f to reduce its dynamic response to earthquake oscillations. Vlm ddh ,
'4 '
'The sand layer under the containment building *is intended to act in two ways: (1) to isolate in part the containment structure from the high peaks of acceleration that might be transmitted to it from the ground f' beneath it4.and (2) to permit either horizontal or vertical faulting to j
. take place.in the rock beneath the containment structure without damaging I i
-i
-r a jj the structure. Dr. Newmark feels that the effectiveness of the sand layer
.g
':y[ .in reducing the peak accelerations may be questionable, but that its
? effectiveness in reducing the consequences of faulting will be substantial, m
G w. (l".d
.g : - Protection of the plant against the possible occurrence of large .
l .z e' '- **, jfQ tsunamis has not yet been completely resolved but does not appear to offer
+: V,U .
Q . any unsurmountable design barriers. t S@pe! y . ., y f' It is difficult to evaluate the public safety risks involved in a new f.', !
- type of construction for which there is little or no experience background.
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] Other reactor installations have presented seismic design problems, .but not in the extreme form presented by Bodega Head under the earthquake postulated 4
by the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Geological Survey. One problem
.[
Nh which the.3odega plant hse in common.with all other nuclear pov.tr plants hk Mi , subject to.special seismic design considerations is the inability to conduct Tdt
.z. ;9 any sort of performance test on the finished structure that will demonstrate
. g4 / 4
;gg....e that the design objectives have been achieved. The uncertainty presented by this situation has been accepted as a reasonable risk in the seismic dealgn i
at other locations where the only problem involved is the ability to withstand '
;j vibrational.. stresses, since this aspect of earthquake design is well under-
.: l i stood and has a considerable amount of experience background. There is
.: ' difficulty..in. applying the same philosophy at Bodega Head, however, because j
- w. ,
.,g i
,t., of the necessity. of considering the additional. problem of designing the M mc -
, reactor structure .to safely withstand differential. ground motion as well as high vibrational stresses, and because there is no realistic way of 1
i evaluating.the proposed solution to the problem. The fact that the proposed site is adjacent to the San Andreas fault zone makes it almost certain that it will te subjected to one or more severe seismic di.sturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While there is a high
, T E probability..that the plant under the proposed design could survive the
'x a
vibrations from even a very large earthquake without damage, it must be ,
- p. -
, L, recognized that if such an earthquake should also involve several feet of
- v. .
**M*, r my shear ground movement as well as ground accelerations as high as 2/3g to
~ ~
3'e J'. 47% 4 4,,g . 1.0g there is presently no sound experimental or experience basis for . Q3 - i Wy ~
- predicting the extent of damage that might be incurred by the reactor con-rf.y i
=.f.9 tainment structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety of y 1 4 }
n.
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h h $ YYY . s $ h: b S ' $ $N S $$ Y W S $5 W. < jf9p - l the reactor. ' The fact that a novel method is proposed for safeguarding the ' Bodega q Head reactor against. differential ground movement of its foundation rock is M [j)h ~ not is itself a cause for concern. The nuclear power industry is replete n!l@ NT**2 with new methods of coping with a large variety of problems never previously elds, j ' w encountered until the arrival of the atomic age. What is of concern is the va
..i.n 1
lack of any experimental or experience proof-test of the proposed novel method that could form an acceptable basis for the required safety evaluation. The pressure-suppression concept of reactor containment was completely novel when it was first proposed for use at the Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power
" Y;;
Plant. In many respects it ads much simpler than the pedestal concept for
%r
!$ safeguarding against shear movement of foundation rock proposed for the
.L%:m
- j. Bodega Head reactor. But it was not approved for use as reactor containment until after the successful conclusion of a long series of engineering tests at the PG&E's Moss Landing power generation plant which proved beyond reasonable doubt that the concept could be utilized safely for boiling water reactors. Similar proof-test standards have consistently been applied to t
other new and previously untried features incorporated from time to time in (.O nuclear power plants. f +) -
.3 i
} The fact that meaningful proof tests are difficult to achieve in the
%u
, case of seismic cafeguards does not, in our opinion, constitute a valid reason for accepting these safeguards in critical areas on the basis of
]
%p' , theoretical reasons alone. -Nor does it justify relying on opinions as to .
.wrj; A . ,
-py.) the feasibility or the proposed seismic safeguards unless these are supported m o ,.
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/ by somewhere. near the same kind of experimental evidence. required of all other safeguards. We do not see such evidence in support of the pedestal concept
~.s 23 m ..
for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor.against differential. ground motion. QIsl g 9: Whether the. public benefits to be-gained from operation of'the Bodega [ m,: lhiclear Power Plant. are.high enough to justify acceptance of the added uncertainties. involved in .the seismic. design of the plant to withstand
.4 k several feet of shear ground movement _is, of course, a matter of judgment.
o The regulatory res.irement that there be " reasonable assurance" that any licensed nuclear reactor car. be built and operated without undue risk
,d to the health and safety of the public recognizes that there is no way of a a(
eliminating,all of the uncertainties' experienced judgment is therefore M), - required. The standmed Me."ress'ohablac assurnca# 'iermorkf diffleult :tormeet
%.y . ,.
, a i _ : .., _
/
9v.4's.
- when it becomes necessary to take itato consideration external forces having lT the potertial of invalidating some of the safeguards built into the reactor installation. Thedifficultyisenpargedwhenthereareuncertaintiesin f the design measures intended to counteract the external forces. Somewhere i
along the line enough uncertainties will create a situation in which the
+
.fc k )*.. ,; " assurance" can no longer be said to be " reasonable." We believe that this MP
,gT3p situation would exist if the proposed pedestal concept of seismic design
;g , .
were to be approved without more convincing evidence of its vali,dity than hw eeQ. is-afforded by presently available information,
-W, a Conclusions J
t i ,- The containment and all of the emergency equipment for shutting down My O[$l,0 the Bodega reactor and maintaining it indefinitely in a safe condition in irN y
.or 22 -
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4 the absence.of seismic disturbances are designed.on the.. basis of well-
-E established. engineering principles. They.can also be tested to ascertain U!K 'n j.,. , .
that the design objectives have bees achieved. Consequently, there is a ff M high degrea of assurance that the reactor can be_ built.and operated without
)
N undue risk to the health and safety of the public in the. absence of seismic "S h- disturbances. b.am
~
lins Ud l [q J/ The seismic design.of the reactor structure to withstand purely ] vibrational effects is also based on well-established engineering principles which in some cases at least have been verified in the presence of earthquakes. Thus, while it is not possible to carry out.any measurements on the finished !
,3 structure .to assure that the seismic , design objectives have been accomplished, bL 8 ,'
g there is sufficient-experience. background to justify a conclusion that the Ch Og specified.saismicNibrationalcriteriacanbeachievedandthattheplantcan
.M
^ ,j therefore.he_ safeguarded against'any credible earthquake that does not rupture the foundation rock.
We believe there is room for reasonable doubt, however, that a comparable - j situation exists with respect to that particular aspect of the proposed seismic
.j design of the Bodega reactor structure intended to assure that the containment 4, .y ..
gn., and reactor shutdown functions will remain intact in the event of a shear ,; f,, f.jl displacement of its foundation bedrock as great as three feet in any direction. X > ((m . While the proposed engineering principles appear reasonable, experimental u ].h,m verification and experience background on the proposed novel construction u .ig
$j method are lacking. . If approved, this would, to the best of our. knowledge, .i
.y be the first attempt on record to design a building structure and its
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e e associated vital equipment to withstand the effects of substantial movent
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in its foundation simultaneously with the vibration accompanying.a severe N
. ~ , . earthquake. Because of the magnitude of the possible consequences of a ;
.hi"4 major rupture .in the reactor containment. accompanied by a failure of
.;;w W(J'k+ ?j emergency.aquipment,-we.do not believe that a.lsrge nuclear power reactor j l
abould E the.'. subject of a pioneering construction effort based on unverified
- 'z
,5 engineering _ principles,.however. sound they.may appear to be.
,' :4 4 J Mf *Y The Advia'ory.. committee. on Reactor Safeguards has reached the conclusion i
that the reactor can.be constructed and operated at the proposed location
)
l without undue risk to the health and safety of.the public. We have carefully I ij [ considered the views.of the ACRS. We have the highest respect for those ! views and we do not lightly reach an opposite conclusion..This is a kind
, a .e o
Ms of case, however, on.which reasonable men may differ. In our view, the c..gb.
~
64; proposal to reir/on. unproven and perhaps unprovable design measures to cope {
~- W t
,\ with forces .as . great as would be produced. by several feet of shear ground
.4 movement under a large reactor building in a severe earthquake raises a 4
substantial safety questions. In all respects except one the proposed design of the Bodega Nuclear Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plcnt can be built and i; *D
$.N.y N operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. However, m
25 m; the single exception is quite important if one accepts the credibility of an nn-d qQ ., earthquake of sufficient magnitude to cause a major displacement of f. [fx' . foundation rock undernea th the plant. Although there is a wide difference of [ expert opinion on the credibility of such an earthquake, prudent judgment favors accepting the conservative recommendations of the USC6CS and the USGS. l, GM , On this basis and for reasons given above, it is our conclusion that Bodega ,i i EMj$
$ Head is not a suitable locat b'. for the proposed nuclear power plant at the a, ~ m j'j!, present stage of our knowledge. l
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