IR 05000312/1986036

Insp Rept 50-312/86-36 on 861013-1126.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint,Surveillance & Followup Items

ML20212E481
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	12/12/1986
From:	Ang W, Dangelo A, Miller L, Myers C, Perez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212E463	List: IR 05000312/1986036 ML20212E459
References
50-312-86-36, NUDOCS 8701050335
Download: ML20212E481 (11)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

~ Report No: 50-312/86-36 Docket N License No. DPR-54 Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at: Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site) l Inspection conducted:

Inspectors: 'b 7 fu i r-12.-#G A. J. D'Angelo, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed N fw t z-I t -J'&

C. J. Myers, Resident Inspector Date Signed y .f. - /z-Iz-tL G. P. Perez, Resident Inspector Date Signed N 9 l z -1s -l- W. Ang, Regional Inspector Date Signed f j (, e /1 -l* * f C L. F. Miller, Chief, Reactor ProjectsSection II Date Signed Summary:

Inspection between October 13 and November 26, 1986 (Report 50-312/86-36)

Areas Inspected: This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors and in part by a Regional Inspector, involved the areas of operational safety verification,. maintenance, surveillance, and followup items. During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 25573, 30702, 30703, 37700, 40700, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92700, 92701, 92702, 92703, 92705, 92711, 93702,

_ 94702, and'94703 were use _

Results: No violations or deviations were identifie f

8701050335 861217 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O PDR L

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DETAILS

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1. Persons-Contacted Licensee Personnel (SNUD)

G. Coward, Deputy Restart Implementation Manager J. McColligan, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Plant D. Army, Nuclear Maintenance Manager

• B. Croley, Deputy Plant Manager

• G. Cranston, Nuclear Engineering Manager S. Redeker, Nuclear Operations Manager

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• J. Shetler, Implementation Manager T. Tucker, Nuclear. Operations Superintendent M. Price, Nuclear Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

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.L. Fossom, Deputy Implementation Manager

• R.'. Colombo, Regulatory Compliance Superintendent J. Field, Nuclear Technical Support-Superintendent S. Crunk, Incident Analysis Group Supervisor

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F. Kellie, Radiation Protection Superintenden M. Hieronimos, Assistant to the Operations Superintendent

• C. Stephenson, Sr. Regulatory Compliance Engineer B. Daniels, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering J. Irwin, Supervisor, I&C Maintenance C. Linkhart, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

• R.'Cherba,: Quality Engineering Supervisor

• T..~Shewski, Quality Engineer

. Management Analysis Company (MAC) Personnel J. Ward, Deputy General Manager, Nuclear K..Perkins, Restart Implementation Manager D. Poole, Plant Manager R. Ashley,' Licensing Manager S. Knight,-QA: Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechancies,' security and office personne '*Attenled the Exit Meeting on November 26, 1986 2. . Operational Safety Verification The inspectors reviewed control room operations including access control,

~ staffing', observation of decay heat' removal system alignment, system -

status and review of control room logs. Discussions with the shift supervis'rso and operators indicated understanding by these personnel of the reasons for annunciator: indications, abnormal plant conditions and maintenance work in progress. The inspectors also verified, by observation of valve and switch position indications, that emergency systems were properly aligned for the cold shutdown condition of the facilit .

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Tours of the auxiliary, fuel handling, reactor and turbine buildings, including exterior areas, were made to assess equipment conditions and plant conditions. The tours were performed to assess the effectiveness of radiological controls and adherence to regulatory requirements. The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness, looked for potential fire and safety hazards, and observed security and safeguards practice During this report period the following events occurred:

On November 15, 1986, the "A" inverter which feeds the SIA bus, tripped due to a blown fuse. Prior to the inverter trip, an I&C technician had started troubleshooting a control room indicator light which displayed the DHS "B" pump room sump level indicatio The loss of the SIA bus, caused a reactor coolant system pressure transmitter to fail high and subsequently caused the closure of the decay heat pump suction valve. Decay heat removal capability was temporarily lost for approximately thirteen minutes, no primary temperature increase was noted. The licensee will be submitting a Licensee Event Report (LER) to describe the incident. Further inspection will be performed in the review of the LE On November 17, 1986, the licensee reported that water was observed seeping through the concrete walls of the spent fuel handling buildin In this instance, the spent fuel pool leakage drain valves were closed for maintenance activities allowing water to accumulate in the leak chase system. The accumulated water appeared to have permeatcd the concrete structure, such that the exterior surface of the fuel handling building had levels of surface contam{ nation of 2000 to 3000 disintegrations per minute per 100 cm . A small trickle of liquid accumulated on the pavement adjoining the area and approximately one gallon has been estimated to have flowed into a yard drain that goes off-site. The activity of the water was measured at IE-SuCi/ml. At the end of the report period the licensee was still evaluating the incident. Region V will continue its review of the incident in a future inspection repor On November 21, 1986, the licensee overheated and damaged the upper pressurizer heater bundle while attempting to produce a steam bubble in the pressurizer during the process of filling and venting the primary system. This occurred due to the following: Operators using an indication for pressurizer level which was in error due to a partially empty reference leg, the pressurizer water level was below the top of the upper heater bundle, and the heaters were energized for a period of time while uncovered by water. The licensee performed a video inspection of a portion of the heater bundles. The results of the inspection showed that various heater elements had buckled. The licensee was in the process of evaluating the condition of the heater elements. Future inspection reports will document the licensee's continued evaluations.

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3. Monthly Review of Maintenance Maintenance activity for the system and component listed below were observed and reviewed to ascertain that it was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and the Technical Specifi ation The following item was considered during this review: The limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente IE Bulletin No. 85-03: " Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings" In their May 16, 1986 response to IEB 85-03, the licensee had provided a description of their program to assure the operability of 30 motor operated valves (MOVs) in the auxiliary feedwater and high pressure injection systems. The initial followup of the licensee's program was reported in inspection report no. 86-2 During this inspection period, the licensee expanded the scope of it's MOV Refurbishment Program to (1) encompass all safety related MOVs and all other MOVs on-site (163 MOVs total), and (2) include the use of response signature analysis equipment (M0 VATS, Inc.) as an additional diagnostic technique. In their November 5,1986 submittal, " Program Status Summary", the licensee updated their original program to describe the current enhanced program in progress.-

The inspector reviewed the expanded MOV program and found that the additional diagnostic techniques incorporated into the program appeared to substantially improve the technical adequacy of the licensee's progra 'lhe inspector was concerned, however, that evaluation of as-found conditions for operability was not specifically included in the licensee's MOV program. At the exit meeting, the inspector emphasized the as-found operability evaluation requirement of IEB 85-03 and the potential reportability of deficiencies identified during the licensee's refurbishaent program under 10 CFR 50.73. Followup of the ongoing licensee MOV program will continue to be open under master tracking item TI-15-73. Open item IB 85-03 will be administratively close (TI-15-73: OPEN, IB 85-03: CLOSED).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Review of Surveillance Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance testing was observed and reviewed to ascertain that it was conducted in accordance with these requirements.

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The following items were considered during this review: Testing was in

.accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was' calibrated;

-limiting conditions for. operation were met; removal and restoration of

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the affected component was accomplished; test results confirmed with TS-and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; the reactor' operator, technician or ,

engineer performing the test recorded the data and.the' data were in' J agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any deficiencies identified during .the testing were properly reviewed and

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resolved by appropriate management personne .

The inspector observed the performance of procedure M.808 " Pressurizer Heater / Internals Video Inspection". The licensee performed the video inspection to assess the condition of the pressurizer heater bundles.- .

The procedure appeared to have been written adequately to control the'

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work activity associated with the inspection. The licensee used a Rees-

Instruments R93 camera that was inserted into the pressurizer from one of the code safety valve penetrations. Due to the geometry of the

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pressurizer and the limited manipulation of the camera, the visual

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inspection was only able to cover a portion of the heater bundles. -In i most cases on the upper bundle only the length of the elements between ,

l' the first and second support plates were observed. The results of the

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inspection found buckling of various heater elements in the upper bundle, l an exact number was difficult to determine. However, there was no i indication of breached heater elements. In addition, the licensee was

able to' view approximately a thirty degree sector of the bottom of the j '

pressurizer. In this view there were no observable parts or segments of

heater elements. The inspector found the control of the video inspection i

acceptable in both the radiological area and in the actual operation of i- the inspection, j No violations or deviations were identified..

[ NRC Open Items Master Tracking _ Items: For simplicity and clarity, the following j individual open items were closed for the purpose of individual i item tracking and will be addressed in the inspection effort associated with the designated master tracking item:

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j MASTER TRACKING ITEM N INDIVIDUAL ITEM N (OPEN) (CLOSED)

Part 21 85-13-P Part 21 85-04-P

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85-22-P l

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86-01-P 86-04-P i 86-08-P l 86-10-P

! 86-16-P

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l LER 85-14 Followup 85-16-01

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MASTER TRACKING ITEM N INDIVIDUAL ITEM N LER 84-18-L1 LER 84-20-LO Temporary Instruction TI-15-73 LER 83-37-L1-Enforcement 86-22-02 Followup 80-34-06 Enforcement 84-19-03 Followup 84-19-03 Unresolved 85-31-01 Followup 85-27-03 Unresolved 86-08-05 LER 86-05-L0 Followup /

Unresolved 86-07-12 86-07-13 86-07-14 86-07-15 86-07-16 86-07-17 i '<

86-08-03 86-08-04 Temporary Instruction (Closed) TI 2515/77 " Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues" To determine the actions that the licensee had taken to address a selected sample of safety issues, the following two issues .'

applicable to Rancho Seco were reviewed in-office based on '

information provided by the license '

(1) Biofouling of cooling water heat exchangers

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The licensee does not have instruments available to monitor a change in flow of the open-cycle nuclear service raw'uater system (NSRW), However, bearing temperatures are monitored from the control room for all nuclear service raw water cooling p umps . This provides indication of the heat exchanger performance. Gross degradation of bearing cooling capability as evidenced by is alarmed in the control room. The licensee does not have specific procedures and training for handling biofouling. However, biofouling is addressed by the licensee's heat exchanger degradation response procedure. The licensee performs periodic inspections to detect fouling in service water and fire protection systems under procedures SP 212.01, i SP 201.03F, and SP 201.03 In addition, the inspector has l previously brought to the licensee's attention the condition of the NSRW spray ponds; this was documented in inspection report 86-21.

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[ (2) Natural Circulation Cooldown The licensee'does not have procedures to assist the operator in determining reactor' coolant inventory at all times when pressurizer level indication is not indicative of reacto t

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coolant inventory. The safety-related reactor vessel level indication system (NUREG 0737 II.F.2) has not been' installe It is scheduled to be installed during the Cycle 8 outage. The i licensee does, however, have procedural guidance on what to do

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, if an abnormal rise in pressurizer level occurs during

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depressurization. The licensee's procedures also provides guidance to (1) ensure reactor coolant inventory by checking-

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j 'l the margin to' saturation in the hot leg, (2) picce makeup and

' \, letdown control in manual during periods of anomelot s pressurizer level indication, (3) address the maximum natural

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. circulation cooldown rate and subsequent depressurization that will avoid the formation of a steam void in the vessel head area, and (4) specify conditions to be met before restarting a reactor coolant pump following a planned or an inadvertent pump tri (TI-2515/77 is closed.)

No violations or deviations were identifie Licensee Event Reports (1) The inspector reviewed the licensee's closure packages for.the following LERs: ,84-10-LO, 84-16-L1, and 85-15-LO. The

. inspector found that the packages ' contained the appropriate evidence that the cause of the event or condition had been addressed and that the corrective actions taken appeared to correct the event or condition':

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s LER 84-10-LO " Partial Performance of Isolation Valve r (2.losed) Surveillance Test"

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As corrective action'for this item.the licensee

} issued a revision to AP 303 " Surveillance

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Program" which specifically states that J individual components in a surveillance procedure may be tested but that surveillance tests will'not be accepted as a completed

.g surveillance. This LER is closed; 4 '

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LER 84-16-L1 " Containment Isolation Valve Str'oke Time in (Closed)- Excess of Tech. Spec. Limit" ( ^

s As corrective action for this occurrence,_the licensee issued revisions to AP 303

" Surveillance' Program" and B.1 " Plant'

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- Precritical Checks".' These changes were to insure that surveillance results are reviewed for proper closure and that items identified during the review are closed prior to plan .

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startup if the problems were identified during a

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shutdown. This LER is close '

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LER 85-15-L0 "EDG "B" Auto Start"

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As corrective action for this occurrence, the licensee has tested the~ operation of th ,j; cross-connect breaker and verified acceptable y i,

,, testing; further, a check of 'all terminations .- N were performed in the subject electrical cabinet-

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and the corresponding cabinet in'the other- 3 train. The results appeared acceptable. This .

LER is close '

. , (2) The LERs listed below have been closed, based on in-office

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review of.the licensee's reports. The criteria used in the

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review were: a. The report met the reporting requirements; the. report was adequate to assess the subject event or .

condition; c. the cause appeared accurate and supported by-the report details; and d. the corrective actions taken.and or

planned appeared to appropriately correct the event and the i caus L2 (Closed)

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81-39-L0

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t-84-22-11

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85-08-LO

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85-11-L0

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86-11-L0 (3) For the purposes of tracking revisions to LERs, .only the most recent revision will be tracked. Therefore, the following LERs have been superceded by subsequent revisions and are therefore considered to be close ,

83-37-L0 (Closed)

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84-16-LO

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84-18-L0

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85-01-L0

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85-14-LO

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85-18-L0

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86-02-LO

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86-07-10 d. Followup Items

~(1) (Closed) 83-36-01: Tears in the rip proof plastic lining

covering used for the spent fuel racks. .This item involved an

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inspector's observation of a tattered covering on a spent fuel ra'ck when 'the rack was received on site in early.1984. ' The

, inspector examined the licensee's Receiving Inspection Data

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Report (RIDR) for the fuel racks and found them to be

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'l acceptable, and no apparent damage was incurred tc the racks due to the lack of proper covers. The inspector observed the licensee's recent practices of covering large equipment stored on site, and no discrepancies were identified. The inspector had no further questions on this item, therefore, this item is closed, 83-36-0 (2) (Closed) 82-25-01: Training records. A computerized records system for licensed and nonlicensed operator training has been installed and implemented. This item is closed, 85-25-1 (3) (0 pen) 84-19-05: Maintenance history documentation. Licensee efforts to implement plant specific maintenance history trending as part of QA program improvements have been reported in previous inspection report 85-11. No trending program currently has been developed within the nuclear maintenance program. This item will remain open, 84-19-0 e. Deviations (1) (Closed) 85-01-01: " Failure to Adequately Address and Implement the Design Verification Recomrrendations of ANSI N45.2.11-1974."

, The inspector verified that the licensee had revised their quality assurance procedure, QAP-2, for design review, to state that the principal method for design verification is design review. In addition the Nuclear Engineering Procedure (NEP)

No.'4109, " Rancho Seco Configuration Control Procedure", had been issued which identified the principal method of design verification as design review. NEP No. 4109 included as an attachment the list of the nineteen basic review questions listed in ANSI N45.2.11. These questions must be answered and the documentation is included in the design package. The licensee's actions appear to adequately address the deviation cited above, therefore, the item'is considered close (Closed, Deviation 85-01-01.)

(2) (Closed) 85-01-02: " Failure to Provide a Procedure to Control Field Changes as Prescribed by ANSI N45.2.11-1974."

The licensee responded to the deviation by revising their procedure for configuration control to explicitly state that changes to approved design documents which become necessary due to problems arising during construction or startup shall be reviewed and approved per NEP No. 4109 " Rancho Seco Configuration Control Procedure". Therefore, NEP No. 4109 provides precedural control over changes that may occer in the field. The inspector verified that the licensee's actions were incorporated into the above procedure. This item is considered closed. (Closed, Deviation 85-01-02.)

No violations or deviations were identified.

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' Meetinas The NRC regional management and the resident inspectors met with

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licensee's management on two occassions during this report period. The first meeting held on' November 12, 1986, concerned the status of the

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licensee's large open item lis '

The licensee presented their program to deal with the NRC open item The program consisted of the assi8nment of each NRC.open item to the

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Coordinated Commitment Tracking System (CCTS) with an associated department responsibility. The department responsible-for the item is to prepare a closure package for the item. The Licensing and Quality Assurance departments are to review the closure packages and make the decision that the item is closed from the licensee's perr.pectiv The above system has been in place for a few months. The inspectors have reviewed various closure packages and found them, in the most part, acceptabl The second meeting was held in the regional office on November 25, 198 The licensee presented their findings on the event which damaged the pressurizer heater upper, bundle. The event is explained in more details

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in paragraph 2 of this repor No violations or deviations were identifie . Spent Fuel Pool Walkdown The inspector toured the fuel storage b'ilding u and observed the stop log between the spent fuel pool and the tilting mechanism in the fuel transfer canal. The stop log seals the spent fuel pool from the transfer canal using,an inflatable seal supplied by pressure'from_a' single nitrogen bottle. A spare nitrogen bottle was also observed to be availabl A licensee representative stated that the original stop log had been  ;

- replaced by a new stop log. The inspector observed what appeared to be the old stop log stored in the fuel cask lid area in the, north end of the spent fuel pool. The stop log (approximately 3 ft., wide by 25 ft.'long) ,

appeared to be unsecured sitting vertically within the spent fuel poo The inspector was concerned that the old stop log'could fall _and impa'ct the fuel storage racks. The inspector also-observed.what appeared to be

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four orifice' rod assemblies' lying adrift.at:the bottom of the spent fuel l pool in the same area as the old stop log. The inspector identified his i ' concerns to a licensee representative for resolutio Inspection in-this area is + still in progress and will continue.in the next reporting period -

(report no. 50-312/86-42).

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Exit Meeting

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The-resident inspectors met with licensee representatives (noted in

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Paragraph 1) at various times during the report period and formally on November 26, 1986. The scope and findings of the_ inspection l activities l

described in this report were summarized at the meeting.-

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