IR 05000312/1986034
| ML20214D889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1986 |
| From: | Jim Melfi, Richards S, Willett D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214D887 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 50-312-86-34, NUDOCS 8611240285 | |
| Download: ML20214D889 (7) | |
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U.' S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-312/86-34 Docket No.
50-312'
License No.
DPR-54 Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 18530 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:
Clay Station, California Inspection Conducted: October 20-24, 1986 K
Inspectors AvHk A
fll~ S A. J. Wille
, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Y WS
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. Melfi, Reactcf Insfector Date Signed Approved by:
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S. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section Dat'e ' Signed Summary:
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Inspection on October 20-24, 1986 (Report No. 50-312/86-34)'
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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of 10 CFR Part 21 reports and Information Notices regarding Transamerica DeLaval Diesel Generators; licensee program for upgrading the control room ventilation system; and follow-up of TMI (NUREG-0737) issues.
Inspection Procedures
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TI-2515-65, 37700, 25565, and 36100 were covered.
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Results: Of the three areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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Personnel Contacted
- * D. Poole, Plant Manager (MAC)
- * R. Croley, Deputy Plant Manager
R. Colombo, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance
J. Janus, Supervisor HVAC (MAC)
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J. Shetlon, Deputy In Manager
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R. Webster, TDI Project Manager (Bechtel)
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J. Field, TDI System Review & Test Director
- M. Nakao, Licensing Engineer (Bechtel)
- C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer R. Ashley, Manager. Licensing (MAC)
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D. McIntre,' Licensed Training M. Ehlinger, Licensed Training G. Wallace, Procedure Writing R. Roller, Licensing Engineer J. Delazinski, Licensing Supervicor R. Myers, Corporate Licensing Engineer
.V. Grayheck, Engineer R. Thomas, HVAC Engineer J. Kaminiski, TDI Engineer (S&W)
W. Niderhost, TDI Factory Rep.
P. Patel, I6C Engineer M. Ross, I&C Group Leader S. Lee, Mechanical Engineer The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contract personnel during the inspection. This included plant staff engineers, technicians, administrative and clerical assistants.
- Denotes those personnel attending the entrance interview October 20, 1986.
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- Denotes those personnel attending the exit interview October 24, 1986.
g 2.
Control Room Ventilation The inspector talked with personnel responsible for the implementation and testing of upgrades / modifications to the control room normal and emergency ventilation systems which supply the control room and technical support center (TSC). The inspector walked-down these systems and the areas they serve, with the systems engineers.
The licensee-intends to have the upgrading of these systems complete by
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the middle of January 1987. The inspector discussed, with licensee personnel, the system verification program which an NRC team intends to conduct once these systems are complete.' The inspector stressed the importance of having the ventilation systems, within boundaries adjacent to the control room and TSC,;available and operating in their normal
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I configurationsiso that a realistic evaluation including synergistic effects can be performed.
The~ inspector discussed the verification method which will be a flow balance of.the' supply, return and make-up ducts as well as measurements in the normal'and._ standby train during norwal and emergency modes configured for radiological or toxic gas
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The licensee told the inspector that they intended t o balance the systems by verifying a make-up rate of 1600 cfm and performing a~ temperature profile of the areas within the ventilation system boundaries. The inspector told the licensee that the NRC team intends to verify the systems design (flows and pressures in the norr;al and emergency configurations) so that confidence can be achieved with regard to potential in-leakage. The inspector reviewed the method and results of similar verifications of control room HVAC performed at other Region V
facilities with the licensee, so that the licensee will be prepared to support a similar verification of their system. The inspector explained the necessity of transmitting the system design and description, normal and emergency operating procedures, test data, flow diagrams sad P& ids, duct dimensions, and other pertinent system information, to the NRC team members a minimum of two weeks-prior to the inspection.
3.
TMI Issues (NUREG-0737) Follow-Up The inspector talked with managers, supervisors and personnel in both the licensing and compliance organizations, on-site and at the corporate offices concerning the status of TMI items. The inspector idantified that Region V currently considered 20 TMI issues as open. The inspector attempted to find organization (s) and individual (s) who were responsible for or would accept responsibility for:
the status, tracking and close-out of TMI issues. The compliance supervisor told the inspectors that informational packages pertaining to the individual TMI issues had been turned-over from compliance to licensing and were located at the corporate offices. Corporate licensing personnel were unaware of any responsibility to track, status or maintain any files relevant to TMI issues and were unable to provide information or identify who or where this information could be found.
The inspectors discovered that the on-site licensing group had a file of individual TMI issues. The on-site licensing supervisor told the inspectors that his group had had these files for several years and if information pertinent to individual issues was received it was included in the files. The supervisor went-on to say that no individual had a charter or direction to maintain these files, and that they were not current or complete. During this discussion the licensee indicated that their only status of TMI issues was included in a May 30, 1986 letter
. from J. Ward to F. Miraglia which listed a status of approved regulatory requirements.
From this list, the licensee considered that only four TMI issues were still open, f
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The inspector reviewed licensee action for TMI item II.B.2.2.B - plant shielding. Licensee representatives stated that ECN A-3563, which was in the TMI files, had closed out this item. The inspector wanted additional information on the implementation of this ECN and went to Site Document Control to obtain the whole package. When ECN A-3563 was reviewed, it was found to have been voided because the recommendations were disapproved. Time did not allow the inspector to pursue further resolution of this item.
During the inspector's review of TMI issues, it became apparent that no one organization or individual felt responsible for the evaluation, follow-up, closure and status of the NUREG-0737 program. The inspector expressed the concern to the licensee that it was necessary for the licensee to have a program in place to evaluate and definitively identify what parts of NUREG-0737 were applicable to Rancho Seco and how these requirements were completed, what exceptions had been made, what exemptions had been sought and granted, what equivalent measures had been ccmpleted in lieu of various requirements, and what commitments were made for each of these issues and their sub-parts, so that in the future, issues which have been addressed in procedures etc. are not inadvertently circumvented during subseq ent procedure changes.
The following individual TMI items were reviewed:
TMI Item II.B.1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)' Vents (Closed)
The purpose of RCS vents is to enable the, operators, in the control room, to vent noncondensible gases from the RCS. The reason for venting noncondensible gases from the RCS is that the presence of these gases could inhibit a natural circulation cooldown. Additionally, the installation and design of these vents should not lead to an unacceptable increase in the probability of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or a challenge to containment integrity.
At Rancho Seco, to fulfill the intent of this TMI item, the licensee proposed to have vents at 3 separate places in the reactor. coolant system boundary. The proposed location of these vents were: on the reactor vessel head, the high point of the RCS piping (into the once through steam generators), and on top of the pressurizer.
The licensee applied for an exemption from installation of a reactor vessel head vent.
This exemption was approved in a letter dated December 24, 1985, Stoltz to Rodriguez. The basis for this exemption were tests performed at the Once-Through Integral Syster (OTIS) test facility.
These tests showed that the head vent was not necessary to ensure adequate core cooling.
The vents on the high point of the RCS piping (candy cane vents) were verified installed in previous inspection reports (85-30, 85-19, 84-19, 82-06). The inspector alza visually observed the completed installation of these high point vents.
During this inspection, the pressurizer vent was walked down. This vent and the high point (candy cane) vents were inutalled by Engineering Change Notice (ECH) A-2934. These vents were specified to be seismically
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and environmentally qualified. With the P&I diagram, the inspector
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verified the installation. Valve HV-21520 was mismarked as valve HV-21528..This concern had previously been addressed by the licensee in a Nonconforming Report (NCR) number S-4438 and has been resolved.
The inspector talked with control room operators about the operation of these vents. Beccuse of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R considerations (these valves fail closed, an electrical short could cause them to open), the fuses have been removed from the operating circuit. The operators knew that they had to install the fuses to open the vents. Emergency Procedure E.07 (ICC) is being rewritten to provide specific guidance for the location and installation of the fuses for operation of these vents.
This item is closed.
TMI Item II.F.2 Instrumentation for the detection of Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) (Open)
This TMI item requires licensees to provide instrumentation for the detection of ICC. This item is to include full range, unambiguous indication of ICC, advanced warning of the approach of ICC, incore thermocouples used for monitoring ICC, reactor vessel level indication and saturation monitors. The licensee had identified 3 options to provide indication of ICC:
the Heated Junction Thermocouple System (HJTCS), the use of gamma thermocouples, and the use of a differential pressure (DP) system. The licensee, in a letter dated December 30, 1985, Rodriguez to Thompson, stated that "Due to the recent availability of qualified higher accuracy transmitters and procurement difficulties with the HJTCS, the District has reevaluated the options and decided to pursue the DP system."
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that this system will Jba installed during the cycle 8 refueling. The licensee is also installing reactor coolant pump power monitors to assess if the reactor coolant is in 2 phases'(water and steam).
The licensee stated that the subcooling margin monitor and core exit thermocouples are installed. The level indication, the reactor vessel inventory tracking system (RITS), and the reactor coolant pump power monitors will be inspected after installation in cycle 8.
TMI Item II.K.l.1, IE Bulletins 79-05,79-05A, 79-05B and 79-05C (Closed)
This element of the TMI action plan relates to the bulletins issued following the IMI-2 accident. This TMI item was addressed in two previous inspection reports, 50-312/79-07 and 50-312/79-10. These bulletins were a predecessor to the NUREG 0737 items that followed. The concerns raised by these bulletins were addressed in these previous reports or are being tracked as NUREG 0737 items. The bulletin requirements that remain open and the associated TMI items are related as follows:
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TMI Item Bulletin Item Bulletin Requirement II.E.1.1 79-05A For manual valves on manually-operated Item 7 motor driven valves that could defeat or compromise AFW flow to the OTSGs, prepare and implement procedures that require valves to be in their locked position or require similar positive-position controls.
I.K.2.10 79-05B Safety Grade Anticipatory Reactor Item 5 Trip.
II.F.2 79-05A
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Operators are not to rely upon Item 4.D pressurizer level indication alone, but to use other plant parameters in evaluating plant conditions.
t II.F.2 79-05C Provide analyses and develop
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guidelines and procedures for ICC.
Item 5 Also, define RCP restart criteria.
Bulletin 79-05B, item 4, required' procedures and training for operators to initiate a prompt reactor trip following any unplanned closure of a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). This is not applicable because Rancho Seco does not have MSIVs.
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The following items were mentioned in the bulletins, and have been closed out under the associated TMI item number.
' Inspection TMI Bulletin Report 50-312/
Item Item Closure-Bulletin Requirement I.C.1 79-05C 85-21 Perform,LOCA analyses for a (Short Term)
range of small breaks in the Item 2 RCS and develop operetor action guidelinss to perform training and revise procedures.
I.C.1 79-05 & 05A 85-21 Review operating procedures Item 3 for recognizing, preventing and mitigating void formation in transients and accidents.
I.C.1 79-05B 85-21 Develop procedures and train Item 1 operators on methods of establishing and maintaining natural circulation, i
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I.C.6 79-05A 81-31 Review and modify procedures Item 10 for removing safety related equipment from service.
I.C.6 79-05A 81-31 Verify that AFW valves are in Item 5 an open position.
II.E.4.2 79-05A 82-06 Review containment isolation Item 6 85-09 initiation design and procedures. Assure isolation of all lines that do not degrade safety features or
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cooling capability upon automatic initiation of SI.
These bulletins are closed. Any remaining TMI associated bulletin followup will be performed during followup of the associated TMI item.
4.
Transamerica DeLaval Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generators The licensee is in preparation for the start of Phase B of the licensing, testing, and turnover program, which is a disassembly and inspection after the diesels complete a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> endurance run. The inspector held discussions with supervisors, engineers, and personnel responsible for testing the diesels and preparing them for turnover to operations. The inspector reviewed documentation associated with Information Notices, 10 CFR Part 21 reports and other issues pertaining to problems with the diesels.
The following is an update to 10 CFR part 21 reports and I&E Information Notices and issues which were previously identified, reviewed and status in report 50-312/86-03.
NRC Open TDI SMUD Iten No.
I.D. No.
I.D. No.
Subject Resolution Status 84-04-P No. 126 No. 27 Fuel control Verified pins Closed shaft installed and torqued during Phase I work 85-04-P No. 127 No. 34 Air filter in Inspected and Closed engine control verified a panel metal bowl
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85-07-P No. 128 No. 30 Air start Syst. Replaced with Closed 85-11-P Duo-check valves 85-08-P No. 129 No. 31 011 plug Fail Replaced oil Closed plugs during Phase I work 86-07-P No. 131 No. 36 Lube oil check Changed out Closed valves to Buna N material
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.No. 135
- No. 45 Failed' foot Inspected OK-
. Closed
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No. not.
No. 47 Air admission Machine metal
. Op'en reported ~
valve willlnot from drive-
-yet-seat pin shoulder No. not No. 50 Improper wiring Replace relay Open
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reported of relays yet Type 12NGA 15AG3 IN-85-91 NA No. 46 Application of Redesign Open ESF loads as breaker one block onto closing ekt's-
' EDG's IN-86-73 NA No. 48 A. Fuel line wear NA
. Closed and leaks due to vibration & cycling of fuel xfer system relief valve.
B. Design error Evaluate Open in reflash of field at low speeds 6.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph,1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on October 24, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection, which were discussed during the exit interview, are set forth in paragraphs 2 through 5 of this report.
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