IR 05000315/1986041

Insp Repts 50-315/86-41 & 50-316/86-41 on 861104-1215. Apparent Violation Noted:Failure to Perform Timely post- Maint Operability Test on Valve & Subsequent Performance of Opposite Train Maint Being Tracked as Unresolved Issue

ML20212H707
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	01/16/1987
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212H697	List: IR 05000315/1986041 ML20212H693
References
50-315-86-41, 50-316-86-41, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-1, IEB-86-3, NUDOCS 8701270533
Download: ML20212H707 (16)

Text

'

~

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

REGION III

Reports No.'50-315/86041(DRP); 50-316/86041(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 Licensee: American Electric Power Service Corporation

~ Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 1 Riverside Plaza-Columbus,'OH 43216

,

Facility Name: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Donald C._ Cook Site, Bridgman, Michigan Inspection Conducted: November 4, 1986 through December 15, 1986 Inspectors: B. L. Jorgensen J. K. Heller JAN 161987 Approved By: B. L. Burgess, Chief

.

' Projects Section 2A Date Inspection Summary Inspection on November 4,1986 through December 15, 1986 (Reports N /86041(DRP); 50-316/86041(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee actions on previously identified items; operational safety verification; reactor trip followup; maintenance; surveillance; reportable events; bulletins; and allegation revie Results: No violations or deviations were identified in seven of the eight areas inspected. One apparent violation (Paragraph 3.f) involving failure to perform a timely post-maintenance operability test on a valve, and subsequently performing opposite train maintenance affecting additional valves, is being tracked as an Unresolved Item pending further evaluatio giapg Eso ,

G

m

-

..

DETAILS Persons Contacted

• Smith, Jr. , P1 ant Manager-

• Blind, Assistant Plant Manager - Administration

• J. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager - Production

• L. Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager - Technical Support

• B. Svensson, Licensing Activity Coordinator T. Kriesel, Technical Superintendent - Physical Sciences

• K. Baker, Operations Superintendent

• E. Morse, Quality Control Superintendent T. Beilman, I&C/ Planning Superintendent

• J. Allard, Maintenance Superintendent

• T. Postlewait, Technical. Superintendent - Engineering-C. Ross, Computer Sciences Superintendent M. Horvath, Quality Assurance Supervisor C. Murphy, Operations - Production Supervisor R. Clendenning, Radiation Protection Supervisor P. Jacques, Fire Protection Coordinator

• M. Terry, Administrative Compliance Coordinator - QC

• G. Arent, Administrative Compliance Coordinator - Operations

• G. Caple, Administrative Compliance Coordinator - STA J. Rischling, Administrative Compliance Coordinator - QC

• R. Simms, Shift Technical Advisor - Supervisor The inspector also contacted a number of other licensee and contract employees and informally interviewed operations, maintenance, and technical personne * Denotes personnel attending Management Interview on December 17, 1986

. Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Violation (315/85041-02; 316/85041-02): A heavy load was not confined to the designated " safe zone" away from the spent fuel pool. The licensee's corrective and preventive actions, as described in his letter (AEP:NRC:0978) dated March 12, 1986, have been verified via continuing observatio (Closed) Open Item (315/86004-02): Containment spray system test procedures included valve stroke timing, but for Valves 1-IM0-212 and 1-IM0-222, not on the first occasion within the procedures that the valves actually moved. This was not consistent with the intent of ASME Section XI to obtain "as found" stroke times. The licensee revised the applicable procedures for both trains of containment spray for both Units effective with Revision 2, correcting this deficiency.

i l

i 2

- -

. ._, - _ - - - . . . - - . - - - _ .- .

r

.

. _(Closed) Violation (315/86017-01; 316/86017-01): The acceptance-criteria for verifying proper response to a safety signal of some essential service water valves were inadequate. No quantitative determination was being made that prop'er flows were achieved via those valves actuated to a " throttled or " partially open" positio The licensee's actions, as described in his letter (AEP:NRC:0981)

dated July 10, 1986 were verified. This included revision of applicable procedures and performance of testing for the essential service water and component cooling water systems (the latter system and auxiliary feedwater were found in licensee review of the matter to be subject to the same deficiency). The inspector verified proper followup testing of auxiliary feedwater valves separately. As indicated in IE Report No. 50-315/86025(DRP);

50-316/86025(DRP), some of the flow values originally found were inadequate. These were adjusted to nominal value Engineering evaluations have concluded the off-nominal flow values were still within safe design limit (Closed) Unresolved Item (315/86017-03; 316/86017-03): Lower linits of detection for radiological environmental' technical specificttions (RETS) were apparently not met; this was not recognized in a timely way, and consequently some reporting action levels were apparently exceeded. This matter was identified, reported and corrected by the licensee, but appeared repetitive of previous similar failures to recognize RETS discrepancies for timely correct. ion. The item was upgraded to a Violation issued with IE Inspection Report No. 50-315/86037(DRSS); 50-316/86037(DRSS).

No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified as a result of these review . Operational Safety Verification During the inspection period the inspector observed control room operation including manning, shift turnover, approved procedures and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) adherence, and reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems, and nuclear and reactor protection systems, as applicabl Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducted. Proper return to service of selected components was verifie Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building, and screenhouse were made to observe accessible equipment conditions, including fluid leaks, i

potential fire hazards, and control of activities in progress. In addition, routine facility tours with the Plant Manager were conducte Unit 1 operated at a nominal 90 percent power level throughout the inspection period, except for a reactor trip as discussed in Paragraph 4 belo Unit 2 operated at a nominal 80 percent power

level throughout the inspection period.

,

. _ . _ ___ . _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ .

-

.

!. ' The inspector selected two Temporary Modifications from the Unit 2

Temporary Modification book to verify the modifications were in -

compliance with . %inistrative requirement * Temporary Mooification No. 19 lifted the leads to five pressurizer heaters. An associated 10 CFR 50.59 review sheet

. concluded that an unreviewed safety question does not exis The review sheet' correctly' concludes that removing these heaters (approximately.125Kw) from the totc1-of 1800Kw, keeps more than the Technical Specification minimum of 150Kw-of heaters available.-The Technical Specification requires the operable heaters must be accessible to power from a diesel generator, and the review sheet implies all 1800Kw of heaters are proven accessible. Refueling frequency Surveillance Test N **2 OHP.4030 STP.040 proves only 1400Kw of heaters (700Kw ,

per diesel) are accessible to emergency power, which still leaves adequate margin at present. This was identified to the Production. Supervisor, who agreed the 50.59 review sheet should reflect the remaining margin in terms of-heaters proven operable from a diesel generator. This observation also applied to heaters in Unit 1 and pending revision of both review sheets, this item is considered open. (315/86041-03; 316/86041-02)

• - Temporary Modification No. 20 jumpered out three cells in the

"N" Train battery. This was discussed with the cognizant engineer who verified the applicable procedures were modified to reflect new float and equalizing. charges. . The engineer also stated that the replacement cells had been tested and were on site being charged while waiting a convenient time for installatio * The Unit 2 Temporary Modification book also contained a 50.59 review check sheet for replacement of pressurizer heater breakers. The insp?ctor noted this check sheet was not attached to a Temporary Modification sheet. This was discussed with the Production Supervisor who determined the check sheet had been inadvertently left after conversion to a permanent modification a few months earlier. The superfluous 50.59

[ review check sheet was removed.

! At 8:33 a.m. E.S.T. on November 11, 1986 the licensee reported that g Unit 1 had inadvertently entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due

to both of the Unit's ESF ventilation fans being concurrently

! inoperable for about 18 minutes ending at 6:21 a.m. that day. An

. error was made in repositioning an inlet damper for 1HV-AES-1 when

restoring the fan after modification work the previous day, such

,

that the flow was about 15,000 cfm versus 25,000 plus/minus 10

! percent. Believing fan AES-1 to be operable, AES-2 was removed from

! service under a " clearance" for the same modification. About 18 minutes later, an operator found and corrected the mis positioned i inlet damper.

r-

l l .

- - - - _ . . . , . . . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ - . - _ . . - _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . ~ _ .

-

.

A-licensee investigation is in progress. The modification involve may.not have required a workman's protective clearance in that it entailed installation of a rubber-seal check valve in the-housing drain to permit the draining of water without creating a bypass flow path for-auxiliary building air to escape without filtratio Since a " clearance" was used, it is uncertain as to why restoration did not include a flow verificatio Preliminary investigation shows the alignment of the damper, the

' damper operating handle, and a position-indicating backing plate are not in agreement for.either Unit 1 AES fan inlet damper;.however they do agree for Unit This item will be reviewed further in following up the anticipated Licensee Event Repor At 3:00 p.m. E.S.T. on November 12, 1986 the licensee determined the environmental qualification of the 2N safety injection pump motor was in question. A work record review found the subject motor windings had been repaired in 1981 by a non-QA contracto Subsequent quality testing, to re qualify the repaired motor for safety-related service, did not address environmental qualification The licensee entered the applicable Technical Specification Action Statement for an " inoperable" safety. injection train (TS 3.5.2)

effective at 3:00 p.m. 'The punip motor was replaced within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit of the Action Statement,'as a " spare" motor was on hand

- which was known to be properly qualifie An investigation will continue to determine if the subject motor electrical environmental qualification was adversely affected by the 1981 repairs. This will be reviewed further in following up the anticipated Licensee Event Report on the matte The licensee declared an Unusual Event for Unit 1 at 5:07 p.m. E. on November 26, 1986 due to both emergency diesel generators being concurrently inoperable. A 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> LC0 action statement also applie Diesel 1 AB had been inoperable under maintenance since failing a routine surveillance test due to voltage regulator problems at 3:31 a.m. on November 26. Routine operability verification testing had just been completed on diesel 1 CD when at about 4:58 p.m., it attempted an auto-start without any start signal. Diesel 1 CD inoperability and Unusual Event declarations followe .

.

Subsequent to the completion of maintenance on Diesel 1 AB, the licensee performed required testing and declared it operable by 7:00 p.m., ending the Unusual Event and moving the Unit into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LC0 action statement. The 1 CD failure was traced to a burned out relay associated with the starting air solenoid valv Repairs and testing were completed and the Diesel declared operable at 4:35 a.m. on November 2 On December 6, 1986 the licensee performed maintenance and post-maintenance testing on the Unit 1 containment spray " West" train (pump discharge Valve 1-IM0-221) which involved administrative

.and functional inoperability from 12:30 p.m. until 2:22 p.m. After the " West" train was restored, the licensee determined the " East" train had been administrative 1y inoperable simultaneously with the

" West" train because a packing adjustment had been made to a pump-suction valve at about 10:30 a.m. and no verification test (valve stroke timing) had been performe The " East" train valve in question is the normal suction valve (1-IMO-215) from the RWST. This valve is normally open and was open throughout the period when the opposite train was out-of-servic A stroke test was performed with satisfactory results at 3:27 Review and discussion with licensee personnel disclosed the following:

(i.) the subject motor-operated flowpath valves were separately identified on two of eighteen Job Orders authorized on the shift for Unit 1 alone (ii.) all eighteen Unit 1 jobs were to support an ongoing

" auxiliary building reclamation project" which includes several hundred known or suspected minor leaks (the work is being done on a voluntary overtime basis on weekends by plant maintenance personnel)

(iii.) both Job Order packages for the involved IMO valves contained correct post-maintenance test forms referencing ASME Section XI stroke-testing (iv.) the approving Shift Supervisor recognized the implications of the work on Valve 1-IM0-221 in that special post-maintenance testing would require disabling the associated West Train pump, and he noted to the maintenance crew to inform the Unit Supervisor on completion so appropriate restoration would occur. No such recognition occurred for 1-IM0-215 for which testing does not involve disabling the associated pump

,

.

.

(v.) no arrangements were made concerning the order-in which the work should proceed in that maintenance chose to perform the East Train work first, followed by the West Train, with no communications in the interim (reference iv. above) with the Operations Department (vi.) special post-naintenance testing instructions for 1-IMO-215 were absent and documentation for work accomplished during the day was not compiled until the end of the working shif At that time, a maintenance supervisor advised the Operations Department that the valve needed to be tested which precipitated review of the day's activities and identification of the situation addressed her Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.6.2.1 requires two independent containment spray systems to be OPERABLE, with each sprcy system capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump. This Specification applies in MODES 1, 2, 3 and Valve 1-IM0-215 provides a suction flow path to the East spray system pump from the RWST. Transferring suction to the containment sump requires closing the valve and opening Valve 1-ICM-305. If Valve 1-IM0-215 should fail open, transfer of suction to the sump could be ineffectual because flow could continue from the RWS The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI (at IWV-3400)

and the licensee's Procedure PMI-5070 " Inservice Inspection" (at Page 4 of 8) both require that a valve which has undergone maintenance that could affect performance shall be tested as necessary to demonstrate that its performance is within acceptable limits prior to the time it is returned to servic Adjustment of stem packing is specifically identified as an example of maintenance that could affect performance. Procedure PMI-5070 further specifies use of Attachment No. 2, " Valve Stroke Time Test Data Form" which provides instructions that testing is "to br performed immediately or as soon as conditions permit following work on or replacement . . . which could affect stroke time of valves."

Therefore, pending completion of the required testing after maintenance, the status of a valve is such that it can not be considered acceptable for " return to service" and, consequently, compliance to Technical Specification requirements for the associated systems to be OPERABLE is r.ot demonstrate On December 6, 1986 with Unit 1 in MODE 1, the licensee failed to place the East train suction Valve 1-IM0-215 in a status of questionable operability at the time a valve packing adjustment was begun and did not immediately perform the required testing following the wor Pending further licensee and NRC assessment of the

_-- _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ -

.

,

matter, these circumstances are considered to constitute a violation of requirements for proper control of maintenance and operating status. The matter will be tracked as an Unresolved Item pending reviews by RIII to determine significance. (Unresolved Item 315/86041-01).

g. During a walkdown of the Unit 2 Safety Injection System using licensee Print OP-2-5142, the inspector found a 0-2000 pound general test gauge (GTG 144) connected to a pressure tap (2-SI-108) on the safety injection pump common miniflow line to the RWST. After discussion with plant personnel the inspector was informed that the gauge had been installed in July 1986 to collect data requested by corporate engineers. Data collection was completed in July / August, however the gauge was not removed. Once identified to licensee management, the gauge was removed and Condition Report 2-11-86-1287 was written and Problem Report No.86-102 assigned. The Problem Report identifies that the gauge was not installed in accordance with administrative Procedure PMI-2140 " Temporary Modifications",

which requires use of an approved procedure or use of a Temporary Modification form in combination with a Job Order. Either mechanism would have assured the removal of the gauge. This failure to comply with the Administrative Procedures is considered an additional example of the violation previously cited (316/86030-03) and which involved installation of a temporary vent line without using a Temporary Modification Form and a Job Order. Since both occurred and were discovered within the same time frame and both involved the same corrective actions, no additional Notice of Violation has been issued for the second exampl h. During a tour of the auxiliary building on December 3, 1986 the inspector found that the door strike for the Unit 1 containment spray heat exchanger room had malfunctioned and was hindering door closure. This was identified to the radiation protection personnel, who stated that they were aware of the problem and that a Job Order had been written. During subsequent tours, the inspector observed that the door strike had been fixe i. During a tour of the screen house, the inspector found an electrical extension cord that prevented closure of the door to the Unit 1 diesel driven fire pump room. Investigation disclosed that in support of the cleaning of the turbine sump, the electrical outlet in the diesel fire pump room was being used to power a small pum Though the door is not a Technical Specification fire door, it is part of a rated fire enclosur .

The appropriateness of the connection was discussed with the Fire Protection Coordinator and a week later, the extension cord was still present inhibiting closure of the door; however, a sign reading

" Fire Door - Do Not Leave Open" was posted on the doo The situation was again addressed to the Fire Protection Coordinator and during subsequent tours, the inspector found the door shut and the extension cord connected to an outlet outside the fire pump roo , .

.

.

One unresolved item, one open item and no violations or deviations or were identifie . Reactor Trip Unit 1 experienced a turbine trip / reactor trip from 90 percent power at 12:46 a.m. on November 22, 1986, during performance of turbine valve testing. The source of the turbine trip was indicated as the thrust bearing wear detection circuit. Investigation showed that small perturbations resulting during valve testing in combination with a bearing wear detection circuit setpoint drift caused the trip. Prior to the subsequent startup, the thrust wear detection circuit was adjusted per manufacturer's instruction The plant trip response was nominal. Thereafter, the licensee investigated and determined the following: (a) one steam flow channel subsequently drifted off-normal, apparently unrelated to the trip; the channel was recalibrated, (b) Source Range Monitor N-32 had to be energized manually after failing to do so automatically, a known phenomenon

, which has been addressed in a Westinghouse Service Instruction, (c) one post trip computer printout (Operations Sequence Monitor) did not indicate that the "B" reactor trip breaker had opened, even though other control room and local indications, including the Turbine Events Monitor, showed that the breaker was open. Instead, this printout indicated that the "A" reactor trip breaker had opened twice. A number of hours after the trip, the trip breakers were closed and manually tripped. Again both breakers opened, but the subject printout again indicated that "A" breaker had opened twice. A Job Order was written to investigate and repai The reactor was made critical at 10:40 p.m., November 22, and synchronized to the grid at 5:13 a.m. on November 23. The Unit has been restored to 90 percent power where it is expected to be held for the remainder of the operating cycle as a steam generator tube protection measur On November 24, 1986 the Region III office informed the resident inspector that they had information which indicated that the licensee knew that the thrust wear detection circuit had drifted and at the time of the trip they had been attempting to jumper out the circuit using an unapproved procedure. The inspector discussed this item with Operations staff personnel and Plant Management personne The inspector was unable to find information that would substantiate thi The inspector verified system responses and reviewed and discussed licensee evaluations relating to cause and to corrective and preventive actions. Further review and evaluation of each of these matters is anticipated in follow up on the Licensee Event Report associated with the even No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie .

5. Maintenance Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: that limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; that approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; that activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and that post maintenance testing was performed as applicabl Job Order No. 000030 Implement RFC No. 1316 - installation of AES filter housing drain line isolation valve The inspector reviewed the following Job Orders pertaining to the undemonstrated operability of the Containment Spray System as discussed in Paragraph '

Job Order Title File 003968 Repair packing leak for IM0-215 ME-VM0-1-IM0-215 004051 Repair packing leak for IM0-221 ME-VM0-1-IM0-221 003723 Repair packing leak for QM0-226 ME-VM0-1-QM0-226 004651 Repair packing leak for IM0-320 ME-VM0-1-IM0-320 004047 Repair packing leak for IPX-212 ME-VKT-1-IPX-212 004037 Repair packing leak for IPX-215 ME-VKT-1-IPX-215 004053 Replace the end cap for CTS-102W ME-VKT-1-CTS-102W 003721 Repair packing leak for CS-301W ME-VLG-1-CS-301W 003707 Repair packing leak for RH-104W ME-VLG-1-RH-104W 003704 Repair packing leak for RH-113W ME-VLG-1-RH-113W 004050 Repair packing and end cap leak ME-VLG-1-CTS-121E for CTS-121E 004045 Repair packing and end cap leak ME-VLG-1-CTS-124W for CTS-124W No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie . Surveillance The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing at described below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate ,:rocedures, that test instrunentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing I were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

l l

-

.

The following were observed or reviewed:

1-OHP 4030 STP.027CD " Operation of the CD Diesel Generator to Meet Action Requirements of T.S. 3.8.2.1" performed on a frequency not to exceed once per eight hours while the AB diesel was out of service for maintenanc THP 4030 STP.054 " Control Room Area Monitor (R-1) Surveillance Test (Quarterly)."

12-THP 4030 PER.323 " Flux Map and Thermocouple Map Data Collection."

• • 2 OHP 4030 STP.040 " Energizing the Pressurizer Backup Heaters From The Emergency Diesel Generator" STP.040 is a refueling frequency surveillance test which demonstrates the capability to energize the pressurizer heaters with emergency ower. The inspector reviewed the completed tests performed May 21 and Ma 27, 1986 and identified an apparent data recording problem. Steps 8.1. and 8. require energizing heater PHA-3 and recording the amperage increase on the applicable data sheets. For these steps the expected reading is given as 17 amps, but the installed amperage gauge did not register below 25 amps. The reading was recorded as greater than 0 and less than 25 amps. The licensee agreed to review the procedure and revise if necessary. For the test reviewed, the equivocal data did not prevent satisfaction of the acceptance criteria, since adequate capacity was demonstrated from other heater No violations, deviations, unresolved items or open items were identifie . Reportable Events The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) by means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records. The review addressed compliance to reporting requirements,andasapplicable,accomplishmentofimmediatecorrective action. If indicated closed", the review showed appropriate corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with applicable requirements, or a generic issue was developed which will be tracked for further examination as an Unresolved Item or Open Item.

(Closed) LER 315/85070, Revision 0

Fire barrier penetration seals were found unsealed. Subsequent evaluation of the specific locations and nature of the unsealed panetrations, against guidance criteria contained in Generic Letter 86-10 " Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements", concluded the matter did not require reporting as an LE The licensee withdrew the LER with his letter of Novenber 17, 198 .

.

b. (Closed) LER 315/86015, Revision 0: Unit 1 tripped from 24 percent power on August 1, 1986 due to high-high steam generator water level. The level transient was initiated by condensate system adjustments which ware not communicated to the feedwater panel operator, who had some system controls in " manual". Individual counselling and an operating memo (disseminated to all operators)

were used to inform and caution concerning the even c. (Closed) LER 315/86017, Revision 0: Unit 1 tripped from 90 percent power on July 22, 1986 due to an indicated stator cooling water low pressure. Instrument and Control personnel conducting an infrequent (5 year) calibration on the stator cooling water monitoring circuits caused the trip by failing to correctly isolate the trip relay prior to beginning the calibration. Administrative actions were issued to the personnel involved and the procedure for calibration has been reclassified so that it will be restricted in future to Unit outag d. (Closed) LER 315/86018, Revision 0: Unit 1 tripped from 13 percent power on August 2,1986 due to feedflow/steamflow mismatch coincident with low steam generator level. The water level control systems were in manual control when, following paralleling of the main turbine generator, steam flow increased and levels began to fal Increasing feedwater flow to compensate caused pump speed and discharge pressures to begin oscillatin The response was compli;ated by cycling of a condensate booster pump emergency leakorf valve. When one steam generator reached the low level setpoint, coincident with the mismatched flows, the Unit tripped as designe Individual counselling and an operating memo (disse'ninated to all operators) were used to inform and caution concerning this even e. (Closed) LER 316/85022, Revision 0: A Unit 2 essential service water system sample, required to be collected at intervals not exceeding eight hours (with an associated automatic monitoring system inoperable) was collected after an interval of 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Disciplinary action was taken concerning the individual who missed the specified sampling interval. Other examples of personnel failing to compensate for inoperable automatic sampling equipment havebeensubjecttoaNoticeofViolation,mostrecentlyinIE Inspection Report No. 50-316/86004(DRP). These other cases involved

,

'

repetitive failures, whereas the event identified here appears isolated. The inspector noted that since the automatic equipment was inoperable for more than three weeks, the assigned Department had been required to perform the sampling manually, doing so about 90timesbeforethesubjecterrorwasmade. This was discussed with plant management, f. (Closed) LER 316/85023, Revision 0: The procedure for performing manual sampling of the essential service water system (as for Item e. immediately above) was found to be non-specific as to which sampling point was to be used for inoperability of which associated automatic monito The procedure was revise ,

.. (Closed) LER 316/85035, Revision 0: Unit 2 tripped'from 79 percent power on October 29, 1985 due to a momentary loss of flow indication on one channel of reactor coolant pump breaker monitoring. No actual low flow condition existed. .The problem was traced to a shorted transformer on a radiation monitoring system instrument which is powered off the same instrument bus as the pump breaker monitoring circuit in question. The short momentarily caused a voltage dip on the power supply, sufficient to cause the relay for the No. 2. reactor coolant pump breaker to " drop out", precipitating-the trip. Reactor trip breaker "A" failed to open on receipt of the trip signa IE Inspection Report No. 50-315/85035(DRP);

50-316/85035(DRP) is dedicated to review of the reactor-trip breaker failure. The suspect components were replace (Closed) LER 316/86002, Revision 0: On four occasions between October 23 and 26, 1985 a 4-hour surveillance frequency (for estimating condenser off gas flow when the flow monitor was

.out of-service) was performed late. This item involved Operations Department activities and, like Item e. above, had been correctly done numerous times before the error occurred. Corrective actions addressed better instructions, increased attention by management, and directives relating to limiting the number of allowable concurrent activitie (Closed) LER 316/86005, Revision 0 and Revision 1: Unit 2 tripped from 80 percent power on February 1,1986 due to a fire-caused fault in the "CD" auxiliary transformer. It appears that acrylic rodent shields on the 4 KV side of the "CD" transformer had experienced carbon tracking and that the shields had dripped enough water and

. contamination (a 20 inch snowfall followed by a heavy rain preceded the event) to reduce the clearance between the phase brushings sufficiently to cause flashover. The shields have been replaced with high voltage insulating heat shrinkable tap (Closed) LER 316/86008, Revision 0 and Revision 1; and LER 316/86016, Revision 0: These reports involved ESF actuation signals caused by shorted wiring in nuclear instrument drawers N-41A and N-41B respectively, on March 11 and April 29, 1986 while the Unit was shut down for refueling. The cables in all the nuclear instrument drawers were re-dressed and all electrical connectors (one failed in each event' addressed here) were checked. During these corrective actions, the licensee lost control of the wiring configurations of two of four power range nuclear instruments and subsequently commenced startup with the two channels mis-wired. This problem was specifically addressed in IE Inspection Report No. 50-315/86029(DRP);

50-316/86029(DRP), which subsequently led to escalated enforcement actio i

-

. - (Closed) LER 316/86013, Revision 0: An ESF actuation (Train B safety injection) signal was generated in Unit 2 during a refueling outage when an instrument technician pulled the wrong logic card during trouble-shooting. The error was contributed to by potentially confusin The event involved no actual water in,g labeling

)ection, andofrestoration the logic card was minimal. The labeling has been clarifie . (Closed) LER 316/86017, Revision 0: Fire barrier penetration seal found unsealed. This report has been withdrawn on the same basis as for Item a. abov (Closed) LER 316/86021, Revision 0: Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip signal in MODE 3 on July 7, 1986 when source range nuclear instrument N-32 " spiked" during troubleshooting. The spike occurred on removal of a test probe from the energized channel, and simulated a high startup rate - which led to the trip signa Two banks of shutdown rods had been withdrawn; both banks tripped as designe The N-32 channel was considered inoperable at the time of the event. It was subsequently tested satisfactorily and declared operable. The guidelines for troubleshooting inoperable source range instruments have been revised to bypass the trip function (as permitted by Technical Specifications) while troubleshootin (Closed) LER 316/86022, Revision 0: Two power range nuclear instruments were concurrently inoperable during a Unit 2 startup on July 10 and 11, 1986. As referenced at Item j. above, this matter was the subject of a special inspection (IE Report No. 50-315/86029(DRP); 50-316/86029(DRP) and subsequent escalated enforcement actio (Closed) LER 316/86023, Revision 0: One Unit 2 safety injection accumulator contained an inadequate level of borated water for about three days while the plant was in MODE 1. This matter was the subject of a Notice of Violation issued with IE Inspection Report No. 50-315/86025(DRP); 50-316/86025(DRP), which will be used to track corrective and preventive action (Closed) LER 316/86024, Revision 0: Unit 2 tripped from 69 percent power when a feedwater flow transmitter failed due to a faulty amplifier. System response to the failure caused over feeding of Steam Generator No. 2, with consequent high-high level and turbine trip / reactor trip. Evaluation of the root cause of the instrument failure (Foxboro Model NE-13DM-HIH2-B) is being pursued with the instrument manufacturer. The subject instrument was replaced, the channel tested, and the Unit returned to service the following da Some of the events discussed above involved violations, as indicated in the text. No violations, deviations, unresolved items or open items were identified in the reviews performed for this inspection repor . .

8. I.E. Bulletins The inspector reviewed the I.E. Bulletins listed below for applicability to the facilit If applicable, the inspector verified that the written response was within the time frame stated in the Bulletin, that the written response provided the information required, and if required, modifications were complete or scheduled to be complete (Closed) IEB 86-01 Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could disable RHR pump This Bulletin is applicable to all G.E. Boiling Water Reactors (BWR)

and is not applicable to D. C. Cook, a Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). (Closed) IEB 86-03 Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Lin The licensee response (AEP:NRC:1012) dated November 12, 1986 was reviewed. It identifud the normal position of ECCS minimum flow valves as "open". The inspector requested that the licensee revise this response, because the normal position of the Residual Heat Removal Pump minimum flow valves (separate valve for each train) is

" closed". The revised licensee response was dated November 24, 198 The licensee response stated that the minimum flow valves in the residual heat removal, centrifugal charging, and the safety injection system are motor operated valves rather than the air operated valves discussed in the Bulletin. The valves are either open normally, or are capable of opening automatically. The licensee concluded that design and administrative controls were adequate and precluded multiple pump failure due to a single valve failure. The inspector concurred, and concluded that the licensee response complied with the request of the Bulleti During the review, as noted above, the inspector found that the normal position for the residual heat removal pump mini-flow valves is " closed".

The mini-flow valves (one per pump) are flow controlled valves in a loop which circulates water from the pump discharge to the pump suction via i the RHR heat exchange The valves open when the pump starts and flow is less than 500 gpm, and they close when flow is greater than 1000 gp Open Item 315/84-19-02; 316/84-21-02 discussed the mini-flows and identified that the licensee was not testing the open circuitry of the valve The licensee resolved this open item by revising the monthly residual heat removal pump operability test. The inspector now questions the preferred position of the mini-flow valves, since failure of the modulating circuit during a pump start combined with the associated valve being closed and the primary coolant pressure above the pump discharge pressure could damage the pump. The licensee agreed to review this item and verify that closed is the preferred position (0 pen It /86041-02,316/86041-01).

One open item, and no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identifie _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

• Allegation Review An anonymous allegation was received at NRC Region III by telephone on May 15, 1986 contending that on May 14, 1986 the documented test weights of 25 ice baskets were falsified. No additional information was provided by the alleger. A request for additional information was acknowledged by the alleger, however no further contact with Region III was made. On November 12, 1986 Region III asked that the Resident Inspector review this ite The licensee had received a similar allegation on May 14, 1986 and had informed the Resident Inspector on May 21, 1986. The licensee's investigation (documented in a report dated August 14,1986) concluded that insufficient information existed to confirm the allegatio The inspector reviewed the documentation and did not find evidence that disputed the licensee's conclusion. Further, prior to entering a MODE thereafter requiring operability of the ice baskets, the licensee repeated the disputed ice basket surveillance testing in the presence of Quality Control Inspectors. The repeat testing could not confirm the substance of the allegation, but it did serve to develop an uncontested record of ice basket acceptability prior to plant restar No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie '

1 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is reauired in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3.b and . Management Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on December 17, 1986 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection. In addition, the inspector asked those in attendance whether they considered any of the items discussed to contain information exempt from disclosure. No items were identifie '

16