IR 05000315/1986036
| ML20203N516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1986 |
| From: | Foster J, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203N509 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-86-36, 50-316-86-36, NUDOCS 8610090216 | |
| Download: ML20203N516 (12) | |
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i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
REGION III
1 Reports No. 50-315/86036(DRSS); 50-316/86036(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 Licensee: American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216
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Facility Name: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Donald C. Cook Site, Bridgeman, MI Inspection Conducted:
September 22-23, 1986 10/i/36 Inspectors:
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Team Leader Date M.
th u. SJ8 Approved By:
W. Snell, Chief lo/i/86 Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on September 22-23,1986 (Reports No. 50-315/86036(DRSS); and No. 50-316/86036(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Special, announced inspection of a quarterly D. C. Cook
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emergency preparedness drill involving observations by four NRC representa-tives of key functions (Communications and Dose-Assessment) and locations (EOF, State EOC) during the drill. The inspection was conducted by three
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NRC inspectors and one consultant.
Results: No Violations, Deficiencies, or Weaknesses were identified.
i B610090216 861001 PDR ADOCK 05000315 G
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e DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed
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- M. Smith, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
- R. Lafreniere, Michigan Em'ergency Operations Center (E0C)
- L. ' Smith, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
American Electric Power Service Corporation, Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
- W. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
- D. Loope, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- T. Harshbarger, Emergency Planning, AEPSC
- R. Stephans, Operations
- J. Rutkowski, Staff Assistant
- A. Blind, Assistant Plant Manager l
- M. Terry, Quality Control
- R. Simms, I&M
- S. Brewer, Radiological Support, AEPSC D. Petroff, Dose Assessment Controller C. Ross, Computer Department Superintendent j
M. Glassman, Asst. Environmental Assessment Coord.
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T. Kriesel, EOF Manager R. Clendenning, Environmental Assessment Director State of Michigan D. Hahn, Chief, Nuclear Facilities Environmental Monitoring J. Tyler, Lieutenant S. Razmas, Sargent W. Miller, Nuclear Emergency Planner Also Contacted
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D. Bement, FEMA Region 5
- Denotes personnel listed above who attended the exit interview on September 23, 1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously-Identified Items a.
(0 pen) Open Item No. 315/86016-01; 316/86016-01: The Completion of plant personnel accountability was not reported to the Site Emergency Coordinator during the previous exercise. This item was not observed during this drill and will remain open until successfully demonstrated.
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(0 pen) Open Item No. 315/85016-02; 316/85016-02:
The team sent to check the operability of the PASS system was unable to activate the power distribution system during the previous exercise. This item was not observed during this drill and will remain open until successfully demonstrated, c.
(Closed) Open Item No. 315/86016-03; 316/86016-03: Communications with the State of Michigan were inadequate during the previous exercise.
In response to this Weakness, the licensee developed the position of State of Michigan Liaison in the E0F. The designated liaison's only function is to respond to inquiries from the State thru the designated communicator. During this drill, the communication with the State was greatly aided by the liaison position.
Observations in the State E0C confirmed that communication, both by voice and by document transmission was greatly improved. This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Open Item No. 315/86016-04; 316/86016-04:
Command and Control of the emergency were not properly passed to the E0F during the previous exercise. During this drill, a Site Area Emergency was
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declared at 1235 hours0.0143 days <br />0.343 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.699175e-4 months <br />. The E0F Manager and staff arrived at the E0F promptly. The EOF manager assembled his staff and agreed to take command and control over communications and dose assessment in the EOF at 1330. This was accomplished within one hour of the declaration of the Site Area Emergency.
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Open Item No. 315/86016-05; 316/86016-05: A number of problems were observed in the area of Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations in the previous exercise.
During this drill, field survey team data was used to perform dose assessment and was compared with computer projections throughout the drill. The dose assessment results were used for initiating Protective Action Recommendations in a timely manner.
PARS were issued and forwarded to the State by telefax and then discussed via telephone.
PARS were used correctly in accordance with dose assessment information.
Upgrades to the PARS to include additional sectors were based on changes in wind direction and speed and anticipated wind changes.
This enabled PARS to be implemented prior to the hypothetical plume's arrival. This item is closed.
3.
General A drill of the D. C. Cook Power Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the D. C. Cook plant on September 22, 1986. The drill tested the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive material. Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope and Objectives of the drill and Attachment 2 describes the drill scenario'.
The State of Michigan and Berrien County participated in this drill to a limited extent, as described in Attachment 1.
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4.
General Observations a.
Procedures
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This drill was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the D. C. Cook Power Plant Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the drill events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
Actions taken to mitigate onsite events were appropriate and timely.
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Observers The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this drill along with four NRC observers and a number of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observers.
FEMA observations on the response of State and local governments will be provided in a separate report.
d.
Drill Critiques A critique was held by licensee personnel on September 23, 1986, the day after the drill. The NRC discussed their observations during an exit interview on the same date.
Attending personnel are listed in Section 1.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
EOF activation was accomplished in a professional manner, within 60 minutes of the decision to activate.
Required equipment and instrumentation was immediately available and operable, and working space in the EOF facility was adequate.
On activation, personnel were briefed on recent events and their assignments.
EOF staff briefings were made periodically, and the
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Emergency Coordinator held conferences with his principal advisors.
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Status boards were well maintained and updated periodically.
Briefings and conferences aided understanding of plant conditions.
Control and direction of the field monitoring teams from the EOF was excellent. The teams were utilized to provide timely and useful field monitoring data. The Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMTs) were well controlled from the EOF, and they were kept informed of.
meteorological conditions.
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A Site Area Emergency was declared at 1235 hours0.0143 days <br />0.343 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.699175e-4 months <br />, and drill players began arriving at the E0F at 1248 hours0.0144 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.74864e-4 months <br />. The EOF Manager announced that he was taking charge of Communications and Dose Assessment in the E0F at 1330 and at that time the E0F was fully operational.
Dose Assessment personnel immediately consulted appropriate emergency procedures and checklists. Dose Assessment functions were carried out in a professional manner and notifications of events and classifications were made promptly.
Dose Assessment personnel stayed abreast of problems and were able to anticipate upccming events.
Dose Assessment calculations were timely and Nuclear Plant Accident Notification forms were filled out with appropriate protective action recommendations and the information was forwarded to the State in a timely manner.
No violations or deviations were identified, b.
State of Michigan Emerger.cy Operations Center (E0C)
Observations were made in the State of Michigan E0C primarily to assess the adequacy of communication with licensee personnel, including voice (telephone) and document transmission (telefax)
communication. NRC personnel also discussed the participant's views of the drill during a mini-critique of the drill held in the E0C.
At all times, it appeared that communication between licensee and State personnel was adequate. State personnel were advised of discussions related to changing emergency classifications and plant conditions. Document transmission via telefax was excellent, with State personnel often having the telefaxed document in hand when the licensee communicator called to discuss the document.
Very minor hardware problems were noted during the drill, such as a volume reduction on the voice communications bridge.
6.
Drill Scenario and Control The drill scenario was considered challenging and difficult (both fast-moving and complex), including a significant radiological release and several wind direction shifts. Heavy flooding dua to rainstorms (actual) had severely taxed the number of State personnel available for participation in the drill. This scenario exercised most aspects of the Emergency Plan.
Evaluation of the drill took into consideration the degree of challenge to the licensee's organization.
Drill control was considered adequate in all arecs.
7.
Drill Critiques NRC representatives observed the critiques which took place immediately following the drill in the State Emergency Operations Center and E0!
These critiques were considered adequate.
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8.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the drill on September 23, 1986, with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. The licensee re'sponded that none of the information was proprietary.
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Attachments:
1. D. C. Cook 1986 Drill Scope and Objectives 2. D. C. Cook 1986 Drill Scenario Outline
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DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE DRILL I.
INTRODUCTION This drill is to be conducted on September 22, 1986.
The i
intent of this drill is twofold:
1.
To present an opportunity for Berrien County to demonstrate that the deficiency identified in the 6/10/86 exercise has been corrected.
This deficiency involved public alerting and notification.
2.
To allow the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant the opportunity to demonstrate to the NRC that selected weaknesses identified in the 6/10/86 exercise have been corrected.
The referred to weaknesses that have been corrected and will be observed pertain to.the following activities:
Establishment of command and control of Emergency
Response at the EOF within one hour of a Site Area or General Emergency.
Dose assessment and protective action
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recommendations.
Communications between the utility and the State
of Michigan.
The drill will include the participation of the D. C.
Cook Emergency Response Organization and State and County agencies to a limited degree commensurate with the intent of the drill.
AEPSC and I&MECo Emergency Response Organizations will not be participating in this drill.
The drill will be evaluated by assigned observers from
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AEPSC and DCCNP in addition to the NRC.
A critique will be held on 9/23/86 at 0830.
Deficiencies identified shall be documented with subsequent resolution being the responsibility of the cognizant Emergency Planning Coordinator.
This manual has been prepared to assist drill controllers and observers in the conduct and evaluation of the drill.
This manual contains all information and data necessary to properly conduct the drill in a coordinated and efficient manner.
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DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE DRILL
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II.
DRILL OBJECTIVES
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The Following objectives have been designated for this drill:
A.
Overall Licensee Objectives 1.
Demonstrate an understanding of Emengency Action Levels (EALs) and proficiency in recognizing and classifying emergency conditions.
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Demonstrate the ability to mobilize corporate t
level support in response to the incident.
3.
Demonstrate at all Donald C. Cook Emergency Facilities the ability to establish and maintain solid accident management command and control authority and maintain continuity of authority throughout exercise.
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4.
Demonstrate the DCCNP emergency organization's
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ability to make proper decisions related to emergency radiation exposure guidelines, and the i
capability to implement these decisions.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and make
protective action recommendations to protect station personnel and the general public based on Plant parameters and/or field monitoring information.
6.
Test the adequacy, effectiveness _ and proper utilization of DCCNP ERFs and their emergency response equipment.
7.
Demonstrate efficient and reliable communications and flow of information from the DCCNP ERFs-to
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i participating off-site agencies.
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Operating Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the Control Room's ability to recognize operations systems and parameters i
indicative of degrading Plant conditions.
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Demonstrate the ability to properly escalat'e through the emergency classifications.
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Demonstrate efficient and effective notification / alerting procedures and methods.
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Demonstrate effective communciations and information flow from the control room to supporting locations.
5.
Demonstrate the capability to shift authorities and responsibilities from the on-shift emergency organization to the DCCNP emergency organization upon their activation.
C.
Radiological Control Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate radiation protection through the utilization of appropriate procedures in support of the Plant's response.
2.
Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessment, and to formulate inplant and onsite radiological dose projections.
D.
Environmental and Radiological Sa'fety Cbiectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to perform offsite radiological monitoring.
Include response to and analysis of simulated airborne samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment.
2.
Demonstrate timely and effective offsite dose projections concerning radiological releases.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to assist the Site Emergency Coordinator and the Recovery.and Control Manager with protective action recommendations for site employees, the public and other' resources.
E.
Chemistry Objectives
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1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Chemistry Section to obtain samples in support of. accident assessment activities.
2.
Demonstrate'the ability to assess data obtained as a result of the sampling activities, and the ability to factor results into the overall assessment process.
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THIRO QUARTER 1986 DRILL TIMELINE REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT 1215 00:00 Establish initial conditions as follows:
Unit-1 is in mode one at 90% power, 564*F Tave, 935 MWe.
Control rod bank D j
at 217 steps. RCS boron = 900 ppm @
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0132.
- Unit-2 is in mode five with refueling preparations to commence on Tuesday, J
9/23/86.
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Control Room Fire Detection System is out of service.
- Halon system for the cable vault is out of service.
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- 14 RCP lower oil pot low level indication is i'n.
- 13 Circulating Water Pump is out of service for
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motor replacement.
- Unit-1 CVCS crosstie is out of service flow meter
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orifice replacement.
- 1-East Containment' Spray System is tagged ~out out due to faulty valve operation. Valve repair is scheduled for February 22, dayshift.
- The Plant Manager is on vacation in Nova Sectia to a
observe the lemming migration.
1230 00:10 A large break LGCA (1400 gpm) occurs. Redctor trip, turbine trip, safety injection and phase B isolation occur.
1235 00:15 Site Area Emergency should be declared (ECC-14).
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THIRD QUARTER 1986 DRILL TIMELINE REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT 1250 00:30 Governmental notifications should be complete. TSC/
OSA/ EOF activation underway.
1315 01:00 RWST low level alarm.
1325 01:15 Switchover from RWST to sump recirculation has been completed and recirc is on West RHR. TSC, 0SA and
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EOF should be manned and turnover from Control Room underway.
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1326 01:11 West RHR pump trips due to a' burned out breaker.
1345 01:30 Core thermocouple maps indicate 50-100% clad failure (1300-1650*). TSC/CR should request a DCT from OSA to substitute East RHR pump breaker for West RHR pump breaker.
1350 01:35 Containment sump sample requested,to evaluate core damage. RCS loop sample unattainable due to insuf-ficient water supply in RCS.
1400 01:45 Containment area monitors indicate 5.4E3 R/hr indicating a 0-5% fuel pellet overheat.
NOTE: Actual comparison applies 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after shutdown. At most this is a best guess estimate.
1415 02:00 Indication is received in the Control Room that YCE,-107 and VCR-207 are open. Unit Vent NG and I2 increase.
General Emergency should be declared (ECC-14).
1430 02:15 Offsite RMTs should be dispatched if not already
_ performed. DCT should be dispatched to investigate XCR probfem and close valves manually. Dose projections at EOF underway.
1445 02:30 Corethermocouflemapindicatesa10-50%fueloverheat ( >1650*).
1500 02:45 DCT reports RHR breaker substitution completed. Sump recire is re-established as soon as possible, j
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THIRD QUARTER 1986 DRILL-'2IMELINE REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT 1515 03:00 DCT at VCR report they have encountered turn back dose rate about 10 feet from.VCR-207. Team members have whole body exposures of 2.7, 2.5 and 2.9 rem.
Request s
guidance from OSA.
1530 03:15 SEC authorizes VCR DCT to exceed 10 CFR 20 limits to close VCT-207.
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1545 03:30 VCR DCT reports VCR-207 is closed. Control Room verifies indication.
1600 03:45 Drill terminated, i
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