IR 05000315/1997019
| ML20202C982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1997 |
| From: | Creed J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202C962 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-97-19, 50-316-97-19, NUDOCS 9712040113 | |
| Download: ML20202C982 (2) | |
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N U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlli Docket Nos.
50 315;50-316 License Nos:
50 315/97019(DRS); 50-316/97019(DRS)
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
1 Cook Place Bridgman, MI 49106
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Dates:
September 29 - Octobor 3,1997 Inspector:
J. Belanger, Senior Physical Security inspector Approved by:
J. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
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This E 11*8 ON 9712040113 971124 PDR ADOCK 05000315 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection Reports 50 315/97019; 50-316/97019 This routine, announced inspection included a review of Secunty Staff Knowledge and Performance, the Security Staff Training and Qualification program, and the Security Organization and Administration. The following specific observations were made:
Unanalyzed changes to duties of responders resulted in response team members being
located such that it was impossible for them to interdict adversaries before reaching
'arget sets. This was demonstrated during security response drills conducted during February and June 1997. The need for corrective action was not recognized nor taken.
This is a violation of 10 CFR 73.55(a) and the security plan. (Section S4.1)
The number of required armed responders specified in the approved security plan was
not met on eighteen occasicris between Or'
~ 26,1996 and May 31,1997. The individuals were performing other assigned nc.-responso duties. Their participation ter'dered them incapable of immediate response for short per ods. The irapact on response capabilities was not recognized. (Section S4.2)
Staff reductions significantly affected the capability of conducting non-Appendix B
training. The licensee eliminated table top tactical response drills, the combat weapons course, and shift deployment exercises. The elimination of much of the non-appendix B pregram was considered a weakness in the contingency response program. (Section S4.1) (NOTE: This training was not required by the approved security plan.)
Non-security personnel (fire technicians) were adequately traine d equipped, and
qualified for their assigned personnel search officer (PSO) duties; however, a statement in the approved security plan appeared to indicate that they were required to be trained and qualified as access control officers (ACO) prior to being trained and qualified as PSOs. The licensee agreed to submit a plan change to clarify this issue. This matter is considered an Inspection Follow Up item (IFI). (Section SS.1)
Remarks made by a manager during a June 13,1997 shift captains meeting created the
belief among those present at the meeting that security management was not 19ceptive to bringing up security concerns. Site management adequately addressed this matter through meetings with each security shift. (Section S6.1)
Enclosure con
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