IR 05000315/1982009

IE Insp Repts 50-315/82-09 & 50-316/82-09 on 820329-31.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation of Emergency Exercise Involving Integrated Response from State of Mi & Local Counties.Fema/Nrc Exercise Scenario Encl

ML20054G713
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	06/04/1982
From:	Axelson W, Grant W, Januska A, Paperiello C, Matthew Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054G705	List: IR 05000315/1982009 ML20054G704
References
50-315-82-09, 50-315-82-9, 50-316-82-09, 50-316-82-9, NUDOCS 8206220232
Download: ML20054G713 (20)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III-Report No. 50-315/82-09(DEPOS); 50-316/82-09(DEPOS)

Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 License No. DPR-58; DPR-74 Licensee: American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 2 Broadway New York, New York 10004 Facility Name: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Donald C. Cook Site, Bridgman, Michigan Inspection Conducted: Farch 29-31, 1982 Inspectors: A anuska h II f 9 t'L

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U W G ant h "lT ,1981

// y M. J. Smith up/ /9.62

, v Approved By: V. xe son, Chief 9b.2 1%s 15 % L

Emer enc reparedness pction

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Emergency Preparedness and Program Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on March 29-31, 1982 (Report No. 50-315/82-09(DEPOS);

50-316/82-09(DEPOS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection and observation of an emergency exercise involving an integrated response from the State of Michigan (small scale) and various local countie Areas observed included: Command and Control of the Control Room; Technical Support Center; Operations Support Area; Medical Treatment, Post Accident Sampling and Surveys, and Joint Press Information Center. Activation of an EOF with the AEP emergency organization and site assembly was not demonstrated during this exercise. The inspection involved 152 inspector-hours onsite by six NRC inspectors and four consultant Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie t 8206220232 820608 PDR ADOCK 05000315 O PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel

• W. Smith, Plant Manager

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• Svensson, Assistant Plant Manager

• Townley, Assistant Plant Manager

• Baker, Operations Superintendent

• Dudding, Maintenance Superintendent

• Smarrella, Technical Superintendent

• Begor, Staff Assistant

• Greenwald, American Electric Power Service Corporation

• Nelson, Training

• Stietzel, QA Supervisor

• Vanderburg, Production Supervisor, Technical Other Personnel J. DiLugio, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

T. Beard, INPO

• Denotes those present at the exit intervie NRC Observers and Areas Observed E. Swanson, Control Room N. Dubry, Technical Support Center W. Axelson, Technical Support Center (TSC)

A. Januska, (TSC), Operations Staging Area (0SA)

W. Grant, (TSC)

M. J. Smith, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

P. Bolton, (OSA)

A. Robinson, Access Control, Medical Team, Hot Laboratory, Radiation Protection Team G. Laughlin, Post Accident Sampling, Radiation Protection Team, Access Control M. Smith, Offsite Survey Team General An exercise of the licensee's Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan was conducted on March 30, 1982, testing the integrated responses of the licensee, State, and local organizations to a simulated emergency. The exercise tested the licensee's response to a large release of radioactivity to the primary coolant and a leak in a Residual Heat Removal system. Attachment 1 describes the scenario. The exercise was integrated with a test of the State of Michigan (small scale) and Berrien County (full scale).

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3. General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50,-

Appendix E requirements using the licensee's Emergency Plans and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures used by Sit Coordination The onsite response was coordinated, orderly and timely. However, the EOF organization was not demonstrate . Observers Licensee representatives and ten NRC observers monitored and critiqued this exercise, Critique The licensee held a critique on March 30, 1982, immediately after the exercis The NRC and the licensee critiqued on March 31, 1982, and identified areas for improvement which are discussed in Paragraph . Summary of Areas for Improvement Problems identified by the NRC observers and discussed during the exit interview include areas in which additional attention should be give They are listed below: Ensure that the Plant Manager (or alternate) officially assumes command by going to the Control Room (CR) and conducting a face to face turn over with the Shift Supervisor as per the Emergency Plan, Reinstruct plant personnel regarding the need for monitoring when leaving a potentially contaminated area to prevent the spread of contamination during an emergenc Post-Accident sample (PAS) preparation for analyses should be done in a hood and the samples saved for disposal at a later dat A station vent sample should be collected to confirm the R-26 monitor reading and to verify a radiolodine source ter Of fsite monitoring team procedures for field radioiodine measure-ments do not account for all radiciodines. Decay curves for I-132, 133, 134, and 135 should be used during the early stages of an accident. Single channel analyzer (SCA) field capability should be used (i.e., SAM-2) for radiciodine measurement .- Dose assessment appeared awkward as a result of not having the Radiation Assessment Director (RAD) as an integrated part of the TSC assessment group. Face to face management assessment with the RAD would have probably insured more timely dose assessment and reduced confusion with the State of Michigan, Protective action recommendations for the first 2 miles around the facility should always be radial and not by sectors. This will insure consistence with the Stat Dose assessment' procedures should' consider forecasting to determine changing meterological condition The following scenario problem areas were observed:

. EOF Staff (AEP Organization) was not activated

. Site assembly and accountability were simulate Public address announcements relevant to changing plant conditions should be made, i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergenc Organization charts should be provided in the TSC indicating who is in the Control Room (CR), Operations Staging Area (OSA),

and TSC, by name and titl . A gamma exposure rate limit should be established for maximum allowable levels for counting on the face of the GeLi detector or a dead time of <20*. should be specifie . Specific observations Control Room The resident inspector observed control room operations through-out the course of the exercise. Observations included verification that the Shift Supervisor and Control Room Operators understood theli responsibilities and appropriate procedures were followed in a timely manner. The Emergency Plan was addressed when appropriat Emergency Action Levels (EALs) were implemented as require Communications were adequate and were passed to appropriate person-nel in a timely manne Accurate logs were maintained to provide a record of events as they occurre Technical Support Center (TSC)

Inspectors observed the licensce's activities in the Technical Support Center (TSC) during the entire exercis i

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(1) TSC - Command and Contro The inspectors observed command and control actions.in the TSC during the exercise. During the Alert phase of the scenario, the'TSC was activated in a timely manner. Required staff reported to the TSC and followed appropriate procedure ,

-It was observed that no organization chart was provided in the-

TSC which would indicate who is in charge in the control room, OSA and TSC, by name and title. This would be useful for-extended periods of operation and for shift-turnove In general, the TSC staff functioned well in providing tech-nical support to the control room staff. Some cases noted were the control room ~ staff was making recommendations to the TSC management such as protective measures and offsite notifi-cation. These are TSC functions and the TSC management reminded the CR staff not to be concerned about this functio This was the proper actio '

During initial activation of the TSC, the assistant Plant-Manager, the acting Onsite Emergency Coordinator (OSEC), went directly to the TSC in lieu of the control room as required by the Emergency Plan. Going directly to the control room will i

ensure face to face communications and adequate turnover of

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command and control. However, the OSEC did communicate with the TSC via telephon It was noted that the Radiation Assessment Director (RAD) is

,' not physically an integral part of the TSC assessment-group but is located in an adjacent room in the TSC. As~a result,

, dose assessment appeared awkward due to a lack of_ face to face i crisis management. The RAD had to walk from his station to i the TSC assessment group several times and in some cases was

, not jointly involved in dose assessment decision making.

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i After activation of the TSC, public address announcements relevant to changing plant conditions were not always made (i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergency, etc). This should be a task of the Shif t Supervisor when he is the OSEC or the Plant Manager as OSEC, when the TSC is activated.

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In general, Command and Control and Technical Assessment of the TSC group were considered adequate. The following areas were recommended for improvement:

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. Ensure that the Plant Manager (or alternate) officially

assumes command by going to the Control Room and conducting l a face to face turn over with the Shift Supervisor as per j the Emergency Plan, i

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. Dose assessment appeared awkward as a result of not having the Radiation Assessment Director as an integrated part of the TSC assessment group. Face to face management assessment with the RAD would have probably insured more timely dose assessment and reduced confusion with the State of Michiga . Public address announcements relevant to changing plant conditions should be made, i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergenc . Organization charts should be provided in the TSC indi-cating who is in the Control Room, Operational Staging Area and TSC by name and titl (2) TSC-Communications / Dose Assessment

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The functions observed were implemented in a timely manne There was a general calm attitude and although a number of functions were being handled simultaneously, no noise problems were eviden Radiation Assessment Director (RAD) recommended an offsite survey team prior to evacuation or release, based on deterio-

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rating conditions. He said he would make recommendations if necessary. This was a correct actio Information, such as teams being dispatched onsite or offsite, should be recorded on status boards to provide a complete picture which could be transcribed for the recor The Communicator / Status Recorder did an excellent job on record-Ing TSC and CR information. Although he was not given specific

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information, he correctly recorded milestone data.

1 Scenario data and an assumed 60 minute release time did not require that the Radiation Assessment Director make any protec-tive actions recommendations. When protective action recommen-dation for the public was required, sheltering was recommended

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for only the effected sectors in the first 2 miles instead of radially for the entire 2 mile area. Forecasting of possible s

changing meterological conditions was not considered as part of these recommendation The following item should be considered for improvement:

. Protective action recommendation for the first 2 miles around a facility should be radial and not by sectors and i

dose assessment procedures should provide for forecasting j of changing meterological condition __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ , _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ , , _ . _ _ _ - , _ . _ - . . . , , _ . , , . _ . .. - - - . _ . _ _ , , _ _ , _ _ . _. , , _

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5 Operations Staging Area (OSA/OSC)

TWo Radiation Protection (RP) people arrived at the area about 8:25 and prepared a team to send offsite at the request of the TSC. As the OSA was not officially activated at this time, although radio communications with the TSC had been established, the radiation protection group could have operated out of Access Control. It was evident to the inspectors that the OSA should have been acti-vated in conjunction with the TS About 8:54 the OSA Director and three others arrived at the OSA .

Office and began an accountability. A Site Emergency had been -

declared and signaled over the public address. As people reported to the area, they recorded on card readers in the hallway of the basement area, which is also used as the assembly area. These card readers are used only for emergencies and were activated by the-OSA Director. Accountability took 38 minutes. The OSA was then officially activate The OSA Director had sufficient staf He did not involve himself directly in communications or information relay during the accountability process, but directed each of his three staff members to do one function (communications, computer operations, update status board) during accountability. No assembly or evacu-ation was called for by the scenari The staging area, its staffing, and procedures seemed adequate for this exercise. The briefing of the two onsite teams was done in a classroom which is part of the assembly area. Had the majority of the plant personnel (500+) assembled there would have been over-crowding.

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Communications between the OSA Director, TSC, and Radiation Protection was adequat Both the OSA Director and the RP person impicmenting communications functions in the RP office were record-ing information on a tablet. Formalizing this by the use of forms would help reduce possible error.

l Implementation of procedures for keeping the area " clean" (i.e.,

frisking and step off pad procedures) ranged from generally sloppy to outright refusal to frisk under a drill condition. RP management did not enforce the procedur Medical Treatment in Access Control Facility Two injured workers arrived at the decontamination /first aid facility in access control between 7:11 and 7:15 a.m.. A man with a broken arm walked in with assistance from rescue team memeber Another man with a simulated burn was carried in on a stretche Radiation Protection (RP) Technicians continued to give first aid and make the victims confortable while waiting for the ambulance.

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Potential contamination was' contained by wrapping the injured workers in blankets. Some frisking was performed by the RP technicians at the decontamination center,-however, this occurre'd

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some minutes after the victims arrived. Frisking should be per-formed as soon as possible after necessary first aid, to reduce the spread of contaminatio Other examples of not paying attention to the potential spread of contamination were: (1) RP. technician not dressed in anti-contamination clothing, and (2) RP technician not covering the floor or surveying while removing contaminated clothing from one victi The following item should be considered for improvement:

. Personnel should pay greater attention to potential. spread i of contamination through the increased use of friskers, l floor coverings, et See Section 5.c for other examples of

! inadequate attention to personnel monitoring for contaminatio e. Chemistry Lab and Surrounding Area A Chemistry Technician who went to take a coolant sample, returned to the chemistry laboratory directly from the auxiliary building and reported that he had encountered a high dose rate field and had not proceeded to take the sample. The technician did not frisk or

remove gloves before using communication equipmen A six-man team arrived at the chemistry laboratory from the OSA and about six minutes later, after prompting by a controller, called in to report their availability. All team members wore full anti-contamination gear and self contained breathing apparatu Three team members went to obtain the sample. The team members j returned with the sample in a lead shield on a cart. They then

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made a 1/1000 dilution of the sample and proceeded to pipette appropriate samples for counting and boron analysis. No tongs or shielding were used although the initial dilution was performed i in a hood. Drops of the diluted sample were spilled on the lab bench and the technician grabbed the wet pipette tip during the j procedure. lie seemed oblivious to the implications and proceeded

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to handle the pil meter and burette thus potentially contaminating both. At the completion of the boron analysis, the sample was poured down the drain. The inspector questioned one chemistry

, technician about counting samples containing high activity. lie i

was familiar with the problems (high dead times and spectral

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, The following item should be considered for improvement:

. Post accident sample preparation should be done in a hood and samples saved for disposal later.

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. Gamma exposure rate limits should be established for maximum allowable levels ~for counting with the GeLi detector or a dead ;

time limit of <20% should be specifie )

l f. Post Accident Sampling The post accident sampling team was outfitted in the OSA with items located in sampling bags in the Post Accident equipment roo The Radiation Protection (RP) Technicians aided the sampling teams with their anti-contamination clothing, breathing apparatus, and dosimetry. A teletector and a PIC-6A were utilized by the RP sampling team. The team members were familiar with their duties and observed ALARA principles while traversing the area. However, the access area may have been-contaminated, since the sampling team made several trips through the access area without removing protec-tive clothing or friskin A monitoring team was dispatched 6o the 650' icvel to monitor the vent gas line with an RM-16 meter. The team members were quick, efficient, and followed ALARA principles. The meter, however, had a 50 ft probe cord, but only a 6 ft electric power cord and therefore had to be placed fairly close to the vent line because of the location of the electrical outlet. An I&C person reading the meter, who was part of the team, would stay away from the vent line and only approach it to take a meter reading. A vent sample should have been taken to confirm the R-26 monitor reading and to verify the radiciodine source ter An air sample was taken at the 573' level close to the Residual Heat Removal pump roo The RPs obtaining the sample observed ALARA techniques, but trans-ported the sample to the access area without a survey to determine contamination or the sample activit This could have resulted in contamination being tracked to the access area. When the sample activity was measured it was determined that the sample was not too hot to be transporte On the whole, the personnel associated with the exercise appeared to be capable of performing their duties and were familiar with the operation of their respective equipment in the plant.

I The following item should be considered for improvement:

. A station vent sample should be collected to backup the R-26 monitor reading and to verify the radiciodine source term.

l g. Field Survey Monitoring Team The survey team had immediate access to their emergency kits, vehicle and keys. The team was in the field in less than a half

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Difficulty was encountered getting a new silver zeolite cartridge ~

into the counting instrument due to the added thickness of this new cartridge. The counter used to measure radioiodine concentra-tion was an end window GM tube. This instrument was sensitive to both beta and gamma radiation and had an efficiency of less than 1%

for radiolodine. No radioiodine decay curves for I-132,-I-133, I-134 and I-135 were available to correct the response for changing isotopic concentration as a function of time after reactor shutdow The measured data were reported in microcuries of iodine using curves which related sample volume, efficiency factor and response to I-131 concentration. A system which would measure gamma photons emitted by I-131 directly would be better. This would permit the calculation of the iodine dose based on I-13 The following items should be considered for improvement:

. Offsite monitoring team procedures for field radioiodine measurements do not account for all radiolodines. Decay curves for I-132, 133, 134 and 135 should be used during the early stages of an acciden . Slagle channel analyzer (SCA) field capability should be used (i.e., SAM-2) for radiciodine measurements in ai Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

The JPIC was established on the first floor of the Community Center at Lake Michigan Junior College. This facility was well prepared and security at the center was excellent. News briefings were well coordinated and held in a timely manner. TV and radio news personnel were not present until the third briefing and most left after that briefing. The press were present and cooperative throughout the exercis State, local and licensee news briefing were well coordinate Written press releases were presented after every news briefin . Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on March 31, 1982. The licensee agreed to address the inspector's concerns stated in Paragraph The inspectors expressed concern that the scenario did not provide for a test of the EOF function to be implemented by the AEP organization and that site assembly and accountability was only simulated. The licensee explained that the latter was conducted because Unit 2 was in the process of startup and implementing a site accountability at that time could be adverse to safe operation. The inspectors concurre _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Paga 1 of 10 0 DONALD C. COOK PLANT FEMA /NRC EMERGENCY PESPONSE FIELD EXERCISE EXERCISE SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS The Donald C. Cook Unit #1 is operating at one hundred percent of rated Thermal Power. The Unit has been at one hundred percent Power for seven days following a refueling outage. All Unit parameters are normal and stable. The East Centrifugal Charging Pump is 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> into an estimated 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> outage to repair an electrical problem with the pump moto Work is also being done to the fire suppression system in the Charging Pump Rooms. The Reciprocating Charging Pump is out of service due to electrical problems with the motor. Unit 2 is operating at one hundred percent rated Thermal Powe () METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS Winds are from the North and West (325*) with a differential temperature between the 180 foot and 30 foot point on the

!!icrowave Tower of +0.5' DETAILED SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME MESSAGE NUMBER EVENT SUM!iARY Before 0700 N/A Two maintenance men are using an Acetylene Torch to cut out a segment of the fire suppression system water piping above the East Centrifugal Charging Pum The men are working from a temporary wood scaffoldin O e. ma o

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Page 2 of 10 0 Approx. 0658 N/A The man using the torch accidentally steps off the scaffolding falling to the floo The man drops the torch as he grabs for something to prevent his fal The torch hits the second man and burns him in the right leg as it falls. The torch lands at the base of the scaffolding igniting a pile of oily rags and other debris from the pump work. The burning debris ignites the scaffolding and anything else in the room that can burn. The man who fell from the scaffolding hit a pipe and breaks his left ar Both men remain conscious and are able to get out of the room and call the Control Room to report the fir Call received by the Control () Room to report a fire in the East Centrifugal Charging Pump Room. The caller states that his helper and himself are hur The Auxiliary Equipment Operator that is on the Auxiliary Building Tour in Unit 1 telephones the Control Room to report a fire in the East Centrifugal Charging Pump Roo The Shift Supervisor should sound the Plant Fire Sire The Shift Supervisor should declare an " ALERT" and activates the Technical Support Center. Notification of off-site support groups is mad \

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Approx. 0705 3 The Shift Supervisor is informed by the Fire Brigade the extent of the Fire and a description of the injurie "Off-Site" Medical assistance is requested and the hospital is notified. Simulation of hospital and ambulance response. Call made to hospital and ambulance to test the communications links onl Control Room receives a telephone report from the Fire Brigade Leader reporting that only the East Centrifugal Charging Pump is affected and the Fire is under Control and should be out soo am N/A The Plant Manager notifies, in accordance with procedure, the NRC, Benton Harbor State Police, and Berrien County Sherriff's Department of an

" ALERT" classification.

I Indication is that no off-site support is necessary at this time, and 15 minute updates will be provided until the problem is solved. Benton Harbor State Police forwards a

" Post Disaster Report" as per procedur Control Room is informed that the Fire is out. The Fire Brigade has begun to clean up their equipmen O

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() 0735 am N/A Because of the nature of the incident, the Benton Harbor State Police forwards a follow-up message to Lansing Operations. Operations again notifies duty staff from Emerscncy Services Division / Michigan State Police and Radiological Health Division / Department of Public Health and they confe Radiological Health recommends that partial mobilization of state and local EOCs may be advisable due to the area in the Plant that is affected. A possible safety system malfunction could occur if the situation escalates.

l 0737 am N/A ESD/MSP notifies the Governor's Office and gs recommends at least partial (,) mobilization as per Radiological Health recommendation. Governor's Office issues authority to begin " call-up" as a l precautionary measure and declares " State of Disaster".

ESD/MSP notifies Berrien County to declare a " State of Disaster" and to begin actions in accord with set procedure (Call-up actually begins on the local level.)

0738 6 The Fire Brigade Leader informs the Control Room that the oxygen bottle from the Acetylene Torch was tipped over and the valve stem broke off and struck the West Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor. There is no visable damage to the motor and the pump sounds O l

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0738 am N/A Plant update is received by off-site authorities and is as follows: The fire is contained in the East Centrifugal Charging Pump enclosure. The fire started when a maintenance man fell off of the scaffolding while working on some overhead piping and dropped the Acetylene Torch he was using which ignited some oily rags on the floor. The out of control torch also burned another worker who was working near the scaffol am N/A A Plant update is received by off-site authorities and indications are that the fire is now under control. No off-site fire assistancTis necessar Control Room is informed the ({} West CCP is getting nois Control Room observes West CCP amp fluctuating and the " Low Seal Flow" annunciator coming in and ou Fire Brigade Leader reports to Control Room that the West Pump sounds ba am N/A The Benton Harbor Post or the MSP will provide the following information to the TSC. The SEOC Lansing is partially mobilized and direct communication lines are established with the Plant and Berrien Count West Centrifugal Charging Pump trip Seal injection flow lost to all four Reactor Coolant Pumps. Shift Supervisor orders the Reactor tripped and the four Reactor (]) Coolant Pumps trippe _ -

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0757 am N/A A Plant update is received by off-site authoritie Indications are that the fire ('~)

- is out and the fire brigade has begun clean-up. Also, during the fire mishap, an oxygen bottle from the torch was knocked over and struck the West Centrifugal Charging Pump. The pump is still operabl am N/A The SEOC Lansing establishes a hot-line to the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) at Lake Michigan College and provides state assessment to sam Reactor Power = 0%

Pressurizer Level = 43% -

slowly decreasing Pressurizer Pressure = 2150 -

slowly decreasing RCS Leakoff approximately l

12 GPM from all 4 RCP seals I) 0804 12 A Safety Injection and Steam Line Isolation occurs due to high steam flow coincident

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with low steam line pressur Steam Generator #1 pressure is l low and decreasing and the

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level has gone high but is now decreasin Containment Parameters - Normal Reactor Coolant System Parameters -

Pressurizer Pressure - Decreasing Pressurizer Level - Decreasing Temperature - Decreasing No Safety Injection flow is occuring because all Charging Pumps are out of service l

NOTE The Reactor Coolant System cooldown and Pressurizer Level decrease is based on a steam line break outside Containment but upstream of the Main Steam Stop Valves. The heat loss l is based on a steam leak of approximately 500,000 lbm per l hour and a total heat loss of approximately 86,000,000 Btu's.

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0810 13 Pressurizer Level = 0, RCS Pressure drops to 670 psig, subcooling margin = 0. Safety Injection Pumps begin injecting water at 650 gpm eac A " Site Emergency" is declare i f

0810 am N/A SEOC sends LEIN to Berrien County EOC indicating conditions presently warrant activation of OSEOC, Benton Harbor State Polic It will be operational at 2:00 All guidance will eminate from the SEOC.

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() 0812 am N/A SEOC notifies the JPIC and i

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Berrien County EOC that based on the current analysis of the plant conditions, the Governor l has declared a " State of Disaster" pursuant to ACT 390, P.A. of 1976 as of 0737 am N/A SEOC notifies the JPIC and Berrien County EOC that Radiological Response Teams (RRT) from Department of Public Health are in route as a precautionary measure to provide off-site monitorin No releases are expected based on a review of the technical specifications and the current accident. The RRTs should be in-place by 11:30 am. They are traveling by state vehicl .

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Page 8 of 10 0820 am N/A Plant update to SEOC: Safety injection and steam line isolation has occured due to the high steam flow coincidence with low steam line pressure. Steam Generator #1 thus has low steam line pressure with a high level and the feedwater system has been secured. All containment parameters are normal. The Reactor Coolant System indicates that pressure, temperature and pressurizer levels are decreasin Steam Generator #1 boils dr Reactor Coolant System temperature = 408' Pressurizer Level = 68% and increasing and the Reactor Coolant Pressure = 668 psi Pressurizer goes Solid Pressurizer level erratic as steam bubble in vessel head collapses under SI Pump discharge pressure then re-form Pressurizer level 100% and stable and RCS pressure equals SI Pump discharge - 1520 psig.

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The RCS pressure is being increased by the use of the pressurizer heaters to bring the RCS pressure to greater than 2000 psig as per procedure. Steaming of the unaffected steam generators is begun to reduce RCS temperature to approximately 350*F. and to remove decay heat. The RCS is on natural (} circulatio _. - - - - - . - - - - - -

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- 0835 am N/A SEOC confirms " Site Area Emergency" to JPIC and Berrien County EOC. Actions per established procedures should be followe NOiE The pressurizer is heated up using all the pressurizer heaters which have a total heat input of 102,400 Btu / mi The pressurizer is heated to a temperature of 637*F to re-pressurize the RCS to greater than 2000 psig. During the pressurizer heat up the RCS is being cooled by steaming the three unaffected Steam Generators at a rate of 60,000 lbm per hour each. This steaming rate also removes.an estimated 3,142,000 Btu per minute decay hea The Pressurizer has reached the desired temperature of 637*F and the RCS is pressurized to greater than 2000 psig at a RCS temperature of T = 350*F. Safety Inje8 tion is secured and a () controlled de-pressurization begins. A bubble is drawn by opening the letdown but

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de-pressurization (collapsing of the steam bubble in the pressurizer) can only be accomplished by radiant cooling of the pressurizer due to the sprays being inoperabl ~

NOTE The scenario jumps ahead 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at this poin .

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1030 18 The RCS has been depressurized (Second Day) to 400 psig and T = 380 F, P 380*F = 18 psi P58har@ationshavebeen completed and the RCS is placed on Residual Heat Removal cooldown with 3000 gpm flow from both RHR pumps and a cooldown rate of approximately 40 F per hour.

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R-26 is increasing. All RHR

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'1040 '20 R-26 is trending up. The

, Shift Supervisor orders the

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,W est RHR Pump removed from service and the pumps suction

-

valve close m 1042 21 AEO on Auxiliary Building Tour reports steam and a high radiation level in the East RHR Pump room. He did not enter the room due to the high s radiation leve ,

1043 22 The Shift Supervisor orders

. . , the West RHR pump returned to

, c O' The West RHR pump has been returned to service and the East RHR pump has been removed from service and'the pump suction valve close R-26 is beginning to come dow R-26 is continuing to trend dow ,

l 1130 26 R-26 is normal.

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l 1135 N/A The exercise continues until 1:00 pm but only steady state I

i information is supplied. This is to provide the off-site agencies time to respond.

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