IR 05000315/1987006

Insp Repts 50-315/87-06 & 50-316/87-06 on 870209-11.No Violations,Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise.Exercise Weakness Noted in Area of Protective Action Recommendations

ML20212H376
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	02/26/1987
From:	Foster J, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212H370	List: IR 05000315/1987006 ML20212H366
References
50-315-87-06, 50-315-87-6, 50-316-87-06, 50-316-87-6, NUDOCS 8703060087
Download: ML20212H376 (27)

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2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA. TORY COMMISSION

REGION III

L Reports No'. 50-315/87006(DRSS);50-316/87006(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 ' Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74

. Licensee: American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Donald C. Cook Site, Bridgeman, Michigan Inspection Conducted: February 9-11, 1987 Inspectors: .'Fo  ? M t /s ?

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Team Leader virte f bd. SA n N. Williamse 2/zc/s>

Date-Approved By: W.W. Snell, ChiefN Emergency Preparedness Section z/a/s7 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on February 9-11, 1987 (Reports No. 50-315/87006(DRSS);

50-316/87006(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the D. C. Cook annual emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by four NRC i

representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.

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The inspection was conducted.by three NRC inspectors and one consultan Results: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identifie One txercise Weakness was identified in the area of Protective Action Recommendations, and is summarized in the Attachment to the report's transmittal letter.

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DETAILS 1. Personnel Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed

• J. Foster, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Stagir,ig Area (0SA)

• N. Williamsen, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

• S. Merwin, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) .

• J. Heller, Off-site Monitoring Teams, Operations Staging Area (0SA)

American Electric Power Service Corporation, Indiana and Michigan Electric Company

• H. Alexich, Vice President, Nuclear

• W. Smith, Jr. , Plant Manager

• A. Blind, Assistant Plant Manager

• L. Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager

• D. Loope, Emergency Planning Coordinator

• R. Ste?hans, Operations

• J. Rutkowski, Staff Assistant

• R. Simms, I&M

• C. Ross, Computer Department Superintendent

• T. Kriesel, E0F Manager

• S. Brewer, Radiological Support, AEPSC

• R. Clendenning, Environmental Assessment Director

• R. Piehl, MTCE

• J. Allard, Maintenance Superintendent

• D. Gallagher, Maintenance

• S. Brewer, AEPSC Rad. Support Manager

• Cook Cente *E. Smarella,icz, Klementow AEPSC

• W. McRae, AEPSC

• D. Schrader, Training

• G. Griffin, I&C/ Planning

• J. Schwerha, Operations /Coor *T. Stephans, Operations

• R. Barnes, Security

• J. Feinstein, Manager, NS&C

• R. Jillson, Training / Instructor

• P. Leonard, Training / Instructor

• D. Karnes, Shift Technical Advisor

• J. Paris, Computer Science

• D. Bruck, Operations

• erations Drape *P. Hoppe, TPSOp/RP Supervisor

• R. Heydenburg, Site QA

• R. Huerter, AEPSC Site QA D. Petroff, Dose Assessment Controller M. Glassman, Asst. Environmental Assessment Coor ~

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'D. Wisner, Maintenance

J. Labis~, , Security'-

J.'_ Sampson,,0perations --

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~H.~ Postlewait,ft Runser, Shi SupervisorTech. Engineering-Support

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G.:Tollas, Assistant Shift Supervisor-

• Denotes personnel listed'above who' attended the exit l interview on February 11', 198 .- Licensee Action on Previously-Identified Items (Closed) Open Item No. 315/86016-01; 316/86016-01: -The Completion of

. plant personnel accountability was not reported to the Site Emergency Coordinator during the previous exercise. During this exercise, completion of--assembly / accountability and related information was promptly reported to .

the Site Emergency Coordinator. This item is close . General-An exercise of the D. C. Cook Power Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the D. C.- Cook plant on February 10, 1987. The exercise-tested the licensee's.and offsite emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in_a major release-of-radioactive material. Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope andObjectivesoftheexerciseandAttachment2 describes-theexercise scenario. .The-State of Michigan and Berrien County participated-in this exercise to a very limited extent, as described in Attachment ' General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with~10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the D. C. Cook Power Plant Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

' Coordination l'

-The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely. If-the exercise. events had been real, the actions taken by the' licensee i would have been sufficient to permit the State and-local authorities =

, to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and

! safety. Actions taken to mitigate onsite events were appropriate i and timel Observers

The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along L with four NRC observers.

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. Exercise Critiques y ,

'A critique was held by licensee personnel on February 10,.1G37'the ,

s day after the exercise. The NRC discussed their observatioris~ during ' _

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an exit interview on the same date. Attending personnel are listed i _V  %

in Section N 1A !.

. Specific Observations 7

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a. -Control Room  ;'

i-Control room personnel displayed' professionalism, organization-  ;# 5-and effective control in responding to the accident scenari '

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Initial ' conditions for-the beginning of the exercise were provided 1 to Control Room personnel via hypothetical shift logs for the previous three shifts, an innovative approach which lend realism to the scenari Personnel were knowledgeable an'd used their procedures, both Emergency Operating Procedures and Emergency Plan-Implementing Procedure .

Notifications to onsite and offsite personnel were performed in accordance with procedures, and within notification timeframe goal The Shift Supervisor made an appropriate and'early decision to reduce reactor power (which was halted by the, controller in order to-maintain the scenario timeline). Later, a conservative decision wa likewise made to evacuate non-essential plant personnel:.from the plant,'and was halted by the Controlle \

Duringallcommunications,gooduseof"thisisadrift"wasnoted to precede and follow message '

Prior to the Assistant Plant Manager assuming the duties of Site Emergency Coordinator, he received a detailed briefing regarding-plant status and ongoing actions. He waited until he was fully aware of events and the status of the plant before assuming hit '

responsibilities. A minor discrepancy was noted in that the checklist for turnover items was not reviewed until after the-turnover had actually occurre '

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4 Noise levels in the Control Room were excellent throughout the exercis < ~

Operator response to the simulated Steam Generator Tube Ruptur (SGTR) was excellent. The SR0 read out the steps of the approp'riate procedure to the Reactor Operators, who confirmed the steps of the '

procedure and repeated instructions in a professional manne ,

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In accordance with the SGTR procedure, samples were requested of-the,hactoi,'CoolantSystem,.SteamGeneratorBlowdownSystemand recircutation sum . .

t(' A possible error was noted in that the Shift Supervisor did not ask-security personnel for the time of the first threatening phone cal < This led him to assume that the projected time of the first explosion '

2, was 1850 hour0.0214 days <br />0.514 hours <br />0.00306 weeks <br />7.03925e-4 months <br />s-instead of 1845 hour0.0214 days <br />0.513 hours <br />0.00305 weeks <br />7.020225e-4 months <br /> ,

Flant announcements,fication the emergency classi announced.by'

Plantprocedure, did not parsonnel were contain the_ rea only

.i advised that an Unusual Event: Alert, etc. had occurred.

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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program *

is acceptable. However, the following

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item should be considered for improvement:

• Iheproceduregoverningplantannouncementsrelativeto

%mergency classifications should provide for announcing of the reason-for the emergency classificatio Technical Support Center (TSC)

Th:a Technical Support Center (TSC) has been revised since the last

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exercise a M routine inspection. Several improvements in equi) ment location. table layout, and status boards were noted. Status )oards

,' were well utilized throughout the exercis Radiological habitability ( of the TSC was monitored by a Continuous Air Monitor and a beta gamma

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s meter. A contamination control step-off pad area was established at

, - the foot.of the stairway leading to the TS ., i TSC personnel performed well during the exercise, good role playing-

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and professional attitudes were displayed at all times. The noise

, level in the TSC was kept to a minimum, and frequent briefings of ,

the TSC staff kept them informerl of ongoing' scenario details. Log and record keeping appeared more than adeguate.to allow reconstruction

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3 of actions taken subsequent to the scenario accident, I

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. TSC personnel maintained an excellent overview of scenario events /

rm throughout the exercise, and responded well. Discussions were held

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, regarding plant events, their relative significance, and the options ,

open for event mitigation in each cas /,

Response teams were tracked on one of the status boards in the TS \

$ Assembly /accountabilitfwasproperlyreportedtotheSiteEmergency Coordinator (SEC) upon coupletio .

While the TSC status bo&ds were much Trproved, it was noted that no boards were available'for trsnding plant parameters of interes '

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.' Minor. problems in the TSC were noted: Noannouncementswere'made-when the SEC authority was exchanged (although all TSC personne1' c*

appeared cognizant ~of the changes); minor EPZ map errors.were made .

astosectorsevacuated(thesewerelaterfoundandcorrected);and

!the TSC was overly warm and stuff Based on the'above findings, this portion of the licensee's program-

'is acceptable. However,-the following item should be considered for

improvement:

.* ProvidetheTSCwith'astatusboard(s)whichwouldbeavailable Lfor trending of selected plant parameters of interes c, OperationsStagingArea(0SA)

Status boards ~for the Operations Staging Area were noted to have :

> been improved since.the last exercise._ Supplies of anti-contamination

clothing and other

articles appeared adequat '

Contamination control step-off pads were established at both

. entrances to.the OSA, and: team member radiation doses were being -

tracked via a computerized syste The area was staffed approximately one hour after the~ Alert was declared. At no-time during-initial staffing did the ins observe that the area was checked for explosive device A pector status board listing the- key personnel, identifying people available for J use and the status of teams was already available and quite usefu The briefin' for the'offsite survey teams was observed (discussed in Section 5.'d .

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl d; Offsite Monitoring Teams Three monitorin were used I ~during the dril . teams (twosurveyandonecountinf)ngforSurvey The inspector attended the brie i H Team No. 1 and the Counting Team, and accompanied Survey Team No. The team briefing consisted of radiation conditions, allowable dose limit, dress / respirator requirements, path to' exit the plant, and plant conditions. One item that was not discussed was the number of' explosive devices believed on site and a precaution to check e the offsite monitoring vehicles and equi) ment staging area for L explosives. Once the teams were dispatcied, some time was lost at Guard Island because the guard force was barring exit / entry to the plant and had not been notified that people were being sent offsit While exiting the plant, the teams did survey Guard Island and related the information and recommendation back to the TSC.

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L At the offsite storage area, the recuired monitoringtequipment was

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properly staged. The teams verifiec calibration / operability of the monitoring equipment and, once the vehicles were loaded, a final

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communication check was mad The portable radio for Survey Team No. -1 failed to function at this time. The team was aware tha replacement radios were available and did obtain a replacement radio at the I-94 guard pos The offsite survey and' counting teams were knowledgeable of the applicable procedures and demonstrated proficiency in locating sample points, and taking/ recording / analyzing the measurement The communication from the team to the communication center was clear. However, the communication center did not always repeat the information provided by the survey teams. For example, if a team relayed a radiation reading to the communication center, the communication center would not always repeat the reading Insaection Report No. 315/86040; 316/86040 documented a walkthrough wit 1 two field monitoring teams, and identified six items that should be considered for improvement. These were:

• Provide a means for positioning the survey probe outside the survey vehicl * Provide a sufficient length of electrical lead to allow the air sampler to be placed on an appropriate vehicle surfac * Provide additional anti-C equipment for each vehicle

• Provide each vehicle with safety features to identify it as a slow moving vehicl * Provide each vehicle with appropriate road service and minor repair equipmen * Provide KI tablets in each of the field monitoring team kit The inspector obserwed that each improvement had been evaluated and implemented as applicabl The inspector did note that the air sampler was connected to the car batterybyjumpercables. While this is an acceptable practice, if the air sampler could be connected to the lighter, the technician would not be required to spend additional time in a radioactive clou Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

E0F activation was accomplished in a timelv and orofessional manner

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by the E0F Manager, within one hour of the declaration of the Alert, as required by Procedure PMP 2081 EPP.301. Subsequently, overall

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emergency command and control was established in the EOF by~the Recovery and Control Manager in less than one hour after declaration of a Site Area Emergency. The E0F staff adequately met the ten (10)

objectivesoftheexercisefortheE0 Within one hour of the Alert, most of the necessary personnel for minimum staffing per PMP 2081 EPP.301 had arrived, except for one communicator. The E0F Manager concluded that (at the Alert level),

one of his staff could double up, filling the vacant positio The E0F Manager.then announced that the E0F had become activated and was responsible for communications and dose assessmen The inspector observed one incorrect action during the activation phas No bomb search was observed, to determine whether a bomb had been planted in the E0 Communications were established early on with the Michigan State Police, the Berrien County Sheriff's Department, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (a Shift Technical Advisor was playing the part of the NRC). All message were preceded by, and ended with, the phrase, "This is a drill."

There were initially some problems with communications including difficulties with the " White Phone" bridge which was intended to connect the Control Room, the E0F, and the Michigan State Police (MSF). This problem was. solved by using a standard commercial phone to reach the MSP. Subsequent to the exercise, the Michigan State Police reported that they were satisfied with the communications and

.all of the initial problems with communications had been solved as the exercise progresse Per procedure, an updated Nuclear Plant Accident Notification form was approved by the E0F Manager and transmitted to offsite agencies every fifteen minutes. Since the Michigan State Police were in the process of moving their Emergency Operations Center and did not have a facsimile machine operational, transmittal of the data on the Plant Accident form was by telephon Changes in the status of the E0F were adequately announced over the PA system. This occurred when the E0F became activated, one hour after the declaration of the Alert; when the Assistant Plant Manager became the Recovery and Control Manager, and when the V.P. Nuclear assumed command and control at the EOF. All transfers of responsibility and authority were accompanied by staff consultations and briefings of the entire EOF staf Both site and AEPSC personnel were actively involved in assessment and mitigation activities throughout the exercise. The spent fuel accidentwasnotforgottenafterthemajorrelaasaoccurred. Also, alternate procedures to determine the source term, rather than rely on the R17 monitor, were well thought out and pursue .. .

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- . Status briefings by the EOF Manager'and Recovery Manager.were timely

.and accurat ' When the corporate'(AEPSC) staff arrived,.they merged into the

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E0F organization smoothly,.obtained status briefings, and provided-technical expertise.- For example, new (radioactive) steam release parameters of 1500 CFM (versus the prior value of 168,000 CFM):were calculated and given to the dose assessment group for evaluatio Good communications with the JPIC were maintaine On the basis of comunications with the E0F, the JPIC would fax a proposed press release _to the E0F for approval. Approval and/or changes would then be made in the E0F and telephoned verbally _to.the JPI The E0F ~did not establish comunications with an offsite monitorin : team until one hour-after the release started, primarily due to a

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. faulty team radio (as noted in Section 5.d). This resulted in an exte'nsive delay before the Environmental Assessment Director could

- obtainiodinesampling.resultstoattempttoverifyprojected

thyroid dose Backup comunication procedures should be improved to ensure that teams can be contacted in the event of failure of

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their primary radio Due to the short time interval-between notifications to the State, PMP 2081 EPP.305, Attachment 2, " Protective Action Recomendation

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Worksheet" could not be completed with the attention it deserved nor is~there time for recalculation to verify the accuracy of the initial calculations. During the exercise, incorrect calculations were made on the form completed at 2045 hours0.0237 days <br />0.568 hours <br />0.00338 weeks <br />7.781225e-4 months <br />, resulting in a ten Rem error for the two mile thyroid dose estimate. In addition, this-form was virtually unreadable. The delay in completing calculations using'this form left little or no time for discussion of the PAR Rather, the results were given to the EOF / Recovery Manager and were then transmitted to the State, without adequate alscussion of PARS etc. This with respect totoplant was considered be anconditions, forecast(0meteorology,5/87006-01; Exercise Weakness pen Item 31 316/87006-01).

The E0F status boards and maps frequently contained errors. Although these errors were usually guickly corrected, in some cases the errors

> led to confusion. 'In one instance, offsite team gama measurements were incorrectly recorded as beta gamma. In several other cases, the map depicting current PARS was not up-to-dat The distribution of written communications within the E0F was prompt and efficient, with the Nuclear Plant Accident forms being distributed every fifteen minutes. Plant status forms, or " Log Group" summaries of plant parameters, were also distributed at

, about fifteen minute intervals. These forms included hot leg i temperatures, pressurizer levels, injection flows, etc. The Log l Group forms had twelve lines for parameters on each page and were initially faxed to the E0F with one plant status form per 8-1/2" by

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11" fax. Later in the exercise, these forms were being transmitted in reduced size, four forms per page, in order to decrease the

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transmission time. However, the severe reduction necessary to allow four forms per page made portions of the status form almost impossible to rea A list of qualified and available personnel for shift turnover had been assembled shortly after the EOF.had been activated. Later in

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the exercise a shift turnover was simulated. After the radioactive release had been stopped, the emergency level was de-escalated to Site Area-Emergenc Re-entry and recovery planning were accomplished-in a staff meeting led by the Recovery and Control Manage Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• The transmission of plant status forms should be reviewed to ensure readability of the transmitted form . Exercise Scenario and Control The exercise scenario was considered challenging and difficult (both fast-moving and complex), including a significant radiological release and several wind direction shifts. This scenario exercised a considerable portion of the Emergency Plan. Evaluation of the exercise took into consideration the degree of challenge to the licensee's organizatio Exercise control was considered adequate in all areas. Minor problems were experienced in that several actions, conservatively proposed by the Control Room Shift. Supervisor, had to be prevented by the Exercise Controller to preserve the exercise timelin It was noted at virtually all of the involved facilities (with the exception of the Control Room) that little or no actual bomb searches were witnessed. Itappearedthatthemajorityoftheexerciseplayers assumed that the bomb search was simulated, or would be/had been conducted by Security personnel. At some locations, information as to how many bombs were believed to be onsite was not readily available. It is recommended that Security procedures be reviewed as to conduct of bomb searches, training as to bomb searches, and bomb threat information disseminatio . Exercise Critiques NRC representatives observed the critiques which took place immediately following the exercise, and attended the final licensee critigue held immediately prior to the Exit Interview. The licensee's critiques identified all exercise problems of significance, and demonstrated the licensee:s ability to evaluate exercise performanc . Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on February 11, 1987, with the representatives denoted in Section The NRC Team. Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspectio The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. The licensee responded that none of the information'was proprietar Attachments:

1. D. C. Cook 1987 Exercise ScopeandObjectives D. C. Cook 1987 Exercise Scenario Outline

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DCCNP ERE-87 DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE

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.II. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The exercise objectives dictate the scope of the scenari The objectives-for this exercise were developed based upon the following documents:

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DCCNP Five Year Pla *

IEIR 86-016, 1986 NRC Evaluated Exercise Inspection Repor Situations will be presented in the scenario to prompt the desired player response for each objective. Where appropriate, specific objectives and criteria for adequate demonstration, have been included.in the exercise messages for Controller / Observer.us The objectives of the 1987 Emergency Response Exercise are l

O as follows:- OVERALL LICENSEE OBJECTIVES Demonstrate the ability of the emergency response organization to implement the DCCNP Emergency Plan Procedures, the IMECo Emergency Response Manual and the AEPSC Emergency Response Manua . Demonstrate the ability to activate and '

operate the following emergency response facilities:

Technical Support Center

Operations staging Area

Emergency Operations Facility

Joint Public Information Center

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3. . Demonstrate the ability to notify and mobilize.off-duty personnel during non-working-hours (i.e.. 1800-2400). Demonstrate the ability to establish emergency management comm&nd and control, and maintain continuity of this function for the

duration of the postulated even . Demonstrate the ability to establish communications and information flow between DCCNP emercJency response facilities and "

participating as simulated off-site agencies.

' Demonstrate the ability to designate

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subsequent shifts at the TSC, OSA and EO . Demonstrate the ability to critique the i exercis OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES Demonstrate the Control Room's ability to recognize symptoms and parameters indicative of degrading plant conditions and to classify degraded conditions as emergencie . Demonstrate the Control Room's ability to

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initiate notification of off-site authorities and plant personnel.

i Demonstrate communications and information flow from the Control Room to the TS ,

, Demonstrate the ability to transfer emergency

authorities and responsibilities from the

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on-shift emergency organization to the DCCNP

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Emergency Response Organization.

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% TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OBJECTIVES - Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility activatio . Demonstrate the ability to provide analytical assistance and operational guidance to the

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Control Roo ;

, Demonstrate the ability to coordinate on-site activities in response to the emergenc . Demonstrate the ability to determine the degree of core damage given thermocouple, hydrogen concentration, containment radiation level and/or coolant isotopic dat . Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain hard copy communications with the EOF and verbal information flow with the EOF and OSA.

• Demonstrate the ability to provide' analytical-radiological assistance to the OSA.

• Demonstrate the ability to designate subsequent shift personnel.

1 OPERATIONS-STAGING AREA

' Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an

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emergency requiring facility activatio . Demonstrate the ability to assemble, brief

, and dispatch at least one of each of the

following emergency response teams:

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Damage Control Team i

Rescue and Re-entry Team

Post-Accident Sampling Team

On-nite Radiation Monitoring Team

Off-site Radiation Monitoring Team

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Each emergency response team assembled shall demonstrate the following actions as

. applicable to the team type and mission: Assembly of' tools / equipmen Pre-operational checks of equipment and communication device Performance of appropriate radiological precaution ~ Performance of team missio Post-mission debriefing and radiological

, control . Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency

radiological support. As a minimum the following activities shall be demonstrated: Establishment of emergency dosimetry and exposure tracking systems.

, Establishment of emergency control

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point Performance of habitability surveys

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prescribed by procedure.

1 Analysis of radiological conditions to be encountered by emergency response j team ,

. Specification of radiological controls and precautions for emergency response i teams.

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f DCCNP ERE-87 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility activatio . Demonstrate the ability to establish overall command and control of the DCCNP emergency response within one hour of declaration of a site area omergenc . Demonstrate the ability to establish and --

maintain communications with the following agencies:

State of Michigan

Berrien County Sherrifs Department

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Demonstrate the ability to determine the projected magnitude of off-site dose using the Dose Assessment Progra . Demonstrate the ability to direct Off-site Radiation Monitoring Teams in order to determire the geographical location and radiological magnitude of the postulated plum . Demonstrate the ability to develop protective action recommendations based on off-site dose and/or core statu . Demonstrate the ability to update the State of Michigan on the status of the emergency at 15 minute interval . Demonstrate the ability to respond to inquiries from the TSC, JPIC and State of Michigan in a timely and accurate manne . Demonstrate the ability to provide hard copy

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and verbal information to the JPI . Demonstrate the ability to designate a second shift for EOF operatio O 2-5

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DCCNP-ERE-87 F. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES Demonstrate activation and operation of the Joint Public Information Cente . Demonstrate tlie timely release and distribution of news announcement . Demonstrate coordination of news announcement content and subsequent presentation with the State and Count . Demonstrate the ability to conduct media briefing . Demonstrate the ability of rumor control personnel to respond to simulated inquiries from the general publi .

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DCCNP ERE 87 (-

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE V EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY

.REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT / CONDITION Initial Conditions:

1800 0000 *

Unit 1 is in mode one at 90%

power, 565 F Tave, 935 MW Control rod bank D at 218 steps. RCS boron = 1530 ppm as of 0335 this mornin Unit 2 is in mode one at 80% power, 570*F Tave, 890 MWe. Control rod bank D at 210 steps. RCS boron = 890 ppm as of O.' 0220 this mornin *

Unit 1 and Unit 2 failed fuel detectors are out of servic *

1. 12 RCP lower oil pot low level indication is i *

Unit 2 north heater drain pump out-of-service due to bearing failur *

Meteorological conditions are as follows:

50' Wind Direction = 256*

150' Wind direction = 262*

Air Temperature = 21*

Wind speed = 3.6 mph

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DCCNP ERE 87

- ('N V ' EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

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REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME ~ EVENT / CONDITION 1815 00:15 Security-receives an anonymous phone call stating that there

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are four explosive devices on'the

. site. The first device will

, detonate at 1845 and the remaining devices will detonate at one hour intervals unless their demandstare satisfied.

1816 00

16 Security Shift Supervisor notifies the Shift Supervisor and implements i the Security Contingency Procedure.

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1831 00:31 An UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared in accordance with ECC-7, SECURITY THREAT OR COMPROMISE.

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1832 0032 Governmental and plant management

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notifications underway.

1835 00

35 Bomb search' of site should be underwa :45 The first bomb explodes. The bomb is located under the

- northwest triple-wide trailer located in the southeast corner of the protected are The trailer is destroyed and

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the three adjacent trailers

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are on fir :50 Fire brigade is responding to the fire. No injured personnel; the trailers were not occupied. Off-site fire assistance shall be simulate ,

1855 00:55 An ALERT should be declared in accordance with ECC-7, SECURITY THREAT OR COMPROMIS . Page 2 of 10 j

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DCCNP ERE 87

/3 VI. EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

V REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT / CONDITION 1910 01:10 Governmental notifications should be completed. Notification of plant personnel in progres NOTE: At this time, the Shift Supervisor acting as.the Site Emergency Coordinator may elect to assemble, account and evacuate non-essential personnel and shutdown both Units. These actions will not be allowed by scenario. The following will be postulated:

The SS/SEC does not think of site evacuatio Lack of action is attributed t personal erro *

Due to the relatively cold

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O,_/ temperatures, system load

, is at an all time high. At

! the moment, all reserves are being utilized and approximately 18% of system load is being purchase The Load Dispatcher requests the Units remain on-line ,

for about two more hours '

until replacement power can be obtaine :30 Second phone call is received from terrorist prompting action in lieu of next detonatio :35 Bomb is discovered by security personnel under the lakeside office building overhan Subsequent examination will indicate that this device was nel fut detunation at 214 O Page 3 of 10

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-DCCNP ERE 87

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V EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

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REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT / CONDITION

'1945 01:45 Second bomb' explode This-bomb is located under the hydrogen tanks. located between the Unit-1 containment /

stop valve' enclosure and the Auxiliary Building. This results in a major explosion causing the following damage:

The northeast wall of the Auxiliary Building is extensively damaged. The wall, including the bay door, is destroyed from ground level

- up to a height of 30 feet and from the NE to-the NW corne Sections of the wall are scattered around'the truck ba O The tops of two partially filled'

LSA waste dumpsters have been dislodged and are lying off to-the side.

The north suction piping of the f Spent Fuel-Pit has a three inch radial split and SFP coolant is

draining to the truck ba Two chunks of the wall, each about 20 cubic feet are i lying in the Spent Fuel Pi The tops of two assemblies were I

damaged on impact resulting in a

, release to the environment.

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DCCNP ERE 87 q VI. . EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

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REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT / CONDITION The accessable surface of the Unit 1 containment and stop-valve enclosure are extremely pitted adjacent to the explosion. The pitting covers an area of approximately 600 square feet. The maximum depth from normal surface is about 7 inches. Containment integrity is not violate :00 All emergency response facilities should be activated and operationa Rescue and Re-entry Team should be dispatched to investigate explosion damag :05 The following conditions are received in the Unit 1 Control Room indicating a 700 gpm steam generator tube rupture:

Low pressurizer pressure

Low pressurizer level Letdown isolation

Pressurizer heater cutout

SRA-1905 increasing (SJAE)

SRA-1805 increasing (GSLO)

R-19, S/G Blowdown Radiation Monitor increasing 2006 02:06 Operator identifies S/G #13 as source of tube ruptur :07 Operator request sample of #13 S/ TSC/OSA should coordinate activity.

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-DCCNP-ERE 87

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nV EXERCISE NARRATIVE' SUMMARY.(CONTINUED)

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REAL SCENARIO

' TIME TIME EVEN/ CONDITION 2008 02:08- The following indications are received in the Unit 1 Contro Room:

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Reactor trip signal Pzr level *

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Turbine trip

Feedwater isolation

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Phase A'CTMT. isolation e

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AFW pumps start,-. reg valves-open-

All ECCS' pumps start

! Service and CCW pumps _ start

. 2009 02:09 Although the~ reactor-trip signal

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was. received,. the. reactor did not

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trip. ATWOS in progres AEO I

dispatched to locally trip F reacto Operators enter FR- '#13 S/G safeties. cycle and' number 3 safety' sticks ope Loss of two i out of three fission product barriers evident. GENERAL.

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EMERGENCY should be declare Site assembly and accountability

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should follow declaratio *

Evacuation will be simulated.

I 2013 02:13 Reactor tripped all rods on the botto S/G samples requested.

j_ 2015 02:15 Operators exit FR-S.1 and L enter E-0, Reactor Trip.

i i 2017 02:17 Operators exit E-O and enter E-3.

l RCS post-accident sample requested, :21 Operators secure AFW to #13 S/G per

[ procedure (S/G 1evel above 6%).

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A-DCCN ERE 87 f4A q>

VI. ' EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

REAL SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT / CONDITION 2026 02:26 The stuck open safety valve should appear as a steam line break to operators. PORV radiation monitor indicates release in progress from S/G

1. 1 :31 Reactor coolant pumps are tripped in accordance with procedur :35 Dose projections from PORV monitor indicate 310 mR/hr whole body and 1320 mR/hr thyroid at site boundary GENERAL EMERGENCY must be declared in accordance with ECC-19, RADIATION RELEAS () 2042 02:42 Pressurizer PORV is opened to refill pressurize :45 Anticipated explosion does not occu Bomb located under 765 KV tower adjacent to Unit-2 RWST is defectiv :48 RCS post-accident sample re

@ 17%,

queste Pressurizer level PORV is close :50 #14 reactor coolant pump is started.

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2100 03:00 RCS temperature less than 350 F but pressure is greater than i 425 psig. Unable to establish RHR recirculation. AEPSC arrives at EO :15 Cooldown and depressurization of RCO continues. Anticipate cooldown established on RHR recirculation.

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4 .- D 4 '* DCCNP ERE 87

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V EXERICSE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

REAL SCENARIO

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TIME TIME EVENT / CONDITION

.2130 03:30 Damage Control Team responding to. stuck open safety encounters turn back dose rat DCT retreats to safe area and request guidance from

,' OS :45 Dose extension activities for

DCT in progres

00 Fourth bomb under Unit- transmission tower is located ,

by Security. Status of bomb unknown. Bomb is adjacent.to the East ASEA transformer and Unit-2 RWST. If it.were to go off Unit-2 would experience an Emergency Trip and loss of make-up water. PET should evaluate O.

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condition and develop mitigating actio '

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i 2215 04:15 DCT enters stop valve enclosure to shut safety i valve. RCS post-accident

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sample results available to TSC.

i i 2230 04:30 #3 safety valve of S/G #13 is

shut release is terminated.

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2245 04:45 Two bombs that were found have been disabled by BCSD Bomb Squa :00 Recovery discussions underway. Significant problem

is loss of Auxiliary Building integrity and Spent Fuel Pit l condition.

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! 2315 05:15 Exercise terminated.

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DCCNP ERE 87 V ' EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

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v ANTICIPATED RESPONSE TEAMS The following reflects the minimum types and numbers of emergency response teams required by scenari Re-entry and Rescue Team One team to investigate status of Spent Fuel Pit are Damage Control Team One team in response to stuck open steam

generator safety valv Radiation Monitoring Team Three off-site RMTs: one counting, two surve . One on-site RM .t ~

, Post Accident Sampling Team One steam generator sampling team.

1 One reactor coolant sampling team.

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DCCNP ERE 87 N

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V EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

METEORLOGICAL SUMMARY The meteorological conditions at initiation of the exercise will be standard for a February evening; mid 20's with winds from the West. Weather forcast will predict a Canadian low pressure zone entering the area in early evening with lake-effect snow flurrie Specific conditions will be as follows:

TIME 50' WIND 150' WIND DIFFERENTIAL STABILITY WIND PRECIP DIRECTION DIRECTION TEMPERATURE CLASS SPEED 1800 256 262 4- 1. o'I F NONE 1815 263 258 4 l . t RL F NONE 1830 254 257 4- i.19 F NONE 1845 269 264 4- 1 . 3. 8 F NONE 1900 274 268 4- 1.15 F NONE 1915 272 275 4- 1.03 F NONE 1930 256 263 4-O.86 F NONE 1945 187 213 & C3. '741 F NONE 2000 236 242 + O. 59 E NONE 2015 278 283 + O.4 3 E NONE ('s (j 2030 2045 286 298 277 302

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E .6 NONE NONE 2100 312 308 O.13, E NONE 2115 321 336 -- O . 3 7 D 1 NONE 2130 332 326 -O.4B D 1 NONE 2145 326 334 - c. to C 1 LT. SNOW 2200 341 321 -c.73 C 1 MOD. SNOW 2215 321 332 -- O . 6 9 C 1 MOD. SNOW 2230 336 341 -- 0 . 5 4 D 1 MOD. SNOW 2245 315 324 -O 49 D 1 MOD. SNOW 2300 324 327 -O.3i D 1 MOD. SNOW

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2315 318 324 -c.37 D 1 MOD. SNOW

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