ML20214F505

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Application for Amend to License NPF-47,extending Applicable Surveillance Intervals.Revs Required Beginning in Aug 1987 to Avoid Shutdown.Fee Paid
ML20214F505
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/15/1987
From: Deddens J
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20214F508 List:
References
RGB-25955, TAC-65396, NUDOCS 8705260123
Download: ML20214F505 (8)


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qn y e GULF STATES - UTILITIES COMPANY P o S T O F F 8 C E; B o x 2 2 0 - e ST. FRANCISVILLE. LOURSIANA7o775 AREAcoDE 504 636-3237 387-4367 May 15,~1987 i e f RBG- 2S955 File Nos. G9.5, G9.8.9.6

-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission' .

Document Control Desk -

Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen: ,

, RiverBendStation-Ubit1--

Docket No. 50-458-Gulf States Utilities (GSU) herebyifiles an amendment to the River Bend

-Station . Unit 1' Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Facility

Operating License- NPF-47, pursuant to 10CFR50.90. This application-is  ;

filed to extend the applicable surveillance intervals.-- Attachments 1, 2, 3: and -4' include the proposed revisions and justifications to the River Bend Station Technical Specifications.-

l The River Bend Station Technical Specifications require certain. I Surveillance Tests to be performed every eighteen (18) months (including Specification 4.0.2 where applicable). The proposed changes request. an extension to the surveillance -interval for the subject Surveillance Requirements to' the first refueling outage' scheduled to .begin on September 15, 1987. GSU is presently in compliance with. Technical-Specification requirements. In addition, GSU will .make a good faith effort to perform the required surveillance testing where possible 1 during an unscheduled outage of sufficient length.

H The revisions discussed in the attachments are ' required beginning in August, 1987 to avoid a River . Bend Station shutdown. Pursuant to 10CFR70.12, GSU has enclosed a' check'in the amount- of- one-hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) for the license amendment application fee.- Your prompt attention to this application is appreciated.

p Sincerely,'

.J.C. Deddens Senior Vice President River Bend Nuclear Group  :

JCD/ ERG /RJK/BhB/je-

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Attachments \

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" p e a l p perf. p * * >

~cc:- Mr. Robert _.D. Martin, ' Regional. Administrator-

'U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1V 611 Ryan Plaza Drive,. Suite 1000-Arlington, TX 76011

.NRC Senior Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051

'St. Francisv111e,'.IJs ;70775 Mr. William H. . Spell, Administrator Nuclear Energy Division Louisiana-Department of-

Environmental Quality

'P.O. Box 14690 Baton _ Rouge,_LA 170898 l

l

GEI'I3!D S1MES T JMRICA IEITFAR 1mzTrA'Itsr (I3mISSI(M S'IME CF LOUISIANA

  • PARISH (F MEST FELICIANE -*

In the Matter of

  • Docket Nos. 50-458 GEE SIMES ITfILITIES CIB@ANY *

(River Bend Station, Unit 1)

AFFIDAVIT J. C. Deddens, being duly sworn, states that he is a Senior Vice President of Gulf States Utilities Canpany; that he is authorized on the part of said Otznpany to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission the documents attached hereto; and that all such hwnts are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

//

AMur J. C.40eddens -

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and and Parish above named, this / >' day of //B% , 19 8

/ n 4 4 poanW.Middlebrooks l Notary Public in and for West Feliciana Parish, Iouisiana My Comnission is for Life.

ATTACHMENT 1 GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY RIVER BEND STATION DOCKET 50-458/ LICENSE NO. NPF-47 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL STEAM DOME-HIGH LICENSING DOCUMENT INVOLVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ITEMS: 4.3.1.2 PAGE 3/4 3-1 Table 4.3.1.1-1 3/4 3-7 4.3.2.2 3/4 3-9 Table 4.3.2.1-1 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-29 REASON FOR REQUEST The RBS Technical Specifications require many surveillance tests be performed every eighteen (18) months (plus a maximum extension defined by Specification 4.0.2). This proposed change is a request to extend the-interval for the subject Surveillance Requirement to the scheduled refueling outage (09-15-87).

A one time extension of approximately 31 days is being requested in accordance with 10CFR50.90 extends the interval for channel calibration and logic system functional test (LSFT) for the reactor vessel steam dome pressure - high reactor protection system instrumentation and the reactor vessel pressure high isolation actuation instrumentation from 18 months to the first refueling outage. Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) has and will make a good faith effort to conduct the above surveillances on the current frequency if an outage of sufficient duration occurs. The purpose of this change is to allow the above listed surveillances to be delayed from their scheduled due date of August 15, 1987 until the first refueling outage scheduled to begin September 15, 1987. Maintenance or calibration of instruments on the reactor pressure vessel sensing legs have resulted in spurious Engineered Safety Features actuations. GSU has determined that these l surveillances should be performed while in cold shutdown due to the high l risk of placing the plant in a scram condition. For the plant to shutdown solely to perform surveillances would cause an unnecessary thermal transient on the plant. GSU requests to amend the subject Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A to_the River Bend l Station (RBS) Operating License, as discussed below, to perform the l subject test during a scheduled refueling outage. Should these proposed j changes not be granted in a timely manner, GSU may be forced to l implement an unnecessary outage during the first cycle.

DESCRIPTION Reactor High Pressure may indicate a threat to the reactor coolant pressure boundary or result in a collapse of voids such that fuel barrier damage may occur. This condition results in a reactor scram which counteracts the pressure increase by quickly reducing core fission

reactor vessel pressure - high protects low pressure RHR piping from che high reactor pressure. Gulf States Utilities is requesting a 30 day extension for the channel calibration and the Logic System Functional Test surveillances as required by Sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2, respectively.

An analysis of the requested extension of the channel calibration for.

the reactor high pressure and RHR isolation was completed with the transmitter drift extended to 30 months by conservatively calculating the maximum expected drift. The actual drift can be expected to be much less. Calculated total drift for the requested surveillance period extension, using this method, was 12.7 psig. Design specification and current setpoint methodology analysis allows for drift of 15 psig. The current Technical Specification setpoint utilizes the 15 psig drift allowance in determining the nominal trip setpoint from the allowable value. Therefore, with the calculated drift of 12.7 psig for the time period of this extension, there is no adverse affect on the process variable limits.

The Logic System Functional Test (LSFT) for the Reactor High Pressure Scram provides channel testing from sensors to Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves, Backnp Scram Valves and Scram Discharge Drain and Vent Valves.

The portion of the channel which this extension affects in the sensor to the trip unit and the full scram actuation. Also, monthly channel functional testing will continue to be conducted on this system. The sensor's ability to perform their function is assured by daily channel checks and reliability of four transmitters used in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic scheme. Full scram actuation is assured by the built in redundancy and reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

Extension of the LSFT and calibration frequency to the first refueling outage has been evaluated for affects on operability and FSAR analysis.

The results of an industry Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) search also indicated a very low probability for equipment failures with regard to manual switches and auxiliary relays during the requested extension to the surveillance period. The extended surveillance does not result in a drift greater than that assumed in previous analysis. A review of the increase reactor pressure transients (FSAR 15.2) and overpressure transient (FSAR 5.2.2.2.2) confirmed that no credit is taken for reactor vessel steam dome pressure scram.

The LSFT for the RHR System isolation provides channel testing from sensors to RHR valve operations (note: the valves isolated by this trip function were stroked as a part of the Inservice Inspection Program August 19, 1986). The extended surveillance will affect the sensor to the trip unit. Sensor operability is verified daily by channel checks.

Also, monthly channel functional testing will continue to be conducted on this system. In addition to redundant transmitters, a reliable one-out-of-two taken twice design contributes to the continued function of this system. Extension of the LSFT and calibration frequency to the first cycle refueling outage has been evaluated for affects on operability and FSAR analysis. As noted above, a review of industry reliability data indica tes the switches and auxiliary relays used in this system are highly reliable and will not be sensitive to the

n.-.

requested . extension. in the ' surveillance period.- The' extended surveillance -does not result in a drif t greater - than : that . . assumed Jin previous' analyses. . The low pressureLportions (500 psig rated)fof the

- RHR system are isolated from reactor pressure when :that system exceeds the nominal trip setpoint of~135 psig. In addition to these automatic 1

protection features,cadministrative ' controls do not ; allow placing the-RHR system in the shutdown cooling mode until-reactor pressure has been .

. reduced to less than 135 psig. The -pressure indications ,used for

, determining reactor pressure when placing the' system-in the shutdown cooling mode are~ located on the' main control board and are different:

from those used in the overpressure protection system.

A review of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), RBS Safety Evaluation Report .

~

- (SER). FSAR, and applicable.IEEE standards indicates that the _ extension

- to the surveillance period is.within the acceptance criteria'. Based on1 the review of this information Gulf States Utilities concludes'that .the -

i intent of ' these : Technical - Specifications is not affected b'y a 31 day extension. The' instrument.and system design is not sensitive; to 'this change.; The performance of this- system- and its. components remainsJ consistent with the design. basis, Technical Specifications and FSAR. -

g SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

As discussed in 10CFR50.92, the following discussions- are provided to  !

4 the NRC Staff in support of "no significant hazards considerations".

1

! 1. No significant increase in the probability or the consequences of an.

accident previously evalua ed results from this change because:

, The system design, function and configuration are not changed. The requested extension may result in greater transmitter drift. This drift has been calculated to be 12.7 psig. The drift used in the FSAR analysis is 15 psig. Channel function is assured by surveillance of channel instruments. This request will not result in any change in setpoints, allowable value or FSAR analysis.- In ,

addition, a NPRDS search indicated a very low probability for equipment failures with regard to- manual switches and auxiliary '

i relays. Since there is 'no change in the loop's operation, or setpoints there is no significant increase in the probability ~ or I consequences of previously evaluated accidents.

2) .This change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

This request will not result-in new modes or configurations of plant operations. The design and operation of.the instrumentation and the -l system remains the same, therefore, previous ' analysis and

. evaluations remain valid.  ;

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1 1

13)'lThis change would not. involve a significant reduction in the margin-of safety because:

i Performance of the system and the-components remain consistent with

- e the' requirements of the Technical Specifications and FSAR. Current setpoints allow for channel' drift of up co 15 psig. -The calculated.

drift including this extension is 12.7 psig. Therefore'there is no J" change to the allowable value -'or nominal- trip setpoint 'and the; margir. of safety is not reduced.

'This change is not considered, as stated .above, to increase the-

! probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or freduce.

safety margin. . Further, the.results of1the change are' clearly within acceptance criteria with respect to the system'or components specified.

The -basis :for this conclusion, as discussed in the justification, is-

- :that the requested frequency will not. affect the ability of the system

~to perform its function.' Therefore, the criteria for system performance as discussed in the FSAR have 'not been affected.-

'Since the proposed amendment does'not change any previously~ revised _ and approved description or analysis described in the FSAR. the proposed' amendment does not. create the possibility of a'new or different type of-j accident, and the proposed change- does not involve a significant i reduction in a margin of' safety. GSU believes' that. no significant

~ hazards are involved.

REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION As indicated above, River Bend Station is currently in compliance with the applicable Technical Specification. This Technical Specification i revision is required prior to August 15, 1987 to; avoid a unit. outage to conduct the required surveillance test as discussed above.

NOTIFICATION OF STATE PERSONNEL i A copy of the amendment application and this submittal'hasTheen provided. i j to the State of Louisiana, Department of Environmental Quality - Nuclear Energy Division.

I k

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL )I Revision of this -Technical Specification does not. result in- an environmental impact beyond that previously analyzed. :Therefore, an i approval. of this amendment does. not result in 'a significant j environmental impact nor does it change any previous. environmental l impact statements for River Bend Station.

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N ENCLOSURE.

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