IR 05000341/1983005

IE Safeguards Insp Rept 50-341/83-05 on 830101-0228. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Reactor Vessel Flow Procedures & Inadequate Review of Procedure Changes & Identification & Control Measures

ML20204F830
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	04/04/1983
From:	Byron P, Konklin J, Little B, Wescott H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204F788	List: IR 05000341/1983005 ML20204F782 ML20204F819
References
50-341-83-05, 50-341-83-5, NUDOCS 8305020285
Download: ML20204F830 (13)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/83-05(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-341 License No. CPPR-87 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Fermi Site, Monroe, MI Inspection Conducted: January 1 through February 28, 1983 Inspectors: l t //[/ g hrd- -a d w u@

H. M. Wescott #

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B 4?!ng&

Approved By: J.E.Konkln, Chef d / '

a Projects Section 2 Inspection Summary Inspection on January 1 through February 28, 1983, (Report No. 50-341/83-05 (DPRP))

Areas Inspected: Action on Previous Inspection Findings; Followup on IE Bulletins; Followup on IE Circulars; Followup on 50.55(e) reports; Pre-operational Testing; Independent Inspection; and Plant Tours. The in-spection involved a total of 252 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors, including 46 inspector-hours onsite during off shifts.

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, three items of noncompliance were identified in two areas: Failure to follow procedures, inadequate

.eview of procedure changes and inadequate ider.tification and control measures (Paragraphs 6 and 7).

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

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• Alessi, Director, Project QA

• Agosti, Assistant Manager, Startup Testing H. Arora, Startup Engineer

• W. Everett, Assistant Project Superintendent, Construction W. Fahrner, Manager, Fermi-2 Project D. Ferencz, Supervisor, Construction QA

• E. Griffing, Plant Superintendent A. Godoshian, Systems Completion Director W. Holland, Vice-President, Fermi-2 Project

• S. Leach, Senior Administrator Security R. Lenart, Assistant Plant Superintendent T. Minton, Startup Director

• T. Nickelson, Startup Engineer

• G. Newton, QA Supervisor, Operational Assurance

• S. Noetzel, Site Manager

• G. Trahey, Assistant Director, Project QA

• Denotes those attending monthly management meetin . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (341/82-10-15) Wismer and Becker (W/B) QC Inspectors Perceived Lack of Management Support for QC Activities. W/B QC inapector concerns were identified during the'NRC Construction Assessment Team interviews with site contractors' QC Inspectors. The QC inspector con- l cerns related to inadequate and untimely response from W/B QC supervision and engineering. .The inspector has completed review of licensee response in this matter. Action taken by W/B to alleviate QC inspector concerns included; W/B PQM weekly meetings with all department personnel, revision

, of W/B procedures, reassignment and indoctrination of QC supervisors and providing explanations for all DDRs dispositioned "use as is". Corrective action taken appears adequate. This item is considered close . IE Bulletin Followup

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For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facilit If the Bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information dis-cussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective j action taken by the licensee was as described in the written respons !

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IEB 72-03 (0 pen) Limitorque Valve Operator Failures. The licensee did not have documentation which confirms that the subject switches have been replaced. The inspector considers this item to be ope IEB 73-01 (Closed) Faulty Overcurrent Trip Delay Devices in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems. The Bulletin referenced Westinghouse circuit breakers. This Bulletin is not applicable to Fermi which has all ITE circuit breakers. Random inspections by the inspector have revealed no Westinghouse circuit breakers. This item is considered close IEB 73-05 (0 pen) Manufacturing Defects in BWR Control Rods. The in-spector was unable to locate a GE response to a DECO request for assurance that the quality problems described would be corrected prior to fabrica-tion of the DECO control rod IEB 74-01 (Closed) Valve Deficiencies. An engineering review revealed that none of the valves which were described in the Bulletin were scheduled to be used at Ferm IEB 74-04 (Closed) Malfunction of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valve An engineering review determined that Fermi has two-stage Target Rock safety-relief valves rather than the three-stage valves which incurred the problem. This item is considered close IEB 74-06 (0 pen) Defective Westinghouse Type W-2 Control Switch Componen The inspector was unable to locate either an engineering review or a response to the NR IEB 74-08 (0 pen) Deficiency in ITE Molded Case Circuit Breakers, Type HE- There was no response to the NRC. DECO concluded with ITE that incorrect test procedures gave the described deficiencies. Four circuit breakers (15A, 30A, 60A, and 90A) were tested at the DECO relay lab. The test results were satisfactory when performed with the proper test pro-cedures and it was concluded that the breakers were acceptable for us IEB 74-09 (Closed) Deficiency in the GE Model 4KV Magne Blast Circuit Breakers. An engineering review concluded that there are no GE circuit breakers less than 15KV at Fermi. The inspector has not seen any GE circuit breakers less than 15KV during random tours of the site. This item is considered close IEB 74-10A (Closed) Failures in 4-inch Bypass Piping at Dresden Fermi removed the affected piping. This is addressed in 5.2.3.2.1 of the FSA This item is considered close IEB 74-12 (Closed) Incorrect Coils in Westinghouse Type SG Relays. Fermi does not use Westinghouse type SG relays. In addition, DECO has a test-ing program which requires verification of relay types and coils when approved for service prior to preoperational testing. This item is con-sidered close .

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IEB 74-13 (Closed) Improper Wiring in General Electric Motor Control Centers. Fermi uses ITE motor control centers. Engineering review indicates that GE Vulkene "600" cable was not used in safetyrelated breaker-starter The inspector considers this item to be close IEB 74-15 (Closed) Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three-Position Maintained Switch, Model No. 702507. DECO investigation revealed the affected C-H switch was not specified or installed in existing equipment nor was it planned to be used on safety-related systems. This item is considered to be close IEB 74-16 (Closed) Improper Machining of Pistons in Colt Industries (Fairbanks-Morse) Diesel Generators. Fairbanks-Morse corrected the described deficiencies by intensified inspections and a design modifica-tion which were included in the Fermi diesels. The inspector reviewed Fairbanks-Morse documentation. This item is considered to be close IEB 75-01 and 75-01A (Closed) "Through-wall Cracks in Core Spray Piping at Dresden-2." Fermi made changes to reduce the susceptibility to I SSC. These changes are summarized in 5.2.3.2.1 of the FSAR and 5.2.32 of the SER. This item is considered close IEB 75-04 and 75-04A (0 pen) " Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station." Fermi's response to this bulletin will be included in their Appendix R submittal. This bulletin remains open pending NRR review and approval of the Appendix R submitta IEB 76-01 (Closed) "BWR Isolation Condensor Tube Failure." This bulletin I

, is closed as Fermi 2 does not utilize Isolation Condensor IEB 77-01 (Closed) " Pneumatic Time Delay Relay Setpoint Drift." The relays were inspected and found to be manufactured in 1974. Two relays were found with no production number. These were replaced. The action taken appears to be in accordance with the licensee's letter EF2-37,322 dated July 27, 1977, to RIII. This bulletin is considered closed.

l IEB 77-08 (Closed) " Assurance of Safety and Safeguards During an l Emergency - Locking Systems." The inspector reviewed the following: DECO Letter, EF2-39,817 dated February 21, 1978, stating that Stone and Webster had been notified that all electrically operated door locks be provided with manual override.

! DECO letter EF2-39,865 dated February 28, 1978, stating that doors l used for emergency egress will be provided with mechanical override, l loss of power to be restored via diesel generator, doors to vital areas are to be checked every eight hours.

l l The licensee's action appears to be in accordance with their letter to RIII, EF2-41,087, dated March 1, 1978. This item is considered closed.

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IEB 78-14 (0 pen) " Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoids."

The inspector reviewed DECO letter EF2-60021 dated September 22, 1982, stating that purchase order has been written to obtain rebuild kits for the subject solenoids. This item remains open pending the licensee pro-

, .viding documentation indicating that the solenoids have been rebuil IEB 79-11 (Closed) " Faulty Overcurrent Trip Devices in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems" Deco letter EF2 -46,898 dated June 19, 1979,

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to RIII states that Fermi-2 does not use Westinghouse low-voltage power circuit breakers. This item is considered close No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be take IEC 76-01 (Open) " Crane Hoist Control-Circuit Modifications." The in-spector was unable to locate documentation to support review. This item remains open pending a review of the' documentation by the inspecto IEC 76-02 (Closed) " Relay Failures--Westinghouse BF (ac) and BFD (de)

Relays." The licensee's review revealed there are no Westinghouse BF or BFD relays in Class IE systems. This item is considered close IEC 76-03 (Closed) " Radiation Exposures in Reactor Cavities." The li-

censee's review determined that the problem described could not occur in

! a BWR. The review additionally revealed two other mechanisms by which

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high radiation transients could exist in the drywell. Measures have been taken to minimize this transient. This item is considered closed.

I-l IEC 76-04 (Closed) " Neutron Monitor and Flow By-Pass Switch Malfunctions."

l GE supplied improved neutron monitoring switches in response to their

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Service Letter SIL III, Revision 1, dated August 29, 1975. This item is considered closed.

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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie Review of Licensee Action on 19 CFR 50.55(e) Reports

10 CFR 50.55(e) report dated October 28, 1982, NRC No. 80-07, Licensee

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No. F-32. Failure of ITE/ electro switch undervoltage relays used in diesel generator 480V load shedding system.

l This item remains open pending the licensee's installation and successful testing of.the replacement relay CFR-50.55(e) report dated December 10, 1980, NRC No. 80-10, Licensee's No. 35. Inadequate pipe clearance for QA level I piping and equipmen ,

.The inspector reviewed the following:

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. Letter F2S80-0314, Revision A, dated February 18, 1981, DECO to site Superintendent establishing pipe clearances, Letter EF2-52,051, dated January 20, 1981, Deco to Director of Field Engineering directing and establishing pipe clearance criteri Letter dated December 18, 1980, DECO to Director of Field Engineering Action plan to establish priority for review and modify large bore and SRV pipin ! Check lists for various systems with corrective action where require The licensee's action appears to be in accordance with their final report to RIII EF2-49,876, dated January 7, 1981, with the attached deficiency

, report. This item is considered close CFR 50.55(e) report dated December 29, 1980, NRC No. 80-11, Licensee's No. F-36. Transverse in-core probe instrument tube design deficienc The inspector reviewed the following: DECO final report to QA dated January 6, 1982, on TIP Guide Tubes stating that tests were performed on four test samples simulating

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axial compression forces expected under LOCA conditions. Three test pieces did not leak, one developed a very small leak at the flare join In no instance did the tube wall fail, Photos of test techniqu The licensee's action appears to be in accordance with their final

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report to RIII, EF2-55873, dated January 11, 1982. This item is

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considered closed.

! 10 CFR 50.55(e) report dated June 26, 1981, NRC No. 81-07, Licen'ee's s No. 45. Rockbestos coaxial cable problem. The inspector reviewed the following: Rockbestos qualification of firewall III class IE electrical cables dated June 7, 1978. The purpose of the test program was to document that the cable will function during a LOCA as prescribed by IEEE-383-74.

DECO letter to supervising engineer, EQ-64, dated April 13, 1982, l stating the reasons for using the existing cable were

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(1) Unavailability of an acceptable alternate with required electri-cal characteristic (2) The SRM circuits are no I (3) Triple shielded cable is required per GE in order to allow proper SRM operation. Second generation cable should be used when tested and availabl i

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. DECO letter to QA, EF2-59252, dated September 9, 1982, recommending the use of Rockbestos cable RSSS-6 series 100 through 11 The licensee's action appears to be in accordance with their final report to RIII, EF2-60507, dated November 16, 1982. This item is considered close l

'10 CFR 50.55(e) report dated December 7, 1981, NRC No. 81-11, Licensee's No. F-49. Deficiency in Control Data Corporation Computer Program. The inspector reviewed the following:

l Control Data Corporation letter to supervisor of construction, dated ,

December 29, 1981, stating that the NRC was provided the following: 1 (1) A list of CDC users who were notifie (2) Description of three errors in the V. l (3) A copy of the Baseplate User Manua Attachment to the final report to RIII, EF2-57,705, "Enrico Fermi Power Plant - Unit 2 deficiency report errors in computer program used to design QA level 1 pipe supports." It was concluded investi-gation that the original design of the supports that could have been affected by this design deficiency and finding that none of these supports required modifications, that QA level 1 support integrity was preserve The action taken by the licensee appears to be in accordance with l their final report to RIII, EF2-57467, dated April 15, 198 This item is considered close l 10 CFR 50.55(e) report dated February 18, 1982, NRC No. 82-08, Licensee's No. F-57. RHR piping design deficiency.

l This item has been turned over to the Material Testing Branch and l will be reviewed at a future date. This item remains ope CFR 50.55(e) report dated February 22, 1982, NRC No. 82-09, Licensee's No. F-58. Cracking of diesel general fuel oil storage tank concrete mounting pedestal. The inspector reviewed the following:

(a) NCR 82-029 dated February 20, 1982, and NCR 82-026 dated February 19, 198 (b) DECO letter F25-82-0428 dated February -25, 1982, stating that the pedestal repair and modification had been visually inspected and found satisfactor The inspector visually examined the pedestal repair and modification and found that certain hold-down nuts (tank feet to pedestal) had

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been tightenet such as not to allow thermal movement of the tank on the sliding joint. This was discussed at the exit meeting held on

' January 26, 198 It was suggested that these nuts be loosened and

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locked in place to allow movement due to temperature changes. The licensee stated that a means would be provided to lock the nuts in plac This item remains open pending corrective action by the license CFR 50.55(e) report dated February 22, 1982, NRC No. 82-10, Licensee's No. F-59. Emergency diesel generator relay failures.

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The inspector reviewed the following:

(a) NCR 82-025 dated December 18, 1982, with Appendix A description of proposed corrective actio (b) DECO Operational Assurance PQA 82-167, dated March 10, 1982, approving NCR 82-02 (c) Startup Form 7.8 (Revision 1) indicating the dates the relavs were tested with QC hold point for re-inspection.

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The action taken by the' licensee appears to be in accordance with their final report-to RIII,.EF2-60512 dated November 19, 1982. This item is considered close CRF 50.55(e) report dated April 1, 1982, NRC-No. 82-16, Licensee's No. F-65. Tubing within instrument rack routed incorrectly. The inspector

reviewed the following:

(a) DDR(MP) 8067, dated March 23, 1982, describing problem. Disposi-tion complete and approved on April 27, 198 (b) Report of defects and noncompliance problem on instrument panel i H21-1420 lines to V8-2213 and V8-2214 were reversed.

I (c) Wismer and Becker operations process traveler, rework of rack, dated March 25, 1982.

The inspector visually examined the rework. The action taken by the licensee appears to be in accordance with their final report to RIII, EF2-61527, dated December 23, 1982. This item is considered close , Preoperational Testing The inspectors reviewed the partial results of the two preoperational tests, PRFT B1113.001, Revision 2, " Reactor Vessel. Flow Induced Vibration Test"

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(FIVT) and PRET B3100.001, Revision 1, " Reactor Recirculation System".

The recirculation pump coast down section of the recirculation test and the data from the FIVT were reviewe >

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The inspector has several concerns regarding the adequacy of review of Test Change Notices (TCNs) and the adherence to procedure Section 8.3.1 of the'Startup Manual (SUM) requires the review of each test

. procedure to determine that the test procedure is complete, accurate, and up-to date. Section 8.3.3 of the SUM requires that the review of a TCN shall be.the same as that given any procedure revision which receives the same review and approval process as the original' procedure received. While performing the FIVT, TCN 455,was written to modify the test procedur Item 1 of TCN 455 deleted steps 6.1.2.4 through 6.1.2.7 and 6.2.1 through 6.2.6 with the explanation that they were contained in an attached RCI pro-

. cedure. The deleted procedural steps reverified the valve line up, filled the-vessel, installed the steam separator, and head, sampled the coolant, filled and_placed the RHR system into operation, placed the RWCU system in operation and heated the vessel. The RCI procedures only cover the installation of the separator and head and installation of the dryer lifting eyebolts. Step 2 of the TCN added two of the steps which were deleted in Step 1, the valve lineup reverification and the vessel fil The two steps were placed back into the procedure.with no reason for the reinsertion of the deleted steps. Review of the RCI procedures revealed that none of the deleted steps were contained in the RCI procedure. The steps deleted by TCN 455 rendered the FIVT procedure incomplete and in-adequate, contrary to the requirements of Section 8.3.1 of the SU This is considered as item of noncompliance (341/83-05-01).

Sections 4.5.4 and 8.3.3 of the SUM state that the TCN shall only be used when the changes are small in number. TCN 442 added 3 1/2 pages of pro-cedure, TCN 449 added ten pages of procedure, TCN 455 deleted 2 1/2 pages of procedure,. TCN 456 added 34 major procedura1 ' steps plus sub-steps, and TCN 484l cancelled part of TCN 442 and added 21/2 pages of procedur The inspector does not consider the above' changes to be small in numbe This is considered to be an item of noncompliance (341/83-05-02a).

The inspectors are concerned about the control of testing. Program Policy 5 of the Operations Quality Assurance Manual requires that activities

affecting quality shall be prescribed by appropriate documented instruc-l tions and procedures and shall be accomplished in accordance with those documents. A review of the FIVT test procedure and the Test Analysis Report revealed that reactor-level, pressure, and temperature were con-trolled without-benefit of documented instructions or procedures and this is considered an item of noncompliance (341/83-05-02-b).

! The above are additional examples of a lack of procedural discipline in

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the performance of preoperational testing. Procedural discrepancies were

! also identified during the performance of preoperational testing of the f Standby Liquid Control System (PRET C4100.001) and the Reactor Recircula-tion System (PRET B3100). These discrepancies were documented in NRC inspection Report 50-341/82-2 A procedural requirement of SI 4.5.1.01, Administrative Control of Startup Originated Procedures and Test Change Notices, is that the changes and the reason for the change must be listed in the TCN. TCN 455, Step 2, l

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added two procedural steps which were deleted by Step 1 of the procedure

but no reason was given for the reinsertion. TCN 456 added 34 procedural steps plus sub-steps with no reason given for the chang The inspectors are concerned about the adequacy of the review of the pro-

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-cedure changes. The above examples contain both procedural and technical

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inconsistencies. These changes were reviewed and signed off by the responsible parties from Engineering QA and Startup. The inspector could

, find no evidence that any of the reviewing parties questioned the change It does not appear that these TCNs were reviewed in accordance with Section 8.3.3 of the SU . Independent Inspection Allegations and Concerns ,

(1) Quality Control of Penetration Fire Seals

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On February 3, 1983, a craftsman employed by the penetration fireseal contractor, SACO/ICMS (S/I), made allegations relating to penetration fire seals deficient quality controls and practice The following allegations were made:

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(a) Penetration seals P-1037 and P-1039 had been QC accepted but did not meet acceptance criteri (b) .A lack of quality controls for the mixing compounds and the mixing equipment used in making penetration seal The inspectors investigated the allegations and found that Allegation (a) was unsubstantiated. A review of QA records

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revealed that the subject penetrations had not been QC inspected thus could not have been QC accepted. The investigation revealed that Allegation (b) was substantiated. The inspectors found that mixing equipment and material was left unattended and un-secured in several areas of the Auxiliary Building. They also l' observed that the five gallon containers of mixing compound were

, not sealed, there were some with unsealed, partially open, or removed lids, (dirt contamination was visible in some uncovered cans) and lacked adequate quality control labels. The inspectors also observed that the crafts provided QC with compound samples at the beginning of each shift and after maintenance was per-

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formed on the equipment. QC did not take random and independent i samples of sealant material The control measures in place for this activity failed to assure identification of and prevent the use of incorrect or defective materials, and is in noncompliance with Criterion VIII of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (341/83-05-03).

On February 5,1983 the inspectors met with S/I and licensee QA representatives. During this meeting, inspection findings i

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were discussed and an in-plant tour was mad Both licensee and site contractor acknowledeged the need for additional control measures. The following corrective actions were im-plemented:

. storage of all mixing materials in a secured area

. covers for unattended mixing equipment

. attachment of material identification labels to all containers

. random material sampling by-QC On February 14, 1983 S/I revised and implemented the following procedures:

PWI-052 Installation of Silicone Rubber Foam QC-101 Quality Control Inspection QC-131 Material Storage and Handling The inspectors verified that the above corrective measures were incoporated in the revised procedures. Compliance with the revised procedures should preclude the recurrence of deficient quality practices in this are .

The inspectors have completed their review of this matter. No response to this item is required since appropriate actions have been taken to correct the noncomplianc (2) Startup Organization Quality-Related Activities-On February 3, 1983, NRC Region III management and the Senior

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Resident Inspector performed a tour of Fermi-2 facility. During the tour a Project Quality Assurance Inspector (PQA) expressed his concern of certain quality-related activities at Ferm On February 4, 1983, the SRI met with the PQA Inspector in an attempt to obtain any specific allegations or concerns. The PQA Inspector stated he did not know of any wrongdoings or non-conforming conditions which had not been documented or reported, but he did have the following concerns:

(a) Inadequate corrective action (core spray bellows)

(b) Startup lacked adequate configuration control (he referred to NRC Open Item 79-17-01).

(c) System Test Engineers (STE) had trouble knowing actual system configuration at the time of testin .

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Items (a) and (b) both relate to NRC identified problems: Item (a)--was. initially reported by the licensee and was reported as a 50.55(e) (82-04). NRC followup inspection found that the licensee's corrective action was not adequate. This matter resulted in an item of noncompliance (82-01-06). Item (b)--re-lates to NRC Open Item (79-17-01) Design Change Controls (DECO)

Startup. This matter relates to the lack of control measures for design changes to systems which were to be turned over to startup for testin In November 1981, (prior to-the start of preoperational testing of safety related systems) Deco estab-lished the System Completion Organization, with it the respons-ibility and the administrative procedures for configuration control. This item was inspected and closed in NRC Inspection Report No. (82-20). Item (c) concern was valid for the period prior to 1982. Since then DECO has required drawing revisions when design changes exceed five, also the System Test Engineer and Lead Systems Test Engineer must initial changes to systems for which they are responsible. Drawing and change control procedures together with required system walkdowns should provide STEs adequate knowledge of system configuration at time of testin The inspector considers this matter close B. Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures This review was performed to ascertain implementation of QA/QC programs and procedures, including appropriate processing and dispositioning of Deviation Disposition Requests (DDRs) and Sur-

, veillance Reports (SRs). As part of this review the inspector interviewed Wismer and Becker (WB) QA/QC Inspectors and Supervisor The inspector reviewed the following documents:

Procedures: WB-QA Manual l WB-E-138 Deviation Disposition Request l WB-Q-113 Quality Surveillance Reporting DDRs: 9484 CRDHS IW Piping 4128 - Weld End Attachments for Snubbers 4209 - Snubber Stroking Problems 4172 - Hanger Lug Retainers SRs: Fourteen Surveillance Reports--various surveillance matters The inspector found that WB DDRs had been processed and disposi-tioned in accordance with WB procedure. Surveillance Reports, which had been entered in WB tracking system, had been appropriately processed. The inspector found that WB QC frequently used SRs to inquiries as opposed to documenting practices and adverse quality conditions. The disposition or response to SR of inquiry was often brief, not fully addressing QC inspector's question )

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r During interviews with WB QC inspectors, the inspector was told that some SRs would not be processed (would be discarded by QC supervision),

i and other SRs were being dispositioned by the lead QC Inspector with-out processing the SR in accordance with WB Q-113 Quality Surveillance Reporting. The inspector reviewed one SR which had not been assigned a SR number nor entered in the WB Surveillance Log. In response to

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the inspector's question regarding the discarding of SRs, the WB QA l Field Supervisor stated that he had discarded some SRs which he con-

, -sidered to be "not adverse to quality" and for which verbal answers j were appropriate.

i The practice of " field dispositioning" voiding or discarding of SRs

< is not in accordance with WB-Q-113 which states in part, "...The

! Project Quality Manager shall maintain a suspense log (Surveillance Report Computer Log) and' assign a serial number. The PQM will assign the responsibility for dispositioning the Surveillance Report and forward the form for dispositioning."

1 . Failure to accomplish activities in accordance with procedures is contrary to DECO Operational Quality Assurance Manual, Section 5, Paragraph 4.3. This is another example of an item of noncompliance i .with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (341/83-05-02-c).

. Plant Tours i

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The inspectors conducted tours of the RHR complex, the Reactor, Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings and the Rad Waste area. These areas were inspected

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for general housekeeping / fire prevention practices, work controls, and maintenance of safety-related system integrity. The inspectors have noted

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continued attention'and effort is being given to housekeeping. The in-spectors also observed the. starting and running of Diesel Generators Nos. 11 and 1 No items of noncompliance or deviation were identifie . Exit Interview

, The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph

1) at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and

> findings of the inspection, including the items of noncompliance. The licensee acknowledged these findings and was responsive to the need for j' additional control measures in these areas.

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