IR 05000412/2005017

Insp Rept 50-416/85-14 on 850412-0517.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation,Surveillance Observation, Startup Testing,Independent Insp & ROs

ML20127M133
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/29/1985
From:	Butcher R, Caldwell J, Panciera V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127M123	List: IR 05000412/2005017 ML20127M119
References
50-416-85-14, NUDOCS 8507010114
Download: ML20127M133 (8)

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>DCf00 UNITED STATES

'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No.: 50-416/85-14 Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Inspection Conducted: April 12 - May 17, 1985 Inspectors: f f MY $b2Y$$

R. C. Butclier, Senior Re

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en nspector Date 51gned Calc , Heside ( In A ctor

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Date S'igned Approvedby:\.I w//w V. W. Parfiera, Sei: tion Chief N39 D/te Yigne'd

Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 197 resident inspector-hours and 40 regional based inspector-hours at the site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observa-tion, Startup Testing, Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, Independent Inspection, and Validation of Performance Based Training Review Procedure Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were identifie $$$70 O g $$$$ . 6

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

+*J. E. Cross,. General Manager C. R. Hutchinson, Manager, Plant Maintenance

• R. F. Rogers, General Manager Technical Assistant J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator

• M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations

• L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent D. Cupstid, Start-up Superviso .. .

R. H. McAnulty, Electrical Superintendent i R. V. Moomaw, I&C Superintendent B. Harris, Compliance Coordinator

• W. R. Patterson, Technical Support

• W. Russel, Operation +K. Deatty, Training Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members, and office personne NRR and NRC Regional Inspectors

+ Falconer, Reactor Engineer, Operational Programs Section, DRS, RII

+ Stadler, Reactor Engineer, Operational Programs Section, DRS, RII

+ Blumer, Training Assessment Specialist, Licensing Qualifications Branch, NRR

+Attendud exit interview on April 24, 1985, regarding Validation of Performance Based Training Review Procedure * Attended Resident Inspectors' exit interview on May 17, 1985 Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 24, and May 17, 1985, respectively, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings: Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-416/85-14-01; Submittal of updated FSAR, paragraph IFI 50-416/85-14-02; Adequacy of post trip analysis, paragraph IFI 50-416/85-14-03; Maintenance of training records, paragraph 1 a

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2 IFI 50-416/85-14-04; define requirements for remedial training and reexamination, paragraph 1 IFI 50-416/85-14-05; quality control of examination administration, paragraph 1 . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 50-416/85-03-01. The licensee had issued a change (TCN 6) to procedure 01-S-06-2 to clarify the requirement for written approved procedures for system evaluations that align more than one valve, (Closed) Violation 50-416/85-02-03. The NRC issued an exemption to Section 50.71(e) of 10 CFR 50. This exemption was forwarded to MP&L in a letter dated February 26, 198 The new date for submitting the updated FSAR is December 1,198 This new submittal date will be tracked as IFI 50-416/85-14-0 (Closed) Violation 50-416/85-03-0 The licensee has taken corrective actions to prevent the improper storage of nitrogen bottles inside containmen The inspectors had no further question (0 pen) Violation 50-416/84-51-01. The corrective actions for this violation have been reviewed and the changes to plant Administrative Procedure 01-S-06-3 have been incorporated and are adequate. Monthly audits of both the jumper log and temporary alteration logs were reviewed by the inspector for the months of January through March of 1985 and found to be satisfactory. However, issue of the monthly reports to the responsible Section heads listing all temporary alterations over 6 months old and requesting their disposition and the monthly reports listing all temporary alterations over 12 months old to the General Manager has not been fully implemented yet. This violation will remain open pending further review of the issue of monthly reports to both the General Manager and responsible Section head . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operation Daily discussiend were held with plant management and various members of the plat operating staf The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms;

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adherence to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisor Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable. The confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage, lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentatio ,

General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress; radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification systems; and containment isolatio The following comments were noted:

During the inspectors tour on May 3,1985, valve E12-F222 was found in the closed position but with the lock and chain unsecured. The system lineup requires this valve to be locked closed. This is a vent and drain valve in the residual heat removal syste The licensee was notified of the discrepancy and valve line-up check of other valves positioned by the same operators was conducted with no other discrepancies found. The inspectors consider this an isolated event. The licensee has cautioned those personnel that manipulate valves in the need to be accurate and precise in meeting valve alignments and locking requirements. No further action is considered necessar In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspector observed selected maintenance activities: The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing Observation (61726)

The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillances. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal

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from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteri In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700)

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective actions taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety signif_icance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an asterisk. The LERs were reviewed using the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement action The following LERs are close i LER N Report Date Event

• 85-016 May 7, 1985 Reactor scram due to main steam line isolatio *85-014 May 3, 1985 Reactor scram due to high water leve LER 85-14 is associated with scram 21 which is discussed in paragraph 9 of this repor LER 85-16 is associated with scram 22 which is discussed in paragraph 9 of this repor In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Operating Reactor Events (93702)

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor scrams. The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriat Scram No. 21: On April 3,1985, the reactor was operating 57% core thermal j power in preparation for the performance of Start-up Test Procedure SU-23-3, t

Feedwater System. The operator was requested to switch the reactor vessel level control from A level instrument to B level instrument to support the

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tes Upon making the change, the vessel level appeared to drop and the i control system caused the feed pumps to increase flow to the vessel. This apparent level drop was caused by a level switch malfunction and represented

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a false decreasing vessel level signal to the reactor vessel water level control system. This false low level signal caused the feed pumps to overfeed the vessel resulting in a high vessel water level scram. The switch in question was replaced and is operating properl Scram No. 22: On April 7,1985, the reactor was operating at 74.5% core thermal power with 100% of rated core flow when the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) automatically closed, resulting in a reactor scram. Instru-ment and Control (I&C) technicians were performing Surveillance Procedure 06-IC-1E31-R-003, Main Steam Line High Flow Calibration, at the time the MSIVs closed. This Surveillance Procedure required placing Division I of the MSIV isolation logic in trip. Just prior to the I&C technician placing Division I MSIV isolation logic in trip, a spurious trip signal in the Division II MSIV isolation logic placed Division II in trip. With both Division I and II in trip, the inboard and outboard MSIVs received an isolation signal and closed. This closure caused an automatic scram of the reactor. During the review of the Post Trip Analysis for this event, the inspector raised the following concerns to the licensee. The on shift analysis contained statements from operators that it appeared as if only the inboard MSIVs received close signals. Traces recovered from the GETARS computer verified that both inboard and outboard MSIVs isolated but neither the on shift or off shift analysis corrected the operations statements. In fact, the off shift analysis restated that the inboard MSIVs closed instead of noting the deficiency in the on shift analysis and correcting i Discussion with licensee personnel at the time of the event and later after the off shift analysis review was complete, indicated that they had looked at the GETARS traces to verify that both the inboard and outboard MSIVs closed. However, they did not document this in either the on shift or off shift analysis. The on shift analysis also contained numerous omissions of required data in attachment I of 01-S-06-26. This information could be obtained and verified from other sources. The on shift analysis should be completed as required prior to restart and the off shift review should identify problems or omissions in the on shift analysis. In this case, neither the on shift or off shift review identified or corrected these omission These inspector correrns will be identified as IFI 50-416/85-14-02 and future post trip analysis will be reviewed for these types of problem . IndependentInspection(92706)

In response to a problem identified during test 1-000-SU-31-2, loss of Turbine Generator and offsite power, the licensee committed to review all outstanding Design Change Packages (DCPs) and design change requests (OCRs)

to ensure they are properly identified as either safety or non-safety-related. This was IFI 50-416/85-02-04. The licensee has completed their review and have verified the proper classification of DCPs and DCRs. IFI 50-416/85-02-04 is close _

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1 Startup Testing (72530C and 72528C)

The inspector observed all or part of the conduct, or preparation for conduct, of the below listed startup procedures and operations. The observation included a review of the procedure for meeting all test prerequisites, initial conditions, test equipment and calibration require-ments. The overall crew performance was observed to ensure that minimum crew requirements were being met, that appropriate revised procedures were in use, that crew actions appeared to be correct and timely, that all data was collected by the proper personnel for final analysis, and that quick summary analysis showed proper plant response to the test. Where test results were available, in preliminary or final form, they were verified to be consistent with observations or that overall test acceptance criteria had

- been me M62-SU-78-3 In-Plant SRV Test; Shakedown and Matrix Tests 1-000-SU-27-3 Turbine Trip 1-000-SU-99-FP Plateau Procedure Full Fiwer -

Section 4.2 Test Instruc. ions for TC-4 Testing (Recirculation Pump Trips To Enter Natural Circulation)

In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Validation of Performance Based Training Review Procedures On May 20-23, 1985, Region II and NRR representatives conducted a special site visit to test recently developed training program review criteria and procedures. These procedures were developed to evaluate performance based training programs and address the five essential elements: Systematic analysis of the jobs to be performe Learning objectives that are derived from the analysis, Training design and implementation based on the learning objective Evaluation of trainee mastery of the objectives, Evaluation and revision of training programs based on performanc The evaluation procedures were found to be a systematic tool for the evaluation of performance based training program The licensee has assembled a well qualified staff to perform the transition to performance based training. Although this transition is in the initial stages, areas which have been completed received the highest possible rating utilizing these draf t evaluation procedures. A number of other transition areas were progressing well including the writing of draft procedures. Good support for this effort by the operations group was evident, with licensed

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i personnel taking in active role -in the development, review, and approval process. The licensee has also established an effective commitment tracking system which is essential to ensure that requirements and commitments are not negated during this transition. Several concerns were identified during the review of the training program and the licensee indicated a willingness to resolve the concerns. These items were identified as IFIs and included the following:

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Licensed operator training and requalification records, including completed examinations, are sent to document control for entry into microfilm disk storage. Once microfilmed, the originals are destroye Because these records are placed in disk storage by class instead of by trainee, the assembling of an individuals complete training file is time consuming and results in an inordinate accumulation of paper. In addition to the disk microfilm storage, the microfilmed original i records of license and license requalification training should be retained for at least two years. This will facilitate internal and external audits of completed training, and more detailed monitoring of individual performance by the training staf This is IFI 50-416/

85-14-0 Procedure 01-5-04-2 requires only that an individual achieving less than 80% on a ret ualification lecture series examination be rescheduled the next time thtt a lecture series on that particular subject is scheduled. A failed examination on a specific area which was just taught indicates a definite deficienc Remedial training and ,

retesting to ensure that this deficiency is resolved should be -

completed within a reasonable period of time, instead of allowing the deficiency to exist for a year or more until the lecture series is repeated. This remedial training and retest requirenent should be procedurally defined and is an IFI 50-416/85-14-0 Procedure 14-S-01-04 on test controls does not require that examina-tions be reviewed and approved prior to administration, or to receive a second review after completion and grading. The review prior to administration, help to ensure that the questions are valid and complete and that the point values assigned are reasonable. This review has apparently been informally conducted by the licensee, but not procedurally required. The review of the completed tests and grading, help to ensure that the grading was reasonable and that the grades were properly totalled. This will be an IFI 50-416/85-14-05.