ML20136D630
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{{#Wiki_filter:. .. . ._ REGION ll ATLANTA, GEORGIA 4 PLANT STATUS REPORT ST. LUCIE 1 Units 1 and 2 ! l February,1996 9703120429 970306 *i PDR FOIA BINDER 96-485 PDR ~_ a \
6 ELANT STATUS REPORT FOR ST. LUCIE TABLE OF CONTENTS PART.1 - FACILITY DESCRIPTION 1.1 FACILITY / LICENSEE...J................................Page 2
- 1.2 UTILITY SENIOR MANAGEMENT ...........................Page 2 1
1.3 NRC STAFF............................................Page 2 1.4 LICENSE INFORMATION..................................Page 3 4 1.5 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS................................Page 3 1.6 SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION.......................Page 3 . 1.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES / PREPAREDNESS...........Page 8 , 1.8 PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS (Past Six Months).........Page 9
- - 1.9 OUTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS...........................Page 10
- PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE
! 2.1 GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE............................Page 11 ] 2.2 SALP HISTORY (Past Two SALP Periods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page .11 2.3 SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSIONS ......................Page 11 PART 3 - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 3.1 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS (Past 12 Months)........Page 16 , 3.2 ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY (Past 12 Months)..........Page 16 i I l PART 4 - STAFFING AND TRAINING l l
. 1 4.1 OPERATIONS STAFF - 0VERALL...........................Page 16 ]
4.2 WORK FORCE ..........................................Page 17 1 ~ 4.3 OPERATOR QUALIFICATION /REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM. . . . . . .Page 17
'4 . 4 PLANT SIMULATOR......................................Page 17 j
4.5 IN PO ACC RED I TAT I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17 i PART 5 - INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
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{ 5.1 OUTSTANDING ITEMS LIST
SUMMARY
.......................Page 18 5.2 MAJOR INSPECTIONS....................................Page 18 5.3 PLANNED TEAM-INSPECTIONS.............................Page 18 4 5.4 INFREQUENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS...............Page 18
, 5.5 SIMS STATUS (OPEN THI ITEMS).........................Page 18 j
ATTACHMENTS l l
- 1. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS l
-2. ALLEGATION STATUS l 3.. NRR OPERATING REACTOR ASSESSMENT !
- 4. ORGANIZATION CHARTS 5.- POWER HISTORY CURVES
- 6. MASTER INSPECTION PLAN-{NOT INC,LUDED)
- 7. SITE ACTIVITY SCHEDULE'
- 8. SITE-INTEGRATION MATRIX .
. 9. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS GRAPH e
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I 2 l PART 1- FACILITY DESCRIPTION
- 1.1 FACILITY / LICENSEE FACILITY: St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Hutchinson Island near Port St. Lucie, Florida PLANT LOCATION: l LICENSEE: Florida Power and Light Co. (Corporate Office in Juno ,
Beach, Florida) , 1.2 UTILITY SENIOR MANAGEMENT CORPORATE: J. L. Broadhead (Jim), Chairman of the Board and CEO J. H. Goldberg (Jerry), President, Nuclear Division SITE: W. H. Bohlke (Bill) - S.t. Lucie Plant Interim Vice President C. L. Burton (Chris) - Services Manager L. 'W. Bladow (Wes) Nuclear Assurance Manager R. E. Dawson (Bob) - Business Manager D. J. Denver (Dan) - Site Engineering Manager A. DeSoiza (Andy) - Human Resources Manager P. L. Fincher (Pat) - Training Manager T. G. Kreinberg (Tom) - Nuclear Materials Management Superintendent J. Marchese (Joe) - Maintenance Manager C. A. Pell (Ash) - Outage Manager L. A. Rogers (Lee) - Systems and Component Engineering Manager J. Scarola (Jim) - Plant General Manager E. J. Weinkam III (Ed) - Licensing Manager . J. A. West (Jeff) - Operations Manager 1.3 NRC STAFF REGION II, Atlanta, GA: S. D. Ebneter (Stew), Regional Administrator, (404) 331-5500 L. A. Reyes (Luis), Deputy Regional Administrator (404) 331-5610 E. W. Merschoff (Ellis), Director DRP, (404) 331-5623 K. D. Landis (Kerry), Branch Chief, (404) 331-5509 L. S. Mellen (Larry), Project Engineer,- (404) 331-5561 E. Lea (Edwin), Project Engineer, (404) 331-3641
, SITE:
M. S. Miller (Mark), Senior Resident Inspector, (407) 464-7822 S. S. Sandin (Steve), Acting Resident Inspector, (407) 464-7822
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I I 3 NRR: D. 8. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate 11-2, . (301) 415-1490 J. A. Norris (Jan), Senior Project Manager, Project ! Directorate 11-2, (301) 504-1483 l AE00: S. Israel (Sandy), Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, (301) 415-7573 . 1.4 LICENSE INFORMATION' )
- Unit 1 -
Unit 2
- Docket Nos.
50-335 50-389 ) License Nos. DPR-67 NPF-16 i Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-7'4 CPPR-144 Construction' Permit Issued 7/1/70 5/2/77 Low Power License NA 4/83 i Full Power License 3/1/76 6/10/83 l Initial Criticality 4/22/76 6/2/83 1 1st Online 5/17/76 6/13/83 Commercial Operation 12/21/76 8/8/83 1.5 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Descriotion Units 1 and 2 Reactor Type Combustion Engineering PWR, 2-loop Containment Type Freestanding. Steel w/ Shield Building Power Level 830 MWe (2700 MWt) Architect / Engineer Ebasco NSSS Vendor Combustion Engineering j Constructor Ebasco Turbine Supplier Westinghouse Condenser Cooling Method Once Through Condenser Cooling Water Seawater 1.6 SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION 1.6.1 REACTOR INTEGRITY Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) With the present fuel type and managea nt policy, Unit 1 is expected to reach a 40-year RPV life. On this unit, the fuel type and management policy have been modified to make that RPV life span possible. Pres,ently, a program is evolving for RPV life extension beyond the projected 40 years, potentially to 60 years, via a flux reduction program. A flux reduction program has started with the addition of eight absorbers in core corner
e 4 positions, performance of vessel fluence calculations, and determination of an optimum power profile for each core load. Calculations using current methodology and uncertainty predict a
, significant RPV life extension, but not to 60 years. .
Due to different design and construction characteristics, Unit 2 RPV life expectancy exceeds 60 years. Low leakage core designs are now used for economic reasons, however the low leakage designs provide even greater life expectancy. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary On this CE plant, ECCS-to-RCS injection points are isolated by at : least two check valves and one closed MOV. High pressure safety linjection (HPSI), low pressure safety injection (LPSI), and
. containment spray (CS) pumps' common containment sump suctions are isolated from the containment sump by one closed MOV in conjunction with a closed seismic piping system. The CS headers are isolated from containment by one closed MOV and a check valve in conjunction with a closed seismic piping system. CVCS has the ;
normal complement of two automatic actuation isolation valves. 1.6.2 REACTOR SHUTDOWN Reactor Protection System The reactor protection system provides protection for the reactor fuel and its cladding by providing automatic reactor shutdowns based on input from reactor power, reactor coolant pressure, coolant temperature, coolant flow, steam generator pressure, containment pressure, turbine hydraulic fluid pressure, and, in Unit 2 only, Component Cooling Water flow to reactor coolant pumps. The RPS is a redundant, four channel system that operates on a two-out-of-four logic. ATWS Protection ATWS protection, outside the normal reactor protection system, is ' initiated via the ESF pressurizer pressure si.gnal. It actuates.by opening contactors in the output of the CEA MG sets, thereby interrupting control element assembly power at its source. This protection has been installed on both units per CE, the NSSS, recommendations. Remote Shutdown Faciliti n These facilities are located in the switchgear rooms beneath each unit's control room. , 1.6.3 CORE COOLING Feedwater ' System .
l l 1 ) 5 The main feedwater pumps are motor driven with each delivering 50 , percent of.the flow required for full power. . l Turbine Bvoass/ Steam 0 - Canacity l Each unit has five steam bypass valves, providing 45 percent of , total capacity. l
- 1 Unit I has one atmospheric dump valye per train (two trains) and . 1 Unit 2 has two valves per train. Each unit has the. capability of I dumping nine percent steam flow to the atmosphere.
Auxiliary Feedwater System There are two motor-driven pumps on each unit with 100 percent capacity per pump._ There is one steam-driven pump on each unit j with 200 percent capacity. Any of the three pumps can inject to i either steam generator. Automatic initiation and faulted steam l
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generator protection are provided by each unit's Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System provided by the NSSS. - l Emeraency Core Coolina System ! i In each unit, there are two HPSI pumps and two LPSI pumps with no unit-to-unit cross-connections. One pump of each type per unit. will handle a postulated LOCA. The LPSI pumps also provide decay. heat removal as' required when the. unit is shut down. Decav Heat Removal
. As indicated above, the LPSI pumps also provide decay heat removal as required.when the unit is shut down by taking suction from the-
- RCS (hot legs), passing the fluid through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and returning it to the RCS (cold legs). The heat removing medium is CCW - di~ s cussed in section 1.7.6 below. _
Shutdown cooling flow path overpressure protection is provided by ' automatic isolation valves and various relief valves in the system. 1.6.4 CONTAINMENT l Pressure Control / Heat Removal There are-two containment spray pumps and four containment fan ! coolers available per unit to suppress pressure spikes and cool , the containment. One CS pump and two fan coolers will handle a l postulated LOCA. There are no unit-to-unit cross-connections. ; This engineered ' safety feature is' automatically started by ESFAS. i Hydrocen Control j l l
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. Post-LOCA containment hydrogen control is accomplished on each unit by two trains' of- hydrogen recombiners located on the .
operating deck inside containment. By elevating, in a controlled manner, the temperature lof containment atmosphere flowing through i the recombiner,- the recombiner, units recombine hydrogen and oxygen ' l to form water, thus preventing the buildup of hydrogen to i
. potentially exp1osive levels, j
- 1.6.5 ELECTRICAL-POWER Offsite AC The station switchyard is connected to the transmission system by '
three independent 240 KV ' lines that thare a right of way and - interconnect with FPL's grid on the mainland approximately 10 i miles West of the plant site. There are two independent offsite ; power feeds'from the station switchyard to the emergency busses. : Onsite'AC ; i Onsite AC power is provided by four EDGs (two per unit). EDGs are j independent of. other plant- systems except vital DC power for ; control of starting. A Station Blackout (SBO) cross connection is -I installed and tested. This cross-connection serves the emergency /I
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. busses directly and reduces cross-connect time to less than 15 minutes.
DC Power . Two trains of vital batteries per unit have been routinely tested > for four-hour DC load profiles. Recently, 'following a cell
- replacement, they have been tested for three-hour battery capacity instead. The battery capacity test is harsher than.the load profile test and is intended to more accurately reflect expected
- usage. There are four normal chargers per unit with swing chargers available for service. Non-safety batteries can be cross-connected to the safety-related swing bus if needed. 1 l Instrumentation Power ! I Each unit has four inverters, two powered from each vital DC I- train, that provide four trains of instrumentation power. - ' Station Blackout Resolution' Status-1 Unit 2 is a four-hour "DC coping" plant per the original license while Unit 1 is subject to the station blackout (580) rule of 10 CFR 50.63 requiring additional licensee action (unit-to-unit ! cross-connect of 4160V bus). l c l l
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l l p .7 1.6.6 SAFETY-RELATED COOLING WATER SYSTEMS-Intake Coolina Water (Service Water) Intake cooling water (ICW) for each unit originates in the unit- i common Intake Canal. The canal level varies with the tides'since 1 it is filled by, a level difference between the Atlantic Ocean and. 2 the ICW ~ pumps. :One 16-foot and. two 12-foot diameter pipes pass i under the beach to connect the ocean and canal. The intake pipe i ends in the Atlantic are covered by intake structures'(rebuilt in 1991) intended to limit flow velocities, particularly vertical i velocity, to reduce marine life entrapment. After use, ICW l returns to the ocean through the Discharge Canal and under-beach J pipes. ;
'Each unit has two trains of ICW plus a swing pump that can be aligned to.either train electrically and physically. The-licensee i
has. converted the deep draft ICW pumps from externally (water) ) lubricated to self-lubricated to increase reliability. The 100 l percent (each) capacity pumps take suction from the intake canal i
.via a canal intake structure using travel.ing screen debris protection. The intake canal structures adjacent to the IC.W pump suctions are. continuously injected with a hypochlorite solution to reduce marine growth in the associated piping and heat exchangers.
The 'ICW pumps move water through two trains of heat exchangers that cool component cooling water (CCW) and two trains of heat
-exchangers that cool main turbine cooling water. During a postulated accident, water flow isolates from the turbine cooling heat exchangers. The discharge from the heat exchangers returns via the discharge canal to the ocean.
Closed Coolina Water Systems Each unit has two trains of Component Cooling Water (CCW). The arrangement of two pumps and a swing pump' mimics the.ICW system. The swing pump can be aligned to either train. The 100 percent (each) capacity pumps drive water through the CCW/ICW heat exchangers and then on to the heat loads, mainly the containment. fan coolers and the shutdown cooling (decay heat) heat exchangers (which also can operate as containment spray heat exchangers). Additionally, CCW cools a variety of bearings, seals, and oil 4 coolers for the HPSI, LPSI, and CS pumps. A non-safety-related I 1
. portion of the CCW system cools reactor coolar.t pump seals' and-the spent fuel pool. This section isolates upon engineered safety features actuation. ;
l.6.7 SPENT FUEL STORAGE , Wet storage capability exists up to the year 2002 (Unit 2) and ' ]
-2007 (Unit.1). , i I
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1 l i 4 8 1.6.8' INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM Instrument air compressors and driers on each unit provide all instrument air for Unit 2 and all but containment air for Unit 1. Unit I has instrument air compressors inside containment. 1.6.9 STEAM GENERATORS' Each unit has two large steam generators (SGs) rather.than the 2 three or four usually.seen. The licensee has begun to focus on a l Unit 1 SG replacement in 1998. The SGs are under construction at ; the B&W Canada shops and a site organization is functioning. , 1.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES / PREPAREDNESS- , Emergency Operations Facility: 10' miles West of site, , I-95/ Midway Rd. Exit Technical Support Center: Onsite, Adjacent to Unit 1 Control Room Operational Support Center: Onsite, 2nd floor of North Service Building ,
.The last annual emergency' preparedness exercise was 'in February,1996. 1 This exercise was formally evaluated by the NRC. !
Since St. Lucie site has a high probability of hurricanes,
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communications facilities were improved following the Turkey Point experience with Hurricane Andrew in August, 1992. Improvements include: High Frequency Auto-link with other FPL sites and NRC.
- Enhanced 900 MHZ System for site and mobile communications, with radios.also in the lictasee's EOF and county emergency facility.
Cellular phones with hardened antennas. Hardened Local Government Radio antenna ties. 1.8 PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS Availability Factors: Unit 1 Unit 2 1991 81.0 100.0 , 1992 96.5 75.2 1993 74.0 71.8 , 1994 86.8 - 79.6 1995 (through 7/95) 93.9 98.3 Cumulative.(through 7/95) 77.7 83.7 ,
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V l 9 -l 1.8.1 UNIT 1 OPERATINC HISTORY-(Past Twelve Months from 1/25/96) , Unit 1 operated continuously during the past 12 months with the i following exceptions: j
- On February 21, 1995, the unit was removed from service for.th'e- l replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been :
leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994. J On March 4 1995, the unit experienced a 14 minute loss of- i shutdown cooling. The apparent root cause was operator error by a , reactor operator placing one loop of SDC in standby. The operator l apparently closed the suction valve to the operating, vice ; standby, pump. The operator in question denied the error; I however, the licensee determined that he was responsible. He resigned from the company. The unit was returned to service on ! March 8, 1994. On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing. It returned to power on July 12, 1995. j 2 On August 1,1995, the unit was shutdown as a result. of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel
. performance issues, the unit remained shut down for 73 days. i
-Problems encountered during the shutdown included a maintenance-induced RCP seal . failure, discovery of two inoperable PORVs due to maintenance errors during refurbishment, a loss of inventory event while placing shutdown cooling in service due to lack of margin to relief valve lift setpoint and complicated by an. excessive blowdown value, inadvertant spraydown of the Unit 1 containment, catastrophic failure of the IB EDG, and leaking pressurizure code safety valve flange leakage. The unit returned to power on
~ October 12.
On November 16, the unit was manually tripped when a feedwater
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regulating. valve failed to the.50% position, resulting in low steam generator water level . The root cause of the failure was determined to be a faulty power supply. The power supply was replaced and the unit was returned to service on November 18. On January 22, 1996, operator error resulted in an excessive dilution event which resulted in reactor power accending to 100.2%. The operator in question apparently left the control room while dilution was in progress without informing other watchstanders of the evolution in progress. The operator was removed from licensed duties and the final disposition of the event is pending. . 1.8.2 UNIT 2 OPERATING HISTORY (Past Twelve Months from 1/25/96) Unit 2 operated continuously during the past 12 months with the' following exceptions: 5 l l _A
p j ' 10 l On February 21,-1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam a generator water level. . The condition was the result of a
.feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water j level control level transmitter failed high. The transmitter was ,
i replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25,- , 1995. l } On April 25,-1995, the unit was shutdown for approximately 8 hours ' L to replace a main turbine DEH power supply. s . ~ On August 1,1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane j Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995, but operated at~ reduced -' power from August 17 through 29, 1995, to clean condenser water ! soxes and repair equipment problems. l On October 9, the unit entered a refueling outage.- The outage was l complicated by the discovery of leaks in RCS flow transmitter taps at the loops, a reactor flange 0-ring leak, discovered during i j repressurization, and the failure of one stage of an RCP seal :
- . package. The unit returned to power on January 1, 1996. ,
! The unit was manually tripped from approximately 35% power on 3 January 5 due to high generator hydrogen temperature. The root i
- cause of the event was improper operation of a turbine cooling
! water temperature control. valve which supplied cooling water to i the hydrogen coolers. Post-trip review resulted in the discovery
; of clogged steam' generator water level transmitter sensing lines i
. which resulted in artificially low levels being indicated when steam generators were isolated upon turbine trip. The lines were blown down and the unit was returned to service on January 7..
i 1.9 OUTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS i Unit l's last-refueling outage began on October 26, 1994, and ended on i November'29, 1994. Major activities included: refueling; reactor vessel i nozzle'and flange weld ISI inspection; installation of a permanent l cavity seal ring; replacing reed switches for several CEAs; integrated i: safeguards test; steam generator tube inspection and plugging; steam 4 generator sludge lancing; repair of refueling water storage tank; several instances of reduced inventory / mid-loop operations; replacement ! of ICW/CCW LOOP logic [HFA latching relays) with pull-to-lock switches; L removal [ collection) of Rx vessel neutron flux dosimetry; modification L of EDG skids to allow access underneath; inspection of ECCS sump area; replacement of a main transformer; modification of containment spray . NaOH addition piping; and mechanical, electrical, and I&C systems
- maintenance. The next Unit I refueling outage is scheduled for April j 29, 1996.
L Unit 2's~1ast refueling outage began on October 9, 1995, and ended , January 1, 1996. Major outage' activities included: ' refueling; steam ! generator tube inspection and plugging; low pressure turbine blade i replacement; emergency diesel generator inspection; replacement of three
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11 reactor coolant pump mechanical seals; and mechanical, electrical, and . I&C systems maintenance. The next Unit 2 refueling outage is scheduled for April 15, 1997. PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE 2.1 GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE A SALP board meeting.was conducted on January 18, 1996, covering the SALP period of January 2,1994, through January 6,1996. The facility was rated category 1 in the areas of Plant Support.and Engineering and 2 in the areas of Operations and Mainenance and Surveillance. The latter scores were a decline from the previous SALP cycle, when the facility was rated category 1 in all areas. , 2.2 SALP HISTORY (Past 2 SALP Periods) The last SALP period, SALP Cycle 11, ended on January 6,1996. The current SALP period ends (tentatively) in June, 1997. ASSMT. OPS RAD MNT/SURV EP SEC ENG/ TECH SAQV PERIOD l 5/1/89 - 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 10/31/90 l 1 1 1 11/1/90 - 1 1 1 1 1 5/2/92 l l PLANT OPS MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING PLANT SUPPORT l l 5/3/93 - 1 1 1. I 1 1/1/94 1-
, 1/2/94 - 2 2 1 1/6/96 l
2.3 SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSION Since July 1995, there has been a series of events that led to questioning the plants overall performance. These have included: k
- A Unit I turbine trip due to procedural weakness, operator performance and supervisory oversight.
- The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and .
inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded
'by failing to follow aspects of the guidente that did exist, which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.
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- A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an. annunciator indicated that the block was enabled. This failure occurred dispite the
-fact that that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at least two different occassions.
. Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months.
- An loss of RCS inventory due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a g'eneric problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the conditions.
. The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and ,
operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around. These and several other recent deficiencies involving weak procedures, a general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel errors clearly indicated that the plant's past high level of performance had declined. These and other problems led to several plant management changes, an overall evaluation of the recent plant problems by a plant-requested indepe'ndent assessment team, and a root cause evaluation by the NRC. In a meeting with the NRC on August 29, 1995, the licensee comitted to use the results of the independent assessment team to develop an action plan
'for improvement.
Plant Ooerations Sumary of Previous Assessment The previous SALP assessment concluded that Operations remained i 2 strong, that management actions were aggressive in dealing with l identified weaknesses, and that attention to detail was a 1 continuing challenge for the licensee. l l Sumary of the Most Recent SALP , The board concluded that licensee performance had declined in the most recent SALP period. The board found that day-to-day activities were conducted with a degree of complacency. Corrective actions, management involvement and comunication of , expectations, attention to detail, procedural adequacy and l adherence, and operator workarounds were similarly considered to I be challenges to licen'see performance. l
13 Maintenance / Surveillance l I Summary of Previous Assessment , Maintenance was assessed as category 1 in the previous SALP. Assessinents made early in the most recent cycle indicated that the performance level of maintenance activities had not abated. Summary'of the Most Recent SALP The board concluded that performance in this functional area had declined. Areas of concern included the existance of long- ; standing equipment problems and a sense that management expectations were either low or not adequately enforced. Of particular concern was the fact that equipment failure factored into 6 unit trips during the SALP cycle. Additionally, worker adherence to procedures, and the quality and adequacy of , procedures was found to be a challenge to performance. t Enaineerina - Summary of Previous Assessment The previous assessments for this SALP cycle concluded that engineering was generally strong. Good support of the plant l was cited, as was the quality of engineering products, both to the site and in submittals to the NRC. Summary of the Most Recent SALP The board concluded that Engineering continued to perform at I a superior level. Continued support to the plant, as well i as adequacy in safety and operational evaluations were l identified. In addition, the licensee's activities at the l engineering materials laboratory and in the developement of l maintenance specifications were seen as strengths. ' PART 3 - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 3.1 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS (Past 12 Months) Unit 1: 95-08,3/22/95, Failures of Rosemount Transmitters due to Gas Permeation of.Monel Diaphragms Unit 2: None 3.2 ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY (Past 12 Months)
. SL'III Violation ($50,000 CP) for violations associated with inoperable Unit 1 PORVs
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- Predecisiona1' Enforcement Conference held, SL IV. violation issued ;
for failure to take prompt corrective action for issues relating 1 to-relief valve lift and. blowdown.setpoint values which resulted ! in a loss of Unit 1 RCS inventory while on shutdown cooling. 1 PART- 4 - 5 T A F F:I N G AND TRAINING
~4.1 OPERATIONS STAFF'- OVERALL-(9/95)
Average performance of the operations staff has been noted. Control room demeanor of personnel is above average. Number.of Shifts: (RCO,.SRO) Five shift ~ rotation, 8-hour , shi,fts; ,(NPO, ANPO, SNPO) Five shift , rotation, 8-hour shifts. , Number ~of SR0s:' 38 active /13 inactive / 51 total Number of R0s: 23 activ'e/1 inactive / 24 total l Total Licensed Operators: 61 active /14 inactive / 75 total t 4.2 WORK FORCE (2/96) , Plant personnel (including - 787 disciplines below) Breakdown'bv Ma.ior Oraanization FPL Contractors Operations 128 0 Chemistry 20 0 Health Physics 73 0 Maintenance 311 60 Outage Management 21 0 . Nuclear Material Management 36 0 l Site Engineering" 50 0 i Juno Engineering 4 Security 9 120 QA/QC 37 0 i
- Includes Reactor Engineers, System Engineers, and Test Engineers 4.3 OPERATOR OUALIFICATION/REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM (Past Two Years)
! 4.3.1 REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM Last Inspection - 9/26/94; Inspection Report 50-335,389/94-19 Next Inspection - 10/96- ! 4.3.2 INITIAL EXAMS L . . ! s ( v y-e-. -, -
15 Last Exams 10/17/94 - 2 R0 2 passed for 100% 9 SRO 9 passed for 100%
. Next Exam 3/25/96 - 6 ,RO 4.4 PLANT SIMULATOR The simulator is on site and fully certified to meet ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985.
4.5 INPO ACCREDITATION All training programs are maintaining INPO accreditation. The site specific simulator has been used for training since 1988 and has been fully certified for approximately 5 years. NRC inspections in the form of operator examinations at the simulator have found no serious problems.
- PART 5 -
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES 5.1 INSPECTION FOLLOWUP OPEN ITEMS
SUMMARY
(UNITS 1 AND 2 COMBINED) (10/6/94) Pre Division Change from Division _S1 1221 Total Last Report ; 1 DRP 4 34 18
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_,_DB.1 1Q 4 14 Total 14 37 51 b Note: Each item that applies to both units is counted as one item. l 5.2 MAJOR INSPECTIONS IR-No. Q11.g Iyp.g ' 89-02 1/89 RG-1.97 89-03 3/89 NDE 89-07 3/89 EQ - 89-09 3/89 Design Control 89-24 10/89 Maintenance Team Inspection 89-27 11/89 E0P Followup 90-09 4-5/90 OSTI 91-03 2-3/91 EDSFI 91-18 9/91 MOV (no negative findings) 91-201 9-10/91 Service Water Inspection ~ 92-14 7/92 Emergency Preparedness Program 92-17 , 7/92 EDSFI Followup 93-01 , 1/93 Check Valves 94-11 5/94 MOV Folicwup 95-05 6/95 Engineering
16 95-16 9/95 PORY Special Inspection 96-01 1/96 Dilution Event Spectial Inspection
- 5.3 PLANNED TEAM INSPECTIONS None 5.4 INFREQUENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS No core inspection procedures are overdue at this time.
5.5 SIMS STATUS - OPEN TMI ITEMS There are no open TMI items. e l l1 I 1 4 0 t 4
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DESCRIPTION OF svasus - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
- 1. On January 9, the unit was-manually tripped in response-to a loss of.the'1B MFWP.
- 2. The unit. tripped from loss of. load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was' inadvertently opened' locally on March 28, 1994.
- 3. On June 6, 1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by . turbine and !!
reactor trips, when a - thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two output-terminals of-main transformer-1A.
- 4. . Power was reduced to 80% power on August-10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic System (DEH) leak. The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.
- 5. The turbine was taken of line on ' August 28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH. Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994. The unit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994
- 6. The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switchyard on-October 26, i 1994. Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a
, decision was made to start the refueling outage
- 7. On February 27, 1995, the unit was , removed from service for the. replacement of .
pressurizer code. safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after. startup in November, 1994. The unit was returned to power on March'8, 1995.
- 8. On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing. The unit was returned to power on July 12, 1995.
- 9. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a . result of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until '!
October 9, 1995. .
~
j . } 10. On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam generator level l when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position. ' 1 l __ _m__..m___=.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ __ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ____ __ _. s v ,- ..- -- -..w .<-m _.wa _- _-rw . -
ST. LUCIE ENIT 2 - SALP CYCLE 11 ,~ 1 3 4 5 6 7
--100 ' =
^
80 -" cr uJ B 60 - O - - n. F-- Z 40 - 8" uJ 2 .. O ,, Er . NOTE:~ See attached page fo r event comments I uJ 0- 20 - O e" '""e"" ""w"'""""e" "" weewemmmmmmmmmmmmmm "e"""""e"" """e""! """"" "" """"" "" "" """"" "" """"" "" "" '"" ! d """" mammmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmme
,-- m <n e m e n m os o ,-- m r m co e m e n m e o ,- m ,-- m i- e ,- . v i ,-
. PERIOD OF OPERATION (MONTHLY)
JANUARY 2,1994 THROUGH JANUARY 6,1996
DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS - ST LUCIE UNIT 2
- 1. On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting down to the cycle 8 refueling outage'. The unit was taken off-line on February 14, 1994.
- 2. On April 23, 1994, the unit tripped from 30% power during RPS adjustment.
- 3. The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July 10, 1994. On July 14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker. The unit was restarted and placed on line on July 15, 1994.-
- 4. On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level.
The condition was the. result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter failed high. The transmitter was ' replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995.
- 5. On April 25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply in the DEH system.
- 6. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.
- 7. On October 9, 1995, the unit was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.
- 8. On January 1, 1996, the unit went-critical.
- 9. On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature. - i w
M O ____________..____.___.__.__m__._____________m__.m___m__ _m __ _ "
4 i
- ST. LUCIE 1 SSF 10/23/M LERs 33594006 50.72s: 27940 1
! COWIT!0N EXISTED IN ALL MtDES UP TO 1005 PowR SINCE 1978 j ; PWR NIST: '
J GROUP : CONTAINMENT AMb CONTAIMMENT !$0LAfl0N GROUP SYSTEM : REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING i DESC A DESIGN ERROR COULD MAVE ALLOWED CROSS TRAIN PRESSURI2ATION OF AN Il RESULTING IN A RELIEF VALVE LIFTING AND CONTAINMENT SUMP INVENTORY L ,
' IN EXCESS OF DES!GN LIMITS.
. l PWR HIST: POWER OPERATIONS AT 1005 SCSAM 10/26/94 LERf 33594007 50.728: 27954 !
!
- A REACTOR TRIP FOLLowD A MAIN TURSIME TRIP. THIS OCCURRED WNEN A FA 1
; DESC TRANSPORMER CAUSED A MAIN GEllERATOR LOCKElf. I l i $ PWR HIST: COLD SNUTDOWN SSA 11/22/M Leas 33S M009 50.728: 28060 l l DESC : SOTN EDeS STARTED ON AN SIAS. DNE EDS LOADED ITS BUS WNEN AN ABNO WITN AsDITIONAL LOADIIIG FREDI TNE SIAS CAUSED TE Bug mesms TO OPEN.
PWR NIST: COLs SNUTDOWN SSR 11/22/M Laas 335M 009 50.728: 2ao60 1 DESC
- JNI SIAg amuse WNEN TWD OF FGE PREsen!ZER PRESEURE TRAIIW88TTERS DRIFTED Nieu DIE T l
- NTONOWN. TM CNAR$1NG MSFS'WRE SECRES BEFW TIE LTir SETPOINT WAS REACIS. i PIE NIST: COLD SNUTDOW SSA' 11/26/M Leas 335M010 50.72s: 20068 l 4 DESC
- All INADVERTENT SAFETT INJECTION ACTf'ATION SIONAL nnuman pun!NS REACTOR PROTECTIV i
) , SAFESAARDS SYSTEM TESTING WNEN A PRESSURIZER PRESENtE BISTABLE TR PROCEDIRE. 4 PWR HIST: POWER OPERAfl0NS AT 1005 I SSA 02/16/95 LERs 33595001 50.728 28400 DESC : WILE RESTORING A SAFETY BUS 70 A NORMAL LillEUP FOLLOWING RELAY REPLACEMENT, THE BUS WAS
- DEENERG12ED. TNE EMERGENCY DIESEL STARTED Am LQADED 088T0 TME BUS.
PWR HIST: POWER OPERATIONS AT 1005 SCSAM 07/08/95 LERf 33595003 50.728: 29039 DESC : THE REACTOR TRIPPEO ON MIGN PRESSURI2ER PRESSURE WNEN THE MAIN TURSIN J VALVES WNT CLOSED DURING TESTING. TN!$ EVENT WAS CAUSED ST AN CPERA I STEP. SSF 0s/09/95 LERs 33595005 50.72s: 2917s l , ' PWR MIST: CONDITION EXISTED IN ALL MCSES UP TO 1001 POWER $1NCE 19M , GROUP SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES GROUP SYSTEM : REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DESC TNE POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES WERE FOUND INOPERABLE DURING TESTING. THE MAIN l INSTALLED INCORRECTLY DURING TNE 1994 REFUELING OUTAGE. SSF Os/10/95 LERs 33595006 50.728: , PWR HIST: EVENT OCCURRED IN COLD SNUTDolRI ; GROUP : RESIDUAL NEAT REMOVAL SYSTEsts GROUP ]
- SYSTEM RESIDUAL NEAT REMOVAL STSTEM I
! DESC : SOTN TRAIWS OF RESIDUAL EAT REMOVAL lERE REISERED IMOPERASLE AS A RESULT OF A FAILEDl l, RELIEF VALVE. TNE ROOT CAUSE WAS thADEEUATE DESIGil MARGIN BETWEN THE RELIEF Aas S ! Am Is0NIAL SYSTEM OPERATIIIG PRESSURE. l ST. LUCIE 2 Lens 38995002 50.728: 28616 PWR HIST POWER OPERATICIIS AT 1001 , SCRAM 02/21/95 ' DESC : A REACTOR TRIP RESULTED Feel A LOh! STEAM GEIERATOR LEVEL AFTER A STEAM CMa* TOR LEVEL. INSTRupENT i FAILED MIGN, CAUSING THE FEED REEILATING VALVE TO CLOSE. l i 1 ) o b i G l 4
DRAFT / REGIONAL REVIEW l Legend: , Shutdown < approx. 72 hrs i Startup i g QQgj Refueling R Operation m i j industry Avg. Trend Shutdown eem gg gg Not Shown Using Op. Cycle *- Ops. Ops. I a I I I ,; I a l l I ,: 1 l 3 93-1'
~
9 1' 94-3 95 1' E 93-1' 9 1' 94-3 951' < Year - Quarter Year - Quorter J l Automatic Screme While Celtical SafetySystem Actuations j 4 4 3- 3-g 2- < 2-
~ ~
"" " - 0 -
0 94-3 95 3 ' 93-1' 93-3 94 1' 94-3 951' 95-3 i 93 1' 93 3 94-1' 95 1' Year - Quarter Year - Quarter
%n Evente 4 Safety System Failures 2.0 1.5 -. 3-W u- i 11.0- g 2- ;
0.5 - 1- g g 0.0 0 E ! 930 IM 953.. i 94-1' 94-3
' 93 1' 93 3 nii 94 3 95-1' 93-1' 9 5-15 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Equipment Forced Outageel l Forced Outage Rate (%) , 1000 Commercial Critical Houre 100 80 -
lii ,0 i 4 1 00 ~ E l 2-
] 20 - l l
. . e < l l g oe l 2;' 0
. .M @N ' N ' .' '
- 0 --
941' 94-3 951'
,2 1 i
8 93 1' 934 94-1' 94-3 95-1' 95'3 m 3 93-1' 93-3 95-3
- Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Cause Codes
' D' ' *
- Radiation Exposure a .
200 var 4a 4- m-3 l l' y W 150. ';l s. ll '
- e. i.
l A = =N , = =, e == E 100. l l . l ' f *
- d. Maint
- e. Dessen
- f. Misc '
50 - ih' l l bnL d IMIA NA o _.J., AA i i
' 93-1' 93-3 94-ti 94 3 951' 953 *- *- i. ,
Year - Quarter n , gj
~ 0=, =
- Site Average Redenoon Exposure e N=. . . .
g
DRAFTIREGIONAL REVIEW STo LUCIE 1 te0end: st t==c i sion><ic=nce wisn isissis ! Peer Group:Cornbuston Engineenng w/o CPC Medium m 92-4 to 95-3 Trends and Deviabons Deviations From Plant Peer Group Self-Trend Median Short Term Long Term Decened Improved Worse Bemer OPERATIONS (including startup) Automatic Scrams While Critical - 0 I -0.56 Safety System Actuations - -
-0.36 0.90 l _
Significant Events - 0 o . I i Safety System Failures - 0 0.22 l l Cause Codes (All LERs) i
- s. Aemmeeseen conrea Presseme - ]0.16 -
E 0.45
- b. ucensed operator errors - l 1.50
] 0.22
- s. oome Pereennes enero - l l 0.64 -
0.07 [ e, maintenance Proteeme -- 4.37 : . '
@ 0.19 e Demonscensevce nnnesenseerwrebnceeen Prename -- 0.25 -
l 0.30 l
- f. miscenenaeus - 0 -
0.18 [ SHUTDOWN . Safety System Actuations - 0.95 kh -0.67 1 Significant Events - o . o Safety System Failures - 0.22
-0.01 Cause Codes (All LERs)
- e. Aemmestreea conwee Premame - ]0.15 -
4.00 [
- b. ucensee operator Errors - 0 -
O
- s. oomr Pereennes eners - ] 0.13 -
0.16 [
- a. momennance Pree6eme - ]0.11 -
4.22 [ e passenscensruceennneennementrenttessenPreesome - E 0.20 - O t uneeneneeve - 0 - 0 FORCED OUTAGES . Forced Outage Rate
- 0.89
-0.10 Equipment Forced Outages / *
-2'45 -
$N""h"NN
# -0'82 1000 Commercial Critical Hours *'
Note: See TeWe 9 en Port N for the -1.0 -0'.5 0'.0 0.5 1.0 -1.0 -0:5 ,0:0 0'.5 1.0 specine eme fromes me e m the cascwasaa*- Performance index Performance index
- Not cWountee for operemonal Cycm l
DRAFT /RE2IONAL REVIEW i ST. LUCIE 1 Year - Celender Quarter g Phase 92-4 93-1 93 93-3 93-4 94-1 94-2 94-3 94-4 95-1 95-2, 95-3
'c"^"
- ft:!A'infin.
8testup 8 0 8. 0 l 8 0 8 i0 !0 8 0 h 8 0. 8 0 i 0
**^
ei ni:" tin. 8 8 8 8 8 i 8 8 8 8 8 8 itnfin on-Refu!1ing 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 i 0 8 0
-8 0
8 0 p:!!!intiu l 8 8 l 8 8 8 8 8 l 8 0!1 ins 0 0 8 1:inti. 8 l0 8 8 8 l0 l 8 8 0 8 ! 0 lins 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 Ftm (I) 0 0 0 6 0 5 8 1 7 0 0- Se IF0/1000 ERS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.47 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 10.24 GIT. ERS 2200 2049 447 2114 2200 2062 2123 2208 1400 1941 2148 648 RAD 7 37 182 S 8 75 11 6 160 22 8 EA cause coots,
^*""- "
ft:!niatio 8- 8 8 8 a 3 8 8 8 8 : Rinfin!1ing Mon-Refu 8 0 l 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 l 8 0 8 0 8 2
" * - '"- :!ninfin 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8'. &
tinirn !0 8 8 8 8 8 -8 8 8 8 8 8 on-Refu!11ns 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oth. Per, grggong 0 0 0 0 0 g g 0 0 0 0 g Iltaffn!1ing Mon-Refu 0 8 h 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 l0 8 0 8 1
!$ein[ ins h h 0 h 8 8 h !
linfrn Non-Refu!11ns 8 0 h [ 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 h 8 0 8 0 8 2 i t!Atlatio 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 $ 8 8 8 3 4:n'Yf 8 8 h 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 i Mon-katS!1 ins 0 0 0 0 0 0 v b 0 0- 1 "2 " - M!niati= 8 8 8 8 8 8 & 8 8 8 8 itinifn!1ing Non-Refu 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0
!0 8 0 !
Phase Phase type Start End Lenath
- !niaun jp'nt: li !! 8l !! t -
p$k!$ S u!*""' geh ! n 0 D$ 85 2lb l Mitt n !! 89
. : ;N 8 !! lh 9
on$b stating d 03 9! 0! !4
- Ininu. Pyni:
p$h'$up g *e llt L8 it 2ll s r Oper ! n f94 h SI 2g
!$ekaling [d b2 fh !5 mini:un. EC!nu" 8 2fli 55 8h!afil 8:
8 2ii Trend Calculatione Deviation Celeulatione I gs T L"i H8t:8 f30/95af
- .k/$$/94-09 M 01days2 8a:;:!!":t: !! :;: :lil TLo. !2fi!!!!:885tilitl12:;:11"l1:
s OU27/94-09/30/95 40 days
!!a:?::lil t
i ! CRAFTIREGIONAL REVIEW Legend: 5""***""'"2"",' St"'a ' ' ST. LUCIE 2 Refueling R operation im industry Avg. Trend Shutdown M Not Shown Using Op. Cycle R25551
~~ ~
l I l l l l l l l j l l I a ,I I I l 1I a I i l l l I I I I I i 1 l E i 931' 93 3 941' 963 951' 953 2 93 1' 93-3 961' 963 95 1' 953 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Automatic Scrams While Cdelcal Safety System Actuations 4 4 3- 3-g 2- 4 2-1 1- ! ' 1-
'o ' 93 1' 93 3 94 1' 963 95 1' 953 0
i 93 1' 93-3 961' 963 951' 953 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter 8%n Emts 4 SaW Spem Muros 2.0 1.5 - 3-Lu u. 31.0- y 2-0.5 - 1-z f
' 9'3-1' 93 3 961' 943 951' 95$ ' 93-1' 93 3 961' 963 951' 955 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Equipment Forced Outages /
gg, Forced Outage Rate (%) e M CmW CM hrs j er ll ll 80-4 ll \ ll' k I 4 ll i
% 60 -l f~ ll
~
2- l
'I
'l20- h0 lilll l'lh ~o *a g g o et
[j
]O '
931' 2 NA 93-3 9616 N A-943 951' 953 g -- ui 0 i 93 1' 93-3 9616 943 951' 953 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Cause Codes
A# D
- 0P C N P
Radiation Exposure ,. ,. 200
$ l l ,,
is . w. .. u8 150 i l l fi 1004 ; l lj s.
. -- m- -
o-
- e. m
- d. unint e. o.s.9n r
;,150-l l
m" ;l u 0 11 *E1 l 1 *- o. ,, 93-1' 93 3 941' 943 951' 953 , Year - Quarter - "" " l
- See Avmenge Reeston Exposure . .
~* w ,
t
DRAFT / REGIONAL REVIEW. ST. LUCIE 2 t.0ena: si.. c.is w nc nce m,n Peer Group:Combuseon Engineenng w/o CPC Medium m 92 4 to 95-3 Trends and Devistons
~
Deviations From Plant Peer Group l Self-Trend Median ! Short Term Long Term Dechned improved Wwee semer _ OPERATIONS Automatic Scrams While Critical - 0.54 0.18 ; Safety System A*=*iasis - o 0.90 l Significant Events - o o [ i Safety System Failures - 0 0.67 R .. i Cause Codes (All LERs)
- e. Ameinmesen cenew Promane - ]0.08 -
] 0.15
- e. L.eeness operseer arvoro - 0 -
0.68 l J
- 4. orm Personnes strero - 0 -
0.68 1 0.19
- e. - Premame - O.23 -
- e. r . - -
2 Promisme - 0 - l 0.30 f.nueseneneeue - 0 - l 0.A5 SHUTDOWN )
- l Safety System Actuations - NA
-0.15 Significant Events - NA 0
Safety System Failures - 1134 f NA Cause Codes (All LERs) a Aemmisveen convos Prewens - NA - -
. ' O.47 e, usensee operseer Errore - NA -
-0.30 I
- c. omer Peroenne strwe e NA .-
]0.08
- e. esamessense Premane - NA -
]0.11
- ar r- -
seresseen Promone - NA - 0.26
- f. - - NA -
0 FORCED OUTAGES . 4 Forced Outage Rate * - o 0.49
~
Equipment Forced Outages / * , 00 1000 Commercial Critical Hours _ Nees: See TeWe 9 in Peri a ser me -1.0 -0.5 0'0
. 05 1D 1.0 45 OD O'S 1A spaans ese esmee mese a me seismes***- Performance index Performance index
- Net ceicussine for operseenal Cysm . j l
1 4
DRAFT /RE2ICNAL REVIEW ST. LUCIE 2 Year - Calendar Quarter h Phase g-4, 1 93-2 93 3 93-4 94-1 94-2 94-3 94-4 M 95-2 95-3 "c"^" kt.rtupf:Enlatio 8 8. 8 8 8 8 8 a S 8 0 0 0 0 8 8" 1 0 0 0 0 0
"^ "
ft:IM!:tio 8 j 8 8 8 8 8 j 8 8 8 CinYr Mon-Ref!1&ng 8 0 l0 8 8 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 8 0 8 0
- !niatio j 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
!NYf 0 0 8 8 8 0 0 b 0 8
-AetI!11ms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 y, g.!!'i tI tio 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 g Lt.I"tu. 8 l l 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 Ftm (2) 20 87 6 2 1 0 7 2 0 4 0 4 IF0/1000 M5 0.00 8.88 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.47 CRIT.'ERS 1835 281 2084 1208 2187 1056 1856 2183 2208 2085 2183 2142 RAD 7 37 182 5 6 75 11 6 180 22 8 NA CAIJ8E CODES:
Inlatio 8 8 a 8 l0 8 a. I a 8 a
.p:niin!
di Non-Refu 1ing k 8 0 8 0 8 0 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 l0 1 u.. o,.r. g.r.u on 0 0 g g 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 3 g iter 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 8 8'
$ !1ing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o* - o 8 a a 8 8 8 a 8 8 8 8 8 l Ir:rni::ti..
.infin Mon-Refu!1ing 8
0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 l 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0
)
"**"'- i f Enl:tio 8 a a i a 8 a i a- a 8 l i
I.:nfin!11ns Non-Retu 8 1 8 1 8 0 0 8 0 i0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 l p:n!nictio 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 a j 8 8 u ifn hon-Refu!1ing 8 0 8 1 8 0 8 0 8 0 [ & 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 8 0 i p:Ininii. ! 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 dinfin Non-Refu!1 ins 8 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 n... n... t o. st., r.no ts 2:Enlau. R:ing"
'fil f 11 f!!
R:!ni=un. R:Ina" E J 81 : !! !]!. 2:Ini=uo R:!na" 8 !! 81 : !! 5!
' $p:Ini=uo ((N : nt: 8: !! 81 ! ,it 2;0 4 ,94 05 l ,94 n:enthun. si::Nn nt: 8:;Lif: 88 ; f:: '!8 Trend Calculations Devietton Calculations 81!8ti!!:8!!'8"fm!! JO
$o CuC4,93-09,1 27g..g:;;
. gg i ag;;;;;; 0
$ 02l11 94-09,10,93ll,1.0..v. ggg:;;;;yj g g; ggl3ggg; sgg g ;; [gg i; a
s 1 r BIOGRAPHICAL DATA - NRC RESIDENT STAFF ; i MARK 8. MILLER - U.S.NRC Senior Resident inspector
. St.Lucie Nuclear Plant - ,
Data Assigned: Assigned as Residentinspector 9/93 . Assumed SRIPosition Il06 , l Previens NRC Employment , 1 Reactor Systems Engineer,NRRID88A 1993' 1 Headquarters Operetions Officer, AE00 1991 1993 Resident inspector, Yankee Rows 1991 Reactor Engineer, Region ( , 1990-1991 Previene Employment Mississina State Universty Graduate ResearchlTeaching Assistant 1988 1990 I I Texas Utiktes Electnc ! Comanche Peak Steam Electnc Staten j System EngineerlRegulatory Compliance Engineer 1987 1988- ] l Nowoort News Shmbuddma and Dry Dock Co. Shitt Test Engineer (S6G) 1983 1987
- Ednestion:
i 1 Mismsanoi State University M.8. Nuclear Engineering,1990 1 Misassioni State University M.8. Nuclear Engineering,1983
. i 1
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA NRC RESIDENT STAFF STEPHEN S. SANDIN U.S.NRC Resident inspector St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Date Assigned: Rotational Assignment
, January 18 thru July 31,1995 (Training)
October 6,1995 thru April 6,1996 (Detail) Prevleue NRC Employment: Headquarters Operctions Officer AE00 - 87 96 4 1 Prevleue Employment. Pearl Harbor Naval Shieverd 82 87 ASTElSTElACTElCTE IS314W, SSW & S6G) 89 90
, Brown & Root. South Texas Proiect 80 82 Engineer Illi Nuclear Analysis Group Biolonical Production 66 78 Fractionator, Filtration Specialist &
Sterile Operations Supervisor Education: l University of California at Santa Barbara '
, B.S. Nuclear Engineering,1980 Ventura Collene A.A.,1975 z . .
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1 Biographical Information FPL William H. Bohlke Vice President, St. Lucie Plant Bill Bohlke is Piant Vice President of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Bohlke reports.to the Nuclear Division President and oversees the operation of the two nuclear units at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island, approximately 50 miles north of West Palm Beach. Mr. Bohlke joined FPL in 1990 as Vice President of Nuclear Engineering and Licensing. He previously served as Vice, President and Manager of Projects at Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. A career nuclear professional, Mr. Bohlke performed in a variety of engineering and~ project management positions for Stone & Webster. Mr. Bohlke is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and received a Master of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He is a registered professional engine.er in eleven states and a member of the American Nuclear Society. He is currently chairman of the NEl Appendix B Working Group and the industry Steam Generator Replacement Group. He is a member of the NEl Nuclear Economics and Fuel Supply Advisory Committee, the NEl Executive Task Force on Regulatory Process and the INPO Analysis & Engineering Industry Review Group. Mr. Bohlke serves as FPL's representative to the Advanced Reactor Corporation where he is vice chairman of the Utility Management Board. 2/96 . l
Biographical information
@ I: P L James Scarola Plant General Manager, St. Lucie Plant Jim Scarola is Plant General Mana~ger of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function Mr. Scarola reports to the Site Vice President. He is responsible for Operations, Maintenance, and technical Support activities at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island.
Mr. Scarola began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including l&C startup engineer, I&C maintenance engineer, assistant superintendent electrical maintenance, manager special projects, maintenance manager, manager equipment, support, and inspections, engineering project manager, and operations manager at St. Lucie. Mr. Scarola holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the . University of Notre Dame and a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida Institute of Technology. Mr. Scarola has completed the senior reactor operator certification training program at St. Lucie. G
. 1/96
Biographical Information FPL Christopher L. Burton Services Manager, St. Lucie Plant i I Chris Burton is Services Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear ! Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Burton reports to the Site Vice President. He is responsible for Plant Facilities, Budget, Fire Protection, Emergency Planning, Training, Land Utilization, Security, and Information Services at the St. Lucie site.
. I Mr. Burton began working for FPL in 1975. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including reactor operator, nuclear plant supervisor, assistant operations supervisor, reliability maintenance supervisor, operations supervisor, operations manager, and j plant general ma,nager. Mr. Burton has held reactor opsrator and senior reactor operator i licenses at St. Lucie.
Mr. Burton is a graduate of State University of New York and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electronics Technology. Mr. Burton also holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida institute of Technology. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) and the Professional Reactor Operator Society. j 1/96
4 Biographical Information FPL C. Ashton Pell Outage Manager, St. Lucie Plant
~
Ash Pellis Outage Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Pell reports to the Site Vice President. He is responsible for the planning and scheduling of St. Lucie Plant outages and for coordination of operations and maintenance activities on a daily basis.- Mr. Pell began working for FPL in 1975. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including Reactor Engineer, Reactor Supervisor, Technical Staff Supervisor, Assistant to Senior Vice Presi' dent-Nuclear, Director Nuclear Administrative Services, Plant l Services Manager and Outage Manager. Mr. Pell complet'ed certification as a senior reactor operator for both the St. Lucie and Turkey Point nuclear units.
)
l Mr. Pellis a graduate of the University of Central Florida and holds a Bachelor of Science 1 degree in Physics. He is a member of the Southeast section of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 4 I 1/96 , i I
l l Biographical Information l l
@ FPL Edward J. Weinkam 111 ,
1 Licensing Manager, St. Lucie Plant Ed Weinkam is Licensing Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear J Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Weinkam reports to the-Site Vice President and is responsible for coordination of the St. Lucie Plant regulatory interface among the NRC Resident inspectors, NRC Region 11 Staff, and NRC Headquarters staff. l Mr. Weinkam began working for FPL in 1986. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including NRR licensing engineer and corporate licensing supervisor for the St. Lucie Plant, licensing manager for the Turkey Point. Plant. He has worked in the l nuclear industry since 1979 in various engineering, educational, and regulatory areas. He was i a U. S. Navy nuclear submarine officer, an engineering instructor at the University of l Maryland, and USNRC, NRR project manager. Mr. Weinkarn completed certification as a senior reactor operator at the Turkey Point nuclear units. Mr. Weinkam is .a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering. He received a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland in 1979. l S 1/96 ,
Biographical Information FPL 1 1 Robert E. Dawson l Business Manager, St. Lucie Plant i I Bob Dawson is Business Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Bob Dawson reports to the Site Vice President and is responsible for the strategic plan, the plant operating plan, the corrective action program, and the in-house-event tracking and trend analysis programs at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Mr. Dawson began working for FPL in 1973. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including reactor engineering department head at Turkey Point Plant, staff reactor support, mechanical startup group supervisor for St. Lucie Unit 2, core barrel ' repair project, electrical maintenance department head, plant maintenance manager, and plant licensing manage ~r. Mr. Dawson has held an senior reactor operator license at St. Lucie. Mr. Dawson is a graduate of the University of Virginia and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering. He is a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 1/96
Biographical Information 9 I: P L Thomas G. Kreinberg. Superintendent,' Nuclear Material Management, St.'Lucie Plant . I i , Thomas Kreinberg is Superintendent of Nuclear Materials Management of Florida Power
& Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, in this function, Mr. Kreinberg reports to the Site Vice President and is responsible for Purchasing, Stores, and interface with I Procurement Engineering at the St. Lucie Plant. l 1
Mr. Kreinberg began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including purchasing & contract services, contracts adrninistrator, manager of contracts and manager materials management. Mr. Kreinberg attended Syracuse University and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Russian and a Bachelors of Business Administration Economics from the University of Florida. He is a member of Contract Management Owners Group (Nuclear Power Utilities). l l 1/96 i O i
Biographical information 9 F:PL Daniel J. Denver 1 Site Engineering Manager, St. Lucie Plant Dan Der.vei is tha Site Engineering Manager for Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Fower Plant. In this function, Mr. Denver reports to the Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Licensing and is responsible for engineering services including design packages, as-building, procurement engineering, fuel design, and outage NDE inspections for the two nuclear units at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island. Dan joined Florida Power & Light Company in May,1993 as Director, Nuclear Technical Support in the Juno Beach offices. In this capacity, he was responsible for nuclear fuel supply, information services and the administrative staffs for Nuclear Engineering and Licensing. He has worked in the nuclear power industry since 1967 in various engineering and technology development areas. He worked for a number of electric utilities including Public Service Electric & Gas, Yankee Atomic, and Houston Lighting and Power as well as Westinghouse Electric and a nuclear industry services company, El International. Dan graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1966 with'a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and received a Mas'ter of Science in Nuclear Engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1967, in outside activities, Dan has served in local town government and on the boards of several amateur theater organizations and professional societies. He is a registered professional engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 4 e 9 a 6
Biographical lnformation
@ 1: P L L. Wesley Bladow Site Quality Manager, St. Lucie Plant l Wes Bladow is the Site Quality Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. .in this function, Mr. Bladow reports to the Vice President Nuclear i Assurance and is responsible for independently assessing the Quality Control and Quality i Assurance Program implementation by the St. Lucie Nuqlear Plant. '
J Mr. Bladow began working for FPL in 1967 in the Distr'ibution Engineering Department. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including quality assuranca supbrvisor, quality assurance superintendent, and site quality manager at the Turkey Point
~
Nuclear Plant and quality assurance manager of the St. Lucie Unit 1 steam generator t'eplacement project, and manager of nuclear safety speak out. J Mr. Bladow is a graduate of Florida international University and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Industrial Technology with a minor in industrial safety. Mr. Bladow is a member of the American Nuclear Society. l 1/96 - l
1 Biographical Information i O I: P L l I Andrew DeSoiza ) Human Resources Manager, St. Lucie Plant Andrew DeSoiza is Plant Human Resources Manager-of Florida Power & Light Company's
, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, in this function, Mr. DeSoiza reports to the Nuclear Division Director of Human Resources. In this position Mr. DeSoiza is accountable for proper .
I implementation of personnel policies and procedures at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Mr. DeSoiza began working for FPL in 1972. He has held a various. positions, including payroll clerk and human resource manager. Mr. DeSoiza is a graduate of Miami Dade Community College and holds an Associates of Arts degree in Business. + i 1/96
Biographical lnformation 1 1 l
@ FPL l
Jeffrey A. . West Operations Manager, St. Lucie Plant ] l l , Jeff West is Operations Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function Mr. West reports to the Plant General Manager. He is I responsible for the direction and coordination of the operational activities including health physics, radio-chemistry, reactor engineering, operations, and operations support & testing at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island. Mr. West began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including shif t technical adviser, reactor control operator, r.uclear watch engineer, assistant nuclear plant supervisor, technical training-supervisor, nuclear plant supervisor, assistant operations supervisor, assistant superintendent - mechanical maintenance, operations supervisor, and services manager. Mr. West has held a senior opera' tor license at St. Lucie. Prior to his tenure at FPL, he held the rank of Lt. Commander in the U. S. Navy Nuclear Submarine Service. Mr. West served from 1974 to 1979. Mr. West is a graduate of the University of Tennessee and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Mr. West also holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida institute of Technology. O 1/96
Biographical lnformation I 1 9 I: P L Joseph Marchese Jr. Maintenance Manager, St. Lucie Plant Joe Marchese is Plant Maintenance Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Marchese reports to the Plant General Manager and is responsible l for supervision and coordination of the maintenance activities including electrical, mechanical, l instrumentation & control, records and planning at the'St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island. Mr. Marchese began working for FPL in 1984. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including lead construction electrical supervisor -Turkey Point Plant , lead . construction mechanical supervisor - Turkey Point Plant, site construction manager - Turkey Point Plant, and plant maintenance manager. Prior to his tenure at FPL, Mr. Marchese had 12 years nuclear experience in various positions of increasing authority with Bechtel Power Corporation, including Milestone, Davis Besse, and St. Lucie Nuclear Plants construction and startup testing. Mr. Marchese completed the senior l . reactor operator certification training program at Turkey Point. ) Mr. Marchese is a graduate of the University of Akron and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Mr. Marchese is a registered Professional Engineer in Florida and Virginia. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). I 1/96
Biographical Information l l l FPL Lee A. Rogers System & Component Engineering Manager, St. Lucie Plant 1 Lee Rbgers is System & Component Engineering Manager of Florida Power and Light l C'ompany's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function Mr. Rogers reports to the Plant I General Manager. He is responsible for the direction and coordination of the technical support j to Operations' and Maintenance Departments and the coordination of issues, regulatory I interaction and documents at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island. Mr. Rogers began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including mechanical startup engineer, mechanical startup supervisor, shift technical advisor, project engineer, electrical mair)tenance department head, and instrument and control department head. Prior to his tenure at FPL, he was employed by Carolina Power & Light Co. from 1977 to 1979. Mr. Rogers is a graduate of the University of Florida and holds a Bachelor of Science ; degree in Nuclear Engineering and a Master of Busiriess Administration degree from Florida Institute of Technology. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS).
. 1/96
f # "*N, UNITED STATES
! i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- i. ! OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION II 101 Marietta St., Suite 2900, Atlanta, GA 30323 s, * * * * * /
Tel. 404-331-5503 or 7878 No.: Il 96-18 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contacts: Ken Clark 404-331-5503 (Friday, February 9,1996) Roger Hannah 404-331-7878 NRC STA FF ISSUES ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE A TST. LUCLENUCLEAR POWER PLANTIN FLORIDA The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfonnance (S ALP) report for Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, located on Hutchinson Island near Ft. Pierce, which rates overall' performance as good for the past two years. The plant had been rated superior in its two previous assessments. In a letter to the company dated Febmary 8,1996, Stewart D. Ebneter, Administrator of the NRC's Region II office in Atlanta, said the areas of Engineering and Plant Support sustained previously assessed ratings of Category 1, considered superior, but that. ratings in the areas of O'perations and Maintenance declined from Category 1 to Category 2, considered good. Ebneter told FP&L that there is a concern that the plant's long period of all superior ratings may have led to a pervasive complacent environment that is tolerant of equipment issues and a lack of discipline in adhering to procedures. He told company officials that it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of extensive corrective actions that were instituted in the very late part of the assessment period, from January 2,1994 through ! January 6,1996. But he said that it is clear that those programs must be aggressively pursued to l terminate the negative trend in performance. ! NRC SALP assessments rate performance in four functional areas as being in Category I l (Superior), Category 2 (Good), or Category 3 (Acceptable). St. Lucie received no ratings in Category l
- 3. l l
Details of the assessment will be discussed with FP&L officials in a meeting at the plant on Februarr 22.1996 at I:00 n.m. That meeting will be followed by a meeting between local and state I oflicials and the NRC to discuss issues related to St. Lucie. Members of the public and the press are l welcome to attend for purposes of observation.
# 1 l
l l 1 i l l
pm ce:g UNITED STATES
. p a,4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O REGION H li S E
101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W., SUITE 2300 0 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303ZF0199 kp,,@V ,,, February 8, 1996 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg
. President - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP) (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-335/95-99; 50-389/95-99)
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
The Systematic Assessment o'f Licensee Performance (SALP) for the period January 2,1994 through January 6,1996, has been completed for St. Lucie. The results of the assessment are documented in the enclosed SALP report which will be discussed with you at a public meeting at the St. Lucie Site on February 22, 1996, at 1:00 pm. At the meeting, you should be prepared to i discuss our assessment and any initiatives that address our concerns and ' challenges identi.fied in the SALP report. Overall the performance of. the St. Lucie Plant was assessed as good over the performance period. The overall performance was mixed with the response to ) transient events being very good but routine activities performed at a somewhat lower level of performance. The engineering and plant support' functional areas sustained the previously assessed ratings of superior performance, but there is a disturbing performance trend in the functional areas of operations and maintenance. Performance declined significantly in these areas from superior ratings that had been sustained over several past performance periods to a level of good performance. There is a concern that the long period of. superior performance may have led to a pervasive complacent environment that is tolerant of equipment issues and a lack of discipline in adhering to procedures. There is evidence that the decline in human performance may be aggravated by inadequacies in the quality of the procedures themselves. Another contributor appears to be acceptance of a lower standard of performance by a significant part of the organization. A further concern is the degree to which the performance declined before it was detected by the organization's self-assessment programs. There is a clear indication that these programs were not effective in identifying the tren6s early. It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the extensive corrective actions that were instituted in the very late part of the assessment period, but it is clear they must be aggressively pursued to terminate the negative trend in performance. fhq)210310
FP&L 2 In accordance with Section 2.790 of the.NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any questions or comments, I would be pleased to discuss them with you.
- Sincerely, uvf G Stewart D. Ebneter s Regional Administrator .
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enc 1: . D. A. Sager, Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128, ' Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 : 1 H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company l P. O. Box 14000 ; Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 I l J. Scarola, Plant General Manager l i
. St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. P.ierce, FL 34954-0128 Robert E. Dawson, Plant Licensing Man'ager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 J. R. Newman, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, NW ! Washington, D. C. 20036 John T. Butler, Esq. 1 Steel, Hector and Davis '
)
4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 33131-2398 cc w/ enc 1: Continued see page 3 ; l l 1 4 4
, 4 y .y _~
l - l FP&L 3 L cc w/ encl: Continued Bill Passetti , t Office of Radiation Control Dept of Health and Rehab.' Serv. 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
' Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o.The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, L FL 32399-1400 Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness -
Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive
' Tallahassee, FL -32399-2100 Thomas R. L. Xindred, County Administrator -
St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 Charles B. Brinkman - Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. - 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 Rockville, MD 20852 4 E 4 4
1
- j. I i !
1 1 [ UNITED STATES l l NUCLEAR REGULATORY !
! COMMISSION l
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/ -
+4 .
! I % '
=: o o, ,
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++*** 1 l
l WILLIAM RUSSELL i VISIT TO ' ! ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR . PLANT i FEBRUARY 15, 1996 3\S>
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Pre-Decisional Semiannual Plant' Performance Assessment St. Lucie 1 and 2 Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97 Last SALP Rating Previous SALP Rating 1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 Operations ,2 1 . Maintenance '2 1 Engineering 1 1 , , Plant Support 1
-1 last INPO Assessment: 1 Previous INPO Assessment: 1 ;
I. Performance Overview Since July 1995, there have been a series of events that led to , questioning the plant's overall performance. These have included: i
- A Unit 1 turbine trip due to procedural weaknesses, I poor operator performance, and weak supervisory oversight.
- The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and )
inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded by failing to follow as)ects of the guidance that did exist, which led to the failure of tie second and third stage seals.
- A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated that the block was enabled. This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at least two different occasions.
- Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP). An loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling
. relief. valve which lifted and. then fai. led to reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic. problem involving several valves). .The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the j conditions (SL4).
a The spraydown of containment due to ari inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around. d
/4 99 .-
.. _ . . ~__ _ __ _. . _ . . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
1 [ N. - l l
- The significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the i
- i. overdilution event.on January 22, 1996, highlighted the recent
- large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control
! in the control room. These and several other recent deficiencies involving weak procedures, a general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel . errors clearly indicated that the plant's past high level of performance - , had declined. An NRC root cause effort determined that, in addition to , , procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses, the licensee suffered from 1 weaknesses in both interfaces across organizational lines and corrective ~ actions. ;
- II. Functional Area Assessments
- A SALP board convened on January 18, 1996. The board concluded that the licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had declined from excellent levels of performance to good levels. The 4
conclusions reached by the board are summarized below. Operations The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had
, declined, particularly in the final six months of the assessment period.
As bases, the board noted an increase in the number of operational : , events attributable to l
. Weaknesses in operator performance !
. . Acceptance of long-standing ' equipment deficiencies !
. Management expectations were not effectively communicated to ,
personnel and enforced l
..* Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence ;
Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions l The licensee undertook a number of efforts to reverse declining -; performance following the onset of the operational events described ' above. Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of, procedural changes and around-the-clock on-site review committee meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of corrective action documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents I initiated, but has also resulted in increases in backlogs. l Maintenance
.The board determined that performance in this area declined during the. i
. previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit !
trips which occurred during the period had roo.ts in maintenance. , l Weaknesses identified by the board included:
. Inadequate post-maintenance testing
- Procedural adequacy and adherence l
.. Instability in management due to acting managers while the maintenance manager received SRO training 4 8 e S
, _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _. - ..
I The board indicated that the current stability of the maintenance
- management appeared to be reversing the observed negative trends. ,
Engineering The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of performance. Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce the. ' numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as- . strengths. Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high quality, as were safety evaluations. - Plant Support , The board found that plant support organizations collectively performed at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows:
- Health Physics was identified as having strong management support and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of con.taminated floor space and the ' volume of solid waste were also noted. ;
a Security was cited as maintaining.an excellent level of : performance during staff reductions due to the implementation of biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing range, and self-assessments were considered good. Some performance problems were noted through the period,'however, including two failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures. >
= Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in respond.ing to plant fires; however, surveillance testing observations indicated weak procedures,' poor attention.to detail, and hardware deficiencies.
- Emergency preparedness was considered good, and the status of ,
equipment and supplies were found to be adequate. The full participation exercise was successful. l [ V 4 e 5
PERCENT POWER (%)
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1 - DESCRIPTION OF syn as - ST.'LUCIE UNIT 1
- 1. -On' January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss.of the IB MFWP.-
I 2.- The unit'. . tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was t inadvertently opened locally"on March 28,-1994. - 3 '. .On June 6, 1994, the unit experienced .a main generator lockout, followed by turbine'and' reactor trips, when a thunderstorm blew a s'ection of flashing across - two output- ! terminals of main transformer 1A.
~
i 4.- Power was reduced to 80% power.on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic- , System - (DEH) leak. The unit was returned'to full power on August 23, 1994.
- 5. The turbine was taken of line on August 28, 1994, to repair a leak'in the DEH. Repairs i 'were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994. The .
unit-was returned to full power on September 2, 1994. *
' 6. The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switchyard on October 26, 1 1994. Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a ;
decision was made to start the refueling, outage f
- 7. On February 27, 1995, the unit was removed from service for . the replacement of !
pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after ,
- startup in November, 1994. The unit was returried to power on March 8, 1995. ;
i
- 8. On July'8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance te' sting. The unit '
was returned to power on July 12, 1995.
- 9. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until !
October 9, 1995. -
- 10. On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam generator le~ vel when the feed regulating valve failed'to mid position. !
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PERIOD OF OPERATION (MONTHLY) JANUARY 2,1994 THROUGH JANUARY 8,1996
^
DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS - ST LUCIE UNIT 2 - 1. On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting down to;the cycle 8 refueling outage. Thel unit was taken off-line on February 14, 1994. 2.. On April 23, 1994, the unit tripped from 30% power during RPS adjustment. ,
-3. The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994', and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on
' July, .10, 1994. On July 14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker. The u. nit was restarted and placed on line on July 15, 1994.
4.. On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level. The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating. valve closure af ter a steam generator water.' level control. level . transmitter f ailed - high. The transmitter was replaced'and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995. 5. On' April 25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply in'the DEH system.
- 6. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.
~
- 7. On October 9, 1995, the unit was shut down for a. scheduled refueling outage.
- 8. On January 1, 1996, the unit'went critical.
- 9. On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.
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1 t AGENDA FOR JAMES M. TAYLOR VISIT TO ST. LUCIE PLANT-FEBRUARY 15, 1996 - NIGHT BEFORE.- FEBRUARY 14, 1996 : Possibly meet with W. T. Russell and S.D. Ebneter - FEBRUARY 15, 1996 0615-0645 Arrive at St. Lucie - badging as visitor 0645-0700 Accompany SRI to observe the shift turnover 0700-0730 Interview with the departing shift crew 0730-0815 Attend licensee's morning meeting 0815-1100 Plant tour with SRI 1100-1130 Caucus with SRI and others (Taylor, Ebneter)
- 1130-1230 Working lunch - an opportunity for a dialog on any topic the Licensee would like to discuss or present to the senior
- NRC managers.
1230-1300 Interview with Operations Manager (J. West et al.) 1300-1330 Interview with Maintenance Manager (J. Marchese et al.) 1330-1400 Interview with Engineering Manager (D. Denver et al.) 1400-1430 Interview with Plant Manager (J. Scarola) , 1430-1500 Interview with Site Vice. President (W. Bohlke) 1500-1530 Interview with President Nuclear Division (T..Plunket) 1530-1600 Caucus.with SRI and others (Taylor, Ebneter) 1600-1630 Exit with Site Vice President and/or Plant Manager i 1630 Leave the St. Lucie site. ; l l i l I 1 1 1 l I I I
i. i ! AGENDA FOR WILLIAM T. RUSSELL VISIT TO ' ST. LUCIE PLANT FEBRUARY 14 - 15,'1996. , FEBRUARYLl4,1996
. 1300-1700 Arrive at St. Lucie - badging as visitor, Tour _ plant with SRI Observe control room operations and vitness shift turnover
. 1700 Leave St. Lucie site FEBRUARY 15, 1996 0615-0645 Arrive at St. Lucie - badging as visitor '
. 0645-0700 Accompany SRI to observe the shift turnover 0700-0730- Interview with the departing shift crew 0730-0815 Attend licensee's morning meeting :
0815-1100 Plant tour with SRI 1100-1130 Caucus with SRI and others (Taylor, Ebneter) .
' 1130-1230 -Working lunch - an opportunity for a dialog on any topic the
. Licensee would like to discuss or present to the senior-NRC managers. .
. 1230-1300' Interview with Operations Manager (J. West et al.)
1300-1330 Interview with Maintenance Manager (J. Marchese et al.) 1330-1400' Interview with Engineering Manager (D. Denver et al.) 1400-1430 . Interview with Plant Manager (J. Scarola)
- 1430-1500 Interview with Site Vice President (W. Bohlke) 1500-1530 Interview with President - Nuclear Division (T. Plunket) ,
1530-1600 . Caucus with SRI and others (Taylor, Ebneter)- 1600-1630 Exit with Site Vice President and/or Plant Manager 1630 Leave the St. Lucie site. ; d c
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i e i i 4 e U 4
l PLANT: ST. LUCIE LOCATION: Ft. Pi3rc3, FL MEMBER UTILITY: Florida Power & Light Company , l
- 1 l
DIRECTIONS PROM WEST PALM BEACH FT. PIERCE AtA 3 INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: 7 i Take the Airport Access Road to Belvedere Road. Tum / a a se- ) east (right) onto Belvedere Road, and proceed to inter- .L.U IC state 95. Take 1-95 North to Exit 61 Highway 76 to High-f 4 llll l way A1A on the right. Take A1A mast (nght), cross the O l Intercoastal Waterway, then north along the ocean to the g on the left. Total approx. distance = (M gI 5 0 I l DIRECTIONS PROM EOF: Ej 1-95 North to Mdway 5/ Road Exit e is Ei south of FL Pierce. 3
$ $ first led tum. ( lg I g c; udway Red g EOF 5 p uh ,dusammesse E
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PALM BEACH , l . AIRPORT i 2-68 1 l
Member UtWtv Name and Addr=== ' , I Florida Power & Light Company 4 P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408 , j Plant information J
' Narne St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant (Units 1 & 2) ~
Docket # 335,389
- Location Ft. Pierce, FL NRC/ FEMA Region MV '
Capacity (MWo)/ Type 830/PWR ' l
- Reactor Supplier Combustion Engineering Turbine-Gen. Mfr. Westinghouse l Engineer Ebasco ,
Constructor Ebasco i Plant Manager Phone (407)467-7103 Control Room Phone Unit 1: (407) 465-7140 / Unit 2: (407) 466-7069
- (407)288-0800 j UTILITY SUPPORT CONTACTS l General
- President- Nuclear Division I (407)694-4222
! Equipment: Plant Manager , j (407)467-7103 f I TravelInformation l Airports: 3 ) 1. West Palm Beach, FL , j 2. Melboume, FL
- 3. St. Lucie, FL i Motels:
1'
- 1. Holiday Inn, Jensen Beach, Hutchinson Island, FL, (407) 225-3000
- 2. Marriott Courtyard, Jensen Beach, Hutchinson Island, FL, (407) 229-1000 l -
t e 9 2-67 4 4 e e - .- - - -, , - - ,
i I LOCATION MAP 1 ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT-TO,0fEANDO , 10vanoteACM "E T *^- a' seaw. 97,, von.$. FT. PfERC 2427
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5 ALP REPORT - ST. LUCIE ;
- . 50-335 50-389 j j
i ' JANUARY 2. 1994 - JANUARY 6. 1996 -
!. BACKGROUND ,
) , The SALP Board convened on January 18, 1996, to assess the nuclear ! safety performance of St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 for the period of . January 2, 1994, through January 6, 1996. The Board Meeting was ; conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic
; - Assessment of Licensee Performance." Board members were Ellis W.
Marschoff (Chairperson), Director, Division of Reactor Projects, i
- Region II (RII); Johns P. Jaudon, Deputy. Director, Division of Reactor j Safety, RII; and David B. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate II-1, i F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
i The performance category ratings and the assessment functional areas used below are defined and described in NRC Management Directive 8.6, ? . " Systematic Assessment of Licensee' Performance (SALP)." l
- II. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT OPERATIONS
}- This functional area assesses the control and execution of activities
- directly related to, operating the plant. It includes activities such as j plant startup, power operatio'n, plant shutdown, and response to j transients.
l- Overall performance in the operations area has declined from its previous superior level to an overall rating of good. The plant has 4.
>een operated safely, although there has been an increase in the number .
of operational. events. This increase is attributable to the following: weaknesses in operator performance, the acceptance of long standing . . deficiencies in plant equipment, management expectations not effectively communicated to personnel and enforced, weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence, and the implementation and adequacy of
- corrective actions. Quality Assurance activities associated with Operations remained strong'and effective in identifying areas for
- improvement.
! Operator performance during the period has, overall, been good, and continued to be strong during unusual' plant events or evolutions. Operators showed alert and proper response to ten reactor trips, reflecting-well upon the licensee's training program and individual capabilities. Similarly, operator performance during twelve observed startups and seven monitored entries into reduced inventory conditions l were typified by excellent command and control and thorough operator knowledge. However, operator perfornnce during less demanding or less focused evolutions'showed weaknesses in procedural adherence, the identification and correction of deficiencies, and attention to detail. 4 s d;
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. i Of particular concern, procedural adherence and adequacy issues resulted l in, or contributed to an increase in the number and severity of ,
i operational. events. The lack of overall quality in plant procedures was . L underscored by the shear volume of procedural changes required when a e j policy of verbatim compliance was adopted. 1 . The ability of Operations to identify and correct problems in a manner - 4 sufficient to prevent recurrence was also of concern. This issue was i compounded by identified weaknesses in communications across L organizational interfaces, in that failures in informal communications were not compensated for by programmatic methods.- l Finally, operator attention.to detail has declined during this SALP I
; period. Given that issues of procedural inadequacies existed, the ! importance of attention to detail by operators was amplified, in that it represents an important barrier to failures. The decline-in attention ;
to details was indicative of an onset of complacency through the SALP ' j period, a trend which operations management failed to identify and i
- remedy in a timely manner. l 2
] The Plant Operations area is rated Category 2. III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE ! This functional area assesses licensee activities in the areas of j i testing and maintaining plant structures, systems, and components. ' ! Activities assessed include preventive, predictive, and corrective { maintenance, as well as surveillance, post-modification, and post- . maintenance testing. Overall performance in the maintenance area declined from its previous superior level to an overall ' rating of good. Maintenance provided . generally effective support for plant operations on a day-to-day basis. ! However, there were problems with equipment that adversely affected . overall plant performance and provided unnecess'ary challenges to i operations. Significant problems related to maintenance were manifested by an operability issue with pressurizer power-operated relief valves, reactor coolant pumps seal failures, and inadequate post-maintenance test determinations. There were also procedural difficulties encountered, especially in surveillance and preventive maintenance procedures. These
- issues had been present but unrecognized previously, and the licensee's
- remedial actions included an attempt to utilize a " verbatim compliance"
! approach.- However, the older procedures were not written to a level of ) detail: that would support this methodology, and the plant rank and file ' were not well oriented in the concept of procedural adherence; - therefore, the use of verbatim compliance did not resolve the problems emanating from weak procedures. l
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Management of the maintenance area changed during this assessment . j' period, and by the end of the assessment period, the new management ' appeared'to be providing the leadership necessary to reverse the
- observed negative trends. In the area of procedures, the new management 3
, team instituted a dual approach of. correcting the procedures and .
' training the personnel to use them which has seen some preliminary !
2-successes. j The surveillance program was implemented satisfactorily, but the procedural problems discussed above.kept it from rising to the superior ! level. Corrective maintenance was performed acceptably and generally
- ' had_ strong management involvement.
) In addition to the apparent strength of the new management team, the. > predictive maintenance group was considered a strength. The group was > adept at vibration analysis, thermography, and lubrication analysis. - i The predic'tive maintenance group had strong and positive interactions i - with the operations and maintenance programs and, furnishing early . ; warning of incipient equipment failures, and long-term degradation of , important components.
' I j Licensee preparations to implement the new maintenance rule were -l 4 . successful in identifying equipment such as the radiation monitoring t
- system and the emergency diesel generators which were not performing to the licensee's expectations..
lr The Maintenance area is rated Category 2. IV. PERF0RNANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING I This functional area assesses activities associa'ted with the design of plant' modifications and engineering support for operations, maintenance, surveillance, and licensing activities. t ( i The overall performance in the Engineering area remained superior.
- The strength of the engineering group was shown in the area of design and installation support. This was manifested by a number of well engineered and implemented plant modifications. In the area of design 4 .
control and maintenance of the current licensing basis, the engineering organization typically performed well with occasional weaknesses. The plant's operations were supported successfully throughout the . assessment period. Of particular note was the design and installation on Unit 2 of the condenser tube cleaning system.' In addition, the licensee has undertaken several initiatives to reduce the number of . jumper / lifted leads, eliminate operator work-arounds, reduce the number of old work orders, and to improve the performance of contractors. The ; fuel vendor independence program.will result in better control of core design, improved support for the plant and enhanced fuel utilization. The support of maintenance activities remained strong. The 45th Street-
- Laboratory provided good support with component specialists along with 1 i i
i a t - , .
4 effective' nondestructive examination services. A comprchensive program of monitoring Alloy 600/690 applications focused on the pressurizer, reactor vessel and loop piping penetrations. The recently implemented maintenance specification program should result in effective maintenance support, efficient engineering, and enhanced plant safety. In light of
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the weaknesses discussed in the Maintenance section, the support of maintenance activities by engineering is an area where improvements could be achieved. Throughout the assessment period, licensing submittals have been consistently of high quality, reflecting sound engineering judgment and appropriate-attention to detail. Safety evaluations demonstrated the i licensee's commitment to safety and compliance with regulations. The Engineering area is rated Category 1.
. V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT -
This functional area addresses radiological controls, radioactive affluents, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, fire prctection, and housekeeping controls. The overall performance in the Plant Support' area has remained superior. The radiation protection program received strong management support.
' The accumulated dose goal was met for the first year of the assessment period but not for the second year. This was the result of the maintenance problems and the resulting increased outage time. The radiation protection organization continued to implement strong initiatives in the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) program through the use of remote monitoring of potentially high radiological dose work and the introduction of electronic dosimetry. Management involvement and support was evidenced by the small amount of surface area contamination, a significant reduction in the volume of' solid waste, and the. readiness of the post accident sampling system. Training and self-assessments were found to be effective. Thus, the combination of management support and an innovative' health physics organization resulted in superior performance.
Security maintained an excellent level of performance during a staff reduction of the guard force and the introduction of biometrics. Measures used included effective training, which included the use of a combat firing range and good 'self-assessments. Changes to the security plan were both appropriate and made in a timely manner. However, there were some performance problems such as a repeat instance of failure to
- compensate in a timely manner for a compter failure; this suggested a problem with the effectiveness of corrective action from a previous event.
l In the fire protection area, combustible control was effective and the fire brigade performed well during drills and during an actual event. l However, observation of surveil. lance testing of the fire protection i 4 4 f
5 systems revealed weak procedures, poor attention to detail, as well as minor past errors that had gone uncorrected. On balance, procedural and surveillance problems detracted from the otherwise excellent level of performance in the fire protection area. In the emergency preparedness area, the full participation exercise conducted in 1994 was successful, and appropriate emergency classifications were made. Overall exercise performance was rated as good. The status of equipment and supplies needed to support emergency preparedness was found to be adequate. The emergency preparedness program maintained a good state of readiness for event response. The Plant Support area is rated Category 1. l i e G l
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knother error , g NN/, .'. e l shakes v. faithe n operations ' rhaps it would seem comical if it dad ) met seem so serious
; Those wacky guys at Florida Power &
l ht admztted this weis to another little i shop at the com%ny's St. Luc e Nuclear , i wer Plant. . t i
! .It seems a worker in the reactor's control eeom who was supposed to be watching pome gauges went off to the kitchen'to get a o
,, ,-ica _- m s got s A recent- pmceduraJ l i p. ,'"I' , error at the St. Lucie Nu. )
than they clear Power plant is added .' ) store suP to a string of errors since 8 Qd y last year that has plagued ;
;*n gone. the facility and reduced
?No bij publjc confidence.
sato ut, the unidentified worker involved in
. the Jan. 22 meident has been suspended - ,
i we don't know for how long - and RL is conductmg an internal investigatico. f I . No bi deal, added the UJ. Nuclear Regu-i lutory cmmission, which clocad its own investigation into the matter Tuesda and ts expected to complete a report wi in two p weeks.
$ . "We may or may not taka enforcement , ;
dtton," said NRC spokesman Roger llan- I nah.
'This just seems to be coe of those lapses 16 precedure that sometimes happens. .
l Eact.se us, but this is a nuclear power l glant which used to be one of the best l operated plants in the r.ation. It i6n't Joe'. Donut Eruporium.
-lWhat's up? Other than concern' The plant has been cutting employees and e have been reports of low morale and
' ufficient training. And, this isn't the first -.,
blun at the plant. Since last August there , ; I has a sernes of errors which resulted I in reprimands and hefty fuses from the NRC.
*FPL and the NRC can say all they want j that none of the problems threatened the '
safety of the pubhc. But, the pubik has a l right to be troubled when the operation of a auclear power plant begins to appear more lbre a circus than a carefuUy run utility. The pubbe has a right to have confidence'
; la the St. Lucie plant. NL and the NRC need to take whatever steps are necessary i to restore that confidence. And that includes
! letally sufficient staffing and training. It ateo includes better oversight s'Ihe most recent meldent does indeed , dem to be no big deal. 4
- But when do a bunch of httle deals turn p a, big deal?
- A bis deal is not something we can afford clr even want to thmk about.
'We can certainly sympathise with FPL officials who must be frustrated with the repeated problems. They have a proud socord that as beommg more and more tar- .
, mished. They obviously don't want to be ' viewed by the public, or by the NRC as seme kind of joke. If the plant is turning into a joka, though. M sorry, but we're not laughing g T0iR. P,01
i. T 4 hlC Ls 8 2Mu j
$ reactor overheats .during lunch break
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~W'HUTCHINSON ISLAND L Press j
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. rator befo.re i.n. 3annah hes,id. left to microwave his ors also failed to notify nuiclear power plant' operator .
up a reactor lea his post t onecutives of tbs incident
- : .r W "a ave his lunch, and O plassure built up to much in the A ing the' ' tern ture
! . unit that alarms went off. . ot$er control room ' operators with the reactor's sys-
- The tot at Florida Power over the incident, spokeswoman tem is a common activity. It is
.4 's St. Lucie Nuclear Stacey Shaw said. done controlli the concen- ,
ant hasbeen s nded. Duri November and Decem. tration boroni the coolant.
; -~ lear R latory m a is- ber.the RC cited St. Lucie for
- sion officials a Atlanta who are nine performance violations and Boron inhibits the absorbs nuclear reaction neutrons '.and investigati insist there was no fined it $2,000. Beginning in "We adjust the boron -
on the life of the fuel," w to t ublic during the , St. Lucie Unit 1.was out i I report on the sai . "As you older, weaker
' inc service for 73 da because of savesti The, ion is not expected for personnel errors mechanical fuel, you need baron, so you
; weeks. forci the utilit to have to dilute it."
~
." Theft wese's tes apety ",
. ficancetotheinci t amid ;g 16 ggmit ion ,as g Hannah, an NRC spoke 6- meet its ..
- sations.
s man in Atlanta. "Our concern was the lack of attention to la the latest problem, ms aior.'..
- detail. There were several other sounded aRer pressere ' built
- peopic in the control room, and inside the Unit I reactorJan. 22.
.some of thern should have been The operator failed to tellcon-
' aware of it." trol-room colleagues that he was FPL.did not discipline any adjusting the reactor coolant t l f I l l 2 1 en d 594STErt cri 01 tred ,Waca:60 %6T-20-20 l
January 25, 1996 ST LUCIE
, Site Intearation Matrix 3 ostoj
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saio; F.A,s
- Ref.{ '
a'CM idenufied Loesoripuenj 1/23/96 MS IR9641 Electrical arc during Self-identifying Blown fuse results in loss of approximately 25% of maintenance control roorn annunciators 1/22/06, OPS IR 9641 Operator Error Self-identifying Boron dilution event due to operator leaving control panel while dilution was in progrees. 1/5/98 OPS /M IR 96-22 Temp Control Valve Uoonese U-2 manual RX trip on high generator H, temp due to S Failure failure of temp control valve. 1/5/96 OPS IR 95-22 Inadequate Procedure' NRC Several procedural deficiencies and calculational Review and Emeoution errors idenbfied in reload physics test procedure. 1/5/96- OPS /- IR 96-22 . Failure to Property NRC Several deficiencies in procedure change pmoses PS NCV 9622 01 Implement Procedures implementation identified Expired or canceled TCs found in control rooms and hot shutdown panel. 12/27/96 OPS IR 96 22 Lack of Attendance at Self identifying - FRG meeting suffered /iterre deferred due to lack of FRG OPS /Eng'g attendance at meeting. Makw issues at meeting affected OPS /$ng'g.
- a '" '95 - MS IR 96 22 Plating - Localized Self identifying RX vessel flange inner C-ring groove pitting reeuited in Corrosion cooidown and head removal for repair, u/ty96 MS IR 96 22 Filling RCS Before Uoensee 2A2 RCP esal pkg lower seal deetaged due to reverse Coupling RCP pressure across seal.
12/5/06 OPS /M IR 96-22 Poor Logheeping/ Attn NRC ESFAS cabinet doore found unlocked following S to Detail maintenance work l&C error. Log entries assoaisted with work were not complete. 12/1/95 PS' 1R 96-21 Failure to Document NRC Red survey reeutts unavailabio for B hot leg work. RAD Survey Surveys performed but not documented 12/1/96 OPS IR 96-21 Corrective Actions NRC Followup to previous inspection findings indicated a weakness in followthrough in addressing deflolonaise 12/1/95 OPS IR 95 21 - Proceduralinadequacy NRC SDC Procedure required natural oiro-related surveillance prior to establishing RCS pressure boundary. Natural oiro not possible without pressurization. 12/1/95 OPS 1R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Recurrent non valid alarms when statung fire pumps were not documented as operator workarounde Voltage dipe aseooisted with auch starts were contributore to a trip previously 12/1/96- OPS IR 96-21 Poor Corrective Actions NRC Clearance in pleos to leolate N, from CST to facilitate prosaure owhoh replacement for nine days without i work order being wrinen. 12/1/95 OPS 1R 95 21 FTF Procedure NRC CCW eample valve showed dual indication without corrective action documentation initiated +
/96 ' OPS- IR 9641 Inadequate Operator NRC- Operatore unable to r d, obtain l&C seapoints Training from computer eher hard copies were removed from F - , oontrai room.
l l
12/1/95 OPS IR 95 21. Procedurd Weaknees/ NRC SDC procedur3 contamed conflicting viues for RX Inadequate Review l cov6ty level requiremente Procedure had been j approved since emphasis on accuracy stressed. OPS IR 96-21 Valve Position NRC Unit 2 procedures and valve deviation log used to Administrative Controle cycle Unit 1 cross connect valves. 11/27/96 OPS IR 96 21 Personnel Bror Uconeee Miesea RCS Boron sample surveillance - Repeat from l VIO 96-2143 IR 95-18 l 11/21/96 OPS IR 95-21 FTF Procedure Ucensee Failure to maintain Penetration Lag NCV 96 2144 j i 11/21/96 OPS IR 96-21 Equipment Failure Self identifying Ught socket failure during lamp replacement reeutts in j loss cooling to 1 A Main Transformer. Unit downpower j to -80%. 11/20/95 OPS IR 95 21 FTF Procedure NRC Valve discovered Closed vice Locked Oosed as VIO 95-2101 specified on Equipment Clearance Order. 11/16/95 OPS /M IR 96-21 Long-Standing Self Unit I manually tripped when 18 MFRV looked in 50% S Equipment Problem identrfying/Ucensee position Root cause degraded power supply, compounded by voltage dip on starting both station fire pumps. 11/11/95 OPS IR 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Tech. Spec equipment not specified for IV on VIO 95-2102 Equipment Clearance Order. 11/6/95 MS IR 9t-21 Equipment Failure Self identifying Failure of EDG 2A relay sockets. Potential common mode failure. 11/1/95 MS IR 9518 Personnel Error Self identifying ICI wiring error during RX head installation last RFO. NCV 95-18-05 10/19/95 OPS 1R 9618 Personnel Error Self identifying Messed shift CEA position indication surveillance ; NCV 95-1846 5 OPS IR 95-18 Personnel Error Uconese Miesed RCS Boron sample surveillance. NCV 951807 a 10/17/95 OPS IR 9518 Personnel Error Self identifying Lack of attenten to task resulted in overfilling RCB lawer cavity during flood up. 10/12/95 ENG 'IR 95-18 Design Error Golf identifying inserting CIAS signal during safeguards test shifted !- VIO 95-1844 EDG 2A to leochronous mode while EDG paralleled with offsite power. 10/9/95 PS LER 95-S02 Personnel Error Uconese Potential route for unauthorized access to protected area. CW water piping.
- 10/7/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure ,to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.
, VIO 95-18-01 Procedures { 10/5/95 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self identifying DG 1B developed FO leak at threaded connection ! during aufveillance run. 9/30/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log. - VIO 95-1842 Procedures 1 9/28/95 ENG IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self identifying Leaking PZR SVs extended forced outage problems l with tailpipe alignment. l 9/20/96 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self identifying EDG 1 A/1B govemor control problems resulted in load oscillations. l 9/15/95 OPS / IR 9518 Failure to Follow Self identifying Maint/ Ops did not provide clearance for work on i MS VIO 961803 Procedures . . condenser waterbox cover When cover pulled closed, severed worker's finger. l f 13 PS LER U1/U2 96- Failure to Follow Uconese Security failed to take correct componeatory action on 301 Procedure computer failure. eiso/96 OPS IR 9618 Failure to use Correct Self identifying SG blowdown sent to incorrect system on RAB roof. Procedure Operator unect wrong procedure. When identified did , not back out of procedure correctly 9
9/9/95 MS IR 9515 Weakness in Work Self identifying Leak en SV 1201 flinge extended cutage, identified Screening and one month earlier but not worked. l Planning l 1 OPS IR 9515 Personnel Error / Ucensee Unit 2 Main Generator overpressurized while filling inoperable with H2. Inattention by operators. Equ!pment/OWA i 9/2/95 OPS 1R 9515 Personnel Error NRC Weaknesses identified in logs relating to abnormal VIO 951543 equipment conditions and out of service equipment l
. not logged (multiple examples).
8/31/95 MS IR 9515 Personnel Error Self identifying Damaged cylinder and head on 10 EDG due to loose ; lash adjustment. 8/30/95 PS IR 9515 Management and OC NRC Containtnent closure walkdowns by management were I weaknesses inadequate and depended heavily on OC involvement to identify deficiencies. 8/30/95 MS IR 95-15 Supervisory oversight NRC Maintenance personnel not using procedures for work and worker attitude in progress. 8/29/95 OPS IR 9515 Personnel Error Ucensee Started 1B LPSI pump with suction valve c!osed. (No j VIO 9515-04 damage to pump) 1 4 8/29/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedure Use NRC Maintenance journeyman not signing off procedure VIO 951506 steps as work completed (previously identified as a l weakness in May 1995). 8/23/95 MS IR 9515 Equipment Failure / Self identifying 2A HOP trip due to relay failure. Eight HDP trips in i inadequate Correctrve past year. Engineering solution available but not I
^
Action implemented. 8/22/95 PS IR 95-15 Personnel Bror NRC QA failed to document a deficiency on containment spray valve surveillance identified in an audit.
.i OPS IR 9515 Operator Error / Self identifying Overfill of PWT. Spilled approx.10K gallons on l Operator Workaround ground inside RCA. Operator work around on level i control system and inattention to filling process by operator caused error.
8/18/95 MS IR 9515 Procedural Weakness NRC Procedural weakness involving supervisory oversight and journeyman qualification. 8/17/05 OPS LER UI9 % 07 Procedural inadequacy Self identifying Spraydown of Unit 1 containment. STAR process did i VIO 9515 and Weakness / not assign accountability for corrective action. Valve Operator work-Around surveillance prelube not documented on STAR. 8/9/95 MS IR 9516 Maintenance / Ucensee Inoperable Unit 1 PORVs due to maintenance. LER U195-005 Testing errors error / testing inadequacies. (Valves assembled EA 95180 incorrectly) (Used acoustic data only) 8/6/95 ENG LER UI 95406 Corrective Self identifying ufting of Unit 1 SDC thermal relief due to procedural VIO 952041 Action / Procedural revision from previous corrective action. Inoperable Weakness equipment not logged. 8/2/95 OPS LER U195004 Procedural Ucensee 1 A2 RCP neal failure due to " restaging
- at high VIO 95-1542 Weakness /Fallure to temperature.
Follow Procedures 8/2/95 OPS LER U195 04 Operator Error Self-identifying Operator failed to block MS!S actuation during VIO 95-15-01 cooldown. 7/29/95 MS IR 95-14 Procedural Weakness Self identifying I&C personnel attempt to test a level switch circuit which could not actuate given system conditions. 7'*9/95 OPS IR 95-14 Operator Self identifying Turbine / Reactor Trip due to test error. Error / Procedural Weaknees .
,/95 MS 1R 9514 Root Cause Pending Self identifying Catastrophic failure of Unit 2 B train CEDM cooling fan.
7/3/95 PS IR 9514 Security Weakness Self identifying Automobi'2 passed thr ugh nirmally closed security gate to plant intake / discharge canals at beach. Subsequent accident resulted in vehicle lodged in discharge canal piping. OPS IR 95-12 Weak log Keeping NRC Weaknesses identfied in logs relating to battery jumper installation and outof-service equipment. 7/1/95 PS IR 9512 Maintenance Self identfying Corrosion in transformer fire protection deluge system results in multiple failures. 7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Personnel Error NRC Three pieces of SNM found improperly tagged. NCV 95-1242 7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Program Weaknesses NRC Fire Protection program weaknesses identified in fire. fighting techniques and respirator qualification program. 7/1/95 MS IR 9512 Personnel Error NRC M&TE found installed across battery cell without J/LL NCV 951241 authorization. 6/3/95 MS IR 9510 Procedural Adequacy / NRC Several examples of weak adherence to procedures, Adherence including stop signoffs and independent verification, identfied. 6/3/95 MS IR 9510 Poor Communication Ucensee Poor communicaton/ lack of detailed instruction leads to improper 1B EDG govemor installation. 6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Maintenance / NRC HVAC systems for both units poorly Procedures maintained / Operating procedures contained numerous deficiencies. 1 6/3/95 MS IR 9510 Poor Surveillance Uoensee Missed several surveillances (7 day) on EDG. ! NCV 95-10 01 Tracking System l N/95 MS IR9%9 Personnel Error Ucensee Failure to perform personnel air lock testing on time. , NCV 954941 J
., ,s5 OPS IR9%5 Corrective Action NRC STAR /NCR program did not address evaluating past Program Weakness operability 4/28/95 MS IR 9545 Maintenance Error Uconsee incore instruments at ICI Flange 8 miswired ICI output signals directed to wrong computer points.
4/28/95 ENG IR9%5 Weakness in Temp NRC Weakness in addressing how mods would affect Mod Procedure control room drawings. 4/28/p5 ENG IR9%5 Failure to implement NRC Failure to document nonconformance regarding ICI NCV 9545-04 Corrective Action flange 8 conditions. Program 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05 ' Design implementation NRC Installation of wrong overload heater models in VIO 954541 Discrepancy switchgear. 4/1/95 OPS IR9%7 Apparent Personnel Ucensee Unit 1 experienced an approximate 14 minute loss of NCV 9M742 Error shutdown cooling while shifting from one shutdown cooling loop to the other. The root cause was the closing of the wrong SDC suction isolation valve (the valve for the operatng, vice idle, pump) on the part of the operator. 4/1/95 MS IR 9547 Poor Adherence to Uoonsee Jumper left installed in ECCS ventilation damper after NCV 9547-02 J/LL and Maintenance work complete. Procedures 4/1/95 OPS IR 9547 Weak Annunciator NRC Weak annunciator response by ROs contributed to Response - loss of shutdown cooling event. V95 MS ' IR 9440 Procedural Weakness NRC LPSI mechanical seal housing outer cap misinstalled. 15 OPS IR 9440 Operator NRC Operatorfailure to recognize outef-sight high Error / Procedural indication on EDG cooling water tank. Failure of Weakness procedure to include instructions on draining tank. 3/04/96 ENG IR 9544 Doeign Uconsee SDC suction relief valve lift due to water hammer.
. .- - ~ ~ - . - --. .-. - - . . . . - . - . - - . .- . ..~ - .
3/04/96 OPS IR 9 H 4 House- rwC Loose plastic debris found in Unit a fuel pool area, keeping 2/F M MS IR 9644 Equipment Failure Self identifying Unit 1 was shut down for the replacement of 3 pressurizer code safety valves. The valves were
. leaking by the seat.
7 2/21/95 OPS IR 9644 Equipment Failure Self identifying Unit 2 trip due to failure of a SGWL control level transmitter. Trenomitter failed high, resulting in
, closure of the FRV and a subsequent trip on low SGWL (9644) 2/20/96 OPS IR 9644 Equipment Anomaly Self identifying 28 LPSI pump found air-bound during surveillance teobng The liconese has theorized that the migration >
of air in the system resulted in the condition as a result of previous surveillance testing. The pumps are not self-venting. , 2/17/96' MS IR SG 02 Physical Condition NRC Numerous areas of corrosion idemified in Unit 1/2 CCW areas. 2/17/96 PS IR 9643 Personnel Error NRC in two observed exercises, ECs failed to notify states
/ Training Weaknees within 15 minutes.
8/16/96 MS 'IR 9644 Maintenance Error / Self identifying Load shed of the 1 A31E 4100 bus due to inadvertent Procedural Weaknees jumper contact while replacing a degraded voltage relay. 3/4/96 OPS IR 9641 Operator Ucensee Failure to sample SIT within TS required time frame VIO 964141 Error / Communications following volume addition. Second occurrence in 2 years. 2/4/95 OPS IR 9641 Poor Communications NRC Failure to identity and analyze Unit 1 hot leg flow stratification aSM MS IR 9601 Personnel Error / Self identifying inadequate independent verification resulted in CVCS VIO 96-0102 Program Weakness leidown control valve failing to respond due to ' reversed leads. Resuhed in a coesation of lendown flow. 12/31/94 ENG IR 94 25 Engineering Design Self identifying inadequate design control of NaOH crose conneobon NCV 94-25-01 Error between ECCS trains. 12/3/94 PS IR 94-24 Procedure N Uconese Feliure to perform TS-required per6 odic procedure NCV 94 2441 Inadequacy reviews 12/3/94- MS IR 94-24 Maintenance NRC Inadequate process for changes to vendor technical l VIO 94-24 02 Procedures manuais. Inadequacy 11/25/94 MS IR 94-22 Program weakness Ucensee The liconese's QA organization identified numerous weakneseos in the implementatson of the site's l welding program. As a result, the Maintenance Manager pieced a stop work order on welding activibes The stoppage lasted one week, i j 11/24/94 MS 1R 94-24 Procedure weakness Self-identifying Unit 18 side SIAS actuanon due to a knotable module which had not been adequately withdrawn from the ESFAS cabinet during maintenanos 11/23/94 MS IR 94-24 Equipment Failure Self identifying Unit 1 SIAS with unit in mode 5 due to common mode failure of Rosemount transmitters used for prosaurizer pressure channels. 11/5/94 OPS IR 94-22 Operations, Ucensee Waste gas release on Sept. 10,1993, with NCV 94-22-03 Maintenance meteorologicalinstruments out of service Errore S/94 MS IR 94-22 Weather-Related/ Self-identifying Unit 1 automatcally tripped due to aro over from a ER Maintenance potential transformer due to salt buildup on switchyard
, insulators.
s
s 9/30/94 OPS 1R %20 inconsistent NRC Local valvo position indicators not maintained MS Expectations accurate. Procedures / training provided to operators on verifying valve position found weak. OPS IR 9420 Operations, NRC Plant personnel not trained on IPE and not using it for Maintenance work planning and scheduling. Deficiency 9/30/94 OPS IR 9419 Operations Weakness NRC During requal exam, a licensed operator exhibited an apparent disregard for EOPs. 9/30/94 MS IR 94 20 Personnel Error Uconsee Maintenance personnel begin to work the wrong RWT isolation vahre. threatening the operability of both trains of ECC3. i 9/30/94 DPS IR 94-19 Operations Error Ucensee Failure to notify the NRC of changes in status of NCV 9419-01 licensed operators' medical conditions. 8/29/94 OPS IR 94 20 Operations Errors NRC Operators placed 1 A EDG in an electrical lineup for VIO 94-2241 which TS-required surveillance tests had not been VIO 94-2242 performed (with the safety 4 elated swing bus powered from it). Also, related control room tog entries appeared to be inaccurate.
- 8/28/94 OPS IR 94-20 Equipment Fallure Ucensee Unit 1 was taken off line (Mode 2) to repair a DEH leak. The unit was returned on line later the same day.
8/12/94
- OPS IR 94-18 Operations / NRC The licensee was unloading new fuel for Unit 1 with a Maintenance Error and hoist grapple that was missing the safety latch sleeve Lack of Engineering locating pin. The safety sleeve functioned by friction Drawings / inspection only.
Criteria j 7/14/94 MS IR 94-15 Equipment Ucensee/NRC During surveillance test, TCB 5 failed to open due to LER U-2 %06 Failure / Poor mechanical binding (licensee). The liconese failed to VIO 94-1541 Management Decision recognize the condition as requiring a shutdown per __ TS (NRC). 7/9/94 OPS IR 9415 Equipment Failure Ucensee Unit 2 turbine was shut down and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 because the 2B1 RCP lower oil level indication showed a leak. The indication was later shown to be erroneous. 7/8/94 OPS IR 94-15 Operator Error Ucensee TS 3.0.3 entry due to placing 2A1 LPSI pump and 2B LER U2 9445 charging pump OOS at the same time. 6/28/94 MS IR 9414 Personnel Error / Ucensee Inoperable Unit 2 RAB ventilation exhaust WRGM due NCV 941441 Procedural Weakness to failure to connect sample lines. . LER U-2 9444 6/6/94 OPS IR 9414 Weather Uconsee Unit 1 trip from 100% power during a severe thunderstorm due to debris blown across two main transformer output terminals. 5/28/94 PS IR 94-13 Poor Corrective Action NRC Emergency supplies in control room less that stated in DEV R13-01 FSAR. 5/6/94 ENG IR 94-11 Engineer 6ng Error NRC inadequate corrective action for MOVs which stalled i VIO 941141 during surveillances. l , 4/23/94 OPS IR 94-12 Mfg. Error Self identifying Unit 2 auto reactor trip from 30% power caused by LEP U 2 94 03 RPS cabinet wiring error for trip bypass circuit, from l original unit construction. ' 4/23/94 MS 1R 94-12 Equipment Failure Self-identifying Following unit 2 trip, steam bypass system operated unexpectedly and dropped RCS temp by seven degrees F, pressurizer heaters tumed off.
- 94 -OPS IR 94-12 Operator Ucensee . Unit 2 reactor power increased from 26 to 31% due to inattentiveness positive MTC.
4
l i 4/7/94- MS R 94-10 Maintenance Error NRC Contractor personnel made and contractor OC
- . VIO 941041 accepted pressurizer nozzle weld prep that did not
- meet procedural requirements for bevel angle.
l Uconese engineering had specified overly tight ; tolerances. 4.,.. OPS IR 94-12 Operations Procedure Self identifying Unit 1 auto reactor trip due to unueuel electrical lineup l f LER U19444, (ieochronous EDO paralleled with offsite power , Error (Lack of sufficient ; l depth in review) through TCBe). , 1 4/3/94 ENG* IR 9412 Surveillanw Error Uconsee Ucensee discovered that the 4160 V [A8 Bus) swing , i VIO 94-1241 - bus components [C ICW Pump and C CCW Pump) + would not strip from the bus upon undervoltage if the bus were aligned to the B bus due to a missing wire.
; 3/28/94 MS 1R 94-09 Personnel Error Self identifying Unit I auto reactor trip. Maintenance foreman opened
- WR Ut 9443 generator exciter breaker on wrong unit.
t 3/16/94 ENG R 94 06 Engineering Correctrve NRC Regional inspector had two Unit 2 SL4 violatons 1) VIO 94-08 01 Action corrective action for an 11/24/92 water hammer event VIO 944842 was done without documented instructions or l procedures, resulting in operating until 3/94 with five enubbers on the SRV and PORV tailpigies inoperable. ,
- 2) Failure to write a nonconformance report for a ,
- damaged pipe support in March 1994.
- 3/16/94 ENG IR 94-10 Equipment Failure Ucensee A Unit 2 pressurizer instrument nozzle that had been r LER U-29442 repaired a year ago was found leaking while the unit was in Mode 5. The unit remained shut down for repairs. >
k 3/4/94 ENG R 9406 Engineering Design Ucensee inadequate design controls on Unit 2 sequencer NCV-94-06-02 Error charging pump loading block, s
- 't ENG R 94 06 Engineering Error Ucensee Failure to report an EDG failure. ;
NCV 94 0641 1 2/2s/94 ENG R 9449 Refueling procedure & Ucensee/NRC inadequate grappling of a fuel assambly caused by ; NCV 94-04-01 operator error error in Recomrnended Move Ust and operator error in
' l l following procedure. "(IR 9449) 2/17/94 OPS R 9446 Operator Error Ucensee Pressurizer aux. spray isolanon valve had been looked l NCV 94 06 01 ,cioned (vice open) since 3/27/93.
- LER U2 9441 1
8/11/94 - PS IR 9442 Security Error ^ Ucensee Failure to provide required compensatory measures in l
- NCV 944241 response to a security computer system failure. I i
1/13/94 OPS IR 9441 Surveillance Self identified UV relay test resuhed in load shed of the 1 A3 4160 voit LER U19442 Procedure Weakness / bus and a 1A EDG auto start Component Failure ] 4 ! 1/9/94 OPS- IR 9441 Equipment Failure Self identified Manual reactor trip . food pump control circuit failure. , LER U19441 1/2/94 . . . SALP period 11 began e l I a = l
ST, LUCIE CHRON0 LOGY .
-8/29/95 Root Cause Analysis (Assessment of Recent Events) Licensee Meeting -
9/5-9/95 Independent Industry (Utility) Experts Conduct Review of SL 9/7/95 Meeting Summary issued listing 6 closing comments 9/15/95 FPL submits plan to improve operational performance, listing 5 problem areas. Acceptance of long standing repetitive problems by management. Equipment performance unsatisfactory Personnel performance inadequate Procedures approved with technical deficiency Management unable to trend / assess plant events 10/10/95 Issued PPR inspection schedule to.St. Lucie 11/1/95 Status Meeting with FPL 11/17/95 Branch Chief briefed on program status at site 1/18/96 SALP Board Meeting 1/22/96 Inspection Team on site - inspecting each broad area of performance improvement program . 1/26/96 Inspection team on site over the weekend inspecting the overdilution event 2/8/96 Performance improvement status meeting - RII 2/15/96 EDO and Russell site visit 2/22/96 SALP Presentation
, Planned activities:
4/96 Chairman Visit' 6/96 N + 1 Residents on site 8/96 Followup team-inspection of the Operational Performance Improvement Program 8-12/96 Maintenance Rule Inspection
; -< c , . -
ST LUCIE ENFORCEMENT PANEL ~
SUMMARY
2/7/96- 1
- 1. General Descriotion of the Event 1
. . . i At approximately 2:25 a.m. on' January 22, 1996, the Unit I control. board ;
- Reactor Controls Operator (RCO) began a manual dilution to the RCS by l aligning primary makeup water (demineralized water) directly to the l suction of the IB Charging Pump. Moments after beginning the dilution, j the board RCO responded to a secondary plant annunciator and then saw L the desk RCO return from the kitchen. He requested that the desk RCO e relieve him so that.he could prepare his lunch. During the turnover, i i there was no discussion of the dilution in progress. Following the l turnover, the relief operator at the controls and the Nuclear Plant i 1 Supervisor (NPS), who was at the desk RCO station, were not aware that a .
i dilution was in progress. The original board RCO returned between 5-10 4 minutes later and immediately. recognized his error. He informed the !
.Other RCO of the overdilution, which was overheard by the NPS, and ;
- stopped the dilution. The NPS directed the ANPS take charge and begin a ;
manual boration. Unit 1 entered 2-hour TS LCO Action Statement 3.2.5 l 1 for T, greater than 549'F. The maximum T, obtained was 549.9'F and the l l maximum reactor power was 101.18%. T, was above the TS limit of 549'F l for approximately 50 minutes and reactor power was above 100% for
- approximately 70 minutes. .The TS LCO Action Statement for T, was not :
} exceeded and the guidance of the Jordan memorandum on maximum reactor ,
- power was not exceeded. The operators did not verbally notify plant 1 l
management or the NRC of this event.
- 2. Enforcement Panel Preliminary Conclusions
! Part 50 Licensee: One SLIII Problem, with three violations - Supplement
- - I.C.7: A breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving a i number of violations that are related that collectively represent a j .significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed '
responsibilities. The -NRC will hold a ' closed predecisional enforcement
- conferencefwith the licensee.
] The three violations are: J
- a. Operators failed to follow procedures, four examples:
, 1) Operators failed to stop dilution when the proper amount had l l been added. i
- 2) There was inadequate watch turnover for the operator at the
_ controls _during dilution. l 3) Operators failed to follow the Conduct of Operations !- procedure in performing the. dilution procedure (lack of. i ( strict / verbatim compliance). j 1 i
- 4) Operators failed to adequately report the event to licensee ,
management. t 4
\
.]
, . j 1
2 l 1
- b. Inadequate design control, in that Unit 1 procedurer for adding a.
mixture of demineralized water and boric acid to the reactor ~ ! coolant system (in manual and directly to the ' suction of the .
- charging pumps) did not implement the procedure as stated in the' <
FSAR, Chapter 15 (in. automatic'and to the VCT) and had not done' , so since before Unit I was licensed. -
- c. Inadequate' 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, .in that the licensee made a change to the Unit 1. dilution procedure on January 23,'1996 (after.-
the event),:to allow adding pure demineralized water in manual and- : directly to the- suction of the charging pumps,. that was different from the procedure.as stated in the FSAR, Chapter 15 (in automatic > and to the VCT) without a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation. Part 55 Licensees: No official enforcement action, but the NRC wilt ask the licensee to bring three licensed operators.from the event (the NPS, , board RO, and desk R0) to the enforcement conference with the utility. Also, the staff is considering sending letters to the three operators expressing NRC concern with their actions.
- 3. Special Insoection and FSAR Review '
' Region.II was notified of this event at approximately 10:00 a.m. on !
. Monday, January 22, when the licensee' delivered a copy of the In-House Event Report t~o the NRC resident inspector. At the time, RII had an ongoing corrective action program inspection at the site including region based inspectors R. Schin, M. Thomas, and L. Mopre. On Thursday, !
January 25, RII management organized a special event followup inspection : to begin on Friday, January 26, and continue through the weekend until ') completed. The special. inspection included lead inspector R. Schin plus i Turkey Point resident inspector B. Desai and.St. Lucie acting resident I inspector S. Sandin. The special inspection exit interview was I conducted at 10:00~a.m. on Tuesday, January 30.- The inspectors-included FSAR review in the inspection plan, and B. Desai's review of the FSAR identified that the licensee's operating procedures for boron dilution were not consistent with the FSAR Chapter , 15. accident analysis procedure for boron dilution. Further review of , this issue resulted in proposed violations b. and c. above. At the exit
- interview, the licensee had seven dissenting comments to this finding.
0 k.. I l
Page r' of 174 j , ST. LUCIE PLANT
~
l ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE NO. 0010120 REVISION 79
. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS I
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. I ST. LUCIE CHRON0 LOGY 8/29/95 Root Cause Analysis (Assessment of Recent Events) Licensee Meeting !
.9/5-9/95 Independent Industry (Utility) Experts Conduct Review of SL-9/7/95 Meeting Summary issued listing 6 closing comments 9/15/95 FPL. submits plan to improve operational performance, listing i 5 problem areas. ;
- Acceptance of long standing repetitive problems by i management.
Equipment performance unsatisfactory Personnel performance inadequate Procedures approved with technical deficiency l l Management unable to trend / assess plant events l 10/10/95 Issued PPR inspection schedule to St. Lucie 11/1/95 Status Meeting with FPL 11/17/95 Branch Chief briefed on program status at site 1/18/96 SALP Board Meeting i 1/22/96 Inspection Team on site - inspecting each broad area of performance improvement program
. 1/26/96 Inspection team on site over the weekend inspecting the .
overdilution event i 1 2/8/96 Performance improvement status meeting - RII ! 2/15/96 EDO and Russell site visit 4 2/22/96 SALP Presentation 4 Planned activities:
- 4/96 Chairman Visit ,
, 6/96 N + 1 Residents on site j 8/96 , Followup team inspection of the Operational Performance Improvement Program 8-12/96 : Maintenance Rule Inspection + . 9 e
.a
Notes from the 2/8/96 meeting with St Lucie on their Operational Performance Improvement Plan: T. Plunkett - (as of 3/1/96 President of FPL nuclear division) TP and SL appear to be like 2 different companies - we will establish uniform policies and programs and standardize across the nuclear division of FPL St. Lucie is taking action to infuse people from outside FPL No strong sense of personal accountability onsite at SL Management - Union relationship is adversarial Teamwork not observed at SL like it is at TP Overall planning (daily and outage) needs improvement SL people are embarrassed - want to improve J. Scarola - Plant Manager Transitioning from one time improvement plan to an ongoing performance improvement plan with management indicators reviewed on a monthly basis Don't put on a show - raise expectations and meet them - let day to day practices speak for themselves as to our standards Reduced operator workarounds - eliminated-43 Reduced control room deficiency tags Performance expectation has been significantly raised for operators. Replacing some shift supervisors. Procedures 'most undergoing major revision: Standardizing with much more detail reducing reliance on technical manuals Facility Review Group (FRG) not doing detailed enough review - has been reconstituted Not good enough yet at closing out identified deficiencies. Shift Control Room logs are on LAN - reviewed and commented on real time by management - accountability has increased W. Bohlke - Acting Vice President St. Lucie Areas for Imorovement Self Assessment - Not as good as we thought Not consistently good at ro'ot cause evaluation Personnel Performance - need people from outside FPL to broaden perspectives, talent, and rigor ! raise management expectations reduce gap between performance and expectations get management in field reinforcing expectations - accountability < Procedure Upgrades - enhance critical attributes (eg. add FSAR comparison,to checklist)
- . - . - ~ .-- . - -- - - --
, February 8, 1996 1
Florida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg President - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000
-Juno' Beach, FL. 33408-0420.
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
- PRESENTATION ON. CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN SAINT LUCIE 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
Th'is refers to the meeting requested by the NRC on February 8, 1996, in ) Atlanta, Georgia.- The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the status of l your progress on your plan to improve operational performance. . It is our opinion, that this meeting was very beneficial. - Enclosed is a list of Attendees and Florida Power and Light Company Handout. The discussions included 'the followin'g topics: Operational Improvement Activities; Transition from the Improvement Plan to Management Indicators; Recent Challenges and Areas for Improvement. In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice, "Part 2, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. l l
.Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, Orig signed by Kerry D. Landis Kerry D. Landis, Chief , Reactor Projects Branch 3 l
- Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335,.50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees l
- 2. FP&L Handout cc w/encls: W. H. Bohlke, Acting Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant ,
P. 0. Box 128 l
.Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 cc w/encls: Continued see page.2 ;
i OFFICIAL COPY 4 /, A A m 1 A **1 w O I e i f ~ . ~p4* r 5 V O 4 %f ,
p 1 I , FP&L -
- 2. !
cc w/encis: Continued l H. N. Paduano, Manager- .
. Licensing and Special Programs
- Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL ' 33408-0420 J. Scarola, Plant General Manager l St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box.128
,. Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 E' Weinkam,' Plant Licensing Manager l St. Lucie Nuclear Plant - P. 0. Box 128 . 1
'Ft. Pierce, FL :34954-0218 l
J. R. Newman, Esq. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius , 1800 M Street, NW i Washington, D. C. 20036 l' John T. Butler, Esq. Steel Hector and Davis
.4000 Southeast Financial cenbr l Miami, FL 33131-2398 l Sill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv.
1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature ! 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 l Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 Joe Myers, Director
. Division of Emergency Preparedness
-Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 323'99-2100 Thomas R. L. Kindred, County Administrator
-St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue l Ft. Pierce, FL. 34912 - '
i Charles. B. Brinkman
- l
_ Washington Nuclear Operations l ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 J
.Rockville, MD -20852 1
- e. . . . - - . - . . .-. - - - . - -- .. - . .. -- .- ..,- .. _ . . - - -
r 1 FP&L 3
~
Distribution w/ enc 1: JJ. Norris, NRR G. Ha11strom,-RI!
,- PUBLIC .
NRC Res' i dent Inspector 1 U.S._ Nuclear Regulatory Comm. 7585 South Highway AIA ~ J
- Jensen Beach, FL.-34957-2010 1 1
)
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1 -
LIST OF ATTENDEES Florida Power and licht Company
.W. Bohlke, Vice President, St. Lucie T. Plunkett, President - Elect J. Scarola, Plant Manager, St. Lucie -
E. Weinkam, Licensing Manager, St. Luci.e Nuclear Reaulatory Commission C. Casto, Chief, Engineering Branch Division Reactor Safety (DRS) R. Croteau, Project Manager, Office of Nucitar Reactor Regulation A. Gibson, Director, DRS J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) K. Landis, Chief, DRP, Branch 3 T. Peebles, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, DRS L.. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator R. Schin, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch DRS e 6 9 4 e 4 4 4 6 9 9
a l-FLORIDA POWER AXD l LIGHT COMPANY ~ l l l ST. LUCIE PLAST - i l i
- IMPROVEMENT
! STATUS j SLMMARY ! 1
\
i L l US:SRC REGIONIIMEETISU i. c ATLA'STA,'GA i ! FEBRUARY 8,1996 . s i
1 i OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT i
?
ACTIVITIES . j -
! RESOLUTION OF LONG-STANDING l - PROBLEMS - ! ELn4INATED 43 OPERA 1DRWORKAROUNDS D4Pu!MENIED DAILY DARK BOARD EXPECTADON FOR ANNUNCIA'IORS j MODIPIED CONTADNENT SPRAY VALVES
] REPLAGD EXCORE NUQ2AR INSULUMENTADON SYSDN j INSTAME CONDENSER CUWWG SYSBN i j EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE i REDU D 1EE CORRECITVE MADfMNANCE BACKIDG BY 400 PLANT WORK ORDERS } ! REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE LEAKS FROM 120 TO 40 REDUCED THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY SYSTEM AL*mRATIONS PROM 43 TO 15 1 RAINED ENGENBERS IN ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS i . l l PERSOKSEL PERFORMANCE. IMPIEMENIED OPERATIONS SEIE ERROR IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
, thWEREDTHEIN-HOUSEEVENT1HRESHOLD COMMUNICATED AND REINFORCED REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONAL ACCOLWTABILITY TO OEMRA1DRS 9
2 g
.- --- = - . . , -
t 1 L PROCED'URE IMPROVEME:ST- . l l
. u=ioiNo.mDO ,ROoooRES SDLENGTMDED AND UPGRADED DE FACILITY REVIEW GLOUP PROCESS
! IMPIBGDm!D MORE RIGOROUS TEMPORARY SYSVD4 ALTERADON PROCESS STRENGTHENEDDE REVIEWPROCESSPOR'MRST-TIME-USEPROCEDURES I -
~
ASSESS / TREND PLANT EVENTS CREAV!D A QUARTERLY STAR VtEND REPORT IMPROVED THE INFORMADON RECORDED WmHN THE OPERATOR LOGS IMP!2MENTED THE USE OF COMPUTERIZED IDGS TRANSITION FROM THE IMPROVEMEhT PLAN TO MANAGEMESTINDICATORS 1 l j
. 1 i
3 i l e
RECENT CHALLENUES 1 -
! UNrr2 MANUALREACIVRTRIP WNERA1DR CXXD GAS TEMPERATURE CONIROL VALVE 3 .
cOmOi. ROOM OPERuoRRES,0NSE
- 1 i
! IJ!SSONS LEARNED , DYNAMIC POST MADmMANCE TESTING OF CONTROL SYSTEMS . FIEID OPERA 1DRPERPORMANCE ] POST 1 RIP DATA COLIJECIlON AND REVIEW l PERIODIC INSTRUMENT SENSING IJNE MAINTENANCE 1
)
i l i UNrrI BORONOVER-DILUITON 1
- A REACTIVITY MANIPULA110N WAS DGTIATED AND LEFT UNATTENDED SEDW RESPONSE BY PLANT STAFF POR RECOGNrrION OF EVENT SIGNJFICANCE 3Anamma REVEWED PERSCENEL SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES /DOCUMENIWPOLICIES TRADENG& QUALITY ASSURANCE 1
i e d 4 4 4
a
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AREASFORIMPROVEMENT i - -! SELF-ASSESSMENTS PROVIDING OUTSIDE TRAINING ' 4 00lmHUED USE OF INDUSTRY SPECIAUST8 FOR ASSESSMENTAND AUDITS BENCHMARluNO OF INDUSTRY-BEST PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 1 - ) PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE i l. DEVEDPING TRENDINDICATORS l EXPECTADONS VERSUS PERFORMANCE j IMPt l'L50mNO FOCUSED OBSERVATIONS BY MANAGEMENT i i i F CONTENT OF PROCEDURES
- INCREASING IEVEL OF DETAIL Di PROCEDURES IMPROVING TruRI JNB88'OF PROCEDURE UPGRADES
- IMPLEMENT MAINTENANCE RULE i IDENTIFYING AND MONITORING SYSTEMS IN CATEGORY A1 IMPt3'uPWIING CORRECHVE ACTION TO TRANSITIONFROM CATEGORY AI TO CATEGORY A2 i
4 h a L . t
- 5
. . , 1
l l 1 l September 7~, 1995 j L .
. l
' Florida Power..and Light Company
' ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg :
President - Nuclear Division ; ~ P.'O. Box 14000 -i Juno Beach,-FL- 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
--ASSESSMENT OF RECENT EVENTS - ST. LUCIE DOCKET :
i NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389 : i i
- Gentlemen: !
! This refers to the meeting conducted at your request at the.NRC' Region II !
. office in Atlanta, Georgia, on August 29, 1995. The purpose of the meeting ' was for you to provide an assessment of recent events that occurred at your
! St. Lucie. facility. During this meeting the NRC also provided an assessment i= of'recent. events at St. Lucie. i
, Enclosed'are a. List' of Attendees, the FPL Assessment Handout, and the NRC Roct I i Cause Assessment Handout. The assessment, provided by your St. Lucie staff, !
included management's review of recent events, the root causes of the events, and the corrective actions to be' implemented as a result of the events. The .
-NRC also provided an organizational and programmatic root cause analysis of i St. Lucie site issues which have occurred over the last 12 months. ;
- The following is a summary of the comments made at the closing of the meeting
- :
- 1. The NRC and FPL are in basic agreement as to root causes and corrective actions;
~
i 1- ;
- 2. FPL is initiating an independent assessment using off site personnel;
- 3. FPL will integrate the findings from the St. Lucie site assessment, the l NRC assessment, and the planned independent assessment; !
- 4. FPL will complete a corrective action matrix and provide it to'the NRC !
, by September 15, 1995; ' 5 .' NRC Resident Inspectors will perform followup inspections of corrective
- ' actions, supplemented with regional inspections as necessary; and
- 6. Another mariagement meeting is planned for late October to review the ongoing performance trend at St. Lucie.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, - i
- Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, a copy, of this letter and its ' enclosures i
'will-be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. .
i
'0FFICIAL COPY i
-j
.. i
.- 'i
[ i
-mo nvw
FP&L 2 ! Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us. Sincerely, Orig signed by Ellis W.'Merschoff ( 1 Ellis W. Herschoff, Director. ! Division of Reactor Projects l Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 I License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees
- 2. FPL Presentation Handout
- 3, . NRC Root Cause Assessment Handout cc w/encis:
D. A. Sager Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company i P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420- ! 1 J. Scarola . Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant ' P. O. Box 128 I Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 ' Robert E. Dawson Plant Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 i J.-R. Newman, Esq. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius . j 1800 M Street, NW ,
- Washington, D. C. 20036 cc w/encis
- Continued See page 3 !
4 0
FP&L 3
~
cc.w/encis:. Continued - John T. Butler, Esq. Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 33131-2398 Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL. 32399-0700 Jack Shreve Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel ' c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Thomas R. L. Kindred County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 . Charles B. Brinkman Washington Nuclear Operations
'ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 " Rockville, MD 20852 4 e 4 b
t , 'FP&L' 4-Distribution w/encls: J. Norris NRR G. Hallstrom, RII 4 PUBLIC' . j NRC Resident Inspector
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com. >
, - 7585 South Highway A1A Jensen Beach, FL 34957-2010 t l 7 ? i l e i-v. + d .i i 1 j ese te puniic OOcOMSMr ROOM 7 YES HO opmet Rif not A StONATURE g
- NAME ELas K OATE os1 ,iss os i b i ts os s -i ss ' os s i et os t l es os s i st COPYP YES NO M NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY 12CUMENT NAME: P:\5TL82995.5UM t
t b t e d S
_ LIST OF ATTENDEES Florida Power Corocration J.~Goldberg, President, Nuclear Division D. Sager, Vice President, St. Lucie Site J. Scarola, Plant General Manager Nuclear Reaulatory Commission R. Bernhard, Reactor Engineer,'RII C. Casto, Chief, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch, RII S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, RII N. Economos, Reactor Inspector, RII R. Hannanh, Public Affairs Officer, RII J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division or Reactor Projects, RII K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B (RP28), DRP, RII E. Lea, Project Engineer, RP2B, DRP, RII
- b. Mallett, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards. RII D. Matthews, Project Director, NRR '
E. Merschoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII
. J. Norris, Project Director, NRR R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector, RII R. Schin, Project Engineer, RP28, DRP, RII M. Thomas, Reactor Inspector, R II G. Tracy, Assistant. to the Executive Director for Operations, NRR Public D. Weimer, Reporter, Palm Beach Post l
t A 8 e I - ' E 4 4 ENCLOSURE 1 4
r . _ .__ _ ._ .__ _ i ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MEETING Atlanta, Georgia August 29,1995
5 c Unit 1 Turbine Trip , , 1 ee c Vehicle in Discharge Canal w ' l
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~ ' Both Units Shutdown for Hurricane Erin Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Failure / 'I i
" C Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) Actuation !
w ! c Unit.2 on line ,
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m E .{ AC-i a G. C a 30 as 3N
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Inadvertent Reactor Protection Sys, tem !O "g [ - (RPS) Actuation l oo CC M
~
E o - Both Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves <
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(PORV's) out of service ;f' Q
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c Letdown Relief Valve Lift l
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c Containment Spray Initiation
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w c Primary Water Tank (PWT) Overfill ( II
m gy N e ma en sua ame r === === === ==== = = === = = Problem Type Acceptance of Equipment Persoimel Prmdures Long Standmg Performance Performance Deficiencies St. Lucie Nuclear Plant y ,, y 3" Recent Problems e ., g Et ia I:: 3 a
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5 b ' NE hk To ci < f 8 Turbine Trip Test results in plant shutdown X X MSIS Actuation during RCS cooldown X X 1 A2 RCP seal failure during restaging process X X X Inadvertent RPS actuation while shutilown X X Both PORV's out of service due to common mode X X X maintenance error Common LPSI header relief valve (V-3439) lifted and would not rescat Pressure perturbations during letdown manipulation X X cause leidown relief valve (V-2345) to lift Inadvertent spraydown of Containment while performing X X X X X SDC venting evolution X X X PWT overflow while filling l- _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - . - - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
M. E M M -M e en en set en am me en as em as O emi <
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PROBLEM: Acceptance Of Long Standing, Repetitive Problems lly Plant t Management ; i i SOLUTION: Management commitment to raise the standards i i ACTION 1: Employee meetings with President, Vice President
'and Plant General Manager.
ACTION 2: Extensive review of deficiencies which impact operations. Added approximately 80 work items i to the current shutdown work.
. ACTION 3: Held Unit 2 at reduced power to solve long '
standing Heater Drain Pump problem with
-a design modification.
ACTION 4: Standardized the outage scope review process
, by the development of a formal procedure.
~
ACTION 5: Reopened the scope review for the Fall Unit 2 refueling outag6.
E E T m a e en a e e e e e e e e G e PROBLEM: Equipment Performance Is Not Satisfactory SOLUTION 1: Improve technical ownership and minimize deferral of plant 1 maintenance actions particularly those which introduce operator workarounds t ACTION 1: Strengthened tecimical leadership by filling the vacant Technical Manager position and suspending the SRO certification course for the Engineering Manager and the Maintenance Manager. ACTION 2: Raise acceptance criteria. ACTION 3: Improve management visibility of plant status, ACTION 4: Expedite elimination of workarounds. I SOLUTION 2: Ensure the post maintenance and modification test program verifies operability ACTION 1: Combine the various test groups under the direction of' the Onernfinns Manneer.
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PROllLEM:' Personnel Performance Has Not lleen Adequate - SOLUTION 1: Set high expectations and hold personnel accountable ACTION 1: Employee meetings with President, Vice President i and Plant General Manager. ACTION 2: Management more involved in the details.
~
ACTION 3: NucIcar Plant Supervisors meeting with their crews to set cicar expectation for Error Free Performance. - ACTION 4: Recognition for superior and discipline for substandard performance. 3 ACTION 5: Reinforcement of the S(top). T(hink). O(perate); P(rove) program. SOLUTION 2: Trend and analyze low level events l ACTION 1: Further upgrade the log keeping practices to enhance event commumcation to management. ACTION 2: Combine the event data' bases from STARS, IHEs, and HPES.
_ . . . __ . _ . . . . - . . - - . - - - . - . . . . - . . . - - - - . . - . - . . . ~ . . GIk F et egg sun. ama man mum uns nas uma mas num inus mas er te - ens'
~ ~
PROBLEM: Procedures Have Been Approved With Technical Deficiencies . SOLUTION: Strengthen the procedure review process 4 ACTION 1: Plant Policy 105 has been revised to require a technical review for first time use of procedures under conditions different than originally intended. ACTION 2:- Establish a screening FRG subcommittee to allow a more detailed critical review of safety significant procedures similar to the CNRIl subcommittee. ACTION 3: Raise the priority for upgrade of Operations Normal and Off-Normal procedures. 7
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_ _ w ens
- i L
READINESS RESTART EVALUATION ~ l 1 i . Containment inspectionsfl'ests Of Equipment - l I,030 inspection / tests satisfactorily performed. ~ Containment Decontamination IIP decontaminated the containment surfaces to the levels documented girior to the event. ' Criteria For Plant Startup With Existing Deficiencies Were Established I Unit i Outstanding Deficiencies Were Reviewed For OperationalImpact And PotentialInclusion In The Current Outage
- 153 items were forwarded to Management Ihr review.
l 85 items were approved to work in the current outage. , 2 Caution Tag Deficiencies Rsmoved lo . lumper / Lifted Leads Removed 5 Equipment Out'of Service Log items Removed 23 NCR STARS Eliminated - 17 Open PCMI's Approved for Implementation 28 Plant Work Orders Completed i The remainder will be included into the next refueling outage schedule. Operations Shift BricHug Emphasizing Error-Free Operation ' Unit 2 Outage Scope Will Be Reviewed Using Similar Criteria .
. = - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . .
M M-M NS S MM Ed [.] E 4 ST. LUCIE PLANT CilRONOLOGY OF EVENTS UNIT I TURBINE TRIP July 8,1995 Unit I was inadvertently tripped during the surveillance test of the turbine trip functions. - IlORRICANE ERIN
~
July 31,1995 The National IIurricane Center issued a hurricane warning which encompassed the St. Lucie site. At i128, an Unusual Event was declared. August I,1995 Both Units were shut down by 1600 in advance of the arrival of flurricane Erin. The RCS was cooled down to approximately 350 degrees to remove the heat load and to allow a steam diiven feed pump to remain operable. Security safeguards were partially suspended at 2323. August 2,1995 At approximately 0100, the eye of Erin made landfall 20 miles north of the plant. The maximum wind speed recorded on site was less than 45 miles. Security measures were restored at 0404. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0542. RCP SEAI1MSIS ACTUATION l During the RCS heatup, O ! restage the seal. At 1750,perations detected a failed I A2 RCP lower seal. At 1702, Operations attempted t l wa's initiated. During this cooldown, the MSIS block pennissive was not acted upon by control room operators. At 1900, MSIS actuation occurred. All components were already in their safeguards required position belbte the l actuation. At 2018, RCS leakage increased to 2 gpm (from 0.25 gpm). A precautionary Unusual Event was declared. August 3,1995 , At 0630. RCS leakage had decreased due to continuing RCS depressurization and the Unusual Event was t terminated. j . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ . - - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - -
m C1 m m m m m' m a m m m m m m a m m INADVERTENT RPS ACTUATION August 9,1995 Unit I was being heated up and pressurized in preparation for retuming to power after the RCP seal changeout. All rods were fully inserted. Onc~ RCO was perfonning the surveillance al the RPS loss.ofload trip when he experienced difficulty with C channel. The other RCO came to his assistance and actuated the B channel. The reactor trip logic was made up and the trip circuit breakers opened.
' BOTII PORVs OUT OF SERVICF/REI.lEF VAI,VE 3439 I,1FT At 1917, both PORVs were declared inoperable. The plant was cooled down in preparation for entering Shutdown Cooling conditions.
August 10,1995 V3439 on the common LPSI discharge header lifted preventing further couldown. RCS temperature was raised to exit the conditions that PORVs are required for LTOP. l August it,1995 V3439 was replaced. At 0600, SDC was initiated. Both PORVs were removed and disassembled. Both valves j had an internal part installed incorrectly. 9 ____-______________________.._______._.______.-____-___._-________________._._-.________________.___________-__-_________________.______.__.___:_.___-____s _ _ . _ - _
. - . __ . .m. . _
M F M M M m m m m amm uma m m m m a g g. LETDOWN RELIEF VAI VE V2345 I,IIT August 16,1995 At 1820. Operators selected letdown control valves LCV 2110P and PCV 2110P. Pressurizer level decreased to 31% and a second charging pump was started. V2345 had lifted and had not reset. Letdown and charging were isolated. V2345 then rescated. At 1850, charging and letdown were restored to nonnal. 700 gallons of RCS inventory were relieved to the holdup tanks. INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY August 17,1995 , At 0215, Containment spray was aligned to normal operation with the exception of FCV 07-I A, which had previously failed its surveillance and had been jumpered to its safeguard required position. The LPSI venting procedure, which could not be accomplished at its intended time during the heatup, was initiated. When V3452 was opened at about 1800, approximately 10,000 gallons of water flowed to the containment spray headers from the RWT. PRIMARY WATER TANK OVERFil.I, August 19,1995 Operators failed to take timely action in response to high level alarm while filling tank. i l
EI E E E E E M M em eeeea 3.m ST. LUCIE PLANT RECENT PROBLEMS EVENT CAUSES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Unit i Turbine Trip Personnel error - inattention to detail and failure to
- Individuals involved were counseled and follow pmcedure disciplined; procedure revised for greater clarity RCP Seal Staging Resulted in Equipment problem =
I A2 RCP seal replaced along with a second Excessive Bleedoff (I AI) suspect seal Performing a root cause of seal failures Inadequate procedure Procedure cancelled Personnel error - failure to follow procedure Individuals involved were disciplineal (initial conditions not met) = Plant policy revised to address use of procedure that is being executed under plant conditions different from those originally approved MSIS Actuation During Cooldown Personnel error - failure to properly respond to . Individuals involved were disciplined annunciator
~
Inadvertent RPS Actuation Personnel error - procedure not followed correctly
- Individuals involved were disciplined PORVs Would Not Lift Personnel crror - failure to follow pmcedure Verificalion step added (bushing installed upside down) Reviewed otherjobs performed by the same individuals Disciplined person assigned to contractor oversight Contractor suspended their individuals' certification Unit 2 detcmiined to not be susceptible Inadequate retest = Review all retest procedures for safety related components will be conducted Maintenance procedure reviseti to add relief valve pressure tests Inservice testing upgraded to provide more
E C O O O E E E E O E EO EE E bE! ST. LUCIE PLANT RECENT PROBLEMS EVENT CAUSES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS V3439 (Shutdown Cooling Design margin too tight for operational Installed new valve with increased setpoint and Header Relief) Would Not Rescat maneuvering decreased blowdown Reviewed 114 valves on all other safety systems (both Units) for ability to reseat during transients; 7 required correction prior to startup An operator aid is being developed that will pmvide expected charging / letdown mismatches during cooldown Letdown Relief V2345 Lift Operational problem - pressure transients from - Operating Procedure revised per engineering PCVs evaluation to increase margin to lift Relief valve blowdown did not allow reseating = Replaced valve with one having a lower blowdown setting Reviewed other safety system reliefs for proper blowdown setting Inadvertent Containment Spray Personnel error - LPSI Venting Procedure initial = Management stopped all work in the plant; conditions not integrated with RCS fleatup meetings were held with division management Procedure - LPSI System Venting Procedure will be i rewritten i RCB has been cleaned to pre-event contamination IcVels Review process for first tiIne procedure use has
, been established FCV-07-I A deficient stroke time
- Repaired valve a
Corrected the decision-making process that allowed valve to be open on startup
- Reviewed outstanding work arounds/ backlogs for inclusion in current outage scope
,
- FCV-07-1B actuator spring size increased i
l l August 29,1995 i I i i ST LUCIE ! INTEGRATION OF SITE ISSUES i I . 1 1 i ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS t I
- OF
! ORGANIZATIONAL , AND PROGRAMMATIC DEFICIENCIES 4
MANAGEMENT MEETING AGENDA - AUGUST 29,1995 l
- 1. OPENING REMARKS Mr. S. Ebneter l Mr. J. Goldberg
- 2. FPL MANAGEMENT REVIEW Mr. D. Sager i
- 3. INTEGRATION OF-SITE ISSUES; Mr. K. Landis l NRC ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
- 4. DISCUSS SIMILARITIES FPL/NRC
- AND DIFFERENCES
- 5. ST LUCIE ACTION PLAN Mr. J. Scarola.
- 6.
SUMMARY
Mr. S. Ebneter i I 9
l 1
- ST LUC
- E i INTEGRATION OF SITE ISSUES p
i METHOD OF ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: 4 l Using the Organizational and Programmatic Diagnostic
- technique provided by Failure Prevention Inc.+(Dr. Chiu),
L the recent issues were assessed using the fdllowing
- tools: -
i Organizational and Programmatic Dia' gnostic Chart c 1 i I Analysis to determine the root probable cause TIME PERIOD COVERED:
- The analysis was performed evaluating issues from the j most recent to the oldest (August 1995 to August
] 1994). ! NUMBER OF ISSUES ANALYZED:
- The team reviewed a total of 39 issues. (Note: most
- l. issues were assigned more.than one contributing cause)
L t 4 e i m --__m.-.c_ _-_.--im-______m -w _---____*v + -
%- w e v & '-
Org nizationci cnd Programm: tic Dirgnoctic Chert r l 1 Organizational i i anal i i Progresnmatic ! Deficiencies 4 i OrganastioMo . organszsuon to- PfograrMo- l Organsastson r'rogram Program I Programmatic Organsassonst ! Intertece Irwiece Intertece Deficiencies Breanstsams i Deeciencies Denciencaos Denciancses i w i anamnessem meremme Lamm el8" W Lammetwuramme munamment kammmePentaman J Amunnes Qugenemens i le program Rammamamus Daudinemmes er Womano l humassmenamom
; (Num nasame orier (Asame seames er (vnguminum n -
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sensmumm sumisses
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4 ' hensmuss mammen petu mmimme i Lama et progress basemmamasmeansom Emmmmmme i Sm asummapremen. Asamemanas bummmmmmmmme . etWuts i Amusesmuns Inamammie muerem (Ammme seawee or dWiur uma smemme m sense sin m,,,em ,mp. tammesymmmuyrie 8' mNameammmmmes i annu mmes e,e a mes,ma mer . payammesuruma a sump .
*enemmmm summie asummmmm # emessoas .tamm me amm m'mumme . summesen memyne . enemmens manym. Immaman'en
+ Summ'm IPom 8'm"=
- sumammen maamme- .ammon summanums === . emmyi .tamm me summmm a===== -- en.em.mme e m un ammmme. == = mmmm -
2 2 ===== m=me 2 _ mammemnons Lam m nummm m m ens- summmmunesam ~ W Versammisen presume enthgemeness Amm==verp= Fem mummmmmmm, #penymemum=s a suomemammam 4 ensammmmmmmmme aira amuss ammme
#mmuneme ns,W amo noimme=a sta==me===m==
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ta= W mem===. .."""mm"m"e.m ammmmmmmmme
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9 ST. LUCIE ~ ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC , COMMON CAUSE
SUMMARY
40 % JOB SKILLS, WORK PRACTICE. DECISION MAKING Z 33%[
#4Nb PROGRAM DETAll H 30 % ------- ------ -- --- ---- --- -------- ----- --
g nes: w 24% a=e Z . . . . . . .
/
O 20 % J==
'O PROGRAM SCOPE ;
- p asisi!!m Z INTERFACE AMONG ORGANIZATIONS M _'=
=
11 % [ 0 p PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION LLI / 6% g l 1 dsh i 3% 3% 3% 3%
"i !!fl ..
ss m, 2% 2% 2% 2%
# ' ' # "'"* I* "* I " I I 0%
05 P1 P2 O
' .01 OP4 OP3 PP3 P3 04 OP1 OP2 P4 03 D ATA FAnhA .41TF RA ATAlY RIQA _ R/QR _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ - _ _ - _ - _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ - - - _
ST. LUCIE ROOT CAUSES ASSIGNED BY FUNCTIONAL AREA OPERATIONS 40%
/
-R N
* ~
/ x i A
~
PLANT SUPPORT 10% . MAINTENANCE 43 %
//f3 ENGINEERING 8%
O ln A D in c
-._-.-_---7-__
1 ST. LUCIE BARRIER ANALYSIS . 4 TRAINING UNDESIRED NEED
> PROCEDURE -+ PEOPLE
- OUTCOME l
l l FEEDBACK "
4 i ST LUCIE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS The following summarizes a Root Cause Analysis conducted by the NRC to assess
; recent performance observed at St Lucie, '
i
SUMMARY
CONCLUSIONS: Analysis identified the following primary common 1 causes.
, i (05) - JOB SKILLS. WORK PRACTICE. OR DECISION MAKING; Defic'iencies included an [
j
! increase in human error rate with potential contribution from supervision, !
training or staff qualification, and vertical communication. Examples included: ; I , DATE AfEA REFERENCE DESCRIPTION 1
; ENG 8/6/95 _LER 95406 Utting of Unit 1 SDC thermal relief due to procedural revieson from peousou.
3 correceve accon 8/2/95 OPS LER 95 004 MSIS Actuaton dunno cooldown 7/29/95 OPS 1R 95-14 Turtune/ Reactor Trio due to test error. J 4/1/95 OPS IR 9547 Unit 1 exponenced an approxamate 14 minute toes of shutdown cooling wtule j NCV 95-07 02 shdung from one enutdown cooling loop to the other. The root cause wee the i otoesng of the wrong SDC suonon isolation vatwo (the valve for me opereeng,
- vie. is.. pumoi on m. pan of m. o re or
- 9/30/94 MS IR 94 20 Maintenance personnet begin to work the wrong RWT isotamon vehe, i- .
threatenene the operatulity of both trains of ECCS. t 8/29/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operatore pieced 1 A EDG in an e6ectnoellineup for which TS-requeed i VIO 94-2241 i survestience teste had not been postormed (with the selety retened swing bus viO 94-2242 pow ed from n). Also, rotated comre room tog enem appeemd to be 7 innaourate. 4 i l l (P1/P2) - PROGRAM SCOPE AND DETAIL; Errors included either omission of necessary j functions or vagueness in procedures. Examples included: DATE AREA REFERENCE DESCRIPTION s/17/95 OPS 1.ER 95407 Sproydown of Unit 1 connunment. ! s/9/9s MS LER 95405 inoperabia Unit 1 PORW due to mensenanos error /tesene inadeounor. 7/29/96 MS M 9514 14C pomennel attempt to test a lowel switch oissuit whleh could not asauste ' ohen svenom condmana. j a/s/95 M8 m 9510 Poor communtendon/ test of doenned insevadon sende to improper te EDG 1 j oovemor incenneelen. 4 4/as/96 MS m eses kienenselon of wrone ovenoed heeser modede in ownshoser.
- VIO 954541 '
~ 2/4/9s Ms m9541 Inadequare independent vennesson remuned in CVCS leidown consel vehe VIO 954142 feanO to respond due to rowersed leeds. Roeuned in a osomenon of leadown E flour. ' { NOV 94.t5 01 I
- p. .
-+^w1 - ~ - .- - - - -
l (001) - INTERFACE AMONG ORGANIZATIONS; Interface problems were demonstrated '
) by errors in tasks requiring communication among organizations with potential contribution from a lack of interface formality or inadequate teamwork.
j Examples included: i
; DATE AREA REFERENCE DESCRIPTION 4/28/95 ENG R 95-o5 ' Failure to occument nonconformance regarding ICI flange 8 conmuons Nev954,44 j 4/1/95 MS R 9547 Jumper left instatied in ECCS venaisson camper after work complees.
NCV 9547 02 ] 2/4/96 OPS R 9541 Failure to sampie SIT within TS ressered time frame following volume ademon.
; VIO954141 Second occurrence en 2 years.
2/4/95 OPS OR 9541 Failure to idenefy and anaeyse Unit I hot leg flow strenneenon l 9/30/C4 - OPS IR 9419 Feliure to nosfy the NRC of changes in status of licensed operators' meshool j NCV 94-1941 conoscons i r
- .(OP4)'-
- ORGAN!7ATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION; Lack of 1
authority was demonstrated by instances of unclear responsibility and j accountability. Examples included: l DATE AREA REFERENCE DESCRIPTION j 8/2/95 OPS LER 95404 1 A2 RCP seal failure due to ressagm0* at high temperature. i 7/1/95 OPS IR 9512 Weakneseos identified in logs relanng to battery jumper installaton and outef.
- sorwoe eouiornent.
7/1/95 MS IR 9512 M&TE found installed across t;attery coil without J/LL authonzanon. l NCV 9512-01 l 6/3/95 MS 1R 9510 Seversi examples of weak adhesence to procedures, including stop sogneffs
- and independent verrficanon. idoneGod i
i-t
- PROBABLE " ROOT" CAUSE
- analysis indicated the probable root cause was PROGRAM SCOPE AND DETAILS i
. ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED; The following organizational groups contributed !
! significantly to the identified deficiencies with no attempt being made to i Jsingle out management as a separate group: OPERATIONS and MAINTENANCE. i I i i
1 4 I UNITED STATES l NUCLEAR REGULATORY
- COMMISSION ,
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5 i JAY ES TAYLC R VISIT TO ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT FE 3 RUA 9Y '5,1996 g3
ST LUCIE MAJOR ISSUES
.Since July 1995, there have been a series of events that led to questioning St Lucie's overall performance. Many of the events listed below demonstrate multiple ~ weaknesses. The more significant issues of concern included: ;
- Weaknesses in Operator Performance ;
- On January 22, 1996, operator inattentiveness resulted in an 6 overdilution event. The event began when an operator forgot he was diluting the unit, continued when an inadequate turnover between himself and another operator took place, and included a lack of command and control on the part of the shift SRO, who was near the center of the activity throughout.
- On January 5, 1996, a Unit 2 manual reactor trip resulted from the malfunction of a temperature control valve which provided water to generator hydrogen coolers. The valve in question had been recently reworked, and the operator failed to, observe the valves erratic performance after placing it in service. *
- On.0ctober 17, 1995, operator inattention to detail resulted in an overfill of the Unit 2 lower reactor cavity during floodup and prior to establishing integrity in the cavity seal ring.
- On August 2, 1995, a main steam isolation signal was generated due to an operator failing to block a MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated that the block was enabled. This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at least two different occasions. l
- On March 4, 1995, an approximate 14 minute loss of shutdown !
cooling event occurred when an operator cycled the wrong valve l during a train swap. The valve was cycled out of sequence and weak annunciator response complicated recovery.
- Acceptance of Lona-Standina Eouipment Deficiencies 1
- On August 17, 1995, a spraydown of the Unit I containment was i caused, in part, by the, licensee'~s willingness to operate with a valve in its fail-open position following the valve's failure to satisfy stroke-time requirements. ;
The operator workaround process was not aggressively pursued by the licensee until issues such as the spraydown of unit I containment pointed out the cost of living with deficient conditions. Once management became committed to resolving the operator workarounds, many.more were identified and 43 have been completed to date. l
d 4 2
= Manaaement Expectations Not Effectively Communicated and Enforced - = Management has failed to achieve the desired level of operator attentiveness, evidenced in the overdilution event and numerous
, NRC-identified control room indication deficiencies.
= Standards of chronological logkeeping, out-of-service logkeeping, and valve deviation and key logkeeping have not, until recently, been consistently applied. A number of recent violations _in this area have been identified, and the failure to maintain a current-valve deviation log complicated a loss of RCS inventory event when L floor drains were found to be unintentionally shut, resulting in an accumulation of 4000 gallons of coolant in the Unit 1 pipe tunnel.'
= Standards of prompt notification of licensee management by operators have not been mhintained, as evidenced by failures to notify the Operativas Supervisor in a timely fashion for the -
recent overdilution event and the loss of a number of Unit 2 control room annunciators the next' night. ; j
= Weaknesses in Procedural Adeauacy and Adherence a
Procedural violations have. ' accounted for 16 SL IV violations .in the last (24 month) SALP cycle.
- The licensee's shift to a verbatim compliance policy resulted in hundreds of changes to procedures, required in order for the procedures to be followed. Management of the procedure change process then became a challenge, as the system in place was not prepared to deal with the increased volume.
=
On August 17, a spraydown of Unit I containment was due.to an inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an ' existing operator-work-around.
=
On August 2,1995, an attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance, compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist, led to I the failure of 3 of 4 stages of the seal nackage.
=
On July 29, 1995, a Unit 1 trip occurred during turbine trip testing due to procedural-weaknesses, poor operator performance, and weak supervisory oversight.
- Implementation and'Adeauacy of Corrective Actions A
=
Inadequate corrective actions resulted in repeated failures to perform TS surveillance sampling of the SITS and the RCS for boron
+
3 concentration.
= On August 6,1995, a loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due.to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic problem involving several. valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the conditions.
On August 29, 1994, inadequate corrective actions for an.NRC NOV, regarding safeguards testing with respect to swing intake and component cooling water pumps, resulted in operators placing the electric plant in a configuration which made an EDG inoperable. .. . Inadeauate' Post-Maintenance Testina
= ' On January 5,1996, a Unit 2 manual reactor trip resulted from the malfunction of a temperature control valve which provided water to generator hydrogen coolers. The valve in question had been recently reworked, but it had not been dynamically tested, nor was testing planned.
=- On August 9,1995, both pressurizer power operated relief valves were found inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage. The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months and were not detected through the licensee's surveillance testing ,
program. !
. l l
I 4
i EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
t . . .. Pre-Decisional. - Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment i St. Lucie l~and 2- ! Current--SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97 Last SALP Rating Previous SALP Rating , 1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 : i Operations 2 1 l Maintenance '2 1 Engineering 1 1 : Plant Support 1 1 i
- Last INP0 Assessinent: 'l- Previous INP0 Assessment: l' !
I. Performance Overview
]
Since July 1995, there have been a series of events that led to ) questioning the plant's overall performance. These have included:
- A Unit 1 turbine trip due to procedural weaknesses,
. poor operator performance, and weak sup.ervisory oversight.
- The attempt to restage an RCP seal-using inadequate and inappropriate. procedural guidance. The evolution wa's compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist,~ which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.
- A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block i the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated i
that the block was enabled. This failure occurred despite the. l fact that the operator's attention was directed to the -annunciator on at least two different occasions.
- Both pressurizer power operated relief valves-being found inoperable due' to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP).
*. An loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic prob 1'em involving several i
. valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this-generic ,
condition existed,.but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the
~ ~
conditions (SL4). i
* :The.spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and operator error. coupled with an existing operator-work-around.
4 e - e
* . 'The significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the overdilution event on January 22, =1996, highlighted the recent
-large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control.
in the control room. These and several other recent' deficiencies involving weak procedures, a general-lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel- J errors clearly indicated that the plant's past high level of performance had declined.. An NRC root cause effort determined that, in. addition to procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses, the licensee suffered from weaknesses in both interfaces across organizational ~ lines and corrective actions.- , 1 II. Functional Area Assessments R A SALP, board convened on January 18, 1996. The board' concluded that the i licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had : declined from ' excellent levels of performance to good levels. The , conclusions reached by the board are summarized below. Operations The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had ! declined, particularly in the final six months of the assessment period. -
- As bases,.the board noted an increase in,the number of opera'tional.
- events attributable to:.
- Weaknesses in operator performance .
- Acceptance of long-standing equipment deficiencies l
*: Management expectations were not effectively communicated to :
personnel and enforced '
- Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence i
- Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions
.-The licensee' undertook a number of efforts to reverse declining L performance following the onset of the operational events described
- above. Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for i i the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of procedural ~ changes and around-the-clock on-site review committee i meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of corrective action i documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents initiated,_ but has also resulted in increases in backlogs.
t Maintenance l The board determined that performance in this. area declined during the previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit j trips which occurred during the period had roots in maintenance. Weaknesses' identified by the' board included: l * - Inadequate post-maintenance testing
- Procedural... adequacy and adherence
- L e' Instability in management due to acting managers while the '
. maintenance manager received SRO. training -
l I 4-.we n ,p r .-
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The board indicated that the current stability of the maintenance management appeared to be reversing the observed negative trends. Engineering The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of performance. Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce the numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as strengths. Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high quality, as were safety evaluations. Plant Support The board found that plant support organizations collectively performed at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows: Health Physics was identified as having strong management support and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of contaminated floor space and the volume of solid waste were also noted. Socurity was cited as maintaining an excellent level of performance.during staff reductions due to the implementation of biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing range, and self-assessments were considered good. Some performance problems were noted through the period, however, including two failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures. Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in responding to plant fires; however, surveillance testing observations indicated weak procedures, poor attention to detail, and hardware deficiencies. Emergency preparedness was considered good, and the status of equipment and supplies were found to be adequate. The full participation exercise was successful, i I e e D _.s
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DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
- 1. On January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss of the 1B MFWP.
- 2. The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994.
- 3. On June 6, 1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when a' thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two output terminals of main transformer 1A.
- 4. Power was reduced to 80% power on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic System (DEH) leak. The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.
- 5. The turbine was taken of line on August 28, 1994, to' repair a leak in the DEH. Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994. The innit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994.
- 6. The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switchyard on October 26, 1994. Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a decision was made to start the refueling outage
- 7. On February 27, 1995, the unit was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994. The unit was returned to power on March 8, 1995.
- 8. On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing. The unit
. was returned to power on July 12, 1995.
- 9. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until October 9, 1995.
- 10. On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam generator level when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.
l l l l
ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 - SALP CYCLE 11 1 3 4 5 6 -7 100" , 5
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DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS - ST LUCIE UNIT 2
- 1. On February 27, 1994, the-unit was coasting down to the cycle'8 refueling outage. The unit was taken off-line on February 14, 1994.
.2. On April'23,.1994,'the unit' tripped from 30% power during RPS adjustment.
- 3. The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July 10, 1994. On July 14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker. The unit was restarted and placed on line on July 15, 1994.
- 4. On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level. -
The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter failed high. The transmitter was replaced and the unit was returned to. service on February 25, 1995.
~
- 5. On April 25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply-in the DEH system.
6.. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.
- 7. On October 9, 1995, the unit was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.
- 8. On January 1, 1996, the unit went critical.
- 9. On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.
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AGENDA FOR' JAMES M. TAYLOR VISIT TO ' ST. LUCIE PLANT FEBRUARY 15, 1996 ~ NIGHT BEFORE FEBRUARY 14, 1996 Possibly meet with W. T. Russell and S.D. Ebneter . FEBRUARY 15, 1996 0615-0645 Arrive at St. Lucie ~ badging as visitor 0645-0700 Accompany SRI to observe the shift turnover 0700-0730 Interview with the departing shift crew 0730-0815 Attend licensee's morning meeting 0815-1100 Plant tour with SRI 1100-1130 Caucus with SRI and others (Taylor, Ebneter) 1130-1230 Working lunch - an opportunity for a dialog on any topic the Licensee would like to discuss or present to the senior NRC managers. 1230-1300 Interview with Operations Manager (J. West et al.) 1300-1330 Interview with Maintenance Manager (J. Marchese et al.) 1330-1400 Interview with Engineering Manager (D. Denver et al.) 1400-1430 Interview with Plant Manager (J. Scarola) 1430-1500 Interview with Site Vice President (W. Bohlke) 1500-1530 Interview with President - Nuclear Division (T. Plunket) 1530-1600 Caucus with SRI and'others (Taylor, Ebneter) 1600-1630 Exit _with Site Vice President and/or Plant Manager 1630' Leave the St. Lucie site. S 6 9
PLANT: ST.LUCIE LOCATION: Ft. Pisrca, FL l, MEMBER UTILITY: Florida Power & Light Company DIRECTIONS FROM WEST PALM BEACH l FT. PIERCE a. AtA 3 lNTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: Take the Airport Access Road to Belvedere Road. Tum / g[ ' east (right) onto Belvedere Road, and proceed to inter. ST' . LUCIE = l I state 95. Take I-95 North to Exit 61. Highway 76 to High-
) g ::3 way A1A on the right. Take A1A east (nght), cross the M O Intercoastal Waterway, then north along tre ocean to the 5 ; noe on the left. Total approx distance =
t DIRECTIONS FROM EOF: m Ej *
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~ . .. . .- . . - . . . - - . . . . . . . -.
Member Utility Name and Address - Florida Power & Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33406 Plant information . Name St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant (Units 1 & 2) Docket # 335,389 Location Ft. Pierce, FL NRC/ FEMA Region ll/IV .
- Capacity (MWe)/ Type 830/PWR .
Reactor Supplier Combustion Engineering
- Turbine-Gen. Mfr. Westinghcuse Engineer Ebasco
?
Constructor Ebasco Plant Manager Phone (407)467-7103 i Control Room Phone Unit 1: (407) 465-7140 / Unit 2: (407) 466-7069 l (407)288-0800 UTILITY SUPPORT CONTACTS General: President - Nuclear Division I (407)694-4222 Equipment: Plant Manager (407)467-7103 Travel Information Airports:
- 1. West Palm Beach, FL '
- 2. Melboume, FL l 3. St. Lucie, FL l Motels:
- 1. Holiday Inn, Jensen Beach, Hutchinson Island, FL, (407) 225-3000
- 2. Marriott Courtyard, Jensen Beach, Hutchinson Island, FL, (407) 229-1000 e
2-67 j
1 N REGION ll ATLANTA, GEORGIA l PLANT STATUS REPORT l ST. LUCIE l l Units 1 and 2 1 February,1996 l 4 4 2.33j; ^ U 1 9 . a
I k PLANT STATUS REPORT FOR ST. LUCIE , 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS l l PART 1 - FACILITY DESCRIPTION 1.1 FACILITY / LICENSEE....................................Page 2 ' 1.2 UTILITY SENIOR MANAGEMENT ...........................Page 2 l.3 NRC STAFF... ........................................Page 2 1 1.4 L I C ENS E I N FOR:4AT I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P a g e 3 1 1.5 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS................................Page 3 l 1.6 SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION.......................Page 3 1.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES / PREPAREDNESS...........Page 8 l 1.8 PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS (Past Six Months).........Page 9 l 1.9 OUTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS...........................Page 10 j PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE , GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE............................Page 11 2.1 l 2.2 SALP HISTORY (Past Two SALP Periods).................Page 11 l 2.3 SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSIONS ......................Page 11 l l PART 3 - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS l 3.1 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS (Past 12 Months)........Page 16 3.2 ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY (Past 12 Months)..........Page 16 , 1 PART 4 - STAFFING AND TRAINING l l 4.1 OPERATIONS STAFF - 0VERALL...........................Page 16 l 4.2 WORK FORCE ........................................<.Page 17 1 4.3 OPERATOR QUALIFICATION /REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM.......Page 17 l 4.4 PLANT SIMULAT0R......................................Page 17 l 4.5 INP0 ACCREDITATION...................................Page 17 i PART 5 - INSPECTION ACTIVITIES 5.1 OUTSTANDING ITEMS LIST
SUMMARY
.......................Page 18 , 5.2 MAJOR INSPECTIONS....................................Page 18 l 5.3 PLANNED TEAM INSPECTIONS.............................Page 18 ! 5.4 INFREQUENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS...............Page 18 5.5 SIMS STATUS (OPEN THI ITEMS).........................Page 18 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
- 2. ALLEGATION STATUS
- 3. NRR OPERATING REACTOR ASSESSMENT
- 4. ORGANIZATION CHARTS
- 5. POWER HISTORY CURVES
- 6. MASTER INSPECTION PLAN (NOT INCLUDED)
- 7. SITE ACTIVITY SCHEDULE
- 8. SITE INTEGRATION MATRIX
- 9. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS GRAPH l
2 PART 1- FACILITY DESCRIPTION
' 1.1 FACILITY / LICENSEE FACILITY: St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 PLANT LOCATION: Hutchinson Island near Port St. Lucie, Florida LICENSEE: Florida Power and Light Co. (Corporate Office in Juno Beach, Florida) 1.2 UTILITY SENIOR MANAGEMENT CORPORATE:
J. L. Broadhead (Jim), Chairman of the Board and CEO J. H. Goldberg (Jerry), President, Nuclear Division SITE: W. H.,Bohlke (Bill) - St. Lucie Plant Interim Vice President C. L. Burton (Chris) - Services Manager L. W. Bladow (Wes) - Nuclear Assurance Manager R. E. Dawson (Bob) - Business Manager D. J. Denv.er (Dan) - Site Engineering Manager A. DeSoiza (Andy) - Human Resources Manager . P. L. Fincher (Pat) - Training Manager T. G. Kreinberg (Tom) - Nuclear Materials Management l Superintendent i J. Marchese (Joe) - Maintenance Manager C. A. Pell (Ash) - Outage. Manager ? L. A. Rogers (Lee) - Systems and Component Engineering Manager J. Scarola (Jim) - Plant General Manager i E. J. Weinkam III (Ed) - Licensing Manager l J. A. West (Jeff) - Operations Manager J,3 NRC STAFF ] REGION II, Atlanta, GA: , S. D. Ebneter (Stew) Regional Administrator, (404) 331-5500 L. A. Reyes (Luis), Deputy Regional Administrator (404) 331-5610 E. W. Herschoff (Ellis), Director DRP, (404) 331-5623 K. D. Landis' (Kerry), Branch Chief, (404) 331-5509 L. S. Mellen (Larry), Project Engineer, (404) 331-5561' E. Lea (Edwin), Project Engineer, (404) 331-3641 i SITE: M. S. Miller (Mark), Senior Resident Inspector, (407) 464-7822 S. S. Sandin (Steve), Acting Resident Inspector, (407) 464-7822 O
i 4 3 -
- NRR
D. B. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate.II-2, 't
. (301)'415-1490
[- J . A. Norris (Jan), Senior Project Manager, Project.
' Directorate !!'-2, (301)-504-1483 '
L - AE00: ' S. Israel ~ (Sandy), Reactor Operations' Analysis . Branch, (301) 415-7573 , 1.4 ' LICENSE INFORMATION p - Unit 1 Unit 2- ,
-i Docket Nos. 50-335 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67 NPF-16 Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-74 CPPR-144'
. Construction Permit issued 7/1/70 5/2/77
-Low Power License NA .
4/83 i Full Power License 3/1/76. 6/10/83 , Initial Criticality 4/22/76 6/2/83 : Ist Online . 5/17/76 6/13/83 Commercial ~ Operation 12/21/76 8/8/83 . . l.5 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS 4 Descriotion Units 1 and 2 Reactor Type Combustion Engineering PWR, 2-loop Containment Type Freestanding Steel w/ Shield Building Power Level- 830 MWe (2700 MWt)
- Architect / Engineer Ebasco Combustion Engineering NSSS-Vendor
, Constructor. ~ Ebasco Turbine Supplier Westinghouse t Condenser Cooling Method Once Through Condenser Cooling Water Seawater
' 1.6 'SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION
'1.6.1 REACTOR INTEGRITY 4
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) ~ With the present fuel type and management policy, Unit 1 is _ expected to reach a 40-year RPV life. On this unit,~the fuel' type and management policy have been modified to make that RPV' life, a
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- . span possible. Presently, a program is. evolving for RPV life
- extension beyond.the projected 40 years, potentially to 60 years, ;
via a flux. reduction program. A flux reduction program has
~ started with the,: addition of eight absorbers in core corner :
4 4 1 9 s P i r . ,___ _
4 pos.itions, performance of vessel fluence calculations, and determination of an optimum power profile for each core load. ~
. Calculations using current methodology and uncertainty predict a significant RPV life extension, but not to 60 years.
Due to different design and construction characteristics, Unit 2 RPV life expectancy exceeds 60 years. Low leakage core designs are now used for economic reasons, however the low leakage designs provide even greater life expectancy. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary On this CE plant, ECCS-to-RCS injection points are isolated by at
, least two check valves and one closed MOV. High pressure safety injection (HPSI), low pressure safety injection (LPSI), and containment spray (CS) pumps' common containment sump suctions are ,
isolated from the containment sump by one closed M0V in l conjunction with a closed seismic piping system. The CS headers are isolated from containment by one closed MOV and a check valve in' conjunction with a closed seismic piping system. CVCS has the ! i normal complement of two automatic actuation isolation valves. 1.6.2 REACTOR SHUTDOWN I Reactor Protection System The reactor protection system provides protection for the reactor-fuel and its cladding by providing automatic reactor shutdowns i based on input from reactor power, reactor coolant pressure, 1 coolant temperature, coolant flow, steam generator pressure, containment pressure, turbine hydraulic fluid pressure, and, in ; Unit' 2 only, Component Cooling Water flow to reactor coolant pumps. The.RPS is a redundant, four channel system that operates i on a two-out-of-four logic. ' ATWS Protection ATWS protection, 'outside the normal reactor protection system, is initiated via the ESF pressurizer pressure signal. It actuates by i opening contactors in the outpot of the CEA MG sets, thereby interrupting control element assembly power at its source. This protection has been installed on both units per CE, the NSSS, , recommendations. Remote Shutdown Facilities 1 These facilities are located in the switchgear rooms beneath .each unit's control room. 1.6.3 CORE COOLING Feedwater System ,
5
.The main feedwater i i h each delivering 50
. percent of the flow,requiredpumpsforLfull are motor dr ven w t power.
Turbine Bvoass/ Steam Dumo Caoacity Each-unit has five steam bypass valves, providing ,45 percent of total capacity.' 4 . Unit I has one atmospheric dump valve per train (two trains) and Unit 2 has two valves per train.- Each unit has the capability of ' dumping nine percent steam flow to the atmosphere. Auxiliary Feedwater System There Lare two' motor-driven pumps on each unit with 100 percent . capacity per pump. There is one steam-driven pump on each unit with 200 percent capacity. Any of the three pumps can inject to ~ either steam generator. Automatic initiation and faulted steam generator protection are provided by each unit's Auxiliary i Feedwater Actuation System provided by the NSSS. . Emeraency Core Coolina System ,
- In each unit, there are two HPSI pumps and two LPSI pumps with no unit-to-unit cross-connections. One pump of each type per unit will handle a postulated LOCA. The LPSI pumps also provide decay
- ' heat removal as required when the unit is shut down.
Decay Heat Removal l As indicated above, the LPSI pumps also. provide decay heat removal- l
- ' as required when the unit is shut down by taking suction from the RCS (hot legs), passing the fluid through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and returning.it to the RCS (cold legs). .The i heat removing medium is CCW - discussed in section 1.7.6 below. 1 I
Shutdown' cooling flow path overpressure protection is provided by automatic isolation valves and various relief valves in the system. l 1.6.4 CONTAINMENT l Pressure Control / Heat Removal i There are two containment spray pumps and four containment fan coolers available per unit to suppress pressure spikes and coo 1~ the-containment. OnelCS pump and two fan coolers will handle a postulated LOCA. There are no unit-to-unit cross-connections. This engineered safety feature is automatically started by ESFAS. Hydroaen Control l 1 l
6 Post-LOCA containment hydrogen control is accomplished on each unit by two trains of hydrogen recombiners located on the operating deck inside containment. By elevating, in a controlled manner, the temperature of containment atmosphere flowing. through the recombiner, the recombiner units recombine hydrogen and oxygen to form water, thus preventing the buildup of hydrogen to potentially explosive levels. 1.6.5 ELECTRICAL POWER Offsite AC The station switchyard is connected to the transmission system by three independent 240 KV lines that share a right of way and interconnect with FPL's grid on the mainland approximately 10 miles West of the plant site. There are two independent offsite power feeds from the station switchyard to the emergency busses. Onsite AC Onsite AC, power is provided by four EDGs (two per unit). EDGs are independent of other plant systems except vital DC power for control of starting. A Station Blackout (SBO) cross connection is installed and tested. This cross-connection serves the emergency busses directly and reduces cross-connect time to less than 15 minutes. DC Power Two trains of vital batteries per unit have been routinely tested l for four-hour DC load profiles. Recently, following a cell replacement, they have been tested for three-hour battery capacity instead. The battery capacity test is harsher than the load l profile test and is intended to more accurately reflect expected usage. There are four normal chargers per unit with swing chargers available for service. Non-safety batteries can be cross-connected to the. safety-related swing bus if needed. Instrumentation Power Each unit has four inverters, two powered from each vital DC ' train, that provide four trains of instrumentation power.
. Station Blackout Resolution Status Unit 2 is a four-hour "DC coping" plant per the original license while Unit 1 is subject to the station blackout (5B0) rule of 10 CFR 50.63 requiring additional licensee action (unit-to-unit l cross-connect of 4160V bus). ,
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1 l 7 l l 1.6.6 SAFETY-RELATED COOLING WATER SYSTEMS 1 Intake Coolina Water (Service Water) Intake cooling water'(ICW) for each unit originates in the unit- l common Intake Canal. The canal level varies with the tides since l it is filled by a level difference between the Atlantic Ocean and ' the ICW pumps. One 16-foot and two 12-foot diameter pipes pass under the beach to connect the ocean and canal. The intake pipe ends in the Atlantic are covered by intake structures (rebuilt in 1991) intended to limit flow velocities, particularly vertical i velocity, to reduce marine life entrapment. After use, ICW returns to the ocean through the Discharge Canal and under-beach l pipes. l Each unit has two trains of ICW plus a swing pump that can be l aligned to either train electrically and physically. The licensee has converted the deep draft ICW pumps from externally (water) lubricated to self-lubricated to increase reliability. The 100 percent (each) capacity pumps take suction from the intake canal via a canal intake structure using traveling scre n debris protection. The intake canal structures adjacent to the ICW pump suctions are continuously injected with a hypochlerite solution to reduce marine growth in the associated piping and haat exchangers. The ICW pumps move water through two trains of heat exchangers ) that cool component cooling water (CCW) and two trains of heat ! exchangers that cool main turbine cooling water. During a postulated accident, water flow isolates from the turbine cooling l heat exchangers. The discharge from the heat exchangers returns l via the discharge canal to the ocean. Closed Coolina Water' Systems Each unit has two trains of Component Cooling Water (CCW). The l arrangement of two pumps and a swing pump mimics the ICW system, l The swing pump can be aligned to either train. The 100 percent l (e_ach) capacity pumps drive water through the CCW/ICW heat exchangers and then on to the heat loads, mainly the containment fan coolers and the shutdown cooling (decay heat) heat exchangers (which also can operate as containment spray heat exchangers). Additionally, CCW cools a variety of bearings, seals, and oil coolers for the HPSI, LPSI, and CS pumps. A 'lon-safety-related portion of the CCW system cools reactor coolant pump seals and the spent fuel pool. This section isolates upon engineered safety features actuation. 1.6.7 SPENT FUEL STORAGE Wet storage capability' exists u'p to the year 2002 (Unit 2) and 2007 (Unit 1).
8 1.6.8 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM Instrument air compressors and driers on each unit provide all instrument air for Unit 2 and all but containment air for Unit 1. Unit I has instrument air compressors inside containment. .
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1.6.9 STEAM GENERATORS Each unit has two large steam generators (SGs) rather than the three or four usually seen. The licensee has begun to focus on a ; Unit 1 SG replacement in 1998. The SGs are under construction at the B&W Canada shops and a site organization is functioning.
.l.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES / PREPAREDNESS Emergency Operations Facility: 10 miles West of site,
- I-95/ Midway Rd. Exit Technical Support Center: Onsite, Adjacent to Unit 1 Control Room Operational Support. Center: Onsite, 2nd floor of North Service Building The last annual emergency preparedness exercise was in February, 1996.
This exercise was formally evaluated by the NRC. Since St. Lucie site has a high probability of hurricanes, . communications facilities were improved following the T0rkey Point I experience with Hurricane Andrew in August, 1992. Improvements include- l
- High Frequency Auto-link with other FPL. sites and NRC.
- Enhanced 900 MHZ System for site and mobile communi' cations, with radios also in the-licensee's E0F and county emergency facility.
- Cellular phones with hardened antennas.
Hardened Local Government Radio antenna ties. 1 1.8 PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS ; I Availability Factors-j Unit 1 . Unit 2 1991 81.0 100.0 ) 1992 96.5 75.2 l 1993 74.0 71.8 ! 1994 86.8 79.6 l 1995 (through 7/95) 93.9 98.3 l Cumulative (through 7/95) 77.7 83.7 i l l l l
L . Y l 9-1.8.1 UNIT 1 OPERATING HISTORY (Past Twelve Months from 1/25/96) l Unit.1 operated continuously during the past 12 months with the-following exceptions: r
'On February 21, 1995, the unit was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been-
- leaking by the seat-since shortly after startup in November, 1994.
< On March 4, 1995, the unit experienced a 14 minute loss of { -shutdown cooling. The apparent. root cause was operator error.by a reactor operator placing one loop of SDC in standby. The~ operator E apparently closed the suction valve to the operating, vice standby, pump. .The operator in question denied the error; however, the licensee determined.that he was responsible. lie resigned from the company. The unit was returned to service on March 8, 1994i
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On July 8,1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve 3: surveillance testing. It returned to power on July 12. 1995. i On August 1,1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane
-Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel-
! performance issues, the unit remained shut down. for 73 days. Problems encountered during the shutdown included a maintenance-1 induced RCP seal failure, discovery of two inoperable PORVs due to [ maintenance errors during refurbishment, a loss of inventory event while' placing shutdown cooling in service due to lack of margin to relief valve lift setpoint and complicated by an excessive blowdown value, inadvertant spraydown of the Unit I containment, catastrophic failure of the IB EDG, and leaking pressurizure code safety valve flange leakage. The unit returned to power on October 12. On November 16, the unit was manually tripped when a feedwater regulating valve failed to the 50% position, resulting in low steam generator water level. The root cause of the failure was determined to be a faulty power supply. The power supply was replaced and the unit was returned to service on November 18. On January 22,-1996, operator _ error resulted in an excessive dilution event which.resulted in_ reactor power accending to 100.2%. The operator in question apparently left the control room while.dllution'was in progress without informing other watchstanders of the evolution in progress. .The operator: was. removed from licensed duties and the final disposition of the event.is pending. 1.8.2 UNIT 2 OPERATING HISTORY (Past Twelve Months from 1/25/96) Unit 2 operated con'tinuously during the past 12 months with-the following exceptions: 9
10 On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator. water level. The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter _ failed high. The transmitter was ' replaced and the unit was returned to service un February 25, 1995. - On April 25, 1995, the unit was shutdown for approximately 8 hours , to replace a main turbine DEH power supply. On August 1, -1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995, but operated at reduced i power from August 17 through 29, 1995, to clean condenser water i boxes and repair equipment problems. , On October 9, the unit entered a refueling outage. .The outage was complicated by the discovery of leaks in RCS flow transmitter taps at the loops, a reactor flange 0-ring leak, discovered during repressurization, and the failure of one stage of an RCP seal , , package. The unit returned to power on January 1, 1996. ' i .The unit was manually tripped from approximately 35% power on l ' January 5 due to high generator hydrogen temperature. The root i ! cause of the event was improper operation of a turbine cooling j water temperature control valve which supplied cooling water to the hydrogen coolers. Post-trip review resulted in the discovery l of clogged steam generator water level transmitter sensing lines i
- j. which resulted in artificially low levels being indicated when
[ steam generators were isolated upon turbine trip. The lines were blown down and the unit was returned to service on January 7. L ' ~ 1.9 OUTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS . l Unit I's last refueling outage began on October 126, 1994, and ended on November 29, 1994. Major activities included: refueling; reactor vessel nozzle and flange weld ISI inspection; installation of a permanent , cavity-seal ring; replacing ' reed switches for several CEAs; integrated safeguards test; steam generator tube inspection and plugging; steam ! , generator sludge lancing; repair of _ refueling water storage tank; several instances of reduced. inventory / mid-loop operations; replacement of-ICW/CCW LOOP logic [HFA latching relays] with pull-to-lock switches; removal [ collection] of Rx vessel neutron' flux dosimetry; modification , of EDG skids to allow access underneath; inspection of ECCS sump; area; replacement of a main transformer; modification of containment spray ) Na0H addition piping; and mechanical, electrical, and I&C systems - maintenance. The next Unit I refueling outage is scheduled-for April 4
)
29, 1996. , J i t- , Unit 2's last refueling outage began on October 9,1995, and ended 1 January 1, :1996. Major outage activities included: refueling;-steam l generator tube inspecticn and plugging; low pressure turbine blade , ! . -replacement; emergency, diesel generator inspection; replacement of three
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11 reactor coolant pump mechanical seals; and mechanical, electrical, and I&C systems maintenance. The next Unit 2 refueling outage is scheduled for April 15, 1997. - PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE 2.1 GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE A SALP board meeting was conducted on January 18, 1996, covering the SALP period of January 2, 1994, through January 6, 1996. .The facility was rated category 1 in the areas of Plant Support and Engineering and 2 in the areas of Operations and Mainenance and Surveillance. The latter scores were a decline from the previous SALP cycle, when the facility
, was rated category 1 in all areas.
2.2 SALP HISTORY (Past 2 SALP Periods) The last SALP period, SALP Cycle 11, ended on January 6,1996. The current SALP period ends (tentatively) in June, 1997. ASS'T. M OPS RAD MNT/SURV EP SEC ENG/ TECH SAQV PERIOD 5/1/89 - 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 10/31/90 1 1 11/1/90 - 1 1 1 1 1 5/2/92 PLANT OPS MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING PLANT SUPPORT l 1 l 1
~5/3/93 - 1 1 1 1/1/94 1
1/2/94 - 2 2 1 1/6/96 2.3 SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSION Since July 1995, there has been a series of events that led to questioning the plants overall performance. These have included:
. A Unit 1 turbine trip due to procedural weakness, '
operator performance and supervisory oversight.
- The attempt'to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded.
by failing to follow aspects of the guidence that did exist, which . led to the failure of the second and third stage seals. l 4 4 4
12 N-
- A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated that the block was enabled. This failure occurred dispite the fact that that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at least two different occassions.
- Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months.
- An loss of RCS inventory due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the conditions.
- The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around.
These and several other recent deficiencies involving weak procedures,'a general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel errors clearly indicated that the plant's past high level of performance had declined. j These and other problems led to several plant management changes, an overall evaluation of the recent plant problems by a plant-requested independent assessment team, and a root cause evaluation by the NRC. In a meeting with the NRC on August 29, 1995, the licensee committed to use the results of the independent assessment team to develop an action plan for improvement. Plant Ooerations Summary of Previous Assessment The previous SALP assessment concluded that Operations remained strong, that management actions were aggressive in dealing with identified weaknesses, and that attention to detail was a continuing challenge for the licensee. Summary of the Most Recent SALP The board concluded that licensee performance had declined in the most recent SALP period. The board founc' that day-to-day activities were conducted with a degree of c7mplacency. Corrective actions, management involvement and communication of expectations, attention to detail, procedural adequacy and adherence, and operator workarounds were similarly considered to be challenges to_ licensee performance. 5
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s I
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. Maintenance / Surveillance )
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. Summary of Previous Assessment ;
Maintenance was assessed as category 1 in the previous SALP.' l Assessments made early in the most recent cycle indicated that the i performance level of maintenance activitiet had not abated.
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Summary of the Most Recent SALP i
.The board concluded that performance in this functional area had
, declined. Areas of concern included the existance of long- . standing equipment problems and a sense that management expectations were either low or not adequately enforced. 0f ~ particular concern was the fact that equipment' failure factored-into 6 unit trips during the SALP cycle. Additionally, worker adherence to procedures, and the quality and adequacy of procedures was found to be a challenge to performance. 't Enaineerina
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Summary o'f Previous Assessment 4 The previous assessments for this' SALP' cycle concluded that i engineering was generally strong. Good support of the plant . was cited, as was the quality of engineering products, both i +. to the site and in submittals to the NRC. Summary of the Most Recent SALP The board toncluded that Engineering continued to perform at l a superior level. Continued support to the plant, as well ! as adequacy in safety and operational evaluations were j identified. In addition, the licensee's activities at the engineering materials laboratory and in the developement of maintenance specifications were seen as strengths. 4 PART 3 - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS l 3.1 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS'(Past 12 Months) Unit 1: 95-08, 3/22/95, Failures of Rosemount Transmitters due to Gas Permeation of Monel Diaphrages j Unit 2: None 3.2 ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY (Past 12 Months)
*. SL III Violation (550,000 CP) for violations associated with .
inoperable Unit 1 PORVs ) ' t 4 l
14 ,
.- Predecisional Enforcement Conference held, SL IV violation issued for failure to take prompt corrective action for issues relating to relief valve lift and blowdown setpoint values which resulted in a loss of Unit 1 RCS inventory while on shutdown cooling.
PART 4 - STAFFING AND TRAINING 4.1 OPERATIONS STAFF - OVERALL (9/95) Average performance of the operations staff has been noted. Control room demeanor of personnel is above average. Number of Shifts: (RCO, SRO) Five shift rotation, 8-hour shifts; (NPO, ANP0, SNPO) Five shift rotation, 8-hour shifts. Number of SR0s: 38 active /13 inactive / 51 total Number of R0s: 23 active /1 inactive / 24 total Total Licensed Operators: 61 active /14 inactive / 75 total 4.2 WORK FORCE (2/96) Plant personnel (including 787 disciplines below) Breakdown by Maior Orcanization FPL Contractors ; Operations 128 0 Chemistry 20 0 )
, Health Physics 73 0 Maintenance 311 60 Outage Management 21 0 l Nuclear Material Management 36 0 Site Engineering
- 50 0 Juno Engineering Security 9 120 QA/QC 37 0
- Includes Reactor Engineers, System Engineers, and Test Engineers 4.3 OPERATOR OVALIFICATION/RE0VALIFICATION PROGRAM (Past Two Years) 1 4.3.1 REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM Last Inspection - 9/26/94, Inspection Report 50-335,389/94-19 ,
Next Inspection - 10/96 4.3.2 INITIAL EXAMS l s 1
15 Last Exams 10/17/94 - 2 R0 2 passed for 100% 9 SR0 9 passed for 100% Next Exam 3/25/96 - 6 R0 4:4 PLANT SIMULATOR The simulator is on site and fully certified to meet ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985. 4.5 INPO ACCREDITATION All training programs are maintaining INP0 accreditation. The site specific simulator has been used for training since 1988 and has been fully certified for approximately 5 years. NRC inspections in the forn of. operator examinations at the simulator have found no serious . problems. ,
' PART 5 - INSPECTION ACTIVITIES 5.1 INSPECTION FOLLOWVP OPEN ITEMS
SUMMARY
(UNITS 1 AND 2 COMBINED) (10/6/94) Pre Division Change from Division 95 1215 Total Last Report DRP 4 34 18 DRS 1_0 4 14 - Total 14 37 51 Note: Each item that applies to both units is counted as one item. 5.2 MAJOR INSPECTIONS IR-No- Eilt_t Typ_q 89-02 1/89 RG-1.97 89-03 3/89 NDE 89-07 3/89 EQ 89-09 3/89 Design Control 89-24 10/89 Maintenance Team Inspection 89-27 11/89 E0P Followup 90-09 4-5/90 0STI 91-03 2-3/91 EDSFI ' 91-18 9/91 MOV (no negative findings) 91-201 9-10/91 Service Water Inspection 92-14 7/92 Emergency Preparedness Program 92-17 7/92 EDSFI Followup 93-01 1/93 Check Valves 94-11 5/94 MOV Followup 95-05 6/95 Engineering , 6
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. 16 95-16 9/95 PORY Special. Inspection ;
96-01 1/96 Dilution Event Spectial Inspection 123 PLANNED TEAM INSPECTIONS None 5.4 INFRE0 VENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS No core inspection procedures are overdue at this time. 5.5 SIMS STATUS - OPEN TMI ITEMS There are no open TMI items, l l l I 9 4 i A e d a
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DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
- 1. On January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss of the 1B MFWP.
- 2. The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994.
- 3. On June 6, 1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when a thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two output terminals of main' transformer 1A.
- 4. Power was reduced to 80% power on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic system (DEH) leak. The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.
- 5. The turbine was taken of line on August 28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH. Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994. The u' nit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994.
- 6. The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switchyard on October 26, 1994. Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a ,
decision was made to start the refueling outage
- 7. On February 27, 1995, the unit. was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994. The unit was returned to power on March 8, 1995.
- 8. On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing. The unit was returned to power on July 12, 1995.
, 9. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series , l of equipment problers and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until ! October 9, 1995. ' l
- 10. On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam generator level when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.
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ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 - SALP CYCLE 11 1 3 4 5 6 7
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DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS - ST LUCIE UNIT 2
- 1. On February 27, 1994, the. unit was coasting down to the cycle 8 refueling outage. The unit was-taken off-line on February 14, 1994.
- 2. On April 23, 1994, the unit tripped from 30% power during RPS adjustment.
- 3. The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July 10, 1994. On July 14, 1994, the. unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker. The unit was restarted and placed on line on July 15, 1994.
- 4. On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level.
_The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter failed high. The transmitter was replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995.
- 5. On April 25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply in the DEH system.
- 6. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Iturricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.
- 7. On October 9, 1995, the unit was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.
- 8. On January 1, 1996, the unit went critical.- .
- 9. On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.
l ST. LUCIE 1 LER# 33594006 50.72#: 27940 l 88F 10/23/94 PWR HIST: CONDITION EXISTED IN ALL MCX)ES UP TO 100% POWER $1NCE 1978 GROUP 3 CONTAINMENT AND CONTAINMENT ISQLATION CROUP SYSTEM : REACTOR CONTAINMENT BulLDING I DESC : A DES!GN ERROR COULD HAVE ALLOWED CROS$* TRAIN PRESSURIZATION OF RESULTING IN A RELIEF VALVE LIFilNG AND CONTAINMENT SUMP INVENTO IN EXCESS OF DESIGN LIMITS. PWR HIST: POWER OPERATIONS AT 100% SCRAM 10/26/94 LER# 33594007 50.72# 27954 DESC : A REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWED A MAIN TURSINE TRIP. THIS OCCURRED WHEN A < TRANSFORMER CAUSED A MAIN GENERATOR LOCKOUT. PWR HIST: COLD SNUTDOWN f SSA 11/22/94 LER# 33594009 50.728: 2.9060 DESC : SOTN EDGS STARTED ON AN SIAS. DME EDG LQADED ITS BUS WNEN AN AS WITN ADDITIONAL LQADING FRCM THE $1AS CAUSED THE BUS BREAKER TO OPEN. , PWR HIST: CotD SuiTDOWN I SSA 11/22/94 LER# 33594009 50.72#: 2e060 DESC : AN SIAS DCCURRED WNEN TWD OF FOUR PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TRANS NYDROGEN. TNE CHARGING PtsPS WERE SECURED BEFORE THE LTOP SETPOINT WAS PWR NIST: Cats SMUTDOWN SEA 11/24/94 LER# 33594010 50.72#: 2s068 ; DESC : AN INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION ACTUAfl0N SIGNAL OCCURRED DURING SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM TESTING WHEN A PRESSURIZER PRESSURE BISTABLE l PROCEDURE. I l PWR H!ST: POWER OPERATIONS AT 100% SSA 02/16/95 LER# 33595001 50.72#: 28400 l DESC : WHILE RESTORlWG A SAFETY SUS TO A NORMAL LINEUP FOLLOWING RELAY RCPLACEMENT, THE BUS WA DEENERGlZED. THE EMERGENCY DIESEL STARTED AND LOADED ONTO THE BUS. i PWR HIST POWER OPERATIOi(S AT 100% SCRAM 07/08/95 LER# 33595003 50.72# 29039 DESC : THE REACTOR TRIPPED ON MIGN PRES $URIZER PRESSURE WHEN THE MAIN TURI VALVES WENT CLOSED DURING TESTING. THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY AN OPE STEP. f SSF 08/09/95 LER# 33595005 50.728: 29178 PWR HIST CON 0lf!ON EXISTED IN ALL MODES UP TO 100% POWER $!NCE 1994 GROUP SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES GROUP SYSTEM : REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DESC : THE POWER OPERATED REllEF VALVES WERE FOUND INOPERABLE DURING TESTING. THE M INSTALLED INCORRECTLY DURING THE 1994 REFUELING OUTAGE.
'SSF 08/10/95 LER# 33595006 50.72#
PWR HIST: EVENT OCCURRED IN COLD SHUTDOWN GROUP : RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS GROUP SYSTEM : RESIDUAL NEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM DESC : E3TH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL WERE RENDERED INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF A
. RELIEF VALVE. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS INADEGUATE DESIGN MARGIN BETWEEN THE RELIEF
- AND WORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE.
ST. LUCIE 2 LER# 38995002 50.72#: 28416 Plat MIST: POWER OPERATIONS AT 1001 SCRAM 02/21/95 DESC : A REACTOR TRIP RESULTED FROM A LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL AFTER A STEAM GENERATOR FAILED HIGN, CAUSING THE FEED REGULATING VALVE TO CLOSE. I 1
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DRAFTIREGIONAL REVIEW ST. LUCIE 1 tesond: st==>ec=> sisniric nce si9n Medlurn Peer Group.Combuston Engineenng w/o CPC 92-4 to 95-3 Trends and Deviations l Deviations From Plant Peer Group Self-Trend Median Short Term Long Term , Dochned improved Worse Better OPERATIONS (including startup) Automatic Scrams While Critical - o
-0.56 Safety System Actuations - o,90 l -
-0.38 Significant Events *
- 0 0
1 Safety System Failures - 0 0.22 l Cause Codes (All LERs) j
- a. Adamsetrouve Centrol Preelems -- ]0.16 -
E 0.45 l
- n. usensed operator Errore - i 1.50 -
] 0.22 l
- e. Omer Personnel Errors - t I 4.64 -
-0.07-[
- d. Mamtenance Problems - -0.37 h -
3 0.19
- e. outgreconstrucconsinstatiacontraencanon Problems - 0.25 -
1 0.30
- f. Miocenaneou. -- 0 -
-0.18 [
SHUTDOWN Safety System Actuations - 0.05 hkiff) -0.67 Slgnificant Events - 0 0 Safety System Failures - 0.22
-0.01 Cause Codes (All LERs)
- a. Adam etreove controa Proweme - ]0.15 -
4.06 [
- n. ucensed operetor Errors - 0 -
O e, omer Personnel Errors - ]0.13 - 0.16 [
- d. uaintenance prom m. .
]0.11 -
4.22 [
- e. oevenicenstruceennnetaiianoneranticanon Prowems - 3 0.20 -
O e minenaneen - 0 - 0 FORCED OUTAGES' m Forced Outage Rate
- 0.89
-0.10 ;
Equipment Forced Outages / *
-2.45 MhN$Mkl
~~ -0.82 1000 Commercial Critical Hours Note. see iawe 8 m Part N for tne 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0:5 1.0 spece.c eme framee ned m tne caicuiscone. Performance index Performance index
- Not caicuiated for Opersoonal cycia f
4
t DRAFT / REGIONAL REVIEW ST. LUCIE 1 Year - Calendar Cuarter Type _ M ae 92-4 93*1 93-2 93-3 93-4 y 94-2 94-3 94-6 95-1 95-2 95-3 NIsk$$1ng h h k 0 tortup 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88^ R:!Ninting 8 8 8 8 8 h 8 8 8 h 8 8 Riinfing 8 8 8 8 8- 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 . Non-ketuoling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
$NNf$$1ng 0 dinYr fon-RelNiing 8 0
8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 0 8 8 0 8 0 a 0 8 0 8 0 88' tilli= tin, j 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 l 8 8 8 2%!un. 8 i ! ! i i i i 8 i i i FOR (I) 0 0 0 6 0 5 6 1 7 0 0 60 EF0/1000 ER8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.24
' CRIT. MRS 2209 2089 447 2114 2209 2062 2123 2208 1400 1941- 2183 683 RAD '7 37 182 5 6 75 11 6 160 22 6 IIA CAUSE CODES:
NNhS[ing 8 8 8 h h 8 8 h 8 !
. Non-Refu!1ing Reinifn 8 0
8 0 l 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 i 0 8 0 8 0 8 2
"*- '" ft:!Ni= ting 8 8 8 h 8 8 8 8 8 8 '8 h Reintin!1ing 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Hon-Refu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
'h '"- ENinting 8 j 8 8 8 h h 8 8 8 8 h p:INY[n!1ing Re Non-Retu 0
0 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 b 0 b 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
'hNNh$$1ng 0 8 8 h 8 0 8 8 0 8 8 Dinirn!1ing 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ,
Non-Refu 0 h h 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
]
Design NNrsI1ng 0 ! ! 8 ! ! 8 8 ! 8 0 8 Re$NY[n!1ing 0 $ 0 0 8 0 0 k 0 0 0 Non-Refu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
$ Nk$$1ng 8 8 0 8 Dintin Non-Refu!1ing 8
0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 Phase Phase type Start End Lenath Ke:ru!Ninung
? R"u:in.i:03 h!'81li! !!' 'f ! i onng tdo n 0/93 0311/93 "19 n"l;iteunsOg:nl3:2 8i'f!!8!ggjj! 3j 5':niftn n-Refueling ut:
Skutdown 89 if 03 29/94
! Siu./94/91 3 33 u9 l g
pe: fueling!Ninung Puni:"; a S$utdown . 0 2f8:
/94 18 aft:
11 28/94 281 h3 .
' Start-up Operation 9/94 12 23/94 25 l kSNNk$ ling tN h]2 /95 Oh 8 9 6 NNNtNiing S$ (N 8/02/9k 0!/80/95 6!
Trend Calculations Deviatten Calculations 8 FpR 1l/25/94-09/30/95l8)' :8 fth!!! 2.g g ;; ;g t _ gg g p ;; ,;;;; gglgglgg:gggggggg p40 daysg g ;; ; gg;, gg g;;; ;;yp 1 2 0 days FOR 02/27/94-09/30/95 ,, 4
, 4 .
9 e
DRAFTIREGIONAL REVIEW Legend: , 5""t* *" ' ""' *. 72 nn i St. . ST. LUCIE 2 Refueling R Operation Clll"ll3 Industry Avg. Trend Shutdown N 2 Quade@ Dau Not Shown Using Op. Cycle 222222 Ops. - Ops. - 1I a l l I 1I a l I I E 93-1' 9%3 A&f 943 1' 953 ' 93-1' 953 941' 943 1' 9 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Autometic Scrams While CHtical Safety System Actuations 4 4 3- 3-y 2- < 2-1- 1-
~
0 = 0 9 3-13 93-3 961' 963 951' 953 i 9'} 1' 93-3 94 1' 94-3 951' 953 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Significant Events , Safety System Failures 2.0 I 1.5 J 3-W l 0- l
's 1.0 -4 y 2- 1 g i J
z 505- ; : z Eid 93-1i 93 3 9&1' 94-3 951' 95~3 l 931' 93-3 B&1 i 94 3 95 12 953 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Equipment Forced Outages / Forced Outage Rate (%) 6 1000 Commercial Critical Hours inn . l 80 h 4~ 60 6[ g 40 J l ' i 5 2* > i i l 1 20 J, O , l 1 - ll eq 0# ou oo O U18S End=- ' NA '+= "Aa
- 0 ~2 5 - E S U 9S1' 93-3 94 1'- 94 3 951' 953 w i 911- 93-3 941' 94 3 951' 95-3 Year - Quarter Year - Quarter Cause Codes
- a. Admin b. Lic Oper c. Other Per Radiation Exposure e a a 200 .
f W 150- ; ,, ,, ,, 100j e .a = ~1 = .-Q- w. .. = g ! f d. Maint e. Design f. Mine k $0J , E" l
; n . .. ..
oj ,J., ,L .f., AL B834. NA l 93 1' 93-3 94 1' 94-3 95-1' 95 3 Year - Quarter ' e, ,. - m' ' ""
- See Average Radation Exposure a e w'" e t
a
DRAFT /RE!!ONAL REVIEW ST LUCIE 2 te2end sia.tc.i sign,ne.nce wion ,,,,, Peer Group.Combuston Engineenng w/o CPC Medium n 92-4 to 95-3 Trends and Deviatons i Deviations From Plant Peer Group Self-Trend Median Short Term Long Term Dochned linproved Worse Bemer OPERATIONS Automatic Scrams While Critical - 0.54 0.18 Safety System Actuatione - 0 0,g0 Significant Events - 0 0 Safety System Failures - o 0.67 hh Cause Codes (All LERs)
- a. Ademasesove Control ProWems - ]0.08
]0.15 D. Ucensed operator erroes - 0 -
0.68 I c, omer Personnes Errors - 0 - 0.68 i
- d. Maintenance Probiems - 3 0.23 -
3 0.19
- e. Dwenicenstruceennnstananentrabricsoon Problems - 0 -
l 0.30 t urecenaneous - 0 - l 0.45 SHUTDOWN Safety System Actuattor's - NA
-0.15 Significant Events - NA O
l Safety System Failures - NA 1.34 h[h h Cause C' odes (All LERs)
- a. Administranve ControlProblems - NA -
M 0.47
- m. ucensed operator errors - NA -
-0.30 l
- e. oowt Portenned Errors - NA -
]0.08
- d. maaneinence Prooiess - NA -
]0.11
- e. Decoevceneouceennnstauanereabacamen Prowems - NA -
E 0.26
- f. Miscesaneous - NA -
0 FORCED OUTAGES Forced Outage Rate * - 0 o,49 Equipment Forced Outages / * - 0 0.13 1000 Commercial Critical Hours .- Nose: See isble 9 in Part N for me 1.0 -0.5 00 0.5 1.0 1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 specene time frames used en me calcutamens. Performance index Performance Index
' Not Calculated for operanonal Cycte k
e
DRAFT /REGICNAL REVIEW ST. LUCIE 2 Year - Calendar Quarter h Phase 92-4 93-1 93-2 93-3 93-4 1 94-2 94-3 94-4 95-1 95-2 53 95-3, eidef$$1ng' 8 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 8 tartup 0 0 0 0 0 0 $ 0 0 0 0 0 88^ Ini:"$ing 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 p:!NY$n!1ing Re Non-kefu 0 0 1 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 Ni$$1ng 0 0 ! 8 8 8 ! 8 o!N$[n ton-Refu!1ing
- 8. 8 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0
. o 0 0 0 0 0 t!All:"$ing 8 8 8 8 j 8 8 8 8 8 8' 8 '
itIfI!1ing lem- s Yf 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8" 8 8 l FCEL (3) 20 87 6 2 1 0 7 2 0 4 0 4 EF0/1000 HR8 0.00 6.88 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.47 CRIT. BR5 1835 281 2084 2208 2107 1056 1656 2183 2209 208$ 2183 2142 4 RAD 7 37 182 5 6 75 11 6 160 22 6 NA CAUSE CUDESt
" " - W:!nin$ing 8 8 8 8 8 8 i ! 3 8 i 8 it!nt[n Non-Refu!1ing 8
1 8 0 8-0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0
"*-"'- !nl:"$1ng 8 8 8 i i 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 p:N$[n!1ing Re!
Non-Refu 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
'"- R:!nin$ing 8 3 3 8 8 8 8. 8 8 8 8 8 it!nt[n!
Non-Refu ling 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 i 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 ENi$$1ng 0 h 0 8 0 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 8 8 Re Non-Refu NY[n! Lins 1 $ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
^
""" 8 8 8 8 8 p:!ni:Hing 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 0 0 1 0 8 0 8 0 Re!ueY[n!1ing f
Non-Refu 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 No!Ni$$1ng 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 it!nt[n!1i ng Non-Refu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Phase Phase type start End Lenath 2 2:!niaung Rat:0 " 11 2:Ini ung R:!nna sli4!81Lllli! ll 2:!ntaung R:!nu"8!l!!!8}jl)ll! 7. 8;'l'll 3S l93 5! 2;g P::: ke: fueling $ !ntuung Skutdown != .8l/0 )/94l'f! 81M,il: 04/:,8 94 63
'N"':n;ign o-Refueling 3:::!:" 81'N/95 Operation 09/
!: 88l 09/00/0
!! ell 16 Trend Calculattens Deviation Calculations
- FR
]so 81!8t!!!:8!!P8'!! ,g g ;;;; 02;gg;g;;gg/3gi!!l18a:?:
hk/31/94-09/30/95 40 days lint: if $ : lLil 01/04/95-09/30/95 27g 210 g:;; days ;;g g; i g,R F O si J
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA NRC RESIDENT STAFF MARK S. MILLER U.S.NRC Senior Resident inspector St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Date Assigned: Assigned as Resident inspector 9/93 Assumed SRIPosition Il96 Previous NRC Employment Reactor Systems Engineer, NRRIDSSA 1993
' Headquarters Operations Officer, AEOD 1991 1993
. Resident inspector, Yankee Rowe 1991 .
Reactor Engineer, Region i 1990 1991 Previene Employment . Mississioni State University produste Research/ Teaching Assistant 1988 1990
. Texas Utilities Electric
' Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station System EngineerlRegulatory Compliance Engineer 1987 1988 Newoort News Shiobuildino and Dry Dock Co.
Shift Test Engineer (S6G) 1983 1987 Education: Mississioni State University M.S. Nuclear Engineering,1990 MississioniState Universitv , M.S. Nuclear Engineering,1983 E 6 t 4
t BIOGRAPHICAL DATA NRC RESIDENT STAFF STEPHEN S.SANDIN U.S.NRC Resident inspector St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Date Assigned: Rotational Assigr. ment - January 18 thru July 31,1995 (Treining) Octaber 6,1995 thru April 6,1996 (Detail) Previous NRC Employment l Headquarter Operations Officer AE00 87 96 - 1 Previous Employment Pearl Harbor Naval Shiovard 82 87 ASTElSTEIACTEICTE [S3/4W, S5W & S6Gl 89 90 . Brown & Root. South Texas Project 80 82 EngineerIlli Nuclear Analysis Group Bioloaical Production 66 78 Fractionator, Filtration Specialist & Sterile Operations Supervisor Education: . University of California at Santa Barbara B.S. Nuclear Engineering,1980 Ventura Colleae A.A.,1975 . 4
-e
Biographical Information
@I:PL ;
l l William H. Bohlke l 1 Vice President, St. Lucie Plant
. 1 l
Bill Bohlke is Plant Vice President of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Bohlke reports to the Nuclear Division President and oversees the operation of the two nuclear units at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island, approximately 50 miles north of West Palm Beach. Mr. Bohlke joined FPL in 1990 as Vice President of Nuclear Engineering and Licensing. He previously served as Vice President and Manager of Projects at Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. A career nuclear professional, Mr. Bohlke performed in a variety of engineering and project management positions for Stone & Webster. Mr. Bohlke is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and received a Master of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He is a registered professional engineer in eleven states and a member of the American Nuclear Society. He is currently chairman of the NEl Appendix B Working Group and the industry Steam Generator Replacement Group. He is a member of the NEl Nuclear Economics and Fuel Supply Advisory Committee, the NEl Executive Task Force on Regulatory Process and the INPO Analysis & Engineering Industry Review Group. Mr. Bohlke serves as FPL's representative to the Advanced Reactor' Corporation where he is vice chairman of the Utility Management Board. I 2/96
Biographical Information l l l FPL l l l l James Scarola l Plant General Manager, St. Lucie Plant 1 Jim Scarola is Plant General Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie
. Nuclear Power Plant. In this function Mr. Scarola reports to the Site Vice President. He is responsible for Operations, Maintenance, and technical Support activities at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island.
Mr. Scarola began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including I&C startup engineer, I&C maintenance engineer, assistant superintendent electrical maintenance, manager special projects, maintenance manager, manager equipment, support, and inspections, engineering project manager, and operations manager at St. Lucie. Mr. Scarola holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Notre Dame and a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida Institute of Technology. Mr. Scarola has completed the senior reactor operator certification training program at St. Lucie. e 1/96
Biographical Information
@ F:PL l l
l I Christopher L. Burton j Services Manager, St. Lucie Plant l l Chris Burton is Services Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Burton reports to the Site Vice, President. He is responsible for Plant Facilities, Budget, Fire Protection, Emergency Planning, Training, Land Utilization, Security, and Information Services at the St. Lucie site. Mr. Burton began working for FPL in 1975. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including reactor operator, nuclear plant supervisor, assistant operations supervisor, reliability maintenance supervisor, operations supervisor, operations manager, and plant general manager. Mr. Burton has held reactor operator and senior reactor operator licenses at St. Lucio. Mr. Burton is a graduate of State University of New York and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electronics Technology. Mr. Burton also holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida Institute of Technology. He is a member of tiie American Nuclear Society (ANS) and the Professional Reactor Operator Society. 1/96
Biographical Information
@ I: P L i
l l C. Ashton Pell Outage Manager, St. Lucie Plant Ash Pellis Outage Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power i Plant. In this function, Mr. Pell reports to the Site Vice President. He is responsible for the planning and scheduling of St. Lucie Plant outages and for coordination of operations and maintenance activities on a daily basis. Mr. Pell began working for FPL in 1975. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including Reactor Engineer, Reactor Supervisor, Technical Staff Supervisor, Assistant to Senior Vice President-Nuclear, Director Nuclear Administrative Services, Plant Services Manager and Outage Manager. Mr. Pell completed certification as a senior reactor , operator for both the St. Lucie and Turkey Point nuclear units. ; Mr. Pellis a graduate of the University of Central Florida and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics. He is a member of the Southeast section of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 1/96
Biographical Information F:PL Edward J. Weinkam til Licensing Manager, St. Lucie Plant i Ed Weinkam is Licensing Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear l Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Weinkam reports to the Site Vice President and is j responsible for coordination of the St. Lucie Plant . regulatory interface among the NRC l Resident inspectors, NRC Region 11 Staff, and NRC Headquarters staff. Mr. Weinkam began working for FPL in 1986. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including NRR licensing engineer and corporate licensing supervisor for the St. Lucie Plant, licensing m.anager for the Turkey Point Plant. He has worked in the nuclear industry since 1979 in various engineering, educational, and regulatory areas. He was - i a U. S. Navy n'uclee submarine officer, an engineering instructor at the University of Maryland, and USNRC, NRR project manager. Mr. Weinkam completed certification as a senior raactor *. aerator at the Turkey Point nuclear units. Mr. WeinLm is a graduate of the. University of Notre Dame and holds a Bachelor of \' Science degree in Mechanical Engineering. He received a Master of Scier.ce in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland in 1979. 4 1/96 .
\
l i Biographical Information ; l i l
@ I: P L :
i Robert E. Dawson l i Business Manager, St. Lucie Plant i Bob Dawson is Business Mansv ar of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Bob Dawson reports to the Site Vice President and is responsible for the strategic plan, the plant operating plan, the corrective action program, and the in-hot se-event tracking and trend analysis programs at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. j l' Mr. Dawson began working for FPL in 1973. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including reactor engineering department head at Turkey Point Plant, staff reactor support, mechanical startup group supervisor for St. Lucie Unit 2, core barret j repair project, electrical maintenance department head, plant maintenance manager, and plant ! licensing manager. Mr. Dawson has held an senior reactor operator license at St. Lucie. Mr. Dawson is a graduate of the University of Virginia and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering. He k e member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 7 1/96
Biographical information I: P L Thomas G. Kreinberg Superintendent, Nuclear Material Management, St. Lucie Plant I Thomas Kreinberg is Superintendent of Nuclear Materials Management of Florida Power !
& Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Kreinberg reports to the Site Vice President and is responsible for Purchasing, Stores. and interface with I Procurement Engineering at the St. Lucie Plant. ;
l Mr. Kreinberg began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of l increasing authority, including purchasing & contract services, contracts administrator, manager of contracts and manager materials management.' Mr. Kreinberg attended Syracuse University and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Russian and a Bachelors of Business Administration Economics from the University of Florida. He is a member of Contract Management Owners Group (Nuclear Power Utilities). e 0 4 1/96
Biographical Information s
@ FPL .
Daniel J. Denver Site Engineering Manager, St. Lucie Plant Dan Denver is the Site Engineering Manager for Florida Power & Ligh't Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, in this function, Mr. Denver reports to the Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Licensing and is responsible for engineering services in,cluding design packages, as-building, procurement engineering, fuel design, and outage NDE inspections for the two nuclear units at the St. Lucie site loce cc on Hutchinson Island. Dan joined Florida Power & Light Company in May,1993 as Director, Nuclear Technical Support in the Juno Beach offices. In this capacity, he was responsible for nuclear fuel supply, information services and the administrative staffs for Nuclear Engineering and Licensing. He has worked in the nuclear power industry since 1967 in various engineering and technology development areas. He worked for a number of electric utilities including Public Service Electric & Gas, Yankee Atomic, and Houston Lighting and Power as well as Westinghouse Electric and a nuclear industry services company, El International. Dan graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1966 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and received a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1967. In outside activities, Dan has served in local town government and on the boards of several amateur theater organizations and professional societies. He is a registered professional engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. I 1 1 1
I 1 l l Biographical Information l F:PL L. Wesley Bladow l Site Quality Manager, St. Lucis Plant l 1 s Wes Bladow is the Site Quality Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie 1 Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Bladow reports to the Vice President Nuclear ) Assurance and is responsible for independently assessing the Quality Control and Quality l Assurance Program implementation by the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. ; i Mr. Bladow began working for FPL in 1967 in the Distribution Engineering Department. { He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including quality assurance j supervisor, quality assurance superintendent, and site quality manager at the Turkey Point l Nuclear Plant and quality assurance manager of the St. Lucie Unit 1 steam generator l replacement project, and manager of nuclear safety speak out. ' Mr. Bladow is a graduate of Florida International University and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Industrial Technology with a minor in industrial safety. I Mr. Bladow is a member of the American Nuclear Society. l P 1 I l 1/96
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1 I Biographical Information O I:PL Andrew DeSoiza Human Resources Manager, St. Lucie Plant Andrew DeSoiza is Plant Human Resources Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. DeSoiza reports to the Nuclear Division ! Director of Human Resources. In this pos. tion Mr. DeSoiza is accountable for proper implementation of personnel policies and procedures at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Mr. DeSoiza began working for FPL in 1972. He has held a various positions, including i payroll clerk and human resource manager. l I Mr. DeSoiza is a graduate of ' Miami Dade Community College and holds an Associates l . of Arts degree in Business. J l 4 1 l 1/96
Biographical lnformation 9 FPL . Jeffrey A. West Operations Manager, St. Lucie Plant Jeff West is Operations Manager of Florida Power & Lig'h t Company's St. Lucie Nuclear
. Power Plant. In this function Mr. West reports to the Plant General Manager. He is responsible for the direction and coordination of the operational activities including health physics, radio-chemistry, reactor engineering, operations, and operations supoort & testing at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island.
Mr. West began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including shif t technical adviser, reactor control operator, nuclear watch engineer, assistant nuclear plant supervisor, technical training supervisor, nuclear plant supervisor, assistant operations supervisor, assistant superintendent - mechanical maintenance, operations supervisor, and services manager. Mr. West has held a senior operator license at St. Lucie. Prior to his tenure at FPL, he held the rank of Lt. Commander in the U. S. Navy Nuclear Submarine Service. Mr. West served from 1974 to 1979. Mr. West is a graduate of the University of Tennessee and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Mr. West also holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida !nstitute of Technology. J 1/96
Biographical lnformation O I: P L Joseph Marchese Jr. Maintenance Manager, St. Lucie Plant , Joe Marchese is Plant Maintenance Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Mtrchese reports to the Plant General Manager and is responsible for supervision and coordination of the maintenance activities including electrical, mechanical, , instrumentation & control, records and planning at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island. Mr. Marchese began working for FPL in 1984. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including lead construction electrical supervisor -Turkey Point Plant , lead construction mechanical supervisor - Turkey Poi 6t Plant, site construction manager - Turkey Point Plant, and plant maintenance manager. Prior to his tenure at FPL, Mr. Marchese had 12 years nuclear experience in
, various positions of increasing authority with Bechtel Power Corporation, including Milestone, Davis Besse, and St. Lucie Nuclear Plants construction and startup testing. Mr. Marchese completed the senior reactor operator certification training program at Turkey Point.
Mr. Marchese is a graduate of the University of Akron and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Mr. Marchese is a registered Professional Engineer in Florida and Virginia. 4 He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 1/96 .
( Biographical information
@I: P L Lee A. Rogers System & Component Engineering Manager, St. Lucie Plant Lee Rogers is System & Component Engineering Manager of Flor'da i Power and Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function Mr. Rogers reports to the Plant General Manager. He is responsible for the direction and coordination of the technical support to Operations and Maintenance Departments and the coordination of issues, regulatory interaction and documents at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island.
Mr. Rogers began working for FPL in 1980. He hss held a variety of positions of I increasing authority, including mechanical startup engineer, mechanical startup supervisor, shift technical advisor, project engineer, electrical maintenance department head, and instru' ment and control department head. Prior to his tenure at FPL, he was employed by i Carolina Power & Light Co. from 1977 to 1979. 4 i Mr. Rogers is a graduate of the University of Florida and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering and a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida institute of Technology. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). O I 1/96
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UNITED STATES f[' 4 04 --N' - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. O .' "_
REGloN 11 101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W., SVITE 2000 j. s
, 7. ATLANTA, GEORotA 303230199 u t
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February 8, 1996 _
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Florida Power and Light. Company , i ATTN: ~ Mr. J. H. Goldberg President'- Nuclear Division' r P. O. Box'14000
- Juno Beach,:FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
SYSTEMATIC-ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP) (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. . 50-335/95-99; 50-389/95-99)
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
I
+ The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance.(SALP) for the period l January-2, 1994 'through January 6, 1996, has been completed for St. Lucie. .
iThe-results of.the assessment are documented in the enclosed SALP report which 1 Ewill be discussed with you at a public meeting at the St. Lucie' Site on February 22,,1996, at 1:00 pm. At the meeting, you should be prepared to ' discuss our assessment and any initiatives that address our concerns and ! challenges' identified in'the SALP report. , j overall the performance of the St. Lucie Plant was assessed as good over the performance period.. The overall performance was mixed with the response to transient events being very good but routine activities performed at a somewhat. lower level of performance. The engineering and plant support functional areas sustained the'previously assessed ratings of su performance, but there is a disturbing performance trend in functional the'perior areas of operations and maintenance. Performance declined significantly in , these areas from superior ratings that had been sustained over several past
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performance periods to a level. of good performance'. There is a concern that
. the long period of superior performance may have led to a pervasive complacent ;
environment that is tolerant of equipment issues and a lack of discipline-in ; adhering to' procedures. There is evidence that the decline in human performance may be aggravated by inadequacies in the quality of the procedures themselves. Another contributor appears 'to be acceptance of a lower standard of performance by'a'significant part of the organization. j A further concern is the degree to which the performance declined before it i . was detected by. the organization's self-assessment programs. There is a clear i indication that these programs were not effective in identifying the trends ,
-early. . ,It .is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the extensive corrective actions that were instituted in the very late part of the ;
assessment period, but it.is clear they must be aggressively' pursued to ; terminate the negative trend in performance. ! s 4 l 4
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1 , s an J, ,y, p, vw v - '
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i l l FP&L 2 j In accordance with Section 2.790 of the.NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any questions or comments, I would be pleased to discuss them with you.
- Sincerely, !
/' e l t &%vj GuMuff/
St'ewart D. Ebneter l Regional Administrator l i
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enc 1: D. A. Sager, Vice President , St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 i Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing and Special Programs - Florida Power and Light Company l P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 J. Scarola, Plant General Manager
. St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 Robert E. Dawson, Plant Licensing Manager i St. Lucie Nuclear Plant i P. O. Box 128 -
l Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 J. R. Newman, Esq. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20036 John T. Butler,' Esq. , Steel, Hector and Davis j 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 33131-2398 cc w/ encl: Continued see page 3
]
t FP&L. 3 cc w/ encl:. Continued Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Dept of Health and Rehab. Serv. 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Jack Shreve, Public. Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o' The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Rcom 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 t Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Thomas R. L. Xindred, County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 Charles B. Brinkman Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 , Rockville, MD 20852 l l 1 a I h 4 O P W e e 4 9
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. i SALP REPORT - ST. LUCIE 50-335; 50-389 '
JANUARY 2. 1994 - JANUARY 6. 1996 ; I. BACKGROUND
.The SALP Board convened on January 18,'19'96,'to assess the nuclear
. safety performance of St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 for the period of . ;
January 2, 1994, through January 6, 19964 The Board Meeting was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic ;
' Assessment of Licensee Performance." Board members were Ellis W.
.Merschoff (Chairperson), Director, Division of Reactor Projects, ;
Region II (RII); Johns P.'Jaudon, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor ! Safety, RII; and David B. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate II-1, ; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The performance category ratings and the assessment functional areas used below are defined and described in NRC Management Directive 8.6, .
. " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
II. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT OPERATIONS I This functional area assesses the control and execution of activities directly related to operating the plant. It includes activities such as plant startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and response to
. transients.
Overall performance in the operations area has declined from its previous superior level to an overall rating of good. The plant has been operated safely, although there has been an increase in the number of operational events.. This increase is attributable to the following: weaknesses in operator performance, the acceptance of long. standing deficiencies in plant equipment', management expectations not effectively communicated to personnel and enforced, weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence, and the implementation and adequacy of . corrective actions. Quality Assurance activities associated with Operations remained strong and effective in identifying areas for improvement. Operator performance during the period has, overall, been good, and continued to be strong during unusual plant events or evolutions. Operators showed ale't and proper response to ten reactor trips, r reflecting well upon the licensee's training program and individual
. capabilities. Similarly, operator performance during twelve observed l startups and seven~ monitored entries into reduced inventory conditions
,' were typified by excellent command and control and thorough operator . knowledge. However, operator performance during less demanding or less - 1 1 focused evolutions showed weaknesses in procedural adherence, the ,
-identification and correction of deficiencies, and attention to detail.
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=Of particular concern, procedural adherence and adequacy issues resulted )
'in,:or contributed to, an increase'in the number and severity of 1 operational events. The lack of overall quality in plant procedures-was !
underscored by the . shear volume of procedural changes required when a - ' policy,of verbatim compliance was adopted. ;
. The ability of 0perations to identify and correct problems in a manner '
I sufficient to prevent recurrence was also of concern. This issue was ' compounded by identified weaknesses in communications across , organizational interfaces, in that failures in informal communications l were not compensated for by programmatic methods. .j Finally, operator attention to detail has declined during this SALP period. Given that issues of procedural inadequacies existed, the ' importance of attention to detail by operators was amplified, in that it i represents an important barrier to failures. The decline in attention ! to details was indicative of an onset of complacency through the SALP i period, a trend which operations management failed to identify and remedy in a timely manner. The Plant Operations area is rated Category 2. I III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE i This functional area assesses licensee activities in the areas of i testing and maintaining plant structures', systems, and components.
. Activities assessed include preventive, predictive, and corrective maintenance, as well as surveillance, post-modification, and post-maintenance testing.
-Overall performance in the maintenance area declined from its previous l superior level to an overall rating of good. Maintenance provided I
- 9enerally effecMve support for plant operations on a day-to-day basis.
However, there wre problems with equipment that adversely affected , overall plant performance and provided unnecessary challenges to operations.
, Significant problems related to maintenance were manifested by an i operability issue with pressurizer power-operated relief valves, reactor !
- coolant pumps seal failures, and inadequate post-maintenance test i determinations. There were also procedural difficulties. encountered, J especially in surveillance and preventive maintenance procedures. .These issues had been present but unrecognized previously, and the licensee's remedial actions.. included an attempt to utilize a " verbatim compliance" 4
approach. However, the older' procedures were not written.to a level of . detail that would support this methodology, and the plant rank and file were not well oriented in the concept of procedural adherence; t therefore, the use of verbatim compliance did not resolve the problems
- , emanating from weak procedures.
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3 Management of'the maintenance area changed during this assessment'
. period, and by the end of the assessment- period, the:new management appeared to be providing the leadership necessary to reverse t.he, observed negative trends. In the area of procedures, the new management ,
team instituted a dual approach of correcting the procedures and training the personnel to use them which has seen some preliminary
. successes.
The surveillance program was'. implemented satisfactorily, but the procedural problems discussed above kept it from rising to the superior level. Corrective maintenance was performed acceptably and generally had strong management involvement. In addition to the apparent strength of the new management team, the . predictive maintenance group was considered a strength. The group was adept at vibration analysis, thermography, and lubrication analysis. The' predictive maintenance group.had strong and positive interactions
. . with the operations and mainteriance programs and, furnishing early '
warning of incipient equipment failures, and long-term degradation of ;
- important components.
Licensee preparations to implenient the new maintenanct rule were~ i successful in identifying equipment such as the radiation monitoring : system and the emergency diesel generators which were not performing to
. the licensee's expectations.
The Maintenance area is rated Category 2. IV. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING
' This functional area assesses activities associated with the design of.
plant modifications and engineering support fcr operations, maintenance, ; I - surveillance,- and licensing activities. i !. The overall performance in the Engineering area remained superior. The strength of the engineering group was shown in the area of design r and installation support. This was manifested by a number of well
- engineered and implemented plant modifications. In the. area of' design
, control and maintenance of the current licensing basis, the engineering i organization typically performed well with occasional weaknesses.
The plant's operations were supported successfully throughout the . assessment period. Of particular note was the design and installation
- on Unit'2 of.the condenser tube cleaning. system. In addition, the i '
licensee has undertaken several initiatives to reduce the number of l jumper / lifted leads, eliminate operator work-arounds, reduce the number
- - of old work orders, and to improve the performance of contractors. The fuel vendor independence program will res_ ult 1n better control-of cote design, improved support for the plant and enhanced fuel'utilizaticn.
The support of maintenance' activities remained sitrong. The 45th Street Laboratory. provided good support'with co'mponent special.ists along with. 1-(- --- _____________._-__b._
V 4 i effective. nondestructive examination services. A comprehensive program E ofl monitoring Alloy 600/690 applications. focused on the pressurizer, reactor vessel and loop piping penetrations. The recently implemented maintenance specification program should result in effective maintenance - -support,- efficient engineering, and enhanced plant safety. In light of the weaknesses discussed in the Maintenance section, the support of maintenance activities by engineering is an area where improvements could be achieved. L Throughout the. assessment period, licensing submittals have been i consistently of'high quality, reflectirig sound engineering judgmer.t and !
- appropriate attention to detail. Safety evaluations demonstrated the ,
i licenseefs commitment to safety and compliance with regulations. ' The Engineering area is' rated Category 1. !
'y. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT This functional area addresses radiological controls, radioactive ;
j effluents, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, . fire protection, I i and housekeeping controls. ; 1 The overall performance in the Plant Support area has remained superior. [ ' The radiation protection program received strong management support. The accumulated dose goal was met for the first year of the assessment l [ period but not for the second year. This w'as the result of the maintenance problems and the resulting increased outage time. The l > - radiation protection organization continued to implement strong initiatives in the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) program l through the use of remote monitoring of potentially high radiological l dose work and the introduction of electronic dosimetry. Management l inycivement and support was evidenced by the small amount of surface l area contamination, a significant reduction in the volume of solid i waste, and the readiness of the post accident sampling system.. Training i and self-assessments were found to be effective. Thus, the combination ] of management support and an innovative health physics organization - resulted in superior performance. I Security maintained an excellent level of performance during a staff I reduction of the guard force and the introduction of biometrics. l Measures used : included effective training, which included the use of.a < combat firing range and good self-assessments. Changes to the security f plan were both appropriate and made in a timely manner. However, there were some performance problems such as a repeat instance of failure to l
- compensate in'a timely manner for a computer. failure; this suggested a' l problem with the effectiveness of corrective action from a previous j event.
In the-fire protection area, combustible control was effective and the fire brigade performed well during drills and during an actual event.
.However, observation .of ' surveillance testing of the fire protection
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5 systems revealed weak procedures, poor attention to detail, as well as-
' minor past errors that had gone uncorrected. On balance, procedural and surveillance problems detracted from the otherwise excellent level of performance in the~ fire protection area.
In the emergency preparedness area, the full participation exercise conducted in 1994 was successful, and appropriate emergency classifications were made. Overall exercise performance was rated as good. The status of equipment and supplies needed to support emergency preparedness was found to be adequate. .The emergency preparedness program maintained a good state of readiness for event response. The Plant Support area is rated Category 1. t 5 I l I l e 6 k 4 4 '1 w
9m. St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 1.0 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1.1 Background and Objectives For several years. Florida Power and Light (FPL) has monitored developments in the area of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). FPL has also performed several probabilistic analyses to support management decisions concerning nuclear plant design, operation and maintenance. These analyses were typically directed at understanding contributors to safety system unavailability or the frequency of individual sequences of events. After 1988, the Nuclear Energy Department management foresaw the need to develop more fully the technology of PRA within FPL. A team was chartered to develop a set of recommendations for the future of PRA at FPL. Subsequently, a course of action was adopted that would result in the development of full-scale. detailed PRAs for the Turkey Point and St. Lucie Nuclear Plants. To accomplish these' objectives. the Nuclear Engineering Department established a group accountable for the development, application and maintenance of the PRAs. This PRA group solicited support from critical interfacing departments such as Nuclear Fuels and the plant Operations. Maintenance. Technical and Training Departments. . Because ofits age and design, a PRA was performed first for the Turkey Point Plant. Following completion of Turkey Point's analysis. the St. Lucie PRA would then be developed. As these decisions were being made, the NRC's Individual Plant Examination Program (IPEP) was also being shaped and defined. As a minimum. the scope of the FPL PRAs must encompass that of the IPEP Based on the Generic Letter 88-20 content [Ref.1.0-1], FPL determined that the Turkey Point and St. Lucie PRAs should include a Level 1 PRA for intemal initiating events, a limited scope Level 2 Containment Performance Analysis, and an assessment of the risk due to
. intemal flooding.
By July of 1989. FPL let a contract to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for assistance in development of the Turkey Point PRA. Since this effort was "new technology" for FPL. SAIC would provide project management service and technology transfer. FPL engineers would perform at least 50% of the work. thus supporting the objective of bringing the PRA
. technology in-house. In practice. FPL performed well over half the work on the Turkey Point analysis and gained valuable experience in almost all aspects of PRA technology. Based on the experience and technology gained during development of the Turkey Point PRA FPL developed the St. Lucie PRA with minimal contractor support.
This report documents the work performed to estimate a core Anage frequency (CDF) for St. ; Lucie Units 1 and 2 and to satisfy the provisions of Generic Letter 88-20. 1.01 of 8
l Om. St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal l Revision 0 1.2 Plant Familiarization St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and 2 are located on Hutchinson Island in St. Lucie County about halfway between the cities of Fort Pierce and Stuart on the East Coast of Florida. Each unit is a pressurized water-type reactor (PWR) with a nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) designed by Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE) and rated for a full power core thermal output of 2700 megawatts. Unit i began commercial operation in 12/76 and Unit 2 in 8/83. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) of each unit is arranged as two closed loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel. Each loop has one outlet (hot leg) pipe, one steam generator, two inlet (cold leg) pipes and two reactor coolant pumps. An electrically heated pressurizer is connected to the hot leg of one loop and a safety injection line is connected to each of the four cold legs. The RCS operates at a nominal pressure of 2235 psig. He reactor buildings are dual containment design comprised of a steel containment vessel surrounded by an annular space and enclosed by a reinforced concrete shield building. The containment vessel steel shell is designed to confine the radioactive material that could be released from a postulated design basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA). The shield building is a concrete structure that surrounds the annulus and steel containment vessel. It protects the containment vessel from extemal missiles and provides biological shielding and a means of collecting radioactive products that may leak from the containment following a major hypothetical accident. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems with the containment ensure that the off-site radiological consequences following any LOCA do not exceed the regulations. The ESF include: (a) independent redundant systems (Containment Cooling System (CCS) and Containment Spray System (CSS)) to remove heat from and reduce the pressure in the containment vessel, (b) a high l and low pressure Safety injection System (SIS), (c) a Shield Building Ventilation System and an Iodine Removal System. (d) a Containment Isolation System. (e) a hydrogen control system, and (f) a control room habitability system. Feedwater to the steam generators is provided by two motor driven main feedwater pumps per unit. Each unit also has an Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) consisting of two motor driven pumps and one pump driven by a steam turbine. This system provides a source of water inventory .o the steam generators during plant startup, hot standby, and during plant cooldown, and provides heat removal to bring the Reactor Coolant System to the shutdown cooling system activation window. One condensate storage tank per unit provides a large volume of water to support operation of the AFW system. Off-site power from the utility grid comes from the switchyard via two startup transformers per unit. During normal operation. each unit receives power from the main generator through two unit auxiliary transformers. When necessary, on-site AC power is provided by two independent emergency diesel generators per unit. Equipment heat loads are removed by a closed Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, which rejects heat to the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) System. 1.0-2 of 8
0m. St; Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 1.3 . Overall Methodology M The St. Lucie PRA was developed to satisfy the provisions of the Individual Plant Examination
-(IPE)' processi that is to perform a " systematic examination to identify any plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents . . . ." The IPE has several goals including the development of an appreciation for severe accident behavior, to understand the most likely severe accidents for St.
- Lucie, to gain a "more quantitative" understanding of core damage probabilities and potential fission
. product releases, and finally to reduce these probabilities by appropriate plant changes where required. The St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 PRA scope and process were designed specifically to meet these goals.
1.3.I' Lntgrnal Events Methodology Standard event tree / fault tree methods were employed to understand the most probable core damage - states for the plant. The St. Lucie analysis used the small event tree /large fault tree philosophy. Functional event trees were developed for each class of unique initiating events identified; top logic was then developed to link the statement of functional failure to that of system failure criteria. Detailed fault trees were developed for both Units I and 2 for each front-line system identified in the top logic. Also, these front-line systems' support systems had fault trees developed. To ensure the tra'ceability of the supporting data, detailed system description notebooks were created to
' document the analytical effort.
' The' Unit I and Unit 2 fault tree basic events were then quantified with a mixture of generic and St. Lucie plant specific data. The scope of the plant specific data analysis included initiating event
' frequencies and plant specific failure data for component types requested by Generic Letter 88-20.
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The project established a six-year data window as the basis for quantifying failure rates and
' maintenance unavailability.
Human failure events were also quantified. Methods compatible with those outlined in the Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure [Ref.1.0-2) were employed to develop conservative - screening values for human events: more detailed analysis was used for important recovery events.
'The SAIC enhanced version of the EPRI-developed CAFTA code was used to integrate the event trees and fault trees into a plant 'model. Model development integration and quantification was performed on personal computers.
9 St. Lucie plant personnel involvement was a key factor in the project. The individual system analysts performed walkdowns, as. required to verify the completeness and correctness of their models. Operations.~ Maintenance, Technical.-ISEG. and Training department personnel were
- consulted throughout the analysis. Operations and Training Department personnel were particularly instrumental in the identification and quantification of operator recovery events.
St. Lucie is an open plant (i.e. no enclosed turbine building). For the internal flooding events, it was recognized that most sources of " floods" would simply run-off across the plant area to either lthe intake or discharge carials. Fire zones were chosen as the unit of examination. For each zone;
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@m .- St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 . screening questions were employed (Does the water source trip the plant'?. is there PRA equipment in the zone?. does the PRA equipment become damaged by the water source? (either immersion .
or spray)). For the areas that did not pass the screening analysis, the contribution to core damage frequency was determined by "failing" the zone's PRA related equipment and analyzing the CAFTA-based plant model. 1.3.2 Containment Performance Methodoloey A simplified, limited-scope approach was taken for this portion of the analysis. To make the transition from core damage states identified by the internal events analysis to plant damage states, a ' containment systems status " bridge" tree was constructed and appended to the binned core damage sequences. This bridge tree assesses the unavailability of containment isolation systems and containment sprays / emergency containment cooling systems and helps categorize the various cor- damage states into plant damage states. The containment event tree then provides insights into the phenomenological factors affecting the core melt and subsequent containment failure and release modes. The EPRI-developed MAAP Code was used to gain St. Lucie specific knowledge about the progression of the accident from melt to release. Containment failure modes and release categories are the outcome of this portion of the overall effon. 1.4 Summary of Major Findings FPL has performed a Level 1 and limited scope Level 2 PRA for St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 in response to Generic Letter 88-20. " Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities". The objectives for this assessment are consistent with the objectives given in the generic letter; FPL personnel have been directly involved in all aspects of the development, quantification. and documentation of the PRA models. The approach included system. procedure, and drawing reviews, discussions with Operations. Training. Technical Staff and other plant personnel, and independent peer reviews.by PRA experts to ensure that the models are consistent with accepted PRA practices. As a result, the IPE provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the severe accident behavior of St. Lucie Units 1 & 2. The overall likelihood of core damage and fission product release from the containment from intemally initiated events has been quantified consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 88-20. The relative contribution to core damage frequency from the different accident sequence types has been determined. The major findings are presented here in two components: findings from the' Internal Events analysis, and the Containment Performance analysis. 1.4.1 Internal Events (Level n Findines The overall core damage frequency due to internally initiated events for St. Lucie 1 is 2.3 x 10'5/yr and for St. Lucie Unit 2 is 2.6 x 10'5/yr. This is much less than the NRC safety goal of I x 10"/yr and illustrates a high level of safety. LO-4 of 8
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&m 'St.' Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal
& Revision 0 )
He overall core damage freq~ u ency for St. Lucie Units ;l '& 2 is within the range of i
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past PRAs performed for PWRs.- Thus, the susceptibility to core damage at St. Lucie Unit: 1 & 2 is not unlike other PWRs. , A chart of the dominant accident sequences is shown in Figure 1.4-1. It shows that - the largest contributor to core damage risk is small-small (1/2" - 3") LOCAs. Total loss of feedwater events are also important accident sequences for core damage risk. Section 3.7 presents the Level I results in more detail St. Lucie has several means of providing feedwater to the steam generators for decay heat removal. No vulnerability related to USI A-45, Decay Heat Removal. has been
- identified.
I
'l.4.2 Containment Performance (Level 2) Findincs The St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 larg'e dry containment design provides adequate capability to mitigate severe accidents. No unusually poor contamment performance has been found. A. chart of the containment analysis results is shown in Figure 1.4-2.
The greatest threat to containment integrity is due to a loss of all containment heat ! removal during an accident where the RCS is at high pressure. Steam generation i without the ability to remove heat and condense steam increases the likelihood that high pressure melt ejection at vessel breach can fail the containment. ' i A key feature of the St. Lucie containment design is that for almost all accident sequences, the reactor cavity is flooded with water. This decreases the likelihood of reactor vessel failure due to ex-vessel cooling and results in lower releases (due to retention of fission products in the RCS and scrubbing of ex-vessel fission products by the water) compared to if the vessel were to fail and the core were to fall on a dry cavity floor. The open design of the' St. Lucie containment means that local hydrogen accumulation (identified in Generic Letter 88-20. Supplement 3, containment performance improvement issues) is not a significant contribution to containment failure. The St. Lucie Unit I and Unit 2 PRA' has been performed in a manner consistent with the objectives stated in Generic Letter 88-20 and the results found that there are no plant unique severe accident vulnerabilities. 1.5 Report Organization - Section 2' of NUREG-1335. " Individual . Plant Examination: submittal Guidance" provided a ' standard Table of Contents for submittals in response to Generic Letter 88-20. This repon adheres to the' standard' format as far as practical The following provides a brief guide to this report's
, forganization-1.0-5 of 8 -
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-. 4
- m. xSt. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal- _
Revision 0
~ SECTION 1.0 - Executive Summary - Overview of the project. its scope and results.
SECTION 2.0 - Examination Description - Details on what methods were applied to perform the various components of the analysis, discussion on how the intent of Generic Letter 88-20 was met by the analysis. SECTION 3.0 ' Core Damage Analysis: " Front-End Analysis" - Details on the Internal Events analysis leading up to the core damage condition (includes the Accident Sequences. Systems Analysis. Intemal Flooding Analysis. Reliability data. Human Reliability Analysis. Quantified Core Damage Sequences. results of the " Front-End" work performed, and proposed resolution of any USIs and GSIs addressed by the St. Lucie PRA). SECTION 4.0'- Containment Performance Analysis: "Back-End Analysis" - Details on the features of' the St. Lucie containment structures, core and plant damage state binning, containment systems " bridge" tree. Containment Event Tree, quantification of containment failure modes and radionuclide release characterization. SECTION 5.0 - Utility Participation and Internal Reviews Project organization, project reviews, major comments ud their resolution. SECTION 6.0 - Plant Improvements and Unique Safety Features - Discussion of how potential vulnerabilities were analyzed and any countermeasures identified. SECTION 7.0 - Summary of Results and Conclusions. I.6 Section 1.0 References l.0-1 NRC Generic Letter 88 20. Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities. November 23.1988. 1.0-2 EPRI-NP-3583. Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure (SHARPL 1984.'
.l.0-6 of 8
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- m. St. Luci Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 Figure 1.4-1 Summary of St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Level 1 Results ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 m--. .
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STo PETERSBURG TIMES
. Date 5/21/94 Page _1 Tampa Bay and State ,
NRC staff tells utilities ! to toe line O Nuclear 1*ma,inchwhoFlorida Power, hope to avoid costly fire safety mc r- A Noway,says the staff ; Im wierA tion. 1 1 pect plants to comply wrth the By T.CMfusmN 8535R and DND DAHL NRC hem 2 rules today." Selin told reporters i after the 90 mmute meetmg in WASHINGTON - The staff of the Nuclear could respond in mirmtes. suburban Washmgton. Regulatory ceir====ian on Fdday thwarted plans by The staff panned the assess- There is some wiggle room. 5" Ws two largest utihues to bypass stringent fire ment plan submitted by Florida though. Both West and Selin said
- sundards at then nuclear plants. Power & Light. a decision seen as the comuussion would consider ex-a blanket recommendanon agamst ceptions to its reg:dacons so that ae staff remnimand=non was bad news for samlar proposals by Florida Power Fur;ida Power Corp. and Florida Power & Light Co., utilities may not have to go and 20 other unlities, through the costly exerc2se of who were hoping to avoid the high cost of r--img fire bamers on emaal safety systenis m the plants. For Florida Power alone, the' mod:fying an entre plant.
action could mean a $40-milhon Sehn said utdities may be re-Like 80 percent of the natmn's utahnes, the repair job at its Crystal River quired to upgrace the one-hour Florida c=np=- matalled a gypsum-like material plant. Bert Henderson, a spokes- barriers to make sure they meet caued Thermo Lag to protect hal cables that man for the plant,had no comment that standard. The commission turn off the care in emergencies to prwent melt- on the decision. might allow utilities to reclassify down. Steven West, chief of the com- three-hour bamers to withstand Thermo Lag is supposed to protect the cables mam's specal projecu secnon. fire for Just one hour, with the i for one hour in areas with sprmklers and three hours told the commissioners that it addition of sprmklers. in areas without. would be "techMe=lly challengmg'* Further. Sehn said one step As it turns out. it lasts only a fraction of that f r de gunment to reew me Ms can & s to e sure tune. The NRC declared Thermo Las moperable madematicsimodels and,the safe- combustible matenals - such as ty plans utihties mm __ electric boxes - areisolated from two years ago. The meetmg Friday was the staff's chance to tell the enmmteninn the best solution to He also was skepticalaboutthe Jre cables they are trying to pro. g* gg ability of scienusu to predict how tect from fire. a fire will behave. Tires are very Nuclear industrv opponents Representatives from Florida Power & Light unpredicuble, c imic." West who have pushed for didn't hke what they beard. ete re-fold re p m . placement of the Thermo- g bar.
"It's back to the drawmg board." engmeer The staff rarnmmended the na- rier r ed Friday with shock . Chuck Fisher said. "They just essentaHy said, 'For- tion's nuclear plants toe theline on and 'on at the NRC's recom-set it.' " fire safety regulations, a sugges- mendations. -
Both r=np==== were trymg to get out of meet- tion that,if apprwed could mean Among other.ttungs, they said
- i. ing the one-hour and three-hour standarda by rely- htmdreds of mihna of dollars m that requirmg plants to comply mg on *% ----
- M =======aara "
modzfleannne wrth the one-hour bamer by add-BasicaDy, the =======aint= would have need elab- While the ra==Mn*s ruling . ing more Thermo Lag- basicall
- mathemencal models to abow that three hours on the remmmendation isn't ex. pihng it on thicker and deeper y insenau was not needed in an area with no for a week or more. NRC would reward a company now be-meuble matenals or in areas where fire teams . Ivan Selinmcbcated be ts ing investgated by a grand y.2ry m ready to go along with it. Baltanore. Thermal Science Inc..
Please see Nnc SB "As a pracucal matter, we ex- maaer of "Germo-Lag. p . 20* d 100* 0N 2E:8' P6.dc 6eW ZE9P-E 95-P 06 : ~l33. WWO3 dB03 3dd
l
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l CORP. GCMMUNICATIONS 7-10-1994 . 0:06 PAGE 1/"I P.igntFAX l News items of Special interest FPL Group, Inc. Corporate Communications Please Distribute & Post 407-694-4695 CC/JB PALM BEACH POST
/ / l O/ :P+
,i Fire retardant at i melear plants doesn't work l After paying once to install the stuff. FPL customers 1
- may shell atit $10 million more to got it replseed.
fly DANIfli F HFRilRlW I Pan seecn am start wmer ned. ; , , I _ ,, ' For nearly seven years, a white .Mthougn Floriaa Power 6: Lignt 1
;; laster-f tkc substance played a inajor Co. - the owner of the Turkey Point 1dq.3 ,, {
role m protectmg South Mondlans and St. Luce nuclear power pants - .a , .gl , ,; ; frcm a nuclear assasterm the event of a is 6ghting for an exemption from the - federal tire codes that required l ! Ere at either cf the area's two nudear power plants. Thenno-Lag. it looks u though FPL's 3.3 million Borida customers may have
!]!!sa 5. U ..,:rM '
i The problem is, federal regulators to pay the $10 nullion bill to hav9 thC ci
;. I ' '
now csy, the cubctance Thermo Lag stu h ep W . 3[l3 ,{
- doesn't work.
Alkm Siegel, president ofIndustrial - FPL's customers already p:dd mil- ! I., f
- y! L i _ !
2.___t Testing 1 aboratories Inc., which war, lions to install Thermo-Lag, and the re sonnsihlt' far Thermrul ass fira Inst 9tQtsGEDn b0f hu bcun m9untutr i d j tentn. rocontly told a fadoral grand jury 17 shnut $700.000 more every year smee M3 at Turkey Pomt done be-g g : li i.. D.Ituuvac Llist Llie tests were f.sisi. 4 , cause of Thenno Lag's dc6ciences. :; J J Extras at Turkey Point, costs of which are passed on in every power bill.
'; U 3 2
%I include: A hank of about 40 video cameras and 10 TV monitors, plus a f
=
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t
i . . = : .: . w y :=._ .:== ..n . ., CCCP .' COMMUNICATIONS 7-18-1994 10:03 PAGE 2/3. RichtFAX replace cables as well. said Paul NUCLEAR Gunter, director of the Washing-Fft>m i A ton. D.C.. based Reacter Watchdog crew of about 10 "6rewatchers." Project. 211 trained on the Thermn. lag Siegeltold a grandjury in Apnl creat to make sure they get a 6re that his St. Louis lab, which had no , under control before it gets to the 5re-testing expenence, merely ,
- plant's wiring. signed off on test reports wntten ;
by the Thermo.bg manufacturer, j Both the Florida Public Ser-vice Commission. which sets Thermal Science Inc. of Fenton. F18L's ratco, anc r FL itself, have h!o. He c!w ist he initisicd ro said that because Thermo l.ag was ports without reading them and pst in unoer federal order, rate- provided blank letterhead to 731. payers would foot the bill. The testimony was part of a plea - Thermo-Lag m 1986 appeared bargam m which he andlus compa-to be an answer to nuclear utilitics' ny pleaded guilty and are cooper-prayers aftet 4 Nudcar Reguistory : stag with tac grand jury mvesu. Commission decree that all elec- 'gation. trical wiring had to be protected Most of the 79 plants with , from nre.The NRC move followed Therino-Lag have been reluctant a 1975 fire at the Brown's Ferry to spend the estimated $500 mil-nuclear power plant during which lion industrywide to replace it ,
- workers lost control of the reactor are still trying to convince i They_ill the N to let thuus kaap it. I for its hours after flames bumed !
through electrical circuits. Thermal Science is the only Thermo Lag was aggrenivJly cupplier of Therrno lag and han- ! uiuketed. Its plusea: It wac rela- dias ita maintenance Utilitica tora,ly chsop, enold dnw a fire int have- *YprPMP.d conCcfr. about , three hours. and didn't appear to how they'll msintain the r l affect the wirmg it protected - a Thenno bg should the maker be I problem with come other fire. mdicted. proo6ng coluttent. Therefore nn niility has zugd Now all three of those things the manufacturer, which stead-are in question. fastly says Thermo-Lag works like The NRC staff,in a May report it is supposed to if installed prop to the commission. said heraime of crly Golden r, aid FPL is iceeping claims about Thesmo.Lg by the that upt'un open. manutacturer, utilitica m4y have It was on the claims of the installed too many wires in too falsified tests that FPL embraced small an area, putting the electrical Thermo. Lag in the mid '80s, in-systems at risk for premature ag- stalling more of it than any other i iag and fraying. That, in itsell is a utdity in the nction. About 26.000 potential 6te hazard, FPL spokes- feet of it coats pipes, electrical man Ray Golden, however, said conduits and walls at Turkey Point tne udilty betjevc= h duc ..vt 1 .% .ndOt.L de. a problem. "It's everywhere," Golden Others disagree. said.
"We thmk the cables should be in 1991, the NRC launched an inspected because it is possible investiganon after repeated com-that they could find they have to plaints frnm utilidna about pt94-l p _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
I
- 2. 'N >?:2'A :
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- l5 ; .2' Conti . CollifUl!! oATIoNO ? io 1004 10.0C PAoD u.'u flia,1. i.. AH huur and une isut$1 hae ptuteslaua
. ' ~, y , , g requirements. saymg :unong other r ,
tamgs that they have no signi6 cant l Gre hazard.
, ,,a,f , "It has a lot loco of a firo ha:ard
-m here because the plant is all out m
.'9 :
" the open." 'said Turkey Point's site vice president Tom Plunkett.
i "I personally don't think it's a
, ,nM. ..
.. 1 problem."
a, .R.}. Nuclear watchdog organiza. j tions scoff at their arguments. Mi- . W '. . ' -
.. 's chael Manotte, executive director i cr tne wasnmgton, D.C.-casco 1 r Q Nuclear Informadon and Resource Service, pointed out that at Tur-l
; w , y.s., key Point. FPL's natural gas and :
use-butning planta ma c :i I8L 6 88 CAL lu l E. - the two reacters. i
.'e W It "It'c sight on the coast, where 1 I
it's vulnerable to hurncanes, and there are huge truelm,of oil citting Thermo Lag encased concults arnimd. Manntte und , Tn ny , ' can ne seen tnrougnout tne , lurkey Pomt racility. there}, no 5m W is lu6 j crous. ; FPL says Thermo-Lag stood 1 icms with Thesmp40g. Tests up to Hurncane Andrew wnile made by a variety ot uutines and many of its buildiugs at Turkey otber groups showed that m best- Point were decimated. case scenarim. Derm > Lag --- Vince Laudato, the fire protec-mientted to nelay a fire ter three non supervisor at Turk Point, hours - could only slow it for an said there are nurnernusbe safe-hour; and its one hour sister kept ty plans and systems in place that a ute back ror only about 20 mm- anure than compensate for Thermo Lag's denciencies, in-e NRC in 1992 ordered the ciudmg a 100-man bngade of atilities to begin intensive tramed firc6ghters.
"firewatches" of the Thermo-Lag areas. At Turkey Point, for exam. All 900 Turkey Point employ-ole, this means that drewatchen, ees have bad extensrve. fire train-
'uaik througn and look for fires or ing; combustible materials are not hazards every hour, 24 hours a allowed in the plant: and there are day, seven days a week, supple, a host of systems m place to put mentmg the video cameras. out a fire, meluding water sprin-Many utilities, including FPL. k,lers. ernnguishem, and hnsn ara-argued that these firewatches and tions around the plant.
other procedures more than com- "We have compensatory men-penaste for Thermo. Lag's shnri- sures in place." Golden said. "so comings. FPL asked not to be there's really no additional con. forced to comply with the three- cern to the public." .
L.a :C '=- :::57:.: rP_ :.:== " w 1 . E :..,- CCTtP . COMMUti!CATICHS ~7 19'94 S:52 PAGE 1/1 %ghtFAA
. APL FYIFAX Please copy, post or route this important information. .luly 19,1994 FPL*S RESPONSE TO PETI BEACH POST STORY ON THERMO-IAG On . Monday , July 18. the Palm Beach Post pnnted a story about Thermo Ltg - a fire barner c:.aiena.1 - insta!!cd at St. Lucie and Turkey Point. The story was misier. ding and the following n ;c cuded to employece, to 1;euer undcouuid und duhy ??L's pusidun un Tlieunu-I%.
Thermo lag is a Sm barner matenal used in many commercial applicanons mcludmg nuclear power plants.
- Thenno-lag wu installed at FPL's nuclear plants in the mid 1980's in response to increasing flee protcqugn requirements by the 57C.
Thermo-lag is only one component in FPL's Hre protecuon progmm. Other ! J components incluce fire detection and suppression sptems. Dre brigades mth fire Sghting equipment. tramed personnel patrnHing rhe plant looking for tires and Src hazards and closed circuit TV monitonng, In 1992. In response to NRC concerns regarding Thermo Lag. FPL insututed . compensatory Sre protection measures (closed circuit TV and dre watches) in areas were the matenal was installed. Recent industrv-sponsored testing has shown that Thermo-Lag does funcuan as a l Gre Lurner. While the material did not meet current NRC cntena for ihe endurance, the matemtl doce provide a level of Sra protocuon. l 1 FPL is acdvely pursuing solutions to the Thermo-Lag issue. The utility has met with the NRC to discuss a proposalinvohing conducung engineenng analpes to. determine whether Thermo-Iag is acceptabic in its curmnt conSgurations or requires plant-speciSc modiScations. If mod Scations are required they could include upgt tding existing Thermn-Tag by adding additional layens, adding fire detection and suppression systems or rerouting critical electnca.1 components. c?L ts worldng with the nuclear industry and' the NRC'on a Snal resolution of this issue. In the enm. FPL believes the compensatory fire protection measures it has in place adequately
, cuteco the plants for fire safety.
Tv dwge vi .L.l . f ..m..lm, 11 (407) C94161
. A CORPORATE COSLMUNICATIONS NEWS SERVICE FOR EMPLOYEB5 OF FPL .R
- I
..~ 04 '94 03:00M r:L cpp .-.Mn . ;E .
T Mqr 4.IuAtt f5L IC7kR (2e /t% i J Retardant maker indicted .
"'"'"*""*"'-" plants between 1982 and 1992' GREENBELT, Md. - The man-Product used on e inact=ent says. ,
. A typical nuclear power plant ufacturer of a fire-retardant St. Lucie Nuclear such - St. tuee can expect used in many nuclear power ,, three to four fires durmg its life lants, including the St. Lucio Power Plant winng mecta=cv d 3m years. $ id huclear Power Plant, was in. Paul Gunter, of the Nuclear In- / e dicted Thursday on charges tne formation and Resource Service.
. company lied about tests that Commissaan saHL Among the potential factors showed the product didn't work. Tharmal Science makes Ther- that could cause a nuclear melt.
As + federal grand jury in mo Iag 330, a fire retardant that down, fires account for half, he Mary returned the uven. is supposed to protect entical said, count indictment against St. electrical lines, including those About 7,000 square feet of , uuis-based Thernial Science used to shut down a reactor in an Thermo Lag is used r.t the St. Inc. and its president, Rubin emergency. The matenal was in-Feldman, the Nuclear Regulatory stalled m more than 70 nuclear Tum.to FIRE / A4 l
^
1 I Thermal Science hired St. buis- l F[.[*g based Industrial Testing Labon-ties Inc. only to witness the tests l I and sign tile reports, accordmg l Fmm u- to the indictment. ; For testing Thermal Science l Lucie plant as fire wall protec- also allegedly used an improved i
- tion and about 5,000 feet for con- product, which was not the prod- l
- dult holdng electrical wirmg, uct sold to power plants. l Florida Power & Light Co. David Williams. Inspector Gen-spokesman Ray Golden said. eral of the. Nuclear Regulatory
, . Workers at the plant for the Commission, said any deficiency past year have been doing inten- in Thermo Lag would not pose a sified fire watches, every hour serious threat at nuclear power walkin through the areas con. plants because of other safe-taining Thermo Lag. guards in place. l Golden said tests are being "You're not gemg to know it I conducted to determme whether failed until you had a catastro.
FPL should; replace the material, phe," Wmtamn said. leave the matenal, add more ma- "There has not been a large-terial or mstall more fire protec- scale replacement or removal of tion devices, such as sprmklers the matetul yet," he said. Wil-and smoke detectors liams would not say if the ma-
"Right now, the Nhc has some terial will ever be removed.
concerns about the matenal and The charges culminate e near-we're looking right now at what ly two year grend jury investiga-would be a long term salution," tion. Golden said. "But at this pomt Gunter said Thursday's v.aict-w'e're sull doing an evaluation ment is not a cause for celebra-and working with the NRC and tion.
- the entire industry." "I wouldn't term it nctory Golden also said he couldn't because our position . This .
rule out a lawsmt against the should be removed," he said. in ulation has failad sev- The NRC rates the amcunt of eral fire tens, once disintegrat. ThermMag used in pp,m plants , ing when burned. The indictment yd., 3 0$ to 10 5 allegss that Thermal Science hed to federal regulators about its square-feet, accceding to Gunter. te ting proced St. Lucie contains a suostanual
. also charges amount of Thermo Lag, he said.
that Thermal Science conducted "It would be fairly expensive tests of Thermolag instead of for St. Lude to replace that." having h +adaaaadaad.wa . um. 5.a a .y tested, a aseGunter
.e sa,id.w"Probably nnu,,,, . u in .the -
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INSIDE BUSINESS
'Coldblooded' may be .
vital trait for FPL chief can to paint James starting to happen in Californf a. Broachcad. the sunicct of and there's httle cuestion it wiH Il*s tocan llusineu Mondas happen in Flonoa. coser ston, as a bad guy. But snouid :angtime FPL Af ter all, ne was re.enoncenng empioyees suuer for it? before the bunword wa5 cser Regrettaelv. tney are. Just as int ented. airline e mpio> ees suffered . Broachcad. chairman of FPL greath for tne deregulation et Group. nas oserscen massne,00 that incustry. J st as maratae. cuts at Fionda Power A Light. tunng workera .;re suffenne as the stateN t'icgest electne uniin giocat trade . '. e an hicn.w a ge ard FPLi pnman suosidiary. In manutactunn; frw trom tne the crocess. Broadneau has i niteo States. n.>t as tnousanas canned a measure oi notonet) tor ui wot Aers n' Jotens of edher lopping ott the in enboods of incustnes ar. sullering as teen. nosocy cnances tne world. t housanos m W hetner or not you like broau-people. headutraten. you can t arcue , There re ; that the man is inconsistent. pienn of susn
- because in trung to mose FPL ullains inese to a different lesci. he not only days. E kunning a- 4 has called for sacnfices from 6 empioyees. He's gone to the 9pany, no Stocuoiders, as well niittt er the . ' '
Last year. FPL cut its dhi. sue. recuires dend the moncv it pays annually a cenain leses DAVID to stockholders for owmnc the - I of coldbloo. S ATTERflEl.D compancs snares. cuuing a uuh. dedness. par. ueular! ' EXECUT!VE tis dnidena n not unhke telhnc ' ame> oi swnt BUSINESS W f3""b i'"* """ CC' '"" mesh a day. enance. It s EDITOp W hen FPL o naskte its on o i aond u ncre cend 32 percent it aticctea some r umners mattei. -ometimes
- 000 sn renmoers. Ratner tnan more inan tne necos ano wisnes raung 'ev r*er ent oi it, pronts to vi eenain peopic
\ nd it > e.ns t o tv. s ntical of stockhoicers nroadneac decteed naran measures inat nurt people. that more mene- necoco to ne
( utung ivos means suttine costs. reinsestec e tne compan. to w nen sou sui s osi, suu can rrepare lor t~e tuture. merea>e pronn a nnoui crowing it was a gain mose. a oeusion j our res enue. h' can nor- tnat earned Broadheau esen ; mula, and itN one nati no doutu more enemics. FPL's stoa telt j t'een emplosed M rienn of top more inan 15 percent following ' esecutne. tne dniuena cut. inroadhead n inaung cuts at But if M all Mrect is the final ; FPL because he sees a world sudge and tun on a compami l inati snancing. lie itunis Flor ;'errormance. FPL seems to ne i ida Power A Light necos to oc a neaded in tne nght cirectiort smaller. quicker orcanizauon to The stock has recusered urtualtv , crerare for dereculation of the ;d! of the loss. Oespite the lower ueetne unius ouunc 1 hat c.o cpanics . idend. Marn ensestmem com. are urcing gnsestors to mas not be tar oli t' a y. hN a op in.n unimatei,
-nould t eneta es ervone. amagint broadncaci mmes m.n ce j nas ine tne opportumn to enoose norst. Tne. mas seem msenso '
wtuen compans sou eus sour ine. Thes mipnt esen r e cota. ciectncin trom. iman:nc compa- clooded. n ics actuath oitenng specist but a. ica-! thesic es er - onces er speciat seruces. it'- nandec . L
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l _ COVER STORY lineman and union member I e mall. James tp pie n m s o Lowell Broadhead is te apprehensive about o 1 just another erowser ruture. He claims that we,ur 4 in the crowd. In pic- .' re tures, he could be a trying to be competitiv l he s sucking ti businessman a company dry.,1,e this peop
- bureaucrat or'a phar- .
If enticism has any efTect on macist. On paper, his I name has the cadence - Broadhead. milli n in 1993, who ite.arned doesa,2$ i t ' of a former senatoror show. He makes it a point to s Civil War general. regularly drop in on work i But mennon his name to . sites and eat with employees
' the 4.000-plus workers laid
- l otT or prematurely reared by he,the company cafetena, but i
Florida Power & Light since' s not manic over approval i ratings. His co i 1989. and watch the steam s w it afin seulm,ncern g imo as he omce i nse from their heaas. in 1989. was nothing less than Broachead. FPL's 59-vear-4
- old chairman and chief execu- ' . 8"^f * *# E 3 N'"*-
People had be,en here for i tive. offers no apology for vears and were doing theirjob ] engmeenng one of Fionda s
- most drastic corporate h it was set forth." Broad-1 restructunngs in the 1990s. head said last week. "But my
- One at every four jobs was - job was to see that this is a
- cut, and many top. level exec- successful company that is utives saw their FPL careers {roductive igh quality and provides of service. Therea
- snuffed out under Broad- was no way that the company head s reign. It happened w th the highest costs in the again on Jan. 4. when FPL President Stephen Frank quit s coing to sur-Southeast vive. I didn wa.t want FP l
' because. sources said, he
{ stood no ' chance of ever become an ther Eastern Air-i becoming CEO. U"#5'.,, Pan Am or Southeast
- Bank Harshness. though, is what j makes Broadhead an enigma.
! A star at SL Joe Minerals a Jekvil-Hvde fieure stalking ( the lifth floor of Building D at -\ look back at Broachead's
- life shows the making of a suc-FPL's serene camous'-stvle cessful camen j headquarters m Juno Beacn.
d No middle ground N. Br adheaa w s ra d' ' by parents who were school-
-\mong people who know 4
Broadhead. fechngs aren't teachers. He excelled in math i ambivalent. Every action Broad. and science, good eno, ugh for j "He may be a tough manager, but admission to Cornell University 5 head signs off on i- hke cutting the he's a damned _ good CEO/' said and graduation with a degree in work t'orce in 1991 and 1993, or Tracy Danese. FPL's former vice mechanical engineenng. He later ! cutting the dividend in 1994 - i president of government relations, worked his way through, Columbia l adds to his list of admirers and who was laid offin 1991 after a 17 Law School and took a job as gen. j detractors. Those who know him year stay. "He struck me as the per. eral counsel for St. Joe Mmerals i sav Broadhead is a bnitiant tacti. sonification of the next generation. Corp. in New i ork. By the time St.
' clan and a man with a wrv sense of of management."
humor. Joe was acquireo.m a 52.8 billion Then there's this, from an FPL nostile takeover in l981, Broad-l
f l l f i t
. COVER STORY >
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Pnotes by JOHN MNEDA / nerand Staff j NO AMBlVALENT FEELINGS: James Broaonead's massive work-force reauctions and a dividend cut, performance as FPL's chief executive. including nas won botn acmirers and detractors. l l t j head had risen to president, a long career as enairman of Flor- Danese said. "We prided ourselves 1 His next stop. GTE Corp., intro- ida Power & Light. one of the on a high degree of meritocracy as l duced Broadhead to the world of nation's fise biggest electric utili- the, basis for moving up." j tegulated utilities. Ultimatelv. he ties. Mcdonald was a folksy and in the 1980s, the Mcdonald-led ] was made president of GTE's $12 w ell-liked leader. FPL disersitied its electricity busi-4 billion a-year. 100.000-employee "Under Mcdonald, there wa ness with an unlikely melange of l telephone operations, quite a family feeling that devel- hfe insurance, real estate. orange l Meanwhile. in Palm Beach Mar- oped. 2 camaraderie sort oflike in s j shall Mcdonald was windina down military unit or on football teams.' FLEASESEE BROADHEAD,28 i i i-I..-. . . , . . _ . - . . - . . . . - . . , . . . - - - . . - . ,
--'v- ' ' " " ' - ~ ' - -
4--w . MONDAY. JANUARY 23,1995 THE MERALD em Broachead 's vision: sam filling vacancies. Employees were stunned. But. agam. it was part of Broaanesis goal to get FPL in 1 ) FPL Lfs yea FPL had 290 cus-tomers ter everv employee. up from 203 in 1989. As operating and mamtenance costs fell. 50 did rates: 7.54 cents per kilowatt BROADHEAD. FROM 27 "You couldn't iust cut out a hour in 1990 to 7.16 last year. larce numoer of people and have "If we nadn't cut costs. we oves and cable T\, holdm.gs. a lesser number of empiovees do would have needed to raise rates gne of them. Colonial Penn 15 to 20 percent to cover it." tne same Inmg." Broacneaa said. insurance. p drag on FPL,romptly . We reviewed procecures to see Broadhesa said. s earnmgs. became a w hat was appropnate for the new Meanwnile. FPL turned its It was also a time wnen FPL environment. We hterally got nc - wornsome Turket Point nuclear was trymg to wm the world's of thousands of' nono~peratinc plant in Dade County mio one of qu 1- procedures we didn't thmk were Ine safest. as rated by'the Nuclear Iy Japan Arnencan s ernhadrfg Pnze'ever company 9 #*"* *
*E"** **'* " ^"
- new plants in Broward and' Mar-roce u[ aj No time to relax tin counues gne FPL one of the a d c ion nighest percentages of available insulled witn checks and broadhead was busy on another front. too. In 1991. FPL power in tne nation. a test that double-checks to improve pro- launches Broadhead m.to mental ductivity and customer service. wiped its cooks cican by selling Employees ran raga Colomal Penn a' t a loss and wnt, cartwheels.
time. but it paid ofI:ed withthe FPL won over- ing down ther nonutihtv busi-award in 1989' nesses. The divestiture's ana 'In the 9ame' downsizines cost FPL nearly $1 "We were really out of the A new attitude bilhon m profits over two years. money: now we re m the game."
. For employees. it still wasn't a Broadhead said. "We're not the Broadhead was hired that Jan- time to relax. best.as far as cost goes, but we've uary and didn't like what he saw. The federal Eneq;y Policy Act moved the furthest, and we've Oneratmg costs were the high- of 1992 enabled outsiders to clearly attracted the interest of est a.mong mvestor-owned utili- build power plants and ship elec. mvestors and others in theindus-ties m the Southeast. Up to 11 tncity from FPL's own back try. For the first time, our com-layers of management separated ~
vard. For now. those plants can petitors are trymg to recruit peo-Broadhead from field workers. Univ sell power wholesale. Inst is. pie away from our company." and volumes of proced.ures and to electric utilities. Just unen the smoke was rules slowed down accision mak- Nonetheless. Broacnead is not begmnine to clear at FPL. the ing In essence. Broadhead said, company aroppec another bomb FPL behaved hke a tat. plodding counting out the possibility of havmg to compete for customers. on May v. Inis time on share-monopoly at a time when deregu- holders: it cut its annual divi-lation was foremg compames in Such a move is afoot m Califor. nia* dend to $1.68 from 52.48 a other industnes to be light on utsid consultants and inside EE EMME studv teams went to work. In June'1991. Broachend unveiled a AM berN FMde Counctid 100, new. flatter organizationaI chart. 83'eiotece and homeeswm me Busmene swnmedie.tne New Rochehe. N.Y. Businese Counce and Edison As a result. about 2.300 jobs were _ Ematneinome execuwe ehmmated. Many .of the old commmen. ruard were shown the door. . m ene miet F8 #FUmin North Palm There was never a target of' execuwsWbom Fbdde Pouser Beam"'e enceuehe Lost Tree VN-1rvmg io get X number of people a ught and MeJuno Beach. legeoevuopment wtth wth out." Broadhead said. "The feel- bened holdmg company.FPL Shor6e.Th@evHour grown
'""8'*"-
ing was in the monopoly we kept Group. more people than we needed to. seekpeneut uechanical Fewne spertiennie.
'It was an employment-for-life enomaanne degreenomCer. Lestemekameeusererr -
approach." non.sewoogreekom Ceaumeie Asseconnebyaemesumener. At the same time, compa unhemny.Fonner prooident d Leetmoeteweeshee Forroet procedures, many wntten dunny St. Joe Mineratein New York Gusp ng City end GTETe6eonone oper-the Den 3mg hunt. were pared m enonein stamears. Conn. ***""**'*eser nuk s175. itavor of employee judgment. pe, ,,en Bemett Hom6 energy.coang Banke.Dette Air unos and deuseecWenntrol Pmeton Co. A/C system, ness eccour . weser4assung syssens.WL's OrgemimettenerChainnenof On-Caliennnce,feowresseeere Flortos Otympic Commmee and en shower homes,auce repaar. Gov.tmoton Oni6es' Partnere m addebens esectiautonen. Producemmertenederce;asem-
Mt II C S fi l l M
- M i. 4 FPLsurpnsedinvastorslast ye:I The company's stock pric:3. which cropp;c immictitriy aftertha by cutting its cividend. dividend cut,nas since rebounded.
I 'i S36 DNN 7.0% i 4.8% S34 6.5% , . g 6.0% 89 '93 '91 '92 '93 '94 o J F M A M hb J J A S 0 d N D J i share, ending a 4/ year run of A sudden resignation Solid support increased payouts. For the last four years. Stephen Analysts anc rnoney managers Broadhead defends himself by Frank was right at Brosonead's citing the company's turnabout I were aghast. The day of the side as president of the Fionda announcement. the stock fell the last five years. ! Power & Light subsidiarv. Frank. "I think he saved the compa-nearly $5. dropping as low as $3. quit Jan. 4. He said nothing 526.87. my's life." said David Blumberg, i more inan stating plans to " seek a Miami developer who sits on ' Today, FPL shares have recov- an opponunity that fulfills my , cred. closing Friday at,535.25. FPL's board of directors. ! personal goals." John Schantzman, business ' But to this day, many investors Analysts and FPL sources said i don't agree with FPL's decision manager of the 3.900-member ! Frank has the itch to be CEO - International Brotherhood of to cut the dividend and use the elsewhere if not at FPL l money to buy back stock and pre- Electncal Workers union. has a pare fora more competitive enyt- "I think that's what it came more tetupered view. Member- I ronment. down to: He wants to be The ship, he said, has steadily Man." said Andy Levi. an ana- 1 "I don't uncerstand the ratio- declined since Broadhead's lyst at Furman Selz in New York. arnval. i nale of FPL saying there's a "It's the only theory that threat fr{om c)ompetition when "He's done a good job for the makes sense." added Barry stockholders. he s done a good they're surrounded on three sides Abramson of Prudential Securi-by water." said David Schanzer. job for ahe industry, and he's j ties. "and it's hard to be able to done a good job for the com- ' a Janney Montgomery Scott ana- search discreetly wnen you're ivst uno droppea coverage of pany " Schantzman said. "But president of one of the biggest f or the people i represent. I can't FPL last year. "who's going to utilities in the country." i compete with them? King Nep- say he's making life any easier.
"When there's no discussion "When peopie came to work tune?" whatsoever as to why the presi-Yet, to hear it desenbed by for a utility, tney felt they had a Broadhead. FPL is no longer a dent leaves - whether it's an certain amount of job security amicable or a heated depanure because everyone needed lights,"
' power company with a high- - that only raises more ques-i yielding divicend forwidows and he added. "Because the industry l tions." said analyst Schanzer. is changing, that assurance is not crphans. The words he .uses - Frank did not return phone fast. flexible. low-cost. exciting necessanly there anymore." calls. Broadhead declined to Even so, Broadhead said
- makes FPL sound more like a elaborate. other than to say that firm in the thick of manufactur- employees have good reason to he and Frank remain friends. be upbeat.
ing or retailing. Being competi- FPL rep! aced Frank less than a tne is gospel. "I don't know of any company week later with Paul J. Evanson. that has changed its culture efF-
"Our ability to be an effective who joined FPL in 1992 as chief competitor apends on two ciency and productivity so much financial officer. the last several years. That's things." he said. "How well we FPL workers fear that Frank's !
perform and improve the quality . something they can be very ' resignation is a harbinger for proud of." Broadhead said. of service to customers. And another layoff in 1995. Broad-what happens in the external "This is a much more exciting head said 'no layoff is planned. place to work, and we've demon- . environment - if the govern- but he would not rule it out. ment passes rules and regulatsons strated that we're going to be suc-that enable people to compete cessful. We're gomg to gain, with us in a low-cost way;That's , probably at the expense of other like a Japanese company devel- companies." opsng a, car and droppmg it in Herald business wnter Ted Detrott. . Reed contnbuted to this nport.
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9}J yeent># f w. - 1 i i i k .; E BROADHEAD'S YlSION: "My job was to see with the highest costs in the Sourneast was going to that this is a successful company that is survive. I didn't want FPL to oa::ome another Eastern productive and provides a high quality of Airlines. Pan Am or Soutneast Bank." service. There was no way that the company l I i l i ' l g 4 g
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l l HOW HE MADE IT A REALITY:"You couldn't just cut new environment. We literally got rid of thousands i out a large number of people anu have a lesser of nonoperating procedures we didn't think were number of employees do the same thing. We revHewed essential." I ' procedures to see what was appropriate for the e I l I l i i
MONDAY. JANUARY 23.1995 au mEWFAALD As others' rates rise, - FPL holds down costs By TED REED Herald Business Wrtier
' """left7af*iSetOc'*"il *dY d' ""* HOW RATES COMPARE e
Florida Power & ^ In general. FPL.s fuel Light have dropped 14 c sts have steadily declined FPL's average residential charge has j smce 1985. One exception droppe0 sharply since 1985.One I at was m 1991. wnen tne Gulf hike was in '91. during the Gulf War. ercent"of that declineWar Most is caused a snarp jump in related to a drop in fuel oil pnces. anc the fuel com. RESIDENTIAL 1.000 KWH BILL nent of the typical FPL h"$a't the w re a $84 Q decade ago. But Flori-da's biggest utility has been able fIII Each' montn. 5' DF 4 3 PC*"I'resi-an FPL
.,B2-l to hold down its' costs at a time dential customer usmg, when other utilities have seen 1,000 kilowatt,71 hours of costs nse. electri, city pays 3 .c2. plus 2,,
Last year, for instance, the. I gal trancmse sees and util-it) taxes that vary accord- - Jacksonville Electric Authontv ing to area. surveyed 60 utilities, including 578-- 20 in Florida and 40 throughout Of that. FPL's base price the country. Only iI showed amounts to 547.38 from which j lower rates during the past 12 the utility takes its ,operati.ng, 576 ! years. Only seven had bigger transmission and distnbution decreases than FPL's 3.7 percent. costs plus FPL's protit - equal to a 12 percent return on equity 574- -- _ Fifth-lowest rates - set by the state's Public Ser- -l ' I 4 Among the 39 largest utilities in Florida. FPL has the fifth-low. vice Commission. Of the 571.62 average bill the 572 l r g est rater, Even Florida's Office of Public largest additional charges are
$15.70 for nuclear and fossil fuels and another $5.17 to pur. 570 l
l Q! I Counsel. which represents con. sumers m utility rate cases, says chase power generated by other FPL is doing a good iob on rates. sources.
- o8,'
" Ten years ago, they were A decade ago, the average bill i expensive in relatiots to the other l'or 1.000 kilowatt hours was major Florida utilities." said 583.39. Of that. $29.33 was for Roger Howe. deputy public fuel. 0.$5 86 87 88 89 90 '91 ' .!'93 '94'95 Possible problem SOURCE. FPL Group.
os to the ot om n e of cost." One factor that could influence Cost cutting at FPL future rates is another hurncane. reflects Chairman James Andrew cost FPL S415 million. Broadhead's efforts to cut all of it paid by storm insurance. costs by streamlining sys. Afterward FPL's insurance rates tems, slashing payrolls and went up so much that the cover-aggressively managing ape was no longer worthwhile. power production. Now. FPL is insuring itself. In the early 1980s. more The storm fund now has $96 than half of FPL's genera. million m it. tion came from oil, with Another storm like Andrew, most of the rest purchased with similar costs for FPL would from outside sources. reouire a rate adjustment, esti-Toda), power sources mated at $2' a month for end melude: nuclear. 25 per. customer for two years. cent: oil. 22 percent: natu-ral gas 21 percent: coal. 8 percent: and purchased power 24 percent.
MONDAY. JANUARY 23.1995 THE HERALD am A NEW FPL - Revenues arelower since FPL sold Colonial Penn. Procuctnnty. as gauged by cus-
$7 tomers per employee. nas risen.
ang
$6 g $5A billion j. "
'b' 203 M 200i
. , 200' ~
i t 1 9 l 54 65Y I l
$3 0l \\
j , 'c 9 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 Aher a one-time enarges et $689 0,gg .ag ~ 91 g*o c3 'c4
* - a n tu saie or tonner suosiciam Coloniai Penn insurance Groue ano Earnings are back up 563 mmion for tne wntecown of tnree since FPL took a charge otner suosicianes.
forthat sale in 1990* Amer a onem cnaroes of $66 milhon for cownsizino ana $135 ' $400~ milhon for the saie of Colonial Penn.
$$18,7 m(NIOR -
... After a one-time criarge of 585 M ^.
milhon for cownsizing.
$300 SOURCE: FPL Group.
i " c.* l
$200 l
. $100 l 0 539f
.$300 g9 90 '91" '92 '93'" '94
{ The size of FPL's work force nas cecunec snarply since 1990.
$20
$1B
$16 gj4
$12 W y
$10
$8- -
$6 I
$0
'89 90 '91 '92 '93 '94
WEDEESDAY JULY R2.1995 11tE PAtM BEACil POST Cooling pipe slurps up Ford, spits it out to sea l
- 7. foot diameter u vehiile. -we vanped .iut the windows, divides inin two "
laamhes, FPL spokesman Ray Golden Dad's truck lies on the ocean floor after a Jupiter teen >~i u c wata was so lu>t." said. Tuesday, diveis attached cables e on a Stif fing jallnl dIives it into a power piant canai. As the teens swam free of the to the inick, and a tughoat padled it u. 1%:ida Power & l.ight Co.can now Explores, they saw it being drawn to By JIM REEDER restaat a rextor that had been mistak- the mouth of a 12-foot diameter pipe through3; t esin seat h rmi %n wie' "l
' liner Jutster redy shut down the. day before the that canies hot water from Now the plant it sits pipe.
or the ocean floor for ll FORT PIEHCE the owner to recover. teens in seai th of gooil sm fing acciden- truck ended up in the cmlio Svane ; pipe.The said he and back into driver the ocean. hiatt "I guess I'm going to have to think r tally 14 shril their F mf Esplore r ont to scactv r was left off while .he vehide Gray, both 17, tried to keep the about vehisthat,said le owner Gene Gray, the r.. we being retrieved. ~ from being swept away but waldsed in si a Simday afternoon, the three surI- drives 's father. "ll's not my call, but it's k On Turmlay, a tus; boat pulled the ens followed a sand real looking for vain as it disappeaseil into the pipe.up to the insurance company." r!
"They told Alatt he could have . Gray wonders whether the truck g vehide irre fiem where it had becocne good waves but instead . plashed into a , d hulgrJ iie.u ti e card of an enonnons .onling anal foi tite pe wer plaut. I.een gone if he hadn't grabbed a la<kfer will cause any problem if it ternains on 34 pc m.cd to ra 4 the St. i.ikic Nudcar "We went up a ti,II, and the next beside the pipe ** Sv me said. -
Powen 1%nt. It siow sits .it the hottoni
'the tnxk beume Imfged about Please see PIPE /10A ,_
of the ocean, mosc than a quaitersaid .4 ;iTim thing we knew we v cre Svane. 4 passenger in the in the water," I,.ItXI feet offshore where flic pipe . o mite (nuii (hmc. 2 lhul says teen -
"fb,tt wonid like to be ahic to
* ; cwisal his life. I hope lie's icaired
'y ^ ^ g jh,UlllS t.8llMllCO
'
- pom Hiis." Gray said.
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I nly one of two nuclear reac-
.t.
j.h) I*C lM C l ors it the' plant was operating i ' . \ U[ A-
- f. I~.!'
i i tvhen the acddent occuned about Il pii. Sunday. Unit I was shut ( '[fk i , fowy Saturday mermag when an a {w .
.o. PIPE sper4 tor failed % Ilip a switcle hineen % ,M: sone I A stinishi an equ piaent test, Ken i g'
" J,neea;A a c, y, '
Q he ehkated GiMen wid #.nl the U.S. Nuclear Regula-j D i.'
.' NUs. fPLMitglygigjhatquest'mn.The Lomnumnt said.
g, pt g hasal ,siccided
.y }y} lhe resulting steam pressure
$.,' * , ,lhSh';.w c ,
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ida 16.gr%gt,(tto suake (. ray Ihr NM. ;penoving the vel: nlepay a huillop caused the seactos to shut codesi, f*iM*.S.\j- 'F Q: t
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- g.[.*li .hb , M' c:$ I"dk? d.klen saul. gf awa aufonectically.
a "It was on hot standby until i t l Mid thankfulhis , 8 a: "ost. a thisd passenger. lgg.) todd get the Exp!arer out of im#so. \ i.f 0$)ip I N } .. ki $ '" tnese," Clark said. "It wasn't an ! 6 M, .' Mdp.t( i b d s S'- @ WC'en t killed.. rmesgency situation." j casdy have I:cen 'an
' di%!' d 3 t .; . , = ..l P'."N333N I'Kidt"I inqud j- FPI,ex ecttd to begin startup
~~
h Uw.udr N A< i , 4 ' 2 ik $$'t [ g hiocedures on Unit I carly this p gmgig, Golden said. la* u ; rst oukome. j.
1 P , 3 s.g . NE= 1.~. * 'N U9I h e41 > PL'*..F P V c.rM = 3
~' e News WedneSd&V. Jul/12 '9%
Mishap forces . nuclear plant unit off-line A divpr plunges inm mucean ESt. Lucie Power Plant's Unit I was s . 7 i ' ' '
; hut down for two days as crews worked
- i 7p*,' ,*or$e"*t. :
.o dislodge a Ford Explorer from a dis- , ,
= Lucio Power Plant.
, jh M ,,,._d h Divers worked to
- narge pipe.
P N [.. ...~ ' .
- [- free a Ford Explorer that was aiYveet.e
- mo.. wc. Hammett.. . . _
dnven mte the
-- . Florida Power &
H'UTCHINSON ISLAND - An aborteu surRng tnp "' Light canal. fer three Jupiter teens may have cost Flonda Power a L:ght Co. more than S500.000 this week. .
'O. -
e ..... m u es. One of two nucicar units at the St. Lucie Power*Plant
, %g..3.,,.
1 tas shut cown Monday and Tucstiay as a utsage crew . wnde anemeting . . 1994 Ford Exclorer !caced in a du.
- to mate e vaum ** i
.t.orked to remose a Ec7.7aNs#I u 2. -e anver ano '- .
s told police they drose tne Exciorer mte an panenge s escape . e FPL mtake canal Sunday as they searchec for a sur6ng., ano ever re emoanweni mio mrouan a wmocw . ggg.7 ; 3 yyy e ,~ A i maaroe can av s*an te saw . spot. The three escaped unharmed. but the strong current oulled the sport utthty vehicle into and thrcugh tne 1,500,= ,.r --~ : 7-
%,- . ; , Mgy,g."
e "" downinn poo 1.asoy - foot oischarge pipe. A The pipe is 17. feet in diameter and extends beneath the . W t - - c- ' 3 Th* *'"'"' S *- .*eet to a fork in tne %,. ; j
# of*se$g
" mesocean, south of Green Turtle Beach Nature Trail. 'MItV-W** emis ~<. . h pipe '"** **"C'-
"'C wnere it A where it discharge 9 water from the plant. ' * * ' " ' M e Explorer lodged offshore at the enc of the pipe. . - -m . . . . Mr 'd .
. PL crews worked all day Tuesday before a salvace boat pailed the schicle from the oceansice end of the
.tlgde- ~~ ""}^{s 22p
<f -. -- - __m: .m Please see PLANT on A6 l {
PLANT ~' E CONTINUED FROM A1 Gary Bouska. FPL site super. canal about 3:30 p m. Air bags intendent for lano utilizauon. said were used to cistodge the vehicie, after divers founo the vehicle. the which was stuck at a fork at the watertlow m the canal had to pe i f end of the pipe. shut down twice to allow divers to j . i FPL c:Ticials estimated their position the vehicle so it could be cost to shut down part of the plant removed. at about 5250.000 a day. Divers working for FPL and Customers did not iose power subcontractof Catal) tic. a mainte-during the shutdown, nance contractor, moved the vehl- l Umt I shut down automatical- cle so salvage boat Big D could i ly about 11:30 a.m. Saturday Pullit out. The vehicle was towed , when an employee closed a valve north of the pipe andleftin 50 feet imptoperly, said FPL's corporate of water. marked by buoys. spokesman Ray Golden. Before tne unit could be started Bouska said dray's insurance again, the vehicle plunged in the company now must decide what discharge canal when driver Matt to do with the venicle. He said the Gray,17. took a wrong turn down owner of Big D gave theinsurance a mamtenance road. company a 510.000 estimate to l , With the vehicle m. the canal, tow the vehicle through the Fcrt the unit had to remain shut down. Pierce Inlet and remove it from Golden said. It was expected to go the water
- back on line about midnight FPL's attorneys are trying to l Tuesday. determine whether State Farm [
Dive'rs searching Monday for Insurance ts obligated to remove l the vehtete came up empty hand. the vehicle tro m the water, ed. but they suspected what had Bouska said. [ happened when they found a windsbicid, radiator, ashtray and cigarette lighter near the discharge
Worker error forces nuclear shutdown rushinn IIuinigh the canal pushed v Sunken-car retrieval delaying ineredswn drogege mas nio pp shout 12 lett m diameter, Uc n snid. Airer i s.i feci. ,he pi ,e ro ,k , IIUTCllINSON ISt.AND - A
,ue, who pened . wmng i.eactor?s return to service into two smi.6ter pipes The Ex.
piorer not stuck in the fonk,
$i valve at the St. Ixcie fluclear l Powrr Phnt Saturday caused a retrieve a car that Pale.rsunk sensedinto the turblacthe <!own the shut- (; olden turbine.
said. On Manday, Another com-unrkers shut off shuselown of one of its two reac- plant's discharge canal Sunday, down and closed down the plant's
' lors, according to Florida Power then was drawn down a 1,450 the How into the canal side and a Light Co., . widch owns the foot-h:ng pipe that drains alieThe Unit I noticar neat day, three reactor. tivna look- diveis entered from the ocean.
plaat canalinto the ocean. Golden said. ing for a Trime surfing spot sank With the help of Didation de-The worl<ct's mistake enused Golden explained that a plant their 1994 Ford Explorer in the vices, they nianeuvesed the car n no release of radioactivhy and worker, conducting what he 3 1 there was na danger to public called a " routine test" Saturday plant's 60 off Reute A1A. whichfoot are deep 7 to R feetcooling around,canal through one of the y l s2fety, FPI. spokesman Itay morning, Irnproporly opened a They told Imlice they had Goldcu said. valse cosmected to one of the taken a wrong turn off a d,irt The car mw is sitting on the Calden said. lloor just off the becch, The company, however, will sicam turblues, which generate road. No one was seriously m- occati
,} not bring the reactor back on clectricity, A com uter picked up the jured. Tum la NUCLEAN/A3 bne until after mhlaight sonight. caror and automatically shut liut the force of the water That's bermne divets Imd to o
TheTritmo = Wednesday,JuPy 12,1995 = A3
?.
7 S . r-s. The last time the Unit i reac-1L.M ter was closed for any extended 8
? *
- L g 35 g g { length of time was in the autumin of 1994, Golden said. The reacter sr J.
t' Frern A1 was shut off for 35 days for a
'A -
scheduled nfuellag.
] lashed to a buo/ for identificn- In an' putly unrelded la-ta cident Sunday, the plant's man-
>- Ihm, Gelden sahl "That's n!! we're dolag he eald.
- If the owner or his ,"nsur- i mages caager his phone'sreceived voice n:sil, threatening ines ance company wards to,come get deputics' teports show.
Path of veldcie it, that's etielt poblem. A anale caller ylioned Claris
. ,, flutten's voice maEbox ard said, Golden decIsnod to ecmnaent
'3 t ' ' N' -
on the late of the etaployce wim *Tm golag ta shoot you," reports inadvertently cauwd the shut- show M. security Isid deput!cs
'- & ..,.y , , . _ , , .
Whir.ie swept .- dowsi. The tractor's closure ecst they did not know whether the 5 g Ministic thran . . the coinpany about $250.t00 a call ori ted frons itakte or wa M ~Q IE fjNUM.9.Wng%L
< , . * ;. n J , ;
%- = ., day m last enesay, he sai.L outskfe 1 e plant.
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The Chattanooga Times, Thursday. Jaly 13,1995 '13 Threc teens barely survive encounter with discharge pipe at nuclear plant
- v. .w a e,u.
r jM AM oot ytesce
', [ M MIAMI-Three teen-agers looking for a shortcut to a a beach drove into a nuclear power plant canal and V %1 ilg '^'
.. i . i. S I 9 ;/k ~'L
- l had to swim for their lives before their four-wheel.
' ,h
. 'k
$a.s.d.d ','-
/[ seam
" [J [l NJ ..
drive vehicle was sucked out to sea through a huge discharge pipe. , The teens, who had planned to go surfing, escaped
' Beach K-Hukhink ' *, ***' - i. .:~ out the windows of the vehicle as it floated in the
'l$ land i
. '" *,.. balhlub-warm wastewater. I 124mm "I took a swimming class last wmester in high V.
8/ d *8*8** A<*,AT..+**,.** school, and I was saying. Thank you, thank you, thank N ' ' k., .' . h' ',
- you' to my swimming coach all the way to the edge" of
,b(b: Y,'{\ y N[ '
the canal,17-year-old Tim Svane said Wednesday.
, swich . 1; The vehicle ended up Jammed in the pipe more eM ,
than a quarter of a mile away on the sea Iloor, delay-N.yant - % ,. 12g w ing a restart ofone of the plant's reactors.
' M en N "
' ,,,g%\ They drove their Ford Explorer up an embankment m er t.i i Atlantic Sunday and couldn't stop it from sliding down the l',{" '
Ocean other side into a canal that carries hot water from the : plant out to sea. The water is not radioactive, utility Mark Wauben/The Palm Beach (Fla ) Peet -p. Asmmeness ollicial5 said. 4
l : l l \ L l
-E S~WhC') CL \ EW5 i
23 M t i l ' MT .%.GCPf_f.E .TB ' PP .' 5,' 5 Nuclear power plantlists j - . a sharp intake of turtles i By er Plant tbase dayse rosord nurabers i e == e.esm sesala
- of sea tuttias have been havag j' - sventftd days. In the Tatst stx HUTCHINSON ISLAND - r rnonths of this year. 609 sea tur.
i 1
'For the leggerhose andgreen sea ties have taken the wud. quarter-
! turtles that spend their days hang. mde ride through the nuclear ing out in the Atlantic Ocean, get. poeme plant's three intaka papes. l ting yanked 'into a blackened hole Almost as many federally pro-i i and sucked 1200 feet through a tested sea turttas have shot ro *f'"A b* i . barnacle falls into ths encru,sted eventful cat.pips as made [ay"bably h [arWag trip in thePes so far thy, year story, sente 19771993 pertoa, accord-
- i Around the St. Lucis Power mense ese Taastfuss on Ao !
. A
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1 M' $1lkt$th M. in43h.' - i km 'NM N Mkh VM 4 if.S Y**, . , , . . f , # i', * . v . fWr :. h y , ww - ~ v n . . t . . . 6f*
- W4M i.* w%s e le .s l l t su enne.-8e c. c.8 k ict d' ) ,
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- .mn ,...... p ,r. e. . . ,,, ; . . w,u,a , o. . . ..,.i,. e........
- h '. , ' u etY t . i '< pesa tm. ; ***C ' n'es . w - oe b r e. ~ u .
towum Mutes Samur e Wege mampleasspeaIES l ' e, 5 1 I 'l i . hf .**%.yc &
$ms *'
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___ . _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . .
.s i
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- The News Sunday.Myas,issa Ao r ,
L 6 TURTLES - Last year the pipes puusd in So tuttias gettias puusd though 3 aCOM'INUs0 PROM At . '
- lataks pip'es dessa's really soncera about 200 tuttise and than the 2 -
ing to rough estimassa. The b Crady.'It s what could happse ,to 'hugsjump came this year. he said. The rise has bieleguts such as l l creams has basa no unusual that them anerward that womes Wilsea and Crady suspesung an l
- ; the Nusisar Regulatory Commis. Crady a A eshers- '
-sian has ords so Florida Power ds Mars and more turtles bass e,osashack in the grasa esa turtis
!~ 4 Light Co. omsials to prepare a making it through tbs sets in the population. j study about what afhot the plant , phtat's staka osaal, which was de' WWoos has been preparing ths - t is having on sea turtis popub sigasd to kespths animals out of bioloS' cal asemassnam around by, tions. , es more danamous areas. As the NR.C and expaus to finishin a-theturtles' i De NRC alas bagna formai .alasm ta supposed through a sesond assuruy r,,, to soundif
,,,,g, ob couplethe initial wesh,a. TQk
*aa=**a in May wnh the Na, jams gorkers routinely seen the safety not, wortame intend to la ,
i tisant Marias Fisban~ss Samos, nati ! whists will issus na opiates sa smanis for tuttius in rueristed seu anotast notwith smaustmesh wbsther the power plaat has does areas. l "%p2 = C"a* $$s@. 8'"' N. byDesember.us?"nF'th*'Je" a habitat out there, said Carne Crady, nats Depamust a rusamh g es
',,$ " g, " $E -
said.
"We may get aa,sirborne turtid that manages ta Soist this year, about 50 turtles orsomsMgu a erask " he said. ..
I"I **"g[g",IM'
- mostly dinner-pinaar.samt ses unin - h slipped wiensthr h at the marias Ashams
! k that pnesure susks than the set on the east suis of servise said the essps FPL is tak. in* the A '
, WResa said. Pro. ins..RPPuer to be saough.
I" d7[ $sps tiadaary show that sight ! ttitak in the long arm it from sa hesed. Florida P D8 P ""'838 smaller mesh not prohnahe i' bot Muham survived. shoist one or two dead turtles a suSalent m aus down es morah
. unha saidb utility's chist assiegist. One ad,- have asked plant workars to cheek
% ornaimis iyty" Ashery b6 ologist Coogsg i
vemeureus juvemis lossutised has the ennals tunes a day so sabe s
@ h gan.as i to [pipu ,in We non too far bass the pass through tause the yeese papas and is 11ene.
timap iaselathe suse esa turtles eysessa, whn das'td uses mese plass is almost tmpossibia.Wilsed , h said, said. W w 6 than a salmon gauens of essna shark samanoeutas in es area o Crady and Wilsea weserper edames, "h's a ionsk job up them." 7atin land.roek away. m m. mast i saa valuatis said, salmai ns from wayward Cmdy said. " ant it's good dem, nuesa, man of. whisk are smsa V dam.a Name d the mistions hoomeC j
- ses: surtles, an species. began assing in. seemed Anasihis. So Wilmes #and a De sont are which ersames in Abe ammbers about other plant workers trave ,
su seendens a sp> 1995, whea 175 nittias last eye out ihr es ! olsa, esinsitseash Esasema elsea tisinske Osse the turdes are studied, hi- 1977 and 1991 the If they tes behester as a , oisWas mg thaus and seturailuun about 25 turtles a year.amrapid Wilisa guida, they'll ses estM
- i
'd susha a1 thas.
t
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e e
Mood remains - somber as cleanup i Pl ans discussed FPL ggggp > O R h
,The plant is not M M ,IIPHI'g '[ h gE *_ h@n grt,g 5e From la a j .
onut own nursday was restart- going to establish a UH-pm 2 N .' 5 Iaffe*m-
.a y E - ! E ! " koc ed at twl power indar mornmg. O helpmg case the ensis somewhat. restart date until a
\nd a Port Everglades umt off-hne
/B-.r-32 P_ ,p oqqe
- r os 1m h 2 4 i
.mee an Aug. 5 6re a seneduied to thorough inspection sa,.g C,.
g H '% j ienart tms weenend. Meanwnile. ht. Luae emplov- and evaluation is Ug seM.-3g 3 d 5
- ef N: -
=
y MEd br 4
' 3 ces mere called m to work over Completed., on the meesend to clean up the N c up thods td we po an [If; ,q y jf[] N 7 lmsgi W (
bems cacussed. said an i PL em-plovee uno asked not to be idenu- Faced with the exact same p y,( pc6e j pi #? ,.,,,
".E7#* d [ }E h ! [W fled but desenbed the mood as problem on Unit 2 months earher, ya , [ ,, j ges "somberi 4I- fF 1 5g'~f'gP***7?z
- h. ,g,,,*y - ay - f g g D g f .,, Q j t PL had deaded to leave the valve 7 puest "The umt remams snut down open, it has remamed open with-in a sale condition." Thomas said, out meident. 53 m j .
o w "The plant is not some to estabhsh However, m the Thursday m- - l ; a restart t! ate untd a thorougn adent another valve separaung ? 2 Q ]I / ' ' ' w gh'" Dugua( jg agg p.
) mspection and evaluauon is com. the emergency system from the a , e es{ gas,r , j j
i pleted? coohng system was also left open. FPL mformed the rederal Nu. allowmg the water to shoot 2g y\ * .f pumgt e gg , j dear herulatory Lommission of througn both valves mto the reac- ls.4 l ", =4 gpIm N 3{ % 1 i ita proosem at 3t. Luae on Enday, tur. empiovees said. W i The NldC which alreadv nas two Normally, the emergency ; - - = .- ~ g g IIIIsilllii on-me representauves, nad no sprav valve is supposed to be shie l i p y,,43 l 1
! plans to send m its own msesura. to cvele open and shut quickly to 4- Q E e3gcn ;;ljf$ 5 E-i tive team. allow water to be pumped mto the so k *l k pmW 1 ' "I wouldn't call at a man-made contamment area m the event of a error, it was a procedural error " cnsis mude the reactor. FPL de-
['!TTI $ I { {* a* g'
'P
*[
E pummi said Kerry Landis, branch chief of oded to leave the valve open m }g>bf{sf AEE 7<5E 4 i m reactor protects at the NRC re- both umts to make sure water gional of6ce in Atlanta. "In our would be able to pass through in e Re ga 5%$ y > g "O :' 4 g discussions with them me have such an acadent. p* d o, r $ e i found they're takmg it senously, it in a report wntten pnor to the appears they ate gomg to' cold inadent and obtamed by The him at v s og] l .T l {
- P, y,, g Q .
g g 3 ' ;<e
,p (R @ 8 g, gk hll8 "
shutdown and going to do a thor. &ach hst. I PL otnaala exammed [I ough review," .the hkehhood of an acadent, gg > ! No release of radiation L*nder a section on the "sately c f j I'PL made the deason to re. new the entire unit because of i eIult Ith en s ertent spraymg down of contam-f3k{ gN k*E kl U three different valve problems, ment on a spunous contamment ng E [E a M Landis said.
"There was no release of rads-sprav pump stara."
But it soticludes: "Although g5 - i s" ( My3 N" ation. and at no time mas lhere a the valve remams open, the proba- *7 C ~ nsk to public health and saletv.
$e pr biems at dt. Luae be-
- tahry of occurrence for this event f"R E r k'[""kk $
"$ 7,'d*,dpe sato ij" "
{ t gan nen t PL ined to restart tne sures are bems implemented to two nuacar umti aner Hurncane reuuce the probabihts os madver. Lnn paned bv. f ederal law man
- tent spray actuation.
I E [R E !. S O 5 . h! a l> b"f @ M h d N* r p'iantsYnen"a" n'u"r"'c$'ieArea must be cleaned up ) f8 "! Jo2 Rh,,apg gg 9[ # threatens, However. the new procedures j Aner Enn came ashore at apparetitty were not specine g g g a p .eg
\.ero beach. IPL attempted to enough to prevent a spraymg start Umts I and 2. Umt 2 came dowti of the contamment area.
5 g a g y j back on ime. Umt I had a problem accordmg to FPL emplovces who , 5 4 with a key valve that was stuck spoke to The Post on condition of
', shut ano could not be used to anonymity. '
n 1' release pressure. According to Thomas. the wa-MM t PL discovered the valve's m. ter has largely evaporated. leavmg ternal elements were installed crystals of banc aad to be cleaned backwards by a contractor operat- up before they damage the mter-
;hf '
E 4 I i 8 [I, mg under t PL supervision dunne nal umts, which are well protect-i the reruchng of the power plant ed. eight months ago. "We're not somg to get mto a h 3 81 After rebuildmg the valves, greater level of detad untd we've 93Y f {4 1g i, FPL ined to bnna Utut I back up completed investigatmg the-last week. But the attempt faded event." he said, addmg the clean Qg E g; g A3 l because of leaks assoc sted with a up will have to be done by hand .O ' set of rehef valves m the low. and will be labor mtensive. '
> i pressure safety miection system. Accordmg to the NRC. there-O Whde tuung the lowpressure have been 16 such madents; rM .
i safety in ection system. rPL dis. across the country smce the NRC W
, g ,
e covered a third valve - which began recordmg such events m; leads to the emergency contain. 1978. g j p .) 1 meet spray system - was not Contamment spray events dq operstmg properly. De contain- not require an of6 cal report to the ._ i { w Q . ment spray system es designed to NRC, the NRC's landis said. Stl $
! O P., T -
spray water mixed with twron mto Luae's problem was not sigm64 L e
., % yg f Q ,,7 the contamment area. The boron cant enough to put the St. Luos ! P " ~' *~- .a -
slows down nuclear reactatss. E' (t) A plan.t on alert. he said. _ _ _ . . 7.T-' w _
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PAGE 48 TUESDAY, AUGUST 22,1995 The Palm Beach Post ,
- . e,
~
, MORE M Codes for h l :I4 gg 24-hour -.m* financial 5 G . IG 5 BUSINESS
- - ~ w . _ ,;!!!
-S
.,.s .
l0 w E Sloppy cleanup; spills plague FPUs St. Lucie planth .
*There have been a few things Overall, the utdity wasin much and buying electncity frora othei!
tive water on Thursday. only to sump.
"I $y DANIELLE HERUBIN That spil was contained and that have gone on here revently/* better shape Menday thanaut lastMonday powerthose companies.
problemt' spill an umtetetmiural amsemt of sakl Retry landis, the N Rc 5 week, when and DE' ANN WEIMER P.mu De,mh IW Si.sn we* es the water they w 1c using kg the e traen11 up. the suute said. to resuk utsit who interrupted service had signed up to were far from over. FPL's poweef The spils as7 linked to valve be ans h diici of reactor propts. 'l hase air conditioner, warer heat- capacity was down about 450,00tig i PcotJe wese aide to tusn amn dranup No projec time fort. reactivatim of the prdicms with the cooling and wouldn't dassify it as a bad day . . their aii usuhtumers across South but we do monitor these things for ers and pool pumps turned off for homes as one fossil fuel electrica[g Fhekta M weday as I buml., Pmviv 77ei megiwatt malca emix unit emergency containment spray trends?' short periods of tarne as part of the unit was up and down - and ust. ' . systems that have kept the Unit I FPL has been prnud of its St. utdity's conservation efforts dui- again -- and another was bmpingi
& l.ight Co. strugglui to nue up has licen set, t PL said.
its enngy pinbksns hie vally. 1-Pl. spokesman Ray Goklen reactor shutamn for the last .Lucie plant, whi(h ludds top rat- ing energy shortages. System- along at 200 megawatts of its ! 78th
; hske-s at the St. Luoc nu- said waikers tested the spilled 18unThe wtrks, ,
valve problems and relat- ings from the NRC for salcty. wule FPL hailost enough power megawatt The worst capacity. situation was at St; clear pmcs plant sput the weik- water arul it was not radioactive. end luming down the interks of Ilowever, a source revealed the ed spdts have benught the St. hose ratings could be jenpar- to fael 840.01K1 homes because of i en of the twin omtauunent plant had another spill last Lucie plant increased attention sized if FPL is unable to clean up Please see the kis acmes that was drenched with Wednesslay of 2Juul gatkuis of frorn Landas the Nudcar said. RegulatoryupCom- its act the difference in the next six months, ating npvst by coriservatinn 10.010 galbes of siistly ishoac- inikfly raisiative water into a misske.
~
Workers mop up water through weekeud . the riposure to the workers is which is where the reactor sitsf - FPL I mahrem. An x ray by a dentist The watrr, which contamed IS'" dB gives a dose of 10 to 2n imJhiems. tww.wi t.: sbm 4.wn a nudcas' - the abihty to power a quarter nf a St. Lucie's Unit I has suffered reactkai in an emergency. left imW mdiksi tunnes. %cre. 40 to 50 a series of problems smcc FPL ric acid crystals on the equipmentj winkers toiled threnigh the week. trust to restart it last week. It had Golden said it was suit clear Mons est, moppmg up the low level three d flerent salve problems,in- day whether there had been any-radunactive water. chadmg one that had been instalk d damage to . lecincal wiring or.
"%gic using mnps and raus. ha kward by outsuk contractors. cquipment apsmic the contenment' 4=ng it by hand. Golden sakt hen, on the third try m three dume.
Worhers wear protective weeks,10,000 gallons of low. level The unit is down indefinitely', dottung and are monitured for radioactive water was sprayed into while FPL conducts a complete; radiatkui exposure. Goldcn said the plant's containment area, review ..
- e %
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i 38-24-1995 23:19% f t '.a.cie Resident "H ice 487 461 462: P.81 m be ~ ~ '" " 'W ~~ 7 . EO * . *~ @'s AO l' ~ bM di,,1 ' NC =t ' AM OT. Cs,c,,t . _ . _ . . , ._ f.#"T"'"7 .,,,,,,, 1 r. . -. ... ~. . . ...- m s m,___ - - u
' Wsei
; , . - .n. - ..t. .n - - -- - ,-. n 3
anotner WNene travenna riortn on interstate 95.The nianwey closse m botn onootsons. s
- Power T .. .
< /
- plan: JerrV ^~ J Sne
. manager l j 1
l h Pdem.. ~Oted
/\
l FPLbovalof the N diop man,agtr,at the st. l Lucie power plant l follows a scr'?u of j l accidents at the facility. l - sy DCANN WEDer.R l and DANGL1Ji Htllstrer Rjf N., 8 *enn sommipeu inie l JUNO' EA mammeer ' t the *:1 St. - h!.'udai
- ttop i i
i a i P.per Phat auf rumso the I
- wake o( Eve aaad==a mthe pest - 1
= meson. se anunsi .oecur. l ! rwum = baa eu: me me.c. s.,
i nadeep retag in seeperty.- l ne iroansek sense of acci-( .ccmsis beeg beamoa on a culturt of '*;-n' =-,." send Jerome i l prvendent of Flosista l Goldberg, Power & Light Cols audeer oper,
- ataoss. fle suas a toe the plant's
! retags have given l conastent esapereas atop %e nesse of eseu. i Jrtty" and mn ' vae. .may have let our doum."
.;
- Burton, plant'. general munanser for two yeare end with
- 3ts esempany for,30 years, was '
teved to plant servies esmaner. . Amt Sareta. Burton's assisuunt as permtoperanens =..=ager.was sto. i Veledu-oto athes,m.,e piantls top % t. ge:the grammete reagikfromour resources, so we have part Mr. a* i S_auste a where Mr._Bartu_m _V a".* wan." , Storrn W gefg gro sheem h this estedte imets torn pinen, see pptga l glEx-sergeant Twd new hurri l }
. OF Of8 5 IGDlJd W IS aan SDIrrTIqAams. .
383 samma esmet edt Ramus i
=-m empidyees psc' 'm,' .r_ W-menenompsesurma'*' e' . M
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* . seems seems a
- . - _ -'_hi8188_ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ___
v 00-14-1995 08: 20f41 St Lucie Res:dsnt Office 1 407 461 4622 P.02 krdlA 6 6 job.hewas putin a position hewas-bptter suited for." 1 ,. Je# West who was plant ser-
- vice manager. was snitted to Scar. '
! ola's former slot.
. While Goklberg said he didn't cg/fg/gf gery/cg y i
- blame Burton for the accidents - '
l
- that have recent weeks.plagued,d he sai the plant in top manage.
j
}gy l l < ment. including himscif. is held
] accountable. He descnbed the < general manager's job as thank- Provieng Nationwide! , less and extremely stressful. j
~ All these problems we have ,
j deaded to handle di5erently, and ! i we've decided to give Mr. Scarola i a chance." Goldberg said. l
- The company also is rewriting
i its procedures and per- i i spnnel so they can make judgment calls.
!- '. PPL'a St. Lucie nuclear power
! .plantis considered one of the best ! to the nanon. It has consistently held top safety ratings from the Nudear Regulatory Commission ! -and had just had those high j safety ratings reaffirmed two j weeks ago. g ! Accidents cause concem
- l} The 6ve accidenta over a peri-
- j @ of just over a momh began with i an operator wno punched two but-l thus out of sequence, causing a ttsrbine en start and the reactor to i j
shut down. and c"I=W in a j' 10.0001alion spray down of the
)
i containment stwo above the reac-with low level radioactive wa- ! Other errors include spilling l tfie water broughtin to wash down the radioacuve spill, and a valve that didn't work because a key
- ipmponent was installed upside.
I nown. i ;i Most of the events, on their i pwn. would not be considered so-l rious by federal regulators.except j for Thursday's spray down. None
- Wthem posed a sisni6 cant risk to i '
the public. FPL of6cials have said. . j p However, together they have ..
- .u.ed
% :egulators .and war
_._y _ , irest .vestor .ho h.ve - a on the casapany's streamim-t , laseHorte.
"We're re Prirends. viewing xer the T %activ.ity e I.Nl2'iMOtsta.
g imy mg rr.nts wen .. THE REMM SHOP' i
'"'R""."n ew s.a decmi- - uehe m.deRadio i. .bc. . 3 hack-
.t i . - .
u.t m e, - 3 Meanwhile. FPL e5cials ane
~
'*est grenesa,o h to ~ e m_ ir_ g peraesse nearyou, oak
' in persco NRC eds. 1-800 Tim. SHACK"' cialsin Atlanta on Tuesday. ., .\ Tt!TRL P.82 3._.. ~ . _ _ _ . . _ - _ _ . . _ _ . .- .
i-
- 1995 ev.22cd. ss t. vet. a..to,,,, ou te, i aev 462 4622 p.e2 i s ue e,s.e -
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,.c, fless i A
- . _ 6 e .e.e e..f mesteu,.r. 1e powered m.sene.reser.
t - par.o I - See the worker
, -ha, hit a.h.utt.e.ns. o.ute 3 satser eyesemas et enas. The tw.
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, . nee.. ... , e um - e e:: O YODienis =84-- . mer. -
- e. .e.t -
t. t ptspees as the plant ser fassue Have cuts gone too far?...:: . d h,. .. ,,,%.m, e _.
~ ac i
ant,S record declinin o~ ~ - - =-= 9:. 3 Q"s."'.=.n=m same rrt. . =e.=m.=a.h. e e mid. 4 "T,s*la*'a*s'u"s "as'iumm
*=='**""'*""""'""
e 'We've nad acts or g -
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t < in me p t dv veers. Florida God. We've had :X.; *e am.m,v.e.n ir mans - = power a ushe has es-insist equipment prob.
- 4.000 emusesymma--e esorter et met.h smen of who are eushed.
.h saamer esepteyees greno ;se ,- 4to werts forea.
la tone past *wo snesecha. FPL's IOmE :M. reeks of management esw j . St. Lume nessteer pesar plasse Inad g yg - meseg bases eewn me gets indeer.
==== had using
-wherMe=t to puuga younger
- .e . ==*e< dre . *'"m' "ee* me .,e ,a ,eer s e- e,-.w pyear knee.r, ores.4 es -- . some pa.s e h=.m i caped wrth we6untary hischeeses em .in me A C." es wertiese roter to l sirecord he .M .
tina ar.esnahtianed edens .- them. enidet.sve me unn.ta =d me prehlems area's reisted. R judg- -- haven't esse emese they dret start.
-e *d s inte *er '
I "Ther*** ne era thias snas.a . mentS.' ed me the oesapeny. i I """"
* * *** * * ' ' , ' , ' ' * * " ' " *
- Juggeses seemessee At their side are warhere )
j Presseemt. .em sa sanny esses, haven't been , ll::*"Ja.st a [l,*.u.seem,r ve i,a .e cod.es,,, m*-- ;l::lly,,ay,g,,ll; glra,,;:ll8 j
~
! had ee *"8 8"** ny. ser merose m iew ed anissahoe Wee had sesn'"#"a'd we'v eh sudpuum"et. ""* . we tedreseng. dimos are huhus rewriesen et the to g
- ~ sus nahem en tesemer. he end. Gateerg and other top ne, e, eele,s,e,paumes, , ,,e e ares es,usAs a 1888*
es. there's esi ==ed-a-t reassMr Lasale eSeate wed travel T "The to Adenta e empean the Jhs N in m 8
- l f,g"g",'s, pannt's not runsninst, med 7 "*"" ** ,N arenars See Sevefel departneset smanagers **Y""" "**
forunames a arend at si U""'v"8'r e== ** *** hadidF e"3D86
.mid marr m med inst ween mas ee. .eaid x a
4 I'."' ser Nac ge mpoemas ""'ed ss. Lune mes.
- '.rrt.pnene enore asynes by-we Caet ate endof.e.te.ye. art i 000 nuenser -
po.w.e'. me "* i e, nd doo ie i. coo ir md so we.d ... e Omer(sie d.- = o=d.- C 'ic ai 4 perenean ene sheenhuone merit
- a weer and a held ese/* etdenS meedsep he 884M84 #
ses. rPL denies at. but the emur88' n$ set the EtumilIF ef av has embed the Nissimar ,,e,amid.,",These es ef was a doenme. ... Samme ed else peop6e Reduisesry Ceasemmen es18464 e ,Tgse NaC anos imung egnaudared are aos as wouter es apeople esse en all.ttmus new member of St. Lassie me assion*e best. rum gehe'ee 8eend." , peepes es sum the Sa.Lasse muebear summer posser k has se. piana, ensved en .o top esches ene. 333 og la edeelma. tim ennemur tus Tyte Phs6 IDgiloser en wac = we a cut n,aamm.e.r. i o enema i . ,at,h.ogum aparansme ma muassumsyaben andplant poems endeer .ns mov. I* Id s malent of the enemmeenc
* . - een simedem'a.
los ser a pesas a sind 8848 emeMcMS W
- the east.a.an== we eso. ar,et,stok.
m gem p,es,egy emede. e,dlest de week. . sinum. FPL emye. Desesse et emme- dress tese a pend. Thatr Fere P ,e , i pumegen. nesset now. - was swege gaa
.me greg em wie me ves== == essa. .e.t,yere i,. mad..he. Ye ite semen ==p= mas ym=agessees.neneetSt.
the 80tC and same employees me a w **andeer me ese tom eime
===8-
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d ee
esas af Gef* has hoeumme a esse.
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08-28-1995 07:2 741 St Lucie Resident Office 1 407 461 4622 P.02 seer >
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l Y ~j: .: , anos phrase at FPL , N 88 plant mer has 1.063 worturn. I C.O. Woody, senior vice suosi. %%IREAgd tmDpe% "I defy somebody to ten me ! dent of generaana, blessed .p As Sarrscene Erin rmhed to- exacsiy hour saany people et takes i acts of Itr Ave ear =Sasa tid;'werd Sk Trousere Coset Aug.1. to get the job done. Goleerg sapped over 3.000 eneyworte out thenuclearphetwee shut dern es said. . of the system a eee week this requesd hy lederallsw.Whea the "Every two weeks, they are month, enough to power 900.000 workere tned so restert it. Gold. Someone base and there." said l honnes. The weret seeidat: As berg emid, they discovered a key one nonstume FPL manager. 5 nahemnos.emd<nt tre at Port Ever. valve had been asetmuod' upside "They don't went it to look like o j prompting the Broward down and backward en Unit 1. big dest " = rare Marshal to take cou. Theegh Unit 2 resumed opers- Within the past two weeks.44 i trolaf Unit 4 for four days. tiene, the ines ei Unit I let FPL employees have been let 30 in the 1 The cause: A chrenc weser wehest 776 seegewetts. The suut oudent materials management ] leak servaded en sehessee covered produces $39 smessweets.but anos and persossel departmeats, f oil caessag it to heest. seems of that der nas own needs. theigh the conspeay snede ao for. ' enRed it FPL*5 worst Who beessed the vedve le> met -= i tre "in the last 50 years." prepertyt RAMY AlfgBIRT: 4
- Tem met happy wim the series As maneirls contracter,bretscht l of evenen," Weedy said at the la es de the work thatin yeare g M2Dh/5 last Beach headspearta.s. "We would have been done by ers. WhBe on the aquede-l ~ workers
- not sound 'ser of thsee eveses warhee trem other pienen. The down velve, St. d whom the esmemains sienne win maracting es, wanted order same sneemr esive praeden w i . peroemet vade ===* er erver." * . the supervaise et as FPL esupier. the lowgreasure seolant syveems. I But what sugestives ceR *sa es. . Thevelves were peppug l act of Got" saane empleroes ces Gele' erg esameted that prior sp==p=anamy and 1 leek of sammtenanse. teatrucemnes had cost the St.1m- el ashescarve water. 3 "FPL has stopped aps=Ame .cie riset le pureamt of its work. ependsend the prettesse were snomer en =h" and a seren, aus e shed ofahe aww et caused by air hubbles b the less. warner whose n'ah inesudes tsing Turkey Pehit. The soepony stiB desun't power been. "The emir time ther Heavser, namese wiqhim the know what emused the Mhaan ta =====hmt is whom .it hunus esempmy said St. imde han last "TsuNo as head Harpery's doem." close to30porquet ofin same.The law a she things yee des *: went j . i *
. 00-28-1995. 07:24f41 St Lucie Resident OHice 1 407 461 4622 P.03 r
- to a pea beer of hhope he eremostgeste-o pemas. cahner up weser heng pumped out of gia :3 ,
' sad. "And Murphy reegy get es.y . to shut ammmaem mwer wm og ausesnamaty. l l Atle. tas di cauwd me size
- j The sprarewn - a spill of 2.000 sanons of eiean. j 1 On the weekend of Aug.12. up water within 100 Isot of Big a
> ., esecuuves at FPL's Juno Beach Muddy Creek and the compaqy $
j heedauerters estructed the St. partung lot. ..I
; Lucie plant's general manager to 1 think there h a comsida :
1 deleyrepiecm3 a hadtyvalve a the matter that we are incuseg 80r ' 1 Unit 1 emergency contauunent attentsen on." Goldberg said. "thes g
, sysese. With fossil fuel plans any tune i piece of agupment.in a 4 cranions moreas FFils grid and the plant isn't working 100 pJer. 5
. record breakaag best rolhag cent,it makes the job of operateg i i acrees the state pism managers the plant mere dil5euk. Not irn. . ' i *
- were unoer preneure to acavese possible. more ddicult. i its modear core med gemarme 716 -
badly needed snesswatts for the to "No beoneaitem problem b he said. "/yitselfis t's +
'ngi 4 i
utih"ty s custensers. when you start to set se i
- The inuity vetve was not in Maintenance isn't the only stock and headquarters decided area bens cut. Federaldocwoesto not to wait. After an.they knew St. show the NRC has agreed to.in.
. Lucie's Unk 2 had been operanns spect emergency driRs every oth- 1 with the sarne valve stuck in the er year instead of annually, savmg . l i open pasiesen for smonths. the waility the empenseof Sysigthe . 1 It was e decimon FPL would inspecnon team to South .
- come to regret besmuse sparators la addition 15 secanty working on amoeer prohtum had- were elimkatad at the .
vertently linked a osoiant syseems gates of St. Lucie and . , to the contmament pipes. reist, the cerapeny's only ? i' When to start that Unk 1 crews system, theattesepted open instead, nuclearpuhu plant, in southere scanners and. Dese. I valve and unked pipes forand cards conirst access to the ; i to.000 gamens ef rediseseve weemr ties - a savtags of $1 ; and bone send to raia down inade Goi6ers said. i theOne concrete tower inwhat worker, remEskis De day before the 11 minutse. . spit. Goldberg held
'! -a l 2 had happened, run kute the esamel his St. Lucie workers. He m rooms. shouang at so.workere: employees est pner to the '
2 of probimes.FPL had "You His reacnon reinedween't my weekendr'. ionissed highest, ; 3 racing award.1 z
"The contaisonest spray- ed by the lastitute of Nuclear!
. down. I nast see you, is some. Power Operamens, an sadtstry ; i thiasI never wanted to seein my weechdos youp made up of as the e i career." Gol6ert said. U.S. nuclear plants. I
- " Der absuhht't have spaned However. he noted
- "If. t
- this vehe ents work en me emer ranng agency wwe io give :
had been amished. But it arissetoday.rt wouhlprobably i
- that whomyoudein enet 2. How people Stew your !
senho these judgessmen, that may menar is very tragile. You' = I { resultisreducingyotermagiasfar to be good every day ... I l . various kimb elpresseelen... sessasse to them was, don't 1 "As. f any, this was a had en year lauseis." ! l cmA." . . On Tuesday. Goleerg ! l , these was sever o signed plant vannager Chris Bw. '; ! thrust to the publir the asident ton to phet samme manager ; a campet the use==sna= ef the NRC's presseed his somstaat. Jike .* l restsaaledinein Adess. Aceerd- ela, es the plant. l ing as seussen, At was sensus 20 year had been t 1 i es presort the NRC to put manager for two years. ' 9 ; j a tut > person team as and Anst 34:
- out what was going en at'ee *
- I
. natism's top.rseed sendearintility. , The heI@tg purftp ,.; j ,
i FFL prevaded uses the NitC Alid that wasa's the end ofme g l l to aneel the team and aBow is. utility's eqiipment failures. Ase i j seest Goldberg to dcah out te Isee as Thusdsy night. FPL was 2 i . "assaces" of the estustion and deploying esecuerves tremi presamthis = ess Two naamses a st. Loeie. nu : I der. ha their The NRC the problem was widi U
- eyesd. which was brought down a heref j
. When amed shone me as to its .The eskisi werd 76. . !
3 theNRC Gohmergsaidhedoesn't day was resider means. ! j nee the NRC what es de. masse en the ada**** tubeM $ AGS.S9: Butsourceswithinthe y "F **
- The etOsnup tieneraus ivenhm hut m "e
, an.r m e .pr r
- w e. w or. esw. ef . hse sup. rr t h m 1 . een<dussed whies, hamrdsungne- Friesyesminmod that,andamid the i . amiesasasausenmesaimasehus ;
whis nepsand rugs towge opdie et fuE was amed sad Una poser. 9 2 was[ l
. rednesersa mmen. . Gel 6ert emid to past tutet i i
- Thdyesaurud talimisme' to sedeursun.
esieur, where tempeso..sneeshoeulase ofofjeeldmas erees outwf a$
, ." .i
! v== =W ISdesress. ..
"Dey'se gidag to haveM..
i But me one samembered ess' .eemmehus wie a isa . amateserfugsammaus haddelayed said,"And Tm guing ae emeest simple sepair.The elese. het thema." !
. _ , . . .. j
. 1 l
. TOTR. P.83
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l l m 2 W'r 7 . FPL chiefs fault 1
- 2#
T 2 nuclear managers Q r N J
~
blame for the plant's problems on carel i j By DE* ANN WElMER ded3jons by mid lCYel managers and li f CC Palm Beacn Post StaN Wnter l 1 l ATLANTA - Florida Power & Light performance expectanons." People l e* M ; Co. officials told federa! regulators Tuesday g that chronic management mistakes and expected of them." Goldberg said. l 3 4 have to be a thorough manager to get thi equipment failures are to blame for months to do what's expected." 4 .. of problems at the St. Lude nudear power Among the missteps Goldberg ci i g plant. were: r Jerome, Goldberg, president of FPL's 5 A failure to demand that FPL's er i "h r
' ) I nudear division. promised unprovements in neenng division respond prompt the plant's operations by Oct. 31. when a i team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- ment problems.
These " demands were not made 1-d sion plans to visit St. Lucte. , . "We'll see. In two months, we'll see." enough and often enough" he said. said Stewart Ebneter, regional administra- 5 A failure to monitor contractors ~ tor of the NRC. which has noted 39 inci- to perform tests after repairs were i dents at the plant since September 1994.Had seeSt. whether the problems had b Lucie officials performed t< ' i i including the recent spate of publicized on two pressure valves installed e problems tnat began in july. m nths ago dunng the refueling of Un: l 3 Most problems are recent they would have realized they were
.: stalled backward, he said.
- NRC officials said most of those prob- 5 A willingness to tolerate alot of s lems have occurred during the past six 4s months, while the NRC has been in dose equipment
' failures.the greatest operatt "I'm convinced l
" contact with FPL officials. the world is bound to get in trouble i: Ebneter said St. Lucie was no longer continue to build up deficiencies in ec ' - operating at the standard of a No. I rated ment." CAldberg said. ;,
@ e plant, a designation it has held for years.
m ^
, , , Goldberg, new plant manager Jim Scar. Staff inexperience..cited
' cla,and plant vice president Dave Sager The NRC sta5 r.nalysis iliced O ._ 25 were in Atlanta Tuesday to explain to an blame on equipment faihees and more M ~5 . NRC panel the past two months of problems phasis on inadequate proc!
~
at the plant. p
$-)
- c. 3 By Sept.15. the officials promised to sion making.
The NRC panel ~"W Goldber; I gravide the NRC with the condusions of an Senmla torecogmze thatchangesin > c $sn Ioussade consulting team it has put together
-) g'*. tardetermine what went wrong at St. Lude have left St. Lucie '"" with less -exp 4
* * {*
84 -
. begenmg with the accidental shutdown July 8 af Unit 1 and n'd=marmy in the Aug.17 em,,L i a Goldberg and.Scarola attributed kO ..
~E. r N ? ,. e.,
IIpray-down of that unit'sn-" containment
^ not mennon toweilayads.
~ changes to attntion FPL"has M.I u) -- with radioactive water. .. x V reduced employment at E'St. Lucie y -
i The team, whose members Were not identdied by the. utility, is = i=rinlad to by10 percent over thepast Ave years
= e5 arts.-
ow. , ardeTiendsy and =w4=da it:1rraluation "- Qaaned about a # Tha; thataFPUs coutmattag reaahan==aal the impact.." - e;*d.g. . . . . _ u, , . 6 g aqng - 8kerr a a ne e s s a g e w ane e. g p ,
4 Workers get notices of new layoffs l, our overall staffing levels." offs." But each department will,on pg an ongoing basis, be reviewmg l Employees in power delivery areas they can cut, he added. From 48 get the electricity to homes and excuse. not the reason why,,, he businesses. They oversee trans, While the incidents focused on mission lines, substations, trans. in Atlanta Tuesday involved Unit said.,Somemnes the last,,10 per- formers and general '1. St. Lucie manager operations of Scarola also cent is what costs you, replied the power network. repotted that Unit 2 had been I Dave Matthews, with NRC's reduced to 50 percent output be-Olivera said in the memo that cause of a heating pump break- I Washington office. I Also Tuesday, notices of new he and his managers were discuss- down* lav' offs 61tered down througn ing where cuts could be made and Though the utility had said it FPL's power delivery secuen. Af. planned to reveal the changes to was back on line Friday, he told ,
- er a meenng in Miami. Vice Presi. workers m three phases - Tues. the NRC it did not come back up day, Sept.11 and Sept. 20.
d.:nt Armando Olivera sent an und Tuesday monung. Acctrome memo to his roughly FPL deniesit has set any goals l 1,000 employees saying there for cutbacks. Spokesman Dale E i Sl4ff writer Damelle Hersbm would ba" organizational changes" Thomas said there are"no compa-and the division would " reduce ny wide, formahzed, planned lay. contributed to this .report. l E 6 9 9 4 W
" ~^ ^ ^^
di as. 5= . a a -u-lanous .-, A .... :. .- ~ '.: l
'i'* .
! s News Release ; l August 31,1995 4 . 1 ! National Litigation Consultants , 113 Lloyd Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15218 Post Office Box 0102, Jupiter, FL 33468-0102 Information
Contact:
Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. (412)243-4601-U.S. NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IS ON THE BRINK OF DISASTER I According to Thomas Saporito, a consultant in dealing with nuclear industry matters and litigation, the nuclear industry is on the brink of disaster. Many U.S. nuclear utilities are down sizing their work forces in the name of money'shys Saporrto. "They ca!! it re-engineering or reorganizing, but the bottom line is that the overall work force at nuclear stations across the United States has dramatically been reduceo.""Added to the mix of being under staffed, the workers at these nuclear stations work long hours,.some. times 72-hours a week, to support refueling outages." Saporito said. Saporito continued "It's just a matter of time until we have a major nuclear disaster in , this country," "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") is supposed to be the ; govemment watch dog charged with the responsibility for the health and safety of the ' public. I think that the NRC is asleep on the job and has been much too cozy with the utilities over the years." . Recently one of the nation's top rated nuclear stations, the St. Lucie nuclear station
' operated by Finrida Power & Light Company, has coma under the scrutiny of the NRC
- for.a series of events at that nuclear station. FPL officials are to meet with NRC officials in Atlanta, GA to explain themselves. The NRC appears to be concemed that FPL employees may be working too much overtime. Additionally FPL has been cutting back _
l Its work force and has eliminated 4,0.00 employees over the past five years. When
uso...= -
.m, m - s. ., . . - . . _ _ _ . . . . . . . . _ . - ._ '
i I e
.-severe cuts in' the workforce take place, workers who have spent years in offices are j i-sometimes performing tasks that they haven't done for years.
Arizona Public Service Company ("APS") has also been reducing its workforce over a . i period of years resulting in a reduction of workers at its Palo Verde nuclear station. ; } Saponto is gravely concerned that many other of the nations 112 nuclear stations may ; have severely gut'their work force in an effort to save costs. In addition, Saporito is l . . concerned that the NRC has miserably failed to effectively consider the adverse l
- consequences of workers on the job at these facilities for 72-hours a week. Fatigue l
- leads to stress and accidents; said Saponto. "I worked in the nuclear industry for years 1
, ~ and I know the affects that long hours have on your body. You don't think straight and l your tired all the time and the overall morale goes down, you eventually become a !
- walking zomby." -
1 i in_ the case of the FPL nuclear stations, the NRC has been monitoring a downward i performance trend at the St. Lucie nuclear station for 18-months. Saporito wants to i know. "What the hell is the NRC waiting fer, an accident? Why hasn't the NRC taken _ action in the past to prevent the senes of events that have occurred at that station?" l j Saponto asked. "It's because I believe that the.NRC is too cozy of a regulator, the Commission should be disisolved and replaced with a single administrator.who could be l held accountable " Saporito said.
- In early July of '95, a St. Lucie plant operator failed to properly execute a sequence of buttons, as a result, the nuclear reactor tripped off-line challenging its safety systems .
needlessly. In early August of'95, a valve was discovered to have been installed upside t down and backward on Unit 1. At that time, other valves were found to be popping open
- unexpectedly, leaking radioactive water. On approximately August 12, 1995, 10.000 gallons of radioactive water and boric acid rained down inside the containment building on St. Lucie unit 1. The incident occurred because workers opened a valve before work
- on another linked systcin was completed. On about August 19,1995, another accident.
l 2.000 gallons of cleanup water spilled. Most recently, on about August 24,1995, a i heating pump failure forced one of the nuclear reactors power level to be reduced. Saporito is concemed, "If one of the nation's top rated plants is doing so poorty, what :
^
}. kind of shape is the rest of the nuclear industry in andJust how safe are these nuclear
' stations?" "What is me NRC doing about this problem?"
4 and *" Natenal Utigsten coneustents ("NLC") represents and flies law suits on beNalf of nucesor wNeustWowers wNo suffer sotahoten for raising safety conceme at commensat nucear statens across the United States. NLC also rnonstors the accons of the NRC and engages in environmental and nucear istigsten to ensure that nuoeer femdes operate in acconsance wan govemment regulatens k
.t- _
3
1 I 16A THE PALM BEACH POST THURSDAY. AUGUST 31.1995 l l 1 l The Palm Beach Post Who has the power to watch over FPL? ost people think about their M power company only when Layoffs may have they flip a light switch and . nothing happens. Deregulation might CompromlSed SerVICO. get a t f pe pie thinking. Power companies have been g u. htly But no regulation regulated. The federal government gets Covers that problem. involved in some areas. notably whole-sale power sales and safety of nuclear reactors, but the major control is at the water heaters and pool pumps of its state level. In Florida, the Public Ser- 395.000 conservanon volunteers for 15 vice Commission determines rates and minutes to three hours. service areas. The trade-off is that the The cutbacks came amid a string of utility is guaranteed a profit. problems ranging from faulty valves to a In setting rates, the PSC is sup- fire to operator error during the past posed to consider "the efficiency, suffi- two months. The manager of FPL's St. ciency and adequacy of the facilities Lucie nuclear power station was demot-provided and the services rendered." ed. and FPL officials had to trek to Reliability is at best implied. This will Atlanta on Tuesday to reassure the cause problems if the rage to deregulate Nuclear Regulatory Commission about affects electrical power the way it ap. St. Lucie operations. parently will affect telecommunications. Meanwhile, the layoffs go on. Man-Florida Power & Light Co., which agers have been told the utility will serves 3.1 million homes and 378.000 eliminate another 1.000 to 2,000 jobs by ' businesses, has been "prepanng for year's end, though FPL denies this is competition." said FPL spokesman the cast . It wouldn't be the 6rst time Dale Thomas. The outlines of that layoffs have been made with no an-preparation were set out by James L nouncement: 44 jobs were eliminated Broadhead, chairman and chief execu- recently in two departments. tive officer in his March 1 letter to shareholders: ,In 1991 we restructured One continuing problem is FPL's our orgamzation to make it leaner' lack of candor. Last Thursday, a spokes-Batter, and less bureaucratic. Two years man claimed the No. 2 unit at St. Lucie later we unplemented a major program was shut down for routine maintenance. to further reduce our costs of operation. in fact, a heating pump had blown up. I Late Friday, another spokesman c;[pYcyl,,we instituted a new daimed the unit was back at full power.
, Behind those generalities are
. But the new plant manager told the specifics - the jobs cut by FPLthem,4.000 NRC that full power had been restored past five years, roughly one-fourth of its only on Tuesday.
pre-layoff work force. FPL insists that . FPL stock has risen $10 a share the cutbacks have not'affected reliabil. smce the end of 1990, and "FPL jfy Company sources disagree. Group's stock outperformed the elec.
'" Those sources may be more con- tnc u,W mdustry average fo cerned about protecting jobs than serv. both in pnce and total return,,r.1994, share- -
ing customers, but recent events give holders were told in the March 1 report. their claims credibility. Two weeks ago,. But have those financial gains affect-hot weather combined with the loss of ed FPL's ability to deliver power to iisinany as five of FPL's 34 generators customers safely and in adequate sup - kany given moment forced the utility ply?.No one in the regulatory system is , to shut off power to air conditioners, ~ asking. Sa==a should.. J.. jw h w wasa - - w- - " -- N E w
SEP 13 '93 07:51f41 FPL CORP COf1M = JB P.2/3 BUSINESS WIRE s u n . m .,.... . .
,. - FLORIDA c O ..sv FPL delays startup
.v Florida Power & Light Co. said it will
, *'g -
(V take another ween to restart Unit 1 at the St.
,* \
Lucie nuclear power plant on Hutchinson Island. The plant. wruch has been off line since V / Aug,1. was supposed to return to serwce on
/ Tuesday.
But a small leak was detected during a O(D linal saf ety inspecuon and a flange on a relief
$ valve must be replaced. said FPL 1 '- spokesman Ray Golden.
There bave oeen severalincidents at the
' ,' plant smee it was taxen off line for Humcane Erin on Aug.1. including an accidental spray-cown or mildly ractoactive water inside the contatnment building. The problems led to the demouon of the plant's general manager I and an invesugatton by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Golden said the unit should be generaung power again within a week.
1 e S a 4
SEP 13 '95 07:52Ari FPL CCRP CORT 1 = .E ' P.3/3 Wednest v. reatemeer 13.1995 83 l . . i More
~
~ woes at 4 nuclear plant . By Yvette C. Mammeet if the News stall . HUTCHINSON ISLAND - a cONTINUl!D FROM B1 ' The latest m a stnns of equipment problems will delay once agam tne The generators supeiy electricity restart cf one or the two nuclear to safety systems at tne plant if reactors at the St. Lucie Power r.ormal power goes out. , Plant. The nuclear plant has nad a se-This time. a pressurtzer. valve is nos of problems in the past several ' leaking radioacuve water mside weeks. the contamment butiding of the The problems. being investi- i nuclear reactor, gated by the Nuclear Regulatorv .
"It's all contained inside, so Commission, include the spill o'f l there is no threat to people or the ' f about 10.000 gallons of radioac-environment. Florida Power & '
tive water inside the containment ! Light spokesman Ray Golden building Aug.17. ! Unit One has been shut down M*0- .the same pressurizer i found this week to have a leaky since Aug.1, when Hurricane Erin blew through. Since then, equip- valve had a portion of another ment problems and human error valve installed backward 19 have kept the unit out of seruce, months ago, when the urut was FPL officials had said Unit One brought down for refue. ling. That would be back in operation by last mistake was discoverec m August weekend. Workers had , missed when FPL workers tned to put the tnat deadline and were hoping to. reactor back in service. have the system on line today The NRC has told FPL to come when the latest leak was found up with a plan to ensure problems Tuesday durine a " walk down" of like these won't contmue at the
. the reactor asit was being heated plant. FPL officials are expected .
up'to go back on ime. Golden to turn in the plan within the next said, week or so. The pressunzer is an elongated Kerry Landis. the N RC's tank clevated above and to one branch chief of the Division of side of the nuclear reactor. A 10 Nuclear Reactor Projects, said to 12 inch pipe connects the pres- NRC officials will begm meetmg i sunzer to the reactor coolant sp- with FPL regularly next monta i tem. and will contmuc to do so until The leaking valve is one of a se- they see improvements at the ries of valves at the- top of the plant. pressurizer, Golden said. The re- FPL officals continue to say , lief valves help keep the. steam in they have not cut back on mainte'- ! the coolant sptem in a liquid state nance at the plant, despite em-and keep the pressure in the sys. ployee cuts of 10 percent during the past two years. olden said FPL officials ex. poet the latest equipment failure to keep Unit one out of service for at least another week. Just one week ago, officials were gearing up to restart Unit One when a worker spotted a i cracked cyhnder in dne of the . plant's emergency dieset genera-j
SEP'12 '95 07:51AM FPL CORP COMM = JB P.1/3 p= a
. , The Tftsure
- Wednende/, September 13. HilMi j )ipe ' problem l
seeps nuclear. . l reactor off-line i i l ?ower plant stiL not up to par i The ptessunser prevents coolant i N,",*,",, ,,,,. weeer heated by the fismen pro-i HUTCHINSON ISLAND - under casepressure. from botting by keepas,it ' .is beleaguered St. Lucan Nucia- Two power-operated relief l tr .8awer Plant ran inns more valves can vesa steam to a pree-jc '1r 1 Monday when workers sunserrelief tankif thepressure leaking pipe flange that exeeeds a programmed haut. .
. =$ .
- an. ...., one reactor.off-Hee an- Golden did not say whether the " '"
on the reactor's comient puest
- other week. flange was r===cend to the a gshe tw that took several ders.torapises A senes of problems have kept same valve installed backward
! 'Jnit 1 om of semca since Huf: dunns last November's refuel-UGb ^ A. 4 ,. Workers nest discovered .
. safetys.rebet vetter :Ir
- icane Erin hit the region Aug.,1. ing. Workers found the backward
' ' contractors dudng l hvoedural and operatsonal mis- valve during an mapecnon fol Mesn es. bar's refumbag was.m backwarc
- akes thin led to a management 'lowmg Humcane Erin. M8f,lis investiganag th'e cause At the same tune, angdier Tebe i .hakeup on Aug. 22. Nuclear. Regulatory Comens. but repetr costs are expected to valve, callesta lowieressurensafe i
The re:ctor was sensduled to sion . officials could not be be ==4==8 Golden said, ty injection, ut*a==*==ilf di:
- ' etunt to'semcc today, Unit 2 reached for conunent Tuesday The reacsor creates 839 mega- charged about 2,000 gauens c cent back online without prob- evenug. watts of power when operstmg.
- nddly radioactive waar.' min
! ens followmg the humcans.' Reactor coolant pumps were "'Itat would roushly meet the sump demgned to-enuestyth The public was not endangered beenns the water to about 520 needs for 400,000 honnes," Gold. water. i by the latest problem. accorthat degrees and 2,400 pounds per on und. - FPL tned starting A.W ths.reenec ' :o Ray Golden, spoltasman for square inch when workers FPL officials met with NRC of- again en. Aus.17..amL m i Rorida Power & Light Co., widch checking for problems along the ficiala on Aug. 29 to discuss the other 10,000 ps)llens. j )wns the bamer tsland plant. tina found leaking stemerat theplant's difficulties dating back to tive waear. tua tune ' ri
- "We were attemptma to beat flange Manday evening, accord Humcans Erin. 'Ibe NRC of- actor's canea4==mambtdidiar i up the plant to get tsady to go' inz.m Golden.
.4.. ficials told FPL to taglunn up its Workers caused the ageL1rbs back on-hne when we.ran inta's % water takes 48' hours toopersoonal programs and proco- they strayed treen propergeor leek on a surized relief valve coc/. down and then another 2443dures. The plant is due for a op. dare and left two valvesopen a flanes," said.."So'we had hours are needed to maks re 'erational maaaaa===r in January. the same time, forcing wesar.im l 4
to cool the plant and.new it pairs, he saut. 'then it wal taks WliDe . to turn Utdt 1 a sestoklar syssent thst was.a should be another week Gmfore two to three days to rebast thebeck on the hurricans, picked up by clasmonic mandso goes back on-linel" 2 Tbs flange connects a pipe to a water; worters found a defective seal for 11 msnmas. . .; valve needung to the preessetser. (um a sumunn.sustus 4 l [ n Post.n- brand tax transmittal memo 7srt *
- pes =
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l o r-S % .:r N m 9/ic/w The B,RC m mi hl um, a e n penett). reps from a sew
;hvuaar.J dol'ars to hur.dttos o(
# thousands of doilars. and has tk FT Net to te!! FPL Vw to correr. ts
[ W. tic ns. he sud. Cork ud the NRC sd 'e. iwe FPL's orogram for corres.tirg g tS prob 4emp. 6.6 tratriang techniques
.e pecole morningt on equipmer.t seo ist cualatt uhrance program.
- P.;#. Il fo'.)os.Jp ff*.aifitefiance to MJde sJ e eqJIpment works prop-3 1
f*l\ 3C 0 'FPL woe <en 6scoverto ir 4wgtan ore of the uhes had been melled upande down 18.monitis 1 tr i I E The Nuclear &a o cret Caratilem.e .o class soune re'ueling o ne, 1 Regulatory Commission report says the nuclear ,"'f,,djg'".'dg4','g*f the .imie xed.
j !
Power Plant miSht have D co
. ih, re,e::orub,e,',o, n ani prem 'a
,y,1,,n.
Violated federal rulC$. Bai the wi.es shat hundis rerori focuses or, aren't :Pc nu- ! M$,h
- sicur wer plartt's only problems. l e plant has empenerteed a F'loride Power oc Light Co rumw of mishaps m nie past sia might have violated federal ti;.les meets, ka&cp to 2e conunud by failms to p operty maintain j and test some routpment, issoirg *essem m eM to one of a stnns of recent mis-
. Paps at the nuclear power piant on ,
i Hutchinson (Stand. A I3.psy mapecuen report re- ' W sted Thursday bv trie U.S. .W- ' clear Reeulatert (ommission Rt son il offee in Atlants docurnents " apparent Wolations at the $t Lue:e Power Plant from I I improper mamtenance or .nsde. qwte tesung. 4 The report focuses on two ' faulty rehef vahts connected to one of the plant's nucisar reactors.
.%RC mspectors reported that FPL failed to conduct fcilow up REMRT -
mamtenance and penodic teetmg sCOPWVeD PACM Ai E A cracked cylatder m one of
- on the vahee. the urdt's emergency dmet pners.
FPL wdl give its sde of the shutdows' of Unit Oie. ton l l y,fYg , $ QQ in Atlanta. AAer that awtung. tne After t leakmg u hts me re-p4 red. L asam ammpt 5 A pressanaer vMw leaking
, to tedioacttw wswr m the een.
SRC must decide whether to bmig hector bck mio struce. charp FPL with wolsuons or to Mt time a sa?u was soft open tamment buildmg. formally penadas tr.e company. Auftng a test when a should have , FPL coestriues to say it has not i send a been closed. reswtar.g ar. the spell cut back on tweetatenance at the ; Clark. gsscy spokesman Ken ' sf 10.000 pilons of shshily ruho- plant. even thoven it has cut tit ' ! FPL spokesman Ray Golden mettve water and boron to tne con a work force by to percent m the i l said the comp 6ny will have no
. t.antnent omlding. post two yeses. I comment on the report until after Other problems include; thgghM C,,g,,g 8 A defecthe ses) on the reac-
, r(W#nt pump.
e ue o $ m forcement action apamst FPL the Wnce utany t be reeered to sorrect 5 A lenk*g rel*f vehe on a lion - of $30.000 the unit shut down Aus I e day in pre. the and wrise a letter to pressunser. parataor for Hurrunne Erm the RC out:arnes what action was taken. when it was taken and how the compa stop the '
,Eh s s.d to s e..u
, s.oc.i.de.ts's"ou.4 n se.ne t.
Clark ansd. T074. P.81 l
45 THE PALM 11EACH POST SAillRDAY, SEPTEMBER 16,1995
- 5 r Computer failure cripples St. Lucie nuclear plant seddfit/,:
ty DE' ANN WEIMER
,en Beach Post St#f Wnte' about where guards must be pended inde6nitely without pay," shortly after 10 p.m. Jerome Gold- Meanwhile, Prevatte said he tions of NRC regulations,inci I placed when a nuclear plant is left xott said. A supervisor who failed berg, president of FPL*s nuclear met with St. Lucie officials Friday ing falure to follow procedur PORT ST. LUCIE - A can- without electronic defenses. to redeploy the guaid after discov- division also received late-edght to review the problems that have failure to update procedures
. uter faihne brought down the The guards are provided by ering he was out .of place was notification of the prehlem. plagved plant operations through- tailure to take corrective action, lectrcaic secmity system at Fke- Sill, a private security firm, said suspended for one day. "lhat event is a loggable out the month of August. Its accordmg to company sources. ' la Power & Light's St. Lucie WL spokeswoman Kathy Scott. "The guard that was out of event." said Richard Prevatte, the Umt I reactor has not been online mclear plant on 1 hursday, fa cing %hile FPL's nuclear division The canpute ized security position, that was (fw) alxnit 20 NRC's resident inspector at St. since Aug. I due initially to the coped with those problems, esa-he utihty to sing the fanhty with system - which, smures say, minutes," Scott uid. The problem Lucie. "A repor t wdl he forwanted threat posed by llurricane Erin, playees in its other divisions 3 ards, the company samt Friday. cwwdinates monitating devices was solved and the extra guards to the Atlanta office and re- and then to a series of mechanical braced for layoffs expected to Though no sceurity breathrs such as camtras and motion detec- dismissed by iI p.m. viewed." breakdowns and operator errors. .ccuried, a gum d and a superviwr turs - was dmun for 25 minutes come next week. Nuclear division Security measures at nuclear Sources said security comput. Itevatte will forward his ernployees do not expect to tie vere suspended for allowing an beginning about 9 p.m. Thursday. power plants are monitored by the er crashes are not unknown at St. monthly report to the NRC region- affected by layo5s unta aAer wea to go unprotected for 20 A guard who went to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Lucie, but plant personnel usually al headquarters in Atlanta today. scheduled refueling outages are ~ ninves. Federal olesarespeafic wrung observation pomt was " sus- which was told of the incident respond more efficiently, lie cited the plant for three vioia, completed this fall W e 9
. 39-26 4995 298 08cet h t.uc ss Res t uen: Hice . 47 461 -s22 p.et j aes*
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1 1 4 j . . . . . . . 31 j . 27 as '9"' cf'm e-r. L.cic Puw t I l BUSINESS : ! 1s ru v. . .. m. w.e, i [FPL nuclear plant may l l t lbe subject to sanctions 4 1 I' farther ! IQ ,,,,, One of the planr two ressors he bass been try *,molems i . l RUTCHINSON ISI.AND - same at was shut dews Auf.1 as i t * !%s UA Mseiner Aegulamrf Hurrassme arta n- _ _-- _ _- ' Cam 2 seassed to servies r-- is esatans wnnaar
'm puneen #1ertes Power & IJset ther the storm wdhout pres-
- ifor summa meWems a tas p6est. less. but Unit 2 fas resumasa
! t 771,represemssess were saar* ctt. Werners are sAowty artn6W3 momed a me two asur mesmas it beak asline. s Aliana er tendse normaere et The presses marted Su.W j een Jetc Adaneer wass empeyees stened heatins 1 aftsus s se assisans an vastb- weser used as essem tae ausmat e
- for enforeement asues wtA to r.seems presume. j l ltaken." PGIC Ken "I don't have any parucular :
i ciert se6s ao dare snare time wasa m wel aume neck en i be a* emelsess me en- '
- FTL souhammes Ball Swank i 31 seder, dl wouJe e
- sunge hem a simple the aest several espe.* gest an to a casi panam e an ideaday's mesume centsrud or, i arter to taas symmes ser- a apuused remet valve. '
vesete aessa, see of FFL's esempts 3' *lrs amt as everyeur assure to start up tan sumuser afar tas . *uus est tenfusessum mesenss) seurs, warhus messeaus tam , tem suas to a n s. ensamment ten Misimmu*
- said. *here assent been asi assammes Am a power *
- easy n et.Idass" apssess sammr suave tesseure 4 t FFL spetumme Rg Gaidna last Slesember.Tts selve esse as '
_ " as meseqs was e ausser m ustamamm a s u s
- ^
a mismus emmes er psub- sem a e subst mak tf psessus ! and me sempest's tensen 445 eger essed as the runstans , h not enemme e diesmas a pressespresseseetiph. i
i 09-26-1993 09.iggpc st 1.uc ** ** * *ent CH ice 1 407 t.61 4622 P.22
...manaMU1A aamtvan to settlein before the laant. He has placed ads in Fort seheel year gave entstans home also helped push sales i i
the Treasure Coast for a boost insales in Pa i otner potential plainties.Pddhamaa= Aunust. Realtors searching said, 6 percent to 4 as down t The equipsment inatallers 3 ales in Paka Basen rose 37 peseent to 953 homes,unty Coance for an a(34,700, wedle the Coast home was tverage Treasure i 4
- turn taking supervisorof exams andcharge the highestincreases coe blacks statewide were year at 877,600. discourage he same as last j inat white candidates were p The Treasure Coast's sales were. mcreased 2 peros$tstew moted deep te poor test scores.ru. at to 891,200.
1 up 4 percent to 239 homes and i The operators say BellSouthstatewide sales increased 12 per-nanagers a Fort Pierce ed not cent to 12.012 units, the Morida beesuee there were m j i select blads to serve as tempo. Assomation of Realtors reportedavalable. homes in the lower pnce rangi rary supervisors hen needed, Manday, Realtors sad i denysg thent a ' that these new homes ,competea with emoting rebet psy and a chance sory experience. supetvt. in before school stssted.' said" People home truyers.hames der Erstwere tirse s . i hecomplaint S'M==a Smith of Coldwell Bank. } itsck employees that erin Wellington and the presulen in Palm Seech County , derogstory racial ect to J' tue- August's sales fell to 1988 i i Palm Beaches. August one.cf the hottest closing "And
-ufute fromthat 2007. readeof repersed TRW Re j ptees see Hotsg8/98 .
1 1 \ iwetattonts j , i Were ADM exeos paid off >
- ? I i
Theluenos Department's . Gates len't Microsoft's highest pan t j Gdisad Co. illegally pad mdl.ons a ofrnsion guy?WASHINGTON-Maybe so is investisetma Bin G whether t as books compensedan to an array ca.of too wage seraer, but he ween'ates. World's ncha
- t "e. e Com ' ;
- secutives through foreign bank accounta, this year, according to compa.s . eth knowledge of the ingary seid Mondsr. records released Monday. %nytop homer ameexecunvas concernwho have worked with 1ricultural oescuters either that they received co have stready inform abertJ. Herbold, Microsoft's down $740 . i . That's more,133 in salary and bonus test ! oney in Swtes and other forvist accounts W ! inw of others who did. these people sad. and bonus kr Gates.than to the 8415.5 a it's annualproxy statess i at tout ofits oscars improperly other Daniele ties and.Rachange is part o has publicly Corna*ent with the acknow og ns
- nost 89 miRion from the company.btained the 53 year.fa dont Microso4 made ton Hedeid's i
< a the money was embeested in a ennapirneyIt hosoidned
- a.;.v I ps mlving Mark Whitmers, a termer executive who , where he epont 25 year. frora Procter & m
- rkedler years as an informantin a fed 000 ano be was guarsatsee a sols. His pic bene i s' edelnsanveengsaan of the campsey.eralof 8200,000 is see erst two years,eimuampih i delity Federet planning ORip Nisoteer regidsters soones FPL loans sos pq \ '
i WEST PALM BEACH - Fideirty Federal decide wieta 30 days itATLANTA - Fede 'F i et W a dividend reinveensent plan. The pian'ings should be penstead 6r m'nonen power a u ht s Sank '**i ! i shareholders of cornmon stock elemen. reactor have ther St. Lusis omniels ar have*'"sa ' j d'aseeds tir reinvested the dividends are paid.The into additionet ts of the shares valv of l by contreet workers,es were ineages *e intersei *
- taholders buy more elselets but plast i rterW without tees. shares of Fedend to catch the mistete or to N units,if reguissors etes't met es <
- . y naa m s t with FPt' i four vicindene,he sleet could he eiend e of er se. s .
esseofwhis earrypossede cist ; ties, said Ken Chant, a squakeenma der to
- l Reguletary Ceemeinema in Aalesta. .
.l The e.,.
enforumment condeseems was closed to t
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09-26-;995 C3 10AM 5s Luc e ces: cant CH t ce ' 407 461 4622
. P.23 he seems Tm assesser a toes l
. l Ppt's Weilt.1 reester about to ge enIhte ~
MUTOIINIION ISLAND -- ' A suuher scener si the EL Laois Pseur Plans is heaal just in umsair thewharsedagesen. Florkla Power & Usht Co. etwksrs tspin the presser hie #9 .'. day at the urus I asseee best on 1 IMe. FPL gnaamse til Swank 1
- It wit teas Ismal segraldays befwe the fearter witish ha been :
Jeten sinry Alig. l will be opers. Lisnet The renere ehtsdown has case I FPL mbuul1230#00 a car. Swant Ssid he Gust,I espect thst fait to I
. increams. !
Ib feesttw should be wqrking by the time l'aiit 2 aceds no bc . Jun dews Aw tefuehag (kt.1. 1 1 1 4 i n 4 i f i t
~~
s . _ . - a i i TOTAL P.83. )-
10A THE pat.M BEACH POST MONDAY. SEPTEMBER 25.1995 hfW/d s Ms 4 cic o <. The Pdm Beach Post t
. TOM GILTTRIDA. Pv6 fisher EDWARD SEARS. Editor LON DANIEI. SON. Genersi Manager l TOM O'HARA.Managsng Editor RANDY SCHut:11. Edder of the Editoreat Page JAN TUCKWOOD. Assocsate Editor AIAN FIRGUSON. VP Advernsing LARRY s!EDLIK. VP & Tresserer l GALIHOWDEN.Dareeser. Commsunstv Relatsens TOM HIGHFIELD. VP Cirevietsen l j
LINDA MURPHY. Direrver. Husman Researces KEN WALTERs. Dirrever. Maractsmg and Research ] l 1 More safety issues at l St. Lucie nuclear plant .
\
lorida Power and Light Co. oni. ' F cials say their nucharpowerplant Worker fatigue and on IIutchinson Island is safe. l That assurance, however, depends on aging Computers have ! rforman e of old computers and Contributed to recent
; ne computerized security system problems. ,
at FPL's St. Lucie plant was out of l opration for 25 minutes on Sept.14. Oqe of the security guards deployed price has increased about one-third. a along the boundary of the facility went good performance for a utility. to the wrong area. and hi,s supervisor But recent events at the St. Lucie did not correct his error. do one of the plant show how what works for inves-guard posts was empty for 20 minutes. tors may not work for public safety.' in
FPL insists the computer is reliable. July, a Ford Explorer wound up in one but sources within the company say it of the plant's outlets for cooling water.
fails three or four times a week. The extendmg for 36 hours an automauc problem. the sources say, is that the shutdown caused when an operator machine is 20 years old. which is a few pushed a button at the wrong time. A lifetimes in the age of computers. series of problems beginning with an Why it hasn't been replaced. and improperly installed valve and culminat-why FPL uses an outside company ing in a spill of radioactive water kept rather than its own employees to guard St. Lucie's Unit 1 out of commission for St', Lucie. are two matters with one most of August. conhmon thread: In each case. the com- FPL insists there is no connection pany is saving money. And cost-cutting between recent breakdowns. including has become an obsession with FPL those at St. Lucie. and the cutbacks.
..,To make a utility executive tremble. FPL sources, however, cite fatigue due say. " deregulation." Within a decade. to overtime work and the demotion of FPL's capuve customers - 3.1 million senior employees to unfamiliar jobs. A homes and 378,000 businesses - may St. Lucie training program abandoned b9lable to pick their power company the five years ago has been resumed be-way they now pick their long-distance cause the staff has less expenence.
phone service. Power companies will In the rush to deregulate. it's too have to compete or die. easy to forget that public utilities are tl.Sina 1991 FPL has elimmated fundamentally different from other pri-4.000 employees, about one-fourth of vate corporations. If a fast food restau-itsuwork force, and another 2,000 jobs rant's milkshake machme breaks down. may be gone by the end of the year.ne the public doesn't need to worry. The stock market likes what FPL is doing; same can't be said for problems with a during this same penod FPL's stock nuclearreactor.
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.m ,au LOCALNEWS. %me l
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. Haste to blame for problems?
l l Speedy nfueling at nuclear powei plant being, examined ; I Jack hhnen norsnally koeta reactors across N' cosspany is now ststring ' J nusuns senseunsus the coun otr4ine for about six ' why those tasks had to be done a : ! ; NUTCHIN80N ISLAND - Chrk. Both Florida Power and Light ~
'!11e w ,- - ., fbr >
; sad the U.S. Nuclear Th8 Pi em88d '"Abh to 'may open wider in future .
- ulatory Unit 1 at the St. Insis plant was because of an NRC rule change- !
! Comnussion wona e if a scheduled to last 55 days, outtbs caning for more ramenenanne . f s y at FPt/s St. work was contpleted in 35 days , work on auntaar planas d e Nuclear t last year ts last fau- periods, rather 4 the root cause for recent prob. time,a reestors are not operadas. . 1 ems that have kept one reactor "Thate's no j '. out of service since Aug.1. Chrk said. ' outages na rule does not tahn e5ect i
- ; 'We're looking lato it," said usually resect wtietever maint> until July 1996, but soms anclear to it, nanes schedule is associated with art already
- ; Kerry !andis, am NRC branca the refueling? sakL Ociden St j cidet la Atlana ' m*+===== 1 mate wee not under han not Saisted we han But sans af the
'.. not finished? Work disting the Ung tha tulo during Uat refuel-j . Maissanance work on plant- 1 has had to be redsee ing last year. . . syeeses as dans durtas refusung smee the sumsser was reeselsd, . (
Tum to seveutasyss j j j Pertado efety is months. This FTL spokanaan mar Golden said. ( - l l i
_ ___ _ _ _. . . _ _ ,___ .. _ . . . . . . - - - . - . . . . - -- -. .. . . - . - .. .~
) 10-06-JM 03:23M Et ..::9 -es: cent H :ce 43' JM 4622 :.03
} d 4
- 1 i l J .
t the shor:or refuelin problems, spokesman Ray Gold. 1
- %"BC "7 ear ath r >:=$ta=> c==g period but2 saad,
== ==t>* aarta a repott on possible
We arv looking at other 3.s- that area last spring.
nac m 1
. Pf9fft 81 sues. There nave been a number Gunter was left 1.neenvmcad.
' 17L shut down coi umts 1 of issues that have kept Unit 1 A nuclear plant using a steam
- .' pad 2 on AuSwl as a pascauuon. out and we a c looking at all gen 2rator has thousands of such
- ,ery measure as Hurrimens Erin tabst issuest' he said, pipes and a thotsugh ins i
.. approached. Unit 2 returned to The mag.anance rule change is a u, ne consuming task. pesuen
!.3ervice
- without problems.m the itself is dangsrous according to OfEclata at blanne Yankee, a 4
i: days Paul Gunter of the Washington. nuclear plant in Wlacasset, Unit following the storm. 4 11s still offline despits D.C.-based watchdog group Nu- Mains are repairing hundreds of a i
- W afferts to reemrt it. clear Informauen 8: Resource cracked tubes, according to
- 3een attenspt has had to be Se m ce.
Cunter. That plant opened an L
- talled off due to a variety of As nuclear plants around the 1972 and St. Lucia Unit 1 opened Otishaps, country age, they need c!aser in, in 1976.
.* to turn Unit i Unit 2 is scheduled to go off.
4
- h'#hile enpro to the hurricane spectaans as cracking stea agamer such problems 'line Tusaday fbr refueling.
m gynerator ;
; wortrv78 found a defective semi pipes. Gunter sud. alseady operating W capaeay !
96a W tessar's coolant manp; "I think a A3 day schedule is because of an organic build.up tr.
;cther discovered an internal part an espedited whaduls," he said, se water intake pipe enming a safety teilaf valve installed "We would think that's just a from the Atlantic Cosen.
contractors during the refuel. :ursory look . . . those in- , . ras la backward; ar.other rpostions i ; ve unintentionally sydled on line." you c.annot due while { : 2,000 gallons of radioactave
- .lWeser fase a sump designed toThe of NRC and other members the nucinar -h i do not
! a mis while
. ant s
%lda".".n'a of"."dio:r m'#;', a s ween- giggs3 -
- .tva water into the containment and 2s mm he said.
+
- .indiding housmg the reactor. FP1, wDrkerS h for
;* The safety re11af valve prob. c. racking m Linit 1 durattbs last
- ; A, m cannet be associated with refunung but did not rua any i .
i i i TOTAL P.03
} 10-11-1995 07:53AM St Lucie Rasadant OH ice 1 407 461 4622 P.82 , . let ,THE PALM BEACH POST WEONESDAY. OCT00ER 11.1995 i i 1
! i FPL besim
. g
'if the NRC should approve. -
i . Unit 1 muld be operated at g, i cuts wit .n ,ii;ghg';g,y,. I teph. Unit 1 has been down sace nuclear unit ^g,, .v.,,en redu-l 1 4 notinvolvedin tbs St. ANN WsBWt are scheduled to be ; esem post essewneer thewenisofOct.30 l
; As Flodds Power & Light employtoset status, said .
]
j twought one of its Turkey Point PEL Stesey Shaw. 1 t nuclear roasters beak on.line WS Lusie could have some ;
- Tuesday after its shestest refuel- staang chseems psier to that .
lag outage over, tbs compen an- . thee,' she said. "Det ther noumend it was cutting its n wouldn'timpast those in the refu. . stag $perseet. d'as ou until enriy 1908."
- power consany's nuciser As wi the other layees that
! division has a stas of 2,100 em- begun in August, nucient division 1
- who are divided amons amployees wlR have el to i i Turiter Point and St. Lucie And another job within or ts as well as a Juno Beach- essapt the severunes ,
support stas. Theminimanseverensepera 4 i The reductions, which could weeks and the mashnum is 52 l a$ set as meer as 100 employees, weeks. . me port of tne selity's esort to l ! ella does and lower opereeleg i in an etits diviesoas. ! FPL's St. Lucie giant has since midduty, Tur. l Unit 3hasrun smooth. ly tbtigStlemeaths, operating 40F eut of 473 , sold she Vies PseidsetTaas . ! and was 53 days the unieur refuelingperiod lasted j
- MesswhBa, St.1.uela's Unit 2 i was cooled down Mender for a 1 schednied reheh'ea. which also ia
- espemed to last 83 ders. But its
- treebied Unit 1 which has been plagued valves,is stol not , the
. more $335,000a . l essists ' areconsid - i sting the Reguis- ! terr he an ! cy waiver to the udt's . requkussents, ser sounes wielun - i the elegt. i
. . . - , . - - - . . .. . . . . - ca : ,s ev -
n E
- a Thefases Emmstooday.h*h If ages Rl '
W E , i New rule may stem problems at nuclear plant Safety sysianM= i5 d ia g ,_ , i ""Io= * - ice. 8.i= . i to te '"1uhal aniine .i ..sn >=dow. r ed aus of. amid Unit I bas
- asyema.ne.tinsemessa - ing, serv ice minee Aug, I heeamus of'
.ee.sh. .nms g ensangemeted essors
- A new fedwat sale pverains minFunctimesandden,ga .
maintsesuite d ==rh=r power Golden saidL i . l e could desssase at Kasey . t = aim the NRC"s j S Puwer & - Ca.% St. bsanses chief of the
- Dorisine d
+ ., Pa a , Rasctor amid sei-i I.acie Flamer 70 mat. she ass He teacher Itagsdatory Comm- linics algemey see l cie semios sete, wencen hemomes luar the new sek. It ammen dust .
ha 1996,woeld meguise gemet oper- systemas can be stas deers ^ j $ alors to comenssa N for sepains whAr seatsers are
; rnaher than
~
e chedte mi safety sysasses utikme- er
- chas re:duas see o'pending. in- se shes down for sense d waitisqt used shey are out mina gouMeans arise. lands i
*l Foremumm *
..y o .4 service. -
,====m==
swe i.u.7=cs.ier as hash pres-seen theeneasemy a
' ~ yk, see past era s he ende caskt give wi=hers .
s ' mo.c ii e is -- --- she peasa . . asJagsp- in,rassonnes. iii In. Indieri ahn, sneenr pass neseds
" of =adiiss son can be she. 4 the wusk dwang ededung useioM while the celier part Pouses & Ugte Co.'s sw what pommer plant as Huashtases Island A
. * == new 8ederaf tasie goversiing "-- at penser passes esedd ' s g- $.n.C"d" *" gg,,, g wa ~~~ ~ - ! g*n ., ~ shimsess teamed pt.iad een innalfi-n . d. e aus e.s d.y July,3a asid e serc da:y asc lully fmencaiewaall' year by Macommescs Markdasap-1 3ae of asse eswessisag - misme as War assest sHirwas 3 eas se l - ocese hv ammasusmal FPI. alumsby at esists the neum for sluit sedeis ahms gdumes saa new Me$s. Laic phmes's thast 2.for she oeved Jewing 1994. !U rede to anisiamma es esmesszecy ne- go for op an eue yours wisliput However I-'Pt. also seensted a sraarmerseers but is aus yes massa shuetire does for scfueba anal caamayer, h=B a smand rea of 582 ! n is for enhet omresy'sym 5;Pt. sinosa safety synna- ex cl smene days se 9998 med 1992 widiand se- es pois. ace + $ spi *coman Ray Goldian saidTees- geoornseg hefwe then to sunke lockey ne plans was named eks r
- 7 a .
/
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10-11-1995 07:55AM St Lucie Restesnt Office 1 407 461 4622 P.06 l l I L i 1 h ti!' ' ' i l Il (( r l '
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10-11-1995 07854AM St Lucse Resident Office 1 407 461 4622 P.03 s e n ._ . - - 4 4. 4 I I i l 1 FPL's two nuclear units off-line l One reactor refueling, the other recovering from problems , j lies after tbs storm without vember last year. Now it is Unit . Jam Mean lems. but Unit 1 is setE wait- 2's turn. Te m susym m - "Over tives and a half years, l HUTCHINSON ISLAND - trting to remrn Unit i the fuel its uranium i Florida Power e Light is not pro to sernes, FFL has had problems fruan assens." soehas. I dusing anF elesetsity at its St. with . valves. Z 1-- two re- mas said Tu . 2 Lucas Nualser Plant. disasteve water spills and found 'The reesthm a a l One' auelear reseter is warm. a defective seal for a emolant Ilhe a of hiBlerds in wideit 1 las up ter a return to service pump- the bemos ett each eter. i' ftBoning two months af me. Tlia asument will not set a it , abunical and operatiemal prob timetable far returning tbn beamrues. ' Whos up and thrasaseussens urasianf amme is slet,ly l l lasms ad the second was taken tor to service. Wetters est keg off, splitting another three l off-Iles Manday for a seheduled las an eye on a - i annans. . 3May refusung. valve that leakedtrytagto bn#--- "Eventunuy the aanbar of ' Both reestors were shut down brigit enlins oldest 00e=assais become - ! 28. <
; on Aug.1 as a pressutionary FFL replaces en said, ionD'- hs? Gold-DEUnas of I
- measure against effests frees third of urenhun la each reacter stems spuedag mininhananualy.a
' Hurrissas Erin. The reestor every is months. Unit 1 was re- l l known as Unit 2 went back on- fueled during October and No. . Tum to NUSLEAII/00 i k i I J i . 1 . j J I'd JMnd 3I:lrf1 *19,m Wur$800 96ETT C0 yw w
- _ _ _ _ _ _ - - ~ . _-- - - ._- . . . - - - - - . _ - - - . - . - . . - - . .
10-11-1995 07854AM St Lucie Restaant OHice 1 407 461 4622- P.04 l l. l l-I N l % ; ! \ . f I I.
, ,. 3,,,,,
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retc staff members eenest re-serious accdonts in a i i mensber the U any$ mens dudag refuel. ' i FWem 84 sand. The fuel is
- lag, moved whus underwater to i
. Tbs heat is used to create shield b Pant l tream radiados. swam that turns a gereur nr. he said, De warst incidents have 2 E rods feet N "" l g.
.e, ,e,m r--e m " h ,. e n._ - - .e less, cadden ased.
j sig 33,gg
- - - .s., - , .
M,se,.f l rods are inonhadles of The fue warters sins, but the samber 286. There are 217 bundles, asund swell m as as 2,200 i
- To orevent the reestsa ps ,. durtng the ammese.
eene fross going out of esamid, wel be used for much of the 77L uses control rods that ab. added a ' bor, assortling to Geisk i serb neutrone to prwent them es. from hitting rnere uranism It is na1Glely the refueling pto. j ess e s. eens wel go faster then planned,
- The asent ureakun is scored en besold.
site and underweger. A Durlag the other reester's re. l post federal starues f is fusiles test year, the scheik ! ed in Yucos Meestain, uled $$ days for and but y maintenance but finished 35 g tism, and the U. . Nuclear Reg-Since the plant is shut down, ulosary ca==aiamiaa are now In- ' the normal safety conearne are vestigating whether the swift ! l alismated, according to NRC peas is reissed to pmineens at
- spokesman Roger Hannah in Al- the plant tids stanmer, i
i 3 i I
]- . ,
A t'd
,Luirtd 31Trt *13 dn wgyStB 96i 11 130 -
y en ,ppe - -
S . ,, reponM to & wneg post h
,i
-* He
- c. 3 a 5 v, mas 5 -4 3H . .
on-hne m the cruddle of the week. As a result or miscues. several f.yd ., iprermus atretopts tohave turnfadsi Unit '.1
*8 88 "'*C"'3#'u"t fadure.'For mf the @~ was,g un-
'Y" abo at mmutes,"a s--*arg- . p g g .,1 4 >t 't.. WhDe preparms e t*. g l -
fy eg 3.' ~ A
- gg +~ on m the days follomng the bar. pw . gN updated riid,as could j .
neane, workers found a defec- be blamed for the guarti's mis-piant.
- tive seal on tne reactors coolant take. Sager saul '
bu in h,, cmmnumty. I pump mat too senral days a "That was nothmg new." he af 1
"-**t* P' men.%g s isl ;.y w
..,,".i,. . ; ;.- have neignbors. Sager said. replace. ,
"One of the key . . . etements is said %t penon did not com.
O workers tnen found an mternal ply with an ex2stmg procedure" worrymg we con t lose tnetr con- part for a sarety reueve valve f?L officials wul go to Atlanta fidence to run the piant safely." 1 mstalled by contractors durmg Monday to discuss witn NRC the The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory last Novemoers refuelms was a valve with parts matulled upsads-i
$ :c .,4 ) ""' * , J'. , * * - p Commiumn has given the plant backwart - - --
n.- ,' e f* -
,os,m its highest marats for years but At the same ume, another re- do.w.77L ktadi 6 prende the j
"cause' " of' "recent
" " problems.
' " *
- Opern
" - 'd " anyerve
' safeey *'" ' n"m"wntmaHv u ac* a* m aa Re.cen.t>hroMeUl3 e va- nUf' I -
tionai and procedurai problems ,ows..ged about 2po galiana of 3, M, ,,,m h _m p p
,, o,14,, ,,,,
j- DC-rCSillt m e - n w J.,. Of40H1nlaCenCY,. han made me plant, aims A1A mddly nomactan waar mm a "It wiu be an hcoas. candd de look bad lately. <- sunse designed to collect the scripten of the ev.at..the one NRC's current two-year assess- waterr * ** neuve actans that have beer Rck Mmch rnent period ends Jan. 6. Another attempt to start the taken and an analysis of the safe nem sw man , ^'.- Sager as the person closest to plant was mace on Aug.17. The ty p-ri, a W pro lems. stan up was nalted unen worb The NRC plans to visit th SOUTH HUTClfINSON ISLAND - After neany A graduate of the U.S. Naval ers spuled 10.000 gadons of re- plant Nov. 1 for a follow
! 19 years mtn a spotless record. St. Iancie Nuclear Plant's recent problems have left the man m cnarse Academy. he spent senn yean dioscun water mm W nacers conference tn a plan f7L subum perplesmL . .
servmg on nuclear suomannes, contamment budding. ted Sept.15 for correctag th
' '.; Workers nad strayed from He has worned for FTL 20 years
" ~~
p g ,,,
! D u y f 6,," A . - and worked tus way up the cor- proper procedures and left two ,
gis he porate ladder. Stx years ago be valves open at the same ume. s piant manarement accept was placed m charge of the forcmg water mto a eprmkler mg long stadmg, repuuv gght plant,s ' system that was not p1CKed up by
, l, plant. IC '
A mor6es of mishops e ecemc mommn for H mm- unsa asfactory equipmer he w nt *, J johng mood *'4JL2~.:D
?""~
a The plant's two umts were shutdown as a precautionary d tauns (kw m F "ma#*"u*a'*te a deq personnel pe: Jurms an amer. measure for Hurncane Enn on . Atlanta on Aug. 29 to meet with gor.mance-new last woest NRC officals and present, plans atechmcal deficiences bm 1
- Aug.1. for getvg back on track.
M st's
.g )m say then Urut 2 returned to service mto W W without problems followmg the The utWty pledged to ehmanate s insuf ficient informatic s sgn frs: , gg a backlog of needed equipment given to management for a I Umt I has yet to restart. Work- repairs. merease perfo mance seas plant events.
d v en were stdl troubleshooting a standards for employees and im- Unit I went whne for tf t t first time m 1976 with a $45 problem m one of the umt's die- prove operational procedures. g.a"Ig mm8' sel generators late Saturday, wt. The unmediate results were mdhon pnce tag. spokesman Ray Golden said. He not good. Urut 2 cost $1.4 bdlion er b th said he expected the unit to be On Sept.15 a secunty guard started up m 1983. fact ars an execlunt plant , up to this j post" Aan ones a==vrhe Teense Vce president of the St. Lucie s e for th difficulties bods Nuclear Pfarit David Al Sager 3 down to an at. says recent problerns' at the' titude proplem plarit are frustr3Urtg. Consider-
- among woners' ing the facility's altnost spot-and m e n a g e- less 19 year operational ment. hager record.
; aid. The more
'han WO workers at the plant grew rocky with their success.
Nonetheless. he remama staunchly supporove of rus workers.
. "This as certainly a departure from our perform.
1 ance, cnd I don't know tf I can assess the unpact." ne said. "But I know I have tne ngnt resources and nght people to put the plant at the top. We've slipped a httle. but we certainly feel we can De among the best agam." Not surpnsmaly, Sager leaves httle doubt be strongly supports nuclear energy. He also is sense tive tu commuruty concerns atmut s-afety at the Tum to PLANT /A4 l
_ _ . . . _ . _ . - . _ ~. _ .__. _ ._ _ . _ _ .. 10-16 .995 09 2"'/d1 St Lucie Fos taent CH ice 407 461 4622 P.02 hD 0 fp r/ 7/t , m () dam ;6y6 I . i FPL workers facing dark days at thelight company Chairman . lames Broadhead worries that employees feel
' entitled' to their jobs. Workers comolain that levels of i safety, trust and comrnunication are down. FPL takes a management approach based on a healthy dose of fear.
l gDE'AMN WGMDI #w CWertlost by judith Bardmck, and i FPL Jaanas Broad- ##* His peh increase headdedded Power & Lightneed- job annety to raise ) ed to raduaDy change its corporate culture this year. productmty. He appears to have Two ssessaniassons in fmr years had .w i not done enough to altar the way esaploy. Surveya taken i ees at the stanc's largest utility did their wittun various FPL jobs. Brm made clear to top sc.sota-era that he lamented the company's cul-K '. businssa divisions l i i eines the opn'ng indi- I ture of "enttlemeat." Cate anMisty is high. FFL easdoyees. he maintained. init g morale is um sac a maided to 4 % dehdod to certain benesta, lack of kb security is and maand to annual raises and bonuses. Stesehead the key facter. heatme ei this entwimmaat culture, em. The perceptionis the same within the j weren't workms as hard as they nudear divistom, even though, managers Inne d. he .sid. they needed to think and act like business ownen in a highty compettive esmronment. He rucum. TD4Dded a f08D48thest book. Manger en i
; . l I
e 10-16-3 5 08:2341 M Lucie Fencent GHice 407 461 4622 P.03 say, i2 has not bun included in she anti. peign th:2 induded weekly meet- ommended utihty stocu on Wa:1 entitlement compasan because of the close mas by L800 FPL maployee Street. supervtsory role played, by the Nudear groups focosag on how to srn Regulatory Commission. The NRC prwe werano'* For his esorts. Brondhead han beconne the highest-paid utility frowns on raums the stress levels of When Braanand armed as executve in the nation. earmng nuclear plant operators. chief anscuuve of FF1. Group e 52.d adbon annually, accordmg to Some managers ano employees say the end of 1999, his autocranc an smalyan by two Colorado based trust and commumcation are nonexistent. nay .,e concemod swow standards we 7e"e ..un,ach inevitably cor,or. cuimre. clashed with resears inns.
; nm,uman.eto, . cf
'*"*"ior* is anow. empawso-e eat 'P awy.m-d
-se,e --y in
- f none.
..ney we,e ,os,es,ed by . '*
we,e Tae*,/,# 1,e m i '
,w,.h. w ,o a m. in ;.u.
Broedhead dechned several recimets Dennag Aws.d." said Mike Hellia. in the past three weelss to discuss ms ary to become president of South-ter. whose Boce Raton company, ern Cahiern a Edison Co., and ! management gemis. or the entinement theory; M.Halhasarlac haseorked Nudear Division Mt Je. 3 In sternal surveys obtamed by Du with hundreds of the more than rose Goldberg. 4000 h laid of by FPI. 7 gma i Palm Sascis Post and m about a dosen sace Brosdhead took over. 4 interviews. managers and employees say 54.6 in 1994.
"New management came in upper managers are wolsted on the 6fth and said, 'We're for quahty. but In additica to increased Snan.
floor of Buskhas D at FPL s Juno Beach you att ha,e gone wacko. We don't cial rewarda. Batedbeats adorts headruaners. e And trat from that perch. need to go to that extent.'" also have resuked in incremed they reh on fear to schieve their objec. concerns about personal secunty l FPL had geoc so ime as to set -a topic FPL does not discuss. g Oves. up a subeldiary m the mid.1960s. ) "No feehag ofjob secanty. Can'tbuy a called Quakee Quality Service
- Last fall. state records show.
j bouse, make plana, disruptve to family Broadbend and Goldberg obtamed Inc., to market toe stihty's exper* cormaned weapons permits. i but you're still Aying m your helicopter. time to such :ompannes as AT4tT 1 i The company could make a better effort." and Boeing. b"' 'M' '"8' **""Y "" i wrote one pertuigent m a locus smup
- desagned to help unplement the anu- " Jim Broadbead was im. I preseed with what FPL had done If Broadhead doesn't want to enutiannant cuteure. use the l "Attbough we are in a 6sht for 'surm.
wie hs gudty eget." said Cert Stimson, a sonner FPL executrve the h car he , any een man,use al.' only the esagiorms take the hits wrote manager m se who redred last year from Qual. hedeuno och
But he thought FPL had Twised behad Buadag D
""..' Upper management ten too etnacared, too risid. at bot. Juno Beach, the executm puka, s at ergoys signiacant salary mersases and ppy , m ja lot a sunounded by ausstnrave bo- ne,e - - amed k mono )
amanicas. _-and m, the,n.eept e, .d i ex. termomir .o propenna, .n hh .aand mi.e som ai .med
,,,, A prwate elevator takes esec-For - a h manasen say utives to the Afth $oor sutens -
l FPL recently paid more thar; AndhesaCladies and g l men, we have gradamed. , entle* dubbed Mahogany Row by em. '
$20milhon & two Citation jets p ,y,,,,
g whSe laying of about about 200 Broadband then made it his
;'W ainee July. goalto renwe scene of tbs strue. Anned gurds at te mun ele.
vatorentrance and by Broadbaa(s Broces.cf hrm@t chartge There are vesy few levels Today's FFL is dearty diser. he ail i ayed. between customers and Jinn est inun the team meansessent Broadband." Stinsson said. When SmedbeesLgoes to the approech that made it the Erst " People are havung to take on caropony actaule japan to wm the cadeteria for k.nd. he a n-=&- acre resposaitahty, more ac- nied by a planclothes guard who Deaung Pnse, an awant for"quali. counsabGity." ty control manaseenent." sits at an adjacent table. FPL reenved the award, pre. Layid. .nd Isme W Ceocamind canneres overhead vioesty given to such Japanese pnmde additional survedlance. Reducing structure has meant Although he dechand to be carpersoons as Tp end Ms- 1ereds int more than a quarter of interviewed, Steedband has ad-san. in October 1 sus. FPL's wesidarce. dressed geessems abset company
%en under the )caderslu That has cana@utad to a 26 performance and chages to hs FPL Frestenet Rooert Tauenp the of percentreducuanin operatsgand culauto put to hen b mGity apoetmore then 320 mision - far FPL pohhesness.y employees expenses, mahisig on a "quehty ,- - :'com- FFL one of the most lugl@ ree . The in-house magasine a
6 4
- -- - ~ . - . - . - . _ _ - - .- --.- - - - - - - - . ---_.
10-16-1995 382 24r41 St Luete Festaent OHice 407 461 4622 P.04 1 I Chapqg (Jurrenar published a whenyou needit." said one power would c eate a atmospoen l J question ant-answer interview delivery emphryte, where emonovees are afraid 13 I with Bramaand last monta that 3 Emphasis on sht" coese to rnanagement with safety
~
addressed theirnpact of a loostung and budget over quahty and setI i corspetnive environment en te es,f dis-vice. udhty industry in general. and ^ Last week. however. Landis i FPLin perncular. P'**' d*** Y said that the agency had not found ' I "We have demonstrated that '7cdrNt
, eli e Nan **P3'y" ' a spemacinsamt of punteve man-there is not a confKct betwwn ronment this wap "We are relax- ngement m de 22 emms a cat reduced cost and improved quali- Inn standards, increaems seiety C"8'8'f7' ty." Broadhead said of his efforts rias, to decrease costa. ' Penny The NRC team amves the
. to streamline the company. wise and dollar fooliah!" same week the nuclear division is
] And when asked about Pressured te do more with odeduled to begm notWing 105 j changes to the " culture." he said less, managers expect the same employees of &ar unnaseen as e employees would "have to learn levelof performance fran reman, part ofits 1995 downstamg enorts.
to kve with"it. ing employees. Sunilarlayoffs are taking place l He acknowledged. "A lot of within emer divisions, wnich have "Maagement by intimida- lost as user as 50 percent of their
- employees feel uncomfortable. tice." said one employee m a non-1 unhappy and &restened wim the power ganaranng division wnen management posanons, uncertamty that comes frcen the desaihmg FPUs leadership ap- to managers who have r prospect of change." proach. " Fear is a motivator. Job O*IID*****
But in the cotopany surveys fear. "Everyone who was in a posi-and in mterywws, managers and "The workforceis afraid to tell II'" i v7-y^^^ mstst Job uncertamty has, m smileen a sand : go elsewnere on de ther own bosses what's going or. ! has not led to improvement. m the field. wnst resources they E N'"** i FPL. they say has trsveled need for fear of not havmg ther %% :I"*I sst of'NI.* e* people have,som too far from its portarmance stan- job in the next reorgamsation.~ sort of ancnor a they can t. ) j dards. pgerg gross dMeion lines Futwo in doutit l Arnong thou qual 4 chasiges matmost a inue" The same fears exist within Inside the company, many are i the nuclear divimon. convinced FPUs upper manage-l "Why must all issues be re. inantdoesa t have a clearvtsson of
. A " don't fix it tillit ereaks" solved as to wnst is , chi;y the stility's future.
j approach to maintenance. as op- corTect instead of what is right Sonne speculate that FPL is l posed to exeensive pregnave logually/'w+miemhy," quened one stnpped down for a sale to
- mantenance segmeer h a survey reopenas. utihty, or for a brealtup of "The recent events at PSL And in an intamew another ha buenses @.
- (Port St. Luce; and at tne fossil said are afraid to point Dare have been 10 electne i plants together shows that pre. out at St. Luos for fear utility mergers over the last year. I vennve maintenance is being of angerir.g plant managws and makag it the t -- - a;- ! compronused." said one engmeer. Pumag their careers in jeopardy. merger ares in the nation,c . mg manager in the rnanagement That could pose problems for "I don't think anyone has any survey tnggered by the lengthy the utility next month when the real ccecern about 24 future of problems with Port St. Lucie,s NRCis scheduled to visit St. Lucie FPL as a company," said a nuer.ar Unit I reactor. to observe irsthand the plant's dmaioninenager. ! A power dekvery employee efforts to ex a downward perfor* "Butitis not as cieerjustwhat ! sad. "We are now begm' am~ s to manos trend dist kept Unit i shut form it will be in the future." see the e5ects of the 1993 reorg. down for 73 days. l TPLse khoWers ad analysts
- Things not gettmg done or ad. The plant was b down don't seen coar-r 8-dressed. Aug. I and came up . <
l 5 Relamed standares so that FPL apont at least 3220.000 a head a vimon l , 11 hour outage are con- day to buy electricity. braging th* udhty. bis for FPUs W- ' i sidered accep matead of the cost of r that power to
- two hour standard FPL had mam. more than 16 mance on all Srut have never 4 besa in doubt.
auclear engineer sa i Iet ",",,g '* y,',,M" # g
- -.vey 8'yces may how costituted to ne .id.guent in his io.d esi . 2h" t a
,,,,da, s , son a, .evat cause was madepiate job skala, darf Asuna in New York, he se surrent degradation in poder. work precuse er ' = " ' -
hs g ,,,, g g, m , j ,g, gtis senad. o n , og g , g ,, ,i,,,, ,,, ; , ,,,,, a Fever supphes kept oc t asw e man. , o ,e,,,m ,,,, main,an ece
- agement " Pusteve manage
- hand at FPL's " parts otosus." do. as,employw dissi- g'"chakW *' " 26 &M'* "* 1
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} "nere's nothing around ,he t perforemose of other easdoy.
- ces detrumenseily ... because i: '
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of 8519 milhon with cammgs per n
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l' ahare up 6 percent. M@Y'In:tlie, vest decade. Arou' she'd.%sineesee suchsb*
- j i
! era t 81 reh ~ 1h.$@MNMNMD'5'@ilion,.: 20ts.hustriass: susipM;powerto 3. "MND"E j watts. . ,
! 5 Sale ey FPL Group, the ..icustomers through Floridsfowef'4, fight Co'1 '., .
j parent holdian company of FPL.of "' Thottsands'of Jobs diseppearWB as the utility-many of its unreisted compames reshaped.itself to rnelrttain proftts. irs,the face of hJgher . i costs and cornostition from outsMers. The pace j such as Colonal Penninsurance, . 5 No rate mcre=c for cus* Quickened uncer chaint.ain lames Broadhead. wpo took l taners since 1985. the coMon's helm in'1949. j .. 4 FPL proudtr pomts out m m-1 formation provided to sharehold- l ers this spring thatinforW1994 EXECUTIVE SALARh Nation's highest j
- - list of the 500 largest companies. .
- FPL Group placed 126th in net ,,
J pro 6u.1500s in market v Jue. 170 thin meets.and 196 thin sales. GM,Mgg,Ugy,W..:. .:.1 ..a. l; "With the company's reason. 2. Don D. Joroan $460,500 82.259.588 able customer rates, low dividend
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Houmo .....,..: . . payout nuo and improvmg. bal. . .. .. .,,, EM.58F . .d...g; . . .,.. - L. ,. .g l ance sheet. strong , , , , , ,service
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- ter m,more dustry competidve .ee n e m s.-electrie uti!. . .. . . l ! l l !
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' Management by intimidation. Fear is a l
- motivator. Job fear. The workforce is afraid to 1
- ell their own bosses what's going on in l'
the field, what resources they need, for fear Ia of not having their job in the next reorganlZation.'
' AN EMPLOYEE DESCRISWG FPL's LEADERSHIP APPROAW l
l i i 1 1 i 1
}' ) - - - _-
10-17 '995 .03:2641 5t Lucie Res: cent Cffice ; 407 461 46n P.02 l th p.s-; [/,)w' d 1 J i: .
'o The Stuart News '
)
i Thomas E. Weber Jr. Rebeoes K. Freeman , j , seter ana Presioent ' aweinoes Maneser. t
- Give llent and the people wN1 find their own way.
) Box 9909 Stuart. I'lorlds. 34995 9009 '
- Sunday, Oslober 18,1995 l
a
+
EDITORIALS 1 . l ' Spotlight on FPL Proba St. Lucie plant operators ! %,,gno ,ueusd' one vhe will feel moreSI haveto resseure I pub i,ucie Power Plant's two generat. Americans sesm to have over-
~
in units are back in opersuon. come much of their earlier fear laat on Hutchinson Island about nuclear power, which a cou-has under a light for sie of deondes ago a ched months as various ro have systeria in some areas. i , opt Unit 1 out oF servloe since ith ad. l - us.1., but that service is now be, vanoeg in plant design and safety ing restored. Unit 2 is down now systems and with' more pubhc i know of the the lewl for scheduled afue of has i In mid August, w workers But pec de still crave steady re-i were fixing a valve and assurance. q area's . ! cleaning up a o J this -- L y radio. are not satis 8ed that their nuclear. active water ' the plant. FPL pawned eLMW genomting i said each day of down. time costs ! plants are running properly, their 5250.000in lost revenue. levelwill rise. t Thors may be another cost, i too, in tanns or local rooklants' e noent G-h=-mt is a i in Nucient conndenas in the plant's manage. Co a rules, to take ment. That may be hardar to as- mi i 1996 to e i sena. But sogne Martin and 5t, Lu- make, that would allow on maintenance ' cie county ' who liveja the saasty systems while the nuclear re-plant's osanot help but he actors are i rather than and perhaps nervous, at wait until 's, out servion.Ia* ! unusual events - the insk, the dustry believe this would fisulty y of another valve aid work, which instaled a poserator otherwise tun, a snounty lapse - that to t have to be rushed dowmakes. l i m l none oTsu,u_s has in- Let's it halpa, the NRC tely(da must continus to striotty moutor terate lo . seems Procedures to see that no comp,ro-St. . mises amanada. County es, g gtg, 'De plant hasg Nuclear Reguis- most tory Commission also has looked need. Local - eE into the situstkut. post-that , l i 1 TOTAL. P.82 I t___ _ , _ _ _ _ _ l
_ - _ . _ _ . _ . . .__ __ _ _ _ _ . _ . ~ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ 10-1E-;995 C2:44PM 3t Lucie es tcent CHice .
' 407 461 4622 P.02
. CORP. COMMUNICATIONS 10-16-1995 13:58 PAGE 1/2 n:;AtrAA
} f:b LN* l ) pe=L . n=a mri, pa or nua ac sarman w } 1 l Special Edition ! October 18,1995 - 3 l Ch5=inasm responds to ; i Palm Beach Post article . j
Dear Employee:
i ! Ir has been my practice not to respond to comments appearmsin the media. i However, the false and mariing ardcles in the Palm Beach Post in the last several j months and. most recendy, in Sunday's edition, demand a reply. ' 1 am deeply concemed that the Sunday arncle misrepresents my attitude and the attitude of senior management toward employees. Even worse, many of the i articles demean your signmeant accomplishments. The Post would have you belieu: that I view employees as lazy and unmouvated. Purther, that upon reading a book entitled ' Danger in the Comfort ! Zone," I 'sent copies to managers" and encouraged them to ' increase job aAy" in i the workforce. . ! . 1 ! Nothing could be further from the truth. I have always prassed our employees to the Board of Directors, our officers, our shareholders, and the community. I l consider you to be capable and dedicated, as dernonstrated by your many l achievernents. l l The author of the book referred to in the Sunday article is one of many yavvvcative business writers and thinkers we have invited to address our senior management kt the past few years. Inviting them to speak to us, however, does not t mean that I, or anyone else, endorse their ideas. Moreover, I did not distribute to , managers the book referred to in the article or suggest that anyone else do so. And I most certainly never suggested that anyone assempt to increase your anxiety, which
- already is high hae- of the new beh environment created by recent federal laws and reaala*=. In fact, I would consider such a suggestion caHous and
- repreh*amihk.
l
10-10-1995 22:43PM 5t Lucae Res: cant Of# 1ee ' 407 461 4622
. P.03 . Comp.- C009tUNICATIONS 10-15-1 CSS 13:05 PAGE 2/2 RightFAX j
- In order to be successfulin the new business environment. we have had to ,
. undergo many changes in the way we conduct our business, especially since we 1 i started from being one of the highest cost utilities in the southent. In the course of i -
these changes, many jobs have been eliminated. The actions we have taken, though I painful, are necessary for the Anancial wil-being and very survreal of the company. ' None of us wutts to end up like Eastern Airlines or Southeast Bank. The Palm Beach Post seems unwilling or unable to recogruze either the problems we have i overcome or the challeges we are facing. i
! A newspaper should be a constructive force in the community. In contrast, the i Palm Beach Post has long manifested a negative and confrontational attitude,
- .especially toward business. For e:kample:
\ ] e The Post did not applaud your outstanding work on Hurncane Andrew i as did other Florida and natidnal media.
! e It never prassed us for being the only utility in the country wimre all .
- nuclear plants received the highest performance ratings, yet it gave front I
- page prominence to the recent problems at St. Lucie. )
i 1 i e lastead of thanking you for your efforts dunng Tropical Storm Gordon, it ! ran an article saying we would probably raise rates because our j ernployees were paid for overtime. ! e It has not given you sufBcient credit for holding the line against rate F increases for more than 10 years while improving the quality of our
- company's performance.
l 1 1:nfortunately, I think we can expect more of the same from the Post in the future. ! Nothing can recufy the harm caused by an irresmnsible front-page newspaper j article, but I do hope this letter sets the record straig2t. l I am grateful to you for accepting the need for change and working topt= l as a team to repostrion the company for success. I'm conadent that with your help FPL will meet the challenges of tomorrow. [ l Sincerely, i 4 t ._-a A i / 4 A CORPORATE COMMtJNICATION5 NEWS SERVICE POR EMPLOYEES OF PFL i Ttm L P.83
10-23 .s:5 J5wi n i.ucae nesioeru. vn ice - ~r ~m -m P "- , :.j - The fear aspect is external and intert.l. The St. Lucie plant has traditionally - re. ceived high marks for its operations. But.
- the Nu-I clear Regula - a . Operational proce-SUP. DAY, OCTOBER 22,1995 Co mis- des and M cutbah
- sion la,2 at nuclear plant must be
- . y
- isy week monitored to assure saf'e l
.: N it OWons.
had found l FPL guilty of seven operational procedure violations at the facility between July 30 ! and Sept. '16. Six involved workers who did
- This newspaper is omicated to fumisNng not not follow ures. The other viola-i hiormaton to our seeners so lhet they can bette tion was ciant procedures to prevent i promote and presene their own freedorn and a radicactive water spill on Aug.18.
encourage othere to see he blesangs. Although the NRC and FPL have said the i public was not in any danger because of the violations, there has been concern that with-out improvements, problems could escalate. ' Internal fest is among employees who re-portedly may not be thoroughly trained and A Freedoes Newspeper who are being asked to do more and do it i sorwms St. Lucie Coumy amoe 1903 am "efhny as FPL continues down. sizing. Many fear lostr4 their jobs and that . Deved motseege, puhueber fear is justified. ] ' Herete aledelenes, easter Problems at the plant which resulted in j ' neinheet esforth, editeeles page eener reactor shutdowns have reportedly cost FPL tyme pertero, operetiene meseger at least $18.3 million. FPL a y in. Lee asetelesyk, enentetseg anteete, tends to make up some of that by firing metag s.easser, nesseems enseege, more, employees. . . l , eserse es cogewees ses, eseenleases enrosse, But, also last week, FLP Group Inc.; the l Deteren eroese, promeesene mesese, parent ,of' FPL, reported a 7 percent in. l crease in thini-quarter profits ared to ! last year with sales of $L58 b , i E$ 5 55 earnings of $240 mulian and I l How nice that the company is making money, 1 That doesn't mean, however, that layoffs will be discoctmuod. f l i hh Starting Monday, FPL plans to start an-n-M who will be losing their jobs as
- .o . ^. ." part of a 5 percent reduction in FPL's 2,100-person nuclear division. About 900 work at He '" FPL.
S* '"=' Fear.>' Profits=' . Layoffs. 3
- e+t < . The St. Luale Nuclear Plant is no normal business. De stakes aru too high to depend A on a poteadally insufficient, overworked,.
il; U worried staff to carry out the huge respon-
. sibilities their jobs entail.
What's up with'71orida Power and Light? We have no problem with FPL trying to With roomat and actions by the get the most out of its employees and to , utility onenpany operates the St. IAncie #5abe its operadGes mort efflcient. That's a Nuclear Plant, the .nasse FPL. appears dio- business, matter and it's certainly PPL's
- turbinsty more to . stand for Fear, Profits right to do so. Such steps might actually
, and Imyotts, save consumers money in addition to make j
ing s % happy. ..
' . But, the NRC must look very ,Jat FPL to assert that safety is not for revenna, sasser must be PPL's esp peter.
j
. . MF. $
i s. ToTR. P.82 4 i
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' in7hr 4 banditoswholootedtheirElde sherub ha-15 got-&e bnot,hid. ,l sent Sesen. Or snarekt She er by
*9. Talesofhisprowessniedehire te the By BCWNDGIVERSTEEG' ' o pop'ular du es gdat en Wat Street, where the ' Westerns who wl F ~It's trae trat'Nereal apiustotank I Florida Power & IW Ca.,
Jerome 1 set hheself Ibooght a of permit to' attheFPU. N{maes siin'tjustdoingItAtthe Broadhead,! chief exe a aquecealed weapon. So did his deputy,is. pack : . (pt9oey,tlIn
' - $2.
year. g; Seend Ske.theFPLmanagement , '1 shareof them in sei !w* IngsnoreheetthanaFrank5nstove. Exthand ten detectors
' ? N'Why is this? Sit down a spen, bite till a plug a '. armedge of.da, dde to be I
; t (is herbtoenpany ant, ef coarse. Folks's
~
erF ames pre 6tspi and M up %on the bottom line. '. ,know w oCMarshat . g' Prontis gn==ier an ha.est ad dog) l Pbst re xxter De' Ann Weinier dhead(ptogen, hkaself recendy n:u ymam was,the-s described-g'A'ed 't ,; take !:InfittyInrGBroadhead d f'ev)!)mpbbeyexplaittMythosewhol *
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. bow Mars ealBroa#4me 4 amWiet noteL 2aw.'im thhservivors,whosewaking, a ccompany d ptooey, are recre ding). 5 squivalekt eely. eyed. kin -toit.Nather
, h kt be sleeping) are * - .
'731 l fallofesphilts i h fear that the next edios notice wit. use to
,4 "
D swaylowlfeemployees. Marshal hours (sind the hours they s ou .E
- C .Yeh'lutel( '
B * (ptooey, ding) liked how,the haveheroes their name on it. They
-consitmed E w ?)tdidn't see Jac their Wilder boss asFerSieg a. is an afidorie .
cleaned up their companies by scan'ag herodtheelectricity theirlat, happy frontier (Watt arp . . ding)' Paka Beach Post. , A_ c : No, they smr Marshal Bic" ad (ptooey, employees ofty with the prospect of job losa.the way those s Mesican folks saw the more ,
$ So~ Marshal Broa6ead qdooey,* ding) came out a-with pirJt silpe bla:Ing, sending 4,000 wage-earners d
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11-tWi-1995 10 2.R1 - ss wcte -eatcent on ice . ~. -c. - o<.e. c . <. j . PALM BEACH POST j , Business Page, Section B g,% T gf 11/08/95 i number of employees at mosa plants t. 0. . {' ,' M}'QMQg The changes were authmed to be is unit lasg f
- f me.bers m a memo frons eGeinia wie the lasasssonnat Brotherbe.d af Ele.wical Watest t
i I would ellnnnate in Pompone ra-ar stnastunas. wi
- i=Beach.
a
-= -Tlat .
loca.l - will
. hold . a m.es ! 470 union jobs . e.w.st:n w t = .m. ,. 4="a teme of g's stus snar b. Warit.g, wgll j gy pg.m wgengt I
- 8"" "" 8"' ""' . . Show dedoed to .o. asst en 4 1.sms's debes e elabout 70 o$sby i r7perdeuter concern to the union are plans $y the lts so.ti.nuing r.eeraaming afort. company enoeu. comoany to una mars sontract workers.
tives e.siasset Th eues M d.r. F FL's disertbu.es buse.as unit. "The y has informed 2c una hat
- . whiah lashades 6.ll.esmen who maintain the eenpe- .
contraneers be brousta la to replace mas, wk. lines, and would result in the arelaid af" th 4 sai i nL's
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January 25, 1996 l
'ST LUCIE ' l Site Inteoration Matrix f Date i Salp - - Ref. -Cause- 6dentified l Description 1 F.A.
1/23/96 MS IR 9641 Electrical arc during Self-identifying Blown fuse results in loss of approximately 25% of maintenance control room annunciators. 1/22/96 OPS 1R 96 01 Operator Error Self-identifying Boron dilution event due to operator leaving control panel while dilution was in progress. 1/5/96 OPS /M 1R 95-22 Temp Control Valve Licensee U-2 manual RX trip on high generator H, temp due to S Failure failure of temp control valve. 1/5/96 OPS IR 95-22 Inadequate Procedure NRC Several procedural deficiencies and calculational Review and Execution errors identified in reload physics test procedure. l 1/5/96 OPS / IR 95-22 Failure to Properly NRC Several deficiencies in procedure change process ! PS NCV 95-2241 Implement Procedures implementation identified. Expired or canceled TCs I found in control rooms and hot shutdown panel. l 12/27/95 OPS IR 95-22 Lack of Attendance at Self identifying FRG meeting suffered / items ceferred due to lack of 1 FRG OPS /Eng's attendance at meeting. Major issues at { meeting affected OPS /Eng'g.
'W 95 MS IR 95-22 Pitting Localized Self Identifying RX vessel flange inner 0-ring groove pitting resulted in Corrosion cooldown and head removal for repair.
12/ty95 MS IR 95-22 Fliling RCS Before Licensee 2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged due to ~ reverse Coupling RCP pressure across seal. 12/5/95 OPS /M IR 95 22 Poor Logkeeping/ Attn NRC ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked foilowing S to Detall maintenance work l&C error. Log entries associated , with work were not complete. 1 12/1/95 PS IR 95-21 Failure to Document NRC Rad survey results unavailable for B hot leg work. .I RAD Survey Surveys performed but not documented. 12/1/95 OPS IR 95 21 Corrective Actions NRC Followup to previous inspection findings indicated a l weakness in followthrough in addressing deficiencies. I 13/1/95' OPS IR 95-21 Proceduralinadequacy NRC SDC Procedure required natural circ-related i surveillance prior to establishing RCS pressure ] boundary. Natural circ not possible without pressurtration. 12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Recurrent nordvalid alarms when starting fire pumps were not documented as operator workarounds. Voltage dips associated with such starts were ; contributors to a trip previously, ; 12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 Poor Corrective Actions NRC Clearanoe in place to isolate N, from CST to. facilitate pressure switch replacement for nine d4ys wrthout work order being written. 12/1/95 OPS BR 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC CCW sample valvo showed dua dication without correctrve action documentabor. .itiated. 115 OPS IR 95 21 Inadequate Operator NRC Operators unable to effectively obtain I&C astpoints Trse og from computer after hard copies were removed from , control room. 4 1 j
12/1/95 OPS tR 95 21 Procedural Weakness / NRC SDC procedur3 contained conflicting values for RX Inadequate Review cavity level requirements Procedure had been _ approved sinos emphasis on accuracy stressed. OPS IR 9521 Valve Position NRC Unit 2 procedures and valve deviation log used to Administrative Controls cycle Unit 1 cross connect valves. 11/27/95 OPS IR 95-21 . Personnel Error Uconsee Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance . Repeat from MO 95-21-03 1R 5 18 11/21/95 OPS lR 95 21 FTF Procedure Ucensee Failure to maintain Penetration Log . NCV 95-2104 11/21/95 OPS IR 95-21 Equipment Failure Self identifying Ught socket failure during lamp replacement reeutts in loss cooling to 1A Main Transformer. Unit downpower to ~60% 11/20/95 OPS IR 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Valve discovered Closed Moe Locked Closed as VIO 95-2101 specified on Equipment Clearance Order. 11/18/95 OPS /M IR 95 21 Long Standing Self Unit I manually tripped when 18 MFRV locked in 50% S Equipment Problem identifying /Ucensee position. Root cause . degraded power supply, compounded by volta 0a dip on starting both station fire pumps. 11/11/95 OPS IR 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Tech. Spec. equipment not specified for IV on MO 95 2102 Equipment Clearance Order. 11/8/95 MS IR 95-21 Equipment Failure Self identifying Failure of EDG 2A relay sockets. Potential common mode failure. 11/1/95 MS IR 9518 Personnel Error Self identifying ICI wiring error during RX head installation last RFO. NCV 95-18 05 10/10/95 OPS 1R 9518 Personnel Error Self identifying Missed shift CEA position indication surveillanos. NCV 95-11M6 5 OPS IR 9518 Personnel Error Uoensee Missed RCS Boron sample surveillanos. 1 NCV 9518-07 I 10/17/95 OPS IR 9518 Personnel Error Self identifying Lack of attention to task resulted in overfilling RCB lower cavity during flood up. 10/12/95 ENG IR 9518 Design &ror Self identifying inserting ClAS signal during safeguards test shifted VIO 95-18-04 EDG 2A to isochronous mode whlie EDG paralleled with offsite power.. i 10/0/95 PS LER 95 S02 Personnel Error uoensee Potential route for unauthorized access to protected area. CW water piping. 10/7/95 OPS IR 9518 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log. MO 95-1801 Procedures 10/5/95 MS (R 9518 Equipment Failure Self identifying DG 1B developed FO leak at threaded connection during surveillance run. ! i 9/30/95 OPS 1R 95-18 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log. MO 9518 02 Procedures 9/28/95 ENG IR 9518 Equipment Failure Self identifying Leaking PZR SVs extended forced outage problems with tailp!pe alignment. l 4 9/20/95 MS IR 9518 Equipment Failure Self identifying EDG 1 A/1B governor control problems resulted in load 4 oscillations. f l 9/15/95 OPS / IR 9518 Failure to Follow Self identifying Maint/ Ops did not provide clearance for work on MS VIO 9518-03 Procedures condenser waterbox comr. When cover pulled closed, severed worker's finger.
'95 PS LER U1/U2 95- Failure to Follow Uoonese Security failed to take correct compensatory action on !
S01 Procedure computer failure. ) tyed/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to'Use Correct Self identifying SG blowdown sent to incorrect system on RA8 roof. l Procedure Operator used wrong procedure. When identified did I not back out of procedure correctly. 1
I l l 9/9/95 MS 1R 9515 Weakness in Work Self Identifying Leak on SV 1201 fi;nge cxtended cutage,id:ntified Screening and one montn earlier but not worked. Planning 4
' OPS IR 9515 Personnel Error / Ucensee Unit 2 Main Generator overpressurized while filling inoperable with H2. Inattention by operators. i Equipment /OWA l l
9/2/95 CPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error NRC Weaknesses identified in logs relating to abnormal VIO 9515-03 equipment conditions and out of service equipment I not logged (multiple examples). i l 8/31/95 MS IR 9515 Personnel Error Self identifying Damaged cylinder and head on 18 EDG due to loose lash adjustment. 4 8/30/95 PS IR 9515 Management and OC NRC Containment closure walkdowns by management were weaknesses inadequate and depended heavily on OC involvement to identify deficiencies. 6/30/95 MS 1R 95-15 Supervisory oversight NRC Maintenance personnel not using procedures for work and worker attitude in progress. I 8/29/95 OPS IR 9515 Personnel Error . Ucensee Started 1B LPSI pump with suction valvo closed. (No l VIO 95-15-04 damage to pump)
)
8/29/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedure Use NRC Maintenance joumeyman not signing off procedure VIO 9515-06 steps as worn completed (previously identified as a weakness in May 1995). 8/23/93 MS IR 9515 Equipment Failure / Self identifying 2A HDP trip due to relay failure. Eight HOP trips in inadequate Corrective past year. Engineering solution available but not Action implemented. 8/22/95 PS IR 95-15 Personnel Bror NRC OA failed to document a deficiency on containment , spray valve surveillance identified in an audit. I l J OPS IR 9515 Operator Error / Self identifying Overfill of PWT. Spilled approx.10K gallons on Operator Workaround ground inside RCA Operator work around on level control system and inattention to filling process by operator caused error. 8/18/95 MS IR 9515 Procedural Weakness NRC Procedural weakness involving supervisory oversight and joumeyman qualification. 8/17/95 OPS LER U19%07 Procedural inadequacy Self identifying Spraydown of Unit 1 containment. STAR process did VIO 95-15 and Weakness / not assign accountability fd corrective action. Valve Operator Work-Around surveillance prelube not documented on STAR. 8/9/95 MS IR 95-16 Maintenance / Ucensee Inoperable Unit 1 POHVs due to maintenance LER U195405 Testing errors error / testing inadequacies. (Valves assembled EA 95180 incorrectly) (Used acoustic data only) 8/6/95 ENG LER Ut 9%06 Corrective Self identifying Ufting of Unit 1 SDC thermal relief due to procedural VIO 95-2041 Action / Procedural revision from previous corrective action. Inoperable Weakness equipment not logged. 8/2/95 OPS LER Ut 9%04 Procedural Ucensee 1A2 RCP seal failure due to
- restaging" at high VIO 95-1M2 Weakness / Failure to temperature.
Follow Procedures 8/2/95 OPS LER U19504 Operator Error Self-identifying Operator failed to block MSIS actuation during VIO 951%1 cooldown. 7/29/95 MS IR 9514 Procedural Weakness Self identifying l&C personnel attempt to test a level switch cirwit which could not actuate given system conditions. 7 % /95 OPS IR 95-14 Operator Self identifying Turbine / Reactor Trip due to test error. Bror/ Procedural Weakness
. ./95 MS IR 95-14 Root Cause Pending Self identifying Catastrophic failure of Unit 2 B train CEDM cooling fan.
, - - - . - . . - - . .. - - -...- - ~ - . . . - - - - - - - . -
I 1 7/3/95 PS IR 9514 ' Security Weakness . Self Montifying Automobile passed threugh normally closed eeourity l gate to plant intake / discharge canale at beach. Sut sequent accident resulted in vehicle lodged in l j discharge canal piping.
]
OPS IR 9612 Weak Log Keeping NRC Weaknesses identified in logs relating to battery jumper installation and out of-servios equipment. 71/96-
/ PS IR 9612 Maintenance Self identifying Corrosion in transformer fire protection deluge system )
results in muitspie failures.
]
7/1/95 PS IR 9612 Personnel Error NRC Three piecos of SNM found improperty tagged l NCV 95-1242 PS 1R 9512 Program Weakneeen \ 7/1/96 NRC Fire Protnotson program weaknesses identified in fire- i fighting techniques and roepirator qualifscation i program. 7/1/95 MS IR E 12 Personnel Error NRC M&TE found installed across battery cell without J/LL l NCV E1241 authortzstion. 6/3/95 MS 1R 9610 Procedural Adequacy / NRC Several examples of weak adherence to procedures, l Adherence including stop signoffs and independent verif6 cation, identified. 6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Communication Uoonsee Poor communication / lock of detailed instruction leads l to improper 1B EDG governor installation.
]
6/3/95 MS IR 5 10 Poor Maintenance / NRC HVAC systems for both units poorly Procedures maintained /Operstmg procedures contained numerous deficiencies. 6/3/95 MS 1R 5 10 Poor Surveillance Ucensee Missed several surveillances (7 day) on EDG. NCV 961041 Tracking System M0 /95 MS IR 9649 Personnel Enor Ucensee Failure to perform personnel air look testmg on time. NCV954041 w ,d5 OPS BR 9646 Corrective Action NRC STAR /NCR program did not address evaluating past Program Weeknees operability 4/28/95 MS IR 9646 Maintenance Error uoensee incore instruments at ICI Flange 8 miswired ICI a output signals directed to wrong computer points. i 4/28/95 ENG 1R 9645 Weaknees in Temp NRC Weaknese in addrecoing how mode would affect q Mod Procedure control room drawings, i ENG IR 9646 Failure to Irnplement 4/28/95 NRC Failure to document nonconformance regarding ICf
, NCV E0644 Corrective Action flange 8 conditions.
- Program
- 4/28/95 MS IR 95 05 Design implementation NRC Installation of wrong overload heater models in
- VIO 95-0641 Discrepancy switchgear.
i i 4/1/93 OPS IR 95 07 Apparent Personnel Ucensee Unit 1 experienced an approximate 14 minuto loss of } NCV 9647 02 Error shutdown cooling while shifting from one shutdown oooling loop to the other. The root cause wee the a cioemg of the wrong SDC suction leolation velve (the valve for the operating, vice idle, pump) on the part of 1 the operator.
- 4/1/95 MS IR 96 07 Poor Adherenos to Ucensee Jumper left installed in ECCS ventilation damper after i NCV 964702 J/LL and Maintenance work complete Procedures
- 4/1/95~ OPS IR 9647 Week Annunosator NRC Weak' annunciator response by ROs contributed to
, Roeponse loss of shutdown cooling event.
*/96 MS 1R 94 09 Procedural Weaknees NRC LPSI machensoni emel houemg outer cap misinstalled 16 - OPS IR 94 09 Operator
- NRC Operator failure to recognize out of sight high Error / Procedural , indicehon on EDG cooling water tank. Failure of Wealmees procedure to include instructions on draining tank.
LO4/95 ENG 1R9644 Design Uoenese SDC suction relief velve left due to water hemmer, i
_ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ - ._ - _ . - _ _ _ _ ,_. - _ . _ _ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ __ i; i. 3/04/06 OPS R 9644 House- NRC Loose plastic debris found in Unit 2 fuJ pool area. ; p keepmg - 2/Fe6 MS. R9644 Equipment Failure Self ident#fying Unit I was shut down for the repisoement of 3 l
. pressurizer oede safety valves. The valves were l leaking by the seat.
l 2/21/96 OPS IR 9644 Equipment Failure Self identifying Unit 2 trip due to failure of a SGWL control level ; transmitter. Transmitter failed high, resulting in j closure of the FRV and a subsequent trip on low SGWL. (9544) , 2/20/96 OPS 1R 9644 Equipment Anomaly Self identifying 28 LPSI pump found air-bound during surveillance toebng The liconees has theorized that the migration { of air in the system roeuited in the condition as a 4 . result of previous surveillance lasting. The pumps are ! i d not self venting. ! 1 i 2/17/96 'MS iR9642 Physical Condition NRC Numerous areas of corroseon identified in Unit 1/2 l CCW areas. i
' l 2/17/96 PS IR 9643 Personnel Error NRC in two observed exercises. ECs failed to notify states j
/ Training Weaknees within 15 minutes. l
)
j 2/16/96 MS R 9644 Maintenance Error / Self ident#fying Load shed of the 1A31E 4100 bue due to inadvertent J Procedural Weakness jumper contact while replacing a degraded voltage i relay. j 3/4/96 OPS IR 9641 Operator Ucensee Failure to sample SIT within TS required time frame l' I VIO 964101 Error / Communications ' following volume addition. Second occurrence in 2
. years. :
I . . 2/4/96 OPS IR 9641 Poor Communloations NRC Failure to identify and analyze Unit 1 hot leg flow j 1 stratification i ! S k al MS IR 9641 Personnel Error / Self identifying inadequate independent verif cation resuhed in CVCS VIO 964102 Program Weaknose lendown control valve failing to respond due to l reversed leads. Resuhod in a esenation of letdown flow. j y t 12/31/94 ENG IR 94-26 Engineer 6ng Design Self identifying inadequate design control of NaOH oroseconnection NCV 94 2641 Error between ECCS trains.
]
12/3/94 PS ,lR 94 24 Procedure Review Uconese Failure to perform TS required periodic procedure NCV 94-2441 inadequacy reviews
)
l l 12/3/94 MS IR 9424 Maintenance NRC Inadequate procoes for changes to vendor technical VIO 94-24-02 Procedures manuals. i Inadequacy , j l 11/25/94 MS 1R 94-22 Program weakness Uoensee The lioenese's QA organization identrfied numerous j weaknesses in the implementation of the site's { } welding program. As a result, the Maintenance i . Manager placed a stop work order on welding activities The stoppage lasted one week. l 11/24/94 MS IR 94-24 Procedure weakness Self-identrfying Unit 18 side SIAS actuation due to a bistable moduie { which had not been adequately withdrawn from the
- ESFAS cabinet during maintenance.
11/33/94 MS IR 94-24 Equipment Failure Self identifying Unit 1 SIAS with unit in mode 6 due to common mode failure of Rosemount transmitters used for prosaurizer I preneure channels.
)
11/5/94 OPS 1R 94-22 Operations, Ucensee Waste gas relones on Sept. 10,1993, with NCV 94-2243 Maintenance meteorologiool instruments out of eennae Errors F
'/94 MS R 94 22 Weather-Related/ Self identfying Unit 1 automascally tripped due to aroover from a ,
- LER Maintenanos potential transformer due to salt bulidup on switchyard i .
i s
9/30/94 OPS IR 94-20 inconsistent NRC Local valvo position indicators not maintained
~
MS Expectations accurate. Procedures / training provided to operators on venfying valve position found weak. OPS IR 94-20 Operations, NRC Plant personnel not trained on IPE and not using it for
, Maintenance work planning and scheduling.
Deficiency 9/30/94 OPS IR 94-19 Operations Weakness NRC During requal exam, a licensed operator exhibited an apparent disregard for EOPs. 9/30/94 MS IR 94-20 Personnel Error Ucensee Maintenance personnel begin to work the wrong RWT isolation valve, threatening the operabiltty of both trains of ECCS. 9/30/94 OPS IR 94-19 Operations Error Ucensee Failure to notify the NRC of changes in status of NCV 9419-01 licensed operators' medical conditions. 8/29/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operations Errors NRC Operatore placed 1 A EDG in an electrical lineup for VIO 94-2241 which TS required surveillance tests had not been VIO 94-2242 performed (with the safety-related swing bus powered from it). Also, related control room log entrles appeared to be inaccurate. I 8/28/94 OPS IR 94-20 Equipment Failure Ucensee Unit 1 was taken off line (Mode 2) to repair a DEH leak. .The unit was returned on line later the same day. 8/12/94 OPS IR 9418 Operations / NRC The licensee was unloading new fuel for Unit 1 with a Maintenance Error and hoist grapple that was missing the safety latch sleeve Lack of Engineering locating pin. The safety sioeve functioned by friction Drawings / inspection only. 1 Criteria 7/14/94 MS IR 9415 Equipment Ucenses/NRC During surveillance test, TCB 5 failed to open due to i LER U-2 94-06 Failure / Poor mechanical binding (licensee). The licensee failed to l VIO 94-1541 Management Decision recognize the condition as requiring a shutdown per ( TS (NRC). l 1 7/9/94 OPS 1R 94-15 Equipment Failure Ucensee Unit 2 turbine was shut down and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 because the 281 RCP lower oil level indication showed a leak. The indication was later shown to be erroneous. 7/8/94 OPS IR 94-15 Operator Error Ucensee TS 3.0.3 entry due to placing 2A1 LPSI pump and 2B
- LER U2 94-05 charging pump OOS at the same time.
6/28/94 MS IR 94-14 Personnel Error / Ucensee Inoperable Unit 2 RAB ventilation exhaust WRGM due 1 NCV 9414 01 Procedural Weakness to failure to connect sample lines. I LER U-2 94 04 . 6/6/p4 OPS IR 94-14 Weather Ucensee Unit 1 trip from 100% power during a severe thunderstorm due to debris blown across two main transformer output terminals. 5/28/94 PS IR 94-13 Poor Corrective Action NRC Emergency supplies in control room less that stated in DEV 94-1341 FSAR. 5/6/94 ENG IR 9411 Engineering Error NRC Inadequate corrective action for MOVs which stalled i VIO 94-1101 during surveillances. l i 4/23/94 OPS IR 9412 Mfg. Error Self identifying Unit 2 auto reactor trip from 30% power caused by LER U-2 94 03 RPS cabinet wiring error for trip bypass circuit, from original unit construction. 4/23/94 MS IR 94-12 Equipment Failure Self-identifying Following unit 2 trip, steam bypass system operated unexpectedly and d;opped RCS temp by seven degrees F, pressurizer heaters turned off.
'94 OPS IR 9412 Operator Ucensee Unit 2 reactor power increased from 26 to 31% due to ,
Insttentivenees positive MTC. l 6
4p/94 MS IR 94-10 Maintenance Err:r NRC Contractor personnel made end contractor OC
. VIO 941041 accepted pressurizer nozzle weld prep that did not meet procedural requirements for bevel angle.
Ucensee engineering had specified overty tight tolerances. e,s n OPS IR 94-12 Operations Procedure Self-identifying Unit 1 auto reactor trip due to unusual electricallineup LER Ut 94-04 Error (Lack of sufficient (isochronous EDG paralleled with offsite power depth in review) thrn+m TCBs). , a . 4/3/94 ENG IR 94-12 Surveillance Error Ucensee d;ensee discovered that the 4160 V [AB Bus) swing VIO 9412-01 bus components [C ICW Pump and C CCW Pump] would not strip from the bus upon undervoltage if the bus were aligned to the B bus due to a missing wire. 3/28/94 MS IR 9449 Personnel Error Self identifying Unit 1 auto reactor trip. Maintenance foreman opened LER Ut 94-03 generator exciter breaker on wrong unit. 3/16/94 ENG IR 9406 Engineering Corrective NRC Regional inspector had two Unit 2 SL4 violations: 1) VIO 944841 Action corrective action for an 11/24/92 water hammer event VIO 94-06-02 was done without documented instructions or procedures, resulting in operating until 3/94 with f've r snubbers on the SRV and PORV tallpipes inoperable.
- 2) Failure to write a nonconformance report for a damaged pipe support in March 1994.
J 3/16/94 ENG IR 9410 Equipment Failure Uconsee A Unit 2 pressurizer instrument nozzle that had been LER U-294-02 repaired a year ago was found leaking while the unit was in Mode 5. The unit remained shut down for repairs. 3/4/94 ENG 1R 94 06 . Engineering Design Ucensee inadequate design controls on Unit 2 sequencer ) NCV-944642 Error ' charging pump loading block. )
's ENG IR 94 06 Engineering Error Ucensee Failure to report an EDG failure.
NCV 94-0641 l 2/2s/94 ENG 1R 94-09 Refueling procedure & Ucensee/NRC Inadequate grappling of a fuel assembly caused by NCV 944441 operator error error in Recommended Move Ust and operator error in 4 following procedure. (IR 94-09) 2/17/94 OPS IR 94-05 Operator Error Ucensee Pressurizer aux spray isolation valve had been locked NCV 94-0541 closed (vice open) since 3/27/93 LER U2 94-01 1 2/11/94 PS IR 94-02 Secunty Error Ucensee Failure to provide required compensatory measures in NCV 9442-01 response to a security computer system failure.
)
1/13/94 OPS IR 9441 Surveillance Self identified UV relay test resulted in load shed of the 1 A3 4160 voit l LER U19442 Procedure Weakness / bus and a 1 A EDG auto start Component Failure 1/9/94 OPS IR 9441 Equipment Failure Self identified Manual reactor trip . feed pump control circuit failure. LER UI 9441 1/2/94- . . . SALP period 11 began l 1 l l l
Notes from-the 2/8/96 meeting with St Lucie on their operational Performance Improvement Plan: T. Plunkett - (as of 3/1/96 President of FPL' nuclear division) TP and SL appear to be like 2 different companies - we will ~ establish uniform policies and programs and standardize across the nuclear division of FPL St. Lucie is taking action to infuse people from outside FPL No strong sense of personal accountability onsite at SL Management - Union relationship is adversarial Teamwork not observed at SL like it is at TP Overall planning (daily and outage) needs improvement SL people are embarrassed - want to improve i J. Scarola - Plant Manager Transitioning from one time improvement plan to an ongoing
- performance improvement plan with management indicators reviewed on a monthly basis Don't put on a show - raise expectations and meet them - let day to day practices speak for themselves as to our standards ,
Reduced operator workarounds - eliminated 43 4 - Reduced control room deficiency tags . Performance expectation has been significantly raised for ]
. operators. Replacing some shift supervisors. '
Procedures - most undergoing major revision: Standardizing with much more detail reducing reliance on technidal manuals Facility Review Group (FRG) not doing detailed enough review -
.has been reconstituted Not good enough yet at closing out identified deficiencies. l Shift Control Room logs are on LAN - reviewed and commented on l real time by management - accountability has increased I l
W .- Bohlke - Acting Vice President St. Lucie Areas for Imorovement Self Assessment - Not as good as we thought Not consistently good at root cause evaluation j . Personnel Performance - need people from outside FPL to broaden i perspectives, talent, and rigor ! raise management expectations ' reduce gap between performance and expectations . I get management in field reinforcing expectations - accountability l Procedure Upgrades - enhance critical attributes (eg add FSAR I comparison to checklist) J e
-l I
L j
.Septemoer 7, 1995 -
a 3 1 4
- Florida Power and Light Company (
q ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg President - Nuclear Division- ' 1
'P.~0. Box 14000 i Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 '
- i
SUBJECT:
MEETING SUmtARY - ASSESSMENT OF RECENT EVENTS -
'ST. LUCIE DOCKET
] , N05. 50-335 AND'50-389 i Gentlemen: i
~ .4 i
~ This refers to the meeting conducted at your request at the NRC. Region It
- office"in' Atlanta, Georgia, on August 29, 1995. The purpose of the meeting Was for-you to' provide an assessment of recent events that occurred at your St. Lucie facility. During this meeting the NRC also provided an assessment l
'of recent events at St. Lucie.
= Enclosed are a List of Attendees, the FPL Assessment Handout, and the NRC Root i Cause Assessment Handout. i The assessment, provided by.your St. Lucie staff, J included management's review of recent. events, the root causes of the events, and the corrective actions to be implemented as a result of the events. The ' NRC 'also provided an organizational and programmatic root cause analysis of [ St. Lucie site' issues which have occurred over the last 12 months. l ? The following is a summary of the comments made at the closing of the meeting:- g ' [ 1. The NRC and FPL are in basic agreement as to root causes and corrective a actions; L ' i 2. 4 FPL is initiating an independent assessment using off site personnel; ~
- 3. FPL will integrate the findings from the St. Lucie site assessment, the !
, NRC assessment,'and .the planned independent assessment; ~
- 4. FPL will complete a corrective action matrix and provide it to the NRC
- by September 15, 1995; ;
i
- 5. NRC Resident Inspectors will perform followup inspections of. corrective
. actions, supplemented with regional inspections as necessary; and
- 6. Another management meeting is planned for late October to review the ongoing performance trend at St. Lucie. -
' In,accordance with.Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
! Title 10 Code of. Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures 1
.will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. ,
0FFICIAL COPY
. l l
1- f ? ? l $ y oL~ h' f -- .
FP&L 2
' ~
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, plea'se contact us. Sincerely, Orig signed by Ellis W. Merschoff Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License.Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees '
- 2. FPL Presentation Handout
- 3. NRC Root Cause Assessment Handout cc w/encls:
D. A. Sager Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 . ^ H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 14000 ) Juno Beach, FL. 33408-0420 l J. Scarola Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 Robert E. Dawson Plant Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 J. R. Newman, Esq. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius . 1800 M Street, NW l; Washington, D. C. 20036 cc w/encis: Continued See page 3 E 8 0 l
d I FP&L 3-
' ~
cc w/encis:. Continued' John T. Butler, Esq. Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center-Miami, FL- 33131-2398 l-Bill Passetti I Office of Radiation Control , Department of Health and ; Rehabilitative Services - 1317 Winewood Soulevard ;
- Tallahassee, FL , 32399-0700-Jack Shreve '
Public Counsel l 4 Office of the Public Counsel ' c/o The Florida Legislature , 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 ; Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 't l
' Joe Myers, Director i
) Division of Emergency Preparedness i Department of Community. Affairs i 1 2740 Centerview Drive-1 Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Thomas R. L. Kindred ! , County Administrator . St. Lucie County l 2300 Virginia Avenue l
- Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 Charles B. Brinkman I
- -Washington Nuclear Operations 1 4
ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. i 12300 Twinbrook Farkway, Suite 3300 l Rockville, MD 20852 W d. 1 4 6 S k e 6 e 4 4 4
I b i
- FP&L 4 7 Distribution W/encis:
J. Norris, NRR .
- G. Ha11strom, RII PUBLIC i
NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com. ; i 7585 South Highway AIA ' Jensen' Beach, FL 34957-2010 4 1 l S 9 e 4 1 4 . , n TO Netle DOctiusNT ROOM 7 yyg qq omeE a nei A . siemrunE g/ (7 out Et xd C om o. , , , .. .. , L , .. o. , , . . , .. . . , , .. o. , ,. COPYP YES NO DES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO GFFICIAL RECORD COPY ll0CUMENT NAME: P:\$iL82995. SUM l l . n
. LIST OF ATTENDEES j Florida Power Corporation J. Goldberg, President, Nuclear Division
. D. Sager, Vice President, St. Lucie Site J. Scarola, Plant General Manager
]
q Nuclear Reaulatory Commission R. Bernhard, Reactor Engineer, RII C. Casto, Chief, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch, RII S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, RII , N. Economos, Reactor Inspector, RII . R. Hannanh, Public Affairs Officer, RII J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division or Reactor Projects, RII i K. Landis, Chief, Reactor. Projects Section 2B (RP28), DRP. RII ' E. Lea, Project Engineer, RP2B, DRP. RII B. Hallett, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and . Safeguards, RII D. Matthews, Project Director, NRR l E. Merschoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII l J. Norris, Project Director, NRR R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector, RII R. Schin, Project Engineer, RP28, DRP, RII M. Thomas, Reactor Inspector, R II G. Tracy, Assistant to the Executive Director for Operations, NRR Public I D. Weimer, Reporter, Palm Beach Post I i J i 4 ( 1 ENCLOSURE 1 O
E E 4 M M m amus muun soms samme - .amn m - - 9 'T ST. LUCNE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR ~ REGULATORY COMMISSION MEETING Atlanta, Georgia August 29,1995
~c Unit 1 Turbine THp ee C Vehicle in Discharge Canni I
w - o - i a q - V
.w l ~
~
, c Both Units Shutdown for Hurricane Erin '
- ~
t Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Failure /
< i
"_ Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) Actuation
" 4 . Unit 2 on line
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y
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mC
- s CC 4
- G. C mn on yW m
Inadvertent Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation
$0 g =
w y,, ; Both Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves g4
~
(PORV's) out of service O I w e<> . I w ' a,
~
a.a . m e Letdown Relief Valve Lift l C 4 Containment Spray Initiation G
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w ; Primary Water Tank (PWT) Overfill l l.
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^
Problem Type . q Long ta ing Procedures Deficiencies - St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. 1 Recent Problessis 1 = 13 I ] Ia ja.i
. i il
!: 3 3 m3 r a i rs e.
21.2 sg jj r i = =* 11 1 8 i fi Turbine Trip Test results in plant shutdown X X i MSIS Actuation during RCS cooldown X X I A2 RCP seal failure during restaging process X X- X
' i
- Inadvertent RPS actuation while shuitlown X X Both PORV's out of service due to common mode 1 X X maintenance error
. Common LPSI header relief valve (V-3439) lifted .
X X and would not rescat Pressure perturbations during letdown manipulation X X cause letdown relief valve (V-2345) to lift , I Inadvertent spraydown of Containment while performing X X X X X SDC venting evolution PWT overflow while filling
M D. M M ma en an e am em en a en m e o es PROBLEM: Acceptance Of Long Standing, Repetitive Problems By Plant. Management SOLUTION: Management commitment to raise the standards ACTION 1: Employee meetings with President, Vice President
, and Plant General Manager.
ACTION 2: Extensive review of deficiencies which impact operations. Added approximately 80 work items to the current shutdown work. ACTION 3: Held Unit 2 at reduced power to solve long ' standing Heater Drain Pump problem with-a design modification. ACTION 4: Standardized.the outage scope review process
, by the development of a formal procedure.
ACTION 5: Reopened the scope review for the Fall Unit 2 refueling outage.
M N 4 m a a e ma e as e e a e e m in m PROBLEM: Equipment Performance Is Not Satisfactory i SOLUTION 1: Improve technical ownership and minimize deferral of plant l maintenance actions particularly those which introduce operator workarounds ACTION 1: Strengthened tecimical leadership by filling the vacant Technical Manager position and suspending the SRO certification course for the Engineering Manager and the Maintenance Manager. l ACTION 2: Raise acceptance criteria. i ACTION 3: Improve management visibility of plant status. ACTION 4: Expedite elimination of workarounds. SOLUI' ION 2: Ensure the post maintenance and modification test program verifies operability
~
ACTION 1: Combine the various test groups under the direction of the. Oncrnfinns Manaper.
1 PROllLEM: Personnel Performance Has Not lleen Atlequate 4 SOLUTION 1: Set high expectations and hold' personnel accountable ACTION 1: Employee meetings with President, Vice President and Plant General Manager. ACTION 2: Management more involved in the details. 4 ACTION 3: Nuclear Plant Supervisors meeting with their
' crews to set clear expectation for Error Free '
Performance. - ACTION 4: Recognition for superior and discipline for < substandard p'erformance. -
~
ACTION 5: Reinforcement of the S(top). T(hink). O(perate). P(rove) program. SOLUTION 2: Trend and analyze low level ~ events ACTION 1: Further upgrade the log keeping practices to enhance event commumcation to management.
. ACTION 2: Combine the event data bases from STARS, IHEs, and HPES.
N E M M M M M M M M M M M .W W EE 'WM. PROB.LEM: Procedures Have Been Approved With Technical Deficiencies
)
SOLUTION:- Strengthen the procedure review process ACTION.1: Plant Policy 105 has been revised to require a 1 technical review for first time use of procedures under conditions different than originally ; intended. . ACTION 2: Establish a screening FRG subcommittee to
~
allow a more detailed critical review of safety t significant procedures similar to the CNRil subcommittee. ; ACTION 3: Raise the priority' for . upgrade of Operations Normal and Off-Normal procedures.
- i I
- - o READINESS RESTART EVALUATION.
Containment inspections / Tests Of Equipment 1,030 inspection / tests satisfactorily performed. Containment Decmitamination - flP decontaminated the containment surfaces to the levels documented prior to the event. Criteria For Plant Startup With Existing Denciencies Were Established Unit i Outstanding DeGeiencies Were Reviewed Ikir Operational Impact And Potential Inchision In The Current Outage 153 items were forwarded to Management for review.. 85-items were approved ta work in the current outage. 2 Caution Tag Deficiencies ~ Removed 10.Inmper/ Lifted Leads Removed 5 Equipment Out of Service Log llems Removed i 23 NCR STARS Eliminated 17 Open PC/M's Approved for Implementation - 28 Plant Work Orders Completed The_ remainder will be included into the next refueling outage schedule. Operations Shift Briermg Emphasizing Error-Free Operation l Unit 2 Outage Scope Will Be Reviewed Using Similar Criteria .
l h~& ~M M S MM EE () E ST. LUCIE PLANT CIIRONOLOGY OF EVENTS UNIT I 'IllRBINE TRIP July 8,1995 Unit I was inadvertently tripped during the surveillance test of the turbine trip functions. IfURRICANE ERIN July. 31,1995 The National Hurricane Center issued a hurricane warning which encompassed the St. Lucie site.
.At 1128, an Unusual Event was declared.
August I,1995 Both Units were shet down by 1600 in advance of the arrival of Ilurricane lirin. The RCS was cooled down to approximately 350 degrees to remove the heat load and to allow a steam diiven feed pump to remain operable. - Security safeguards were partially suspended at 2323. August 2,1995 At approximately 0100, the eye of Erin made landfall 20 miles north of the plant. The maximum wind speed recorded on site was less than 45 miles. Security measures were restored at 0404. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0542. RCP SEAllMSIS ACTUATION During the RCS heatup, O restage the seal. At 1750,perations detected a failed IA2 RCP lower seal. At 1702, Operations attem wa's mitiated. During this cooldown, the MSIS block penuissive was not acted upon by control room operators. At 1900, MSIS actuation occurred. All components were already in their safeguards required position befine the actuation. At 2018, RCS leakage increased to 2 gpm (from 0.25 gpm). A precautionary Unusual Event was declared. August 3,1995 At 0630, RCS leakage had decreased due to continuing RCS depressurization and the Unusual Event was terminated.
,,, :, , ... . - a .: . . ~.e,.
E F M M M m M M m m m m 1 a e m f!JADVERTENT RPS ACTUATION August 9,1995 Unit I was being heated up and pressurized in preparation for retuming to power after the RCP seal changeout. All rods were fully inserted. One RCO was perfonning the surveillance of the RPS loss ofload trip when he experienced difficulty with C channel. The other RCO came to his assistance and actuated the B channel. The reactor trip logic was made up and the trip circuit breakers opened. BOTII PORVs OUT OF SERVICE /REI,IEF VAI,VE 3439 I,lFT At 1917, both PORVs were declared inoperabic. The plant was cooled down in preparation for entering Shutdown Cooling conditions. August 10,1995 V3439 on the common LPSI discharge header lifted preventing further couldown. RCS temperature was raised to exit the conditions ! hat PORVs are required for LTOP. August II,1995 ' V3439 was replaced. At 0600, SDC was initiated.. Both PORVs were removed and disassembled. Both valves had an internal part installed incorrectly.
M F , M M M M WEEh REE REEdi
- EEh Euan m m m_m 3 g g LETDOWN REI,IEF VALVE V23451,lFT August 16,1995 At 1820. Operators selected letdown control valves LCV 2110P and PCV.2110P. ' Pressurizer level decreased to 31% and a second charging pump was started. V2345 had lifted and had not reset. Letdown and charging were isolated. V2345 tien rescated. At 1850, charging and letdown were restored to normal. 700 gallons of RCS inventory were relieved to the holdup tanks.
INANVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY August 17,1995 , At 0215, Containment spray was aligned to normal operation with.the exception of FCV 07-I A, which had previously failed its surveillance and had been jumpered to its safeguard required position. The LPSI venting procedure, which could not be accomplished at its intended time during the heatup, was initiated. When V3452 was opened at about 1800, approximately 10,000 gallons of ' vater flowed to the containment spray headers from the RWT. PRIMARY WATER TANK OVERFII,I. August 19,1995 Operators failed to take timely action in response to high level alarm while filling tank.
E I M E E E E eM M e eeea m WW ST. I.UCIE PI, ANT RECENT PROBI. EMS EVENT CAUSES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Unit i Turbine Trip Personnel error - inattention to detail and failure to
- Individuals involved were counseled and follow procedure disciplined; procedure revised for greater clarity RCP Seal Staging Resulted in Equipment problem
- I A2 RCP seal replaced along with a second Excessive Bleedoff (I Al) suspect seal
- Performing a root cause of seal failures inadequate procedure
- Procedure cancelled
. Personnel caror - failure to follow procedure
- Individuals involved were disciplined (initial conditions not met)
- Plant policy revised to address use of procedure that is being executed under plant conditions different from those originally approved MSIS Actuation During Cooldown
~
Personnel error - failure to properly respond to
- Individuals involved were disciplined annunciator inadvertent RPS Actuation Personnel error - procedure not followed correctly
- Individuals involved were disciplined PORVs Wouki Not Lift Personnel error - failure to follow procedure Verification step added (bushing installed upside down)
- Reviewed otherjobs performed by the same individuals
- Disciplined person assigned to contractor oversight
- Contractor suspended their individuals' certification Unit 2 detennined to not be susceptible Inadequate retest
- Review all retest procedures for safety related components will be conducted
~
- Maintenance procedure revised to add relief valve pressure tests
.
- Inservice testing upgraded to provide more
__.r.. ai__.r _ , . . ... _ _ _ . . . . : _
E I O E E M M M S S S S EE E [] E ST. LUCIE PLANT RECENT PROllLEMS EVENT CAUSES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS V3439 (Shutdown Cooling Design margin too tight for operational Installed new valve with increased setpoint and fleader Relief) Would Not Rescat maneuvering decreased blowdown a Reviewed 114 valves on all other safety systems (both Units) for ability to rescat during transients; 7 required correction prior to startup An operator aid is being developed that will provide expected charging / letdown mismatches dwing cooldown Letdown Relief V2345 Lift Operational problem - pressure transients from Operating Procedure revised per engineering PCVs evaluation to increase margin to lift Relief valve blowdown did not allow rescating
- Replaced valve with one having a lower blowdown setting Reviewed other safety system reliefs for proper blowdown setting Inadvertent Containment Spray Personnel error - LPSI Venting Procedure initial
- Management stopped all work in the plant; conditions not integrated with RCS Ileatup meetings were held with division management Procedure
- LPSI System Venting Procedure will be rewritten RCB has been cleaned to pre-event contamination levels Review process for first time procedure use has
. been established FCV-07-I A deficient stroke time
- Repaired valve
- Corrected the decision-making process that allowed valve to be open on startup
- Reviewed outstanding work arounds/ backlogs for inclusion in current outage scope
- FCV-07-1B actuator spring size increased n.: - - - . . . . . . . . . . e .n e.. , . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . . .
.._.__-.w__ . - _ _ - - - - - _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ -
4 - l August 29,1995 l e l I I l i, i i
- ST LUCIE i
i INTEGRATION OF SITE ISSUES ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS I
- OF i i i ORGANIZATIONAL 1
AND. ! PROGRAMMATIC DEFICIENCIES 9 6
a MANAGEMENT MEETING AGENDA - AUGUST 29,1995
- 1. OPENING REMARKS Mr. S. Ebneter Mr. J. Goldberg
- 2. FPL MANAGEMENT REVIEW Mr. D. Sager
- 3. INTEGRATION OF SITE ISSUES; Mr. K. Landis NRC ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
- 4. DISCUSS SIMILARITIES FPL/NRC
- AND DIFFERENCES l
- 5. ST LUCIE ACTION PLAN Mr. J. Scarola.
I f i 6.
SUMMARY
Mr. S. Ebneter l l
e l ST LUCIE l INTEGRATION OF SITE ISSUES METHOD OF ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: ! Using the Organizational and Programmatic Diagnostic technique provided by Failure Prevention Inc. (Dr. Chiu), the recent issues were assessed using the following tools: i Organizational and Programmatic Diagnostic Chart 1 Analysis to determine the root probable cause i i ! TIME PERIOD COVERED: 1 The analysis was performed evaluating issues from the l most recent to the oldest (August 1995 to August
- 1994).
NUMBER OF ISSUES ANALYZED: The team reviewed a total of 39 issues. (Note; most
- issues were assigned more than one contributing cause)
T l
i Org:nizatianci cnd Programm tic Dirgncetic Chnrt
- I
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ST. LUCIE - ' ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC COMMON CAUSE
SUMMARY
i
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40 % JOB SKILLS, WORK PRACTICE, DECISION MAKING Z 33%/
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tm _ PROGRAM DETAll F- 30% ------- ------
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24% N!!$
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O 20 % Q g.. .
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PROGRAM SCOPE
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INTERFACE AMONG ORGANIZATIONS ~ LIJ 11 % O 30g .... . l _u_ E W !=!!!!! 8% PROGRAM-IMPLEMENTATION y , 6% g
$$li. 3% 3% 3% 3%
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/ 3;ls[li[3 2% 2% 2% 2%
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~
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/ \
- \
MAINTENANCE
/
/
m... ENGINEERING
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43 % 8% e O In A O lh C
- ST. LUCIE ' BARRIER ANALYSIS TFAINING -
NEED UNDESIRED PROCEDURE
- PEOPLE
- OUTCOME 1
i _ _ . . _ _ _ _ J k e
~
FEEDBACK "
i
,an -m 4
4 ST LUCIE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS j The following summarizes a Root Cause Analysis conducted by the NRC to assess recent performance observed at St Lucie. 4
SUMMARY
CONCLUSIONS: Analysis identified the following primary common causes. i
' (05) - JOB SKILLS. WORK PRACTICE. OR DECISION MAKING; Deficiencies included an increase in human error rate with potential contribution from supervision, training or staff qualification, and vertical communication. Examples included: .
i [ oATE MEA REFERENCE oESCRPTION i q 8/6/95 ENG L2R 95406 j Ufting of Unit 1 soc thermal resef due to procedural revision from previous 1 correouve acuen 8/2/95 OPS LER 95 o04 MSl$ Actusoon dunng cooldown j 7/29/95 OPS 1R 95-14 Turbine / Reactor Trio due to test error. ! 4/1/95 OPS IR 9547 Urdt 1 expensnood an approxamate 14 rmnuto ions of shutdown cooNng while NCV 95 07 o2 stutting from one enutdown nooiang loop to the other. The root ceues wee the 4 oloesng of the wrong soc suonon iso 6ation valve (the valve for the opereeng, vios idle, pump) on the part of the operator. j - 9/30/94 M8 IR 94-20 Maintenance personnel began to work the wrong RWT loosamon vehe, j threatening the operacauty of both trains of ECCS. ! 8/29/94 OPS IR 94 2o Operators placed 1A EDG in an elootnoal lineup for which TS requesd i viO 94-224, eu,ve ance test. had not .oo,, p.,,o,,ned % the %e- ows.g - VIO 94-2242 powered from et). Also, related control room log entnes appeared to be ! inecoursie i i , (Pl/P2) - PROGRAM SCOPE AND DETAIL;' Errors included either omission of necessary [ functions or vagueness in procedures. Examples included:
- oATE #EA REFERENCE DESCRPDON i'
a 8/17/96 OPS L2R 96407 - _;1. of Unit 1 containment. ~ , S/9/98 MS LER 95406 inoperable Unit 1 PORVs due to maintenance error /teseng inadesuesy. I 7/20/95 MS m 9514 14C paraennel odempt to'toet a level switch eiseud M could not actuate given syneem senditons. s/s/96 MS m 3510 Poor communicamon/ leek of deceded instuoWon leads to improper is EDG gewomerineesmanien !
- 4/as/9s Ms msSes ]
j Menemason of wrong overised heener modnes in sweenhoser. VIO950541 l' 1/4/96 MS m 9641 - lmedequate indepensent venAcellon reeutted in CVCS letdown eeneres value VIO 954142 feMing to respond due to reversed leads. Resulted in a esseamon of letdoum l flour. 12/31/94 ENG m 9425 Inadequaes design contros of NaOH oroesconnocean between ECCS trains. NCV942541 ' 4 J
-n - ,r -
(001)'- INTERFACE AMONG ORGANIZATIONS; Interface problems were demonstrated by errors in tasks requiring communication among organizations with potential contribution from a lack of interface formality or inadequate teamwork. Examples included: oATE AREA REFERENCE DESCRIPTION 4/28/95 ENG 1R 9545 Failure to document nonconformance regaramg ICI flange 8 conodons. NCV 954544 4/1/95 MS IR 9547 Jumper left installed in ECCS venedamon damper after work compioso. NCV 9547 02 2/4/95 OPS 1R 9541 Failure to sample STr witNn TS reeuwed time frame followeg voeums addellon. VIO 95o101 Second occurrenos m 2 years. 2/4/95 OPS R9541 Failure to idonefy and analyze Unit 1 hot leg flow stransfleshon 9/30/04 OPS R 9419 Failure to nosfy the NRC of changes in status of licensed operators' moslical NCV 94-1941 condselons $ (OP4) -: ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION; . Lack of authority was demonstrated by instances of unclear responsibility and accountability. Examples included: oATE AREA REFERENCE oESCRIPTION 8/2/95 OPS LER 95-004 1 A2 RCP seal failure due to "restageg' at high temperature. 7/1/95 OPS IR 9512 Weaknesses 6dentified in logs relatmg to battery jumper installation and outef-service souapment. 7/1/95 M8 1R 9512 M&TE found instasted across battery oeil without J/LL authonzation : NCV 951241 6/3/95 MS 1R 9510 Several examples of weak adheronos to procedures, inoeuding stop esgnoffs and independent venfication. idonefied l t e
)
L PROBABLE " ROOT" CAUSE: analysis indicated the probable root cause was
)
PROGRAM SCOPE AND DETAILS l: I i ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED; The following organizational groups contributed i significantly to the identified deficiencies with no attempt being made to single out management as a separate group: OPERATIONS and MAINTENANCE. i : 1 l l
l UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY l COMMISSION : veA" 88%< s
.) 7
- l %++*
i e 4 REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR ' QUARTERLY PRESS j CONFERENCE m . AT !t i ST. LUCIE .
\
5
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y 7 .
ST LUCIE MAJOR ISSUES l
.Since July 1995, there have been a series of events that led to questioning St Lucie's overall performance. Many of the events listed below demonstrate 1 multiple weaknesses. The more significant issues of concern included: c
, i
- Weaknesses in Ocerator Performance '
- On January 22, 1996, operator inattentiveness resulted in an overdilution event. The event began when an operator forgot he was. diluting the unit, continued when an inadequate turnover
.betwedn himself and another operator took place, and included a lack of command and control on the part of the shift SRO, who was near the center of the activity throughout.
- On January 5, 1996, a Unit 2 manual reactor trip resulted from the !
malfunction.of a temperature control valve which provided water to '
. generator hydrogen coolers. The valve in question had been ,
recently reworked, and the operator failed to observe the valves erratic performance after placing it in service. ,
- On October 17, 1995, operator inattention to detail'resulted in an overfill of the Unit 2 lower reactor cavity during floodup and prior to establishing integrity in the cavity seal ring. .
-
- On August'2, 1995, a main steam isolation signal was generated due-to an operator failing to block a MSIS signal during a cooldown I when an annunciator indicated that the block was enabled. This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention i
was directed to the annunciator on at least two different
- - occasions.
- On March 4, 1995, an approximate 14 minute loss of shutdown
, cooling event occurred when an operator cycled the wrong valve ! during a train swap.. The valve was cycled out of sequence and - weak annunciator response complicated recovery. !
- Acceptance of Lono-Standina Eauipment Deficiencies
- On August 17, 1995, a spraydown of the Unit I containment was l caused, in part., by the licensee's willingness to operate with a '
valve .in its fail-open position following-the valve's failure to satisfy stroke-time requirements. 1 4 1
.The operator workaround process was not aggressively pursued by t the. licensee until issues such as the spraydown of unit I containment pointed out the cost of living with deficient i conditions. 0nce management became committed-tg resolving the !
operatorworkarounds,manymorewereidentifiedfand43havebeen completed to date. . t 5 s
2 \
- Manaaement Exoectations Not Effectively Communicated and Enforced
~
. Management has failed to achieve the desired level of operator attentiveness, evidenced in the overdilution event and numerous NRC-identified control room indication deficiencies.
. Standards of chronological logkeeping, out-of-service logkeeping, and valve deviation and key logkeeping have not, until recently, been consistently applied. 'A number of recent violations in this area have been identified, and the failure to maintain a current valve deviation log complicated a loss of RCS inventory event when floor drains were found to be unintentionally shut, resulting in an accumulation of 4000 gallons of coolant in the Unit 1 pipe tunnel. '
. Standards of prompt notification of licensee management by operators have not been maintained, as evidenced by failures to notify the Operations Supervisor in a timely fashion for the recent overdilution event and the loss of a number of Unit 2 control room annunciators the next night.
. Weaknesses in Procedural Adeauacy and Adherence
. Procedural violations have accounted for 16 SL IV violations in the last (24 month) SALP cycle. ,
. The licensee's shift to a verbatim compliance policy resulted in hundreds of changes to procedures, required in order for the procedures to be followed. Management process then became a challenge, as the,of systemthe procedure in place change was not prepared to deal with the increased volume.
. On August 17, a spraydown of Unit I containment was due to an
~
inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an~ existing operator-work-around.,
- On August 2,1995, an attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance, compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist, led to the failure of 3 of 4 stages of the seal package.
. On July 29,1995,aUnit1tripoccurredduringSurbinetrip testing due to procedural weaknesses, poor operator performance, and weak supervisory oversight. . Implementation and Adeauacy of Corrective Actions
- Inadequate corrective actions resulted in repeated failures to perform TS surveillance sampling of the SITS and the RCS for boron
l 3 concentration, j On August 6,1995, a loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons.) due to a
- shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to ;
reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic problem l involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this gene'ric condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the conditions. On August 29, 1994, inadequate corrective actions for an NRC NOV, ! regarding safeguards testing with respect to swing intake and component cooling water pumps, resulted in-operators placing the l electric plant in a configuration which made an EDG inoperable. Inadeouate Post-Maintenance Testina
' l On January 5, 1996, a Unit 2 manual reactor trip'resulted from the i malfunction of a temperature control valve which provided water to i generator hydrogen coolers. The valve in question had been l recently reworked, but it had not been dynamically tested,.nor was ;
testing planned. . !
- On August 9,1995, both pressurizer power operated relief valves were found inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage. The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months and were not detected through the licensee's surveillance testing program.
4 1 1 i
l I l EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Pre-Decisional Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment St. Lucie 1 and 2 Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97. . l Last SALP Rating Previous SALP Rating 1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 Operations 2 1 Maintenance 2 1 Engineering 1 1 . Plant Support 1 1 Last INPO Assessment: 1 Previous INP0 Assessment: 1 I. Performance Overview Since July 1995,'there have been a ser'6es of events that led to questioning the plant's overall performance. These have included: e A Unit I turbine trip due to procedural weaknesses, 1 poor operator performance, and weak supervisory oversight. l e The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist, which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.
)
e A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an ar.nunciator indicated that the block was enabled. This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at least two different occasions.
- Both pressurizer power' operated relief valves being found i inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage. l The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP).
- An loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic problem involving several valves) . The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the conditions (SL4).
e The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and . operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around. j f i
1 . j'
- i 4
- g e The'significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the j N overdilution event on January 22, 1996, highlighted the recent ,
, large number-of personnel errors and lack of command and control ' in.the control room. I These and several other recent deficiencies involving weak procedures, a . i , general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel ! t errors clearly indicated that the plant's past high level of performance had declined. An NRC root cause effort determined that, in addition to
; procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses, the licensee suffered from -
- weaknesses in both interfaces across organizational lines and corrective actions.
- +
II. Functional Area Assessments A SALP board convened on January 18,- 1996. The board concluded that,the , licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had : , declined from excellent levels of performance to good levels. The "
- conclusions reached by the board are summarized below. ,
Operations ; ~ ' The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had '
~
declined, particularly in the final s'ix months of the assessment period. 1- As bases, the board noted an increase in the number of operational , e events attributable to:
- e Weaknesses in operator performance 1
e Acceptance of long-standing equipment deficiencies e Management expectations were not effectively communtcated to I personnel and enforced
- e Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence j e Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions
! The licensee undertook a number of efforts to reverse declining i performance following the onset of the operational events described l above. Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for , the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of procedural changes'and around-the-clock on-site review committee meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of corrective action l documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents i l- initiated, but has also resulted in increases in backlogs. ; Maintenance The board determined that performance in this are'a declined during the previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit
. trips which occurred during the period had roots in maintenance.
. Weaknesses identified by the board included: ,
\ e Inadequate post-maintenance testing o Procedural adequacy and adherence . . e- Instability in management due to acting managers whi,le the <
-maintenance manager received SRO training l 4 ,.y ..
The board indicated that the current stability of the maintenance management appeared to bs reversing the observed negative trends. Engineering The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of performance. Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce.the numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as strengths. Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high quality, as were safety evaluations. Plant Support The board found that plant support organizations collectively performed at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows: e Health Physics was identified as having strong management support and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of contaminated ' floor space and the volume of solid waste were also noted. e Security was cited as maintaining an excellent level of
- performance during staff reductions due to the implementation of biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing ' range, and self-assessments were considered good. Some performance problems were noted through the period, however, including two failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures..
d e Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in responding to plant fires; however, surveillance testing observations indicated weak procedures, poor attention to detail, and hardware deficiencies. e Emergency preparedness was considered good, and.the status of equipment and supplies were found to be adequate. The full participation exercise was successful. 4 4
l l l l Biographical Information PPL , William H. Bohlke Vice President, St. Lucie Plant Bill Bohlke is Plant Vice President of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Bohlke reports to the Nuclear Division President and oversees the operation of the two nuclear units at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island, approximately 50 miles north of West Palm Beach. 1 Mr. Bohlke joined FPL in 1990 as Vice President of Nuclear Engineering and Licensing. He previously served as Vice President and Manager of Projects at Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. A career nuclear professional, Mr. Bohlke performed in a variety of ! engineering and project management positions for Stone & Webster.
~
Mr. Bohlke is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and received a Master of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He is a registered professional engineer in eleven states and a member of the Amarican Nuclear Society. i He is currently chairman of the NEl Appendix B Working Group and the industry Steam I Generator Replacement Group. He is a member of the NEl Nuclear Economics and Fuel Supply Advisory Committee, the NEl Executive Task Force on Regulatory Process and the INPO Analysis & Engineering Industry Review Group. Mr. Bohlke servos as FPL's representative to ; the Advanced Reactor Corporation where he is vice chairman of the Utility Management l Board. ' l e e 2/96 .
Biographical Information
@ I: P L James Scarola Plant General Manager, St. Lucie Plant i Jim Scarola is Plant General Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie ,
Nuclear Power Plant. In this function Mr. Scarola reports to the Site Vice President. He is l responsible for Operations, Maintenance, and technical Support activities at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island. Mr. Scarola began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including l&C startup engineer, l&C maintenance engineer, assistant superintendent electrical maintenance, manager special projects, maintenance manager, manager equipment, support. and inspections, engineering project manager, and operations manager at St. Lucie. i Mr. Scarola holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Notre Dame and a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida' Institute of Technology. Mr. Scarola has completed the senior reactor operator certification training program at St. Lucie. l 4 1/96
l l Biographical lnformation 9 FPL Christopher L. Burton' Services Manager, St. Lucie Plant. , Chris Burton is Services Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, in this function, Mr. Burton reports to the Site Vice President. He is responsible for Plant Facilities, Budget, Fire Protection, Emergency Planning, Training, Land Utilization, Security, and Information Services at the St. Lucie site. . Mr. Burton began working for FPL in 1975. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including reactor operator, nuclear plant supervisor, assistant operations supervisor, reliability maintenance supervisor, operations supervisor, operations manager, and plant general manager. Mr. Burton has held reactor operator and senior reactor operator licenses at St. Lucie. Mr. Burton is a gra'duate of State University of New York and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electronics Technology. Mr. Burton also holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida institute of Technology. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) and the Professional Reactor Operator Society. 1/96 -
Biographical Information O FPL l C. Ashton Pell , Outage Manager, St. Lucie Plant l t Ash Pellis Outage Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. .Pell reports to the Site Vice President. He is responsible for the i 4 planning and scheduling of St. Lucie Plant outages and for coordination of operations and I maintenance activities on a daily basis. , Mr. Pell began working for FPL in 1975. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including Reactor Engineer. Reactor Supervisor, Technical Staff Supervisor, Assistant to Senior Vice President Nuclear, Director Nuclear Administrative Services, Plant Services Manager and Outage Manager. Mr. Pell completed certification as a senior reactor operator for both the St. Lucie and Turkey Point nuclear units. Mr. Pellis a graduate of the University of Central Florida and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics. He is a member of the Southeast section of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 4 W 6 e 1/96 '
Biographical Information
@ FPL Edward J. Weinkam 111 Licensing Manager, St. Lucie Plant ,
Ed Weinkam is Licensing Manager of Florida Power & Light Compariy's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, in this function, Mr. Weinkam reports to the Site Vice President and is responsible for coordination of the St. Lucie Plant regulatory interface among the NRC Resident inspectors, NRC Region il Staff, and NRC Headquarters staff. Mr. Weinkam began working for FPL in 1986. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including NRR licensing engineer and corporate licensing supervisor for the St. Lucie Plant, licensing manager for the Turkey Point Plant'. He has worked in the nuclearindustry since 1979 in various engineering, educational, and regulatory areas. He was a U. S. Navy nuclear submarine. officer, an engineering instructor at the University of Maryland, and USNRC, NRR project manager. Mr. Weinkam completed certification as a . senior reactor operator at the Turkey Point nuclear units. Mr. Weinkam is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering. He received a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from tne University of Maryland in 1979. 1/96
Biographical Information 9 FPL 1 Robert E. Dawson Business Manager, St. Lucie Plant , 4 Bob Dawson is Business Manager of Florida Power &. Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Bob Dawson reports to the Site Vice President and is responsible for the strategic plan, the plant operating plan, the corrective action program, and the in-house event tracking and trend analysis programs at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Mr. Dawson began working for FPL in 1973. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including reactor engineering department head at Turkey Point Plant, staff reactor support, mechanical startup group supervisor for St. Lucie Unit 2, core barrel repair project, electrical maintenance department head, plant maintenance manager, and plant licensing manager. Mr. Dawson has held an senior reactor operator license at St. Lucie. 4 Mr. Dawson is a graduate of the University of Virginia and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering. . He is a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS). J 1/96
Biographical information
@ PPL Thomas G. Kreinberg Superintendent, Nuclear Material Management, 4
St. Lucie Plant i Thomas Kreinberg is Superintendent of Nuclear Materials Management of Florida Power j
& Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Kreinberg reports to ;
the Site Vice President and is responsible for Purchasing, Stores, and interface with l Procurement Engineering at the St. Lucie Plant. ' Mr. Kreinberg began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including purchasing & contract' services, contracts administrator, manager of contracts and manager materials management. Mr. Kreinberg attended Syracuse University and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Russian and a Bachelors of Business Administration Economics from the University of Florida. He is a member of Contract Management Owners Group (Nuclear Power Utilities). l 1 1/96
, Biographical Information I: P L Daniel J. Denver Site Engineering Manager, St. Lucie Plant Dan Denver is the Site Engineering Manager for Florida Power & Light Company's St.
Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, in this function, Mr. Denver reports to the Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Licensing and is responsible for engineering services including design p.ackages, as building, procurement engineering, fuel design, and outage NDE inspections for the two nuclear units at the St. Lucie site located on Hutchinson Island. Dan joined Florida Power & Light Company in May,1993 as Director, Nuclear Technical Support in the Juno Beach offices. In this capacity, he was responsible for nuclear fuel l , supply, information services and the administrative staffs for Nuclear Engineering and ) Licensing. He has worked in the nuclear power industry since 1967 in various engineering and l technology development areas. He worked for a number of electric utilities including Public j Service Electnc & Gas, Yankee ' Atomic, and Houston Lighting and Power as well as j Westinghouse Electric and a nuclear industry services company, El International. l i Dan graduated' from the University of Notre Dame in 1966 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and received a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1967. In outside activities, Dan has served in local town government and on the boards of several I amateur theater organizations and professional societies. He is a registered professional ! engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 9 l l
Biographical Information j I: P L L. Wesley Bladow Site Quality Manager, St. Lucie Plant t . 2 Wes Bladow is the Site Quality Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Bladow reports to the Vice President Nuclear
. Assurance and is responsible for independently assessing the Quality Control and Quality Assurance Program implementation by the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
Mr. Bladow began working for FPL in 1967 in the Distribution Engineering Department. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including quality assurance 4 supervisor, quality assurance superintendent, and site quality manager at the Turkey Point
, Nuclear Plant and quality assurance manager 'of the St. Lucie Unit 1 steam generator replacement project, and manager of nuclear safety speak out.
Mr. Bladow is a graduate of Florida International University and holds a Bachelor,of' Science degree in industrial Technology with a minor in industrial safety. Mr. Bladow is a member of the American Nuclear Society. l 1/96
f I i l Biographical Information O^
@F:PL .
Andrew DeSoiza Human Resources Manager, St. Lucie Plant Andrew DeSoiza is Plant Human Resources Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function, Mr. DeSoiza reports to the Nuclear Division Director of Human Resources. In this position Mr. DeSoiza is accountable for proper implomentation of personnel policies and procedures at the St Lucie Nuclear Plant Mr. DeSoiza began working for FPL in 1972. He has held a various positions, including payroll clerk and human resource manager. Mr. DeSoiza is a graduate of Miami Dade Community College and holds an Associates of Arts degree in Business. ' e 9 1/96
l Biographical information I:PL Jeffrey A. West Operations Manager, St. Lucie Plant Jeff West is Operations Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear l Power Plant. In this function Mr. West reports to the Plant General Manager. He is ' responsible for the direction and coordination of the operational activities including health
. physics, radio chemistry, reactor engineering, operations, and operations support & testing j at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island.
Mr. West began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including shift technical adviser, reactor control operator, nuclear watch engineer, I assistant nuclear plant supervisor, technical training supervisor, nuclear plant supervisor, assistant operations supervisor, assistant superintendent - mechanical maintenance, operations supervisor, and services manager. Mr. West has held a senior operator license at St. Lucie. Prior to his tenure at FPL, he held the rank of Lt. Commander in' the U. S. Navy i Nuclear Submarine Service. Mr. West ~ served from 1974 to 1979. Mr. West is a graduate of the University of Tennessee and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Mr. West also holds a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida Institute of Technology. l l 1/96
Biographical lnformation 9 I: P L Joseph Marchese Jr. Maintenance Manager, St. Lucie Plant Joe Marchese is Plant Maintenance Manager of Florida Power & Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear l Power Plant. In this function, Mr. Marchese reports to the Plant General Manager and is responsible
. for supervision and coordination of the maintenance activities including electrical, mechanical, instrumentation & control, records and planning at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island.
Mr. Marchese began working for FPL in 1984. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including lead construction electrical supervisor -Turkey Point Plant , lead construction mechanical supervisor - Turkey Point Plant, site construction manager - Turkey Point Plant, and plant maintenance manager. Prior to his tenure at FPL, Mr. Marchese had 12 years nuclear experience in ; various positions of increasing authority with Bechtel Power Corporation, including Milestone, Davis Besse, and St. Lucie Nuclear Plants construction and startup testing. Mr. Marchese completed the senior reactor operator certification training program at Turkey Point. Mr. Marchese is a graduate of the University of Akron and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Mr. Marchese is a registered Professional Engineer in Florida and Virginia. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 1 I s 1/96
1 l l Biographical Information FPL i Lee A. Rogers System & Component Engineering Manager, St. Lucie Plant Lee Rogers is System & Component Engineering Manager of Florida' Power and Light Company's St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. In this function Mr. Rogers reports to the Plant General Manager. He is responsible for the direction and coordination of the technical support to Operations and Maintenance Departments and the coordination of issues, regulatory interaction and documents at the St. Lucie Plant located on Hutchinson Island. Mr. Rogers began working for FPL in 1980. He has held a variety of positions of increasing authority, including mechanical startup engineer, mechanical startup supervisor, sh'ift technical advisor, project engineer, electrical maintenance department head, and instrument and control department head. Prior to his tenure at FPL, he was employed by Carolina Power & Light Co. from 1977 to 1979. l Mr. Rogers is a graduate of the University of Florida and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering and a Master of Business Administration degree from Florida institute of Technology. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). 1 e i 1/96 ,
- . . - -. .- . - - _ . ... - . - . . . ~ - - . - . - _ . - -
i l
- February 8, 1996 1
l ! Florida Power and Light Company
' ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg President - Nuclear Division '
. :P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL- 33408-0420 .
SUBJECT:
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP) (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-335/95-99; 50-389/95-99)
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
! The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) for the period January 2, 1994-through January 6, 1996, has been completed for St. Lucia. . The results of the assessment are documented in the enclosed SALP re' port which will be discussed with you at a public meeting at the St. Lucie Site on , February 22, 1996, at 1:00 pm. At the meeting, you should be prepared to discuss our assessment and any initiatives that address our concerns and i challenges identified in the SALP report. Overall the performance of the St. Lucia Plant was assessed as good over the p performance period. The overall performance was mixed with the response to - l transient events being very good but routine activities performed at a
- somewhat lower level of performance. The engineering and plant support functional-areas sustained the previously assessed ratings of superior performance, but there is a disturbing performance trend in the functional areas of operations and maintenance. Performance declined significantly in these areas from superior ratings that had been sustained over several past perfomance periods to a level of good performance. There is a concern that the long period of seperior performance may have led to a pervasive complacent environment that is tolerant of equipment issues and a lack of discipline in adhering to procedures. There is evidence that the decline in human performance may be aggravated by inadequacies in the quality of'the procedures themselves. Another contributor appears to be acceptance of a lower standard of performance by a significant part of the organization.
A further concern is the degree to which the performance declined before it was detected by the organization's self-assessment programs. There is a clear indication that these programs were not effective in identifying the trends early. It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the extensive corrective actions that were' instituted in the very late part of the assessment period, but it is clear they must be aggressively pursued to terminate the negative trend in performance.
, OFFICIAL COPY .
2 [' ' f 9 &O W (i&hD ,'U l % .
FP&L 2 In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of
- this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions or comments, I would be pleased to discuss t!.es
, with you.
Sincerely, . , Orig signed by Stewart D. Ebneter Stewart D. Ebneter ' Regional Administrator !
Enclosure:
As stated - cc w/ enc 1: D. A. Sager, Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 H. N. Paduano, Manager i Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 14000 . Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 ) J. Scarola, Plant General Manager , St. Lucie Nuclear Plant ;
- P. O. Box 128- l Ft. Pierce, FL- 34954-0128 l l
, Robert E. Dawson, Plant Licensing Manager l I St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 !
- Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 i
.J. R. Newman, Esq. l Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, NW !
Washington, D. C. 20036 ! John T. Butler, Esq. , Steel,. Hector and Davis ! 4000 Southeast Financial Center i Miami, FL 33131-2398 s cc w/ enc 1: Continued see page 3 . ,
- l A ,
6 9
'- Y' C___ -
Z FP&L 3 ~ cc w/ encl: Continued ! < Bill Passetti ! Office of Radiation Control . Dept of. Health and Rehab. Serv. . 1317 Winewood Boulevard , j Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400. Joe Myers, Director . . i Division of Emergency Preparedness ' Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive f
- Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Thomas R. L. Kindred, County Administrator St. Lucie County -
l 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 ! Charles B. Brinkman
. Washington Nuclear Operations '
ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. ' 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 - Rockville, MD 20852 - Distribution w/ encl: Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson - Cossaissioner K. C. Rogers J. M. Taylor, EDO H. L. Thompson, Jr... DEDS J. L. Milhoan, DEDR j G. M. Tracy, Regional Coordinator, EDO ! W. T. Russell, NRR l R. P. Zimmerman, NRR A. C. Thadani, NRR l J. Lieberman, OE l
'S. A. Varga, NRR J. A. Zwolinski, NRR D. - L.- Gamberoni, Jr., NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
D. B. Matthews, NRR 1
-J. Norris, NRR l
- R. W. Cooper, RI j W. L. Axelson, RIII l J. E. Dyer, RIV l K. E. Perkins, WCFO I E. W. Merschoff, RII '
J. R. Johnson, RII ' A. F. Gibson, RII Distribution'w/ encl: Continued see page 4 3; L
4 4 i - l 1 . a , 5 i
'SALP REPORT - ST. LUCIE 50-335: 50-389 ;
)' JANUARY 2. 1994 - JANUARY 6. 1996 . j I. BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on January 18, 1996, to assess the nuclear safety performance of St. Lucie Units I and 2. for the period of-Jar <uary 2,1994, through January 6,1996. The Board Meeting was l conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance." Board members were Ellis W. s Marschoff (Chairperson), Director, Division of Reactor Projects, > i Region II (RII); Johns-P. Jaudon, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor ' 1 Safety, RII; and David B. Matthews,. Director, Project Directorate II-1,
- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. ' .
The parformance category ratings and the asses'sment functional areas ! used balow are defined and described in NRC Management Directive 8.6, I L , " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)." j I II. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT, OPERATIONS ? I This functional area assesses the control and execution of activities ! } directly related to operating the plant. It includes activities such as l plant startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and response to l transients. J 1 overall performance in the operations area has declined from its previous superior level to an overall rating of good. The plant has i been operated safely, although there has been an increase in the number of operational events. This increase is attributable to the following: , weaknesses in operator performance, the acceptance of long standing ! deficiencies in plant equipment, management expectations not effectively i communicated to personnel and enforced, weaknesses in procedural ' i adequacy and adherence, and the implementation and adequacy of l corrective actions. Quality Assurance activities associated with Operations remained strong and effective in identifying areas for improvement. Operator performance during the period has, overall, been good, and continued to be strong during unusual plant events or. evolutions. Operators showea alert and proper response to ten reactor trips, reflecting well upon the licensee's training program and individual , capabilities. Similarly, operator performance during twelve observed startups and seven monitored entries into reduced inventory conditions were typified by excellent command' and control and thorough operator knowledge.- However, operator performance during less demanding or less focused evolutions showed weaknesses in procedural adherence, the , identification and correction of deficiencies, and attention to detail. s QOk '
- 4. w a v e ' I_
n'
. j
. l 2 I h 2 l 4 Of particular concern, procedural adherence and adequacy issues resulted j i in, or contributed to, an increase in the number and severity of I
; operational events. The lack of overall quality in plant procedures was- :
i underscored by the shear volume of procedural changes required whsn a ' j policy of verbatim compliance was adopted. a
- The ability of Operations to identify and correct problems in a manner
- 4 sufficient to prevent recurrence was also of concern. This issue was ,
i compounded by identified weaknesses in consnunications across ' i organizational interfaces, in that failures in informal communications ' were not compensated for by programmatic methods. i Finally, operator attention to detail'has declined during this SALP
- period. Given that issues of procedural inadequacies existed,'the i j importance of attention to detail by operators was ampli~fied, 'in that it !
represents an important barrier to failures. The decline in attention ~ ' to details was indicative of an onset of complacency through the SALP , period, a trend which operations management failed to identify and l j remedy in a timely manner. ' i
- The Plant Operations area is rated Category 2.
l III.. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - NAINTENANCE i This functional area assesses licensee activities in the areas of . testing and maintaining plant structures, systems, and components. t Activities assessed include preventive, predictive, and corrective maintenance, as well as surveillance, post-modification, and post-maintenance testing. j . Overall performance in the maintenance area declined from its previous
- superior level to an overall rating of good. Maintenance provided generally effective support for plant operations on a day-to-day basis.
However, there were problems with equipment that adversely affected
- overall plant performance and provided unnecessary challenges to operations..
~
- Significant problems related to maintenance were manifested by an
, operability issue with pressurizar power-operated relief valves, reactor coolant pumps seal failures, and inadequate' post-maintenance test i determinations. There were also procedural difficulties encountered, especially in surveillance and preventive maintenance procedures. These j ,- issues had~ been present but unrecognized previously, and the licensee's ! i remedial actions included an attempt to utilize a " verbatim compliance" approach. However, the older procedures were not written to a level of detail that would support this methodology, and the plant rank and file 1 were not well oriented in the concept.of procedural adherence'; , therefore, the use of verbatim compliance did not resolve the problems
, emanating from weak procedures.-
i } *
. I 1
~ .-
l
- 3 L k, - Management of the maintenance area changed during this assessment i period, and by the end of the assessment period, the new management ,
2 appeared to be providing the leadership necessary to reverse the
! observed negative trends. In the area of procedures, the new management L team instituted a dual approach of. correcting the procedures and j training the personnel to use them which has seen some preliminary '
successes. j The surveillance program was implemented satisfactorily, but the , procedural problems discussed above kept it from rising to the superior l 3 level. Corrective maintenance was performed acceptably and generally ;
- had strong management involvement. '
i In addition to the apparent strength of the new management team, the predictive maintenance group was. considered a strength. The group was i l ! adept at vibration analysis, thermography, and lubrication analysis. ' i The predictive maintenance group had strong and positive interactions l , . with the operations and maintenance programs and, furnishing early . warning of incipient equipment failures, and long-term degradation of j important components. Licensee preparations to implement the new maintenance rule were i successful in identifying equipment such as the radiation monitoring system and the emergency diesel generators which were not performing to j .the licensee's expectations. The Mainton'ance area is rated category 2; IV. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING
\
i This, functional area assesses activities associated with the design of l plant modifications and engineering support for operations, maintenance, i surveillance, and licensing activities. The'overall performance in the Engineering area remained superior. The strength of the engineering group was shown in the area of design i and installation support. This was manifested by a number of well engineered and implemented plant modifications. In the area of design
- control and maintenance'of the current licensing basis, the engineering l organization typically performed well with occasional weaknesses.
i The plant's operations were supported'successfully throughout the assessment period. Of particular note was the design and installation
- on Unit 2'of the condenser tube cleaning system. In addition, the licensee has undertaken several initiatives to reduce the number of-jumper / lifted leads, eliminate operator work-arounds, reduce the number i of old work orders, and to improve the performance of contractors. The
- fuel vendor independence program will result in better control of core
- design, improved support for the plant and enhanced fuel utilization.
The support of maintenance activities remained strong. The 45th Street l Laboratory provided good support with component specialists along with I
- 4 i
, effective nondestructive examination services. A comprehensive program 1 i of monitoring Alloy 600/690 applications focused on the pressurizer, L reactor vessel and loop piping penetrations. The.recently implemented
- maintenance specification program should result in effective maintenance support, efficient engineering, and enhanced plant safety. In light of
- the weaknesses discussed in the Maintenance section, the. support of maintenance activities by engineering is an area where improvements-
- could be achieved.
Throughout the assessment period, licensing submittals have been
- consistently of high quality, reflecting sound engineering judgment and 4
appropriate attention to detail. Safety evaluations demonstrated,the - licensee's commitment to safety and compliance with regulations. ! The. Engineering area is rated Category 1. V. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT , l This functional area addresses radiological controls, radioactive i effluents, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, fire protection, i and housekeeping controls. 4 l The overall performance in the Plant Support area has remained superior. The radiation protection program received strong management support. The accumulated dose goal was met for the first year of the assessment period but not for the second year. This was the result of the maintenance problems and the resulting increased outage time. The
. radiation protection organization continued to implement strong initiatives in the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) program -
through the use of remote monitorinq of potentially high radiological dose work and the introduction of e'actronic dosimetry. Management involvement and support was evidenced by the small amount of surface area contamination, a significant reduction in the volume of solid waste, and the readiness of the post accident sampling system. Training and self-assessments were found to be effective. Thus, the combination of management support and an innovative health physics orgainization resulted in superior performance. Security maintained an excellent level of performance during a staff reduction of the guard force and the introduction of biometrics. Measures used included effective training, which included the use of a combat firing range and good self-assessments. Changes to the security plan were both appropriate and made in a timely manner. However, there were some performance problems such as a repeat instance of failure to compensate in a timely manner for a computer failure; this suggested a problem with the effectiveness of corrective action from a previous event. In the fire protection area, combustible control was effective and the fire brigade performed well during drills and during an actual event. However, observation of surveillance testing of the fire protection 8
S-systems revealed weak procedures, poor attention to detail, as well as
. minor past errors that had gone uncorrected. On balance, procedural and surveillance problems detracted from the otherwise excellent level of performance in %t.e fire protection area.
In the emergency preparedness area, the full participation exercise conducted in 1994 was successful, and appropriate emergency classifications were made. Overall exercise performance was rated as good. The status of equipment and supplies needed to support emergency _ preparedness was found to be adequate. The emergency preparedness program maintained a good state of readiness for event response. The Plant Support area is rated Category 1. 4 i G I i e
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' St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 'IPE Submittal Revision 0 !
- 1.0 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1.1 ' Background and Objectives : For:several years. Florida Power and Light (FPL) has monitored developments in the area of ! Probabilistic . Risk Assessment (PRA). FPL has also performed several probabilistic analyses to : support management decisions conceming nuclear plant design, operation and maintenance. These : analyses were typically directed at understanding contributors to safety system unavailability or the ! frequency of individual sequences of events. After 1988, the Nuclear Energy Depanment management foresaw 'the need to develop.more fully the technology of PRA within FPL. A team was chanered to develop a set of recommendations l for the future of PRA at FPL. -Subsequently, a course of action was adopted that would result in ; the development of full-scale, detailed PRAs for the Turkey Point and St. Lucie Nuclear Plants. , To accomplish thes'e objectives the Nuclear Engineering Depanmen't established a group accountable for the development application, and maintenance of the PRAs. This PRA group
- solicited suppon from critical interfacing depanments such as Nuclear Fuels and the plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical and Training Depanments. .
Because of its age and design,' a PRA was performed first for the Turkey Point Plant. Following completion of Turkey Point's analysis, the St. Lucie PRA would then be developed. As these decisions were being made, the NRC's Individual Plant Examination Program (IPEP) was j also being shaped and defined. As a minimum. the scope of the FPL PRAs must encompass that ' l of the IPEP. Based on the Generic Letter 88-20 content (Ref.1.0-1), FPL determined that the , Turkey Point and St. Lucie PRAs should include a Level 1 PRA for intemal initiating events, a i limited scope Level 2 Containtnent Performance Analysis, and an assessment of the risk due to l intemal flooding. ' By July of 1989, FPL let a contract to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for ! assistance in development of the Turkey Point PRA. Since this effon was "new technology" for FPL, SAIC would provide project management service and technology transfer. FPL engineers '. would perform at least 50% of the work. thus supponing the objective of bringing the PRA ' ' technology in-house, in practice, FPL performed well over half the work on the Turkey Point ! analysis and gained valuable experience in almost all aspects of PRA technology. Based on the experience and technology gained during development of the Turkey Point PRA, FPL developed the St. Lucie PRA with minimal contractor support. f
- ' This repon documents the work performed to estimate a core damage frequency (CDF) for St. ,
F Lucie Units 1 and 2 and to satisfy the provisions of Generic Letter 88-20. _ [ u" 1 1.0-1 of 8
9m. St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 1.2 Plant Familiarization St. Lucie Plant Units I and 2 are located on Hutchinson Island in St. Lucie County.about halfway between the cities of Fott Pierce and Stuart on the East Coast of Florida. Each unit is a pressurized water-type reactor (PWR) with a nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) designed by Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE) and rated for a full power core thermal output of 2700 megawatts. Unit I began commercial operation in 12/76 and Unit 2 in 8/83. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) of each unit is arranged as two closed loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel. Each loop has one outlet (hot leg) pipe, one steam generator, two inlet (cold leg) pipes and two reactor coolant pumps. An electrically heated pressurizer is connected to the hot leg of one loop and a safety injection line is connected to each of the four cold legs. The RCS operates at a nominal pressure of 2235 psig. The reactor buildings are dual containment design comprised of a steel containment vessel surrounded by an annular space and enclosed by a reinforced concrete shield building. .The containment vessel steel shell is designed to confine the radioactive material that could be released from a postulated design basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA). The shield building is a concrete structure that surrounds the annulus and steel containment vessel. It protects the containment vessel from extemal missiles and provides biological shielding and a means of collecting radioactive products that may leak from the containment following.a major hypothetical accident. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems with the containment ensure that the off-site radiological l consequences following any LOCA do not exceed the regulations. The ESF include: (a) l independent redundant systems (Containment Cooling System (CCS) and Containment Spray System (CSS)) to remove heat from and reduce the pressure in the containment vessel, (b) a high and low pressure Safety Injection System (SIS), (c) a Shield Building Ventilation System and an
, lodine Removal System, (d) a Containment Isolation System (e) a hydrogen control system, and (f) a control room habitability system.
Feedwater to the steam generators is provided by two motor driven main feedwater pumps per unit. Each umt also has an Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) consisting of two motor driven pumps and one pump driven by a steam turbine. This system provides a source of water inventory to the
' steam generators during plant startup, hot standby, and during plant cooldown, and provides heat removal to bring the Reactor Coolant System to the shutdown cooling system activation window.
One condensate storage tank per unit provides a large volume of water to support operation of the
, AFW system.
Off-site power from the utility grid comes from the switchyard via two startup' transformers per unit. During normal operation, each unit receives power from the main generator through two unit auxiliary transformers. When necessary, on-site AC power is provided by two independent emergency diesel generators per unit. Equipment heat loads are removed by a closed Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, which rejects heat to the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) System. 1.0-2 of 8
Om. St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 1.3 Overall Methodology The St. Lucie PRA was developed to satisfy the provisions of the Individual Plant Examination (lPE) process; that is to perform a " systematic examination to identify any plant-s'pecific vulnerabilities to severe accidents . . . ." The IPE has several goals, including the development of an appreciation for severe accident behavior, to understand the most likely severe accidents for St. Lucie, to gain a "more quantitative" understanding of core damage probabilities and potential fission product releases, and finally to reduce these probabilities by appropriate plant changes where required. The St. Lucie Units I and 2 PRA scope and process were designed specificaty to meet these goals. , 1.3.1 Internal Events Methodoloey Standard event tree / fault tree methods were employed to understand the most probable core damage states for the plant. The St. Lucie analysis used the small event tree /large fault tree philosophy. l Functional event trees were developed for each class of unique initiating events identified; top logic ' was then developed to link the statement of functional failure to that of system failure criteria. Detailed fault trees were developed for both Units I and 2 for each front-1ine system identified in the top logic. Also, these front-line systems' support systems had fault trees developed. To ensure , the traceability of the supponing data, detailed system description notebooks were created.to document the analyticai effort. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 fault tree basic events were then quantified with a mixture of generic and St. Lucie plant specific data. The scope of the plant specific data analysis included initiating event frequencies and plant specific failure data for component types requested by Generic Letter 88-20. The project established a six-year data window as the basis for quantifying failure rates and maintenance unavailability. Human failure events were also quantified. Methods compatible with those outlined ir, tile Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure (Ref.1.0 2] were employed to develop conservative screening values for human events; more detailed analysis was used for important recovery events. The SAIC enhanced version of the EPRI-developed CAFTA code wal used to integrate the event trees and fault trees into a plant.model. Model development, integration and quantification was performed on personal computers. St. Lucie plant personnel involvement was a key factor in the project. The individual . system analysts performed walkdowns, as requit.ed, to verify the completeness and correctness of their models. Operations, Maintenance, Technical. ISEO, and Training depanment personnel were consulted throughout the analysis. Operations and Training Department personnel were particularly
~ instrumental in the identification and quantification of operator recovery events.
St. Lucie is an open plant (i.e., no enclosed turbine building). For the internal flooding events, it was recognized that most sources of " floods" would simply run-off across the plant area to either the intake or discharge canals. Fire zones were chosen as the unit of examination. For each zone, 1.0-3 of 8
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~ St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 Y ;
screening questions were employed (Does the water source trip the plant?. is there PRA equipment. )
' in the ione?, does.the PRA equipment become' damaged by the water source? (either immersion ;
~or spray)). For the areas that did not pass the screening analysis, the contribution to core damage .
j frequency was determined by "failing" the zone's.PRA related equipment and analyzing the i f CAFTA-based plant model. l
- 1.3.2. Containment Performance Methodolony
- =A simplified,' limited-scope approach was taken for this portion of the analysis. To make the i transition from core damage states identified by the intemal events analysis to plant damage states,
.)
2 a containment systems status " bridge" tree was constructed and appended to the binned core ' damage sequences. This bridge tree assesses the unavailability of containmem isolation systems ' and containment sprays / emergency containment cooling systems and helps categorize the various core damage states into plant damage states. The containment event tree then provides insights into i the phenomenological factors affecting the core melt and subsequent containment failure and release { j modes. The EPRI-developed MAAP Code was used to gain St. Lucie specific knowledge about the progression of the accident from melt to release. Containment failure modes and release categories are the outcome of this portion of the overall effort. 1 l 1.4 Sununary of Major Findings 4
- FPL has performed a Level 1 and limited scope Level 2 PRA for St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 in response
- to Generic letter 88-20, " Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilitics". The objectives for this assessment are consistent with the objectives given in the generic letter. FPL personnel.have been directly involved in all aspects of thd development, quantification, and l~' documentation of the PRA models. The approach included system, procedure, and ' drawing reviews, discussions with Operations. Training, Technical Staff, and other plant personnel, and independent peer reviews by PRA experts to ensure that the models are consistent with accepted i ' PRA practices.
1 As a result, the IPE provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the severe accident behavior ; _of St. Lucie Units 1 & 2. The overall likelihood of core damage and fission product release from i the containment from internally initiated events has been quantified consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 88-20. The relative contribution to core damage frequency from the i different accident sequence types has been determined. t The major findings are presented here in two components: fm' dings from the Internal Events
*. analysis, and the Containment Performance analysis.
1.4.1 'Intemal Events (Level 1) Findines The overall core damage frequency due to. internally initiated events for St. Lucie 1 is 2.3 x 10-5/yr and for St. Lucie Unit 2 is 2.6 x 10 5/yr. This is much less than the i NRC safety goal of I x 10d/yr and illustrates a high level of safety. 1.0-4 of 8 ' L . . - -. -. .-- - - .
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.. ; Tim.i St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal . Revision 0 1
. l
.. ~ The overall core damage frequency for St.'Lucie Units { & 2 is within the range of past PRAs performed for PWRs. Thus, the susceptibuity to core damage at St. Lucie -
Units 1 & 2 is not unlike other PWRs. . i ! . ; A chart of the dominant accident sequences is shown in Figure 1.4-1. It shows that l the largest contributor to core damage risk is small-small (1/2" - 3") LOCAs.~ Total ! l loss of feedwater events are also important accident sequences for core damage risk.
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Section 3.7 presents the Level I results in more detail. i St. Lucie has several means of providing feedwater to the steam generators for decay ) heat removal. No vulnerability related to USI A-45 Decay Heat Removal, has been i identified. 3 l.4.2 Containment Performance (Level 2) Findings 1 ! The St. Lucie Units 1 '& 2 large dry containment design provides adequate capability to mitigate severe accidents. No unusually poor containment performance has been !
- found. A chart of the containment analysis resdits is shown in Figure 1.4-2. {
. The greatest threat to containment integrity is due to a loss of all containment heat }
removal during an accident where the RCS is at high pressure. Steam generation I without the ability to remove heat and condense steam increases the likelihood that , high pressure melt ejection at vessel breach can fail the containment.
. A key feature of the St. Lucie containment design is that for almost all accident sequences, the reactor cavity is flooded with water. This decreases the likelihood of ;
reactor vessel failure due to ex-vessel cooling ~ and results in lower releases (due to >
. retention of fission products in the RCS and scrubbing of ex-vessel fission products by the water) compared to if the vessel were to fail and the core were to fall on a dry l cavity floor. :
The open design of the St. Lucie containment means thr.1 loctl hydrogen accumulation (identified in Generic Letter 88-20.. Supplemtent 3. containment .
- performance improvement issues) is not a significant contribution to containment !
l failure. 5 4
, The St. Lucie Unit 1. and Unit 2 PRA has been performed in a manner consistent with the objectives stated in Generic Letter 88-20 and the results found that there are no plant unique sevem i accident vulnerabilities.
- 1.5 Report Organization Section 2 of'NUREG-1335, " Individual Plant Examination: Submittal Guidance" provided a standard Table of Contents for submittals in response to Generic Letter 88-20. This report adhems ;
to the standard format as far as practical. The following provides a brief guide to this report's !
. organization:
l.0-5 of 8 : D
=, . . - .
' St. Luele Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal ' Revision 0 SECTION 1.0 - Executive Summary - Overview of the project. its scope and results.
SECTION 2.0 - Examination Description - Details on what methods were applied to perform 4 , the various components of the analysis, discussion on how the intent of Generic letter 88-20 [ was met by the analysis. SECTION 3.0 - Core Damage' Analysis: " Front-End Analysis" - Details on the Internal Events analysis leading up to the core damage condition (includes the Accident Sequences,
.. Systems Analysis. Internal Flooding Analysis, Reliability data, Human Reliability Analysis.
- Quantified Core Damage Sequences, results of the " Front-End" work performed, and -
proposed resolution of any USIs and GSIs addressed by the St. Lucie PRA).. , SECTION 4.0 - Containment Performance Analysis: "Back-End Analysis"- Details on the ; j features of the St Lucie containment structures, core and plant damage state binning, containment' systems " bridge" tree, Containment Event Tree, quantification of containment failure modes and radionuclide release characterization. { SECTION 5.0 - Utility i'articipation and Internal Reviews - Project organization, project reviews, major comments and their resolution. I t SECTION 6.0 - Plant. Improvements and Unique Safety Features - Discussion of how l potential vulnerabilities were analyzed and any countermeasures identified. I l SECTION 7.0 - Summary of Results and Conclusions. i 1.6 Section 1.0 References r 1.0-1 NRC Generic Letter 88'-20,ludividual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities. November 23.1988. 1.0-2 EPRI-NP-3583. Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure (SHARP),1984. 1.0-f, of 8
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- m. St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 IPE Submittal Revision 0 l l
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