ML20080G835
| ML20080G835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1983 |
| From: | Woods T ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080G796 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-83-598 NUDOCS 8402140028 | |
| Download: ML20080G835 (339) | |
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Inspector: l,./E. ACPffBffd6fyn!W i
Question List Name: 84 u TE/f G # Work for: Organization M c N rA=4- _
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Date: _ $/?2./56'*2 f
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- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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Inspector: /Ep/gpeggrevppy Question List !
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Inspector: b. 6 ) 2 DE5X?B E4MEc V M Question List Name: A // u E'/pFLE Work for: Organization /ECN TEf Craft:I g/ FC , ' Date: 7/M/ef 3-Years on site: lYy YKS-fu on & j _. hgg g 4 9 ,i g s g o e r -
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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How's the QC here?
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- 4. knat do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? '
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Inspector: F/ Aw
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Question List Name- b/d' A ./ Work for: Organization .c,CI .
9 -/S ~[]
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Craft $ [ ec-[N, Date:
Years on site: 7 Questions
.; 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
f/*LC # , ,
- 3. How's the QC here?
Mw W c vr -
Jss-en e S & l Wm }N b C<
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should kno about? _
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Inspector: P ff [/a _...
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Question List Name: 0,m e,)t hta.w Work for: Organization e.cll'u !
Crafti fbrLl fim o w Date: ?- lE $5 1
Years on .-ite: J-d !
l Questions
- 1. Any prob:ims with quality of work?
O I
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Inspector:
Question List Name: pp V Work for:- Organization -
r/[I[
Crafti t' Date: Ff/J J Years on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. ?.
Anymanagementpressureto"cutcorners"Y/*
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- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? ,
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,' ,
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Inspector:.
9,uestion 1.ist Name:
- h/* / Work for: Organization -
M .
Crafti , - ,
s Date: $, /) 7 f3 Years on site: E Questions 3
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 0
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- 3. How's the QC here?
h0 S
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
frs$frMJ f/ b ktn d 4 ft o
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? 1 fp .'
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Inspector: /r Question List Name: #9 4 &### Work for: Organization #
Crafti [ /-
Date:
f /[ 8 Years on site: [
Questions l 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
- 3. How's the QC here? / //# /* #/T/ "&
/s, 3oya,., e d 9 % [A W Je f vf /, f(f f/*f #1
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
! )pt vyk ! /P $4/0 W 5.
fn //mi yr/ a //l<r.<- /
Is there ar.ything NRC should know about? ,' _
O .
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< 4 Inspector: -
f 0 Question List Name: - e AIA/ -
Work for: Organization - . .
Craftt h !MEOib. Date: _
- /3 ' ,
Years on site: 8
- Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 , ,
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- 3. How's the QC here? I .
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC[should know about? .
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i Inspectnr: M k
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Question List Name: b. 4- Work for: Organization -
Craft:.& 1 AlbG hD Date: ~ / Y- S3 -
Years on site: v Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
M# .
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 ,
i MM i
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- 3. How's the QC here?
O 6 .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
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inspector: M"
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t Question List Name: i /' Work for: Organization -
Craft:: 60 '/NDE Gb cate: 9 /Y-83 -
Years on site: ,
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
Mb. . ,
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Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
2.
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- 3. How's tha QC here? .
- 4. What do you feel is mar.agements attitude toward quality?
?1 .
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Inspecto_r: - Wr .
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Question List _
Name: . , dlS# -
Wopk for: Organization -
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Craftf /l)M [])DE'hbDate: h- /f- kY -
Years on site: // I /'
c
- Questions i 1. Any problems with quality of work? ,
/
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 l
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- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
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n Inspector: - @Mr l U L .
Question List I
9 Name: _
.W Work for: Organization A -
Craft 1 Y kYV)b ' h ate: ~lY' D -
Years on site A Questions _
- l. Any problems with quality of work?
kM
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",?
- M
- 3. How's the QC here?
0o j .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward qual _ity?
6
- 5. Is there cr' thing NRC should know about? .
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Inspector: f/ M Question List Name: . _
Work for: Organization -
Crafti I , h_ b Date: h - / "h3 -
Years on sit $M /
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 i g-t
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
I
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l 5. Is there anything NRC should know about _
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Inspcetor: M, 1 o /
Question List Name: / gud./ Work for: Organization 1 -
Craft! / !//N6 Date: "/ ~
b-Years on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
OM A.
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
UV1A i
- 3. How's the QC here?
l 4. What do yuu feel is managements attitude toward qualityl l
0 9
Is there anything NRC should know about?
5.
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Inspector: - Ul.4CA_
0 C -
Question List Name: Work for: Organization .
Craftikoed 2/S $ $ h b Date: / 'd -
Years on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
NOMA W'
- 2. Any management pressure to ' cut corners"?
i M
- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
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Inspector:-. mmc U 0 -
Question !.ist Name: . Work for: Organization s .
Craft:: 4 M Date: / 'b -
Years on site:
- Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? . -
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Insp cter:-.- @ .
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Question List
.9 - ,
Name: . h. dvl -
Work for: Organization s. .
Craft} f0 ' l $ 5 S & gate: [/ y- Ph ' .
Years on site:
{ Questions
! - 1. Any problems with quality of work? ,
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners".? -
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
5, Is there anything NRC should know about? -
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- Inspect r:- _ /.
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Question List Name:
W ork for: Organization -
Craft- bheh, dh 0M% Date: ~lf Sb -
Years on site
[ ()'estions
- 1. Any problems with quality of verL?
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.. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
4 What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
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inspector:
g gj f4, Myf06/L Question List Name: _kf b, /I/4.L Work for: Organization #9, Crafti [2 d67)f / d/4N .5 Date: 9-P-[9 Years on site: A6 /b Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
2
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
W/W$
- 3. How's the QC here?
h00N N
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
No f&W"t S-l l
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,-
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k Inspector: DJ
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- h. % fgeLL l h loN-Question List Name: 67/ /////dM Work for: Organization 4 #5 Craft [ [//67N/ 6/M Date: 9' 9~83 Years on site: $ r/Eg bD#bY
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Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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3.
How's the QC here?
f8/YW hChY
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? '
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Inspector:. I f
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Question List
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Name: A Work for:-Or anization -
Crafti d Ash, h Date: k// b -
Years on site: d Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
BOX.d,
- 2. Any management press re to " cut corners"? ,
hg f fe #4 j AX A h; -
1
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
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Inspector: d A be%
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Question List -
Na;ae: bl] /u 3 h Work for: Organ'ization .
Craft [ 6. Date: 9- /3 b2 Years on site: 4IL i
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
/
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
A
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? I '
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Inspector: C[ b% ~
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Question List :
Name: 'I r) A ]Nb- Work for: Organization M)beh .
Craft: hfil k Date: 7- /2 cP3 m Years on site: 2 /L Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
Y pp . u r. : f"'~J'
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
i
- 3. How's the QC here?
/lp,r 9 Jd"
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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Is there anything NRC should know about? ,'
5.
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Inspecter:- [8d4Td/M i
guestionList
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Name: 4dc S4/4M Work.for:. Organization [ 8 IC#[-7 . -
Crait:. T ]/ MJ S Z h J U $ A U $
Date: - f, l O ,
Years on site: _] .
Ouestions 4
- 1. Any problems with kuality of work? -
/VO
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
NW5$$// /fNW
- 3. How's the QC here?
s d.2M0
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality't . .
fhof$ . .
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ..
//[f ff fotM//.0/AJS 7b EWSRN/Nb A b$W ZAMc/fM7ddJ l'dNBAS ffc lg'sJs' / Ng/2 Ses/' SAC '7H/J ' '.
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sus.ne aro. r/;r/n.
Inspector: (4/ b /
Question List 2
Name: _bfe4. Lucks Work for: Organization kWFrL ,
Craft? [L.scrAler4A/ Date: T*f5~ f 5 Years on site: _h thA86 W 8.4. k Questions
- 1. Anyproblemswithqualityofwork?g,gg
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? g ,,,, g g g gjgg y pops,y
%OMYtost4L MF 48/41/MFS 70 90 or Ar$+*r //c You ft4We PN9 AMel?tod to n.s6 Resst .
- 3. How's the QC here? (p g sf e y
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? g
- 5. IsthereanythingNRCshouldknowabout?[ ,
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Inspecto,r: h.MJ8/Ar/ _
l Questien List l Name: --[ /tA(4 4 D U l r # ,_ M . Work for: Organization 8sianz.
Crafti [1ferArcseW Date: 9'/$~P 5 Years on site: M9 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
, $44MY $99m$ T9 BG ests.c. O61s7.
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? ggy 4L8t$YJ GIV6pf &gupy-gt y$,se& N g,ey~ eerentet 00686 OAO$**LY.
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- 3. How's the QC here? y p empseteet8teerJ eAny MSG Mttet06 t RM4tFifD
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? ,,
4??thade /t M # MiY d "N ## W ^ ^ ^ ^8 " F" l
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? [o ,
g _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .. ~.-.
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i hW Inspector: @. det/v/
Question List Name: ,_ki ck. _her;/ryys Work for: Organization 85rgywe l
l Craft? fL6c. IWJ}esteyt Date: $~l] T5 I
Years on site: 6 A.
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? /V8# C
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here? f y ggg y 4 g f y, , pq , y g y, y
- MY he*SF AF&tt/sw/ 4Ab Jpoc yyy,
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
Tkfir'RF MesdY3 NfM/M6 10 967- TNivpr Donwr *H dekeekL6 '
04Y !!"184fM*Y temPAenetre y>tg gard $ery ett )ptc week.
l S. Is there anything NRC should know about? g ,'
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Inspector: @.844taf Question List Name: bs Fe 4ev work for: organization ed.utet Crafti CIArarmerAN Date: Wl5f5 Years on site: _1YA f - 2. My eeng Yeds W /17$ 45 wesect's Me&fA Questions n e, Aggggpersy pseryspp., eyer.T eer WYJ
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? g,gg
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? # F M
- 3. How's the QC here? g , q q gg l
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. IsthereanythingNRCshouldknowabout?%
f . ._._ .. _. . .
i Inspector: r/
Question List Name: pm / Work for: Organization / /ArrY/ .
Craft:I . f s'/fnw Y Y Jhr Date: ,/2 /$ N Yeat-s on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
O l
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
/ O
- 3. How's the QC here?
CD
- Nff <7' Way r .
o< a /d<nv / fy m p ' .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
00
- 5. Is there anything NRC ould know about? -
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Inspector:. hNM_
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Question List Name: hAA.A fxt - Work for: Org nizat on 4 91 _
Crafty lf klbr Date: 0 $3 - Y Years.on site: [hio d7/
O 1)
Questions
- 1. Any p.oblems with quality of work?
W
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
- 3. How's the QC here?
oe tr7^ . .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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9 Inspector: h4'4
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Question List Work for:- Organization e A Name: _ .
/ - 1 Craft: bfacb of?E-nf),W Date: '53~$3 -
Years on site: -
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
LMA [d
- 2. Any managevM oressure to " cut corners"?
!V G4A
- 3. How's the QC here?
/ %
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
W^- 0u 6
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
ib./ -
7 Insp;cter:- MMi .
Question List Name: ! -
Work for:- Organization .
Craft: N/M ' (( Date: hM 3-Years on sit : 3 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
DYLR $
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",?
i Y M
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
1 l
l S. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
,WA VJ m%&
L a-s. J trau A 1%4 ha. d~[I$ aad *
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Insp cter: - Mf
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Question List
. ., I Hame: A Work for: Organization -
Craft: hb h Date: h b-Years on tite: ,
Questions
- 1. Any problems with kuality of work?
i ED'L R.
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- 2. Any managem'nt pressure to " cut corners",7 CW
- 3. How's the QC here?
'u
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
1 ,
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
1 O 1;
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Inspector:- M, ll d' .
Question List -
Name: L Ac -
im Work for: Organization -
Craft: [h bc[ A I/b Date: ' h 3 '~ 3-Years on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
/dcW, f
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? I c 2O f
- 3. How's the QC here?
l/w~ c -
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
Of '
6
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
3n,pwpdL
Inspector; bMc 0 () .
Question List i Name: -
kb Work:for: Organization bA -
Craft: O '-
b(,
Date:
' ~
Years on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
h YTW s.
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 ,
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- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
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49
.& 49
'k?'k!>'d# IMAGE EVALUATION ///jg/f .bfb Nff77 \'" $ff
\ TEST TARGET (MT-3) NT =/ ]f V (g1 4+f %g%jf l.0 M E[y p;;;;I!CIE i.i [ m HE 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 l
4- -
150mm >
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Inspector: [
Question List _
Name: <ey el E < /9 Work for: Organization -Me [M/' .
Craft: ke k,/ , Date: ?kf/S5 Years on site: /
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do ou feel 's managements attitude toward quality? ~
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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i Insp;ctcr:'- Oh4f ~
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Question 1.ist Name: [M [L Work for: Organization . M -
Craft: -
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Date:
/
3 -
Years on . site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
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1 Inspec tor:-"- hMk 0
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Question List Name: & h- ,
Work for: Organization b/\ -
Craft: k ~
Date: 8-t Years on site:
f Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
1
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
, /J n
- 3. How's the QC here?
/
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- 4. k' hat do you feel is managementg attitude toward quality?
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! 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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Inspector:_ -[. 9z[/2/d.
i Question List :
Name: 97h.hA M Work for: Organization wd8 Craft c-s us-Date: . b ,a d, 1 3 ,, / 9, 7 R _
Years on site: 1 vrL Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
I
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
Wh t
- 3. How's the QC here?
Good . .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
boo
- 5. Is there anything NP.C should know about?
i Inspector: _ i/g ,
Question List i
Name: ,#he Work for: Organization bejd[
Craft? .f Afm Date: ,& ) 7, J t) f *$
Years on site: 7, g
,/, c, Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
i Nb
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
YO
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
00 l
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
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I Inspector: - c4 rku' I Question List Name: ttboks Work for: Organization -
c . l Craft! ic,d i e[ Date: 3/27/.63 Years on site: 3 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
i' Mo, cod wor k
- ~ -
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 bo
- 3. How's the QC here? I 000b , TD cc 5 Os kW ?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Inspector: -
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Question List Work for: Organization Name: . // )4 y -
Craft: /v$w / +- Date: J[ -
Years on site: a /wf//s Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
6
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 1
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- 3. How's the QC here?
l 4. What do you feel is managements attitu toward quality?
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Question List Name: - o I? ev 7--
Work for: Organization ,
de/ /
Craft: E k t fys e / ,, i, ' Date: So b 2 'l -
y Years on site: />~ Mea Vs-
///d n /on Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
6
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here? .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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Inspectnr: /
Question List
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Name: br @ )< -
Work for: Organization Lu}
Craft- [Yb Date: -
3 -
Years on site: ! I/ '
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
NW l
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
1 OV J (
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Insp ctor: MM r.
Question List 3 Name: k . Work- for:- Organization Craft *! ! Date:
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Years on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
%/L9
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
I W&
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
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t Inspector: WW, ,
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Question List Name: Work for: Organization n
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Date:
Years on site:
Questions i
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
M' l t
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 li M L
- 3. How's the QC here? '
l % a l
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
lvo
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Inspector:-
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Question List h ,
Name: I /N Work for: Organization '
Craft; h Date: YO-Years on site: 3 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
i M
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
M
- 3. How's the QC here?
V
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
O-
9 i Insp:ctor:' 'd Y Y .-
Question List Name: / Work for: Organization < 2 Craft: h ((#b 6 //S$3 Date: ' Mbb-Years on site:
Af O
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Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
i f v6
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is man &gements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know abo'. ? e 4 v A cr3 GI (C 4 8 '
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Inspector:'- .h/ f f [ ,
Question List Name: 1 Arw Work for: Organization t_ M '
Craft: d[4e thk DIM k Date: ' OI'< 3 Years on site: .
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
dC l
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",?
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- 3. How's t,e QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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Inspector: C [. f/m ,
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Qu5stionList Name: 7hlk [Mm_d Work for: Organization .ec/
Craft; bI. -
Date: 9'- 1 -83 I
Years on site: Nf Questions i 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
- 3. How's the QC here?
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l 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? 7)ce, U f./.d /id., N-i
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., - 3 Inspector: f./ , 0a%
Question List Name: [r W)%. Work for: Organization 'cc d .
Craft- hdvN Date: 9/ C//75 Years on site:-- 3 - u.,
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- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
V 0h
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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l 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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- i. l Inspector: ./I Y .
Question List Name: Nh b$J+ Work for: Organization , * )aA Craft; $N Date: 9 - /I <P 1 Years on site: 7 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
W
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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t Inspector: f./f. b ,
Question List Name: $ 1 .[ l) e Ic Work for: Organization u-Crafti b[4I Date: 1-D-[3-Years on site: I ,
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Questions
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
Inspector:-/[ 6[/2/
Question List Name:
.A. DevTs work for: organization det J,h / .
Craft- 3[Jer$hbq Date: Sc. w[.
Q I "1 , 1 4 f ;f Years on site: 41 )/#_ o r_e f
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
Yh
- 2. .i ly management pressure to " cut corners"?
I
- 6 -
- 3. How's the QC here?
Good .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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g . // w M Date:
- - ,. )'2 15. 7 f3 Years on site:
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Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
l
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
. 60
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
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Question I.ist Name: 14 -
. Work for: Organiz tion . .
Craft: (f ) Jr Date: $/l0 Vh -
Years on site: ! !'
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
N
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
i l! 3. How's the QC here?
M
- 4. What do you feel is manag nts attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Question List Name: - #4 -
, Wark for: Organ zat on d Craft is Date: k8 b '
Years on site: ch' ! '
Questions I
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
07 Q
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
- [ 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you -feel is managemen s attitude toward au3lity?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should knew about? ,
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Inspect ~.r: N f U 6 .
Question List Name: -
Work for: Or nization -
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Craft: '
Date: k /8 [3 -
Years on site:
fi"
/
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Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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.2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
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- 3. How's the QC ere?
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- 4. What do you feel is manapments attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? , ,
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y 3 Inspector: -
Question List
-Name:. M- '
Work-for:-Organization -
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d 3 Craft: 'h [l/ rd- Date: - -
Yearsonste:! !
Questions .
I 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? ,
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', 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ;' -
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Question List Name: - 6 -
Work- for: Organization .
Craft:, f)hh Date: kP_3 - -
Years on site: [
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
NCNV i
- 3
(" 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
i ON6
- 3. How's the QC here?
)
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- 4. Wiiat do you feel is managements attitude toward qualit/?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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Inspecter: -
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l Question List Name: hp e -
g Work for:-Organization eII/_
Craftj lp o s w a r b e $69/b)Date: /3-. -
Years on site:
,Y Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
f i
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- 2. Aqy r.anagement pressure to " cut corners"?
i f9 .
- 3. How's the QC here? h[- 4 r(
l/4 fbt E $N
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,-
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'_ Question List Name: _
Work for: Orga ization MG ' .
Craftf __ Od @ ate: />
Years on site: d '
i Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
A&" 6" V stA9 ,
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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! 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know aboutt ,
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Question List
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- Name: - I -
Work-for: Organization. - [b .
h D & Date:. Ylb:
Craft: Y *
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Years on site: k '
- Questions .
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? -
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- 3. How's the QC here? - .
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? 7 , . .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ;" . r .f. M.
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Question List Name: - .
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Work-for: Organization d .
Craft 3, hate: / Y-4 / / / \
Years on site: [ '
Questions
- 1. Any problems ~ with quality of work?
hW ~
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managementy attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? '", - ,. '. .
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b Question List
~. 3 ,
Name: - '. U * ~
. Work-for: Organization.
Crafti k' [Date: .
/? b - ' -
Years on site:
O8 '
Questions i 1. Any problems with quality of work?
'N' W -
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- 2. Any management' pressure to " cut corners",7
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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. :2 What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 4. .
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[ 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? . , ,
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Inspector:
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Question List Name: h. )TFf -
. Work-for: Organization. - .
Craft: D d '
-Date:. / b' j Years on site: [ ~
- Questions l 1. Any problems with quality of work? .
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here? , .g . .
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? -
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
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. Question List
.Name: b 4 -
. Work-for: Organization -
Craft:
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M ate: '
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/49 73
/ .
Years on site: O-Questions
- 1. Any problems'with kuality of work? -
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 Ncrvie .
- 3. How's the QC here? e
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- 4. What do you teel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? '
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t Inspector: b. bTACU,$
Question List 2
Name: E.1C,ll bD(p65 Work for: Organization IllldlM(n
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Craftt; If8IlM KL43 b l W $3 Date: Q-If.-83 Years on site: 1 Mount Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
3D h/M bi M MiAJ100 Stli45
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Inspector: b. h/M Question List i Name: NWM IdkN Work for: Organization YI UU[r Craftt; SPflMklEl bTTEld Date: 9-1l.-$.3 Years on site: IT07Nis Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
No fd0d(EkJ WEE % FooM siri FAaft446-Poidt.
l 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
l MO.
- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
d1530 47t#1006 Src#7EL 72nJV2h @StW.
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
No.
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L Question List Work for: Organization Name: ,
Craftg.j /7fM Date: 7-7 I3 Years on site: I/[M QU3stion3
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
n wo# eau i
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? $ 2 // 7 F FA( +
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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Inspector: b'OC+c
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Question List Name: Work for: Organization @ C.
Craftt, ,/p ([I@I Date: @ * / O '-- 8 1 Years on site: EO Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
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- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here? -
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?, -
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i i Inspector: d% r l
Question List i I Name: Work for: Organization -' l i
Crafty, e5 (M W [ M M ate: '7 / ON2
- Years on site
- 3 Questions 4
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
li
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? [j
- 3. How's the QC here?
I i
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
i
Inspectsr: 2. [
puestionList Name: #/Nd"#^
- Work for: Organization NI !
Craft; hs)lr-fr e er Date: $sf ()
Years on site: /
Questions
- 1. Any problems with of W2 f ktf0C#11 O!7/'
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, 2.
up&e:iG14&&
Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude towa quality?
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- 5. Is-there anything NRC should know about?
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Inspector: --7-3 c)A 6 0/ M.
Question List Name: 1), 'DA U/ O S 0 M Work for: Organization J!W/7F [
Crafte ANAestri Elec. cate: 9/o/f.1 ~.
Years on site: /
1 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
QOh l
1 i
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners?
/T/8
- 3. How's the QC here?
M
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
f)cCgif2A/T
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
l l
1
Inspector: Z'[4/M6/
Question List Name: d 7)/dSA/f Work for: Organization 3 //MI CraftL /dMW)C/WW Date: V fI Years on site: 8
- Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
s (yo e &
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"'
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? y g .,
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Inspector:-- Ine/ESd/
Question List Name: //[6 Work for: Organi ti I .
Craftt. M, -
- 2 Date: 7,,
Years on site: 7 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
A/c2
'1
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
Mo
- 3. How's the QC here?
04W-9/ sp AV2 Mg4s Is rv Je //twr>fwap
~P A%Dc'c5/NsMP)' .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
//EAf &- AJ6 &f5S i
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
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_ . . . - , , - . . - . , ~ , , . , . -.. ,,,_. ,, ,..,. - .-.
Inspector: - M t/ M & M Question List Name: M [# M /d Work for: Organization 8 _
Craft: Z4' 0r/ /A)aph/
~
Date: 990 Years on site: 3 4}go Q_)agggp gg) QLj/gf g/pp____g Questions
- 1. Any probitms with quality of wirk?
/VU
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?'
Al d
- 3. How's the QC here?
YWf $0Act/8f
! 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
\ S M & OA/ ?
b' M / f o' s/716'2.
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
Ho
~
Inspector: [ 84/886/ ,
Question List Name: [4 6 [ M A/ 6#K Work for: Organization , [ C V M Crafty TbAl hb?hfk Date: Vf9f[]*
gi -
Years on site:
/
~
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
, yd i
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
NJ
- 3. How's the QC here?
M
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
EWf&0-
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
po -
4 1,
=
Insp:ctor:V, [#NMd/M t
Question List Name: 88 Work.for:. Organization L#(//M .
Craft:,
- N////0MNF ' Date: k!/4 M f, -
Years on site: 2 -
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
ps
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
/O ,
- 3. How's the QC here?
Gro0
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
&cQ ff7f/>ER, . N4494*#A/fA/'/
M zs ik<>'g.cg62" toA0 0G, t
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
1 h.
1
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Inspector: 4/. MAAM/
Question List
+
Name: Mays 8FpatsW Work for: Organization _8schrs4.
Craft 1 fil*CFITYF I MAFLbdA
~
Date: Y" f" $h Years on site: Y Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? po#6
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? goN6 e
- 3. How's the QC here? WMWF966FM&f f neektetrNcresti "f*TM /F .E tegn QIQ TRY 70 L9Y 4 SAO ss4Ae $Att' $ Y, 5'M o
$AF 11947 tFC wouAb e4 rest or,
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? Geob "Tmv'er asways 'syssine ses to rnare os n. yr.org AMb e* or pron y, "
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? [p , -
I 1
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Inspector:7 LJ ),) n r $ 5 Question List Name: Mt[e._ It blE> v Work for: Organization Craftg htafk i ' Elk Date: 4-9-83 Years on site: 3#
~V Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
l h 4AIP
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
l hN
- 3. How's the QC here? )
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitt de toward quality? .
' i l
l i
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .,
1
%C
~ _
Inspector- . Id. Nav r 3 Question List Name: ,d a -
.x , t. EE -
, Work for: Organization b Craft,s wg, bbE y-Date: 9 73 -
~
Years on site: 44s 4 Questions
[ 1. Any problems with quality of work?
! O t
l 2. Any management pressure to'" cut corners",7 N
- 3. How's the QC here? <
5
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
eq/ -
, i l
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .
l s
Inspector:- ,f , N ,
y > ,' e Question List
.' 't Name:! W l w Work for: Organization 22dq b 1 -
Luff h Craft:: 4 Date: -
7 I Years on site: 6uh 0~
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
I.
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut cornersd 7 ,
9
- 3. How's the QC here?
I . .
1*
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
l 1
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ]
v -- .. - - - - -
i
- . -l l
l Inspector: -]. N. M e,-[t<
,- l Question List Name: [aA -
Odd Rl A) A Work for: Organization . ._,
9 f S
~
Craft:* 'Mafdtive Date: -
\. V y Years on site: bAW
'9 Questions
, 1. Any problems with quality of work?
b
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
(
- 3. How's the QC here?
O .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
M 'd i
- 5. Is there anything NRC'should know about? ,
i l*
t .
Inspector: bMM -,
l 0 L .
l Question List Name: Aful
- Work for: Organization / Cr h Craft)
Date: 5 '
Years on site: 3 .
Qitestions l 1. Any problems with quality of work?
i fah L b}-5 n & ~ L'&&(Ah ""
- fr %' C& rda bi-3 & AtaAAj. %n j
2.
~/ - a o @ .
Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
Mb Y
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
Sw A dt.4 c
l l 1 fDam) u -
l
1
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a ds '
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dal~t M 1.
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Inspector: -
77LMA U 6' .-
Question List Name: - 8[ -
Work for: Organization MIb -
Crafts [/. ECTA/CAk/ ~
Date: [9 3 -
Years on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
O L l
f
.b
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
- ND.I /1 o Mb ,
- 3. How's the QC here?
V 3 geA ! W A m d & qd alt ~.
- 4. What 'do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
.h & '
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
hD. Uf N A ,
44%AkAsw sAmd A&p Ph L Ad 6 a cf acr i . -
M, $M, Inspector: --
{ Question List
=
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Name: M 2678/60@ Work for: Organization M
- Craft 3 $$Cf f/fodd Date: V'lON.$ _
Years on site: M Questions l
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
Ak % ttn>rnfM GvKtfff 1H ps/K 1 8//eua0Tw thNfeaf TH41 ??wy die CAMW.rmeAl loro Do QvMory tuWr.
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
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- 3. How's the QC here?
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- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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l
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .,
~
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Inspector: MM [TM I .
Question List Name: MO4O A/MrodJ Work for: Organization _ d@fsb Craft $ $ f l fifttfG. Date: T-/O-ff Years on site: 7-@ 3 @
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
/ 10 f 4 0 0 (A M J $18T W lit E OJ h lTY ff Tktf hfndEr
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
//G Akt /kb Afo fgg. reps h7 nd Ut+1 7b CUT fatWrA3
- 3. How's the QC here?
TeVCtf He $7hCf. QC IkJtsyJ sd 77ta n/bdt kT AE;
@ Met 1.'
l
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
Aro Retfed.tf 7b TNrJ SdenaM.
! 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,,
)201Hft/6 7b REfet/ hl>V-
Inspector: I //
Question List Name: 2e/>< Work for: Organization /r !.
Craftg '
/rrt r- Date: 9f
/
~
Years on site: [
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
ffMi
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
l
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about?
ll0 ~
l
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l
Inspector:
Question List
' ~
Name: Work for: Organization Craft?
/'
!/kIM((/-M '
Date: 7 // f 7 f
'/ / f Years on site: e_
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
i i 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
Y
- 3. How's the QC here?
6 1
l
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
- -p ,fyr.s* -/ 0#
l Qk12 s S
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
f Of /7// SP ,
&n ,o n#- % /L-s
i 4 1 .
3 j9spector:s /r/
Question List Name: /f1//*d' 7-- '
Work- for: Organization - p//[ _
Crafti Od*, e
~
Date: I /d Id f un known (/
1ents on site:
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of- work?
llc) 9 .
l
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? ~
44 .
t
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel .is managements attitude toward quality?
~ ~
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
~
. 4fo .
. y,s--/:/y .
A
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i .
Inspector: - tr Question List
/fMW / I Name: - #4 SM- Work for: Organization i vY '
1' -
kks-Craftg Date: fyr,//O )*l-y-
~
Years on site: [ y rs-
/ .
Questions i
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?..
! / Vo .
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
- 3. How's the QC here? [p/
dv/ k.< /
, ~
r Cr / Nf b
sr ,Xf Yk/ SV n A ff w d sn a L,,, a y ,y/ *
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? ,
hoc >f.
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? s
..p,, ;
1 s *
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- - . , - . - . - y . _ _ , , , . . - - - ++ --'v.-
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Inspector:
Question List Name: . v5 Work for: Organization -/ FII/ .
Crafty bir2/Yh Date: by /0 Y3-V V .
Years on site: S y'r.r
/
- Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 l !
AG
- 3. How's the QC here?
hoc) r tVisj f' f/ hein 'far/ O
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? p g, ,
M l' ns P.r ' f d'6/r /]f sk/ m ,-,t A A
/ //
/d' wnd frIf /
RN Rfreynt/
- 5. .Is there anything NRC.should know about? v-
= - .'. . .
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Inspect 7r: tr-t Question List Name: VN Work for: Organization -
/I /.
Craftt $ W W N 'q W Date: $s/ /N $~Y Years on site: M f P'/'s
/ ,
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? .
!! YV i
l
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
/K
- 3. How's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
[r's j / kbn 6 /' O Y(f _
P/ k ko inn /97ve k *W Wdf d P/ FM /'. . d A rt f/ir f /&'#r
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
r; .- ,
,y; .#.
8,
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l
Inspector:
Question List Name: )ex L sc+ work for: organization EJ # N r.C Craft 4 F(NY Date: -
Years on site: #[ E Questions
, 1. Any problems with quality of work?
!L/ ^ -
. 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
- 3. How's the QC here?
ge (o. .
- 4. What do you . feel is managements attitude toward quality?
.r .
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,-
, yi,o%.4
- - a
M1 .
Inspector: PG
.- 1 Question List Work for: Organization Name:
Craft-Nla oN, OA, b Date:
1 Years on site: [/2. W u
Questions f 1. Any problem 3 with quality of work?
l N0.
l
- 2. Any management pressure to "c' t corners"?
- i
/J o f 3. How's the QC here?
[\
ss c) -
1 l
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
l s
e ch. ,
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? -
Q~ .. c.? __
0 -
g ~ - - -
' b M k& '
- f
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Inspector: ((6 ,
Question List Name: kPh /I d M J Or ork for: Organization "c //Eb 1
Crafti d Date:
Years on site: i Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
0
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
})0
- 3. Mcy's the QC here?
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? .,
)Y0 '
j 'j -
Inspector:-_. Ock Question 1.ist Name: b" c Work for: Organization MSes .
Craft 1 n2# Mb Date:
Years on s te: $Mw U Questions l 1. Any problems with quality of work?
k'
- l] W 2 Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
- 3. How's the QC here? -
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
Q .-C. c A ,
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? <,
bd .
l-t
i
- Inspector: /[gb l' .
Question List Name: Work for: Organization .
Crafty //M N'b Date:
Years on site: / m_ -K Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
A
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
!h
- 3. How's the QC here?
~
8 .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,,
00.
l
Inspector:
[MC' Question List Name: 3 8ON d Work for: Organization 8d.
Al O6 ' M
~^
Craft; Date: -
Years on site: /d m - N Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
EN
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
Nol
- 3. How's the QC here?
De '
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? )
1 l
( 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,,
l 40-
f
[
V Inspector: f[f.h Question List Name: '
kh k% Work for: Organization .
Craftf MO 'A Date: -
Years on site: 4 ?
Questions
, 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
r t
- 3. How's the QC here?
O .esE-D .
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
t l 8 Is there anything NRC should know about?
- 5. l .
Ds i
r , , , , . ..--# . _, - -_,_ ,
y), .
Inspector: .
I Question List Name: We Work for: Organization c,cI
' ~
Date: -
Craftf Years on site: ' 7%M 0
Questions
,! 1. Any problems with quality of work?
C' ~
N J ,'
l' l
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
. - , 7 .- ~u-- -
- 3. How's the QC here? -
?
Y I
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality'l k
we
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? y
()D~
~ .v -- - _ . , . - - - .. - -
Inspector: [b _
Question List Name:
- Work for: Organization -
FCl1NP /
dE LQA.
Craft: Date: - -
Years on site: / %
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
O'
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
i h O*AJ &
- 3. How's the QC here?
A
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
\'
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,,
d.
k Inspector:
Question List Name: Work for: Organization Craft? 8%~p f .
Date: -
Years on site: / F ^ -- - %
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
\[
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
A) 3 -
- 3. How's the QC here?
l l [b .
l 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
l i
l
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,,
nsp ctir: 6 Question List Name: 31_# Work for: Organization O Craft: Af 9F Y.h\ Date:
"'*~~
Years on site: i%
l Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"?
Y N
- 3. How's the QC here?
Ca o \3
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? .
Is there anything NRC should know about?
- 5. -
t l
l i
-\
l' i Inspector:
(
N k.
Question List Name: _
7' Work for: Organization Craftf DM '
Date: . -."
Years on site: %v Questions 4
. 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- N i
. 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
^
- 3. How's the QC here? -
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
5 I
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,
pw. __=~
d Inspectar: [kC ,
Question List Name:
- Work for: Organization d. .
'a li e.
Date: '"T Craftg Years on site: 4km
\ 0 Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work?
- N ,
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7
- 3. How's the QC here? -
, D,
,e-t-rc -
.s
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
l
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,,
i s
I l
I ,
l
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l
- ,.~ .- --
/ .
/
Inspector:
I~
((C Question List '
Name: b -
-Work for: Organization CP .
Craff: C , ')) nN^ Date:
~
Years on site: vvO p %.
Questions
, 1. Any problems with quality of work?
I
- w. _
. 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 A
- 3. How's the QC here?
&G..h . -
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
,- .o .:.
j 5. Is there ar.ything NRC should know about? $
- i I
l g
i
i 1- . .
Inspector: NArhok o
Question List ,
Name: ad O scA Work for: Organization .
Craft: b Ti>]Ihkfhbp3
'I Date: 3 f10!b 3 Years on site: 3 wcwbs Co-,as
% Qwc1
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? }do
- i
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? MV
- 3. How's the QC here? Q . . ,) b o k 6Me s M s b ss Mtv9". Gb a oSD *b j po 64 scoo o g 7 .)
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? b% bed as .
b 4 ~ g L .. T erJ g - -
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? (o ,'
I i
~
k . .. .
j Inspector: hrbu _
Question List s ;
Name: hen E' D4 Work for: Organization 'bo N.w 9/o ee r PE v s nate: .e i
Years on site: 3 y rs v
Questions
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? No
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 Q
- 3. How's the QC here? g ( ,
]
i :
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? j. I: s'i p,c.a.v.t. .
e ' 0 r p . .J. 1
,::.e AM w . e. .c .?' a"{.,G s}<
3 H kv'
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? ,,
No ~
I
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Inspector: 7 3 () g [ CV -
Question List .
Harre: 8//Ot[_. 32~7/r$Ofd -
Work.for:.Organi tion .
Craft: I E/BC&C/W .
Date: -
V/
ff.-
Years on site: _ 77dC +
Quastions i
- 1. Any problems.with q'uali-ty of work? -- .
gd. ,
e s
.?-** .e <
,s l -
- 2. Any maragement pressure to " rut corners".?
,. .l p
- 3. How's the QC here?
No t
]
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? . .
8 //5A h0 h5$ .
\ Is there anything NRC should know about?
NC - ~
a j
.__._..____7 d, .
. \
.. , . . l Inspector: 7 ' [ l/ 8 8 8/
Question List , , ,
Name: EO, ,b4/MM ' '
Work.for: Organization .. .
TMAM..
9.//& M Craft: .
Date: . .
Years on site: 8/I .
i' 2,
Questions .
- 1. Any problems.with' q'uality of work? --
/t/$ .
..?
~ '
~ - - - -
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut'c'orners".7 . ,
gg . . .
- 3. How's the QC here?
GosD -
What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? ,l
- 4. . .
l Czoob . . _
t
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? , . .
A/O 6 .
. p
,-m. -+ % e ,. ~ , -,e... , , _ .- , - - . -w
. - - - - . . 7 t *
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Inspect 0r:- I//gB8/M
\
l Question List .
[ 8 E 971/ M '
Name: Work.for: Organization .
Craft:I g# 6 Date: 9 [7 i Years on site: S&;(/fA)
Questions
- 1. Any problems with q'uality of work? -
~ fD -
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners",7 Yd
- 3. How's the QC here?
YNf hMh
~
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality? . .
$ff$1/77OE .
~
I
- 5. Is there anything NRC should know about? I ,
Ald
\
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- .. . - .-.)
b~ .i .4 ,
Inspectar: h f >w Question List
. E.
Name: Rong o y ekrods Work for: Organization
-, c. ,
Crafg- tp i $(. Date: b!h r Years on site: b Lat:
Questions 2yes(@~wEQ
- 1. Any problems with quality of work? 8u rpreiel 1b' we a - 4, Ikyts e ac ,iE bgs. 7,.L.J.g wik ek
- 2. Any management pressure to " cut corners"? sef Ok *b" 6"Ed"S-
},' , b b Nde "9 'g , g ,. ,P S Pitee k b I"'b 9/0 Lb bj in 79 sessre. -N _ _ _
b inaA.1 d d (co(c d p*,pg OcR 4;As u. as 'is . IVC R ? re e9o Wig-( 4
- 3. How's the QC here? d. ik l
- 4. What do you feel is managements attitude toward quality?
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mss A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
! : namoef V i 14s0 MARIA LANE. SUITE 210 WALNUT CREEK CALIFORNIA 94908 6.e* .
c No. 50-528 Arizona Public Serv ce Company
' P. O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85 136 7
! Attention: Mr. T. G. Woods Jr.
Executive Vice President / h*
, Gentlemen:
Subject:
Constructio2 App isal Inspection 50-528/83-34 i
t This refers to the co.istr etion appraisal inspection conducted by Region V on i hSeptember6-16and26.30,11983 at Palo Verde Unit 1. The Construction
, hv Appraisal Team was coirposed of members of Region I, Region V and a number of i consultants. This innpection covered construction activities authorized by NRC Ccastruction Perant CPPR-141.
- The enclosed report icentifies the areas examined during the inspection.
g sWithin these areas, tie effort consisted of detailed inapection of selected 4
+
( T rdware subsequent to Quality Control inspections, examination of procedures k g and records, observation of work activities and interviews with management and other personnel.
} \\AppendixAtothislet er is an Executive Summary of the results of the l,' inspection and of conc: usions reached by this office. The Appraisal team
- noted no pervasive brea kdown in meeting construction requirements in the I
samples of installed ha dware inspected. However, deficiencies in installed b hardware were noted by ;he team which indicate a need for increased g
- management attention to the APS Quality Control Inspections, Work Control and 4 Quality Assurance Progra . These deficiencies include the areas of hangers
, ( and supports, control o equipment after turn-over to startup, the as-built 1 *
% inspection program, ele .rical construction and other detailed deficiencies
% discussed in the attachet report. Prompt APS management attention to the resolution of the detail deficiencies identified during the inspection is s g needed.
Appendix B to this letter ontains a list of apparent violations based on the Appraisal Team observation . Your response to this notice is to be submitted j in accordance with the pro isions of 10 CFR 2.201 as stated in Appendix B, Notice of Violation.
1 l Appendix C to this letter contains an item on one of your activities which appeared to deviate from your commitment to the NRC, as set forth in the l Notice of Deviation. Please respond to this notice Notice of Deviation. f $g s reg ~sted in thy F/
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l Arizona Public Service Company '
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of i the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the l requirements of 2.790(b)(1). l l
, The response requested by this letter (and the accompanying Notices) are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, J. B. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
- 1. Appendix A - Executive Summary
- 2. Appendix B - Notice of Violation
- 3. Appendix C - Notice of Deviation
- 4. Inspection Report 50-528/83-34 h
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Docket No. 50-528 i Arizona Public Service Company '
P. O. Box 21666 '
Phoenix, Arizona 85036 4ttention: Mr. T. G. Woods Jr.
Executive Vice President Gentlemen:
Subject:
Construction Appraisal Inspectics 50+528/83-34 i
This refers to the construction appraisal inspection conducted by Region V on i
September 6-16 and 26-30, 1983 at Palo Verde Unit 1. The Construction Appraisal Team was composed of members of Region I, Region V and a number of consultants. This inspection covered construction activities authorized by NRC Construction Permit CPPR-141.
The enclosed report identifies the areas examined during the inspection.
Within these areas, the effort consisted of detailed inspection of selected hardware subsequent to Quality Control inspections, examination of procedures and records, observation of work activities and interviews with management and other personnel.
Appendix A to this letter is an Executive Summary of the results of the inspection and of conclusiens reached by this office. The Appraisal team noted no pervasive breakdown in meeting coustruction requirements in the samples of installed hardware inspected. However, deficiencies in installed bordware were noted by the team which indicate a need for increr. sed management attention to Ae APS Quality Control Inspectiote, Work Control and Quality Assurance Progrea. These deficiencies include the areas of hangers and supports, control of equipment after turn-over to startup, the as-built inspection program, electrical construction and other detailed deficiencies discussed in the attached report. Prompt APS management attention to the resolution of the detailed deficiencies identified during the inspection is needed.
Appendix B te this letter contains a list of apparent violations based on the Appraisal Team observations. Your response to this notice is to be submitted in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201 as stated in Appendix B.
Notice of Violation.
Appendix C to this letter contains an item on one of your activities which appeared to deviate from your commitment to the NRC, as set forth in the Notice of Deviation. Please respond to this notice as requested in the ,
Notice of Deviation. !
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Arizona Public Service Company l In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a cupy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).
The response requested by this letter (and the accompanying Notices) are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to I discuss them with you. I Sincerely, J. B. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
- 1. Appendix A - Executive Sunesty
- 2. Appendix B - Notice of Violation
- 3. Appendix C - Notice of Deviation
- 4. Inspection Report 50-528/83-34 bec: RSB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Distributed by RV:
Resident Inspector Mr. Martin, RV Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Ms. Jill Morrison pink / green copies docket file copy
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RV YOUNG / dot MARTIN
, 11/ /33 11/ /83 1 _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --------- ___ _
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SUMMARY
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a eam inspection for the purpose of appraising site 3g \U
/)44 on ru t was performed at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating StatiotI j p\
lt 14 5 0 9 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS The team found basic construction to be satisfactory, although they did identify weaknesses in the conduct of final system inspections and in the -
g(p cont cre~rol iuTilitiently ofpervasive work toafter preclude turn over to the issuance of an testoperatingand*hetoperation.
license NI OFo 4h G . providing prompt and adequate corrective action is initiated in these areas. _ _,/ l 41 Y Y AREAS INSPECTED AND RESULTS Worker Interviews M The team contacted more than one hundred craftsmen or first line quality control inspectors with regard to any concerns they may have regarding the quality of work at Palo Verde.
These contacts were normally infor.nal, and wera made in private between one or two workers and rinc NRC inspector.
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The tabulated results of these contacts, the crafts rep as ted by the evntacts, and any significant details in the responses e . in the attached report. In summary, the responses were near al'. positive with regard to the quality of site'Ttm5tre .lon wor . The reservations of some with _It. gard-+c cU--Site fYendpl) w k wep/ being followed by
'either the Licensee, the NRC, or bp*hg (,,,,-
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Electrical and Instrumentation Construction The inspections in this area revealed isolated deficiencies in the thoroughness of the final inspections and/or in maintenance following testing. For instance, plywood was found left in a covered vertica able tray, and caps were left on containment nressure sensing lines. /,,,c., g,, y
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Some problems with cable separation were found. However, it was noted #
that the Licensee does have a program underway which woulJ provide for reinspection of separation in the areas examined by the NRC. None of the separation problems noted by the NRC appeared to be significant.
Additionally, discrepancies associated with concrete expansion anchor bolts supporting elecrLical raceways were found. None of these, however, were such as to represent any particular safety significance.
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l Nechanical Construction j }knexaminationof65pipehangersorsupportsoftheHPSIsystemshowed that fourteen such structures have deficiencies such as und.ersized fillet
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welds. However, deficiencies of a more significant nature 'were found in the HPSI piping inspections. For instance, a 10-inch suction line valve did not have the hand operating mechanism connected to the collar of the rising stem, and flange bolts on the same valve had not been adequately torqued. As a result, the valve bonnet was leaking.
Welding and Nondestructive Examination The NRC examined 18 circumferential and 10 socket welds in the HPSI system by independent radiography. Also, 34 welds were visually examined in the field, and the radiographs on file for 192 welds were read by NRC.
No deficiencies were found. In addition to the HPSI examinations, system radiographs and weld records for twelve welds in the primary loop were examined. Three primary loop welds in PVNGS Unit 3 was examined radiographically for comparicon of radiographic techniques with similar Licensee radiographs.
One unresolved item was identified dealing with weld ripple images which could possibly mask weld defects.
Structures Examinations in this area include copc, rete in situ testing, penetrations, structural, bolting a ( welding. Some problems with )(
bolting and welding of gallery steel were noted as described in the report.
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APPENDIY B NOTICE OF VIOLATION 1
Arizona Public Service Company Docket No. 50-528 P. O. Box 21666 Construction Permit No. CPPR-141 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 As a result of the inspection conducted between September 6, 1983, and September 30, 1983, and in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, 47 FR 9987 (March 9, 1982), the following violations were identified:
A. Appendix B, of 10 CFR 50, Criterion II, as implemented by Chapter 17 of the PSAR and FSAR, requires, in part that: "The quality assurance program shall provide control over activities affecting the quality of the 1
identified structures, systems, and components, to an extent consistent with their importance to safety."
- 1. Contrary to the above requirement, on September 10, 1983, the i
containment pressure instrumentation was incapable of performing
\ its intended safety function in that caps had been installed on j the sensing lines. Construction of the containment and pressure sensing systems had been completed, turned over from the i constructor to the licenses, and tested. No administrative requirstent existed to assure that the caps would have been.
discovered until the next scheduled containment leak rate test pursuant to the operating license requirements.
- 2. Contrary to the shove requirement, on September 10, 1983, scaffolding lumber was discovered in the channel "C" electrical raceway chase located at elevation 120 feet in the lower cable
) spreading room. These areas are reg m ed to be free of combustible Y materials.
- 3. Cc,ntrary to the above requirement, on September 14, 1983, 87 k 3/8-inch bolts were missing from the base frames for six motor control centers (NCC) of the vital AC on site power distribution system. These bolto are necessary to insure the structural integrity l of these MCC's,
- 4. Contrary to the above requirement, on September 7, 1983, the manual operator for valve SI V470 on the suction of the MPSI "A" pump was disconnected and re. sting on the sprinkler system piping.
Construction of the subsystem had been completed, turned over to the licensee, and was under going preoperational testing. There was no record of the defective and/or nonconforming condition.
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- 5. Contrary to the above requirement, on September 28, 1983, the position indicator for valve SI V402 on the suction of the HPSI "B" pump was positioned so that the valve could only be opened 30 to 35 percent. Construction of this subsystem had been completed, turned over to the licensee, and was undergoing preoperational testing.
There was no record of the defective and/or nonconforming condition.
This is a Severi el IV Vi ation, Supplement II G*rAA B. Appendix B of 10 cra 5v, Criterion V, as implemented by Chapter 17 of PSAR and FSAR requires, in part, that: " Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings,gg > _
of a type appropriate to the circumstances, and shall be accomplished in f accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings."
- 1. The separation and identification criteria as identified in the FSAR Section 8.3.1 are described in Bechtel's: a. " Cable and Raceway Physical Separation Guide," Drawing 13-E-2AC-077, Revision 2, and
- b. " Installation Specification for Cable Splicing, Termination and Supports," Specification Fo. 13-EM-306.
- a. The separation requirement as described in the above
} specifications identifies one foot as the minimum separation k distance between raceways of different separation groups j located in the cable spreading rooms.
g Contrary to the above requiruant, ther NRC .tnspector identified, in tray IEZJ4AATSCE, cables projecting above the '
level of the tray siderails which were ic physical ccatact with fire protection pipint and tue HVAC ducts. ___
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- b. The separation requirement, as described in the above specifications, identifies the minimum separation diztsace between safety-related and e nsafety-related trays as one inch.
Contrary to the above requirements, the NRC inspector identified:
(1) Nonsafety-related conduit 1EZADCNRQ506 for thermostat IEQFNT1243C in HPSI A pump room was separated from safety related group 1 junction box IEZACCAKKJ03 by less than one inch.
(2) At diesel generator E-PEA-G01, nonsafety-related flexible conduit IEZGIANRX11 at junction box 4 was in contact with safety-related flexible conduit 1EZGIAARR20 at junction box 6.
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/ (3) In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PBA-503L, nonsafety-Q related flexible conduit 1EZJ1ANRR52 was separated from y/ safety-related wiring by less than one inch.
I (4) In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PBA-503K, nonsafety-related flexible conduit IEZJ1ANRR51 was separated from safety-related wiring by less than one inch.
- c. The separation requirement as described in the above i specifications requires each circuit and raceway be given a unique alphanumeric i&,ntification and colored dots (round
, emblems) along their lengths at intervals not greater than 15 feet.
t Contrary to the above requirements, the NRC inspectors identified:
1 l
( (1) Separation group I cable tray located in HPSI pump room A b >
i was not marked with red color identification (round emblems) between points IEZACEATCBA and 1EZACCARC03.
DI (2) Round blue identification emblems were missing from channel D conduit (PT-351) for a distance of approximately 40/50 feet ( at the 120 foot, elevation.
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(3) Temporary alphanumeric identification on cable tray g IEZAIDETXE had not been replaced with pern.anent '
identification.
- d. IEEE Standard 384-1974, " Criteria for Separe:Lon of Class IE Equipsert and Circuit Breakers," endorsed by the Licensee in
\ Section 8.3.1 of the ISAR la 3ection 5.1.2, states, in part,
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%yeed Class IE Raceways shall be marked in a permanent p ,
(g sanner at points of Entry r.nd Exit from an Euclosed Area."
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Contrary to the above requirements, a NRC inspector identified
) that the following separation group I conduits were not idenified by alphanumeric markings:
(1) Conduits IEZJ1AARC12, 14, and 16 on both sides of the wall between group I, 4.16 KV switchgear area and channel A remote shutdown panel area at the 100 foot elevation.
(2) Conduit sleeves 1EZJ1BARC13, 14 and 15 on contcol l
building wall in channel B remote shutdown area at the 100 foot elevation.
- 2. Contrary to the above requirement and the Bechtel Specifications listed below, the following condi'.; ions existed at the time of the inspection. ..
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- a. Section 11.0 of Bechtel Specification 13-CM-320, " Ejection of 4 Structural and Miscellaneous Steel," states, in part, " Installation shall be in accordance with AISC Specification for Structural Joints using ASTM A325 or A490 bolts." Paragraph 5(a) of the AISC opecification requires that A325 bolts, 7/8-inch diameter be tightened to at least a minimum tension of 39 Kips. An acceptable method of obtaining this tension is described in t
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paragraph 5(e), " Turn-of-Nut Tightening," which requires that )
bolts be brought to a "snus tight" condition plus an additional l 1/3 to 2/3 turn, depending on the bolt length. j Contrary to these requirements, on September 7 and 13, 1983, j four A325 bolts were finger loose, and additional testing using a calibrated torque wrench found two A325 bolts with tightness less than 39 Eips.
- b. Bechtei Specification 13-CM-307, " Design, Installation and !
Testing of Concrete Anchors," establishes requirements for bolt embedment depth, spacing, torquing, and case-by-case Licensee
- approval for use.
Contrary to these requirements, the NRC inspection of concrete expansion anchors found 15 bolts under-torqued, missing washers under two nuts, three bolts insufficiently spaced from other bolts or unused holes, three unused holes ungrouted, and two cases where prior Licensee approval was required and not obtained.
- 3. Procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18, dated May 25, 1983, " Nuclear Pipe Rangers and Supports Instr,11ation," Appendir I, requires the
( QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for huelear j ,
Pipe Supports."
, v The inspection requirenent on the CIP for " Task 1" in to verify l *t 4 7 *s.
udhat the support assembly is correct per approni ex.gineering drawings specifications. '
D hjT*{s Contrary to the above, in September 1983, Unit 1 pipe supports were
( found not correctly installed per approved drawings and
( specifications but had been verified correct by the Piping QC
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Engineer. Specifically, supports SI-089-H008; SI-100-H003, H005, and H036; SI-101-H00A; and SI-106-H001 were found with items which k+ did not meet drawing requirements. The supports had been accepted by Piping QC Engineers during the period November 29, 1979, to Novem er 20, 1981.
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- 4. Procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18, dated May 25, 1983, " Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports Installation," Appendix I, requires the QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports." The "CIP" inspection requirements for Task 8 require the Welding QC Engineer to verify that field welding is complete. For Task 9, he is to check the vendor welding for size and length. Additional instructions to the Welding QC Engineer in Appendix I instruct him to verify welding acceptability.
Contrary to the above, in September 1983, Unit 1 pipe supports were found with unacceptable weld conditions which had been verified acceptable by the Welding QC Engineers. Specifically, pipe supporta SI-100-H005, H010, H015, and B034; SI-102-H00B; SI-106-H011; and SI-176-H001, and H003 were found with unacceptable weld conditions. The supports had been verified acceptable during the period July 14, 1980 to September 15, 1982.
- 5. Specification 13-PM-204, Revision 12, dated April 7, 1983, paragraph 12.1.2, states the design and location of all pipe supports shall be the responsibility of project engineering.
Paragraph 12.1.4 states pipe supports designed by engineering will be shown on drawings and all design details will be shown including miscellaneous steel.
Contrary to the above, in September 1983, Unit 1 pipe support SI-100-H012 was found with a miscellaneous steel member installed. :
The member was not shown on the pipe support drtving, 13 SI-100-H012, Revision 1, and was used to provide support to an instrument air line. '
This is a Severity Level Violation, Supplement II. /\
i C. Appendix D of 10 CFR 50, Critierion IX, as implemented by Chapter 17 of the PSAR and FSAR, requires, in part, that: "sessures be established to ,
assure that special processes including welding are controlled and
, accomplished in accordsnee with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and other special requirements."
FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.6 states: " Welding is done in accordance with AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1, 1973, Structural Welding Code". Bechtel Drawing 13-S-ZAS-536, Revision 3, requires a 5/16-inch fillet weld when attaching structural steel vertical members to horizontal members.
Drawing 13-C-ZAS-570, Revision 8, requires a 5/16-inch fillet weld when attaching structural steel to embedded plates. Additionally, AWS D.I.1, Paragraph 10.17, states that undercut shall be no more than
.01-inch deep when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress in the part that is undercut, and not more than 1/32 inch for all other situations, i
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Contrary to the above requirements, the NRC inspection found welds on structural steel with fillet sizes less than required by the drawings and welds with undercut which exceeded the requirements of AWS D1.1.
This is a Saverity Level IV Violation, Supplement II. 1, D. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI states, in part, that: " Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures,... deficiencies,... defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected."
Borg Warner valve assembly drawing number 77770-1 requires that the stud nuts connecting the bonnet to the valve body be torqued to a value of 160-200 foot pounds.
Contray to the above, on September 15, 1983, the inspector observed torque verification performed on valve number 470 which resulted in the identification of loose stud nuts connecting the bonnet to the valve body.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation, Supplement II.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Arizona Public Service Company is hereby required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including: (1) the orrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved;
- 2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further items of onecmplir.nce; sad (3) the dr.te when full compliance will be achieved.
, C neideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause s'own.
ated T. Young, Chief Reactor Project Section 1 l\
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APPENDIX C NOTICE OF DEVIATION 2
Arizona Public Service Company Docket No. 50-528 '
P. O. Box 21666 Construction Permit No. CPPR-141 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 As a result of the inspection conducted between September 6, 1983 and September 30, 1983, and in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, 47 FR 9987 (March 9, 1982), the following deviation was identified:
FSAR SEction 3.8.1.6.6, Structural and Miscellaneous Steel, states:
" Welding is done in accordance with AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1, 1973, Structural Welding Code. The acceptance criteria for visual inspection of welding is done in accordance with AWS D1.72, Revision 1, 1973."
Contrary to this commitment, Appendix A, V sual Inspection Criteria.
ForStructuralSteelandMiscellaneous'Me[talWeldingtoMeetDesignT Requirements, to Specification 13-CH-320, Erection of Structural ppd MiscellaneousSteel,permitsacceptanceofundercut,incompletefAion X (rollover or everlap), and underfilled wcld ctaters in amounts or circunstances not allowed by the AWS Code.
Additionally, Specification 13-EM-302 for electrical casle tray hangers refereaces AWS D1.1-70 for inspection criteria.
You are hereby requested to su'umit to this office within thirty days of the date of this notice, a written statement or explanation regarding the above deviation)(describingcorrectivestepstaten,theresulteachieved(or Y corrective steps that are planned), and the date when corrective actica will be completed.
Date T. Young, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 2 l
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V Division of Resident, Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs #
Report No. 50-528/83-34 Docket No. 50-528 License No. CPPR-141 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 1 Inspection at: Construction Site Inspection conducted: September 6-16 and 26-30, 1983 Inspectors:
W. G. Albert, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed WNP-3 (Team Leader)
J. F. Burdoin, Reactor Inspector Date Signed R. H. Campbell, Engineering Technician Date Signed l
R. H. Harris, Engineering Technician Date Signed H. W. Kerch, Lead Reactor Engineer Date Signed P. P. Narbut, Project Inspector Date Signed L. E. Vorderbrueggen, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed PVNGS -
l W. J. Wagner, Reactor Inspector Date Signed i 1 l
G. E. Walton, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed l BVPS-2 2
T. Young, Jr., Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 2 Consultants: W. Marini, C. Crane, and L. Stanley Contract Technicians: K. Grevenow and J. Ludivissi Approved By:
T. W. Bishop, Director, Division of Residents, Date Signed Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS TOPIC SECTION Inspection Scope and Objectives I:
Team Organization and Metnods II C'ontacts and Licensee /NRC Heetings III Electrical and Instrumentation Construction IV Hangers and Supports, Snubbers and Restraints V Piping Systems VI Civil and Structural Construction VIII Nondestructive Examination VIII Craft and QC Inspector Interviews IX 9
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l I. INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES The scope of this inspection was the evaluation of on-site construction for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1. ,
The objective was to provide an overall assessment of the actual as-built condition of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (PVNGS-1)
. by comparing the as-built condition to design requirements. Therefore, the inspection concentrated on hardware and assessed whether the construction of PVNGS-1 was performed in accordance with quality requirements applicable to the plant.
In the areas inspected, the following was determined:
The construction observed was in conformance to the drawings and specifications.
Necessary quality verifications were performed during the construction process with appropriete hold points and other controls.
Nonconforming conditions were properly addressed in accordance with approved procedures.
Equipment was turned over to the startup organization in operable condition and it was being maintained properly as evidenced by the as-found condition.
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II. TEAN ORGANIZATION AND METHODS The NRC inspection team consisted of ten NRC employees, three consultants, and two technicians from Wisconsin Testing, Inc., as follows: #
William G. Albert - Team Leader Registered Professional Engineer (Mechanical) with 33 years experience in reactor construction, engineering and operation.
Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector for the WNP-3 plant in Washington State.
Paul P. Narbut - Lead Inspector, Mechanical Area i Nuclear Engineer (Nuclear) with 20 years experience in the design, construction and testing of nuclear power plants.
Currently a Project Inspector for the NRC's Region V office.
John F. Burdoin - Lead Inspector, Zlectrical Area Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical, Mechanical and Nuclear), with 36 years experience in the field of electrical engineering. Currently a Reactor Inspector with the NRC's Region V office, specializing in electrical inspection.
Tolbert Young, Jr. - Interview and Report Coordination Registered Professional Engineer (Nuclear) with 22 years experience in nuclear power plant operation. Currently a Section Chief with the NRC's Region V office.
Glen A. Walton - Welding and NDE Specialist Twenty-seven years experience in regulation and manager.ent of NDE and QA/QC. Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector for the Beaver Valley plant in Pennsylvania.
William J. Wagner - Welding Inspection
( Registered Professional Engineer (Quality) and AWS-Certified I
Welding Inspector with 24 years of experience in the field of
( metallurgy, quality assurance and NDE. Currently a Reactor i
Inspector with NRC's Region V office, specializing in welding.
Harry W. Kerch - NDE Van Supervisor Registered Professional Engineer (Quality) and Certified ASNT Level III Examiner with 35 years of NDE experience. Currently a Lead Reactor Engineer with the NRC's Region I o.ffice.
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L. E. Vorderbrueggen - Team Support and Civil / Structural Coordinator Electrical engineer with 36 years experience in the design and l construction of industrial plants. Currently the,NRC's Senior Resident Inspector at Palo Verde.
Richard H. Harris - NDE Inspection
- Certified ASNT Level II Examiner and AWS Welding Inspector with 22 years experience in NDE and QC. Currently an Engineering
, Technician with the NRC's Region I office.
R. M. Campbell - NDE Inspection Certified ASNT Level II Examiner and AWS Welding Inspector with nine years experience in NDE and QC. Currently an Engineering Technician with the NRC's Region I office.
Loren Stanley - Electrical Consultant Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical) with 27 years electrical engineering experience. Currently in private l consulting, i
William Marini - Electrical Consultant Electrical Inspection Specialist with 23 years experience in the field of electrical and welding inspection. Currently with Resource Technical Servicer, Cyril J. Crane - Electrical Consultant Regirtered Professional Engineer (Electrical) with 27 years experience in reactor operation and electrical engineering.
Currently with Westec Services, Inc.
K. Grevenow - NDE Technician Wisconsin Testing J. Ludivissi - NDE Technician Wisconsin Testing The methods used for this inspection were to select a sample of Palo Verde safety-related construction for rigorens examination. The sample was of high safety significance and was deemed to be representative of the work controls, procedures, methodology, and documentation of safety-related work performed at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
Selection and in-depth examination of a representative sample of this nature allowed extrapolation of the Team's findings to the adequacy of other safety-related construction at Palo Verde.
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Accordingly, the team's approach was to direct 70 percent of its effort l
! to the verification of system installation for the High Pressure Safety Injection System (HPSI) A train. This included in-depth examination of a large number of elements related to this system, including piping, pipe supports, pumps, valves, welding, nondestructive examination, electrical power supplies, electrical cables (including redundancy and separation),
instrumentation, control, electrical motors, supporting structural steel elements, and related concrete structures. Within this sample, special emphasis was directed to the areas of welding and electrical construction since both of these areas had been the subject of allegations. The other ,
30 percent of the team's effort was focused on inspection in other important areas such as the Reactor Coolatt. Gystem.
The examinations discussed above were conducted by:
(a) Physical inspection of systems, components, and structures.
(b) Independent NDE of welds and structures.
(c) Examination of documentation, where necessary, to support physical inspections.
(d) Private interviews and discussions with over 100 craft and inspection personnel.
(e) Examination of radiographs and other direct evidence of the quality of work such as postweld heat treatment charts.
(f) Testing of components by ultrasonic thickness measurements, hardness, radio signal cable tracing, and concrete probes.
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III. CONTACTS AND LICENSEE /NRC MEETINGS The inspection was unannounced until the morning of September 6,1983.
On that day all team members and the NRC Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
Van arrived on site. The teams primary point of contact diring the course of this inspection was the Arizona Public Service (APS)
Construction Quality Assurance organization at the site. This I , organization is managed by Mr. W. E. Ide.
An entrance meeting was held at the start of the inspection to acquaint the licensee with ehat the NRC inspection team intended to accomplish, arrange for needed drawings and documentation, arrange for off shift radiography, define organizational points of contact, and arrange necessary Saturday coverage since September 10, 1983, was a day of work for the inspection team. This meeting was attendel by Mr. E. E.
Van Brunt, APS Vice President for Nuclear Projects Management, I
Mr. J. A. Roedel, APS Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Mr. W. J. Stubblefield, Bechtel Field Construction Manager and 20 other staff members of the APS and Bechtel Site Organizations.
On September 14, 1983, a brief meeting was held between the NRC team leauer Mr. W. G. Albert, Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, APS Vice President of Nuclear Projects and Mr. D. B. Fasnacht, APS Nuclear Construction Manager. The purpose of this meeting was to provide highlights of tentative findings up to that time since Mr. Van Bruat could not attend
- the meeting on September 16th.
On September 16, 1983, a meeting was held between the team leader and the
, team lead inspectors with Mr. J. A. Roedel, AFS Ccrporate Quality Assurance Manager, Mr. D. B. Fasnacht, APS Nuclear Construction Masager, Mr. W. G. Bingham, Bechtel Project Engineering Manager and approximately ten other APS and Bechtel Staff. The purpose of this meeting was to provide APS with a progress report on the type and nature of NRC findings at that point in the inspection.
i This was a status meeting and, therefore, no attempt was made to categorize the findings at to their seriousness or to define which would be items of noncompliance. The NRC stated at that time that they perceived a weakness at the interface between construction and operations and while the basic construction appeared satisfactory, a aignificant number of findings indicated that either final inspections were not properly performed and/or there was a lack of control of work after completion of construction by the startup organization.
The principal exit interview for this inspection was held in the APS corporate offices on September 30, 1983. This meeting was attended by Mr. J. B. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator, Mr. T. W. Bishop, NRC Division Director and three NRC observers from headquarters organizations. The APS attendees included Mr. K. L. Turley, Chairman of i the Board, Mr. O. M. DeMichele, President, Mr. T. G. Woods,-Jr. ,
t Executive Vice President, Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Vice President Nuclear III-1 l
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Projects, Mr. G. C. Andognini, Vice President Nuclear Operations, and eight other APS staff members. Bechtel attendance consisted of t Mr. W. J. Stubblefield, Site Construction Manager and Mr. D. R.
4 Hawkinson, Projects Quality Assurance Manager. In addition to the above, the meeting was also attended by representatives of the five other owner ;
organizations for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station which are:
Southern California Edison Company, Salt River Project, Los Angeles l Department of Water and Power, El Paso Electric and Public Service of New Mexico. At this meeting, the individual tsam members reported upon the areas examined and the significant findings in each area as detailed in this report.
The NRC management again reiterated their concern with regard to the quality controls exercised at the time of system turnover from construction to the APS startup organization and the apparent need for more definitive quality control by maintenance organizations. However, the NRC expressed general satisfaction with basic construction, i
particularly pipe welding, and the results of over 100 private but informal contacts with craftsmen and first-line inspectors.
The applicant expressed their intent to immediately and thoroughly followup on the NRC findings. Except for disagreement with the NRC finding regarding the readability of certain primary loop pipe radiographs, the applicant did not comment on the NRC findings at the time of this meeting and questions were generally continued to clarification of issues.
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IV. Electrical and Instrumentation Construction Objective
, The primary objective of the appraisal of electrical and inttrumentation construction was to determine whether safety-related components and systems were installed in accordance with regulatory requirements, SAR
, commitments, and approved construction specifications and drawings.
Additional objectives were to determine whether procedures, instructions and drawings used to accomplish construction activities were adequate and whether quality-related records accurately reflect the completed work.
Particular attention was concentrated on the "A" train of the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system to demonstrate specific areas within the bread categories of electrical and instrumentation l
construction. These areas include electrical raceway (cable tray and conduit) and raceway supports; electrical motors; electrical cable and cable terminations; electrical penetrations; instrumentation (sensors and logic); diesel generator; and onsite AC power distribution system and DC power system. Portions of the BPSI B train were also examined.
A. Electrical Raceways and Raceway Supports Raceways
- 1. Areas Examined Electrical Raceways The NRC Team Inspectors examined approximately 1,690 feet of cable trays and 26 conduit runs. These raceways were inspected for: separation, proper identification and color coding, tray / conduit size and routing in accordance with design drawings, raceway bend radii conformance to criteria, bolted conneccion are tightness, weld conformance to applicable requirements, raceways free of debris and sharp edges, and ,
installation and inspection documentation completeness and accuracy.
Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- a. Temporary alphanumeric identification on cable tray 1EZAIDBTXF had not been replaced with permanent i identification.
- b. Nonsafety-related conduit IEZADCNRQ506 for thermostat IEQFNT1243C in HPSI A pump room was separated from safety-related group 1 junction box IEZACCAKKJ03 by less than one inch.
- c. At diesel generator E-PEA-G01 nonsafety-related flexible conduit IEZGIANRX11 at junction box 4 is in contact with safety-related flexible conduit IEZGIAARR20 at junction box 6.
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- d. Separation group 1 cable tray locsted in RPSI pump room A was not marked with red color identification (round emblems) between points IEZACEATCBA and 1EZACCARC03.
- e. The following separation group I conduits were not identified by alphanumeric markings:
- 1) Conduits 1EZJ1AARC12.-14 and -16, on both sides of the wall between group 1, 4.16 KV switchgear area and channel A remote shutdown panel area, at the 100 foot elevation. .
- 2) Conduit sleeves 1EZJ1BARC13, 14 and 15 on control building wall in channel B remote shutdown area, at the 100 foot elevation,
- f. Round blue identification emblems were missing from channel D conduit (PT-351) for a distance of approximately 40/50 ft at elevation 120'.
3 At diesel generator E-PEA-G01, vendor supplied nonsafety-related ALS flexible cable at junction box 14 could potentially move and come in contact with safety related flexible conduit IEZGIAARX27 at junction box 7.
- h. The vinyl jacket on safety related flexible (anaconda metal hose type NWC), conduit ERIEZCICARK13 inside containment was damaged and subsequently repaired in accordance with established procedures (Procedure for Raceway Installation, WPP/QCI 251.0, Revision 18, Section 5.10) by taping over the damaged vinyl with Scotch 33 tape.
2, Raceway Su,pports The NRC Team examined 60 raceway supports. These supports were inspected for conformance to design drawings including:
support spacing, configuration, location, mounting, material, support member size, and weld joints.
Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- a. The bolted connections attaching tray 1EZAIBBTXCV to hanger R7 (drawing 13-E-ZAC-016 Rev. 20) were disconnected.
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- b. # The as-installed configuration of the welds attaching the longitudinal bracing for hangers H212, M10, Mll and M12 on l drawing 13-E-ZJC-044 Rev. 9 to embedded plates is not as j specified by detail 21, alternate, on drawing 13-E-ZAC-043 rev. 18. In addition, slag remains on the referenced !
welds for hanger M12. The raceway installation cards for trays IEZJ4AATXHA and 1EZJ4AATXHB indicate that these d
welds have been inspected and accepted by QC.
- c. The fifth support from instrument rack IJSBAA01 for conduit IEZCIAARX-10 was found to contain welds which exhibited overlap, which is prohibited by AWS D1,1-72.
- d. The priming and painting of welds on raceway supports in channel c (green) riser room adjacent to cable spreading room at the 120 foot elevation was incomplete.
- e. The fourth support from junction box J-RCA-PT-190A for
, conduit IEZCAAARXO8 contains a damaged P1001A3 unistrut i
member which prohibits the full engagement of a unistrut j spring nut within the unistrut channel.
B. Electric Motor Installation Areas Examined The NRC Team Inspectors examined a sample of installed electric motors within the HPSI system. The motors selected were two HPSI
! pump motors, INSIAP02 (Train A) and INSIBP02 (Train B); and 17 4
' motor-operated valve motors included in the HP!I System (Trains A and B);
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UV-617 HV-530 UV-673 HV-531 UV-647 UV-667 HV-604 UV-674 UV-626 HV-699 UV-627 UV-616 UV-636 HV-609 HV-698 UV-637 UV-646 For the motors, the inspectors reviewed associated vendor drawings and documents, and plant maintenance, test, and installation records which define the design and installation methods for the equipment.
A physical inspection of the installed equipment was performed to j
determine compliance to design requirements and vendor fnstallation criteria, mounting, bolting, identification, nameplate date, location, grounding, and protection. The following documents and areas were reviewed: equipment specifications; purchase order documentation; vendor drawings and instruction manuals, including maintenance and installation requirements; seismic analysis or test and equipment qualification documentation, including special mounting and maintenance requirements; equipment maintenance records for warehouse, construction, and startup phases; warehouse records including receipt, storase, and release documentation;, material l receiving reports, including equipment certifications from vendors; electrical testing records for pre-operational phase; and associated quality control and installation records.
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l The power cables for the motors were inspected in the field and the terminations were examined at the motors.,The routing of the cables for the HPSI motors and approximately one-third of the MOVs were traced back to their respective 4160 volt or 480 volt power sources
, to verify physical separation of trains, cable tray /canduit i
arrangement, and cable tray fill. Specific ca' ale numbers are l identified below in Section C, electrical cable installation.
Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. It was found that the installation of the dowel pins in the motor mounting (following alignment), as required by the manufacturer, had not been installed. Doweling of the motor
- mounts could not be identified oc the master list of items to be completed prior to fuel load. However, it was established that the maintenance division, charged with the installation of these dowel pins, was aware of this remaining requirement in the mounting of the HPSI pump motors and tools were ordered in August 1983 to perform the job.
- 2. HPSI pump 1MSIAP02 motor, ground cable hold-down clamp was missing.
- 3. Motor heater (M-SIA-P02h) nameplate missing at MCC IEPHAM37.
- 4. There are no permanent identification signs at entrances to HPSI pump rooms, Train A and Train B.
- 5. Revision 3 of Specification SYS.80-PE-410 for the HPSI pumps is not centained in Purchase Order 9500088, as required.
Revision 2 of the specification is included in the purchase
, order.
- 5. MOV nameplate error at MCC 1EPHAM33. The nameplate reads JSIA-UH-604, but thould read IJ-SIA-HV-604.
- 7. Material Receiving Report 42220 is missing from Purchase Order 960-1231 for MOV IJSIA-HV 604.
C. Electrical Cable Installation and Cable Terminations
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- 1. Electrical Cable Installation I
The NRC Team inspectors selected a sample as listed below of installed electrical high and low voltage power, and control cables within the HPSI systess Trains A (and some in Train B) and the Class IE power systems. For each selected cable, the NRC inspectors reviewed associated drawings and documents which define the locttion, design route, and instFallation l methods for cable installation within tray and conduit. A j 1
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physical inspection of the as-built cable installation was performed by inspecting the entire length of cable run between the associated equipment and its respective load center / control cabinet. The objective of the inspection was to ascertain complia: ice with design, installation, and quality, assurance dccuments. During the course of the inspection, the following documents and areas were reviewed: elementary and cable block diagrams; cable code and cable scheme numbers; single line diagrams, cable type and identification, including separation color and cable markers; E580 computer program sorts for routing, identification of cables at tray points, actual and allowable tray fill at tray points, and size and type of cable; physical separation criteria, including raceway and tray designations; conduit and tray arrangement drawing; raceway installation cards; cable installation cards; and cable installation specifications. The physical inspection of the cable runs included a determination of size, type, routing, protection, separation, identification, loading, cable supporte and cable spacins. The actual cable installation and routing was compared to the design as determined from the E580 computer program and the cable installation cards.
- l The installation was examined for the following power, control and instrument cables, totaling approximately 8680 feet for the
- HPSI system, Trains A and B and Instrument Channels A, B, C, and D.
CABI.ES EQUIPMENT TO LOCATION 1ESIO1BCICA HPSI Pump / Motor B IEPBBSO4E 1ESIO1ACICA HPSI Pump / Motor A 1EPBAS03E 1ERC65CC1XA PT-102C IESACZ28I 1ERC65CCIXB Penetration Z28 IJSBCC02A 1ERC65DC1XA PT-102D 1ESFDZ77I 1ERC65DC1XB Penetration Z77 IJSBDC02A 1EHC62CC1XA PT-351C IJSBCCO2A 1EHC62DC1XA PT-351D IJSBDC02A 1ESI40BC1KA V-609 IEPHBM3410 1ESI1BBC1KA V-667 IEPHBM3608 1ESI39BC1XA V-699 1EPHBM3807 IERC64AC1XB PT-102A 1ESAAZ47I 1ERC64BC1XA PT-102B 1ESFBZ381 ,
l 1ERC64BC1XB Penetration Z38 IJZJBE02 l l 1EHC61ACIXA PT-351A IJSBACO2A l 1EHC61BC1XA PT-351B IJSBBC02A l' ;
IEPE01ACICA Diesel Generator IJDGAB03 l
- EPE01ACICB IEPEAG01 IJDGAB03
- 1EPE01ACICC 1EPEAG01 IJDGAB03 1
1ESI40AC1KA MOV HV-604 1EPHAM3305 1ESI39AC1EA MOV HV-698 1EPHAM3708
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IESI40ACIRA MOV HV-604 1EPHAM3305 1ESI39ACIRA MOV HV-698 IEPHAM3708 IV-5 I
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CABLES EQUIPMENT TO LOCATION 1ESI21ACIRC Penetration 246 1EPHAM3512 1ESI21AC1RB NOV UV-673 1EPHAZ46I 1ESI21AC1KA Penetration 246 ,1EPHAM3512 1ESI21AC1KB NOV UV-673 IEPHA246I 1EBC64BC1XD Remote Shutdown Pnl. IJSBBCO2A 1ESB01AC1RM Distrib. Pal. 1JSBAC02B (IERNA-D25) 1ESB01ACIRS Distrib. Pnl. IJRMAB02B (IEPNA-D25) 1EPN02ACIRB Isolat'n.Pul. 1ERNAN11 (1JSAA-C04)
Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- a. While inspecting the traceability of Anaconda 5 KV cable, it was found thct the identification, required to be permanently marked on the outer jacket of the cable at three-foot intervals, could easily be rubbed off. This resulted in the cable jacket markings becoming illegible following handling during installation.
- b. Scaffolding lumber was found stored in channel C electrical raceway / cable chase located in the lower cable spreading room at the 120 foot elevation,
- c. In tray 1EZJ4AATSCE, cables are projecting above the level of the tray siderails, and are in physical contact with fire protection piping and two HVAC ducts.
- d. Traceability of 5KV cable was found to lack clarity. The cable is received on site from the vendor under a material receiving record (MRR) which identifies the cable, vendor ,
and receiving cable reels. Following receipt, the vendors cable reels are assigned Bechtel cable reel numbers for storage and future processing. The Bulk Material Inventory (computer readout), the principle cable record, correlates Bechtel cable reel numbers to vendor reel numbers, but does not list the MRR numbers under which the vendor cable reels were delivered. Therefore, it is nigh impossible to trace cable directly from the Bechtel storage reels to the material receipt records.
konflusions I sb c th a ove f n ' ass ve b iden ' 'ed s vi lat a na o 'ce f v ola io i sue t the ic ns e .
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- 2. Cable Terminations The NRC Team inspectors examined the terminations of 31 = ables identified above under cable installation. The terminations at l both ends of the cables were inspected for: cable: terminations as shown on engineering documents, identification with enclosure, separation, size of conductor, tie-down, bend radius, grounding of cable shield, disposition of spare wires, proper size terminal lugs, neatness and workmanship, and installation and inspection documentation.
Findinas The following deficiency was identified:
Electrical installation, Specification EM-306, Section 7.2R, requires spare wires in a cable to be coiled and insulated with tape or a shrink sleeve. The end of green / black tracer, spare wire cable ESI21ACIRC at EPHAM3512 was bare and not insulated as required. The quality of insulating the ends of other spare wires was inconsistent and insecure.
D. Electrical Penetrations The following installed containment electrical penetration assemblies were inspected:
Number Elevation 228 100-foot Z38 100-foot 246 120-foot
- 247 120-foot Z77 120-foot The location, type, mounting, and identification were compared with the installation drawings. The cable terminations at the penetrations were examined both inside and outside of containment.
The QC recorda associated with receiving, storage and installation of these penetrations were also reviewed. Activities observed and documentation reviewed indicated work performed in this area was in accordance with requirements.
E. Electrical Instrumentation The actuation of HPSI is initiated from either of two parameters (four channels); low-pressurized pressure and high containment pressure. The four pressurizer low pressure transmitters, PT-102A, 102B, 102C and 102D; and the four containment high pressure transmitters, FT-351A, 351B, 351C, and 351D were inspected in the field.
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1 These pressure transmitters were inspected for proper mounting, physical separation, identification of correct instruments and esfety channel (color code), instrument calibration, etc. The stainless steel tubing runs were traced from the transmitters back to the containment isolation / root valves to verify; pr.oper grade l (slope) and tubing support. l The instrument cabinets and panels were inspected for technical i
? requirements as contained in the Procurement Specifications :
13-JM-200 (CONSIP, Inc) and 13-EM-022 (HARLO Corp.), and l Installation Specification for Instrumentation and Control Equipment, 13-JM-702, Revision 8. The physical inspection also included inspection of internal wire routing and separation, cable marking (identification), termination connections, module mountings, overall workmanship, and cleanliness. Operator controls and displays for the HPSI system were examined at the B02 and B05 main control room benchboards. The interface between the HPSI system and remote shutdown panel was also examined.
The following engineered safety features (HPSI) systems cabinets and instrument panels were inspected:
- 1. NSSS Analog Instrument Cabinets A, B, C, and D:
1-J-SBA-C02A 1-J-SBB-C02A 1-J-SBC-C02A 1-J-SBD-C02A 1-J-SBA-C02B 1-J-SBB-C02B
- 2. Plant Protection System Cabinets A, B, C, and D:
1-J-SBA-C01 1-J-SBB-C01 1-J-SBC-C01 1-J-SBD-C01
- 3. Main Control Room Panels:
1-J-RMA-B02 1-J-RMB-B02 1-J-RMC-B02 1-J-RMD-B02 ;
1-J-RMA-B05 1-J-RMB-B05 1-J-RMC-B05 1-J-RND-B05
- 4. ESEAS Auxiliary Relay Cabinets A and B:
1-J-SAA-C01 1-J-SAB-C01
1-J-SAA-C02A 1-J-SAB-C02A 1-J-SAA-C02B 1-J-SAB-C02A
- 6. Isolation Cabinets A, B, C, and D:
1-J-SAA-C04 1-J-SAB-C04 1-J-SAC-C04 1-J-SAD-C04
- 7. Status Display Panel Inserts A and B:
1-J-ESA-C01 1-J-ESB-C01 ' I
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- 8. Remote Shut Down Panel Sections (HPSI Valve Contrals):
1-J-ZJA-E01 1-J-ZJB-E01 1-J-ZJC-E01 1-J-ZJD-E01 The following quality control records for the HPSI instrument systems were examined: purchasing / receiving records, storage / maintenance records, installation records, cable installation, and termination records.
Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. The sensing lines for the four channels of containment pressure (PT-351A, 351B, 351C and 351D) were found to be capped immediately inside containment. The sensing lines were capped with threaded pipe caps and could only be removed with the aid of a pipe wrench. The presence of these pipe caps make this system inoperative. There were no records to indicate when the caps were installed or when they were to be removed.
- 2. The instrument sensing line support shown in Detail 1 on Drawing 13-J-01D-105, Revision 4 has a weld which contains undercut measuring approximately 1/32-inch in depth. The '
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1/32-inch value does not satisfy the requirements of the
.01-inch criteria for undercut transverse to the primary tensile stress of the member in question as stated in AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1973 as defined in specification 13 CM 320.
- 3. An internal separation barrier cover was missing from remote shutdown panel IJZJBE01, and no status tag noting its removal was observed.
- 4. It was found that temporary nonconformance report hold tags for level transmitters LT 1123A and LT 1124A at the 100 foot elevation inside containment were reversed.
F. Emeraency Diesel Generator Areas Examined The electrical aspects of the Emergency Diesel Generator 1, IEPEAG01, including control cabinet wiring, were inspected for location, mounting, separation, protection, and identification.
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Findinas These reviewed aspects indicated work was performed in accordance with installation requirements. Some minor deficiencies that were l found in raceways (flexible conduit) separation were address under !
l raceway and support section of this report Paragraph IV.A-1. No other deficiencies were identified. ~ ,
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G. Onsite AC Power Distribution System Areas Examined The NRC faspector examined the following components of the Class I 4160-volt and 480-volt power distribution system: .
1E-PBB-S04 4.16 KV switchgear, separation group 2 1E-PBA-S03 4.16 KV switchgear, separation group 1 IE-PGA-L35 480 V switchgear, separation group 1 1E-PGA-L33 480 V switchgear, separation group 1 IE-PHA-M33 480 V MCC, separation group 1 1E-PHA-M35 480 V MCC, separation group 1 1E-PHA-M37 480 V HCC, separation group 1 1E-PHB-M34 480 V MCC, separation group 2 1E-PHB-M36 480 V MCC, separation group 2 IE-PHB-H38 480 V MCC, separation group 2 The 4160-volt switchgear, 480-volt switchgear and 480-volt motor control centers (NCC) were inspected and compared to installation drawings relative to configuration, location, mounting, identification, installation documentation, and protection.
Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. It was found that 87 3/8-inch bolts were missing from the base frames for the six separation groups 1 and 2 motor control centers identified.
- 2. It was found that three cubicle tie-down bolts in MCC )(
1E-PHg-M35werenotfullyengaged. The licensee had in progress design change package (DCP) ISE-PH-035 requiring certain modifications to the tie-down method for the above identified MCCs. These modifications were required to assure the MCCs comply with the seismic analysis requirements.
- 3. In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PBA-503L nonsafety-related flexible conduit IEZJ1ANRRS2 is separated from safety-related wiring by less than 1 inch which does not satisfy the separation requirements.
- 4. In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PBA-503K nonsafety-related flexible conduit IEZJ1ANRR51 is separated from safety-related wiring by less than one inch, contrary to separation criteria.
- 5. An error was found in the identification of compartment 05 of MCCEPMAM33 on drawing 13-E-PHA-003. Long term cooling valve JSIAHV604 was identified as JSIAUV604.
IV-10
H. DC Power System The four main DC batteries, battery chargers, and Vital AC bus inverters were inspected for electrical separation aspects, fluid levels, termination connections, bolting materials, spacers, mounting arrangements, and general workmanship and cleanliness.
Equipment that was inspected is identified in the following list:
1
+
DC Batteries and Mounting Racks A, B, C, and D: {
1-E-PKA-F11 1-E-PKB-F12 1-E-PKC-F13 1-E-PKD-F14 DC Battery Chargers A, B, C, and D:
1 1-E-PKA-H11 1-E-PKB-B12 1-E-PKC-H13 1-E-PED-H14 1-E-PKA-H15 1-E-PKB-H16 Vital AC Bus Inverters A, B, C, and D:
1-E-PNA-N11 1-E-PND-N12 1-E-PNC-N13 1-E-PND-N14 Technical requirements for the batteries, battery chargers, and inverters contained in Procurement Specifications 13-EM-050 for Exide, 13-EM-051 for Power Conversion Products, Inc., and 13-EM-054, respectively, were reviewed.
Each battery was physically inspected for adequate fluid levels, conductor termination connections, bolting materials used, and ,
absence of battery case cracks. Each battery rack was inspected for battery-to-end plate spacing, battery-to-battery spacers, alignment of frame spring-nuts, and frame welding to the battery room floor imbeds. The location, floor mounting, panel displays, and ,
electrical conduit configuration for each battery charger and Vital AC inverter were inspected.
Revisions 0 and 1 of the PM-410 Startup Generic Maintenance Procedure for Station Batteries were reviewed for technical requirements and test acceptance criteria. Records were inspected for each of the four safety-related batteries, such as on-site receiving records, mid-1981 test results during warehouse storage, and periodic maintenance test result records during construction for the period from February 1982 through September 1983.
Installation, in-site modification, and periodic maintenance records for each battery charger, -"d Vital AC inverter (prior to turnover to Startup) were also inspesced.
l Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. The batteries were received on site during the summer of 1981.
It was found that no procedure existed for performing the required periodic tests (IEEE Std. 308) to maintain the l
batteries. The required procedure came into effect in the spring of 1982.
IV-11
_ _ .- m._ _, - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _.__.__ ____._ _ _ __ . ._. - _-
l
- 2. The earliest maintenance records are for August 1981, and :
proceed monthly through November. However, no records can be found for December 1981 and January 1982.
l 3. The storage of periodic maintenance records did not satisfy the storage requirements of Section 1.8 of the FSAR. These records, required to be stored in a manner which minimizes the risk of destruction from fire, were found stored in a paper-board box.
l
- 4. No records exist to indicate that baseline annual cell-to-cell and terminal detail connection resistance data was ever i
recorded during factory acceptance tests for these batteries.
However, the licensee startup generic test procedure addresses the requirement to record intercell resistance checks, during pre-licensing testing.
- 5. It was found that the vendor testing (at the factory) of battery C did not completely fulfill the discharge rate requirements. However, the licensee identified this, at the time, by issuing supplier deviation disposition request (SDDR) 2763 which requires the capacity discharge test to be run on the job site. This test is scheduled to be accomplished by the startup group during pre-licensing testing.
j IV-12 I
l
d V. Hanners and Supports, Snubbers and Restraints A. Areas examined
- 1. Hardware: The inspector examined all pipe hangers, supports, snubbers, and restraints on the RPSI A piping system from the start of suction line.SIA-008-GCBC-10-inch through discharge linesSI-A-100-CCRA-4)GibeandSI-A-106CCRA-3-inch,throughout )(
the 40-foot elevation, up through the vertical pipe chase to the 89-foot elevation pipe chase. At this juncture, one ;
of the five injection branch lines, SI-E-176-CCBA-3", was followed to the injection point and all pipe supports, hangers, snubbers, and restraints were examined. Additionally, miscellaneous branch lines from the HPSI discharge path were examined for supports (to the first isolation valve on the <
branch). Additionally, a few supports not involved in the '
line description above were examined if a condition was noted which warranted follow up. All supports examined are listed in Table V-1.
In most cases, pipe insulation was removed for inspection. In those cases where a support was only partially examined, Tabis I so notes. These cases generally fall into the following conditions:
. Insulation not removed. This condition precluded examining pipe lug welds only. The hanger members and welds are not covered by insulation and can be throughly inspected.
. Lua welds only. In these cases, the inspector examined only the lug welds to increase the sample of lug welds by inspecting supports which were not on the selected branch line, but were part of HPSI-A.
. One aspect only (e.g., " base plate only"). In these cases, the support was not included in the lines selected but was partially examined because a condition warranting follow up was noted.
. Location and confituration only. These cases involved a series of replicate supports in a horizontal run. The location of the support and the configuration were checked assinst drawing requirements, and support member sizes and weld sizes were checked by visual examination l rather than by measurement.
V-1 i
i
1 i
All other supports were examined fully.
The inspector examined the supports to determine that:
. All supports shown on the piping isometric drawings were installed.
. No additional supports were installed.
. The support configuration was as shown on the support drawing.
. The support member material was per the drawing.
. The welds on the support were the correct size and met the applicable code and standard requirements.
. The welded attachments to piping were per drawing.
. The attachment welds to pipe were per drawing and met code and standard requirements.
Mechanical snubbers and restraints were installed where required by drawing.
. The snubber and restraints were the proper size (load rating).
. The snubbers and restraints had the proper cold setting shown on the drawing.
. The supports were properly located per the drawing relative to the piping and the structure.
There are a total of 116 pipe supports involved in all of the HPSI-A system. The inspector examined 68 supports or '
about 60 percent. Of the 68 supports examined 14 supports had one or more problems. This is about a 20 percent reject rate.
The problems identified are discussed in the " Findings" section below.
- 2. Drawinas. Specifications, and Procedures
! l The inspector gathered and reviewed the applicable piping {
drawings, hanger drawings, specifications, work and )
inspection procedures, and pertinent vendor information.
V-2 l
l Y
i Other safety-related documentation, including documents, authorizing deviations from the drawings, records of I hanger inspection by QC, non-destructive examination I records, welding inspection records, noncomformance reports, vendor certification records, code reports, and piping spool fabrication records were reviewed as they were identifed in the pursuit of questions raised on a particular support's apparent anomolies.
?
The inspector also reviewed the FSAR and ASME codes for applicable requirements.
The documents discussed above will be listed and specifically addressed only as they apply to findings, discussed in the " Findings" section below.
- 3. Tools The inspection was conducted utilizing unaided visval examination, tape measure, weld gages, angle finder, and adequate lighting. Safety equipment was utilized as required. No NRC independent non-destructive examination was performed on the pipe supports due to other priorities. In the one case where the visual inspection indicated a possible weld defect, the inspector requested the licensee reexamine the weld using liquid penetrant examination. The inspector cbserved the entire performance of the examination.
B. Findinas Table V-1 lists all supports inspected and shows which supports were found unsatisfactory and provides a brief description of the problen(s) found.
The problems found group into three areas which are considered
) apparent violations of NRC regulations. Each problem identified in Table V-1 is explained more fully below.
(1) Failure of the pipe support QC personnel to identify support conditions which are not in accordance with drawing or specification requirements (six examples).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion 5, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
l V-3
The licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18, dated May 25, 1983, " Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports 1 Installation," Appendix I, requires the Piping QC Engineer l to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports." The inapection requirement for Task 1 is to verify the support assembly correct per approved engineering drawings and specifications.
. Support SI-089-H008 was found with r'ibber seal material injected in the space by the Flourogold slides plates, Items 54 and 55 on the drawing. The drawing does not show rubber sealaut material. It is probable that the material was inadvertently injected after the support inspection on November 29, 1979, but the material had been neatly trimmed away and the edges painted in the area painting.
I
. Support SI-100-H003 was found with a loose pipe clamp and installed at an angle of 4 1/2' from vertical. Procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, paragraph 8.9, requires the clamp to be snug on the pipe. Procedure WPP/QCI, paragraph 9.2.7.1, requires the angle to be no greater than 2 demrees. The support was accepted by QC on November 20, 1983.
. Support SI-100-H005 was found with the drawing specified dimension of 3 3/4 inches between the centerline of the pipe stanchion and the centerline of the insert plate to be actually 7 1/2 inches. This difference exceeds the tolerances af i 2 inches paragraph 9.3.12 of the WPP/QCI. The support was accepted by QC on November 13, 1981.
. Support SI-100-H036 was found in a condition which did not match the hanger drawing and moditying Field Change Request (FCR) 15, 123P. Item D of the FCR was not installed. The support was accepted by QC on October 22, 1983 to the drawing and FCR.
. Support SI-101-H00A was found with a loose jam nut on Item 61, the sway strut assembly. The support was accepted by QC on October 2, 1981.
Support SI-106 B001 was found with the 2" long pipe lugs, Item 38, bearing on the supporting steel for only 3/16 inch and 7/16 inch, respectively. Paragraph 9.4.1 of the WPP/QCI indicates full bearing surface should be provided as indicated on the support drawing. The support was accepted by QC on May 23, 1980.
l V-4
, .,m .- , ,-- --. , - - - , - - . -., -,- -_ . . - - . . . . - - - - , . , - ,_,,,,--,,,,.-c._--,-.--_-,,. ---e--,.+--.---.e,-.
l The failure of pipe support QC personnel to identify pipe '
support conditions which were not in accordance with drawing or specification requirements is an apparent violation of NRC l regulations {' 'r- ---+ T*- 50-!2!/SS-20). ,
g (2) Failure of the weldina QC personnel to identify weld conditions which are not in accordance with the drawina or the weldina code requirements (eimht examples).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion 5, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
Licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18, dated May 25, 1983, " Nuclear Pipe Mangers and Supports Installation," Appendix I, requires the Piping QC Engineer to
} verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports."
The inspection requirements for Task 8 requite the welding QCE i
to verify that field welding is complete. For Task 9, he is to verify the vendor welding was checked for size and length.
The instructions to the QCE in Appendix I instruct the QCE to verify velding acceptability.
. Support SI-100-H005 was found with an underfill condition in the stanchion, Item 30, to pipe weld. The weld is required to be a 5/16-inch fillet weld. The actual fill was measured to be 1/4 inch. The weld was accepted on the field weld check list on November 9, 1981.
Support SI-100-H010 was observed to have an appaient lap in the weld of Item 38 to the pipe. This was a vendor weld. Minor slag was also present in the toe of the weld. These conditions would have precluded a satisfactory liquid penetrant examination by the vendor. The vendor records show the weld was liquid penetrant examined and accepted on December 4, 1977 (Job 2810, Piece 1-SI-100-S-009, "F" No. 261).
The NRC inspector had the visual indication on the weld reexamined by licensee personnel by liquid penetrant
' examination in his presence. The liquid penetrant examination resulted in an unacceptable linear indication.
The vendor weld had been last inspected by site QC personnel per Task 8 on June 17, 1981, and was accepted.
e l i
V-5 I l 1 1
1
_ _ - - . . _ m. -.,. .._ ._,__m____ __ ___ _ -, ...,, _ . ,, -.,.. _ _ __,. -_.-- . - , _ , . . _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - .
! . Support SI-100-H015 has the lug, item 38A, field welded to the l pipe. The weld w;s 1/32-inch undersize. The welds were l originally accepted on January 22, 1979, and were accepted assin during the support inspection on October 28, 1981.
. Support SI-100-8034 was found with one undersized vendor lug weld (Item 38 to the pipe). The weld was required to be a 1/4-inch fillet and measured to be 3/16 inch. The vendor welds were checked by site QC for size and accepted on September 11, I 1982. '
. Support SI-102-H00B was found with several weld problems. The i vendor weld of Item E to Iten B was required to be a 3/16-inch fillet, but was 1/8 inch on three sides. Additionally, there was rollover (or laps) at the corners. The field weld of Item C i to existing structure was required to have one-inch end returns on the welds, but did not. The vendor weld was accepted by site QC on August 18, 1981. The field weld was originally accepted on October 14, 1980, and was accepted again on
- August 18, 1981.
. Support SI-106-H011 was found with the pipe lug welds l
(Items 38 and 38A to pipe) closer than 1 inch to the adjacent pipe-to-pipe circumferential weld. The actual distance was 3/4 inch. Specification 13-PM-204, " Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systers," paragraph 12.2.9, states that welded attachments shall not be installed within 1.0 inch of existing circumferential welds. The field lug welds were originally accepted on February 12, 1979, and again during final support acceptance on October 2, 1980.
. Support SI-176 H001 was found with an undimensioned weld on the drawing, therefore, the proper size of the weld could not be verified by the NRC inspector. The 3-inch long fillet field welds of Item 84 to Item B are not dimensioned on the support drawing 13-SI-176-H001, Revision 1. The welds were originally accepted on December 18, 1980, and were accepted again on i
Septsaber 15, 1982. ;
. Support SI-176-H003 was found to have an undersize weld. The skewed (120-degree) fillet weld of Item A to the containment insert plate measured 1/4 inch rather than the required 5/16 inch.
The support weld was accepted on July 14, 1980.
Further discussions with the Lead QC Engineer for Pipe Supports and the Lead Welding Engineer disclosed that the Welding Engineer had given verbal instructions to the QC Engineer that were contrary to the AWS D.1.1 code requirements for measuring th size of skewed fillet welds. Hence, this undersize weld may be considered caused by improper engineering information. It follows that all skewed fillet welds may require reinspection to the proper criteria.
! V The AWS D.1.1 Code 1974 shows, in Figure 2.7.1, that skewed l fillet welds are mee,ured thus: I wldsizt,
- 1 r
3 n
At Palo Verde the QC Engineer states weld are " measured" as shown below (it is not clear how this is "mesured" since there is no access to one of the measurement points):
~ /
w SIZf, lJ To "neasure" by the Palo Verde method to a given size (e.g.,
S/36 inch on a 120-degree weld) will result in an undersize weld by ti.e Code definition (in this case by 3/64 inch). Nonetheless, QC Anspectors are required by WPP/QCI 201.1 to inspect to AWS D.1.1 criteria for this weld. The AWS D.I.1 criteria are clear and are not superceded by verbal instructions from engineering.
l V-7
,-- , - - - - - n- - ,-,w. -,- , - , . --w,,,,.- -
The failure of welding QC to identify pipe support weld conditions which are not in accordance with the drawing or welding code requirements is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (5;f.. -- ^ It;; 30-0;;/00 04/::).
<{
(3) Failure of enaineerina to include a non-safety loads in a safe related pipe support calculation (one example).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Criterion 5, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented ;
instructions, procedures and drawings and shall be !
accomplished in accordance with these instructions. 1 i
Specification 13-PM-204, Revision 12, Paragraph 12.1.2 dated April 7, 1983, states the design and location of all pipe i supports shall be the responsibility of project engineering.
Paragraph 12.1.4 states pipe supports designed by engineering will be shown on drawings and all design details will be shown including miscellaneous steel.
. Support SI-100-H-012 was found with a miscellaneous steel member installed which was used as a support for an Instrument Air Line. The miscellaneous steel was not shown on the pipe
- support drawing, 13 SI-100-H-012, Revision 1. The drewing does i show the engineering design loads used in the analysis of the
- pipe support and the applicable calculation number (Problem i No. 513-E, point number 293).
, Engineering was contacted by telephone, and the responsible
! engineer stated that the loads from the miscellaneous steel i member used as an instrument air support (IA-116-H00A) were not included in the design load for the pipe support, SI-100-H-012.
The engineer stated that loads were inconsequential (29 pounds) and the instrument air calculation had been annotated to state that the attachment to the Safety Injection Support was satisfactory.
Nonetheless, he stated the procedure requires the safety injection support calculation be amended to include such loads.
The failure of engineering to include a nonsafety design load in a safety-related pipe support calculation is considered an apparent violation of NRC regulations. -(Erferrr rrt ;<
-?*-- 50-522/82-34)-- sc l
l P
V-8 l
- l. . , - _ _ _ - _ - . ,-. - - - , . - . - _ - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X TABLE KT-j DEGREE OF SUPPORT TYPE FINDING PROBLEM DESCRIPTION _ INSPECTION 1
- 1. SI 008 B001 S Sat : Full
- 3. SI 008 E003 S Sat Full
- 4. SI 008 H004 SNB Sat Full
- 5. SI 0'08 N005 S Sat Full
- 6. SI 089 B008 S Unsat Penetration Seal Material Slide Plate
- 4. _ 1 !;;;;;ti;;)-
on Slide Plate only $
- 7. SI 099 B001 SNB Sat Full
- 8. SI 099 H002 S Sat Full
- 9. SI 100 H001 S Sat Presence only - seal boot on
- 10. SI 100 H002 S Sat Full
- 11. SI 100 H003 S Unsat (1) Loose clamp (2) Excessive Full Angle
- 12. SI 100 H004 S Sat Full
- 13. SI 100 H005 S Unsat (1) Location dimension varies Full more than allowed (2) Lack of fill on stanchion to pipe field weld
- 14. SI 100 H006 S Sat All but lug welds
- 15. SI 100 H007 SNB Sat Full
- 16. SI 100 H008 S Sat Full
- 17. SI 100 H009 S Sat All but lug welds
- 19. SI 100 H011 S Sat Full
- 20. SI 100 H012 S Unsat Nonsafety hanger loads not Full included
- 21. SI 100 H013 S Sat Full
- 22. SI 100 H015 S Unsat Lug weld size Full
- 23. SI 100 H016 S Sat Full
- 24. SI 200 H017 S Sat Full
- 25. SI 100 H018 S Sat Full
- 26. SI 100 H019 S Sat Full
- 27. SI 100 H020 SNB Sat Full
- 28. SI 100 H021 S Sat Full
- 29. SI 100 H022 S Sat Location /
Configuration /
Clearances only
- 30. SI 100 H023 S Sat "
{ 31. SI 100 H024 S Sat "
- 32. SI 200 H025 S Sat "
- 33. SI 100 B026 S Sat _
- 34. SI 100 H027 S Sat "
- 35. SI 100 H028 S Sat Full V-9 l
- 36. SI 100 H029 8 Sat All but pipe lugs
- 37. SI 100 B031 S Sat Lug welds only
- 38. SI 100 H032 S Sat Lug welds only
- 39. SI 100 B034 S Unsat Undersize lug weld , Full
- 40. SI 100 5035 S Sat Lug welds only
- 41. SI 100 5036 S Unsat Configuration differs from Full drawing
- 43. SI 102 H00A S Sat Full
- 44. SI 102 500B S Unsat Welds deficient (Undersize Full weld, rollover, no end returns)
, 45. SI 105 H00B S Sat Full
- 46. SI 105 H00C S Sat Full
- 47. SI 105 HOOD S Sat Full
- 48. SI 105 H00E S Sat Full
- 49. SI 106 H001 S Unsat Lack of Lug Contact area Full with support members
- 50. SI 106 B002 S Sat Full
! 51. SI 106 H003 S Sat Full
- 52. SI 106 H004 S Sat Full
- 53. SI 106 H005 S Sat Full
- 56. SI 106 H009 S Sat Full
! 57. SI 106 H010 S Sat Full
- 58. SI 106 H011 S Unsat Pipe lug weld w/in 1" of Full circumferential weld
- 59. SI 106 H012 S Sat All but pipe lugs
- 60. SI 106 H013 L Sat All but pipe lugs
- 61. SI 106 H014 S Sat Full
- 62. SI 106 H015 S Sat Full
- 65. SI 176 H001 S Unsat Undimensioned weld on drawing Full
- 66. SI 176 H002 S Sat Full
- 67. SI 176 H003 S Unsat Undersize fillet weld Full
SNB = Snubber ,,
V-10
VI. PIPING SYSTEMS INSPECTION Approximately 826 feet of HPSI-Train A piping was selected for inspection.
Inspection war performed on 64 percent, which represents 530 feet of the i HPSI piping, to verify compliance with the isometric drawings and ASN2 l Section III requirements. This included 64 feet of piping on the suction l line of HPSI pump A; the balance of piping inspected was on the discharge lines located in the auxiliary and containment buildings respectively.
l Piping system inspection includes visual inspection of pipe welds, welder qualifications, piping size and quality, and valve installation.
A. Pipina System Welds
- 1. Areas Examined Visual inspection of 200 pipe welds, out of a total of approximately 900 weld joints (pipe and socket) in the entire HPSI systems was made for quality and compliance with ASME Section III requirements. Characteristics examined included weld surface appearance, location, weld reinforcement, and absence of surface defects including cracks, lack of fusion, porosity, slag and undercut exceeding prescribed limits.
The records associated with one percent of the total welds were reviewed in detail and compared with the information obtained at the weld joint. Records examined included certified material test reports, piping class sheets, Bechtel's Forn 84 which specifies the welding and nondestructive examination requirements for field erected piping, welder qualifications, field welding check list, and filler material certifications.
- 2. Findinas The type of pipe weld joints examined included pipe-to pipe, l pipe-to-fittings and pipe-to-valves. The visual inspection of -
these weld joints and the associated records reviewed indicated that the components were welded together by qualified weldecs using qualified filler materials and qualified welding procedures, the components being joined were certified, i
that the base material and the filler material were compatible for welding, and the required nondestructive examinations and weld inspections were performed.
i j VI-1 i
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - ' - ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ " '
B. Pipins l
- 1. Areas Examined 1
Field inspection activities included visual examinatio .of the 530 feet of piping. This was to assure that the insta ed pd;# : r:: e ;;;;;'ir' ^= +' 'rr';r '-- ' :, =ad t C ]{
piping was as specified on the design drawing, and that the piping was reasonably straight, had a workmanlike finish and was free from injurious defects such as mechanical marks, .)
abraisions and pits. 1
! 2. Findinas Inspection of piping quality revealed one section of pipe to have an excessive amount of mechanical marks. This was identified on pipe spool 28 line number A106-CCRA, adjacent to pipe-to-valve weld number WO25. The quality control instruction, WPP/QCI No. 204, Revision 3, " Piping Systems Release for Insulation," Appendi2 I, requires that piping systems, prior to insulation, be checked for surface damage by the quality control engineer. Any identified surface damage is then required to be documented on the construction inspection plan (CIP), and then evaulated in accordance with procedure ED-1, entitled " Elimination of Defects". The CIP for the pipe spool in question did not identify any surface damage on this system. The main concern was whether the pipe minimum wall thickness requirements were violated. The jIicenseeinitiatedNCRNo.Sj}2976;thepipewasre-inspected P and dispositioned " accept-as-is" in accordance with the acceptance standards specified in ED-1.
Also during this examination of pipe quality the inspector observed an apparently unacceptable pit-like defect on the outer-surface of pipe spool SI-008-S002 adjacent to pipe support SI-008-H002. The pit was unusual in that it did not i
appear to be typical mechanical damage or a typical welding are strike. It appeared to be a minor blow hole from the original pipe manufacturer. The pit appeared to violate nimum wall requirements. The inspector requested the y icensee to have the pipe hanger removed for access to the pipe pit; measurements were taken by the piping QC engineer in the presence of the NRC inspector with a calibrated pit sage.
The pit was measured to be 0.059 inches deep. The allowable.
minimum wall for pipe spool SI-009-S 002 is 0.219 inches and the remaining wall (calculated from nominal wall) is 0.191 inches. Therefore the pit represents an underwall condition requiring an engineering evaluation.
VI-2
Procedure WPP/QCI 204, Revision 2 " Piping Systems Release for Insulation", requires the final inspection of piping to be performed by a piping QC engineer prior to covering the pipe I with insulation. Paragraph 3.1 of Appendix 1 requires an I inspection for surface damage per specification (ED-1). The specification " Welding Standard ED-1 Elimination of Defects" states in paragraph 4.1 that defects may be removed provided wall thickness is not reduced below the minimum specified.
The pipe spool.was inspected in accordance with the above and improperly accepted on November 14, 1982, as certified on the Piping Release No. 301-398. The failure of the piping QC engineer to identify an unacceptable defect during the piping inspection pgor to insulation is considered an apparent item v of noncompliance. (0 !...::::t itr- sn-son /no_35yr C. Valves
- 1. Areas Examined Valves were examined during the walkdown inspection for compliance with the isometric drawing; specifically to assure proper valve size, location, type, orientation and installation. In addition, torque verifications were performed on a few selected valves to assure that the torque values were within the valve manufacturer's acceptable range.
- 2. Findinas (a) During the inspection of valve No. 470 on the suction side of the HPSI pump "A", it was observed that the manual operator assembly was totally disconnected from the valve and resting on the sprinkler system piping.
There was no documentary evidence to indicate that maintenance was being performed on the operator assembly. Failure to indicate the operating status of l the valve, such as by tagging, to prevent inadvertent l operation is an apparent item of noncompliance.
";;:: ;1i---- (5^-52?/S2 )- k (b) Three additional adverse conditions were identified on valve No. 470. First, visual examination revealed that the bonnet was leaking; second, that one stud nut was missing from one of the studs connecting the bonnet to the valve body. These two conditions resulted in the inspector's request for torque verification on the stud l nuts. The torque verification revealed a number of loose l
l O
VI-3 i
M stud nuts which connect the bognet to the valve. This g third item, failure of the stud nuts to meet the torque requirements specified on the design drawings, represents a condition adverse to quality, and is an apparent item of noncompliance. LEnfare =+ I*:: 50 00!/*3-?^- 3- ,(
(c) Valve No. 402 was found with the position indicator
- positioned so that the valve could only be opened about l r 30-35 percent. There was no documentary evidence to indicate that maintenance was being performed or that i anyone was aware of the condision of the valve. !
Preoperational testing was being conducted on this i subsystem. (E 'e. ; - r
- T+ -- 5^ 0 0/03 0' )
D. Welder Qualifications
- 1. Areas Examined Bechtel specification WQ-1, Revision 17, of March 10, 1983,
" Welding Standard Performance Specification," was examined.
This specification describes the requirements for determining the ability of welders to make acceptable welds. The Welding Test Lab where welder performance qualifications are performed was examined for compliance with WQ-1 and ASME Section IX
, requirements. Also examined was the ability of the Welding i
Test Lab to detect " stand-in" for welder qualification tests.
The qualification records of 22 percent of the welders who field-welded on the 530 feet of pipe selected for the inspection were examined for compliance with WQ-1 and the latest issue of ASME Section IX.
- 2. Findinas The welders records examined revealed that the welders were qualified, on the date the weld was made, to the requirements of Bechtel specification WQ-1. WQ-1 meets the requirements of the QJest issue of ASME Seection IX. The weldecr performarce qual (Btion records were being properly maintained and were y up-to-date.
Although no new welders were being qualified during this inspection, the Welding Test Lab was examined found to be well organized and controlled. The weld rod is properly j
controlled, rod evens are calibrated and kept at the correct temperature, and testing booths and welders' records are properly maintained.
l l
l VI-4 l
(
l Bechtel welder qualification procedures do not specifically address the subject of welder identity during qualification testing. However, Bechtel's current system requiring the welder's signature, social security number, and a photo badge appears to be satisfactory in preventing any practices of using stand-ins for welder qualifications.
I VI-5 .
l
[
l l
I l
VII. Inspection Results - Civil / Structural A. Concrete Tests
- 1. Areas Examined :
j Eleven test areas were selected for examination using the " Windsor Probe Test" (WPT). These areas are identified in Table VII-1. They were selected as representative of concrete in the HPSI A pusp rcom and in the vicinity of selected portions of the connected piping. The WPI measures the resistance of concrete to penetration by an explosively driven probe. Correlation to actual concrete strength is by reference to the Windsor Probe manufacturer's charts which relate probe penetration distance to strength for different aggregate hardness values.
- 2. Inspection Findinas Maximum aggregate size in the concrete tested was 1 1/2-inches. The Moh number for the aggregate selected from the probe manufacturer chart was number 6 (Far Southwestern United-States). The indicated concrete
, strengths ranged from 5,800 to 7,600 psi. Detailed data are given in Table VII-1.
B. Structural Steel Framina
- 1. Areas Examined Building and platform structural steel was examined to verify that the sizes, types and materials were in accordance with design requirements. The areas examined were in the HPSI A pump room, the auxiliary building northwest pipeway at the 40' elevation, and the 100 feet elevation on the south side of the containment building.
The governing documents were as follows:
- . Specification 13-CM-320 - Erection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-001 - Civil / Structural General Notes.
VII-1 l
l l
l
i
. Drawing 13-C-ZADS-500 - Auxiliary Building - Framing Plan for Elevation 51'-6".
2 . Drawing 13-C-ZCS-529 - Containment Internals -
Structural Steel Platforms below Elevation 100.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-570 - Auxiliary Building -
Structural Steel Sections and Details . Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-571 - Auxiliary Building -
Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 2.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-572 - Auxiliary Building -
Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 3
. WPP/QCI 58.0 - Erection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel.
- 2. Inspection Findians The steel that was examined was installed as specified and was of the required type and size. Certified Mill Test Reports were on file which verified that the proper material had been furnished. These were spot checked and l were found to be in order.. Bolting and welding of the steel is addressed in Sections VII.3 and VII.4 of this report.
- 3. Structural Steel-Bolted Connections
- a. Areas Examined Bolted connections in selected portions of the building and platform structural steel in areas associated with HPSI A train system were examined for compliance with design requirements. Particular attention was given to bolt size and type, presence of washers where required, adequacy of thread engagement. Tightness of a representative sample of bolts was tested using a calibrated torque wrench. The joints were located in the HPSI A pump room, the northwest pipeway at the 40-foot elevation and the 88-foot elevation pipeway in the auxiliary building, the 82 to 95-foot elevations of both
" wrap-around" portions of the auxiliary building, and at VII-2 i
~
various elevations in the containment building.
Additional structural steel joints not associated with the HPSI A train system were also examined. They were in the containment building and in the NPSI B pump room.
Detials are provided in Table VII-2. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph VII.B.1, the governing documents also include the following:
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-510 - Auxiliary Building Framing Plan for Elevation 88' - Area AAA.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-511 - Auxiliary Building Framing Plan for Elevation 88' - Area AAB.
. Drawing 13-S-ZAS-535 - Auxiliary Building i
Miscellaneous Steel Plan 9 Elevation 88'.
. Drawing 13-S-ZAS-536 - Auxi'tary Building Miscellaneous Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-581 - Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Steel Platforms and Details -
Sheet 2.
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) -
Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A325 or A490 Bolts.
- 2. Inspection Findinas Detailed inspection findings are given in Table VII-2.
Except as described below, all bolted joints examined satisfied the specified requirements.
Table 3 of the AISC specification requires that 7/8-inch diameter A325 bolts be tightened to a minimum tension of 39 kips. The following departures from that requirement were found:
(a) Four bolts in one joint in the AC-6 platform at the 51'6" elevatiou of the HPSI A pump room were only
" finger tight."
(b) One bolt in a 4-bolt I-beam to I-beam connection at the 125 degree azimuth, 10 feet from the liner, e'ievatica 88-feet in the containment building, required a nut rotation of 45 degrees before achieving the tightness equivalent to the required 4
39 kips.
VII-3
_- = _ _ - . . _-
I (c) One bolt in a 4-bolt floor beam connection in the auxiliary building northwest pipeway, 6 feet east of column line AD, 51'-6" elevation, required e nut rotation of 60 degrees to achieve the 39 kip requirement. ,
In all three cases, the connections had been 4
inspected and accepted by Bechtel Quality Control personnel. The unsatisfactory bolting accepted by l QC is an apparent violation,(E:fe. ._-oi It;_ - y l
.. ---,.a -,, -) ,
- D. Structural Steel Welded Connections
- 1. Areas Examined Welded connections in selected segments of the building and platform structural steel in areas associated with HPSI A train system were examined for compliance with design requirements. Attributes examined were fillet les size and length, weld contour, and absence of overlap and undercut. The joints examined were located in the auxiliary building (pipeways at the southwest 40 foot
- elevation and at the 88 foot elevation), and in the contalment building (80-87 foot elevation and the 125 foot elevation). Details are provided in Table VII-3.
In addition to the documents listed in paragraphs VII.B.I. and VII.C.1. , the governing documents also include the following:
. Drswing 13-C-00A-050 - Welding and Nondestructive Exsmination Requirements for Civil Structural -
"Forn 84C".
i . Structural Welding Code AWS D1.1 1972, with Revision 1, 1973.
i
- 2. Inspection Findinas Detailed inspection findings are given in Table VII-3.
i The welded connections in the containment building that were examined were found acceptable. In the auxiliary building pipeway, elevation 88 foot, the inspector found six fillet welds with undersize leg length and four welds with unacceptable undercut. The welds are portions of a W8X31 pipe support rack, number B-79, fabricated by Marathon Steel Company.
VII-4
f In the auxiliary building northwest pipeway, '
elevation 51'6", the inspector found six fillet welds with undersize les lengths. The welds are portions of a W16X36 floor beam clip connection. The inspector measured fillet weld sizes down to 5/32 inch, whereas 5/16 inch size was '
specified for these welds. The undercut criteria i specified in AWS D1.1 requires that it be no more than .01 l inch deep when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress in the part that is undercut, and no more than 1/32 inch for all other situations. Contrary to this requirement,' the inspector found undercut of approximately 1/16 inch deep.
The undersize and undercut welds had been inspected and accepted by Bechtel Quality Control personnel.
'Isf .,__:r* Y+--- *"-529/SS-3':/ )- X FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.6 states: "The acceptance criteria for visual acceptance for welding is done in accordance with AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1, 1973." During the inspection, the following items were noted which appear to be deviations from this commitaw.ut:
AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1973, paragraph 3.6.6 states
" welds shall be free from overlap." Specification i
' 13-CM-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.4, 3.2, and 3.3.4 allow a maximum of 1/8" of overlap.
. AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1973, paragraph 8.15.1.3 requires that "all craters are filled to the full cross section of the welds." Specification 13-CM-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.5, 3.2, and 3.3.8 allow underfilled weld craters.
. AWS D1.1-72, Revision 73, paragraph 3.6.4 states that "... undercut shall not be more than 0.01" deep when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress in the part that is undercut, nor more than 1/32" for all other situations." Specification 13-CM-320, Appendix A, paragrph 3.3.7 allows up to a maximum of 1/16" of undercut under certain circumstances and does not address undercutting transverse to primary tensile stress.
i i
. AWS D1.1-72 does not permit incomplete fusion.
Specification 13-CM-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.8, 3.2 and 3.3.6 allow an exception i
to the requirement for complete fusion between weld metal and base metal.
VII-5 l 1 l l
. Paragraph 9.2 of Specification 13-EM-302, Cable Tray I
Rangers, states that..." all quality Class Q cable l tray hanger welds shall be inspected in accordance l with AWS D1.1-79." (emphasis added) '
These discrepancies are considered to constitute a deviation from the FSAR consitaent.
E. Containmen_t Structure Penetrations e
- 1. Areas Examined Five piping penetrations (nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, and 77) and one electrical penetration (no. 47), all associated with the HPSI train A system were visually examined and their records reviewed to ascertain compliance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 111-1974 Edition. In addition, piping penetration No. 62, monitoring containent internal pressure, and spare penetration !!o. 69 were examined. The visual examination was related to weld reinforcement height and surface finish. The records review addressed the presence and validity of the supplier's material '
test report, and the adequacy of the Field Welding check list (Form WR-5) and the Filler Metal Withdrawal Record (Form WR-6). Other factors examined were the qualification of the specified welding procedure, control of preheat and interpass temperatures, and nondestructive examination of the completed welds.
- 2. Findinas No discrepancies with the specified requirements were identified.
F. Steel Embed Plates In Concrete
- 1. Areas Examined l
l Except for 3 or 4 plates in the vertical pipe chase in j the northwest corner of the auxiliary building, all embedded plates carrying pipe hangers / supports for the EPSI A system lines in the auxiliary building were examined. These were 3 plates on the suction line and 35 plates on the discharge lines. In addition, approximately 30 plates were randomly selected in various walls in the auxiliary and containment buildings, of which approximately 20 were not loaded. The examination included measurement of plate thickness and anchor bolt VII-6
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - - - , - - , , - ~ , - . - , , - -
- - - - - - . - - . . .,..-,-.m~ .-~_..e_- , --. ,..,-._ ,,,. . ,- .m
t length using an ultrasonic transducer and CRT videoscope
- (only 2 or 3 bolts in each embed plate were measured),
I and a graduated depth gauge measurement of bolt thread engagement. The governing documents were as follows:
. Specification 13-CM-308 - Installation and Testing i
of Concrete Embeds $nd Insert Plates. l
. Drawing 13-C-00A-001 - Civil Structural - General l Notes. '
i
. Drawing 13-C-00A-010 - Typical Insert Plate Schedules and Details.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-011 - Anchor Bolt Schedule and Details.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-110 - Auxiliary Building - Plan at Elevation 40'.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-112 - Auxiliary Building - Insert Plan at Elevation 40'.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-146 - Auxiliary Building - Plan at Elevation 120'.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-200 - Auxiliary Building - Wall Elevations - Sheet 1.
I
- . Drawing 13-C-ZAS-224 - Auxiliary Building - Wall Elevations - Eheet 25.
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-413 - Containment Internals - Wall Inserts and Penetrations - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-406 - Containment Internals - Wall Inserts and Penetrations - South Secondary Shield Wall.
- 2. Inspection Findinas All embedded plates examined were found to be installed in the specified locations and were the specified thickness. All anchor bolt lengths were as specified.
One plate was found with three of eight bolts apparently missing; search with the UT transducer, however, found that all three had been relocated (by welding) as !
permitted by the specificacion when interference with !
reinforcing steel was encountered. Two other plates were l VII-7
found with documented relocation of anchor bolts. For one case of suspected insufficient bolt thread engagement, doc 9 mentation was on file which showed that the bolt had been circumferential1y welded to the back of ,
the plate, also as permitted by the specification, j G. Concrete Expansion Anchors
- 1. Areas Examined A representatit- sample of concrete expansion anchors was examined to ascertain conformance with the installation requirements. At Palo Verde, the design intent is to avoid the use of expansion anchors to the maximum possible extend. A generous quantity of embedded steel plates and unistrut channels were provided for fastening equipment generally and, except for specifically identified lightly loaded applications, expansion anchors were to be used only after all other methods had been evaluated and determined unfeasable or unacceptable by Engineering. For these situations, documented licensee approval is required on a case-by-case basis. The l previously mentioned lightly loaded applications include electrical raceway (except cable tray) instruments, instrument sensing lines, and local panels.
A total of 88 anchor bolts were examined for depth of embed and proper torquing of the tensioning nut. These were comprised of the following:
. 20 Hilti Kwik-Bolts sesociated with 1 electrical panel box and all Class IE raceway supports (9) in the HPSI A pump room.
. 29 Hilti Kwik-Bolts fastening raceway supports in the east " wrap-around" section (100' elevation) of the auxiliary building.
. 8 Hilti-Xwik-Bolts anchoring 2 instrument sensing line support plates in the east " wrap around" section (80' elev.) of the auxiliary building.
. 8 Hilti Kwik-Bolts anchoring 2 switchbox panels in Battery Rooms C and D in the Control Building (100' elevation).
. 17 Drillco Maxi-Bolts anchoring control center panels to the floor (100' elevation) in Battery Rooms A, C and D in the Control Building. (Only 8 of these bo7ts were torque tested). -
VII-8 l
l l
l
.__ - . - _ _ _ - . . . .. ..._ _.. _. ___ _ - , . _ . . . _ _ _ - - - _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ ~ . . _ . - . , _ . ~ . . _ . . - , . _ - . . - . _
, . 6 Drillco Nazi-Bolts anchoring 6" fire-line support i plates (2) to the MSSS wall (108' elevation) in the corridor adjacent to the turbine building.
l All torque testing was performed by a Quality Control Inspector or a journeyman electrician using a calibrated torque wrench in the presense of the NRC inspector. The governing documents were: *
. Specification 13-CM-307 - Design, Installation and Testing of Concrete Anchors.
4 i . WPP/QCI 24.1 - Installation and Testing of Concrete i Expansion Anchors.
- 2. Inspection Findinas Of the 23 Drillco Maxi-Bolts examined, all were found to
- be embedded and torqued to the required values. For the ,
bolts anchoring the equipment panels in the battery i rooms, there was no doeuraentary evidence that Bechtel had I obtained the required licensee approval prior to their installation. Similarly, no approval documentation was available for 4 Hilti Kwik-Bolts used for a strut i supporting a cable tray hanger in the auxiliary building east " wrap-around" at the 100' elevation (east wall).
In the HPSI A pump roos, 6 miscellaneous Hilti Kwik-Bolts '
(1 raceway support) could not be properly torqued due to the absence of weshers under the tensioning nut (support holes too large). Due to the proximity of adjacent supports, this one probably could have been eliminated and the raceway would have been adequately anchored.
Also in the HPSI A pump room, one anchor bolt was insufficiently embedded (3") because it was located too close (1 1/2") to an ungrouted, unusued hole. Embed
- depth should have been 6 1/4". Two unused holes were found ungrouted, contrary to the specified requirements.
Additionally, there were two bolts that violated the specified minimum distance from other anchor bolts.
In the auxiliary building " wrap'around" section (100' l elevation), 9 bolts, randomly located, were found i
undertorqued (all four in one 4 Solt plate), one bolt was too close (2 1/8") to the edge of a wall opening, one bolt was insufficiently embedded (2 1/4" instead of 5" required), and two bolts had nuts with insufficient thread engagement.
~
VII-9 l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - . - . . - - . - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -
i i
All bolts examined in this sample had been given the requisite inspection by Bechtel Quality Control inspection and had been judged acceptable. Although the identified discrepancies represent noncompliance with specified requirements, each one taken individually would not present any particular safety siFaificance.
s 1
l VII-10 1
TABLE VII - 1 CONCRETE STRENGTH MEASUREMENT PLACEMENT Meas.(1) STRENGHT (psi)
Trt Max. Probe Cylind.(2)
W3. LOCATION / DESCRIPTION No. Date Age Agg. Size Exten-in. Probe Meas Break Design 1 HPSI A Pump Roore-Aux. Bldg.
Floor (El. 40') Adjacent to 4000
. Pump 1A05-1 11/24/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. I 1/2 2.25 7400 5870 9 28 Da.
2 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
East Wall (Elev. 44')
Adjacent to Pump 1A12-1 1/21/77 6 Yrs.-9 Mo. 3/4 2.20 7000 5185 "
l 3 EPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
, South Wall (Elev 43')
l Adjacent to Pump Motor 1A12-1 1/21/77 6 Yrs.-9 Mo. 3/4 2.25 7400 5155 "
4 North Pipeway-Aux. Bldg-South Wall (elev.44')
Between Col Lines AE & AF 1A08-1 12/23/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. 3/4 2.273 7600 5960 "
l 5 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
- Floor (Elev.40') Adjacent to i West Wall & Floor Embed under i Suction Line to Contain. Sump 1A04-1 11/24/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. I 1/2 2.125 6400 5870 "
6 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.100')
125 V Battery A Charging 4000 5 Yrs.-6 Mo.
Equipment Room IJ016_ 3/10/78 1 1/2 2.050 5800 5875 @ 91 De.
7 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.100')
- 125V Battery A Room 2.075 6000 5875
- 3. Control Bids. Floor (Elev.200') " " " " "
125V Battery C Room 2.100 6200 5230 VII-11
TABLE VII - 1 CONCRETE STRENCmt MEASUREMENT PLACEMENT Meas.(1) STRENGRT (Psi)
Tzt Max. Probe cylind.(2)
No. IDCATION/ DESCRIPTION No. Date Ate Agg. Size Exten-in Probe Meas Break Desian 9 Contro?. Bldg. Floor (Elev. 100')
In front of HPSI A 4160V Motor Breaker Cubicle " " " "
2.150 6600 5875 "
10 Containment Bldg. Bane Hat Floor (Elev. 80') Adjacent 5000 to South stairway 1C013-1 7/8/77 6 Yrs. -2 Mo. I 1/2 2.200 7000 5350 9 91 Ds.
- 11. Contaimment Bldg. Base Mat Floor (Elev. 80') West Side Under Safety Injection Piping Runs 1 1/2 2.100 6200 6040 i
i Nit:s (1) Windsor Prdbe Test-Average of 3 driven probes (2) Average of compression test of 2 cylinders i
1 VII-12 i
I
TABLE VII-2 STRUCTURAI, STEEL BOLTED CONNECTIONS i
- Irspection Amount of Inspection Type of Inspection Incation Elevation Versus Total Available Inspection Findinas Auxiliary Bldg. 51'6" 15 joints of approx. 30 Visual Four Imose bolts in a 4-bolt HPSI A Pump Room Joint - Platform AC-6 Northwest Pipeway 51'6" 13 joints of approx. 15 Visual Acceptable
- Auxiliary Bldg.
l Wrap-Around Areas 82'-95' 94 joints of approx. 200 Visual Acceptable q Auxiliary Bldg.
j Pipeway Area 88' 40 joints of approx. 300 Visual Acceptable Auxiliary Bldg.
Containment Bids. 80'-87' 110 joints of approx. 500 Visual Acceptable Auxiliary Bldg. 51'6" 10 bolts of approx. 120 Torque Test Acceptable HPSI A Pump Room Northwest Pipeway 51'6" 28 bolts of approx. 52 Torque fest one bolt rotated 60 degrees before Auxiliary Bldg. minimum tightness was achieved.
was achieved.
l Containment Bldg. 87' 24 bolts of approx. 2500 Torque Test one bolt rotated 45 degrees before minimum tightness tightness was achieved.
C ntainment Bldg. 98' 34 joints of approx. 100 Visual Acceptable
- Containment Blds. 125' 12 joints Visual Acceptable I
.
- Containment Bldg. 140' 15 joints Visual Acceptable
- Contaissent Bldg. - 20 joints Visual Acceptabb Pressurizer Compartment 1 CAuxiliary Bldg. 51'6" 15 joints Visual Acceptable HPSI B Pump Room CItems inspected which are not associated with the HPSI train A system.
4 VII-13
i TABIE VII-3 STRUCTURAL STEEL WELDED CONNECTIONS t
I::rpection Amount of Inspection Type Of Inspection I Location Elevation Versus Total Available Inspection Findings Northwest 51'6" 13 joints of aaprox.15 Weld gauge Visual Six undersize Pipeway fillet welds Auxiliary Bldg.
r Pipeway Area 88' 50 joints of approx. 200 Weld gauge Visual Six undersize Auxiliary Bldg. fillet welds, Four welds with undercut.
Containment Bldg. 80'-87' 110 joints of approx. 250 Weld gauge Visual Acceptable
- Containment Bldg. 125' 4 joints Weld gauge Visual Acceptable CItems inspected,which are not associated with the HPSI Train A system.
VII-14
t VIII. NRC Nondestructive Examination and Quality Review of Safety Related Systems A. Purpose 1
The purpose of the independent, NRC nondestructive examination (NDE) was to verify the adequacy of the licensee's welding quality control program. This was accomplished by duplicating those examinations required of the licensee by regulations and evaluating the results. In addition to the required examinations, several additional confirmatory examinations )
- designed to verify conformance with material specifications '
were performed and compared to quality assurance records.
The NRC inspection team selected the HPSI A system to inspect at the Palo Verde Unit 1. There are approximately 900 piping welds in the HPSI A system. This system was undergoing pre-operational testing and was full of water under pressure.
A selection of welds from this system that could be drained and inspected was made. Due to preoperational testing of Unit 1, a selection of welds from Unit 3 was also made. The selection of these welds was intended to provide a representative sample of piping components, sizes, materials, of shop and field welds. All the welds selected were previously accepted by the licensee based on vendor, shop, or field NDE records.
B. Document Reviews The following quality assurance documents were reviewed to verify compliance with regulatory and code requirements:
- 1. Twelve weld document packages were reviewed for:
Material Certifications NDE results Fabrication recerds shop and field Drawings (Isometric)
PWET Charts (Note: The twelve welds reviewed are listed at the end of Table VIII-2. 13-P-ZCG-103)
- 2. Two quality procedures were reviewed.
13PM-201 Shop Fabrication of Nuclear Piping Systems 13PM-204 Field Fabrication and Insta11aiion of Nuclear Piping Systema VIII-1
4
- 3. A review of GE0's (site NDE subcontractor) internal audit, dated June 10, 1983, was performed. This audit reviewed all of GE0's NDE site personnel qualification at 3 Palo Verde.
t
- 4. Verification of NDE Personnel Qualifications to SNT-TC-1A
, The NRC inspector reviewed all of Bechtel's individual film interpreter qualification and certification records. He also reviewed 6 out of 39 of GE0's NDE records for personnel qualifications.
4
- All the above documents were verified to satisfy NRC requirements and licensee commitments to industry codes and standards.
C. NRC Independent Examinations (Note: Refer to Table VIII-1 for specific listings of independent inspection items)
- 1. Radioaraphy Twenty-one welds were re-examined by the NRC using an Iridium 192 source. Welds that were radiographed were ASME Code Class 1 and 2, carbon and stainless steel.
Results: All re-radiographed welds were found acceptable to ASME Section III acceptance criteria.
- 2. Pipe Wall Thickness Measurement - Eleven pipe welds and adjacent pipe material were examined per NRC procedure NDE-11, Revision 0, using a NORTEC NDT thickness gauge.
Minimum wall thickness was determined by using an ASTM standard pipe sizes and nominal thickness chart.
Results: All areas examined were within tolerance requirements.
- 3. Ferrite Measurements - Thirteen pipe welds were checked for delta ferrite content using a Type II Ferrite Indicator (Severn Gauge).
Results: All measurements were within acceptable limits of material test results.
- 4. Hardness Measurements - Fourteen welds were checked for hardness (base material adjacent to welds) using the Equo-tip hardness tester per NRC Procedure NDE-12, Revision 0. Hardness numbers were converted to Brinnell values and the approximate tensile strengths..were l determined by use of conversion tables.
1 i VIII-2
_ . - - - = - .- - . _ .
i Results: All areas examined were within acceptable limits
- of material test reports.
- 5. Alloy Analyzer - Four pipe welds and adjacent base metals were examined using e Texas Nuclear Alloy Analyzer. A
- quantitative chemical analysis was made on two stainless i ateel, type 304, and two stainless steel, type 316 j ,
materials.
Results: Areas examined were within + 2% of chemical analysis indicated on corresponding certified mill tent reports and were within acceptable limits.
l 6. Liquid Penetrant Examination - Eight safety related pipe weldsents were liquid penetrant examined per NRC procedure NDE-9, Revision 0. All weldsents examined were ASME Class 2 welds.
- Results
- All areas inspected were acceptable.
- 7. Visual Examination - Thirty-four weldsents and adjacent base material were visually inspected for veld reinforcement, overall workmanship and surface condition l per NRC procedure NDE 14, Revision 0.
- Results
- All areas inspected were acceptable, i
- 8. Radicaraphy of Socket Welds - Ten socket welds were radiographed to verify pipe engagement.
Results: All radiographs show at least a minimum of 1/16 inch gap per ASME Section III, paragraph NC4427 requirements.
- 9. Radicaraphic Review of Licensee Field Welds and Vendor Welds - A review of licensee's pipe weld radiographs was
, made during this inspection of ASME Class 1 and 2 weldsents. Out of 746 sets of radiographs, 204 were reviewed as listed below, with results as listed in Table VIII-2.
The radiographic film review disclosed 6 welds which are in the "as-welded" condition and present weld ripple images in the film. The ASME V Code, paragraph T-221-2, requires that weld irregularities be removed to the extent that they cannot mask or be confused with actual discontintities. The weld ripple images for ISO 01-P-SIF 105 Line IRC-051-S-001-16, welds A and B; 1RC-051-S-002; weld A; and ISO-13-P-ZCG-103, IRC-079, 030 and 073 are considered excessive and capable of masking sne being confused with discontinuities in the opinion of the NRC Level III examiner.
VIII-3
On October 12, 1983 licensee representatives and the Bechtel Corporation Level III examiner telephoned the Regional office to express a difference of professional opinion. The Bechtel examiner did not consider that the weld ripple images could mask discontinuitiet. This item is considered unresolved. (Unresolved item 50-528/83-34-Ss) yg
- VIII-4
Table VIII-2 Review of Licensee RT Films and Records Line ISO WELD RESULTS SI-008-CCBC-10" 13'-P-SIF-201 W5 Acceptable W1 Acceptable FW 2 Acceptable W3 Acceptable W4 Acceptable W6 Acceptable '
- FW 7 Acceptable SI-008-GCBC-10" 13-P-SIF-201 W-D-F375 Acceptable W-B-F37S Acceptable W-A-F375 Acceptable W-A-422 Acceptable W-B-423 Acceptable
~
W-A-423 Acceptable SI-A-009-CCBC-4" 13-P-SIF-203 WI Acceptable W2 Acceptable SI-099-CCBB-4" 13-P-SIF-203 W-E-F149 Acceptable W-B-F149 Acceptable W-A-F149 Acceptable SI-099-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable E Acceptable SI-A-100-CCBA-4" "
W1 Acceptable W2 Acceptable FW 3 Acceptable SI-100-CCBB-4" 13-P-SIF-203 W-A-156 Acceptable W-B-156 Acceptable W-3-156 Acceptable SI-A-101-CCBA-1" 13-P-SIF-204 FW 00L Acceptable 2" "
FW 00A Acceptable 2" "
W 00B Acceptable 2" "
FW 00C Acceptable 2" "
W 00H Acceptable 2" "
FW 00J Acceptable 2" "
FW 00K Acceptable l
- Visually verified RT root indication (concavity) between RT l station numbers 12 and 15 by using a fiberscope. All areas of concern are acceptable.
VIII-5 l
-- -- - -- ~ ~ ---- -
I
\ .
Line ISO WELD RESULTS l
2" " W 00L Acceptable
" l 2" W 00N Acceptable 2" " W 00P Acceptable 2" " W 00R(C) Acceptable 2" " W 00S(C) Acceptable 2" "
W 00T Acceptable 2" " Acceptable W 000 SI-A-102-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIP-204 W 00A Acceptable W 00B Acceptable
" " W 00C Acceptable
" " W 00D Acceptable
" " W 00E Acceptable
" " W 00F Acceptable
" " W 00G Acceptable W 00H Acceptable
" " W 00J Acceptable W 00K Acceptable
" " W 00L Acceptable W 00M(C) Acceptable SI-103-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIF-203 W 300 Acceptable W 00A Acceptable W 00B Acceptable W 00C Acceptable W OCD Acceptable W 00E Acceptable SI-103-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIF-203 W 00G Acceptable W 00I Acceptable W 00J Acceptable W 00K(C) Acceptable W OOP Acceptable W 00R Acceptable SI-105-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable SI-105-S-004-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-105-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable SI-105-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-202 A Acceptable SI-105-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-202 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable SI-157-CCBA-4" 13-P-SIF-204 W 300 Acceptable 4" "
W 301 Acceptable 1" "
W 00C(C1) Acceptable 2" "
W 00A Acceptable 2" "
l W 00B(C) Acceptable 2" "
W 00C(C1) Acceptable 2" "
W 00D(C) Acceptable 1" "
i N 00E Acceptable SI-157-CCBA-1" 13-P-SIF-204 W 00E Acceptable 2" "
W 00H Acceptable VIII-6 l
l l
l l
Line ISO WELD RESULTS l 1" "
l FW 00I Acceptable
! 4" " FW 001 Acceptable 4" "
FW 002 Acceptable 4" "
FW 003 Acceptable 3" FW 004 Acceptable 3" "
FW 006 Acceptable ,
3" "
FW 007 Acceptable )
3" "
FW 008 Acceptable i SI-157-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable '
" " B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable
" " E Accepteble
" " F Acceptable SI-157-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
, B Acceptable
!f C Acceptable SI-157-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable SI-157-S-004-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable SI-157-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable 13-P-ZG108 U-77(c-1) Acceptable i SI-157-S-006-3" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable SI-157-S-007-3" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" -" C Acceptable D Acceptable E Acceptable RC-051-S-001-16" 01-P-SIF-105 A Rejected Beads B Rejected Beads RC-051-S-002-16" 01-P-SIF-105 A Rejected Beads RC-051-S-003-16" 01-P-SIF-105 G Acceptable H Acceptable A Acceptable B Acceptable D Acceptable SI-176-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable E Acceptable SI-176-S-002-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable SI-176-5-003-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable SI-176-S-004-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable VIII-7 i
Line ISO WELD RESULTS
" " Acceptable 3
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable SI-176-8-006-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
- " " D Acceptable
" " E Acceptab10
" " F Acceptable SI-218-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable ,
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" " Acceptable E
" " F Acceptable SI-218-S-002-4" 13-P-3IF-203 A Acceptable SI-236-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-236-S-005-4" ~.3-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable D Acceptable SI-236-S-006-3" 13-P-SIF-203 B Acceptable
" " E Acceptable F Acceptable H Acceptable J Acceptable
" " K t.:ceptable L Acceptable
" " M Acceptable N Acceptable SI-248-S-003-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " D Acceptable SI-248-S-007-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable G Acceptable
" " H Acceptable J Acceptable K Acceptable
" " D Acceptable i E Acceptable F Acceptable SI-248-S-008-3" 01-P-SIF-105 E Acceptable J Acceptable
" " K Acceptable SI-248-S-009-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable VIII-8
I D Acceptable SI-248-3-011-3" 01-7-SIF-105 G Acceptable
" " R Acceptable
" " J Acceptable SI-248-S-012-3" 01-P-SIF-105 F Acceptable
" " C Acceptable N Acceptable 6.D. Size Line Document Review ISO Weld S/N Resuly 30" "
1-RC079 13-P-ZCG-103 WOO 1 Rejected Beads 30" " " "
1-RC030 Rejected Beads 30" " " "
1-RC073 Rejected Beads 30" " " "
1-RC031 Acceptable limit 2 30" "
2-RC079 13-P-ZCG-103 WOO 1 Acceptable 30" " " "
2-RC030 Acceptable 30" " * "
2-RC073 Acceptable 30" 2-2C031 " " "
Acceptable Unit 3 30" 3-RC079 "
l 23-P-2CG-103 W001 Acceptable 30" " " "
3-RC030 Acceptable 30" 3-RC073 " " "
Acceptable 30" 3-RC031 " " "
Acceptable l
i r
VIII-9
t IX. CRAFT AND QC INSPECTOR INTERVIEWS During the course of the inspectior. interviews were conducted by the team members with various craft persons and QC inspectors. These interviews were conducted on a one on one basis at random in the fiel4, predominantly at Unit 1, but some were conducted at Units 2/3 and in the senior resident inspector's office. There were 115 of these interviews i conducted with the idea of finding whether there was pressure by management to " cut corners," to obtain the interviewee's reception of quality on the project and to give the interviewee an opportunity to discuss any problems he/she may know of with a NRC inspector.
i None of the workers indicated that there was any pressure to cut corners, all thought that the quality on this project was above average to excellent and none knew of major problems on this project that NRC did not know about.
Table IX-1 Workers e Interviewed Craft No. Interviewed
- 1. Electrician 23
- 2. Hi11 wright 2
- 3. Ironworker 7
- 4. Boilermaker 1
- 5. Pipefitter 21
- 6. Carpenter 4
- 7. Janitor 1
- 8. QC Welder 7
- 9. QC Elect 16
- 10. QC Mech / Piping /NS3S 12
- 11. Laborer 3
- 12. Insulator 2
- 13. Welder 7
- 14. NDE Tech 4
- 15. Sprinkler 2
- 16. Operating Engineer 1
IX-1 l
. . - . _ . . . . - . . . , _ = . - - . = . ..
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[be;a ,*o UNITE 3 STATES E'
o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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..q ,a REGION V 1460 MARIA LANE. SUITE 210
% ,e,4 WALNUT CREE K, CALIFoRNI A 94596 Docket No. 50-528 ,[.
v Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 21666 f Phoenix, Arizona 85036 ! b- ,
Attention: Mr. T. G. Woods Jr.
Executive Vice President Gentlemen:
Subject:
a /
onstruction W Inspection 50-528/33-34 This refers to the construction appraisal inspection conducted by Region V on September 6-16, 26-30, October 31 and November 1, 1983 at Palo Verde Unit 1.
The Construction Appraisal Team was composed of members of Region I, Region V and a number of consultants. This inspection covered construction activities authorized by NRC Construction Permit CPPR-141.
The enclosed report identifies the areas examined during the inspection.
Within these areas, the effort consisted of detailed inspection of selected hardware subsequent to Quality Control inspections, examination of procedures and records, observation of work activities and interviews with management and other personnel.
Appe dix A to this letter is an Executive Summary of the results of the .
inspection
_..a _ ...,. and of ..w m . ,, conclusions
_ 4. ... reached 4.
m- - . by . -. this 4 _ .office.
7+ =1Thei= Appraisal tsc team g 1
- ef #- + -11:d h::t:2-- #a p--t d. However, large numbers of f, ,i deficiencies were not being identified during final QC inspections and/or there were uncontrolled changes made after the tystems vare turned-over to operations and startup. The majority of these deficiencies appeared to be minorbutsomeweresignificantandreflectedabreakdowninqualifyassurance and/or a lack of management control by operations and startup.aed could n t be e determined from existing records. [// u h.re ( h ;.4., . ,<
d Enforcement action related to this inspection will be the subject of separate correspondence.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).
hy '
', VAHA D" Y l9 ' d ec&ym ' ad
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l Arizona Public Service Company .
1 4
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to
~
discuss them with you.
Sincerely, I
t
- I 1
J. B. Martin Regional Administrator t
Enclosures:
)
! 1. Appendix A - Executive Summary 1
- 2. Inspection Report 50-528/83-34 s
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i 3
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~ -, _
i Docket No. 50-528 1
i Arizona Public Service Company .
P. O. Box 21666 #
Phoenix, Arizona 85036 5ttention: Mr. T. G. Woods Jr.
Executive Vice President Gentlemen:
Subject:
Construction Appraisal Inspection 50-528/83-34 This refers to the construction appraisal inspection conducted by Region V on September 6-16, 26-30, October 31 and November 1, 1983 at Palo Verde Unit 1.
The Construction Appraisal Team was composed of members of Region I, Region V and a number of coasultants. This inspection covered construction activities authorized by NRC Construction Permit CPPR-141.
The enclosed report identifies the areas examined during the inspection.
Within these areas, the effort consisted of detailed inspection of selected hardware subsequent to Quality Control inspections, examination of procedures and records, observation of work activities and interviews with management and other personnel.
Appendix A to this letter is an Executive Summary of the results of the inspection and of conclusions reached by this office. The Appraisal team noted no pervasive breakdown in meeting construction requirements in the samples of installed hardware inspected. However, large numbers of deficiencies were not being identified during final QC inspections and/or there were uncontrolled changes made after the systems were turned-over to operations and startup. The majority of these deficiencies appeared to be minor but some were significant and reflected a breakdown in quality assurance and/or a lack of management control by operations and startup and could not be determined from existing records.
Enforcement action relsted to this inspection will be the subject of separate correspondence.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).
l
_ , - - - ~ - - .- -e- ,-e. .g . - = , * , - - y vvwr +we e +, y v m w- -
ve--
f Arizona Public Service Company Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, J. B. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
- 1. Appendix A - Executive Summary
- 2. Inspection Report 50-528/83-34 cc w/ enclosures:
J. Bynum, APS G. C. Andognini, APS 'P 6 4 La Gr:c..T ye., b[5 b:c:
RSB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Ms. Jill Morrison Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
pink / green copies docket file copy Resident Inspector Mr. Martin, RV RV YOUNG / dot N IfMARTIN 11/ /83n[/q11/ /83
i
' l APPENDIX A l
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
An unsanounced team inspection for the purpose of appraising site '
construction was performed at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating' Station Unit I during the periods of September 6 through 16 and September 26 through 30, October 31 and November 1, 1983.
The inspection concentrated on handware and was intended to assess whether the construction of Unit I was performed in accordance with quality l requirements by companing the as-built condition to the design requirements.
The agthod used in this inspection was to select a meaningful sample of comp (ted safety-related construction for rigorous examination. The sample X was of high safety significance and was representative of the work controls, procedures, methodology and documentation of all safety-related work performed at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
The team's approach was to direct 70 percent of its effort on system and installation verification of the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
System, "A" train. This included gn in-depth examination of a large n3gebez Dd N N -
of elements related to that systemf' including: piping; supports; pumps; 6%
valves; welding; nondestructive examinat. ion; electrical supplies; (including redundancy /seperation); electrical motors; cables; terminations; supporting structural steel elements; related concrete structures; and otner systems.
Within the sample special emphasis was directed to the area of welding and electrical activities because of the multiple allegations received in these areas in the past. The other 30 percent of the team's effort was focused on inspection of other important areas (including the Reactor Coolant System).
The HPSI "A" train was selected because of its high safety significance, its representativeness in terms of construction practices, and the fact that the system had not previously been independently examined by a third party. The licensee had previously contracted Torrey Pines Technology to perform an independent quality assurance evaluation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in the areas of organization, management, quality assurance, design and construction. Torrey Pines Technology (the independent auditor) selected the Auxiliary Feedwater, the Contain W Spray and the Low Pressure Safety 4 Injection systems of the "B" train for examination.
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS The team found that basic construction ippeared to be satisfactory, however large numbers of deficiencies were not being identified during final QC :
inspections.
nature but some The majority of these deficiencies were significant and reflected appeared a W Wtolitybe minor in g#
assurance and/or or e lack of management control by operations and startup.
Although the team's focus was construction, a number of problems identified indicated that the deficiencies may have resulted from activities performed after the system or component had been turned over to operations and startup.
i I __ - , _ . - _. _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ ._ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
byy p@
AREAS INSPECTED AND RESULTS Worker Interviews M knp .
h 7F b
JL/#m g Because of concerns expressed to the NRC :.;d :i;;;- r:2 -L. ' ' p;;.e V regar4ing worker intiridation at Palo Verde, the team contacted more than J00 craftsmen or first line quality control inspectors with Y questions to determined if they felt intimidated or were subjected to undue pressures or to cut corners in their work.
cCLic W i Thesecontacts}wereg ,
and were made in private )(etween /
one of two wor:ters and one NRC inspector. . ggf Thetabulatedresultsofthesecontacts,thecraftsrepresentedbythe'pvoadd contacts, and any significant details in the responses are in the attached report. In summary, the responses were generally positive with % g O, W regard to the quality of site construction work. S: r r ::...ti::: u;;-- Y e p --= = ekt e. th; yu.liAv af oark daa- 4= =andor char- -- :;;;;;: m ana -Eipp;d ;c a g, ;; uai;;,_
Electrical and Instrumentation Construction Theinspectionsinthisarefrevealeddeficienciesinthethoroughnessof X the final inspections and/or in maintenance following testing. Of major significance was the finding of pipe caps found in place on the containmer.t pressure sensing lines with no administrative requirement in place to insure their removal prior to operation of the plant. Had these caps remained in place during operation the response capability of the HPSI system would have been seriously jeopardized. The inspector's were unable to reconstruct whethem the caps were installed and left on
,bytheconstructionpersonnelorgtnepreoperationaltestingpersonnel.]
't di' ret, Lc.:r'? r, " -t the li:;
77-- .m. to. ting : rtr:t up rr
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.Some oblemswitTeables aration were found. However, it was noted that the Licensee does have a program underway which would provide for reinspection of separation in the areas examined by the NRC. None of the separation problems noted by the NRC appeared to be major technical problems.
Additionally, discrepancies associated with concrete expansion anchor bolts and supporting electrical raceways were found. None of these, t however, were such as to represent any particular safety significance.
l deund M Lge' ,
k
i l pO Mechanical Construction Y
An examination of 68 pipe hangers or supports of a total of 116 in (60 percent)theHPSIsystemshowedthatfourteensuchstructureshave x deficiencies such as undersize fillet welds. However, deficiencies of i major significance were found in the inspection of the HPSL piping
- components. Specifically, a 10-inch suction line valve did not have the hand operating mechanism connected to the collar of the rising stem, and flange bolts on the same valve had not been adequately torqued. As a result, the valve bonnet was leaking. It appeared that the valve disassembly had been performed after construction personnel had completed their work on the valve. There was no indication that the preoperational testing or startup personnel had control measures in effect to recognize and repair the unsatisfacto.f valve condition. AIJ M sh i h valvegwas formed in a condition which would not allow it to open
'"111- &B y w e j M pe L .
l Q Weldina and Nondestructive Examination ,
TheNRCexamined18circumferentialand10socketweldsintheHPSIh6 system by independent radiography. Also, 34 welds were visually 0 examined in the field, and the radiographs on file for 192 welds were read by NRC. No deficiencies were found. In addition to the HPSI examination, system radiographs and weld records for twelve welds in the primary loop were examined. Three primary loop welds in PVNGS Unit 3 was examined radiographically for comparison of radiographic techniques with similar Licensee radiographs. One unresolved item was identified dealing with weld ripple images which could possibly mask weld defects.
p Structures Examinations in this area include concrete in situ testing, penetrations, structural gbolting and welding. Some problems with y bolting and welding of gallery steel were noted as described in the report.
As noted above, many of the more significant problems identified by this
{ construction inspection appeared to have occurred, in part, due to weaknesses in the preoperational/startup program reflecting the need for significant licensee action in this area.
, W QC. w o bje [. % /
i i
"A P
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i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
REGION V Division of Resident, Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs _
Report No. 50-528/83-34 Docket No. 50-528 License No. CPPR-141 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 1 Inspection at: Construction Site Inspection conducted: September 6-16, 26-30 October 31 and November 1, 1983 Inspectors:
W. G. Albert, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed WNP-3 (Team Leader)
J. F. Burdoin, Reactor Inspector Date Signed R. H. Campbell, Engineering Technician Date Signed R. H. Harris, Engineering Technician Date Signed H. W. Kerch, Lead Reactor Engineer Date Signed P. P. Narbut, Project Inspector Date Signed L. E. Vorderbrueggen, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed PVNGS l
t I
l l . _ . . .. . .
l W. J. Wagner, Reactor Inspector Date Signed e
G. E. Walton, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed BVPS-2 J. L. Crews, Technical Assistant to the Date Signed Regional Administrator T. Young, Jr., Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 2 Consultants: W. Marini, C. Crane, and L. Stanley l Contract Technicians: K. Grevenow and J. Ludivissi I
Approved By:
T. W. Bishop, Director, Division of Residents, Date Signed Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs l
l
TABLE OF CONTENTS TOPIC SECTION Inspection Scope and Objectives I-Team Organization and Methods II Contacts and Licensee /NRC Heetings III Electrical and Instrumentation Construction IV Hangers and Supports, Snubbers and Restraints V Piping Systems VI Civil and Structural Construction VIII Nondestructive Exaniination VIII Craft and QC Ins;ector Inte.' views IX l
I. INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES The scope of this inspection was the evaluation of on-site construction for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1.
The objective was to provide an overall assessment of the actual as-built condition of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (PVNGS-1)
- by comparing the as-built condition to design requirements of a representative sample. Therefore, the inspection concentrated on hardware and assessed whether the construction of PVNGS-1 was performed in accordance with quality requirements applicable to the plant.
In the areas inspected, the following was determined:
- The construction observed was in conformance to the drawings and specifications.
Necessary quality verifications were performed during the construction process with appropriete hold points and other
- controls.
? Nonconforming conditions were properly addressed in accordance with approved procedures.
Equipment was turned over to the startup organization in operable condition and it was being maintained properly as evidenced by the as-found condition.
I i
I-1 l -,_'.
II. TEAM ORGANIZATION AND METHODS The NRC inspection team consisted of ten NRC employees, three consultants, and two technicians from Wisconsin Testing, Inc., as follows: --
William G. Albert - Team Leader Registered Professional Engineer (Mechanical) with 33 years experience in reactor construction, engineering and operation.
Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector for the WNP-3 plant in Washington State.
Paul P. Narbut - Lead Inspector, Hechanical Area Nuclear Engineer (Nuclear) with 20 years experience in the design, construction and testing of nuclear power plants.
Currently a Project Inspector for the NRC's Region V office.
John F. Burdoin - Lead Inspector, Electrical Area Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical, Hechanical and Nuclear), with 36 years experience in the field of electrical engineering. Currently a Reactor Inspector with the NRC's Region V office, specializing in electrical inspection.
Tolbert Young, Jr. - Interview and Report Coordination Registered Professional Engineer (Nuclear) with 22 years experience in nuclear power plant operation. Currently a Section Chief with the NRC's Region V office.
Glen A. Walton - Welding and NDE Specialist Twenty-seven years experience in regulation and management of NDE and QA/QC. Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector for the Beaver Valley plant in Pennsylvania.
William J. Wagner - Welding Inspection Registered Professional Engineer (Quality) and AWS-Certified Welding Inspector with 24 years of experience in the field of i metallurgy, quality assurance and NDE. Currently a Reactor Inspector with NRC's Region V office, specializing in welding.
Harry W. Kerch - NDE Van Supervisor l Registered Professional Engine'er (Quality) and Certified ASNT l Level III Examiner with 35 years of NDE experience. Currently l a Lead Reactor Engineer with the NRC's Region I office.
l II-1
l l
l )
L. E. Vorderbrueggen - Team Support and Civil / Structural Coordinator i
Electrical engineer with 36 years experience in the design and construction of industrial plants. Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector at Palo Verde. ~
e Richard H. Harris - NDE Inspection Certified ASNT Level II Examiner and AWS Welding Inspector with 22 years experience in NDE and QC. Currently an Engineering Technician with the NRC's Region I office.
R. H. Campbell - NDE Inspection Certified ASNT Level II Examiner and AWS Welding Inspector with nine years experience in NDE and QC. Currently an Engineering Technician with the NRC's Region I office.
Loren Stanley - Electrical Consultant Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical) with 27 years electrical engineering experience. Currently in private consulting.
William Marini - Electrical Consultant Electrical Inspection Specialist with 13 years experience in the field of electrical and welding inspection. Currently with i
Resource Technical Services.
Cyril J. Crane - Electrical Consultant Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical) with 27 years ,
experience in reactor operation and electrical engineering.
Currently with Westec Services, Inc.
Jesse L. Crews - Registered Proffessional Engineer (Nuclear) with 22 years experience in reactor construction, engineering and operations. Currently Technical Assistant to the Regional Administrator.
K. Grevenow - NDE Technician Wisconsin Testing J. Ludiwissi - NDE Technician Wisconsin Testing i l
i r II-2 l
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1
, , , . . ~ . . . . - - -
The methods used for this inspection were to select a meaningful sample .
of Palo Verde safety-related construction for rigorous examination. The l sample was of high safety significance and was deemed to be '
representative of the work controls, procedures, methodology, and documentation of safety-related work performed at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. Selection and in-depth examination of>a representative sample of this nature allowed extrapolation of the Team's findings to the adequacy of other safety-related construction at Palo Verde.
Accordingly, the team's approach was to direct 70 percent of its effort ,
1 to the verification of system installation for the High Pressure Safety Injection System (HPSI) A train. This included in-depth examination of a large number of elements related to this system, including piping, pipe supports, pumps, valves, welding, condestructive examination, electrical power supplies, electrical cables (including redundancy and separation),
instrumentation, control, electrical motors, supporting structural steel elements, and related concrete structures. Within this sample, special emphasis was directed to the areas of welding and electrical construction since both of these areas had been the subject of allegations. The other 30 percent of the team's effort was focused on inspection in other important areas such as the Reactor Coolant System.
The examinations discussed above were conducted by:
(a) Physical inspection of systems, components, and structures.
(b) Independent NDE of welds and structures.
(c) Examination of documentation, where necessary, to support physical inspections.
(d) Private interviews and discussions with over 100 craft and inspection personnel.
(e) Examination of radiographs and other direct evidence of the quality of work such as postweld heat treatment charts.
(f) Testing of components by ultrasonic thickness measurements, hardness, radio signal cable tracing, and concrete probes.
II-3 i
l
! III. CONTACTS AND LICENSEE /NRC MEETINGS l
The inspection was unannounced until the morning of September 6, 1983.
On that day all team members and the NRC Ncndestructive 'xamination (NDE) i Van arrived on site. The teams primary point of contact during the l course of this inspection was the Arizona Public Service (APS) l Construction Quality Assurance organization at the site. This 1 organization is managed by Mr. W. E. Ide. l An entrance meeting was held at the start of the inspection to acquaint the licensee with what the NRC inspection team ir ended to accomplish, l arrange for needed drawings and documentation, a...ange for off shift radiography, define organizational points of contact, and arrange necessary Saturday coverage since September 10, 1983, was a day of work for the inspection team. This meeting was attended by Mr. E. E.
Van Brunt, APS Vice President for Nuclear Projects Management, Mr. J. A. Roedel, APS Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Mr. W. J. Stubblefield, Bechtel Field Construction Manager and 20 other staff members of the APS and Bechtel Site Organizations.
On September 14, 1983, a brief meeting was held between the NRC team leader Mr. W. G. Albert, Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, APS Vice President of Nuclear Projects and Mr. D. B. Fasnaent, APS Nuclear Construction Manager. The purpose of this meeting was to provide highlights of tentative findings up to that time since Mr. Van Brunt could not attmd the meeting on September 16th.
On September 16, 1983, a meeting was held between the team leader .6 the
, team lead inspectors with Mr. J. A. Roedel, APS Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Mr. D. B. Fasnacht, APS Nuclear Construction Me ager, Mr. W. G. Bingham, Bechtel Project Engineering Manager and approxi.aately ten other APS and Bechtel Staff. The purpose of this meeting was to provide APS with a progress report on the type and nature of NRC findings at that point in the inspection.
This was a status meeting and, therefore, no attempt was made to categorize the findings as to their seriousness or to define which would be items of noncompliance. The NRC stated at that time that they l perceived a weakness at the interface between construction and operations
! and while the basic construction appeared satisfactory, a significant
( number of findings indicated th.t either final inspections were not properly performed and/or there was a lack of control of work after l
completion of construction by the startup organization.
The principal exit interview for this inspection was held in the APS corporate offices on September 30, 1983. This meeting was attended by Mr. J. B. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator, Mr. T. W. Bishop, NRC Division Director and three NRC observers from headquarters
! organizations. The APS attendees included Mr. K. L. Turley, Chairman of
- the Board, Mr. O. M. DeMichele, President, Mr. T. G. Woods, Jr.,
1 Executive Vice President, Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Vice President Nuclear i
III-1
Projects, Mr. G. C. Andognini, Vice President Nuclear Operations, and eight other APS staff members. Bechtel attendance consisted of Mr. W. J. Stubblefield, Site Construction Manager and Mr. D. R.
Hawkinson, Projects Quality Assurance Manager. In addition to the above, the meeting was also attended by representatives of the five.other owner organizations for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.which are:
Southern California Edison Company, Salt River Project, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, El Paso Electric and Public Service of New Mexico. At this meeting, the individual team members reported upon the areas examined and the significant findings in each area as detailed in this report.
The NRC management again reiterated their concern with regard to the quality controls exercised at the time of system turnover from construction to the APS startup organization and the apparent need for more definitive quality control by maintenance organizations. However, the NRC expressed general satisfaction with basic construction, particularly pipe welding, and the results of over 100 private but informal contacts with craftsmen and first-line inspectors.
The applicant expressed their intent to immediately and thoroughly followup on the NRC findings. Except for disagreement with the NRC finding regarding the readability of certain primary loop pipe radiographs, the applicant did not comment on the NRC findings at the time of this meeting and questions were generally oriented toward the clarification of issues.
On November 1, 1983, a meeting was held between the Section Chief, the Technical Assistant to the Regional Administrator, Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, APS Vice President of Nuclear Projects, Mr. J. A. Roedel, APS Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Mr. D. B. Fasnacht, APS Nuclear Construction Manager and other members of the APS staff. The purpose this meeting was to discuss the additional facts obtained (during the last two days of the inspection) surrounding the more significant violations.
III-2 l
IV. Eltctrical cnd _nstrumentetien Ccnstructien Objectiva The primary objective of the appraisal of electrical and instrumentation construction was to determine whether safety-related components and systems were installed in accordance with regulatory requirements, SAR commitments, and approved construction specifications and drawings.
Additional objectives were to determine whether procedures, instructions and drawings used to accomplish construction activities were adequate and whether quality-related records accurately reflect the completed work.
Particular attention was concentrated on the "A" train at the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system to demonstrate specific areas within the broad categories of electrical and instrumentation construction. These areas include electrical raceway (cable tray and conduit) and raceway supports; electrical motors; electrical cable and cable terminatious; electrical penetrations; instrumentation (sensors and logic); diesel generator; and onsite AC power distribution system and DC power system. Portions of the HPSI B train were also examined.
A. Electrical Raceways and Raceway Supports Raceways
- 1. Areas Examined Electrical Raceways The NRC Team Inspectors examined approximately 1,690 feet of cable trays and 26 conduit runs. These raceways were inspected for: separation, proper identification.and color coding, tray / conduit size and routing in accordance with design .
~
drawings, raceway bend radii conformanch to criteria, bolted '
connection are tightness,. weld conformance to applicable '
requirements, raceways free of debris and sharp edges, and installation and inspection documentation completeness and accuracy.
Findings The inspection fcund that the raceways were in conformance with requirements regarding' size, bend radii, bolting, welding, debris, sharp edges, gene ~ral installation and -
inspection. .However, deficiencies were identified in the areas of identification and separation, as indicated below. -
One instance of a damaged flexible conduit jacket repair is an open. item and will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
- a. Temporary alphanumeric identification on cable tray ,
IEZAIDBTXF had not been replaced with permanent "
identification (OII 50-528/83-34-11).
- b. Nonsafety-related conduit IEZADCNRQ506 for thermostat 1EQFNT1243C in HPSI A pump room was separated from safety-
-related group 1 junction box IEZACCAKKJ03 by less than one inch (OII 50-528/83-34-12).
- c. At diesel generator E-PEA-G01 nonsafety-related flexible conduit 1EZGIANRX11 at junction box 4 is in contact with safety-related flexible conduit IEZGIAARR20 at junction box 6 (011-50-528/83-34-13).
IV-1 r
- d. Separation group 1 cable tray located in HPSI pump room A was,not marked with red color identification (round emblems) between points IEZACEATCBA and 1EZACCARC03 (OII 50-528/83-34-14). i
- e. The following separation group I conduits were not !
identified by alphanumeric markings (OII 50-528/83-34-15):
- 1) Conduits 1EZJ1AARC12,-14 and -16, on both sides of the wall between group 1, 4.16 KV switchgear area and channel A remote shutdown panel area, at the 100 foot elevation.
- 2) Conduit sleeves IEZJ1BARC13, 14 and 15 on control ~
building wall in channel B remote shutdown area, at the 100 foot elevation.
4
- f. Round blue identification emblems were missing from channel D conduit (PT-351) for a distance of approximately 40/50 ft at elevation 120' (011 50-528/83-34-16).
- g. At diesel generator E-PEA-G01, vendor supplied nonsafety-related ALS flexible cable at junction box 14 could potentially move and come in contact with safety related flexible conduit IEZGIAARX27 at junction box 7.
- s- :
- h. The vinyl jacket on safety related flexible (anaconda metal hose type NWC), conduit ERIEZCICARK13 inside-containment was damaged and subsequently repaired in accordance with established procedures (Procedure.for Raceway Installation, WPP/QCI 251.0, Revision.18, Section ~
5.10) by taping over the damaged vinyl with Scotch 33.
tape (Unresolved Item 50-528/83-34-02).
- 2. Raceway Supports '
The NRC Team examined 60 raceway supports. These supports were _.
inspected for conformance to design drawings including:
support spacing, configuration, location, mounting, material, support member size, and weld joints.
Findings The raceway supports were found to be in general conformance
'with design drawings and regulatory ' requirements. The following deficiencies were identified:
- a. The bolted connections attaching tray IEZA1BBTXCV to hanger H7 (drawing 13-E-ZAC-016 Rev. 20) were disconnected (OII 50-528/83-34-17). !
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IV-2
. - , ~ _ _ _ - - -
- b. Tha cs-installed cenfiguratien cf the walds attcching th2 lengitudinal brecing for h:ngers H212, H10, H11 cnd H12 en drcwieg 13-E-ZJC-044 R;v. 9 to snbrddad plctes is nst es specified by detail 21, alternate, on drawing 13-E-ZAC-043 rev. 18. In addition, slag remains on the referenced welds for hanger H12. The raceway installation cards for trays IEZJ4AATXHA and IEZJ4AATXHB indicate that these welds have been inspected and accepted by QC (OII j 50-528/83-34-18).
i
- c. The fifth support from instrument rack IJSBAA01 for conduit IEZCIAARX-10 was found to contain welds which exhibited overlap, which is prohibited by AWS D1.1-72 (011 50-528/83-34-19).
- d. The priming and painting of welds on raceway supports in channel c (green) riser room adjacent to cable spreading room at the 120 foot elevation was incomplete. ,
- e. The fourth support from junction box J-RCA-PI-190A for conduit IEZCAAARXO8 contains a damaged P1001A3 unistrut member which prohibits the full engagement of a unistrut spring nut within the unistrut channel.
B. Electric Motor Installation Areas Examined The NRC Team Inspeccors examined a sample of installed electric motors within the HPSI system. The motors selected were two HPSI
- ";' pump motors, IMSIAP02 (Train A) and IMSIBP02 (Train B); and 17
. motor-operated valve motors included in the HPSI System (Trains A j and B);
I UV-617 HV-530 UV-673 HV-531 UV-647 UV-667 HV-604 UV-674 UV-626 '
HV-699 . -UV-627 UV-616 UV-636 HV-609 HV-698 UV-637 UV-646 For the motors, the inspectors r'eviewed associated vendor drawings and documents, and plant maintenance, test, and installation records which define the design and installhtion methods for the equipmentv---
A physical inspection of the installed equipment was performed to determine compliance to design requirements and vendor installation criteria, mounting, bolting,' identification; nameplate'date, location, grounding, and protection. The following documents and areas-were reviewed: equipment specifications; purchase order documentation; vendor drawings and instruction manuals, including maintenance and installation requirements; seismic analysis or test and equipment qhalification documentation, including special
- mounting and maintenance requirements; equipment maintenance records.
for warehouse, construction, and startup phases; warehouse records including receipt, storage, and release documentation; material receiving reports, including equipment certifications from vendors; electrical testing records for pre-operational phase; and associated
- quality control and installation records.
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IV-3
The pswar esbles for the motors w2re in:pectsd in th2 field cnd tha tec=instiens ware exeninad et the octors. The routing of the etbles for the HPSI motors end cpproximately ens-third cf the MOVs wsre traced back to their respective 4160 volt or 480 volt power sources to verify physical separation of trains, cable tray / conduit arrangement, and cable tray fill. Specific cable numbers are i identified below in Section C, electrical cable installation.
Findings -
The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. It was found that the installation of the dowel pins in the motor mounting (following alignment), as required by the ;
manufacturer, had not been installed. Doweling of the motor mounts could not be identified on the master list of items to be completed prior to fuel load. However, it was established ,
that the maintenance division, charged with the installation of '
these dowel pins, was aware of this remaining requirement in the mounting of the HPSI pump motors and tools were ordered in August 1983 to perform the job.
- 2. HPSI pump IMSIAP02 motor, ground cable hold-down clamp was missing.
- 3. Motor heater (M-SIA-P02H) nameplate missing at MCC IEPHAM37.
. 4. There are no permanent identification signs at entrances to me - __HPSI pump rooms, Train A and Train B.
- 5. Revision 3 of Specification SYS.80-PE-410 for the HPSI pumps is
.not contained in Purchase Order 9500088, as required.. ;
Revision 2 of the specification is included in the purchase-
. order.
- 5. MOV nameplate error at MCC 1EPHAM33.'.The nameplate reads JSIA-UH-604, but should read IJ-SIA-HV-604.
- 7. Material Receiving Report 42220 is missing from Purchase Order .
i
, 960-1231 for MOV IJSIA-HV 604. hts Na items of noncompliane or deviations were identified. ~i C. Electrical Cable Installation l Electrical Cable Installation l Areas Examined The NRC Team inspectors selected a sample as listed below of installed electrical high and low voltage power, and control e- .
ables within the HPSI systems Trains A (and some in Train B) and the Class IE power systems. For each selected cable, the NRC inspectors reviewed associated drawings and documents which define the location, design route, and installation methods for cable installation within tray and conduit. A IV-4
- - ~ . -, -- .. . . . =
physical inspection of the as-built cable installation was performed by inspecting the entire length of cable run between the associated equipment and its respective load center / control cabinet. The objective of the inspection was to ascertain l compliance with design, installation,.and quality assurance documents. During the course of the inspection,-the following documents and areas were reviewed: elementary and cable block diagrams; cable code and cable scheme numbers; single line diagrams, cable type and identification, including separation color and cable markers; E580 computer program sorts for routing, identification of cables at tray points, actual and allowable tray fill at tray points, and size and type of cable;
, physical separation criteria, including raceway and tray designations; conduit and tray arrangement drawing; raceway ,
installation cards; cable installation cards; and cable installation specifications. The physical inspection of the cable runs included a determination of size, type, routing, protection, separation, identification, loading, cable supports and cable spacing. The actual cable installation and routing was compared to the design as determined from the E580 computer program and the cable installation cards.
The installation was examined for the following power, control and instrument cables, totaling approximately 8680 feet for.the HPSI system, Trcins A and B and Instrument Channels A, B, C,
&~ and D.
CABLES ,
EQUIPMENT TO LOCATION 1ESIO1BCICA HPSI Pump / Motor B IEPBBSO4E-----
IESIO1ACICA HPSI Pump / Motor A 1EPBAS03E-II 1ERC65CC1XA PT-102C 1ESACZ28I IERC65CCIXB Penetration Z28 1JSBCC02A' 1ERC65DC1XA PT-102D 1ESFDZ77I.
1ERC65DC1XB - Penetration Z77 IJSBDCO2A n -
1EHC62CCIXA -
PT-351C IJSBCCO2A .
r- 1EHC62DC1XA PT-35'1D IJSBDC02A.._
1ESI40BC1KA <- V-609 IEPHBM3410^-
IESI1BBC1XA V-667 - - IEPHBM36084.'
h IESI39BC1KA V-699 -- 1EPHBM3807d:
IERC64AC1XB~ PT-102A- IESAAZ471-IERC64BCIXA _ PT-102B' - 1ESFBZ38I-IERC64BC1XB Penetration Z38 IJZJBE02
- IEHC61AC1XA PT-351A IJSBAC02A.
IEHC61BCIXA PT-351B IJSBBC02A IEPE01ACICA Diesel Generator IJDGAB03 1EPE01ACICB IEPEAG01 IJDGAB03 1EPE01ACICC IEPEAG01 IJDGAB03 IESI40AC1KA MOV HV-604 .-
1EPHAM3305.
IESI39AC1KA - MOV HV-698 1EPHAM3708 1ESI40ACIRA MOV HV-604 1EPHAM3305 1ESI39ACIRA MOV.HV-698 IEPHAM3708 IV-5 1
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- * , . . - - , , . , . , _ , ...w . , .r, - . , . , , . , , s. , _ , , . - , -
c I
CABLES EQUIPMENT TO LOCATION 1ESi21ACIRC Penetration Z46 1EPHAM3512 1ESI21ACIRB MOV UV-673 IEPHAZ46I IESI21AC1KA Penetration Z46 1EPHAM3512 1ESI21AC1KB MOV UV-673 - IEPHAZ46I IEBC64BC1XD Remote Shutdown Pal. IJSBBC02A 1ESB01ACIRM Distrib. Pnl. IJSBACO2B (IEPNA-D25) 1ESB01ACIRS Distrib. Pal. IJRMAB02B (IEPNA-D25) 1EPN02ACIRB Isolat'n. Pal. IEPNAN11 (1JSAA-C04) .
Findings ,
Cable installation activities were found to be in conformance with requirements. Two apparent violations were identified in this area.
- 1. Scaffolding lumber was found stored in channel C electrical raceway / cable chase located in the lower cable spreading room at the 120 foot elevation (OII 50-528/83-34-20).
- 2. In tray 1EZJ4AATSCE, cables are projecting above the 1( el
- - of the tray siderails, and are in physical. contact with.
fire protection piping and two HVAC ducts (OII 50-528/83-34-21).
In addition to the violations, the following two concerns were.
identified: -
- 1. While inspecting the traceability of Anaconda 5.KV cable,.
it was found that the identification, required to be permanently marked on the outer jacket of the cable at-three-foot intervals, cou,1d easily be rubbed off. This' .
resulted in the cable jacket markings becoming illegible
._ following handling during installation.
- 2. Traceability of SKT cable was found to lack clarity. The~
cable is received on site from the vendor under a material .
receiving record (MRR) which identifies the cable, vendor and receiving cable reels. Following receipt, the vendors
- cable reels are assigned Bechtel cable reel numbers for storage and future processing. The Bulk Material -
Inventory (computer readout), the principle cable record, correlates Bechtel cable reel numbers to vendor reel numbers, but does not list the MRR numbers under which the a:
- vendor cable reels were delivered. Therefore, it is difficult to trace cable directly from the Bechtel storage reels to the ma.terial receipt records.
IV-6 l
D. C:ble Terminntiens The NRC Toca insprctors excainzd the termin:ticas of 31 cables idsntified cbsva undar cable installatien. Tha terminsticas at both ends of the cables were inspected for: cable terminations as shown on engineering documents, identification with enclosure, separation, size of conductor, tie-down, bend radius, grounding of cable shield, disposition of spare wires, proper size terminal lugs, i neatness and workmanship, and. installation and inspection documentation. -
Findings Except as noted below, cable terminations were found to be in conformance with requirements. The following deficiency was identified:
- 1. Electrical installation, Specification IM-306, Section 7.2R, .
requires spare wires in a cable to be coiled and insulated with tape or a shrink sleeve. The end of green / black tracer, spare wire cable ESI21ACIRC at EPHAM3512 was bare and not insulated.
The quality of insulating the ends of other spare wires was inconsistent and insecure in some instances. No items of i
noncompliance or deviations were identified.
2 E. Electrical Penetrations Areas Examined i The following installed containment electric'al penetration -
- "- assemblies were inspected:.
Number - Elevation Z28 100-foot-Z38 100-foot -
246 120-foot 247 120-foot Z77 120-foot The location, type, mounting, and identificatien were compared with-'- -
the installation drawings. -The cab'le terminations at the -
penetrations were examined both inside and outside of-containmente. :
c The QC records associated with receiving, storage and installation r of these penetrations were also reviewed.
Finding Activities observed and documentation reviewed indicated work performed in th'is area was in accordance with requirements. No !
items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. .
F. Electrical Instrumentation .~
Areas Examined i The actuation of HPSI is initiated from either of two parameters (four channels); low pressurized. pressure and high containment pressure. The four pressurizer low pressure transmitters, PT-102A, 102B, 102C and 102D; and the four containment high pressure transmitters, PT-351A, 351B, 351C, and 351D were inspected in the field.
IV-7
T These pressure transmitters were inspected for proper mounting, physical separation, identification of correct instruments and safety channel (color code), instrument calibration, etc. The stainless steel tubing runs were traced from the transmitters back to the containment isolation /r.oot valves to verify; proper grade (slope) and tubing support.
The instrument cabinets and panels were inspected for technical requirements as contained in the Procurement Specifications 13-JM-200 (COMSIP, Inc) and 13-EM-022 (HARLO Corp.), and Installation Specification for Instrumentation and Control Equipment, 13-JM-702, Revision 8. The physical inspection also included inspection of internal wire routing and separation, cable marking (identification), termination connections, module mountings, , '
overall workmanship, and cleanliness. Operator controls and
- displays for the HPSI system were examined at the B02 and B05 main control room benchboards. The interface between the HPSI system and remote shutdown panel was also examined.
The following engineered safety features (HPSI) systems cabinets and instrument panels were inspected:
- 1. NSSS Analog Instrument Cabinets A, B, C, and D:
1-J-SBA-C02A 1-J-SBB-C02A 1-J-SBC-C02A 1-J-SBD-C02A
- 1-J-SBA-C02B 1-J-SBB-C02B -
~
- 2. < Plant Protection System Cabinets A,.B, C, and D:
1-J-SBA-C01 1-J-SBB-C01 1-J-SBC-C01 1-J-SBD-C01- -
- 3. : Main Control Room Panels:
1-J-RMA-B02 .._ 1-J-RMB-B02- 1-J-RMC-B02 1-J-RMD-B02 ' '
1-J-RMA-B05 J-RMB-B05 ' 1-J-RMC-B054 1-J-RMD-B05 .- -
- 4. ESFAS Auxiliary Relay Cabinets \A and B:
1-J-SAA-C01 1-J-SAB-C01 ._:
1-J-SAA-C02A 1-J-SAB-C02A .1-J-SAA-C02B 1-J-SAB-C02A=
- 6. Isolation Cabinets A, B, C, and D:
1-J-SAA-C04 1-J-SAB-C04 1-J-SAC-C04 1-J-SAD-C04 -
- 7. -Status Display Panel' Inserts A and B:
1-J-ESA-C01 1-J-ESB-C01 IV-8
- 8. R: mote Shut Dswn Penal Szctiens (HPSI Valva Centrolo): U 1-J-ZJA-E01 1-J-ZJB-E01 1-J-ZJC-E01 1-J-ZJD-E01
- The following quality centrol records for tha HPSI instruasnt systems were examined; purchasing / receiving records, storage / maintenance records, installation records, cable .
installation, and termination records.
Findings l 1
l Inspection of instrumentation revealed a significant violation ,
which reflects a weak- w in the preoperational/startup test program:
- 1. The sensing lines for 'our channels of containment pressure (PT-351A, 351B, a s1C and 357D) were found to be capped immediately inside containment. The sensing lines were capped with threaded pipe caps and could only be removed with the aid ,
- of a pipe wrench. The presence of these pipe caps made this system inoperative. There were no records to indicate when the caps were installed. The inspectors were unable to determine whether the caps were installed by construction or preoperational personnel. It was not apparent that any preoperational or startup program action would have assured the removal of the caps prior to plant operations. This is an apparent violation (OII 50-528/83-34-22).
! In addition to the apparent violation identified above, three items
- of concern were identified:.
- ne (
- 1. - The instrument sensind line supp' o rt shown in Detail 1 on! - :. -
Drawing 13-J-01D-105, Revision 4 has a weld which contains - -
undercut measuring approximately 1/32-inch in depth. . The -
1/32-inch value does not satisfy the requirements of the-
.01-inch criteria for undercut transverse to the primary
. tensile stress of the member in question as stated in AWS .
DI.1-72, Revision 1973 as defined in specification 13 CM 320.
- 2. An internal separation barrier cover was missing from remote - :
, shutdown panel IJZJBE01, and no status tag noting its removal .
was observed. \.
l -.
- 3. xIt was found that: temporary nonconformance report hold t'ags
..for level. transmitters LT 1123A and LT 1124A at the 100 foot elevation inside containment were reversed. -
G. Emergency Diesel,Cenerator i
Areas Examined l
The electrical aspects of the Emergency Diesel Generator- 1,-
-IEPEAG01, including control cabinet wiring, were inspected for
- location, mounting, separation, protection,- and identification.:
Findings These reviewed aspects indicated. work was performed in accordance with installation requirements. Some minor deficiencies that were found in raceways (flexible conduit) separation were address under raceway and support section of this report. Paragraph IV.A-1. No other violations or deviations were identified.
IV-9 l
H. Onsite AC Pswar Distributien Systeo Arecs Exenined The NRC intpretor exanined the following components of the Class I 4160-volt and 480-volt power distribution system:
. I 1E-PBB-SO4 4.16 KV switchgear, separation group 2 l 1E-PBA-S03 4.16 KV switchgear, separation group 1 IE-PGA-L35 480 V switchgear, separation group 1 1E-PGA-L33 480 V switchgear, separation group 1 1E-PHA-M33 480 V MCC, separation group 1
- IE-PHA-M35 480 V MCC, separation group 1 1E-PHA-M37' 480 V MCC, separation group 1 IE-PHB-M34 480 V MCC, separation group 2 IE-PHB-M36 480 V MCC, separation group 2 IE-PHB-M38 480 V MCC, separation group 2 The 4160-volt switchgear, 480-volt switchgear and 480-volt motor ,
control centers (MCC) were inspected and compared to installation drawings relative to configuration, location, mounting, identification, installation documentation, and protection.
Findings Inspection of this area revealed three apparent violations related to cabinet installation and electrical separation:
, 1. It was found that 87 3/8-inch bolts were missing from the base frames for the six separation groups 1 and 2 motor control
- ' centers identified. The failure to identify this condition, .
adverse to quality, is an apparent violation (OII-50-528/83-34-23).
- 2. In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PBA-503L nonsafety-re. lated flexible conduit 1EZJ1ANRR52 is separated from safety-related wiring by less than-1 inch which does not satisfy the so separation requirements (OII 50-528/83-34-24).
- 3. In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PBA-503r nonsafety-related --
i flexible conduit IEZJ1ANRR51 %s separated from safety-related- - -
wiring by less than one inch, contrary to separation criteria.~_-
l (OII'50-528/83-34-25).-b-In addition to the violations noted above, two items of concern .
were identified:
- 1. An error was found in the identification of compartment 05 of MCCEPMAM33 on drawing 13-E-PHA-003. Long term cooling valve JSIAHV604 sas identified as JSIAUV604.
- 2. 'It was found that three cubicle tie-down bolts in MCC IE-PHA-M35 were not fully engaged. The licensee had in' progress design change package (DCP) ISE-PH-035 requiring certain modifications to the tie-down method for the above identified MCCs. These modifications were required to assure the MCCs comply with the seismic analysis requirements.
l IV-10 t .
~.# - , . - - ,,,
- 1. DC Pcwar Systen Areca Exctintd The four main DC bstteries, battery chargers, and Vital AC bus inverters were inspected for electrical separation aspects, fluid levels, termination connections, bolting materials, spacers, mounting arrangements, and general workmanship and cleanliness.
Equipment that was inspected is identified in the following list: i l
DC Batteries and Mounting Racks A, B, C, and D: I 1-E-PKA-F11 1-E-PKB-F12 1-E-PKC-F13 1-E-PKD-F14
. DC Battery Chargers A, B, C, and D:
1-E-PKA-H11 1-E-PKB-H12 1-E-PKC-H13 1-E-PYD-H14 1-E-PKA-H15 1-E-PKB-H16 Vital AC Bus Inverters A, B, C, and D:
1-E-PNA-N11 1-E-PNB-N12 1-E-PNC-N13 1-E-PND-N14 ,
Technical requirements for the batteries, battery chargers, and inverters contained in Procurement Specifications 13-EM-050 for Exide, 13-EM-051 for Power Conversion Products, Inc., and 13-EM-054, respectively, were reviewed.
Each battery was physically inspected for adequate fluid levels, conductor termination connections, bolting materials used, and absence of battery case cracks. Each battery rack was inspected for battery-to-end plate spacing, battery-to-battery spacers, alignment of frame spring-nuts, and frame welding to the battery room floor a"- imbeds. The location', floor mounting, panel displays, and a 2::
electrical conduit configuration for each battery charger and Vital -
AC inverter were inspected.
Revisions 0 and-1 of the PM-410 Startup Generic Maintenancece r Procedure for Station Batteries were reviewed for technical.
- requirements and test acceptance criteria. Records were inspected for each of the four safety-related batteries, such as on-site _
, receiving records, mid-1981 test results during warehouse storage, and periodic maintenance test result records during construction for .a the period from February 1982 through, September 1983. .
\
Installation, in-sit _e._ modification, and periodic maintenance records. l_
for each. battery charger, Rand Vital AC inverter (prior to turnover- -
to Startup) were also inspected.
Findings The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. The batteries were received on site during the summer of 1981.
l It was found that no procedure existed for performing the -
required periodic tests (IEEE Std. 308) to maintain the - -
batteries. The required procedure came into effect in the spring of 1982. 'This item was the subject of a violation during the team inspection of 1981.
IV-11
,, - .n,, n. . . - n e.-. . . . , . , , , - - - . , ,
l l
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- 2. The earliest maintenance records are for August 1981, and proceed monthly through November. However, no records can be found for December 1981 and January 1982.
1
, 3. The storage of periodic maintenance records did not satisfy the storage requirements of Section 1.8 of the FSAR. These records, required to be stored in a manner which minimizes the i risk of destruction from fire, were found stored in a paper- l board box. A licensee representative stated that this was temporary for field use.
- 4. No records exist to indicate that baseline annual cell-to-cell and terminal detail connection resistance data was ever recorded during factory acceptance tests for these batteries. ,
- However, the licensee startup generic test procedure addresses the requirement to record intercell resistance checks, during preoperationaltesting.(
- 5. It was found that the vendor testing (at the factory) of battary C did not completely fulfill the discharge rate requirements. However, the licensee identified this, at the time, by issuing supplier deviation disposition request (SDDR) 2763 which requires the capacity discharge test to be run on the job site. This test is scheduled to be accomplished by the e- startup group 'during preoperational- testing. ( }- j J
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IV-12 1
V. Hanners and Supports, Snubbers and Restraints A. Areas examined
- 1. Hardware: The inspector examined all pipe hangers, supports, snubbers, and restraints on the HPSI A piping system from the stset of suction line SIA-008-GCBC-10-inch through discharge lines SI-A-100-CCBA-4 inch were and SI-A-106 CCBA-3-inch, throughout the 40-foot elevation, up through the vertical pipe chase to the 89-foot elevation pipe chase. At this juncture, one of the five injection branch lines, SI-E-176-CCBA-3", was followed to the injection point and all pipe supports, hangers, snubbers, and restraints were examined. Additionally, siscellaneous branch lines from the HPSI discharge path were examined for supports (to the first isolation valve on the branch). Additionally, a few supports not involved in the line description above were examined if a condition was noted which warranted follow up. All supports examined are listed in Table V-1.
In most cases, pipe insulation was removed for inspection. In those cases where a support was only partially examined, Table 1 so notes. These cases generally fall into the following conditions:
. Insulation not removed. This condition precluded
- examining pipe lug welds only. The hanger members and welds are not covered by insulation and can be throughly
.; inspected.
. Lua welds only. In these cases, the inspector examined only the lug welds to increase the sample of lug welds by inspecting supports whi-h were not on the selected branch l line, but were part of HPSI-A.
. One aspect only (e.a., " base plate only"). In these cases, the support was not included in the lines selected but was partially examined because a condition warranting follow up was noted.
- . Location and configuration only. These cases involved a series of replicate supports in a horizontal run. The j location of the support and the configuration were checked against drawing requirements, and support member sizes and weld sizes were checked by visual examination
- rather than by measurement.
V-1 L
1 All other supports were examined fully.
The inspector examined the supports to determine that:
. All supports shown on the piping isometric drawings were installed.
. No additional supports were installed.
. The support configuration was as shown on the support drawing.
- . The support member material was per the drawing.
. The welds on the support were the correct size and met the applicable code and standard requirements.
. The welded attachments to piping were per drawing.
. The attachment welds to pipe were per drawing and met code and standard requirements.
. Mechanical snubbers and restraints were installed where required by drawing.
. The snubber and restraints were the proper size (load rating).
. The snubbers and restraints had the proper cold setting shown on the drawing.
. The supports were properly located per the drawing relative to the piping and the structure.
There are a total of 116 pipe supports involved in all of the HPSI-A system. The inspector examined 68 supports or about 60 percent. Of the 68 supports examined 14 supports had one or more problems. This is about a 20 percent reject rate.
The problems identified are discussed in the " Findings" section below.
- 2. Drawings, Specifications, and Procedures The inspector gathered and reviewed the applicable piping drawings, hanger drawings, specifications, work and inspection procedures, and pertinent vendor information.
V-2 l
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Other safety-related documentation, including documents, authorizing deviations from the drawings, records of hanger inspection by QC, non-destructive examination records, welding inspection records, noncomformance reports, vendor certification records, code reports, and piping spool fabrication records were reviewed as they were identifed in the pursuit of questions raised on a particular support's apparent anomolles.
The inspector also reviewed the ISAR and ASME codes for applicable requirements.
Tha documents discussed above will be listed and specifically addressed only as they apply to findings, j discussed in the " Findings" section below.
- 3. Tools The inspection was conducted utilizing unaided visual examination, tape measure, weld gages, angle finder, and adequate lighting. Safety equipment was utilized as required. No NRC independent non-destructive examination was performed on the pipe supports due to other priorities. In the one case where the visual inspection indicated a possible weld defect, the inspector requested the licensee reexamine the weld using liquid penetrant examination. The inspector observed the entire performance of the examination.
B. Findinas Table V-1 lists all supports inspected and shows which supports were found unsatisfactory and provides a brief description of the problem (s) found.
The problems found group into four areas which are considered apparent violations of NRC regulations. Each problem identified in Table V-1 is explained more fully below.
(1) Failure of the pipe support QC personnel to ideatify support conditions which are not in accordance with drawina or specification requirements (five examples).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 5, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
V-3
The licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18, dated May 25, 1983, " Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports
- Installation," Appendix I, requires the Piping QC Engineer
! to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pips Supports." The inspection requirement for Task I is to verify the support assembly correct per approved engineering drawings and specifications.
. Support SI-100-H003 was found with a loose pipe clamp and installed at an angle of 4 1/2' from vertical. Procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, paragraph 8.9, requires the clamp to be snug on the pipe. Procedure WPP/QCI, paragraph 9.2.7.1, requires the angle to be no greater than 2 degrees. The support was accepted by QC on November 20, 1983.
. Support SI-100-H005 was found with the drawing specified dimension of 3 3/4 inches between the centerline of the pipe stanchion and the centerline of the insert plate to be actually 7 1/2 inches. This difference exceeds the tolerances of i 2 inches paragraph 9.3.12 of the WPP/QCI. The support was accepted by QC on November 13, 1981.
. Support SI-100-H036 was found in a condition which did not match the hanger drawing and modifying Field Change Request (FCR) 15, 123P. Item D of the FCR was not installed. The support was accepted by QC on October 22, 1983 to the drawing and FCR.
. Support SI-101-H00A was found with a loose jam nut on Item 61, the sway strut assembly. The support was accepted by QC on October 2, 1981.
. Support SI-106 H001 was found with the 2" long pipe lugs, Item 38, bearing on the supporting steel for only 3/16 inch and 7/16 inch, respectively. Paragraph 9.4.1 of the WPP/QCI indicates full bearing surface should be provided as indicated on the support drawing. The support was accepted by QC on May 23, 1980.
The failure of pipe support QC personnel to identify pipe support conditions which were not in accordance with drawing or specification requirements is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (OII50-528/83-34-01).
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i (2) Failure of the welding QC personnel to identify weld conditions which are not in accordance with the drawing or the welding code l requirements (eight examples).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 5, requires, in part, that l activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings, and shall be
- accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
l Licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18, dated May 25, 1983, " Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports Installation," Appendix I, requires the Piping QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports."
The inspection requirements for Task 8 require the welding QCE to verify that field welding is complete. For Task 9, he is to verify the vendor welding was checked for size and length.
The instructions to the QCE in Appendix I instruct the QCE to verify welding acceptability.
. Support SI-100-H005 was found with an underfill condition in the stanchion, Itcm 30, to pipe weld. The weld is required to be a 5/16-inch fillet weld. The actual fill was measured to be 1/4 inch. The weld was accepted on the field weld check list on November 9, 1981.
i . Support SI-100-H010 was observed tc have an apparent lap in the weld of Item 38 to the pipe. This was a vendor weld. Minor slag was also present in the toe of the weld. These conditions would have precluded a satisfactory liquid penetrant examination by the vendor. The vendor records show the weld was liquid penetrant examined and accepted on December 4, 1977 (Job 2810, Piece 1-SI-100-S-009, "F" No. 261).
The NRC inspector had the visual indication on the weld
( reexamined by licensee personnel by liquid penetrant examination in his presence. The liquid penetrant examination resulted in an unacceptable linear indication.
The vendor weld had been last inspected by site QC personnel per Task 8 on June 17, 1981, and was accepted.
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! . Support SI-100-H015 has the lug, item 38A, field welded to the pipe. The weld was 1/32-inch undersize. The welds were originally accepted on January 22, 1979, and were accepted l
. again during the support inspection on October 28, 1981. l
. Support SI-100-H034 was found with one undersized vendor lug weld (Item 38 to the pipe). The weld was required to be a 1/4-inch fillet and measured to be 3/16 inch. The vendor welds were checked by site QC for size and acceptsd on September 11, 1982.
. Support SI-102-H00B was found with several weld problems. The vendor weld of Item E to Item B was required to be a 3/16-inch fillet, but was 1/8 inch on three sides. Additionally, there was rollover (or laps) at the corners. The field weld of Item C to existing structure was required to have one-inch end returns on the welds, but did not. The vendor weld was accepted by site QC on August 18, 1981. The field weld was originally accepted on October 14, 1980, and was accepted again on August 18, 1981.
. Support SI-106-H011 was found with the pipe lug welds (Items 38 and 38A to pipe) closer than 1 inch to the adjacent pipe-to pipe circumferential weld. The actual distance was l' 3/4 inch. Specification 13-PM-204, " Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems," paragraph 12.2.9, states that welded attachments shall not be installed within 1.0 inch of existing circumferential welds. The field lug welds were originally accepted on February 12, 1979, and again during final support acceptance on October 2, 1980.
. Support SI-176 H001 was found with an undimensioned weld on the drawing, therefore, the proper size of the weld could not be properly verified by the QC inspector. The 3-inch long fillet field welds of Item 84 to Item B are not dimensioned on the support drawing 13-SI-176-H001, Revision 1. The welds were originally accepted on December 18, 1980, and were accepted again on September 15, 1982.
. Support SI-176-H003 was found to have an undersize weld. The skewed (120-degree) fillet weld of Item A to the containment insert plate measured 1/4 inch rather than the required 5/16 inch.
The support weld was accepted on July 14, 1980.
Further discussions with the Lead QC Engineer for Pipe Supports and the Lead Welding Engineer disclosed that the
! Welding Engineer had given verbal instructions to the QC 1
Engineer that were contrary to the AWS D.1.1 code requirements for measuring the size of skewed fillet welds. Hence, this undersize weld may be considered caused by improper engineering information. It follows that all skewed fillet welds'may require reinspection to the proper criteria.
V-6
The AWS D.1.1 Code 1974 shows, in Figure 2.7.1, that skewed fillet walds are measured thus:
ScWshrt -
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At Palo Verde the QC Engineer states weld are " measured" as shown below (it is not clear how this is "mesured" since there is no access to one of the measurement points):
Ze.
To " measure" by the Palo Verde method to a given size (e.g.,
5/16 inch on a 120-degree weld) will result in an undersize weld by the Code definition (in this case by 3/64 inch). Nonetheless, QC inspectors are required by WPP/QCI 201.1 to inspect to AWS D.1.1 criteria for this weld. The AWS D.I.1 criteria are clear and are not superceded by verbal instructions from engineering.
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The failure of welding QC to identify pipe support weld conditions which are not in accordance with the drawing or welding code requirements is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (OII 50-528/83-34-02). s (3) Failure of engineering to include a non-safety loads in a safe related pipe support calculation (one example).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 5, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
Specification 13-PM-204, Revision 12, Paragraph 12,1.2 dated April 7, 1983, states the design and location of all pipe supports shall be the responsibility of project engineering.
l Paragraph 12.1.4 states pipe supports designed by engineering will be shown on drawings and all design details will be shown including miscellaneous steel.
. Support SI-100-N-012 was found with a miscellaneous steel member installed which was used as a support for an Instrument Air Line. The miscellaneous steel was not shown on the pipe support drawing, 13 SI-100-H-012, Revision 1. The drawing does show the engineering design loads used in the analysis of the l pipe support.and the applicable calculation number (Problem No. 513-E, point number 293).
Engineering was contacted by telephone, and the responsible engineer stated that the 2 cads from the miscellaneous steel member used as an instrument air support (IA-116-H00A) were not included in the design load for the pipe support, SI-100-H-012.
The engineer stated that loads were inconsequential (29 pounds) and the instrument air calculation had been annotated to state that the attachment-to the Safety Injection Support was satisfactory.
j Nonetheless, he stated the procedure requires the safety injection support calculation be amended to include such loads.
The failure of engineering to include a nonsafety design load in a safety-related pipe support calculation is considered an l apparent violation of NRC regulations.
(4) Failure to maintain an accepted pipe support in an acceptable l condition l
l Appendix B, of 10 CFR 50, Criterion II, as implemented by Chapter 17 of the PSAR and FSAR requires in part that "The
, quality assurance program shall provide control over I
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- activities affecting the quality of the identified structures, systems, and components, to an extent consistent with their importance to safety".
l Support SI-089-H008 was found with rubber seal material 4
injected in the space by the Flourogold slides plates, Items 54 and 55 on the drawing. The drawing does not show rubber sealant material. It is probable that the material was inadvertently injected after the support inspection on i November 29, 1979, but the material had been neatly trimmed I
away and the edges painted in the area painting.
The failure to provide control over activities affecting i quality, resulting in a challenge to the sliding function of l support SI-089 H308 is considered a violation (OII j 50-528/83-34-03).
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TABLE V-1 DEGREE OF SUPPORT TYPE FINDING PROBLE'1 DESCRIPTION INSPECTION
- 1. SI 008 H001 S Sat Full
- 3. SI 008 H003 S Sat Full
- 4. SI 008 H004 SNB Sat Full
- 5. SI 008 H005 S Sat Full
- 6. SI 089 H008 S Unsat Penetration Seal Haterial Slide Plate on Slide Plate only
- 7. SI 099 H001 SNB Sat Full
- 8. SI 099 H002 S Sat Full
- 9. SI 200 H001 S Sat Presence only - seal boot on
- 10. SI 100 H002 S Sat Full
- 11. SI 100 H003 S Unsat (1) Loose clamp (2) Excessive Full Angle
- 12. SI 100 H004 S Sat Full
- 13. SI 100 H005 S Unsat (1) Location dimension varies Full more than allowed (2) Lack of fill on stanchion to pipe field weld
- 14. SI 100 H006 S Sat All but lug welds
- 15. SI 100 H007 SNB Sat Full
- 16. SI 200 H008 S Sat Full
- 17. SI 100 H009 S Sat All but lug welds
- 19. SI 100 H011 S Sat Full
- 20. SI 100 H012 S Unsat Nonsafety hanger loads not Full included
- 21. SI 100 H013 S Sat Full
- 22. SI 200 H015 S Unsat Lug weld size Full
- 23. SI 100 H016 S Sat Full
- 24. SI 100 H017 S Sat Full
- 25. SI 100 H018 S Sat Full
- 26. SI 100 H019 S Sat Full
- 27. SI 100 H020 SNB Sat Full
- 28. SI 100 H021 S Sat Full
- 29. SI 100 H022 S -Sat Location /
Configuration /
Clearances only
- 30. SI 100 H023 S Sat "
- 31. SI 200 H024 S Sat " 1
- 32. SI 100 H025 S Sat "
- 33. SI 100 H026 S Sat "
- 34. SI 100 H027 S Sat "
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- 35. SI 200 H028 S Sat Full V-10
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- 36. SI 100 H029 S Sat All but pipe lugs
- 37. SI 100 B031 S Sat Lug welds only !
a
- 38. SI 100 H032 s Sat Lug welds only !
- 39. SI 100 H034 S Unsat Undersize lug weld Full
- 40. SI 100 H035 S Sat Lug welds only
- 41. SI 200 H035
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S Unsat Configuration differs from Full drawing
- 43. SI 102 H00A S Sat Full
- 44. SI 102 MOOB S Unsat Welds deficient (Undertize Full weld, rollover, no end returns)
- 45. SI 105 H00B S Sat Full
- 46. SI 105 H00C S Sat Full
- 49. SI 106 H001 S Unsat Lack of Lug Contact area Full with support members 2
- 50. SI 106 H002 S Sat Full
- 51. SI 106 H003 S Sat Full
- 52. SI 106 H004 S Sat Full
- 53. SI 106 H005 S Sat Full
- 54. SI 106 H006 S Sat Full
- 55. SI 106 H007 S Sat Full
- 56. SI 106 H008 SNB Sat Full
- 56. SI 106 H009 S Sat Full
- 57. SI 106 H010 S Sat Full
- 58. SI 206 H011 S Unsat Pipe lug weld w/in 1" of Full circumferential weld
- 59. SI 106 N012 S Sat All but pipe lugs
- 60. SI 106 H013 S Sat All but pipe lugs
, 61. SI 106 H014 S Sat Full
- 62. SI 106 H015 S Sat Full
- 63. SI 106 H016 S Sat Full
- 64. SI 106 H023 S Sat Full
- 65. SI 176 H001 S Unsat Undimensioned weld on drawing Full
- 66. SI 176 H002 S Sat Full
- 67. SI 176 H003 S Unsat Undersize fillet weld Full
LEGEND S = Support SS = Restraint (Sway Strut)
SNB = Snubber
- V-11
VI. PIPING SYSTEMS INSPECTION _
Approximately 826 feet of HPSI-Train A piping was selected for insp6ction.
Inspection was performed on 64 percent, which represents 530 feet of the NPSI piping, to verify compliance with the isometric drawings and ASME Section III requirements. This included 64 feet of piping on the suction line of HPSI pump A; the balance of piping inspected was on the discharge lines located in the auxiliary and containment buildings respectively.
Piping system inspection includes visual inspection of pipe welds, welder qualifications, piping size and quality, and valve installation.
A. Pipina System Welds
- 1. Areas Examined Visual inspection of 200 pipe welds, out of a total of approximately 900 weld joints (pipe and socket) in the entire HPSI systems was made for quality and compliance with ASME Section III requirements. Characteristics examined included l weld surface appearance, location, weld reinforcement, and absence of surface defects including tracks, lack of fusion, porosity, slag and undercut exceeding prescribed limits.
The records associated with one percent of the total welds were reviewed in detail and compared with the information obtained at the weld joint. Records examined included certified material test reports, piping class sheets, Bechtel's Forn 84 which specifies the welding and nondestructive examination requirements for field erected piping, welder qualifications, field welding check list, and filler material certifications.
- 2. Findings The type of pipe weld joints examined included pipe-to pipe, pipe-to-fittings and pipe-to-valves. The visual inspection of these weld joints and the associated records reviewed indicated that the components were welded together by qualified welders using qualified filler materiale and qualified welding procedures, the components being acined were certified, that the base material and the fil.ter material were compatible for welding, and the required nondestructive examinations and weld inspections were performed. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
VI-1
l B. Pipinz
- 1. Areas Examined Field inspection activities included visual examination of the 530 feet of piping. This was to assure that the installed piping was as specified on the design drawing, and that the piping was reasonably straight, had a workesalike finish and was free from injurious defects such as mechanical marks,
. abrasions and pits.
- 2. Findinas Inspection of piping quslity revealed one section of pipe to have )mg mechanical marks. This was identified on pipe spool 28 N line number A106-CCBA, adjacent to pipe-to-valve weld number WO25. The quality control instruction, WPP/QCI No. 204, Revision 3. " Piping Systems Release for Insulation,"
, Appendix I, requires that piping systems, prior to insulation, be checked for surface damage by the quality control engineer.
Any unacceptable surface damage is then required to be i
documented on the construction inspection plan (CIP), and then evaulated in accordance with procedure ED-1, entitled
" Elimination of Defects". The CIP for the pipe spool in question did not identify any unacceptable surface damage on
, this system. The main concern was whether the pipe minimum '
I wall thickness requirements were violated. The Licensee initiated NCR No. SM 2976; the pipe was re-inspected and dispositioned " accept-as-is" in accordance with the acceptance standards specified in ED-1. In this case minimum wall had not been violated.
Also during this examination of pipe quality the inspector observed an apparently unacceptable pit-like defect on the outer-surface of pipe spool SI-008-S002 adjacent to pipe support SI-008-H002. The pit was unusual in that it did not appear to be typical mechanical damage or a typical welding are strike. It appeared to be a minor blow hole from the original pipe manufacturer. The pit appeared to violate minimum wall requirements. The inspector requested the Licensee to have the pipe hanger removed for access to the pipe pit; measurements were taken by the piping QC engineer in the presence of the NRC inspector with a calibrated pit sage.
The pit was measured to be 0.059 inches deep. The allowable minimum wall for pipe spool SI-009-S 002 is 0.219 inches and the remaining wall (calculated from nominal wall) is 0.191 inches. Therefore the pit represents an underwall condition requiring an engineering evaluation.
VI-2 l
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. Procedure WPP/QCI 204, Revision 2 " Piping Systems Release for Insulation", requires the final inspection of piping to be performed by a piping QC engineer prior to covering the pipe with insulation. Paragraph 3.1 of Appendix 1 requires an inspection for surface damage per specification (ED-1). The
- specification " Welding Standard ED-1 Elimination of Defects" states in paragraph 4.1 that defects may be removed provided wall thickness is not reduced below the minimum specified.
! The pipe spool was inspected in accordance with the above and improperly accepted on November 14, 1982, as certified on the Piping Release No. 301-398. The failure of the piping QC engineer to identify an unacceptable defect during the piping inspection prior to insulation is considered an apparent item of noncompliance. (OII 50-528/83-34-04)
C. Valves
- 1. Areas Examined All valves in the HPSI A train were examined during the walkdown inspection for compliance with the isometric drawing; specifically to assure proper velve size, location, type, orientation and installation. In addition, torque verifications were performed on a few selected valves to assure that the torque values were within the valve manufacturer's acceptable range.
- 2. Findings Inspection of this area revealed three instances which are apparent violations, indicating a weakness with the preoperational test /startup program.
(a) During the inspection of valve No. 470 on the suction side of the RPSI pump "A", it was observed that the
- manual operator assembly was totally disconnected from the valve and resting on the sprinkler system piping.
There was no documentary evidence to indicate that maintenance was being performed on the operator assembly. It does not appear that the preoperational testing progree organization was fully cognizant of the valve's unsatisfactory status nor were procedures being applied which would assure control of this activity.
Neither the valve or the operator had been recorded as deficient or conconforming. The failure to control activities affecting quality is an apparent violation.
(OII 50-528/83-34-05) i i
VI-3 l
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, (b) Three additional adverde conditions were identified on valve No. 470. First, visual examination revealed that the bonnet was leaking; second, that one stud out was missing from one of the studs connecting the bonnet to the valve body. These two conditions resulted in the inspector's request for torque verification on the stud nuts. The torque verification revealed a number of locse attJ nuts which connect the bonnet to the valve. This third ites, failure of the stud nuts to meet the torque requirements specified on the design drawings, represents a condition adverse to quality, and is an apparent violation. (OII 50-528/83-34-06) l (c) Valve No. 402 was found with the position indicator positioned so that the valve could only be opened about 30-35 percent. There was no documentary evidence to indicate that maintenance was being performed or that the I
licensee was aware of the condition of the valve.
Preoperational testing was being conducted on this subsystem. The failure to identify this condition adverse to quality, is an apparent violation. (OII 50-528/83-34-07)
D. Welder Qualifications
- 1. Areas Examined Bechtel specification WQ-1, Revision 17, of March 10, 1983,
" Welding Standard Performance Specification," was examined.
This specification describes the requirements for determining the ability of welders to make acceptable welds. The Welding Test Lab where welder performance qualifications are performed was examined for compliance with WQ-1 and ASME Section IX requirements. Also examined was the ability of the Welding Test Lab to detect " stand-ins" for welder qualification tests.
The qualification records of 22 percent of the welders who field-welded on the 530 feet of pipe selected for the inspection were examined for compliance with WQ-1 and the latest issue of ASME Section IX.
2
- 2. Findinas The welders records examined revealed that the welders were l qualified, on the date the weld was made, to the requirements
- of Bechtel specification WQ-1. WQ-1 meets the requirements of the latest' issue of ASME Section IX. The welder performance qualification records were being properly maintained and were
, up-to-date.
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Although no new welders were being qualified during this
! inspection, the Welding Test Lab was examined and found to be well '
organized and controlled. The weld rod is properly I controlled, rod ovens are calibrated and kept at the correct I temperature, and testing booths and welders' records are properly maintained.
1 Bechtel welder quall'ication procedures do not specifically address the subject of welder identity during qualification
! testing. However, Bechtel's current system requiring the welder's signature, social security number, and a photo badge appears to be satisfactory in preventing any practices of using stand-ins for welder qualifications. No items of )
noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Ep]..o y i.;[p g
1 spectionactivitiesincluded)v us examination of the /"'
530 feet o ing. This was s~sure that the installed piping was as spe e design drawing, and that the
! piping was reasonably str had a workmanlike finish and rious defects such as cal marks, abrasions
, s A er arranging for pipe % sulation removal to' inspect a pipe sup rt. The inspector obslirved an apparently unacceptable pit-1 e defect on the outer-su'rface of pipe spool SI-008-S-002 adjacent to pipe support SI-008-H002 The pit was unusual in that it d not appear to be typical mechanical damage or a typed weldin rc strike. It appeared t'o bes a minor blow hole from the origin (pipe manufacture. The pit appeared to violate minimum walixrequirements. The inspector requested the licensee to have the p1 hanger removed for s'ccess to the pipe pit and a measurement was en by the piping QC'ungineer in the presence of the NRC inspector s with a calibrated pit gage.
The pit was measured to be 0.059 inches deep. 'N h \ / lh (2)3Findinas W i \
Inspectionofpipin\g . quality revealed olib s section of pipe to have an excessive amount of mechanical marks. .This was identified on line ' number A106-CCBA, adjacent.to pipe-to-valve weld number WO25. The quality control in,struction, WPP/QCI No.
204, Revision 3, entitled " Piping Systems \ Release for Insulation" Appendix I,\ requires that piping systems, prior to .
insulation, be checked for surface damage by the quality control engineeri Any identified surface damage is then
! required to be documented on the constructions inspection plan (CIP), and then evaulated in accordance with procedure ZD-1,
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entitled " Elimination of Defects". The CIP fo the pipe spool in question did not identify any surface damage a this system..
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i VII. Inspection Results - Civil / Structural 4
A. Concrete Tests
- 1. Areas Examined Eleven test areas were selected for examination using the " Windsor Probe Test" (WPT). These areas are identified in Table VII-1. They were selected as representative of concrete in the HPSI A pump room and in the vicinity of selected portions of the connected piping. The WPT measures the resistance of concrete to penetration by an explosively driven probe. Correlation to actual concrete strength is by reference to the Windsor Probe manufacturer's charts which relate probe penetration distance to strength for different aggregate hardness values.
- 2. Inspection Findinas Maximum aggregate size in the concrete tested was 1 1/2-inches. The Moh number for the aggregate selected from the probe manufacturer chart was number 6 (Far l Southwestern United States). The indicated concrete strengths ranged from 5,800 to 7,600 psi, indicating adequate concrete strength exists in all areas measured.
Detailed data are given in Table VII-1. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
B. Structural Steel Framina
- 1. Areas Examined j Building and platform structural steel was examined to verify that the sizes, types and materials were in accordance with design requirements. The areas examined were in the HPSI A pump room, the auxiliary building northwest pipeway at the 40' elevation, and the 100 feet elevation on the south side of the containment building.
The governing documents were as follows:
. Specification 13-CM-320 - Erection of Structural and
- Miscellaneous Steel.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-001 - Civil / Structural General Notes.
VII-1 l
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, . Drawing 13-C-ZADS-500 - Auxiliary Building - Traming Plan for Elevation 51'-6".
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-529 - Containment Internals -
Structural Steel Platforms below Elevation 100.
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. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-570 - Auxiliary Building -
, Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-571 - Auxiliary Building -
Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 2.
, . Drawing 13-C-ZAS-572 - Auxiliary Euilding -
Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 3
. WPP/QCI 58.0 - Erection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel.
- 2. Inspection Findinas The steel that was examined was installed as specified and was of the required type and size. Certified Mill Test Reports were on file which verified that the proper material had been furnished. These were spot checked and were found to be in order. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Bolting and welding of the steel is addressed in Sections VII.3 and VII.4 of this report.
- 3. Structural Steel-Bolted Connections
- a. Areas Examined Bolted connections in selected portions of the building and platform structural steel in areas associated with l HPSI A train system were examined for compliance with design requirements. Particular attention was given to bolt size and type, presence of washers where required, adequacy of thread engagement. Tightness of a representative sample of bolts was tested using a calibrated torque wrench. The joints were located in the
!! PSI A pump room, the northwest pipeway at the 40-foot elevation and the 88-foot elevation pipeway in the auxiliary building, the 82 to 95-foot elevations of both
" wrap-around" portions of the auxiliary building, and at VII-2 l
f I various elevations in the containment building.
Additional structural steel joints not associated with the HPSI A train system were also examined. They were in
- the containment building and in the NPSI B pump room.
Detials are provided in Table VII-2. In addition to the ,
documents listed in paragraph VII.B.1, the governing i documents also include the following:
l Drawing 13-C-ZAS-510 - Auxiliary Building Framing Plan for Elevation 88' - Area AAA.
- . Drawing 13-C-ZAS-511 - Auxiliary Building Framing Plan for Elevation 88' - Area AAB.
. Drawing 13-S-ZAS-535 - Auxiliary Building i
Miscellaneous Steel Plan 9 Elevation 88'.
. Drawing 13-S-ZAS-536 - Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-581 - Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Steel Platforms and Details -
Sheet 2.
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) -
Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A325 or A490 Bolts.
- 2. Findinas Detailed inspection findings are given in Table VII-2.
Except as described below, all bolted joints examined satisfied the specified requirements.
Table 3 of the AISC specification requires that 7/8-inch diameter A325 bolts be tightened to a minimum tension of 39 kips. The following departures from that requirement were found:
(a) Four bolts in one joint in the AC-6 platform at the 51'6" elevation of the HPSI A pump room were only
" finger tight."
(b) One bolt in a 4-bolt I-beam to I-beam connection at the 125 degree azimuth, 10 feet from the liner, elevation 88-feet in the containment building, required a not rotation of 45 degrees before achieving the tightness equivalent to the required 39 kips.
VII-3
( l l
(c) One bolt in a 4-bolt floor beam connection in the auxiliary building northwest pipeway, 6 feet east of column line AD, 51'-6" elevation, require',a nut ;
rotation of 60 degrees to achieve the 39 kip i requirement.
In all three cases, the connections had been inspected and accepted by Bechtel Quality Control personnel. The unsatisfactory bol+.ing accepted by QC is an apparent violation. (OII 50-528/83-34-08)
D. Structural Steel Welded Connections i
- 1. Areas Examined Welded connections in selected segments of the building and platform structural steel in areas associated with HPSI A train system were examined for compliance with design requirements. Attribates examined were fillet leg size and length, weld contour, and absence of overlap and undercut. The joints examined were located in the auxiliary building (pipeways at the southwest 40 foot elevation and at the 88 foot elevation), and in the containent building (80-87 foot elevation and the 125 foot elevntion). Details are provided in Table VII-3.
In addit'.on to the documents listed in paragraphs VII.B.I. and VII.C.I. , the governing documents also include the following:
1 i . Drawing 13-C-00A-050 - w lding and Nondestructive e
! Examination Requirements n- CPril Structural -
! " Form 84C".
. Structural Welding Code AWS DI.1 1972, with Revision 1, 1973.
- 2. Findinas Detailed inspection findings are given in Table VII-3.
The welded connections in the containment building that were examined were found acceptable. In the auxiliary building pipeway, elevation 88 foot, the inspector found six fillet welds with undersize leg length and four welds l
with unacceptable undercut. The welds are portions of a W8X31 pipe support rack, number B-79, fabricated by Marathon Steel Company.
i VII-4
In the auxiliary building northwest pipeway, elevation 51'6", the inspector found six fillet welds with undersize leg lengths. The welds are portions of a W16X36 floor beam clip connection The inspector measured fillet weld sizes down to 5/32 inch, whereas 5/16 inch size was specified for these welds. The undercut criteria 3 specified in AWS D1.1 requires that it be no more than .01 inch deep when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress in the part that is undercut, and no more than 1/32. inch for all other situations. Contrary to this requirement, the inspector found undercut of approximately 1/16 inch deep.
The undersize and undercut welds had been inspected and accepted by Bechtel Quality Control personnel. The acceptance of welds which are not in conformance with specification requirements is an apparent violation.
FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.6 states: "The acceptance criteria for visual acceptance for welding is done in accordance with AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1, 1973." During the inspection, the following items were noted which appear to be deviations from this commitment:
. AWS DI.1-72, Revision 1973, paragraph 3.6.6 states
" welds shall be free from overlap." Specification 13-CM-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.4, 3.2, and 3.3.4 allow a maximum of 1/8" of overlap.
t
. AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1973, paragraph 8.15.1.3
. requires that "all craters are filled to the full cross section of the welds." Specification 13-CM-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.5, 3.2, and 3.3.8 allew underfilled weld craters.
. AWS DI.1-72, Revision 73, paragraph 3.6.4 states that "... undercut shall not be more than 0.01" deep when its direction is transverse to primsry tensile stress in the part that is undercut, nor more than 1/32" for all other situations." Specification 13-CH-320, Appendix A, paragrph 3.3.7 allows up to a maximum of 1/16" of undercut under certain circumstances and does not address undercutting transverse to primary tensile stress.
. AWS D1.1-72 does not permit incomplete fusion.
Specification 13-CH-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.8, 3.2 and 3.3.6 allow an exception to the requirement for complete fusion between weld metal and base metal.
VII-5 1
_- _ _ _ _ _ - _-__ -___-_________-_____A
1 l
. Paragraph 9.2 of Specification 13-EM-302, Cable Tray I Hangers, states that..." all quality Class Q cable tray hanger welds shall be inspected in accordance with AWS D1.1-79." (emphasis added)
These discrepancies are considered to constitute a deviation from the FSAR commitment. (OII 50-528-83-34-09)
E. Containment Structure Permtrations
- 1. Areas Examined Five piping penetr.ations (nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, and 77) and one electrical penetration (no. 47), all associated with the HPSI train A system were visually examined and their records reviewed to ascertain compliance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III-1974 Edition. In addition, piping penetration No. 62, monitoring containent internal pressure, and spare penetration No. 69 were examined. The visual examination was related to weld reinforcement height and surface finish. The records review addressed the presence and validity of the supplier's material test report, and the adequacy of the Field Welding check list (Form WR-5) and the Filler Metal Withdrawal Record (Form WR-6). Other factors examined were the qualification of the specified welding procedure, control of preheat and interpass temperatures, and nondestructive examination of the completed welds.
- 2. Findinas All work in this area was found to be in conformance with requirements. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
F. Steel Embed Plates In Concrete
- 1. Areas Examined Except for 3 or 4 plates in the vertical pipe chase in the northwest corner of the auxiliary building, all embedded plates carrying pipe hangers / supports for the HPSI A system lines in the auxiliary building were examined. These were 3 plates on the suction line and 35 plates on the discharge lines. In addition, approximately 30 plates were randomly selected in various walls in the auxiliary and containment buildings, of which approximately 20 were not loaded. The examination included measurement of plate thickness and anchor bolt VII-6
i i
length using an ultrasonic transducer and CRT videoscope (only 2 or 3 bolts in each embed plate were measured),
, and a' graduated depth gauge measurement of bolt thread engagement. The governing documents were as follows:
. Specification 13-CM-308 - Installation and Testing of Concrete Embeda and Insert Plates.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-001 - Civil Structural - General Notes. l l
. Drawing 13-C-00A-010 - Typical Insert Plate Schedules and Details.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-011 - Anchor Bolt Schedule and Details.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-110 - Auxiliary Building - Plan at Elevation 40'. I
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-112 - Auxiliary Building - Insert Plan at Elevation 40'.
i
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-146 - Auxiliary Building - Plan at Elevation 120'.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-200 - Auxiliary Building - Wall Elevations - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-224 - Auxiliary Building - Wall Elevations - Sheet 25.
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-413 - Containment Internals - Wall Inserts and Penetrations - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-406 - Containment Internale - Wall Inserts and Penetrations - South Secondary Shield Wall.
- 2. Findinas All embedded plates examined were found to be installed in the specified locations and were the specified thickness.. All anchor bolt lengths were as specified.
One plate was found with three of eight bolts apparently missing; search with the UT transducer, however, found
-that all three had been relocated (by welding) as permitted by the specification when interference with l
reinforcing steel was encountered. Two other plates were VII-7
found with documented relocation of anchor bolts. For one case of suspected insufficient bolt thread engagement, documentation was on file which showed that the bolt had been circumferential1y welded to the back of the plate, also as permitted by the specification. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
G. Concrete Expansion Anchors
- 1. Areas Examined A reprecentative sample of concrete expansion anchors was examined to ascertain conformanc: with the installation requirements. At Palo Verde, the design intent is to avoid the use of expansion anchors to the maximum possible extend. A generous quantity of embedded steel plates and unistrut channels were provided for fastening equipment generally and, except for specifically identified lightly loaded applications, expansion anchors were to be used only after all other methods had been evaluated and determined unfeasable or unacceptable by Engineering. For these situations, documented licensee approval is required on a case-by-case basis. The previously mentioned lightly loaded applications include electrical raceway (except cable tray) instruments, instrument sensing lines, and local panels.
A total of 88 anchor bolts were examined for depth of embed and proper torquing of the tensioning nut. These were comprised of the following:
. 20 Hilti Kwik-Bolts associated with I electrical panel box and all Class IE raceway supports (9) in the HPSI A pump room.
. 29 Hilti Kwik-Bolts fastening raceway supports in the east " wrap-around" section (100' elevation) of the auxiliary building.
. 8 Hilti-Kwik-Bolts anchoring 2 instrument sensing line support plates in the east " wrap around" section (80' elev.) of the auxiliary building.
. 8 Hilti Kwik-Bolts anchoring 2 switchbox panels in Battery Rooms C and D in the Control Building (100' elevation).
. 17 Drillco Maxi-Bolts anchoring control center panels to the floor (100' elevation) in Battery Rooms A, C and D in the Control Building. (Only 8 of these bolts were torque tested).
VII-8
. 6 Drillco Maxi-Bolts anchoring 6" fire-line support plates (2) to the MSSS wall (108' elevation) in the corridor adjacent to the turbine building.
All torque testing was performed by a Quality Control Inspector or a journeyman electrician using a calibrated torque wrench in the presense of the NRC inspector. The l governius documents were:
. Specification 13-CM-307 - Design, Installation and Testing of Concrete Anchors.
. WPP/QCI 24.1 - Installation and Testing of Concrete Expansion Anchors.
- 2. Findings Of the 23 Drillco Maxi-Rolts examined, all were found to be embedded and torqued to the required values. For the bolts anchoring the equipment panels in the battery rooms, there was no documentary evidence that Bechtel had obtained the required licensee approval prior to their installation. Similarly, no approval documentation was available for 4 Hilti Kwik-Bolts used for a strut supporting a cable tray hanger in the auxiliary building east " wrap-around" at the 100' elevation (east wall).
In the HPSI A pump room, 6 miscellaneous Hilti Kwik-Bolts (1 raceway support) could not be properly torqued due to the absence of washers under the tensioning nut (support holes too large). Due to the proximity of adjacent supports, this one probably could have been eliminated and the raceway would have been adequately anchored.
Also in the HPSI A pump room, one anchor bolt was insufficiently embedded (3") because it was located too close (1 1/2") to an ungrouted, unusued hole. Embed depth should have been 6 1/4". Two unused holes were found ungrouted, contrary to the specified requirements.
Additionally, there were two bolts that violated the specified minimum distance from other anchor bolts.
In the auxiliary building " wrap-around" section (100' elevation), 9 bolts, randomly located, were found undertorqued (all four in one 4-bolt plate), one bolt was too close (2 1/8") to the edge of a wall opening, one bolt was insufficiently embedded (2 1/4" instead of 5" required), and two bolts had nuts with insufficient thread engagement.
VII-9
All bolts examined in this sample had been given the requisite inspection by Bechtel Quality Control inspection and had been judged acceptable. The failure of QC to identify nonconforming conditions to specification requirements as considered an apparent violation. (50-528/83-34-10)
VII-10 l
TABLE VII - 1 CONCRETE STRENGTH MEASUREMENT PLACEMENT Meas.(1) STRENGHT (psi)
Tect Max. Probe Cylind.(2)
No. LOCATION / DESCRIPTION No. Date . Age Agg. Size Exten-in. Probe Meas Break Design 1 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
Floor (El. 40') Adjacent to 4000 Pump 1A05-1 11/24/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. I 1/2 2.25 7400 5870 9 28 Da.
2 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
East Wall (Elev. 44')
Adjacent to Pump 1A12-1 1/21/77 6 Yrs.-9 Mo. 3/4 2.20 7000 5185 "
3 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
South Wall (Elev 43')
Adjacent to Pump Motor IA12-1 1/21/77 6 Yrs.-9 Mo. 3/4 2.25 7400 5155 "
4 North Pipeway-Aux. Bldg-South Wall (elev.44')
Between Col Lines AE & AF 1A08-1 12/23/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. 3/4 2.275 7600 5960 "
5 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
Floor (Elev.40') Adjacent to West Wall & Floor Embed under Suction Line to Contain. Sump 1A04-1 11/24/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. I 1/2 2.125 6400 5870 "
6 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.100')
125 V Battery A Charging 4000 Equipment Room IJ016 3/10/78 5 Yrs.-6 Mo. I 1/2 2.050 5800 5875 @ 91 Da.
7 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.100')
125V Battery A Roon 2.075 0000 5875
- 8. Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.200')
125V Battery C Room 2.100 6700 5230 VII-11
TABLE VII - 1 CONCRETE STRENGTH MEASUREMENT PLACEMENT Meas.(1) STRENGHT (Psi)
T;ct Max. Probe Cylind.(2)
No. IDCATION/ DESCRIPTION No. Date Age Agg. Size Exten-in Probe Meas Break Design 9 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev. 100')
In front of HPSI A 4160V Motor Breaker Cubicle " " "
2.150 6600 5875 "
10 Containment Bldg. Bare Mat Floor (Elev. 80') Adjacent 5000 to South stairway IC013-1 7/8/77 6 Yrs. -2 Mo. I 1/2 2.200 7000 5350 9 91 Da.
- 11. Containment 31dg. Base Mat Floor (Elev. 80') West Side Under Safety Injection riping Runs 1 1/2 2.100 6200 6040 Notm (1) Windsor Probe Test-Average of 3 driven probes (2) Average of compression test of 2 cylinders VII-12
TABLE VII-2 STRUCTURAL STEEL BOLTED CONNECTIONS I= pection Amount of Inspection Type of Inspection Locntion Elevation Versus Total Available Inspection Findinas Auxiliary Bldg. 51'6" 15 joints of approx. 30 Visual Four Loose bolts in a 4-Folt RPSI A Pump Room Joint - Platform AC-6 Northwest Pipeway 51'6" 13 joints of approx. 15 Visual Acceptable Auxiliary Bldg.
Wrap-Around Areas 82'-95' 94 joints of approx. 200 Visual Acceptable Auxiliary Bldg.
Pipeway Area 88' 40 joints of approx. 300 Visual Acceptable Auxiliary Bldg.
> Contcionent Bldg. 80'-87' 110 joints of approx. 500 Visual Acceptable ;
Auxiliary Bldg. 51'6" 10 bolts of approx. 120 Torque Test Acceptable HPSI A Pump Room Northwest Pipeway 51'6" 28 bolts of approx. 52 Torque Test One bolt rotated 60 degrees before i Auxiliary Bldg. minimum tightness was achieved.
was achieved.
Coltciament Bldg. 87' 24 bolts of approx. 2500 Torque Test One bolt rotated 45 degrees before minimum tightness tightness was achieved.
Conteinment Bldg. 98' 34 joints of approx. 100 Visual Acceptable
- Containment Bldg. 125' 12 joints Visual Acceptable
- Containment Bldg. 140' 15 joints Visual Acceptable
- Containment Bldg. - 20 joints Visual Acceptable Precsurizer Compartment
- Auxiliary Blds. 51'6" 15 joints Visual Acceptable HPSI B Pump Room CItems inspected which are not associated with the HPSI train A system.
VII-13
TABLE VII-3 STRUCTURAL STEEL WELDED CONNECTIONS Inspection Amount of Inspection Type Of Inspection Locntion Elevation Versus Total Available Inspection Findings Northwest 51'6" 13 joints of approx. 15 Weld gauge Visual Six undersize Pipeway fillet welds
( Auxiliary Bldg.
Pipeway Area 88' 50 joints of approx. 200 Weld gauge Visual Six undersize Auxiliary Bldg. fillet welds, Four welds with undercut.
Containment Bldg. 80'-87' 110 joints of approx. 250 Weld gauge Visual Acceptable
- Containment Bldg. 125' 4 joints Weld gauge Visual Acceptable CItems inspected which are not associated with the HPSI Train A system.
l l
VII-14 L___
.._.._m . _ _ . _. _. . . - . _ _ _ _ - _ __ _ _
VIII. NRC Nondestructive Examination and Quality Review of Safety Related Systems A. Purpose The purpose of the independent, NRC nondestructive examination (NDE) was to verify the adequacy of the licensee's welding quality control program. This was accomplished by duplicating 4
those examinations requirid of the licensee by regulations and evaluating the results. In addition to the required examinations, several additional confirmatory examinations designed to verify conformance with material specifications l were performed and campared to quality assurance records.
, The NRC inspection team selected the HPSI A system to inspect l at the Palo Verde Unit 1. There are approximately 900 piping 1 welds in the HPSI A system. This system was undergoing pre-operational testing and was full of water under pressure.
A selection of welds from this system that could be drained and inspected was made. Due to preoperational testing of Unit 1, a selection of welds from Unit 3 was also made. The selection of these welds was intended to provide a representative sample of piping components, sizes, materials, I of shop and field welds. All the welds selected were previously accepted by the licensee based on vendor, shop, or field NDE records.
B. Document Reviews The following quality assurance documents were reviewed to verify compliance with regulatory and code requirements:
- 1. Twelve weid document packages were reviewed for:
Material Certifications NDE results Fabricatica records shop and field
-- Drawings (Isometric)
PWHT Charts (Note: The twelve welds reviewed are listed at the end of Table VIII-2. See those listed for drawing 13-P-ZCG-103)
- 2. Two quality procedures were reviewed.
13PM-201 Shop Fabrication of Nuclear Piping Systems 13PM-204 Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems
_VIII-1 l
l
i
- 3. A revlea of GE0's (site NDE subcontractor) internal
, audit, dated June 10, 1983, was perforced. This audit I reviewed all of GE0's NDE site personnel qualification at Palo Verde.
l 4. Verification of NDE Personnel Qualifications to SNT-TC-1A The NRC inspector reviewed all of Bechtel's individual film interpreter qualification and certification
! records. He also reviewed 6 out of 39 of GE0's NDE records for personnel qualifications.
! All the above documents were verified to satisfy NRC 1 requirements and licensee commitments to industry codes and standards.
C. NRC Independent Examinations (Note: Refer to Table VIII-1 for specific listings of independent inspection items) 1
- 1. Radiography Twenty-one welds were re-examined by the NRC using an Iridium 192 source. Welds that were radiographed were ASME Code Class 1 and 2, carbon and stainless steel.
Results: All re-radiographed welds were found acceptable to ASME Section III acceptance criteria. -
- 2. Pipj 'all Thickness Measurement - Eleven pipe welds and adj* nt pipe material were examined per NRC procedure NDE-1., Revision 0, using a NORTEC NDT thickness gauge.
3 Minimum wall thickness was determined by using an ASTM standard pipe sizes and nominal thickness chart.
Results: All areas examined were within tolerance requirements.
- 3. Ferrite Measurements - Thirteen pipe welds were checked for delta ferrite content using a Type II Ferrite Indicator (Severn Gauge).
Results: All measurements were within acceptable limits of material test results.
- 4. Hardness Measurements - Fourteen welds were checked for hardness (base material adjacent to welds) using the Equo-tip hardness tester per NRC Procedure NDE-12, i Revision 0. Hardness numbers were converted to Brinnell values and the approximate tensile strengths were determined by use of conversion tables.
VIII-2
! Results: All areas examined were within acceptable limits of material test reports.
- 5. Alloy Analyzer - Four pipe welds and adjacent base metals were examined using a Texas Nuclear Alloy Analyzer. A j quantitative cheaical analysis was made on two stainless steel, type 304, and two stainless steel, type 316 materials.
Results: Areas examined were within + 2% of chemical analysis indicated on corresponding certified mill test reports and were within acceptable limits.
L
- 6. Liquid Penetrant Examination - Eight safety related pipe weldsents were liquid penetrant examined per NRC procedure NDE-9, Revision O. All weldments examined were ASME Class 2 welds.
1 Results: All areas inspected were acceptable.
- 7. Visual Examination - Thirty-four weldments and adjacent base material were visually inspected for weld reinforcement, overall workmanship and surface condition per NRC procedure NDE 14, Revision 0.
Results: All areas inspected were acceptable.
- 8. Radicaraphy of Socket Welds - Ten socket welds were radiographed to verify pipe engagement.
Results: All radiographs show at least a minimum of 1/16 inch gap per ASME Section III, paragraph NC4427 requirements.
- 9. Radioaraphic Review of Licensee Field Welds and Vendor Welds - A review of licensee's pipe weld radiographs was made during this inspection of ASME. Class 1 and 2 weldsents. Out of 746 sets of radiographs, 204 were reviewed as listed below, with results as listed in Table VIII-2.
The radiographic film review disclosed 6 welds which are in the "as-welded" condition and present weld ripple images in the film. The ASME V Code, paragraph T-221-2, requires that weld irregularities be removed to the extent that they cannot mask or be confused with actual discontinuities. The weld ripple images for' ISO 01-P-SIF 105 Line IRC-051-S-001-16, welds A and B; 1RC-051-S-002; weld A; and ISO-13-P-ZCG-103, IRC-079, 030 and 073 are
- considered excessive and capable of masking or being confused with discontinuities in the opinion of the NRC Level III examiner.
f VIII-3
On October 12, 1983 licensee representatives and the Bechtel Corporation Level III examiner telephoned the Regional office to express a difference of professional opinion. The Bechtel examiner did not consider that the weld ripple facges could mask discontinuities. This item is considered unresolved. (Unresolved item 50-528/83-34-01)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
VIII-4 l
l l
l
. . _ _ _________. ._ _. __ _ m .
I Table VIII-1 i
i INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENTS PALO VERDE 1
i INDEPENDDIT MEASUREMENTS PROC 8tAPI I
Wl_M00ll& 5PE ' Pall Pete 1 h I I Lives / ISO toeld IClose lDete '
RT Ptf PT WT Mord Thicktrerrite AIIey Visuel Comments
- Isa. - ness t#e e i aneI -
- Ness so s/s i
r-375 w-e -2 X ' X' . ' X X X- X
- X- s e 7.s rn nonasste i
Elev 45' s s/s -
w-s '
2 1 Xe.- y I X X_ X s.o to 7.s rit i r- m X- E, X so" s/s Aun sig w-A 2 Y .I- 1 X_ .. u s.o to 7.s rn E1ev % 46*A* . speea 5F-U00-005
- "A" Puno Line '
y *
$r_-ode-Ges llPSl n *. I s
, r.422 su-, , X X ,
,X.. X' X- .X' . - X s.e to r.s re
- . Elev 43' u 10" s/s
=A* uno W-A 2 I X* ,X_
I X' X XI s.S to F.s tu
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to s/s
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X X Xe '
X_ . Xi s.o to 7.s tu
. F-4n i 80 s/s
. Elev ts W-A 2 I _ I I I I XJ l X' s.O to 7.s FN F-423 I j 10' s/s geev 45 8 .
w-r ? I 1 Y I I. . , Ii s.o to 7.s re Aent sidg si-e99-4 x 4 s/s
- x. r
. Aux sie, w-r 2 X. c "A" Line 4 s/s
. e.
F-its w-s 2 X k. At X,.
ss-099-4 r149 ,
X.
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- s 4 s/s MPsi rW-1 ~2 X X' - X . X~
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- ~ *#8 3
serse tv-s 2 X X. X l Line A I rw-4 2 I X. I X'
, U seo-est 4 s/s i X Y I X r196 W-A 2 Y o z/s lw-a 2 i I X._h 8 I ! I '
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l Table VIII-2 Review of Licensee RT Films and Records Line ISO WELD RESULTS SI-008-CCBC-10" 13-P-SIF-201 FW 5 Acceptable FW 1 Acceptable FW 2 Acceptable
" " Acceptable FW 3 FW 4 Acceptable FW 6 Acceptable
" " Acceptable
- FW 7
! SI-008-GCBC-10" 13-P-SIF-201 VW-D-F375 Acceptable
" " VW-B-F375 Acceptable
" " VW-A-F375 Acceptable
" " VW-A-422 Acceptable
" " VW-B-423 Acceptable
" " VW-A-423 Acceptable SI-A-009-CCBC-4" 13-P-SIF-203 FW 1 Acceptable FW 2 Acceptable SI-099-CCBB-4" 13-P-SIF-203 VW-E-F149 Acceptable VW-B-F149 Acceptable
" " VW-A-F149 Acceptable l SI-099-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable E Acceptable SI-A-100-CCBA-4" "
FW 1 Acceptable FW 2 Acceptable FW 3 Acceptable SI-100-CCBB-4" 13-P-SIF-203 VW-A-156 Acceptable VW-B-156 Acceptable VW-3-156 Acceptable SI-A-101-CCBA-1" 13-P-SIF-204 FW 00L Acceptable 2" "
FW 00A Acceptable 2" "
FW 00B Acceptable 2" "
FW OOC Acceptable 2" "
FW OCH Acceptable i
2" ."" FW 00J Acceptable 2" FW 00K Acceptable
- Visually verified RT root indication (concavity) between RT station numbers 12 and-15 by using a fiberscope. All areas of.
l concern are acceptable.
VIII-5 l l
- += - e ~~ , r -o o
- - . - .-~ --
Line ISO WELD RESULTS
" Acceptable 2" W 00L 2" " W 90N Acceptable
" Acceptable 2" W OOP 2" " W 00R(C) Acceptable
" W 00S(C) Acceptable 2"
" Acceptable
. 2" W 00T 2" " W 000 Acceptable SI-A-102-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIP-204 W 00A Acceptable
" " Acceptable W OOL
" " FW OOC Acceptable
" " Acceptable FW 00D
" " FW 00E Acceptable
" " W 00F Acceptable
" " Acceptable FW 000
" " W 00H Acceptable
" " Acceptable FW 00J
" " Acceptable W OOK W 00L Acceptable FW 00M(C) Acceptable SI-103-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIF-203 W 300 Acceptable FW 00A Acceptable FW 00B Acceptable W OOC Acceptable
" " Acceptable W OOD W 00E Acceptable SI-103-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIF-203 W 00G Acceptable FW 00I Acceptable W 00J Acceptable W 00K(C) Acceptable W 00P Acceptable W 00R Acceptable SI-105-S-003-4" 13-P-SJF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable SI-105-S-004-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-105-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A A ueptable B Acceptable SI-105-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-202 A Acceptable bl-105-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-202 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable SI-157-CCBA-4" 13-P-SIF-204 FW 300 Acceptable 4" "
W 301 . Acceptable 1" " W 00C(C1) Acceptable 2" "
W 00A Acceptable 2" "
FW 00B(C) Acceptable 2" W 00C(C1) Acceptable 2" " FW 00D(C) Acceptable 1" "
W 00E Acceptable SI-157-CCBA-1" 13-P-SIF-204 FW 00E Acceptable 2" "
W 00H Acceptable VIII-6 l
I i
l . - . .-. -.
Line ISO WELD RESULTS 1" " FW OOI Acceptable l
4" "
FW 001 Acceptable 4" " FW 002 Acceptable 4" " FW 003 Acceptable 3" "
FW 004 Acceptable 3" "
FW 006 Acceptable 3" " FW 007 Acceptable 3" " FW 008 Acceptable SI-157-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable
" " F Acceptable SI-157-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable SI-157-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable SI-157-S-004-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable SI-157-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " Acceptable C
" " D Acceptable
" 13-P-ZG108 U-77(c-1) Acceptable SI-157-S-006-3" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable SI-157-S-007-3" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " Acceptable B
" " C Acceptable
" " Acceptable D
" " Acceptable E
RC-051-S-001-16" 01-P-SIF-105 A Rejected Beads
" " Rejected Beads B
RC-051-S-002-16" 01-P-SIF-105 A Rejected Beads RC-051-S-003-16" 01-P-SIF-105 G Acceptable
" " Acceptable H
" " A Acceptable
" " Acceptable B
" " Acceptable D
SI-176-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-204- A Acceptable
" " Acceptable B
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptcole
" " Acceptable E
l SI-176-S-002-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable SI-176-S-003-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable SI-176-S-004-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable VIII-7
- ,- -n , ,+ - - - , , , - - , - -
Line ISO WELD RESULTS
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " Acceptable D
SI-176-S-006-3" 13-F-SIF-204 A Acceptable
" " Acceptable B
" " C Acceptable D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable
" " Acceptable F
SI-218-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable C Acceptable
" " Acceptable D
" " Acceptable E
" " Acceptable F
SI-218-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-236-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-236-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable SI-236-S-006-3" 13-P-SIF-203 B Acceptable
" " Acceptable E
F Acceptable H Acceptable J Acceptable K Acceptable L Acceptable M Acceptable N Acceptable SI-248-S-003-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable E Acceptable D Acceptable SI-248-S-007-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable
" " Acceptable B
" " C . Acceptable G Acceptable
" " H Acceptable J Acceptable K Acceptable D Acceptable E Acceptable
" " F Acceptable SI-248-S-008-3" 01-P-SIF-105 H Acceptable
" " J Acceptable
" " K Acceptable SI-248-S-009-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable VIII-8 i
I
" " D Acceptable SI-248-S-011-3" 01-P-SIF-105 G Acceptable
" " H Acceptable
" " J Acceptable SI-248-S-012-3" 01-P-SIF-105 F Acceptable
" " G Acceptable
" " H Acceptable O.D. Size Line Document Review ISO Weld S/N Results 30" 1-RC079 "
13-P-ZCG-103 WOO 1 Rejected Beads 30" 1-RC030 " Rejected Beads
" " " Rejected Beads 30" 1-RC073
" " " Acceptable 30" 1-RC031 Unit 2 30" 2-RC079 "
13-P-ZCG-103 WOO 1 Acceptable
" " " Acceptable 30" 2-RC030
" " " Acceptable 30" 2-RC073
" " " Acceptable 30" 2-RC031 Unit 3
" Acceptable 30" 3-RC079 13-P-ZCG-103 W001
" " " Acceptable 30" 3-RC030 30" 3-RC073 " Acceptable 30" 3-RC031 Acceptable VIII-9
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IX. CRAFT AND QC INSPECTOR INTERVIEWS l During the course of the inspection interviews were conducted by the team members with various craft persons and QC inspectors. These interviews were conducted on a one on one basis at random in the field,
- predominantly at Unit 1, but some were conducted at Units 2/3 and in the senior resident inspector's office. There were 115 of these interviews conducted with the idea of finding whether there was pressure by management to " cut corners," to obtain the interviewee's reception of quality on the project and to give the interviewee an opportunity te discuss any problems he/she may know of with a NRC inspector.
Nane of the workers indicated that there was any pressure to cut corners, all thought that the quality on this project was above average to excellent and none knew of major problems on this project that NRC did not know about. Some reservations were expressed about the quality of work done in vendor shops on components that were later shipped to the site.
Table IX-1 Workers Interviewed j Craft No. Interviewed
- 1. Electrician 23
- 2. Millwright 2
- 3. Ironworker 7
- 4. Boilermaker 1
- 5. Pipefitter 21
- 6. Carpenter 4
- 7. Janitor 1
- 8. QC Welder 7
- 9. QC Elect 16
- 10. QC Mech / Piping /NSSS 12
- 11. Laborer 3
- 12. Insulator 2
- 13. Welder 7
- 14. NDE Tech 4
- 15. Sprinkler 2
- 16. Operating Engineer 1
not meet the standard that would be acceptable if the work were done onsite. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
e IX-1 I
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Attachment A l
As Persons Contacted l
- 1. Arizona Public Service Company E. Van Brunt Jr. , V.P. Nuclear Projects J. Roedel, Corporation QA Manager D. Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager J. Keiley, Startup Manager J. Bynum, Nuclear Operations Manager W. Ide, Construction (QA/QC) Manager P. Moore, QA Engineer B. Love, QA Engineer R. J. Kimmel, Field Engineering Supervisor G. Pankonin, Startup QA/QC Manager F. Godwin, Nuclear Projects Records Manager K. Gross, Compliance / Operations Supervisor C. Rogers, Nuclear Engineer L. Souza, Construction QA Supervisor J. Hayes, Startup Manager, Unit 1
- 2. Bechtel Power Corporation W. Stubblefield, Field Construction Manager D. Hawkinson, Project QA Manager J. White, Lead Pipe Support QCE G. Stam, Weld Engineericg Supervisor J. Sabol, Lead Pipe Support Engineer D. Keitch, Bechtel, Downey H. Miller, Lead Field Welding Engineer M. Rosen, QC Supervisor T. Mack, Assistant Project Manager A. Priest, Construction Engineer C. Berg, Construction Engineer Other persons contacted during the inspection included construction craftsmen, QC inspectors, startup personnel, QA personnel and Supervisory Personnel.
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mm NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION
- {o , aseION V las0 MARIA LANE.SutTE 21s
] WALIN#T CREE K. CALIFORNIA 90ss6 s.*
e NOV 111983 Docket No. 50-528 Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Attention: Mr. 7. G. Woods Jr.
Executive Vice President Gentlemen:
Subject:
Construction Appraisal Inspection 50-528/83-34 This refers to the construction appraisal inspection conducted by Region V on September 6-16, 26-30, October 31 and November 1, 1983 at Palo Verde Unit 1.
The Construction Appraisal Team was composed of members of Region I, Region V and a number of consultants. This inspection covered construction activities authorized by NRC Construction Permit CPPR-141.
The enclosed report identifies the areas examined during the inspection.
Within these areas, the effort consisted of detailed inspection of selected hardware subsequent to APS Quality Control inspections, examination of procedures and records, observation of work activities and interviews with l management and other personnel.
The inspection concentcated on hardware and was intended to assess whether the construction of Unit I was performed in accordance with quality requirements by comparing the as-built condition to the design requirements.
The method used in this inspection was to select a meaningful sample of completed safety-related construction for rigorous examination. The method l further required the sample to be of high safety significance and to be generally representative of the work controls, procedures, methodology and documentation of the other safety-related work performed at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
The team's approach was to direct 70 percent of its affert on system insta11ation verification of the Nigh Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) System, "A" train. This included an in-depth examination of a large number of elements related to that system (on the order of 25 percent) including:
piping; supports; pumps; valves; welding; nondestructive examination; electrical supplies;-(including redundancy / separation); electrical motors; cables; terminations; supporting structural steel elements; related concrete structures; and other systems. Within the sample special emphasis was directed to the area of welding and electrical activities because of the multiple allegations received in these areas in the past. The other 30 percent of the team's effort was focused on inspection of other important areas (including the Reactor Coolant System),
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NOV i11983 The EPSI *A" train was selected because of its high safety significance, its representativeness in terms of construction practices, and the fact that the syst.am had not previously been independently examined by a third party.
OVERAI.L CCNCLUSIONS .
' ~
The team found that basic construction appeared to be generally satisfactory, however large numbers of deficiencies were not being identified during final QC inspections. The majority of these deficiencies appeared to be minor in nature but some were significant and reflected a weakness in quality assurance and/or a lack of management control by the APS Operations and Startup Groups. Although the team's focus was construction, a r, umber of problems identified indicated that some of the deficiencies may h. eve resulted from activities performed after the system or component had been turned over to operations and startup. General findings are discussed below:
l AREAS INSFECTED AND RESULTS I A. Electrical and Instrumentation Construction The inspections in this area revealed deficiencies in the thoroughness of the final inspections and/or in control of maintenance following testing.
Of major significance was the finding of pipe caps left in place on the containment pressure sensing lines with no administrative requirement in place to insure their removal prior to operation of the plant. The existence of these caps was therefore lost. Bad these caps remained in
, place during operation the response capability of the HPSI aystem would have been defeated. The inspectors were unable to reconstruct the circumstances of the caps being installed: whether the caps were installed and left on by the construction personnel or whether they were later installed by the preoperational testing personnel.
Missing bolts were identified in the base frames of the six separation groups 1 and 2 motor control centers. These bolts appear to be required for the seismic gualifications of these cabinets.
Some problems with cable separation were identified. These problems did not appear to be pervasive or indicate a lack of control in the area of cable separation.
Additionally, discrepancies associated with concrete expansion anchor bolts and supporting electrical raceways were found.
B. Mechanical Construction Again the inspections in this area revealed deficiencies in the thoroughness of the final inspections and/or in maintenance following testing.
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_ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ . _ . - . _ . - - - _ , - . - - - . - . . - - ~
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3 l",t- NOV i11983 f The manual operating mechanism of a 10 inch suction line valve was l completely disconnected from the valve and flange bolts on the i.ame j valve had not been adeguately torgued. As a result, the valve couldn't i be operated and the valve bonnet was leaking. It appeared that the valve j disassembly had been performed after construction personnel had completed their work on the valve. There was no indication that tha'preoperational testing or startup personnel had control measures in effect to recognise and repair the unsatisfactory valve condition, The same valve in train B l
was found in a condition which would not allow it to open fully.
An examination of 68 pipe hangers or supports of a total of 116 (60 percent) in the EPSI system showed that fourteen such structures have deficiencies such as undersize fillet welds.
C. Weldina and Nondestructive Examination The NRC examined 18 circumferential and 10 socket welds in the HPSI system by independent radiography. Also, 34 welds were visually examined in the field, and the radiographs on file for 192 welds were read by NR .
This resulted in looking at 28 percent of the welds in the EPSI systems.
No deficiencies were found. In addition to the IPSI emanination, system radiographs and weld records for twelve welds in the primary loop were emanined. Three primary loop welds in PVNGS 11mit 3 was examined radiographically for comparison of radiographic techniques with similar Iicensee radiographs. One unresolved item was identified dealing with weld ripple images which could possibly mask weld defects.
D. structures Examinations in this area included concrete in situ testing, penetrations, structural bolting and welding. Some problems with bolting and welding i of gallery steel were noted as described in the enclosed inspection report.
1 Most deficiencies appear to result fram inadeguate inspections prior to or l inadeguate control of systems after turnover to operations and startup.
1 i WORKER INTERVIEWS
! In order to determine if there were intimidation or undue pressure felt by workers to cut corners, 115 craftsmen and first line quality control inspectors were interviewed. The team considered that if such pressure and intimidation were widespread, the problem would surface in these interviews.
i These interviews were face to face, and were made in private between one l or two workers and a NRC inspector.
! The tabulated results of these contacts, the crafts represented by the 4
contacts are contained in the enclosed inspection report. Ione of the workers
- interviewed indicated that he or she felt intimidated or felt any pressure to j cut corners for the sake of production.
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4
. . . .. NOV 111983 Enforcement action related to this inspection will be the subject of separate
- correspondence.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written l
application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
$R4 J. B. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
- 1. Inspection Report 50-528/83-34
^ ~ ^
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j U. 3. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ttlISSION REGION V ,
Division of Resident, Reactor Paojects and Ecgineering Programs [
Report No. 50-528/83-34 Docket No. 50-528 Iicense No. CPPR-141 I,1censee: Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 1 Inspection at: Construction Site l
Inspection conducted: September 6-16, 26-30 October 31 and November 1, 1983 Inspectors: d T. / BIO
W. G. Albert, Setlor g Re g t Insp etor Date Signed WNP-3 eam Leader) 1/
. F. 36rd6fn, Reactor Inspector
//~l0"U Date Signed W . ll~10~ES Date Signed R.H. Campbell,[,nginee(ingTechdcian DW l'. //~/O -83 Date Signed R.H.Barris,EngineerigTechniciaji N . ll~~~l0 ~ N H. W. Kerth, Lep Reactgr paineer: p Date Signed l
WOslh ^
P. P. Narbut, Project Inspector Il-to-83 Date Signed E. E. Vorderb bMb.
ggen, (gb or Repdent Inspector
//-10 -83 Date Signed m .S
,. i mx Q L. R '/ / #
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//-IO-23 Date Signed W. J. Wagner, Regtor Ingepor kelAs,bh&. by. $w : n-1o -83 Date Signed F.E.Walton,SgtiorRe(deptInsp4 RVPS-2 tor We Y. //~/O 'N Date Signed J.L. Crews,TepicalAgsipanttofthe Regional Administrator
[
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- 7. Young, Jr. , Chigi NW[h. j
//-/o-93 Date Signed Reactor Projects Sdetics 2 ( L) '
Consultants: W. Marini, C. Crane, and L. Stanley Contract Technicians: K. Grevenow and J. Ludiwissi b
Approved By: !.D '3E 80 II!IOb3 T. W. Bishop, D'1 rector, Division of Residents, Date Signed Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
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.. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS TOPIC SECTION Inspection Scope and Objectives 1- i Tema Organisation and Methods II Contacts and Licensee /NRC Meetings III Electrical and Instrumentation Construction IV Bangers and Supports, Snubbers and Restraints V Piping Systems VI Civil and Structural Construction VIII l Nondestructive Examination VIII Craf t and QC Inspector Interviews IX
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- 1. INSPECTION SCOPE AND OSJECTIVES '
! The scope of this inspection was the evaluation of on-site construction for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1.
The objective was to provide an overall assessment of t actus1 as-built l
condition of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (PVNGS-1) l ,. by comparing the as-built condition to design requirements of a t
representative sample. Therefore, the inspection concentrated on .
hardware and assessed whether the construction of PVNGS-1 was performed in accordance with quality requirements applicable to the plant.
In the areas inspected, the following was determined:
The construction observed was in conformance to the drawings and specifications.
Necessary quality verifications were performed during the construction process with appropriate hold points and other controls.
Nonconforming conditions were properly addressed in accordance with approved procedures.
Equipment was turned over to the startup organization in operable condition and it was being maintained properly as evidenced by the as-found condition.
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II. TEAM ORGANIZATION AND METHODS The NRC inspection team consisted of ten NRC empluyees, three consultants, and two technicians from Wisconsin Testing, Inc., as follows:
William G. Albert - Team Imeder Registered Professional Engineer (Mechanical) with 33 years experience in reactor construction, engineering and operation.
Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector for the WNP-3 plant in Washington State.
Paul P. Narbut - Ieed Inspector, Mechanical Area Nuclear Engineer (Nuclear) with 20 years experience in the design, construction and testing of nuclear power plants.
Currently a Project Inspector for the NRC's Region V office.
John F. Burdoin - Zead Inspector, Electrical Area Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical, Mechanical and Nuclear), with 36 years experience in the field of electrical entineering. Currently a Reactor Inspector with the NRC's Region V office, specializing in electrical inspection.
Tolbert Young, Jr. - Interview and Report Coordination Registered Professional Engineer (Nuclear) with 22 years experience in nuclear power plant operation. Currently a Section Chief with the NRC's Region V office.
Glen A. Walton - Welding and NDE Specialist Twenty-seven years experience in regulation and management of MDE and QA/QC. Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector for the Beaver Valley plant la Pennsylvania.
William J. Wagner - Welding Inspection Registered Professional Engineer (Quality) and AWS-Certified Welding Inspector with 24 years of experience in the field of metallurgy, quality assurance and NDE. Currently a Reactor Inspector with NRC's Region V office, specializing in welding.
Barry W. Ee:ch - NDE Van Supervisor Registered Professional Engineer (Quality) and Certified ASNT Ievel III Examiner with 35 years of NDE experience. Currently a Imad Reactor Engineer with the NRC's Region I office.
II-1
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L. E. Vorderbrueggen - Team Support and Civil / Structural Coordinator Electrical engineer with 36 years experience in the design and construction of industrial plants. Currently the NRC's Senior Resident Inspector at Palo Verde. e
- Richard R. Marris - NDE Inspection Certified ASNT Level II Exaniner and AWS Welding Inspector with i 22 years experience in NDE and QC. Currently an Engineering !
Technician with the NRC's Region I office. l R. H. Campbell - NDE Inspection j Certified ASNT Imysl II Examiner and AWS Welding Inspector with nine years experience in NDE and QC. Currently an Engineering Technician with the NRC's Region I office.
j Loren Stanley - Electrical Consultant
! Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical) with 27 years electrical engineering experience. Currently in private consulting.
William Marini - Electrical Consultant Electrical Inspection Specialist with 13 years experience in the field of electrical and welding inspection. Currently with Resource Technical Services.
Cyril J. Crane - Electrical Consultant Registered Professional Engineer (Electrical) with 27 years experience in reactor operation and electrical engineering.
Currently with Westec Services, Inc.
Jesse L. Crews - Registered Proffessional Engineer (Nuclear) with 22 years experience in reactor construction, engineering and operations. Currently Technical Assistant to the Regional Administrator.
K. Grevenow - NDE Technician Wisconsin Testing l . J. Ludiwissi - NDE Techniciar.
Wisconsin Testing 11-2
i The methods ased for this inspection were to select a meaningful sample i of Palo Verde safety-related construction for rigorous examination. The sample was of high safety significance and was deemed to be
, representative of the work controle, procedures, methodology, and
. documentation of safety-related work performed at Palo Verds Nuclear Generating Station. Selection and in-depth examination of;a representative sample of this nature allowed estrapolation of the Team's findings to the adequacy of other safety-related construction at Palo )
Verde.
Accordingly, the team's approach was to direct 70 percent of its effort I to the verification of system installation for the Eigh Pressure Safety Injection System (HPSI) A train. This included in-depth examination of a large number of elements related to this syste.a. including piping, pipe supports, pumps, valves, welding, sondestructive examination, electrical
- power supplies, electrical cables (including redundancy and separation),
instrumentation, control, electrical motors, supporting structural steel elements, and related concrete structures. Within this sample, special emphasis was directed to the areas of welding and electrical construction since both of these areas had been the subject of allegations. The other 30 percent of the team's effort was focused on inspection in other important areas such as the Reactor Coolant System.
The examinations discussed above were conducted by:
(a) Physical inspection of systems, components, and structures. ,
(b) Independent MDE of welds and structures.
> (c) Examination of documentation, where necessary, to support physical inspections.
(d) Private interviews and discussions with over 100 craft and inspection personnel.
(e) Examination of radiographs and other direct evidence of the quality I
of work such as postweld heat treatment charts.
(f) Testing of components by ultrasonic thickness measurements,
) hardness, radio signal cable tracing, and concrete probes.
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. l III. CONTACTS AND LICENSEE /NRC EEETIND5 The inspection was unsanounced matil the morning of September 6,1983.
On that day all team members and the ERC Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
Van arrived on site. The teams primary point of coctact during the course of this inspection was the Arizona Public Service (APS) -
Construction Quality Assurance orSanization at the site. This
' organisation is managed by Mr. W. X. 2de.
An entrance meeting was held at the start of the inspection to acquaint ,
the licensee with what the NRC inspection team intended to accomplish, 1 I
arrange for needed drawings and doctemtation, arrange for off shift radiography, define organizational points of contact, and arrange necessary Saturday coverage since September 10, 1983, was a day of work for the inspection team. This meeting was attended by Mr. E. E.
Van Brunt, APS Vice President for Nuclear Projects Management, Mr. J. A. Roedel, APS Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Mr. W. J. Stubblefield, Bechtel Field Construction Manager and 20 other staff members of the APS and Bechtel Site Organizations.
On September 14, 1983, a brief . meeting was held between the NRC team leader Mr. W. G. Albert, Mr. Z. E. Van Brunt, APS Vice President of Nuclear Projects and Mr. D. 3. Fasnacht, APS Nuclear Construction l Manager. The purpose of this meeting was to provide highlights of I tentative findings up to that tine atace Mr. Van Brunt could not attend the meeting on September 16th.
On September 16, 1983, a meeting was held between the team leader and the team lead inspectors with Mr. J. A. Roedel, APS Corporate Quality Ass rance Manager, Mr. D. B. Fasnacht, APS Nuclear Construction Manager, Mr. W. G. Bingham, Bechtel Project Engineering Manager and approximately ten other APS and Bechtel Staff. The purpose of this meeting was to provide APS with a progress report as the type and nature of NRC findings at that point in the inspection.
This was a status meeting and, therefore, no attempt was made to categorize the findings as to their seriousness or to define which would be items of noncompliance. Ibe NRC stated at that time that they perceived a weakness at the interface between construction and operations and while the besic construction appeared satisfactory, a sigr.ificant number of findings indicated that either final inspections were not properly performed and/or there was a lack of control of work after completion of construction by the startup organization.
The principal exit interview for this inspection was held in the APS corporate offices on September 30, 1983. This meeting was attended by Mr. J. B. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator, Mr. T. W. Bishop, NRC Division Director and three MRC observers from headquarters organisations. The APS attendees included Mr. K. L. Turley, Chairman of the Board, Mr. O. M. DeMichele, President, Mr. T. G. Woods, Jr.,
Executive Vice President, Mr. 2. 2. Van Brunt, Vice President Nuclear III-1 a . .- - . -- .- - -- __
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Projects, Mr. 6. C. Andognini, Vice President Nuclear Operations, and eight other APS staff members. Bechtel attendance consisted of Mr. W. J. Stubblefield, site Construction Manager and Mr. D. R.
Eawkinson, Projects quality Assurance Manager. In addition'to the above, the meeting was also attended by representatives of the five other owner
, organisations for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station which are:
Southern California Edison Company, Salt River Project, T.os Angeles l . Department of Water and Power, El Paso Electric and Public Service of New
- Mexico. At this meeting, the individual team members reported upon the areas examined and the significant findings in each area as detailed in this report.
The NRC management again reiterated their concern with regard to the
- quality controls esercised at the time of system turnover from l construction to the APS startup organisation and the apparent need for i
more definitive quality control by maintenance organizations. However,
, the NRC expressed general satisfaction with basic construction, particularly pipe welding, and the results of over 100 private but informal contacts with craftsmen and first-line inspectors.
The applicant expressed their intent to immediately and thoroughly followup on the NRC findings. Except for disagreement with the NRC finding regarding the readability of certain primary loop pipe radiographs, the applicant did not comment on the NRC findings r,t the time of this meeting and questions were generally oriented toward the clarification of issues.
l On November 1, 1983, a meeting was held between the Section Chief, the Technical Assistant to the Regional Administrator, Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, APS Vice President of Nuclear Projects, Mr. J. A. Roedel, APS Corporate Qvslity Assurance Manager, Mr. D 3. Fasnacht, APS Nuclear Construction Manager and other members of the APS staff. The purpose this meeting was to discuss the additional facts obtained (during the last two days of the inspection) surrounding the more significant violations.
III-2
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- 17 Elmtriel and I strument-tion Construction
- Objective The primary objective of the appraisal of electrical and instrumentation I construction was to determine whether safety-related components and I
- systems were installed in accordanes with regulatory requirements, SAR l cosmitments, and approved construction specifications and drawings. i
- Additional objectives were to determine whether procedures,rinstructions ;
i and drawings used to accomplish construction activities were adequate and l whether quality-related records accurately raflect the completed work.
! Particular attention was concentrated on the "A" train of the high pressure safety injection (BPSI) system to demonstrate specific areas ;
within the broad categories of electrical and instrumentation construction. These areas include electrical raceway (cable tray and ;
j conduit) and raceway supports; electrical motors; electrical cable and cable terminations; electrical penetrations; instrumentation (sensors and logic); diesel generator; and onsite AC power distribution system and DC power system. Fortions of the EPSI B train were s1so examined.
A. Electrical Raceways and Raceway Supports Areas Examined
- 1. Electrical Raceways The NRC Team Inspectcre examined approximately 1,690 feet of cable trays and 26 conduit runs. These raceways were inspected for: separation, proper identification and color coding, tray / conduit size and routing in accordance with design
! drawings, raceway bend radii conformance to criteria, bolted connection are tightness, weld conformance to applicable requirements, raceways free of debris and sharp edges, and ,
installation and inspection documentation completeness and accuracy.
Findinas i The inspection found that the raceways were in conformance with requirements regarding size, band radii, bolting, welding, debris, sharp edges, general installation and
- inspection. However, deficiencies were identified in the areas of identification and separation, as indicated below.
One instance of a damaged flexible conduit jacket repair is an open item and will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
- a. Temporary alphanumeric identification on cable tray 1EZAIDBTIF had not been replaced with permanent identification (011 50-528/83-34-11).
- b. Nonsafety-related conduit IEZADCNRQ506 for thermostat 1EQFNT1243C in EPSI A pump room was separated from safety-related group 1 junction box 1EZACCAKKJ03 by less than one inch (OII 50-528/83-34-12).
- c. At diesel generator E-PEA-G01 monsafety-related flexible conduit IEZG1ANRX11 at junction box 4 is in contact with safety-related flexible conduit 1EZG1AARR20 at junction box 6 (011 50-528/83-34-13).
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- -_________-__=_____________-__ _______ _ _ _ _ __. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
- d. Separation group 1 cable tray located in EPSI pump room A was not marked with red color identification (round emblems) between points irrarrATCRA and 1EZACCARC03 (011 50-528/83-34-14). .
- e. The following separation group I conduits wtre not identified by alphanumeric markings (011 50-528/83-34-15):
- 1) Conduits 1E2J1AARC12,-14 and -16, on both sides of the well between group 1, 4.16 KV switchgear area and channel A remote shutdown panel area, at the 100 foot elevation.
- 2) Conduit sleeves 1E2J1kARC13, 14 and 15 on control building wall in channel B remote shutdown area, at the 100 foot elevation.
- f. Round blue identification emblems were missing from channel D conduit (PT-351) for a distance of approximately 40/50 ft at elevation 120' (01I 50-528/83-34-16).
3 At diesel generator E-PEA-001, vendor supplied nonsafety-related ALS flexible cable at junction box 14 could potentially move and come in contact with safety related flexible conduit 1EZG1AARX27 at junction box 7.
- h. The vinyl jacket on safety related flexible (anaconda metal hose type NWC), conduit ERIEZCICARK13 inside
- containment was damaged and subsequently repaired in accordance with established procedures (Procedure for Raceway Installation, WPP/QCI 251.0, Revision 18, Section 5.10) by taping over the damaged vinyl with Scotch 33 tape (Unresolved item 50-528/83-34-02).
- 2. Raceway Supports The NRC Team examined 60 raceway supports. These supports were inspected for conformance to design drawings including:
support spacing, configuration, location, mounting, material, support member size, and weld joints.
Findinas The raceway supports were found to be in general conformance with design drawings and regulatory requirements. The following deficiencies were identified:
- a. The bolted connections attaching tray 1EZA1BBTECV to hanger E7 (drawing 13-E-ZAC-016 Rev. 20) were disconnected (01I 50-528/83-34-17).
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- b. The co-insta11sd configuration cf the welda cttaching tha
," longitudinal brccing far harstra M212, M10, 311 and B12 en drawing 13-I-2JC-044 Rev. 9 to embedded plates is not as specified by detail 21, alternate, on drawing 13-E-ZAC-043 rev. 18. In addition, slag remains on the referenced welds for hanger 312. The raceway installation cards for trays 1EZJ4AATXMA and 1EZJ4AATXHB indicate that these welds have been inspected and accepted by QC (011 50-528/83-34-18). ,
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- c. The fifth support from instrument rack IJSRAA01 for conduit 112CIAARX-10 was found to contain welds which I
exhibited overlap, which is prohibited by AWS D1.1-72 (011 50-528/43-34-19).
l 3 d. The prising and painting of welds on raceway supports in channel c (green) riser room adjacent to cable spreading room at the 120 foot elevation was incomplete.
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- e. The fourth support from junction box J-RCA-PT-190A for conduit 112CAAARX08 contains a damaged P1001A3 unistrut member which prohibits the full engagement of a unistrut spring out within the unistrut channel.
B. Electric Motor Installation Areas Examined l
l The NRC Team Inspectors examined a sample of installed electric motors within the MPSI system. The motors selected were two HPSI pump motors, IMSIAP02 (Train A) and IMSIBP02 (Train B); and 17 motor-operated valve motors included in the MPSI System (Trains A and B);
W-617 RV-530 W-673 Ev-531 W-647 W-667 BV-604 W-674 W-626 NV-699 W-627 W-616 W-636 RV-609 EV-698 W-637 W-646 For the motors, the inspectors reviewed associated vendor drawings and documents, and plant maintenance, test, and installation records which define the design and installation methods for the equipment.
A physical inspection of the installed equipment was performed to determine compliance to design requirements and vendor installation criteria, mounting, bolting, identification, sameplate date, location, grounding, and protection. The following documents and areas were reviewed: equipment specifications; purchase order
{ documentation; vendor drawings and instruction manuals, including maintenance and installation requirements; seismic analysis or test and equipment qualification documentation, including special mounting and maintenance requirements; equipment maintenance records for warehouse, construction, and startup phases; warehouse records including receipt, storage, and release documentation; material receiving reports, including equipment certifications from vendors; electrical testing records for pre-operational phase; and associated quality control and installation records.
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I The power ccbloo ist the meters vers laspested in th2 field cad tha terminations were esamined at the motors. The routing of the cables for the MP8I motors and approximately one-third of the MOVs were traced back to their respective 4160 volt or 480 volt power sources to verify physical separation of trains, cable tray / conduit arrangement, and cable tray fill, specific cable numbers are identified below in Section C, electrical cable installation.
Findinas The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. It was found that the installation of the dowel pins in the motor mounting (following alignment), as seguired by the manufacturer, had not been installed. Doweling of the motor mounts could not be identified on the master list of items to be completed prior to fuel load. However, it was established that the maintenance division, charged with the installation of these douel pins, was aware of this remaining requirement in the novating of the NPSI pump motors and tools were ordered in August 1983 to perform the job.
- 2. IPSI pump IMSIAP02 motor, ground cable hold-down clamp was mis 6ing.
- 3. Motor heater (M-SIA-P02H) nameplate missing at MCC 1EPHAM37.
- 4. There are no permanent identification signs at entrances to IPSI pump rooms, Train A and Train B.
- 5. Revision 3 of Specification SYS.80-PE-410 for the BPSI pumps is not contained in Purchase Order 9500088, as required.
Revision 2 of the specification is included in the purchase order.
- 5. MOV nameplate error at MCC 1EPHAM33. The nameplate reads JSIA-115-604, but should read 1J-8IA-BV-604.
- 7. Material Receiving Report 42220 is missing from Purchase Order 960-1231 for MOV IJSIA-BV 604.
No items of noncompliane or deviations were identified.
C. Electrical Cable Installation Electrical Cable Installation Areas Examined The NRC Team inspectors selected a sample as listed below of installed electrical high and low voltage power, and control cables within the EPSI systems Trains A (and sosse in Train B) and the Class IE power systems. For each selected cable, the NRC inspectors reviewed associated drawings and documents which define the location, design route, and installation methods for cable installation within tray and conduit. A IV-4
physical inspection of the as-built cable tastallation was performed by inspecting the entire length of cable run between l the asenciated equipment and its respective load center / control cabinet. The objective of the inspection was to ascertain compliance with design, taatallation, and quality. assurance l documents. During the course of the taspection,,the following documents and areas were reviewed: elementary and cable block
_ diagrams; cable code and cable scheme numbers; single line diagrams, cable type and identification, including separation color and cable markers; 1580 computer program sorts for j routing, identification of cables at tray points, actual and i allowable tray fill at tray points, and size and type of cable; physical separation criteria, including raceway and tray designations; conduit and tray arrangement drawing; raceway installation cards; cable installation cards; and cable installation specifications. The physical inspection of the cable runs included a determination of size, type, routing, protection, separation, identification, loading, cable supports and cable spacing. The actual cable installation and routing was compared to the design as determined from the 1580 computer program and the cable installation cards.
i The installation was examined for the following power, control and instrument cables, totaling approximately 8680 feet for the EPSI system, Trains A and B and Instrument Channels A, B, C, and D.
CABLES EQUIPMENT TO EOCATION 1ESI01BCICA IPSI Piasp/ Motor B IEPBBSO4E 1ESIO1ACICA IPSI Pump / Motor A 1EPBAS03E
, 1ERC65CC1XA PT-102C IESACZ28I 1 1ERC65CC1XB Penetration 128 IJSBCC02A 1ERC65DC1XA PT-102D 1ESFDZ77I 1ERC65DC1XB Penetration 277 IJSBDC02A l
1EHC62CCIIA PT-351C IJSBCC02A IENC62DC1XA FT-351D IJSBDC02A 1ESI40BC1EA V-609 1EPHBM3410 1ESI1BBC1EA V-667 1EPHBM3608 1ESI39BCIEA V-699 IEPEBM3807 1ERC64AC1XB PT-102A 1ESAAZ47I 1ERC64BC1XA PT-102B IESFBZ381 1ERC64BC1XB Penetration 138 IJZJBE02 1EHC61AC1XA PT-351A IJSBACO2A 1EHC61BC1XA PT-351B IJSBBC02A 1EPE01AC1CA Diesel Generator IJDGAB03 1EPE01ACICB IEPEAG01 IJDGAB03 1EPE01ACICC 1EPEAG01 1JDGAB03 1ES140AC1EA HOV EV-604 1EPHAM3305 1ESI39AC1EA MOV EV-698 IEPHAM3708 1ESI40AC1RA NOV EV-604 1EPHAM3305 1ESI39AC1RA BOV EV-698 1EPHAM3708 1
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j CABLES EQUIPMENT _TO IDCATION 1ESI21AC1BC Penetration 346 1EFEAM3512 1ESI21ACIRB NOV UV-673 ~.
1EPHAZ46I 1ES121AC1EA Penetration 146 ' 1EPHAM3512 1ESI21AC1ER NOV UV-673 1EPHAZ46I 1EBC64BC1ED Remote Shutdown Pal. 1J8BBC02A 1ESB01AC1EM Distrib. Pal. IJSBAC02B (IEPNA-D25) 1ESB01AC1RS Distrib. Pal. 1JRMAB02B (IEPNA-D25) 1EPN02AC1RB Isolat'n. Pal. 1EPNAN11 (1JSAA-C04) !
Findinas l l
Cable installation activities were found to be in conformance with requirements. Two apparent violations were identified in this area.
- 1. Scaffolding lumber was found stored in channel C electrical raceway / cable chase located in the lower cable spreading room at the 120 foot elevation (OII 50-528/83-34-20).
- 2. In tray 1EZJ4AA15CE, cables are projecting above the level of the tray siderails, and are in physical contact with fire protection piping and two EVAC ducts (011 50-528/83-34-21).
In addition to the vialations, the following two concerns were identified:
- 1. While inspecting the traceability of Anaconda 5 KV cable, it was found that the identification, required to be permanently marked on the outer jacket of the cable at three-foot intervals, could easily be rubbed off. This resulted in the cable jacket markings becoming illegible following handling during installation.
- 2. Traceability of SEV cable was found to lack clarity. The cable is received on site from the vendor under a material receiving record 00tR) which identifies the cable, vendor and receiving cable reels. Following receipt, the vendors <
cable reels are assigned Bechtel cable reel numbers for storage and future processing. The Bulk Material i
Inventory (computer readout), the principle cable record, correlates Bechtel cable reel numbers to vender reel numbers, but does not list the IGtR aumbers under which the i
vendor cable reels were delivered. Therefore, it is difficult to trace cable directly from the Bechtel l storage reels to the material receipt records, i
l IT-6 I~ - ,-er--s.w .- ., =,e--. . - , - - - - -y e, , - --,-iw- * - - + - - + + -
D. Cable Terminations The ERC Team inspectors esamined the terminations of 31 cables identified above mader cable installation. The terminations at both ends of the cables were inspected for: cable terminations as shown on engineering docsments, identification with enclosure, separation, size of conductor, tie-down, bend radius, grounding of cable shield, disposition of spare wires, proper size, terminal lugs, seatness and workmasahip, and installation and inspec. ion documentation.
Findinas 1
Except as noted below, cable terminations were found to be in conformance with requirements. The following deficiency was
- identified
- 1. Electrical installation, Specification EM-306, Section 7.2R, requires spare wires in a cable to be coiled and insulated with tape or a shrink sleeve. The end of green / black tracer, spare wire cable ESI21AC1RC at EPHAN3512 was bare and not insulated.
The quality of insulating the ends of other spare wires was inconsistent and insecure in some instances. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
E. Electrical Penetrations Areas Examined The following installed containment electrical penetration assemblies were inspected:
Number Elevation 4
228 100-foot 238 100-foot 246 120-foot 247 120-foot 277 120-foot The location, type, mounting, and identification were compared with the installation drawings. The cable terminations at the penetrations were emanined both inside and outside of containment.
l The QC records associated with receiving, storage and installation of these penetrations were also reviewed.
Findina Activities observed and doc eentation reviewed indicated work performed in this area was in accordance with requirements. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
F. Electrical Instrasentation Areas Examined The actuation of EPSI is initiated fram either of two parameters l (four channels); low pressurized pressure and high containment l pressure. The four pressuriser low-pressure transmitters, PT-102A, l 102B, 102C and 102D; and the four containment high pressure
! transmitters, FT-351A, 351B, 351C, and 351D were inspected in the field.
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These pressure transmitters were inspected for proper mounting, physical separation, identification of correct instruments and safety channel (color code), instrument calibration, etc. The stainless steel tubias runs were traced from the transmitters back ,
to the contaissent isolation / root valves to verify; proper grade '
{ slope) and tubias support. r l
The instrument cabinets and panels were inspected for technical requirements as contained in the Procurement Specifications 13-JM-200 (CONSIP, Inc) and 13-EM-022 (BARLO Corp.), and Installation Specification for Instrumentation and Control Equipment, 13-JM-702, Revision 8. The physical inspection also l Ancluded inspection of internal wire routing and separation, cable marking (identification), termination connections, module mountings, overall workmanship, and cleanliness. Operator controls and displays for the EPSI system were examined at the 302 and B05 main control room benchboards. The interface between the EPSI system and remote shutdown panel was also examined.
t The following engineered safety features (EPSI) systems cabinets and instrument panels were inspected:
1.,
NSSS Analog Instrument Cabinets A, B, C, and D:
n 1 .7-SBA-C02A 1-J-8BB-C02A 1-J-8BC-C02A 1-J-SBD-C02A 1-J-5BA-C02B 1-J-8BB-C02B
- 2. Plant Protection System Cabinets A, B, C, and D:
1-J-SBA-C01 'l-J-SR3-C01 1-J-SBC-C01 1-J-SBD-C01
- 3. Main Control Room Panels:
l 1-J-RMA-302 1-J-BMB-302 1-J-RMC-B02 1-J-RMD-B02 1-J-RNA-505 1-J-BMB-305 1-J-RMC-305 1-J-BMD-B05
- 4. ESFAS Auxiliary Relay Cabinets A and B:
J-SAA-C01 1-J-SAB-C01
- 5. BOP E3FAS Cabinets A and R:
1-3-SAA-C02A 1-J-SAB-C02A 1-J-SAA-C02B 1-J-SAB-C02A
- 6. Isolation Cabineta'A, B, C, and D:
1 .kSAA-C04~ 1-3-SAB-C04 1-J-SAC-C04 1-J-SAD-C04
- 7. Status, Display Panel Inserts.A and B:
1-J-ESA-C01 1-J-ESB-C01 IV-8
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_ .- w w . . , -. . - - . - ~ - . - -
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. 4. Samote Shut Down Panel Sections (EPSI Valve Contrels):
l 1-J-2JA-201 1-J-EJB-301 1-J-2JC-301 1-J-EJD-E01 The following g u lity control records for the EPS1 instrument systems were enemined: purchasing / receiving records, storage / maintenance recorda, installation records, cable installation, and termination records.
Findinas [
Inspection of lastrumentation revealed a significant violation l
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which reflects a weakness in the preoperational/startup test j program:
l 1. The sensing lines for the four channels of containment pressure (PT-351A, 3515, 351C and 3!,1D) were found to be capped immediately inside containment. The sensing lines were capped with threaded pipe caps and could only be removed with the aid i of a pipe wrench. The presence of these pipe caps made this
, system inoperative. There were no records to indicate when
- the caps were installed. The inspectors were unable to ,
determine whether the caps were installed by construction or preoperational personnel. It was not apparent that any preoperational or startup program action would have assured 1
the removal of the caps prior to plant operations. This is an apparent violation (OII 50-528/83-34-22).
In addition to the apparent violation identified above, three items of concern were identified:
- 1. The instrument sensing line support shown in Detail 1 on Drawing 13-J-01D-105, Revision 4 has a weld which contains undercut measuring approximately 1/32-inch in depth. The 1/32-inch value does not satisfy the requirements of the
.01-inch criteria for undercut transverse to the primary tensile stress of the member in question as stated in AWS D2.1-72, Revision 1973 as defined in specificaties 13 CM 320.
- 2. An internal separation barrier cover was missing from remote shutdown panel 1JZJBE01, and no status tag noting its removal was observed.
- 3. It was found that temporary nonconformance report hold tags j for level transmitters LT 1123A and LT 1124A at the 100 foot elevation inside containment were reversed.
G. Emeraency Diesel Generator Areas Examined The electrical aspects of the Emergency Diesel Generator 1, t
IEPEAG01, including control cabinet wiring, were inspected for i location, nounting, separation, protection, and identification.
Findinas These reviewed aspects indicated work was performed in accordance with installation requirements. Some minor deficiencies that were found in raceways (flexible conduit) separation were address under raceway and support section of this report Paragraph IV.A-1. No other violations or deviations were identified.
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N. On'ite AC Power Distribution System i..*- ~
Arc s tsemined~
The NRC inspect 4r enemined the following components of the Class 1 4160-volt and 440-volt power distribution system:
H-P85-804 4.16 EV switchgear, separation group 2 H-PBA-503 4.16 EV switchgear, separation group 1 H-PGA-I.35 480 V switenseat, separation grong 1 1E-PGA-I.33 480 V switchgear, separation group 1 1E-PEA-M33 480 V EC, separation group 1 1E-PEA-M35 480 V EC, separation group 1 H-PEA-M37 480 V EC, separation group 1 1E-PEB-M34 480 V EC, separation group 2 1E-PEB-M36 480 V EC, separation group 2
, 1E-PEB-M38 480 V EC, separation group 2 The 4160-volt switchgear, 480-volt switchgear and 480-volt motor control centers (NCC) were inspected and compared to installation di awings relative to configuration, location, mounting, i entification, installation documentation, and protection.
Fxadinas l
Inspection of this area revealed three apparent violations related l to cabinet installation and electrical separation:
l l 1. It was found that 87 3/8-inch bolts were missing from the base frames for the six separat'3n groups 1 and 2 motor control centers identified. The failure to identify this condition, adverse to quality, is an apparent violation (01I 50-528/83-34-23).
- 2. In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PRA-503L nonsafety-related flexible conduit 1EZJ1ANRR52 is separated from safety-related i wiring by less than 1 inch which does not satisfy the separation requirements (OII 50-528/83-34-24).
- 3. In 4160-volt switchgear cubicle E-PBA-503E nonsafety-related flexible conduit 1EZJ1AMRR51 is separated from safety-related .
wiring by less than one inch, contrary to separation criteria (OII 50-528/83-34-25).
In addition to the violations acted above, two items of concern were identified:
- 1. An error was found in the identification of compartment 05 of MCCEPHAM33 on drawing 13-E-PRA-003. I.ong term cooling valve JSIARV604 was identified as JSIAUV604.
- 2. It was found that three cubicle tie-down bolts in EC 1E-PEA-M35 were not fully engaged. The licensee had in progrets design change package (DCP) 18E-PE-035 requiring certain modifications to the tie-down method for the above identified McCs. These modifications were required to assure the MCCs comply with the seismic analysis requirements.
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- . 1. DC Power System
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Areas Examined The four main DC batteries, battery chargers, and Vital AC bus 5 inverters were inspected for electrical separation aspects, fluid levels, termination connections, bolting materials, spacers, 11 mounting arrangements, and general workmanship and cleanliness. -
Equipment that was inspected is identified in the following list:
DC Batteries and Mounting Racks A, B, C, and D: e 1-E-PKA-F11 1-E-PKB-F12 1-E-PKC-F13 1-E-PKD-F14 :
DC Battery Chargers A, B, C, and D: '
1-E-PKA-H11 1-E-PKB-M12 1-E-PKC-M13 1-E-PKD-H14 1-E-PEA-B15 1-E-PKB-H16 ;
Vital AC Bus Inverters A, B, C, and D:
1-E-PNA-N11 1-E-PNB-N12 1-E-PNC-N13 1-E-PND-N14 ,
Technical requirements for the batteries, battery chargers, and
- inverters contained in Procurement Specifications 13-EM-050 for -
Exide, 13-EM-051 for Power Conversion Products, Inc., and 13-EM-054, ;
respectively, were reviewed. J Each battery was physically inspected for adequate fluid levels, '
conductor termination connections, bolting materials used, and E absence of battery case cracks. Each battery rack was inspected for battery-to-end plate spacing, battery-to-battery spacers, alignment f of frame spring-nuts, and frame welding to the battery room floor ,
imbeds. The location, floor mounting, panel displays, and electrical conduit configuration for each battery charger and Vital ?
AC inverter were inspected. ;
Revisions 0 and 1 of the FM-410 8tartup Generic Maintenance $
Procedure for Station Batteries were reviewed for technical i requirements and test acceptance criteria. Records were inspected .~
for each of the four safety-related batteries, such as on-site receiving records, sid-1981 test results duris.g warehouse storage, :
and periodic maintenance test result records during construction for y the period from February 1982 through September 1933. -
Ins'tallation, in-site modification, and periodic maintenance records A for each battery charger, and Vital AC inverter (prior t- turnover d to Startup) were also inspected.
m Findinas 1
The following deficiencies were identified:
- 1. The batteries were received on site during the summer of 1981.
It was found that no procedure existed for performing the required periodic tests (IEEE Std. 308) to maintain the batteries. The required procedure came into effect in the spring of 1982. This item was the subject of a violation ,
during the team inspection of 1981.
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- 2. The earliest maintenance records are for August 1981, and i
proceed monthly through November. However, no records can be found for December 1981 and January 1982.
- 3. The storage of periodic saintenance records did not satisfy the storage requirements of Section 1.8 of the FSAR.r These -
records, required to be stored in a manner which minimizes the risk of destruction from fire, were found stored in a paper-1 board box. A licensee representative stated that this was temporary for field use.
- 4. No records exist to indicate that baseline annual cell-to-cell i
' and terminal detail connection resistance data was ever recorded during factory acceptance tests for these batteries.
However, the licensee startup generic test procedure addresses the requirement to record intercell resistance checks, during preoperational testing.
- 5. It was found that the vendor testing (at the factory) of battery C did not completely fulfill the discharge rate 4
requirements. However, the licensee identified this, at the time, by issuing supplier deviation disposition request (SDDR) 2763 which requires the capacity discharge test to be run on i
the job site. This test is scheduled to be accomplished by the startup group during preoperational testing.
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V. Banners and supports. Snubbers and Rese.raints A. grees emanined
- 1. Bardware: Eheinspectoresaminedallpipehangefs, supports, snubbers, and restraints on the EPSI A piping system from the start of suction line SIA-008-GCBC-10-inch through discharge lines SI-A-100-CCBA-4 inch were and SI-A-106 CCBA-3-inch, throughout the 40-foot elevation, op through the vertical pipe chase to the 89-foot elevation pipe chase. At this juncture, one of the five injection branch lines, SI-E-176-CCBA-3", was followed to the injection point and all pipe supports, hangers, snubbers, and restraints were examined. Additionally, miscellaneous branch lines from the EPSI discharge path were examined for supports (to the first isolation valve on the branch). Additionally, a few supports not involved in the line description above were examined if a condition was noted which warranted follow up. All supports examined are listed in Table V-1.
In most cases, pipe insulation was removed for inspection. In those cases where a support was only partially examined, Table 1 so notes. These cases generally fall into the following conditions:
. Insulation not removed. This condition precluded examining pipe lug welds only. The hanger members and welds are not covered by insulation and can be throughly inspected.
. Lua welds only. In these cases, the itapector examined only the lug welds to increase the sample of lug welds by inspecting supports which were not on the selected branch line, but were part of IPSI-A.
. One aspect only (e.a.. " base plate oniv"). In these cases, the support was not included in the lines selected but was partially examined because a condition warranting follow up was noted.
. Location and confinuration only. These cases involved a series of replicate supports in a horizontal run. The location of the support and the configuration were checked against drawing requirements, and suppcrt senior sizes and weld sizes were checked by visual examination rather than by measurement.
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All other supports were examined fully.
The inspector enemised the supports to determine that:
. All supports showa on the piping isoestric drawings were installed. - .
- - . No additional supports were installed.
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, . The support configuration was as shown on the support drawing.
. The support member material was per the drawing.
. The welds on the support were the correct size and met the applicable code and standard requirements.
. The welded attachments to piping were per drawing.
. The attachment welds to pipe were per drawing and met code and standard requirseents.
Mechanical snubbers and restraints were installed where required by drawing.
. The snubber and restraints were the proper size (load rating).
. The snubbers and restraints had the proper cold setting shown on the drawing.
. The supports were properly located per the drawing relative to the piping and the structure.
There are a total of 116 pipe supports involved in all of '
the EPSI-A systen. The inspector exanised 68 supports or I about 60 percent. Of the 68 supports enemined 14 supports had :
one or more problems. This is about a 20 percent reject rate.
The problems identified are discussed in the " Findings" section below. ,
)
- 2. Drawinas. Specifications, and Procedures i The inspector gathered and reviewed the applicable piping !
drawings, hanger drawings, specifications, work and inspection procedures, and pertinent vendor information.
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Other safety-related documentation, including documents, authorizing deviations from the drawings, records of hanger inspection by QC, nas-destructive esamination )
records, welding inspection records, noncomformance '
reports, vendor certification records, code-reports, and piping spool fabrication records were regiassed as they were identifed in the pursuit of questions raised on a
. particular support's apparent anomolies.
The inspector also reviewed the FSAR and ASME codes for applicable requirements.
The documents discussed above will be listed and specifically addressed only as they apply to findings, discussed in the " Findings" section below.
- 3. Tools The inspection was conducted utilizing unaided visual examination, tape measure, weld gages, angle finder, and adequate lighting. Safety equipment was utilized as required. No NRC independent non-destructive
) examikation was performed on the pipe supports due to other priorities. In the one case where the visual l inspection indicated a possible weld defect, the inspector requested the licensee reexamine the weld using liquid penetrant examination. The inspector observed the entire performance of the examination.
- 3. Findinas Table V-1 lists all supports inspected and shows which supports were found unsatisfactory and provides a brief description of the problem (s) found.
The problems found group into four areas which are considered apparent violations of MRC regulations. Each problem identified in Table V-1 is explained more fully below.
(1) Failure of the pipe support QC personnel to identify support conditions which are not in accardance with drawina or specification requirements (five examples).
10 CFR 50, Appendix 3, Criterion 5, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
l l
V-3
_ _ _ - - - - - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - , , - - , - . - . - - - . - . - - _ . _ .- .-- . - - - . , . _ s , .--y y, m - r.-
7
. , . , 7 8
, The licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18,
- dated May 25,1983, " Nuclear Pipe Bangers and Supports i
Installation " Appendix I, requires the Piping QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe Supports." The inspection requirement'for Task 1 is to verify the support. assembly correct per approved engineering drawings and specifications.
. Support SI-100-E003 was found with a loose pipe clamp and installed at an angle of 4 1/2' from vertical. Procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, paragraph 8.9, requires the clamp to be snus on the pipe. Procedure WPP/QCI, paragraph 9.2.7.1, requires the angle to be no greater than 2 degrees. The support was accepted by QC on November 20, 1983.
. Support SI-100-5005 was found with the drawing specified dimension of 3 3/4 inches between the certerline of the pipe stanchion and the centerline of the in:srt plate to be actually 7 1/2 inches. This difference exceeds the tolerances of 1 2 inches paragraph 9.3.12 of the WPP/QCI. The support was accepted by QC on November 13, 1981.
. Support SI-100-H036 was found in a cor,dition which did l not match the hanger drawing and modifying Field Change Request (FCR) 15, 123P. Item D of the FCR was not installed. The support was accepted by QC on October 22, 1983 to the drawing and FCR.
. Support SI-101-H00A was found with a loose jam nut on Item 61, the sway strut essembly. The support was accepted by QC on October 2, 1981.
. Support 8I-106 B001 was found with the 2" long pipe lugs, Item 38, bearing on the supporting steel for only 3/16 inch and 7/16 inch, respectively. Paragraph 9.4.1 of the WPP/QCI indicates full bearing surface should be provided ,
as indicated on the support drawing. The support was l accepted by QC on May 23, 1980. l l \
The failure of pipe support QC personnel to identify pipe ;
support conditions which were not in accordance with drawing or specification requirements is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (OII50-528/83-34-01). '
l V-4
o'. ,
- e. e. ..
(2) Failure of the weldina QC personnel to identify weld conditions which are not in accordance with the drawina or the welding code requirements (eiaht examples).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 5, requires, in'part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed *by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
Licensee's procedure WPP/QCI 201.1, Revision 18, dated Nay 25, 1983, " Nuclear Pipe Nangers and Supports Installation," Appendix I, requires the Piping QC Engineer to verify each completed task on the "CIP for Nuclear Pipe
! Supports."
The inspection requirements for Task 8 require the welding QCE to verify that field welding is complete. For Task 9, he is to
- verify the vendor welding was checked for size and length.
The instructions to the QCE in Appendix I instruct the QCE to verify welding acceptability.
. Support SI-100-H005 was found with an underfill condition in I
the stanchion, Item 30, to pipe weld. The weld is required to be a 5/16-inch fillet weld. The actual fill was measured to be 1/4 inch. The weld was accepted on the field weld check list on November 9, 1981.
. Support SI-100-H010 was observed to have an apparent lap in the weld of Item 38 to the pipe. This was a vendor weld. Minor slag was also present in the toe of the weld. These conditions would have precluded a satisfactory liquid penetrant examination by the vendor. The vendor records show the weld was liquid penetrant examined and accepted on December 4, 1977 (Job 2810, Piece 1-SI-100-S-009, "F" No. 261).
The NRC inspector had the visual indication on the weld reexamined by licensee personnel by liquid penetrant l examination in his presence. The liquid penetrant examination i
resulted in an unacceptable linear indication.
i The vendor veld had been last inspected by site QC personnel per Task 8 on June 17, 1981, and was accepted. -
l V-5 l
..__~m._.. ___
3 l:...
. Support SI-100-H015 has the lug, item 38A, field welded to the pipe. The weld was 1/32-inch undersize. The welds were originally accepted on January 22, 1979, and were accepted again during the support inspection on October 28, 1981.
l .
. Support 8I-100 5034 was found with one undersized vendor lug weld (Item 38 to the pipe). The weld was required to be a 1/4-inch fillet and measured to be 3/16 inch. The vendor welds were checked by site QC for size and accepted on September 11, 1982. .
. Support SI-102-H005 was found with several weld prob]?ns. The i vendor weld of Item E to Item B was required to be a 3/16-inch fillet, but was 1/8 inch on three sides. Additionally, there was rollover (or laps) at the corners. The field weld of Item C
! to existing structure was required to have one-inch end returns on the welds, but did not. The vendor weld was accepted by site QC on August 18, 1981. The field weld was originally accepted on October 14, 1980, and was accepted again on August 18, 1981.
. Support SI-106-H011 was found with the pipe lug welds
( (Items 38 and 38A to pipe) closer than 1 inch to the adjacent i pipe-to pipe circumferential weld. The actual distance was
! 3/4 inch. Specification 13-PM-204, " Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems," paragraph 12.2.9, states that welded attachments shall not be installed within 1.0 inch of existing circumferential welds. The field lug welds were originally accepted on February 12, 1979, and again during final support acceptance on October 2, 1980.
. Support SI-176 B001 was found with an undimensioned weld on the drawing, therefore, the proper size of the weld could not be properly verified by the QC inspector. The 3-inch lang fillet field welds of Item 84 to Item B are not dimensioned on i
the support drawing 13-SI-176-H001, Revision 1. The welds were ,
originally accepted on December 18, 1980, and were accepted again on September 15, 1982.
. Support SI-176-H003 was found to hive an undersize weld. The skewed (120-degree) fillet weld of Item A to the containment insert plate sessured 1/4 inch rather than the required 5/16 inch.
The support weld was accepted on July 14, 1980.
Further discussions with the Lead QC Engineer for Pipe Supports and the Lead Welding Engineer disclosed that the 1 Welding Engineer had given verbal instructions to the QC '
Engineer that were contrary to the AWS D.1.1 code requirements for measuring the size of skewed fillet welds. Hence, this undersize weld may be considered caused by improper engineering information. It follows that all skewed fillet welds may require reinspection to the proper criteria.
l V-6 l
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The AWS D.1.1 Code 1974 shows, in Figure 2.7.1, that skewed illlet welds are measured thus:
wldsize, .
~
0 -
A At Palo Verde the QC Engineer states weld are " measured" as shown below (it is not clear how this is "mesur-d" since there is no access to one of the measurement points):
wM %:22, To " measure" by the Palo Verde method to a given size (e.g.,
5/16 inch on a 120-degree weld) will result in an undersize weld by the Code definition (in this case by 3/64 inch). Nonetheless. QC inspectors are required by WPP/QCI 201.1 to inspect to AWS D.1.1 criteria for this weld. The AWS D.I.1 criteria are clear and are not superceded by verbal instructions from engineering.
V-7
_ _ - - . ~ . - -
' ~ ~~ ~~ '~ --- - - - - - '
. O ". . : . . . . - . _ . . .
The failure of velding QC to identify pipe support weld
, conditions which are not in accordance with the drawing or l welding code requirements is an apparent violation of MRC !
regulations (0II50-528/83-34-02). 3 (3) Failure of engineerin to include a non-safety loads in a j . safe related pipe support calculation (one example).
~
10 CFR 50, Appendix 3 Criterion 5, requires, in part, that i
activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures and drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions.
1 Specification 13-PN-204, Revision 12 Paragraph 12.1.2 dated April 7, 1983, states the design and location of all pipe supports shall be the responsibility of project engineering.
Paragraph 12.1.4 states pipe supports designed by engineering will be shown on drawings and all design details will be shown i including miscellaneous steel.
. Support SI-100-N-012 was found with a miscellaneous steel member installed which was used as a support for an Instrument Air Line. The miscellaneous steel was not shown on the pipe support drawing, 13 SI-100-N-012, Revision 1. The drawing does show the engineering design loads used in the analysis of the pipe support and the applicable calculation number (Problem No. 513-E, point number 293).
Engineering was contacted by telephone, and the responsible engineer stated that the loads from the miscellaneous steel member used as an instrument air support (IA-116-B00A) were not included in the design load for the pipe support, SI-100-N-012.
The engineer stated that loads were inconsequential (29 pounds) and the instrument air calculation had been annotated to state that the attac' ament to the Safety Injection Support was satisfactory.
Nonetheless, he stated the procedure requires the safety injection support calculation be amended to include such loads.
The failure of engineering to include a nonsafety design load in a safety-related pipe support calculation is considered an apparent violation of MRC regulations.
(4) Failure to maintain an accepted pipe support in an acceptable
, condition Appendix B, of 10 CFR 50, Criterion II, as Laplemented by Chapter 17 of the PSAR and FSAR requires in part that "The quality assurance program shall provide control over V-8
1 i
activities affecting the quality of the identified structures, systems, and components, to an extent consistent with their importance to safety".
Support SI-089-H008 was found with rubber seal material injected in the space by the Flourosold slides platas, Items 54 and 55 on the drawing. The drawing doe 8 not sh'ow rubber sealant material. It is probable that the material was inadvertently injected after the support inspection on November 29, 1979, but the material had been neatly trimmed away and the edges painted in the area painting.
The failure to provide control over activities affecting quality, resulting in a challenge to the sliding function of support SI-089 H008 is considered a violation (01I 50-528/83-34-03),
l l
V-9 l
.. ... ..- . &. . - . . - - O TABLE V-1 DEGREE OF SUPPORT TYPE FINDING PRO 3LEM DESCRIPTION INSPECTION
- 1. SI 008 N001 S Sat -
Full
- 3. 81 008 E003 8 Sat Full
- 4. SI 008 5004 SNB Sat Full
- 5. SI 008 B005 S Sat Full
- 6. SI 089 5008 8 Unsat Penetration Seal Naterial Slide Plate on Slide Plate only
- 9. SI 100 H001 S Sat Presence only - seal boot on
- 10. SI 200 N002 S Sat Full
- 11. SI 100 N003 S Unsat (1) Loose clamp (2) Excessive Full Angle
- 12. SI 100 M004 S Sat Full
- 13. SI 100 H005 S Unsat (1) Location dimension varies Full more than allowed (2) Lack of fill on stanchion to pipe field weld
- 14. SI 100 H006 S Sat All but lug welds
- 15. SI 100 B007 SNB Sat Full
- 16. SI 100 H008 S Sat Full
- 17. SI 100 M009 S Sat All but lug welds
- 19. SI 100 H011 S Sat Full
- 20. SI 100 H012 S Unsat Nonsafety hanger loads not Full included
- 21. SI 100 H013 S Sat Full
- 22. SI 100 H015 S Unsat Lug weld size Full
- 23. SI 100 B016 S Sat Full
- 24. SI 100 N017 S Sat Full
- 25. SI 200 H018 S Sat Full
- 26. SI 100 M019 S Sat Full
- 27. SI 100 H020 SNB Sat Full
- 28. SI 100 H021 S Sat Full
- 29. SI 100 M022 S Sat Location /
Configuration /
Clearances only
- 30. 8I 100 E023 S Sat "
- 31. SI 100 B024 S Sat "
- 32. SI 100 B025 S Sat "
- 33. SI 200 E026 8 Sat "
- 34. SI 100 N027 5 Sat "
- 35. SI 200 B028 S Sat Full V-10
a.
- 36. SI 100 HG29 8 Sat All but pipe lugs
- 37. SI 200 B031 3 Sat Lug welds only
- 38. SI 100 B032 8 Sat . Lug velds only
- 39. SI 100 B034 8 UnaSt UAdersize lug weld ,. Full
- 40. SI 100 B035 8 Sat Lug welds only
- 41. SI 100 5036 8 Unsat Configuration differs from Full drawing
- 42. 8I 101 500A SS Unsat Loose Locknut Lock nut only
, 43. SI 102 500A 8 Sat Full
- 44. 81 102 E005 8 Unsat Welds deficient (Undersize Full
) weld, rollover, no end t
returns)
- 45. SI 105 B00B S Sat Full
- 46. 81 105 H00C 8 Sat Full
- 47. SI 105 HOOD S Sat Full
- 48. SI 105 B00E S Sat Full ,
- 49. SI 106 B001 8 Unsat Lack of Lug Contact ares Full I with support members
- 50. SI 106 B002 8 Sat Full
- 51. SI 106 H003 S Sat Full
- 55. SI 106 B007 S Sat Full
- 56. SI 106 B008 SNB Sat Full
- 58. SI 106 H011 S Unsat Pipe lug weld w/in 1" of Full circumferential weld
- 59. SI 106 H012 S Sat All but pipe lugs
- 60. SI 106 B013 S Sat All but pipe lugs
- 61. SI 106 B014 S Sat Full
- 62. SI 106 B015 S Sat Full
- 63. SI 106 B016 ft Sat Full
+
- 64. SI 106 B023 S Sat Full
- 65. SI 176 B001 S Unsat Undimensioned weld on drawing Full l
- 66. SI 176 B002 8 Sat Full
- 67. SI 176 B003 S Unsat Undersize fillet weld Full
SNB = Snubber 1
l V-11
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VI. PIPING SYSTEMS INSPECTION Approximately 826 feet of IPSI-Train A piping was selected for inspection. j Inspection was performed on 64 percent, which represents 530 feet of the i RPSI piping, to verify compliance with the isometric drawings and ASE !
Section III requirements. This included 64 feet of piping on the suctioc
~
line of IPSI pump A; the balance of piping inspected was on the discharge lines located in the auxiliary and containment buildings respectively.
Piping system inspection includes visual inspection of pipe welds, welder qualifications, piping size and quality, and valve installation.
l A. P_ipina System Welds
- 1. Areas Examined Visual inspection of 200 pipe welds, out of a total of approximately 900 weld joints (pipe and socket) in the entire IPSI systems was made for quality and compliance with ASE '
Section III requirements. Characteristics examined included weld surface appearance, location, weld reinforcement, and absence of surface defects including cracks, lack of fusion, porosity, slag and undercut exceeding prescribed limits.
The records associaced with one percent of the total welds were reviewed in detail and compared with the information obtained at the weld joint. Records examined included certified material test reports, piping class sheets, Bechtel's Forn 84 which specifies the welding and nondestructive examination requirements for field erected piping, welder qualifications, field welding check list, and filler material certifications.
- 2. Findinas The type of pipe weld joints examined included pipe-to-pipe, pipe-to-fittings and pipe-to-valves. The visual inspection of ,
these weld joints and the associated records reviewed indicated that the components were welded together by qualified welders using qualified filler materials and qualified welding procedures, the components being joined were certified, that the base material and the filler material were compatible for welding, and the required nondestructive examinations
- and weld inspections were performed. No items of I noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l VI-1 l
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B. Pipina
- 1. Areas Examined Fieldinspectionactivitiesincludedvisualexaminationofthe 530 feet of piping. This was to assure that the installed piping was as specified on the design drawing, and that the piping was reasonably straight, had a workmanlike finish and
- was free from injurious defects s'uch as mechanical marks, abrasions and pits.
- 2. Findinas Inspection of piping quality revealed one section of pipe to have mechanical marks. This was identified on pipe spool 28 line number A106-CCBA, adjacent to pipe-to-valve weld number WO25. The quality control instruction, WPP/QCI No. 204, Revision 3. " Piping Systems Release for Insulation,"
Appendix I, requires that piping systems, prior to insulation, be checked for surface damage by the quality control engineer.
Any unacceptable surface damage is then required to be documented on the construction inspection plan (CIP), and then evaulated in accordance with procedure ED-1, entitled
" Elimination of Defects". The CIP for the pipe spool is question did not identify any unacceptable surface damage on this system. The main concern was whether the pipe minimum wall thickness requirements were violated. The Licensee initiated NCR No. SM 2976; the pipe was re-inspected and dispositioned " accept-as-is" in accordance with the acceptance standards specified in ED-1. In this case minimum wall had not been violated.
Also during this examination of pipe quality the inspector observed an apparently unacceptable pit-like defect on the outer-surface of pipe spool SI-008-8002 adjacent to pipe support SI-008-H002. The pit was unusual in that it did not appear to be typical mechanical damage or a typical welding arc strike. It appeared to be a minor blow hole from the original pipe manufacturer. The pit appeared to violate minimum wall requirements. The inspector requested the Licensee to have the pipe hanger removed for access to the pipe pit; measurements were taken by the piping QC engineer in
! the presence of the NRC inspector with a calibrated pit gage.
l The pit was measured to be 0.059 inches deep. The allowable
- minimum uall for pipe spool 81-009-S 002 is 0.219 inches and i
the remaining wall (calculated from nominal wall) is 0.191 l inches. Therefore the pit represents an underwall condition requiring an engineering evaluation.
VI-2
Procedure WPP/QCI 204, Revision 2 " Piping Systems Release for Insulation", requires the final inspection of piping to be performed by a piping QC engineer prior to covering the pipe l with insulation. Paragraph 3.1 of Appendix 1 regpires an inspection for surface damage per specification (ED-1). .The specification " Welding Standard ED-1 Elimination of Defects"
~
states in paragraph 4.3 that defects may be removed provided wall thickness is not reduced below the minimum specified.
i The pipe spool was inspected in accordance with the above and improperly accepted on November 14, 1982, as certified on the Piping Release No. 301-398. The failure of the piping QC engineer to identify an unacceptable defect during the piping inspection prior to insulation is considered an apparent item of noncompliance. (OII 50-528/83-34-04)
C. Valves l 1. Areas Examined All valves in the EPSI A train were examined during the walkdown inspection for compliance with the isometric drawing; specifically to assure proper valve size, location, type, orientation and installation. In addition, torque verifications were performed on a few selected valves to assure that the torque values were within the valve manufacturer's acceptable range.
. 2. Findinas Inspection of this area revealed three instances which are apparent violations, indicating a weakness with the preoperational test /stertup program.
1 (a) During the inspection of valve No. 470 on the suction side of the HPSI pump "A", it was observed that the manual operator assembly was totally discennected from the valve and resting on the sprinkler system piping.
There was no documentary evidence to indicate that maintenance was being performed on the operator assembly. It does not appear that the preoperational testing program organization was fully cognizant of the valve's unsatisfactory status nor were procedures being applied which would assure control of this activity.
Neither the valve or the operator had been recorded as deficient or nonconforming. The failure to control activities affecting quality is an apparent violation.
(011 50-528/83-34-05)
VI-3
- - - - ^
3 i (b) Three additional adverse conditions were identified on valve No. 470. First, visual examination revealed that the bonnet was leaking; second, that one stud out was i missing from one of the studs connecting the bonnet to the valve body. These two conditions resulted in the inspector's request for torque verification on the stud
. auts. The torque verification revealed a number of loose stud nuts which connect the bonnet to the valve. This third ites, failure of the stud nuts to meet the torque requirements specified on the design drawings, represents <
a condition adverse to quality, and is an apparent violation. (OII 50-528/83-34-06)
(c) Valve No. 402 was found with the position indicator positioned so that the valve could only be opened about 30-35 percent. There was no documentary evidence to indicate that maintenance was being performed or that the licensee was aware of the condition of the valve.
Preoperational testing was being conducted on this subsystem. The failure to identify this condition adverse to quality, is an apparent violation. (OII 50-528/83-34-07)
D. Welder Qualifications
- 1. Areas Examined Bechtel specification WQ-1, Revision 17, of March 10, 1983,
" Welding Standard Performance Specification," was examined.
This specification describes the requirements for detensining the ability of welders to make acceptable welds. The Welding Test Lab where welder performance qualifications are performed was examined for compliance with WQ-1 and ASME Section IX requirements. Also examined was the ability of the Welding Test Lab to detect " stand-ins" for welder qualification tests.
The qualification records of 22 percent of the welders who field-welded on the 530 feet of pipe selected for the inspection were examined for compliance with WQ-1 and the latest issue of ASME Section IX.
- 2. Findinas The welders records examined revealed that the welders were qualified, on the date the weld was made, to the requirements of Bechtel specification WQ-1. WQ-1 meets the requirements of the latest issue of ASME Section IX. The welder performance qualification records were being properly maintained and were up-to-date.
VI-4
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- g. y - - - - + - -,e----- s.v .- - e - ,w-v1r,,-w.= - - - -eN-y7ww.-e---eei w
' ~ ~ ~ ~
-- . ..-_..._...c.. 7 s.
Although no new welders were being qualified during this l inapection, the Welding Test Lab was examined and found to be well organiz2d and controlled. The weld rod is properly controlled, rod evens are calibrated and kept at the correct temperature, and testing booths and welders' records are properly maintained. e Bechtel welder qualification procedures do not specifically address the subject of welder identity during qualification testing. However, Bechtel's current system requiring the welder's signature, social security number, and a photo badge appears to be satisfactory in preventing any practices of using stand-ins for welder qualifications. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l l
l i
VI-5 l
1 l
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7
- e. ,
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l VII. Inspection Results - Civil / Structural A. Concrete Tests
- 1. Areas Examined
[
~
Eleven test areas were selected for examination using the " Windsor Probe Test" (WPT). These areas are identified in Table VII-1. They were selected as representative of concrete in the EPSI A pump room and in the vicinity of selected portiona of the connected piping. The WPT measures the resistance of concrete to penetration by an explosively driven probe. Correlation to actual concrete strength is by reference to the Windsor Probe manufacturer's charts which relate probe penetration distance to strength for different aggregate hardness values.
- 2. Inspection Findinas Maximum aggregate size in the concrete tested was 1 1/2-inches. The Moh number for the aggregate selected from the probe manufacturer chart was number 6 (Far Southwestern United States). The indicated concrete strengths ranged from 5,800 to 7,600 psi, indicating adeqvate concrete strength exists in all areas measured.
Detailed data are given in Table VII-1. No items of
- noncompliance or deviations were identified.
B. Structural Steel Framina l
- 1. Areas Examined Building and platform structural steel was examined to verify that the sizes, types and materials were in accordance with design requirements. The areas examined
! were in the RPSI A pump room, the auxiliary building l
northwest pipeway at the 40' elevation, and the 100 feet elevation on the south side of the containment building.
The governing documents were as follows:
. Specification 13-CH-320 - Erection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-001 - Civil / Structural General Notes.
l l
1 VII-1
. Drawing 13-C-ZADS-500 - Auxiliary Building - Traning Plan for Elevation 51'-6".
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-529 - Contaissent Inte,rnals -
Structural Steel Platforms below Elevation 100.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-570 - Auxiliary Building -
Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-EAS-571 - Auxiliary Building -
Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 2.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-572 - Auxiliary Building -
Structural Steel Sections and Details - Sheet 3
. WPP/QCI 58.0 - Erection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel.
- 2. Inspection Findinas The steel that was esamined was installed as specified and was of the required type and size. Certified Mill Test Reports were on file which verified that the proper material had been furnished. These were spot checked and were found to be in order. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Bolting and welding of the steel is addressed in Sections VII.3 and VII.4 of this report.
- 3. Structural Steel-Bolted Connections
- a. Areas Examined Bolted connections in selected portions of the building and platform structural steel in areas associated with HPSI A train system were examined for cespliance with design requirements. Particular attention was given to bolt size and type, presence of washers where required, adequacy of thread engagement. Tightness of a representative sample of bolts was tested using a calibrated torque wrench. The joints were located in the HPSI A pump room, the northwest pipeway at the 40-foot elevation and the 88-foot elevation pipeway in the auxiliary building, the 82 to 95-foot elevations of both
" wrap-around" portions of the auxiliary building, and at VII-2 1 .. . .
q various elevations in the containment building.
Additional structural steel joints not associated with the EPSI A train system were also examined. They were in the containment building and in the NPSI B pump room.
Detials are provided in Table VII-2. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph VII.B.1, the governing documents also include the following:
~
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-510 - Auxiliary Building Framing Plan for Elevation 88' - Area AAA.
. Drawing 13-C-EAS-511 - Auxiliary Building Framing Plan for Elevation 88' - Area AAB.
. Drawing 13-5-ZAS-535 - Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous steel Plan 9 Elevation 88'.
. Drawing 13-S-ZAS-536 - Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous steel Sections and Details - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-581 - Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Steel Platforms and Details -
Sheet 2.
. American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) -
Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A325 or A490 Bolts.
- 2. Findinas Detailed inspection findings are given in Table VII-2.
Except as described below, all bolted joints examined satisfied the specified requirements.
Table 3 of the AISC specification requires that 7/8-inch diameter A325 bolts be tightened to a minimum tension of 39 kips. The followius departures from that requirement were found:
(a) Four bolts in one joint in the AC-6 y latform at the j 51'6" elevation of the BPSI A pump room were only
! " finger tight."
(b) One bolt in a 4-bolt I-beam to I-beam connection at the 125 degree azimuth, 10 feet from the liner, elevation 88-feet in the containment building, required a nut rotation of 45 degrees before achieving the tightness equivalent to the required 39 kips.
VII-3
- - __ ______Y
r.
(c) One bolt in a 4-bolt floor beam connection in the auxiliary building northwest pipeway, 6 feet east of column line AD, 51'-6" elevation, required a nut rotation of 60 degrees to achieve the 39 kip requirement. .
In all three cases, the connections had been
. inspected and accepted by Bechtel Quality Control personnel. The unsatisfactory bolting accepted by QC is an apparent violation. (011 50-528/83-34-08)
D. Structural Steel Welded Connections
- 1. Areas Examined Welded connections in selected segments of the building and platform structural steel in areas associated with RPSI A train system were examined for compliance with design requirements. Attributes examined were fillet les size and length, weld contour, and absence of overlap and undercut. The joints esamined ware located in the auxiliary building (pipeways at the southwest 40 foot elevstion and at the 88 foot elevation), and in the containent building (80-87 foot elevation and the 125 foot elevation). Details are provided in Table VII-3.
In addition to the documents listed in paragraphs VII.B.1. and VII.C.1., the governing documents also include the following:
. Drawing 13-C-00A-050 - Welding and Nondestructive Examination Requirements for Civil Structural -
"Forn 84C".
. Structural Welding Code AWS D1.1 1972, with 8
Revision 1, 1973.
- 2. Findinas Detailed inspection findings are given in Table VII-3.
The welded connections in the containment building that were examined were found acceptable. In the auxiliary building pipeway, elevation 88 foot, the inspector found six fillet welds with undersize les length and four welds with unacceptable undercut. The welds are portions of a W8X31 pipe support rack, number B-79, fabricated by Marathon Steel Company.
VII-4
, . ;n - ._ n -, - - - -- --- --
In the auxiliary building northwest pipeway, i elevation 51'6", the inspector found six fillet welds with undersize leg lengths. The welds are portxons of a W16X36 floor beam clip connection. The inspector measured fillet veld sizes down to 5/32 inch, whereas 5/16 inch size was specified for these welds. The undercut criteria specified in AWS DI.1 : guires that it be no more than .01 Anch deep when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress in the part that is undercut, and no more than 1/32 inch for all other situations. Contrary to this requirement, the inspector found undercut of approximately 1/16 inch deep.
The undersize and undercut welds had teen inspected and accepted by Bechtel Quality Control personnel. The acceptance of welds which are not in conformance with specification requirements is an apparent violation.
FSAR 8ection 3.8.1.6.6 states: "The acceptance criteria for visual acceptance for welding is done in accordance with AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1, 1973." During the inspection, the following items were noted which appear to be deviations from this commitment:
. AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1973, paragraph 3.6.6 states
" welds shall be free from overlap." Specification 13-CM-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.4, 3.2, and 3.3.4 allow a maximum of 1/8" of overlap.
. AWS D1.1-72, Revision 1973, paragraph 8.15.1.3 requires that "all craters are filled to the full cross section of the welds." Specification 13-CH-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.5, 3.2, and 3.3.8 allow underfilled weld craters.
. AWS DI.1-72, Revision 73, paragraph 3.6.4 states that "... undercut shall not be more than 0.01" deep when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress in the part that is undercut, nor more than .
1/32" for all other situations." Specification 13-CH-320, Appendix A, paragrph 3.3.7 allows up to a maximum of 1/16" of undercut under certain circumstances and does nos address undercutting l transverse to primary tensile stress.
. AWS D1.1-72 does not permit incomplete fusion.
Specification 13-CH-320, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.1.8, 3.2 and 3.3.6 allow an exception to the requirement for complete fusion between weld metal and base metal.
VII-5
- . . . , [' -
i t
l . Paragraph 9.2 of Specification 13-EM-302, Cable Tray )
Mangers, states that..." all quality Class Q cable '
tray hanger welds shall be inspected in accordance with AWS D1.1-79." (emphaais added) -
c i
These discrepancies are considered to constitute a
. deviation from the FSAR commitment. (0I1 50-528-33-34-09)
E. Containment Structure Penetrations
- 1. Areat Examined Five piping penetrations (nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, and 77) and one electrical penetration (no. 47), all associated with the HPSI train A system were visually examined and their records reviewed to ascertain compliance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 111-1974 Edition. In addition, piping penetration No. 62, monitoring ;
contalment internal pressure, and spare penetration No. 69 werc examined. The visual examination was related to weld reinforcement height and surface finish. The records review addressed the presence and validity of the supplier's material test report, and the adequacy of the Field Welding check list (Form WR-5) and the Filler Metal Withdrawal Record (Form WR-6). Other factors examined were the qualification of the specified welding procedure, control of preheat and interpass temperatures, and nondestructive examination of the completed welds.
- 2. Findinas All work in this area was found to be in conformance with requirements. No items of noncompliance or deviations were :
identified.
F. Steel Embed Plates In Concrete
- 1. Areas Examined Except for 3 or 4 plates in the vertical pipe chase in the northwest corner of the auxiliary building, all sobedded plates carrying pipe hangers / supports for the EPSI A system lines in the auxiliary building were l
examined. These were 3 plates on the suction line and 35 plates on the discharge lines. In addition, approximately ,
30 plates were randomly selected in various '
walls in the auxiliary and containment buildings, of l which approximately 20 were not loaded. The examination included measurement of plate thickness and anchor bolt VII-6 1 l l ;
s.
length using an ultrasonic transducer and CRT videoscope (only 2 or 3 belts in each embed plate were measured),
and a graduated depth gauge measurement of bolt thread er. gage:nent. The governing documents were as follows:
. Specification 13-CM-308 - Installation-and Testing of Concrete Babeds and Insert Plates.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-001 - Civil Structural - General Notes.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-010 - Typical Insert Plate Schedules and Details.
. Drawing 13-C-00A-011 - Anchor Bolt Schedule and Details.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-110 . Auxiliary Building - Plan at Elevation 40'.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-112 - Auxiliary Building - Insert Plan at Elevation 40'.
. Drewing 13-C-ZAS-146 . Auxiliary Building - Plan at Z1evation 120'.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-200 - Auxiliary Building - Wall Elevaticas - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZAS-224 . Auxiliary Building - Wall Elevations - Sheet 25.
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-413 - Containment Internals - Wall Inserts and Penetrations - Sheet 1.
. Drawing 13-C-ZCS-406 - Containment Internals - Wall Inserts and Penetratinas - South Secondary Shield Wall.
2 Findinas All embedded plates examined were found to be installed in the specified locations and were the specified thickness. All anchor bolt lengths were as specified.
One plate was found with three of eight bolts apparently missing; search with the UT transducer, however, found that all three had been relocated (by welding) as permitted by the specification when interference with reinforcing steel was encountered. Two other plates were VII-7
. .s,..
found with documented relocation of anchor bolts. For one case of avspected insufficient bolt thread engagement, documentation was on file which showed that the bolt had been circumferential1y velded to the back of the plate, also as permitted by the specification. No itema of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
G. Concrete Expansion Anchors
- 1. ' Areas Examined
- A representative sample of concrete expansion anchors was examined to ascertain conformance with the installation '
requirements. At Palo Verde, the design intent is to l avoid the use of expansion anchors to the maximum )
possible extend. A generous quantity of embedded steel plates and unistrut channels were provided for fastening equipment generally and, except for specifically identified lightly loaded applications, expansion anchors were to ha used only after all other methods had been evaluated and determined unfeasable or unacceptable by Kagineering.- For these situations, documented licensee approval is required on a case-by-case basis. The previously mentioned lightly loaded applications include '
electrical raceway (except cable tray) instruments, instrument sensing lines, and local panels.
A total of 88 anchor holts were examined for depth of embed and proper torquing of the tensioning nut. These were comprised of the following:
. 20 Hilti Kwik-Bolts associated with I electrical panel box and all Class IE raceway supports (9) in the HPSI A pump room.
. 29 Milti Kwik-Bolus fastening raceway supports in the east " wrap-around" section (200' elevation) of the auxiliary bu'.iding.
. 8 Hilti-Kwik-Bolts anchoring 2 instrument sensing line support plates in the east " wrap around" section (30' elev.) of the auxiliary building.
. 8 Milti Kwik-Bolts anchoring 2 switchbox panels in Batt'ery Rooms C and D in the control Building (100' elevation).
. 17 Drillco Maxi-Bolts anchoring control center panels to the floor (100' elevation) in Battery
-.'Rooms A, C and D in the Control Building. (Only 8 of these bolts were torque tested).
s VII-8 l
l
i 5
. 6 Drillco Maxi-Bolts anchoring 6" fire-line support plates (2) to the MSSS well (108' elevation) in the corridor adjacent to the turbine building.
j All torque testing was performed by a Quality Control Inspector or a journeyman electrician naing i
torque wrench in the presense of the NRC pector.ins,a calibrated The geverning documents were:
. Specification 13-CM-307 - Design, Installation and
- Testing of Concrete Anchors.
i . WPP/QCI 24.1 - Installation and Testing of Concrete Expansion Anchors.
- 2. Findinas of the 23 Drillco Maxi-Bolts examined, all were found to be embedded and torqued to the required values. For the bolts anchoring the equipment panels in the battery rooms, there was no documentary evidence that Pechtel had obtained the required licensee approval prior to their installation. Similarly, no approval documentation was available for 4 Hilti Kwik-Bolts used for a strut supporting a cable tray hanger in the auxiliary building east " wrap-around" at the 100' elevation (east wall).
l In the IPSI A pump room, 6 miscellaneous Hilti Kwik-Bolts j (1 raceway support) could not be properly torqued due to the absence of wasbers under the tensioning nut (support holes too large). Due to the proximity of adjacent supports, this one probably could have been eliminated and the raceway would have been adequately anchored.
! Also in the HPSI A pump room, one anchor bolt was
- insufficiently embedded (3") because it was located too close (1 1/2") to an ungrouted, unusued hole. Embed depth should have been 6 1/4". Two unused holes were found ungrouted, contrary to the specified requirements.
Additionally, there were two bolts that violated the specified minimum distance from other anchor bolts.
In the auxiliary building " wrap-around" section (100' elevation), 9 bolts, randomly located, were found undertorqued (all four in one 4-bolt plate), one bolt was too close (2 1/8") to the edge of a wall opening, one
- bolt was insufficiently embedded (2 1/4" instead of 5" l required), and two bolts had nuts with insufficient thread engagement.
I VII-9 l
i I
L-. -
t All bolts examined in this sample bod been given the requisite inspection by Bechtel Quality Control inspection and had been judged acceptable. The failure of QC to identify ~ nonconforming ccaditions to specification requirements is considered an-apparent violation. (50-528/83-34-10) 4 VII-10 l
l TABLE VII - 1 ~.
CONCRETE STRENGTH MEASUREMENT ,
PLACEMENT Meas.(1) STRENGHT (psi)
Test Max. Probe Cylind.(2)
No. LOCATION / DESCRIPTION No- Date Age Agg. Size Exten-in. Probe Mess Break Design _
1 RPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
Floor (E1. 40') Adjacent to 4000 '
Pump 1A05-1 11/24/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. 1 1/2 2.25 7400 5870 9 28 Da.
t 2 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
East Wall (Elev. 44') "
Adjacent to Pump 1A12-1 1/21/77 6 Yrs.-9 Mo. 3/4 2.20 7000 5185 j 3 MPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
South Wall (Elev 43') "
Adjacent to Pump Motor 1A12-1 1/21/77 6 Yrs.-9 Mo. 3/4 2.25 7400 5155 4 North Pipeway-Aux. Bldg-South Wall (elev.44') "
Between Col Lines AE & AF 1A08-1 12/23/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. 3/4 2.275 7600 5960 5 HPSI A Pump Room-Aux. Bldg.
Floor (Elev.40') Adjacent to West Wall & Floor Embed under "
Suction Line to Contain. Sump 1A04-1 11/24/76 6 Yrs.-11 Mo. I 1/2 2.125 6400 5870 l
6 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.100')
125 V Battery A Charging 4000 Equipment Room 1J016 3/10/78 5 Yrs.-6 No. 1 1/2 2.050 5800 5875 9 91 Da.
7 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.100') " "
125V Battery A Room a " " 2.075 6000 , 5875
- 8. Control Bldg. Floor (Elev.200') " "
125V Battery C Room 5 " " 2.100 6200 5230 VII-11 l
.. 1 i
TABLE VII - 1
- CONCRETE STRENGTR MEASUREMENT ,
PLACEMENT Meas.(1) STRENGRT (Psi)
Test Max. Probe cylind.(2)
No. IDCATION/ DESCRIPTION No. Date Age Agg. Size Exten-in Probe _ Mess Break Design 9 Control Bldg. Floor (Elev. 100')
In front of HPSI A 4160V " "
" " " 2.150 6600 Motor Breaker Cubicle 5875 10 Containment Bldg. Base Mat Floor (Elev. 80') Adjacent 5000 to South stairway 1C013-1 7/8/77 6 Yrs. -2 Mo. 1 1/2 2.200 7000 5350 9 91 De.
- 11. Containment Bldg. Base Hat Floor (Elev. 80') West Side Under Safety
" " 2.100 "
Injection Piping Runs "
1 1/2 6200 6040 l
l K; tis (1) Windsor Probe Test-Average of 3 driven probes 1 (2) Average of compression test of 2 cylinders VII-12
- -- --- a
1 TABIZ VII-2
- STRUCTURAL STEEL BOLTED CONNECTIONS
- Inspection Amount of Inspection Type of Inspection ,
Locr. tion Elevation Versus Total Available Inspection Findinas Anziliary Bldg. 51'6" 15 joints of approx. 33 Visual Four Loose bolts in m '.~ooit NPSI A Pump Room Joint - Platform AC-6 Acceptable Northwest Pipeway 51'6" 13 joints of approx.15 Visual Auxiliary Bldg. .
Wrap-Around Areas 82'-95' 94 joints of approx. 200 Visual Acceptable l Auxiliary Bldg. j Pipeway Area 88' 40 joints of approx. 300 Visual Acceptable !
Auxiliary Bldg.
-Containment Bldg. 80'-87' 110 joints of approx. 500 Visual Acceptable Anziliary Bldg. 51'6" 10 bolts of approx. 120 Torque Test Acceptable NPSI A Pump Roon Northwest Pipeway 51'6" 28 bolts of approx. 52 Torque Test One bolt rotated 60 degrees before Aemiliary Bldg. minimum tightness was achieved.
was achieved. 1 Containment Bldg. 87' 24 bolts of approx. 2500 Torque Test One bolt rotated 45 degrees before minimum ti8htness tightness was achieved.
t I
l Contoimeent Bids. 98' 34 joints of approx. 100 Visual Acceptable
- Cont-fament Bldg. 125' 12 joints Visual Acceptable
- Containment Bldg. 140' 15 joints Visual Acceptable i .
- Containment Bldg. - 20 joints Visual Acceptable Pr=curizer 1 l Compartment
- Auxiliary Bldg. 51'6" 15 joints Visual Acceptable i
RPSI B Pump Room CItems inspected which are not associated with the NPSI train A system.
VII-13
-. .- . . .J
l 2
, e TABLE VII-3 ,-
STRUCTURAI STEEL WELDED CONNECTIONS ,
! Inspection Anount of Inspection Type Of Inspection Locetion Elevation Versus Total Available Inspection Findinas Northwest 51'6" 13 joints of approx. 15 Weld gauge Visual Six undersize Pipeway fillet welds 4
Auxiliary Blds.
Pipeway Area 88' 50 joints of approx. 200 Weld gauge Visual Six undersize Auxiliary Blds. fillet welds,
. Four welds with undercut.
Contadament Bldg. 80'-87' 110 joints of approx. 250 Weld gau p Visual Acceptable
- Containment Bldg. 125' 4 joints Weld gauge visual Acceptable CItems inspected which are not associated with the HPSI Train A system. 1 .
VII-14
l .
VIII. NRC Nondestructive kaamination and Quality Review of Safety Related Systems A. Purpose The purpose of the independent, NRC nondestructive examination (NDE) was to verify the adequacy of the licensee!s welding quality control program. This was accomplished by duplicating
_ those examinations required of the licensee by regulations and evaluating the results. In addition is the required examinations, arveral additional confirmatory examinations designed to verify conformance with material specifications were performed and compared to quality assurance records.
The NRC inspection team selected the NPSI A system to inspect at the Palo Verde Unit 1. There are approximately 900 piping welds in the NPSI A system. This system was undergoing pre-operational testing and was full of water under pressure.
A selection of welds from this system that could be drained and inspected was made. Due to preoperational testing of Unit 1, a selection of welds from Unit 3 was also made. The selection of these welds was intended to provide a representative sanple of piping components, sizes, materials, of shop and field welds. All the welds selected were previously accepted by the licensee based on vendor, shop, or field NDE records.
B. Document Reviews The following quality assurance documents were reviewed to verify compliance with regulatory and code requirements:
j 1. Twelve weld document packages were reviewed for:
Material Certifications i --
NDE results Fabrication records shop and field Drawings (Isometric)
PWET Charts (Note: The twelve welds reviewed are listed at the end of Table VIII-2. See those listed for drawing 13-P-ZCG-103)
- 2. Two quality procedures were reviewed.
13PM-201 Shop Fabrication of Nuclear Piping Systems 13PH-204 Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems l VIII-1 i
l
- 3. A review of GE0's (site NDE subcontractor) internal audit, dated June 10, 1983, was performed. This audit reviewed all of GE0's NDE site personnel qualification at Palo Verde.
- 4. Verification of NDE Personnel Qualificationi to SNT-TC-1A The NRC inspector reviewed all of Bechtel's individual film interpreter qualification and certification records. He also reviewed 6 out of 39 of GE0's NDE records for personnel qualifications. l All the above documents were verified to satisfy NRC requirements and licensee commitments to industry codes and standards.
C. NRC Independent Examinations (Note: Refer to Table VIII-1 for specific listings of independent inspection items) i 1. Radicaraphy Twenty-one welds were re-examined by the NRC using an Iridium 192 source. Welds that were radiographed were ASME Code Class 1 and 2, carbon and stainless steel.
Results: All re-radiographed welds were found acceptable to ASME Section III acceptance criteria.
- 2. Pipe Wall Thickness Measurement - Eleven pipe welds and adjacent pipe material were examined per NRC procedure NDE-11, Revision 0, using a NORTEC NDT thickness gauge.
Minimum wall thickness was determined by using an ASTM standard pipe sizes and nominal thickness chart.
Results: All areas examined were within tolerance requirements.
- 3. Ferrite Measurements - Thirteen pipe welds were checked
) for delta ferrite content using a Type II Ferrite Indicator (Severn Gauge).
i Results: All measurements were within acceptable limits of material test results.
- 4. Hardness Measurements - Fourteen welds were checked for hardness (base material adjacent to welds) using the Equo-tip hardness tester per NRC Procedure NDE-12, Revision 0. Hardness numbers were converted to Brinnell values and the approximate tensile strengths were determined by use of conversion tables.
VIII-2
e...
Results: All areas examined were within acceptable limits I of material test reports. l
- 5. Alloy Analyzer - Four pipe welds and adjacent base metals were examined using a Texas Nuclear Alloy Analyzer. A quantitative chemical analysis was made on two stainless ,
steel, type 304, and two stainless steel, type 316 '
materials.
Results: Areas examined were within + 2% of chemical analysis indicated on corresponding certified mill test i
reports and were within acceptable limits.
- 6. Liquid Penetrant Examination - Eight safety related pipe weldments were liquid penetrant examined per NRC procedure NDE-9, Revision 0. All weldments examined were ASME Class 2 welds.
Results: All areas inspected were acceptable.
- 7. Visual Examination - Thirty-four weldsents and adjacent base material were visually inspected for weld i
reinforcement, overall workmanship and surface condition per NRC procedure ND 14, Revision 0.
l Results: All areas inspected were acceptable.
- 8. Radicaraphy of Socket Welds - Ten socket welds were radiographed to verify pipe engagement.
Results: All radiographs show at least a minimum of 1/16 inch gap per ASME Section III, paragraph NC4427 requirements.
- 9. Radicaraphic Review of Licensee Field Welds and Vendor Welds - A review of licensee's pipe weld radiographs was made during this inspection of ASME Class 1 and 2 weldsents. Out of 746 sets of radiographs, 204 were reviewed as listed below, with results as listed in Table VIII-2.
The radiographic film review disclosed 6 welds which are in the "as-welded" condition and present weld ripple images in the film. The ASME V Code, paragraph T-221-2, requires that weld irregularities be removed to the extent that they cannot mask or be confuse; with actual discontinuities. The weld ripple images for ISO 01-P-SIF 105 Line IRC-051-S-001-16, welds A and B; 1RC-051-S-002; l weld A; and ISO-13-P-ZCG-103, IRC-079, 030 and 073 are l considered excessive and capable of masking or being confused with discontinuities in the opinion of the NRC Level III examiner.
VIII-3
i -
s ...
( On October 12, 1983 licensee representatives and the Bechtel Corporation Level III examiner telephoned the Regional office to express a difference of professional opinion. The Bechtel examiner did not consider that the weld ripple images could mask discontinuities. This item is considered unresolved. (Unresolved iten- '
50-528/83-34-01) -
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l VIII-4 i
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Table VIII-2 Review of Licensee RT Films and Records I
Line ISO WELD RESULTS SI-008-CCBC-10" 13-P-SIF-201 W5 Acceptable W1 Acceptable W2 Acceptable W3 Acceptable W4 Acceptable W6 Acceptable
- W 7 Acceptable SI-008-GCBC-10" 13-P-SIF-201 W-D-F375 Acceptable
" " W-B-F375 Acceptable
" " W-A-F375 Acceptable
" " W-A-422 Acceptable W-B-423 Acceptable
" " W-A-423 Acceptable SI-A-009-CCBC-4" 13-P-SIF-203 W1 Acceptable W2 Acceptable SI-099-CCBB-4" 13-P-SIF-203 W-E-F149 Acceptable
" " W-B-F149 Acceptable W-A-F149 Acceptable SI-099-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable D Acceptable E Acceptable SI-A-100-CCBA-4" "
WI Acceptable W2 Acceptable W3 Acceptable SI-100-CCBB-4" 13-P-SIF-203 W-A-156 Acceptable W-B-156 Acceptable W-3-156 Acceptable SI-A-101-CCBA-1" 13-P-SIF-204 W 00L Acceptable 2" "
W 00A Acceptable 2" "
W 00B Acceptable 2" "
FW 00C Acceptable 2" "
W 00H Acceptable 2" "
W 00J Acceptable 2" " W 00K Acceptable
- Visually verified RT root indication (concavity) between RT station numbers 12 and 15 by using a fiberscope. All areas of concern are acceptable.
5 VIII-5
Line ISO WELD RESULTS 2" " W 00L Acceptable 2" " Acceptable FW 00N 2" " Acceptable FW 00P 2" " FW 00R(C) Acceptable 2" " FW 00S(C) Acceptable 2" " W 00T Acceptable 2" " FW 000 Acceptable SI-A-102-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIP-204 FW 00A Acceptable
" " Acceptable FW 00B FW 00C Acceptable
" " Acceptable W 00D
" " FW 00E Acceptable W 00F Acceptable
" " FW 00G Acceptable
" " FW 00H Acceptable W 00J Acceptable FW 00K Acceptable FW 00L Acceptable
" " FW 00M(C) Acceptable SI-103-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIF-203 FW 300 Acceptable FW 00A Acceptable FW 00B Acceptable FW 00C Acceptable FW 00D Acceptable W 00E Acceptable SI-103-CCBA-2" 13-P-SIF-203 FW 00G Acceptable FW 001 Acceptable FW 00J Acceptable W 00K(C) Acceptable FW 00P Acceptable FW 00R Acceptable SI-105-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable SI-105-S-004-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-105-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable SI-105-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-202 A Acceptable SI-105-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-202 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable SI-157-CCBA-4" 13-P-SIF-204 W 300 Acceptable 4" "
FW 301 Acceptable 1" "
W 00C(C1) Acceptable 2" " W 00A Acceptable 2" "
FW 00B(C) Acceptable 2" "
FW 00C(C1) Acceptable 2" "
FW 00D(C) Acceptable 1" " FW 00E Acceptable SI-157-CCBA-1" 13-P-SIF-204 FW 00E Acceptable 2" " FW 00H Acceptable VIII-6
Line ISO WELD RESULTS 1" " IV 001 Acceptable 4" " FW 001 Acceptable
- 3" " W 006 Acceptable
., 3" " FW 007 Acceptable 3" " FW 008 Acceptable SI-157-5-001-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable
" " F Acceptable SI-157-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable SI-157-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable SI-157-S-004-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable SI-157-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" U-77(c-1) Acceptable 13-P-ZG108 SI-157-S-006-3" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " Acceptable B
" " C Acceptable
! " " D Acceptable SI-157-S-007-3" 13-P-SIF-136 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable .
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable RC-051-S-001-16" 01-P-SIF-105 A Rejected Beads
" " B Rejected Beads RC-051-S-002-16" 01-P-SIF-105 A Rejected Beads RC-051-S-003-16" 01-P-SIF-105 G Acceptable H Acceptable
" " A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " D Acceptable SI-176-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable.
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable SI-176-8-002-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable SI-176-5-003-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable
! SI-176-8-004-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable l
VIII-7 l
4 . . ,,,
S , .- .
Line ISO WELD RESULTS B Acceptable C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable SI-176-8-006-3" 13-P-SIF-204 A Acceptable B Acceptable
_ C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable F Acceptable SI-218-S-001-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable
" " B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable
" " F Acceptable SI-218-S-002-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-236-S-003-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable SI-236-S-005-4" 13-P-SIF-203 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable
" " D Acceptable SI-236-S-006-3" 13-P-SIF-203 B Acceptable E Acceptable ,
F Acceptable H Acceptable
. J Acceptable K Acceptable L Acceptable M Acceptable N Acceptable SI-248-S-003-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" " D Acceptable SI-248-S-007-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable B Acceptable C Acceptable
" " G Acceptable H Acceptable
" " J Acceptable K Acceptable D Acceptable
" " E Acceptable ,
" " F Acceptable i SI-248-S-008-3" 01-P-SIF-105 H Acceptable l J Acceptable '
" " K Acceptable SI-248-8-009-3" 01-P-SIF-105 A Acceptable B Acceptable
" " C Acceptable VIII-8
- - - - . - - - . r.- . . - -- ,.-,--,,na , , , , , - - - -- , - - - - -
l .
~. .-
g -
D Acceptable l 81-248-S-011-3" 01-P-SIF-105 G Acceptable
" " M Acceptable
" " J Acceptable 81-248-8-012-3" 01-P-SIF-105 F Acceptable
" " G Acceptable
" " E Acciptable 0.D. Size Line Document Review ISO Weld S/N Results 30" 1-RC079 " 13-P-ZCG-103 WOO 1 Rejected Beads 30" 1-RC030 " " " Rejected Beads 30" 1-RC073 Rejected Beads 30" 1-RC031 " " " Acceptable Unit 2 30" "
2-RC079 13-P-ZCG-103 W001 Acceptable 30" 2-RC030 " " " Acceptable 30" " " "
2-RC073 Acceptable 30" " " "
2-RC031 Acceptable Unit 3 ,
30" 3-RC079 13-P-ZCG-103 WOO 1 Acceptable 30" " " "
3-RC030 Acceptable 30" 3-RC073 Acceptable 30" " " "
3-RC031 Acceptable VIII-9
. e.
- t l
II. CRAFT AND QC INSPECTOR INTERVIEWS l During the course of the inspection interviews were conducted by the team members with various craft persons and QC inspectors. These interviews were conducted on a one on one basis at random in the field, predominantly at Unit 1, but some were conducted at Units 2/3 and in the senior resident inspector's office. There were 115 of these interviews
- conducted with the idea of finding whether there was pressure by management to " cut corners." and to give the interviewee an opportunity to discuss any problems he/she may know of with a NRC inspector.
None of the workers indicated that he/she felt intimidated or that there was any pressure to cut corners, all thought that the quality on this project was above average to excellent and none knew of major problems on this project that NRC did not know about.
Table. IX-1 Workers Interviewed Craft No. Interviewed
- 1. Electrician 23
- 2. Millwright 2
- 3. Ironworker 7
- 4. Boilermaker 1
- 5. Pipefitter 21
- 6. Carpenter 4
- 7. Janitor 1
- 8. QC Welder 7
- 9. QC Elect 16
- 10. QC Mech / Piping /NSSS 12
- 11. Laborer 3
- 12. Insulator 2
- 13. Walder 7
- 14. NDE Tech 4
- 15. Sprinkler 2
- 16. Operating Engineer 1
IX-1
- - - - . - . . . _ . _ _.-_ . _ _ _ _ ~
. s- ~
. , s-Attachsnent A j A. Persons contacted
~
- 1. Arizona Public Service Company E. Van Brunt Jr., V.F. Nuclear Projects J. Roedel, Corporation QA Manager D. Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager J. Eeiley, Startup Manager J. Bynum, Nuclear Operations Manager W. Ide, Construction (QA/QC) Manager P. Moore, QA Engineer B. Love, QA Engineer R. J. Rimmel, Field Engineering Supervisor G. Pankonin, Startup Q4/QC Manager F. Godwin, Nuclear Projects Records Manager K. Gross, Compliance / Operations Supervisor C. Rogers, Nuclear Engineer L. Souza, Construction QA Supervisor J. Rayes, Startup Manager, Unit 1
- 2. Bechtel Power Corporation W. Stubblefield, Field Construction Manager D. Hawkinson, Project QA Manager J. White, Lead Pipe Support QCE G. Stan, Weld Engineering Supervisor J. Sabol Lead Pipe Support Engineer D. Keitch, Bechtel, Downey E. Miller, Lead Field Welding Engineer M. Rosen, QC Supervisor T. Mack, Assistant Project Manager A. Priest, Construction Engineer C. Berg, Construction Engineer Other persons contacted during the inspection included construction craftsmen, QC inspectors, startup personnel, QA personnel and Supervisory Personnel.
..