ML20080G862

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Summary of 830916 Exit Status Meeting W/Nrc Const Appraisal Team Re 830907-16 Insp
ML20080G862
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 09/19/1983
From: Ide W
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Roedel J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
Shared Package
ML20080G796 List:
References
FOIA-83-598 83-C-83-WEI, NUDOCS 8402140032
Download: ML20080G862 (6)


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P.o. sox pass . Phon.x. AmzoNA e5036 QUAL.ITY ASSURANCE DEP RTMENT OA Document No. 83-C-83 NEI Audit Report No.

DATE: September 19, 1983 TO: J. A. Roedel .

FROM: W. E. Ide ,

SUBJECT:

NRC Construction Appraisal Team Inspection The NRC CAT Inspection Team held an Exit Status Meeting on September 16, 1983, to discuss the results'of the NRC Inspection of September 7 through 16, 1983.

The following individuals attended the Exit Status Meeting: .

T. Young, Jr. NRC Region'V Section Chief W. Albert NRC Team Leader P. Narbut NRC Project Inspector J. S. Burdoin NRC Reactor Inspector G. Fiorelli NRC Resident Inspector L. Vorderbrueggen NRC Resident Inspector J. A. Roedel Corporate QA Manager A. C. Rogers Manager, Nuclear Engineering D. B. Fasnacht Manager, Nuclear Construction W. E. Ide Construction QA/QC Manager G. Pankonin Startup QA/QC Manager W. G. Bingham Bechtel Project Engineering Manager W. A. Miller Bechtel Construction Project Field Engineer R. E. Vote Bechtel Project QA Engineer It was noted during the Exir Meeting that this is a preliminary exit de-signed to give the status after two weeks of the CAT inspection. The NRC will return the week of September 26, to complete their inspection with a planned exit meeting on September 30, at 9:00. Since this_is a preliminary exit meeting, there were not comments concerning which items will be items of noncompliance.

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l J. A. Roedel QAD 83-C-83/WEI l September 19, 1983 ,.

Page 2 ,

The following items were discussed: .

_ I. Pipe Supports ,

Sixty five (65) pipe supports were inspected in detail.

There are two (2) additional supports that will be in-spected during the next week of inspection. Of the 65 i supports inspected, ten (10) were found to have defici-encies. The deficiencies found are as follows:

o 3 supports had undersized vendor welds o 3 supports had undersized lug welcs o 1 support had udssing welds .

o 1 support had an undimensioned weld' '

which was accepted by QC o 1 support was mounted at an angle out of tolerance

! o 2 supports had dimensions ou't of tolerance o 2 sway strut locking nuts were loose o 2 support baseplate thickness not shown on drawings. These supports had been NCR'd prior to the NRC ' Inspection,- but had pre-viously been accepted b/ QC without dimen-sions.

o 2 supports had dimensions or configuration

. problems o 1 non-safety support was supported by a .

safety support without having been approved by an FCR o 1 slide plate had seal rubber under the plate o 2 cases were found where pipe clamps were over the code plate o 1 pipe was pitted It was noted that overall these problems don't appear to be technically significant, in that if left uncorrected they would not affect plant safety. However, the NRC was surprised that the problems exist to the extent found, in particular since  :

DER 79-10 dealt with undersized welds on pipe supports.

l

11. Pipe Inspection Several hundred feet of Safety Injection pipe were examined.

Ninety nine (99) field welds and one hundred two (102) vendor welds were examined. The following problems were found:

o Reinforcement on 2 joints require further review o 2 bolted joints were loose o Valve operator on SI470 was not connected i

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J. A. Roedel

QAD 83-C-83/WEI ~

September 19, 1983 Page 3

  • Additionally, during this inspection three valves were torque checked and the hardness of bolts also

~ checked. During the next week of inspection, addi-tional safety related documentation will be reviewed.

III. Nondestructive Examination i:

Twenty three (23) butt joints, ten (10) socket welds, i

and three (3) Reactor Coolant System welds in Unit 3 were independently checked by the NRC using radio-graphic examinations. Thirty four (34) welds were visually checked by the Nondestructive Examination Team, eight (8) liquid penetrant inspections were performed; metal thickness adjacent to the ten welds was checked; thirteen (13) welds were checked for ferrite; and alloy checks were performed on three (3) pieces of base metal and one -(1) piece of weld metal.

Additionally, the Nondest'uctive. r Examination' Team reviewed fif ty nine (59) Bechtel radiographs on ,the HPSI System, ten (10) vendor radiographs and radio-graphs of four (4) Reactor Coolant System velds in Unit 3. Fif teen (15) weld document packages and four (4) Reactor Coolant System weld packages, includ-ing post veld heat treatment, were reviewed. . The qualifications of six (6) GEO and twelve (12) Bechtel NDE personnel were reviewed. As a result of this in- '

spection, there are two outstanding problems. ,

o There is a questionable indication in one Bechtel radiographic film. To re-solve this issue, the NRC will witness '

the setup and reshooting of that veld.

o The control of cumulative heat treatment

, time is unresolved.

IV. Electrical / Instrumentation l

NRC Inspectors reviewed the installation of the pressur ,

izer low pressure transmitters, including the instrument itself, all wiring and tubing. Additionally, the Con-tainmer.c High Pressure Transmitter System was reviewed.

l As a result of this review, the NRC found four (4) high pressure sensing lines capped in Containment. It was noted that_ operating plants have been fined by the NRC for this violation. Additionally, the NRC checked

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J. A. Roedel g QAD 83-C-83/WEI .

September 19, 1983 Page 4 ,

four (4) penetrations, approximately sixty five (65) cable terminations, logic and separaticn in the'< Control Room and Channel A remote shutdown panel, four (4) vital uninterruptible' power supplies, four (4) . safety injection pump motors, seventeen (17) motor operated i

valves, four (4) batteries, 4160 volt switchgear, and one (1) diesel generator train.. Additionally, the NRC reviewed the records associated with the receiving, maintenance, installation, calibration, and storage of these items. This review, however, is incomplete. As a result of this inspection, there are fifty three (53)

Findings. Some are insignificant, such as naue tags on trays. 'Some of'the more significant problems are:

o Separation o Pressure taps being capped o Wood in vertical' cable trays i o Battery. maintenance tests not conforming ~

to IEEE 450 .

o Battery load capacities not meeting the test period requirements o Maintenance records were found scattered j in many places '

i o Records were found in a cardboard box under a desk.

V. Civil Concrete was tested in eleven (11) locations with the Windsor probe. In all cases the concrete was in excess of design requirements. Embedded plates were checked in the Auxiliary Building and Containment. Thsse plates were checked for thickness by UT and proper thread engage-ment. Of the twenty (20) or thirty (30) plates checked, l three (3) had bolts with insufficient thread engagement.

l The thread engagement was significantly less than that required.

VI. Structural Steel In the HPSI train "A" pump room fifteen (15) joints were examined for proper welding and bolting. Two (2) bolts out of three (3) in one connection'were found loose.

Four (4) bolts out of six (6) in another connection were l

found loose. In the train "B" HPSI pump room fifteen (15) joints were examined. All were found satisfactory. Addi-tional welded connections were checked in the Auxiliary e

l .

. I 1 .

J. A. Roedel .

l5 QAD 83-C-83/WEI September 19, 1983 -

Page 5 .

Building. Of these connections,' thirteen (13)

  • were found with undersized or undercut welds on' l _

two (2) pipe racks. Additionally, six (6) struc-tural steel welds were found undersized. In one case a 5/32 weld was found where a 5/16 weld was required. In Containment, one hundred ten (110) structural steel joints were examined. All were found satisfactory. Bolts were torque tested in the High Pressure Safety Injection pump room, pipe ways and inside Containment. Sixty two (62) bolts were examined and found generally acceptable.

Six (6) bolts did not come up to the required torque levels. The torquing of eighteen (18) maxi bolts was also examined. Maxi bolts in the battery charger pump rooms did not'have APS approval prior to installation, as required by specification.

Additionally, the minimum distance of anchor bolts from unistrut was' questioned. The NRC also visdally examined flued heads and instrument records. More records will be examined during the next week of inspection. Structural steel associated with HVAC 4

in the Containment Building was also visually ex-amined and found satisfactory. During the next week of inspection electrical penetration welds and NDE will be reviewed.

VII. Personnel Interviews There has been a charge that the NRC has not inter-acted with the media, and, additionally, that the.NRC is always escorted, and therefore is not available to the craft. During this inspection, NRC Section Chief was interviewed by the pedia. Additionally, the NRC will interview at least a hundred (100) QC and craft personnel. During these two weeks, ninety five (95) interviews were conducted. Two or three -

minor comments were made by personnel being interviewed.

All items have been resolved.

VIII. Comments and Conclusions Since this was a preliminary status Exit Interview, no decision has been made which items will be items of noncompliance. However, the general perceptions of the NRC are as follows:

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l J. A. Roedel l 0, QAD 83-C-83/WEI /

September 19, 1983 ,

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a. Although the NRC did not go beyond Construation, in several cases they coordinated activities through Startup and Operations. The cosnent was made that they don't have the confidence in the Startup QA/QC program that they do in Construc-tion. They stated that they will look at this area much more closely in the future.
b. From the Findings thus far, the NRC perceive's a problem with walkdown inspection conducted prior to, and at the time of, turnover of systems .to Startup and Operations.- Several of the items noted during the inspection should have been discovered at the time of the walkdowns of systems by Construction Operations, or Startup.

If noted during these walkdowns, these discrep-s ancies were not corrected. Items such as wood in cable risers, stainless steel pipe badly gouged but insulation.placed over it, valves with the operating mechanism.not attached, and valve bolts loose, should have been picked up during the various walkdowns.

By and large the NRC was impressed with construction, but sees rough edges which require additional attention. The NRC will return to Palo Verde September 26, for an additional week of inspection. The Exit Interview is tentatively scheduled for 9:00 in the 411 Building. There will be at least fifteen NRC inspection personnel present at the Exit, including Mr. Martin

, and Mr. Bishop and potentially NRC headquarters personnel.

. W. E. Ide PVNGS Construction

.QA/QC Manager WEI/jp cc: T. G. Woods, Jr. B. S. Kaplan E. E. Van Brunt, Jr. S. R. Frost G. C. Andognini D. R. Canady O. M. D6Ttchele D. D. Green /P. P. Klute J. R. Er,wam A. C. Gehr D. B. Fasnacht J. E. Kirby R. J. Kimmel R. M. Taylor

'J. M. Allen T. L. Cotton A. C. Rogers G. E. Pankonin J. R. Provasoli W. J. Stubblefield W. F. Quinn .D. R. Hawkinson C. N. Russo M. Rosen J. Vorees

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