ML20009A008
| ML20009A008 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1981 |
| From: | Beckham J GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-47007, NUDOCS 8107070357 | |
| Download: ML20009A008 (14) | |
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Washington, D. C. 20555 fy NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS Gentlemen: Georgia Power Company hereby submits the attached report and drawings for the six-month response to Section 2.1, " General Requirements For Oserhead Handling Systems" as requested by your letter dated December 22, 1980. I Sincerely, J. T. Beckham, Jr. Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Generation odC
'DAE/mb Attachments xc: M. Manry R. F. Rogers, III O
8107070357 810629'? l PDR ADOCK 05000321a p PDRg q bl{\ i I - - _ - - - - - . - - - - -
SIX MONTH RESPONSE TO THE NRC LETTER DATED DECEMBER 22, 2980 ON
' DIE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS l
l June 18, 1981 S I
This report addresses the six month response to section 2,1, enclosure (3) of the December 22, 1980 NRC letter: Control of Heavy Loads. A complete sietematic evaluation of all overhead load- handling systems in the rs ctor buildings, diesel generator building, water int'ake structure, and turbine buildings in the vicinity of the control building for both Units 1 and 2 of Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant was undertaken to review areas in the plants where a load drop could result in damage to equipment required for safe shutdown cr decay heat removal. Far the purpose of the review, each overhead load-handling system in the above men-tiened areas was identified and its load path determined. The determination of th2 load path included a possible load swing of 50 prior to the load drop and an analysis of the floor penetration potential following a load drop. The load dr p analysis was based on comparing the weight of an object to its impact dimension. The impact dimension is considered to be the least overall general dimension of an cbject. The weight vs impact dimension comparison establishes the criteria for d2termining the floor penetration potential of a dropped load. The maximum possible lif ting heights (the distance from the monorail to the floor slab) for the majority cf the load drops taalyzed fell within the established limit. Those loads which have th2 potential to penetrate the floor slab have been limited to a maximun lif t height i cuch that floor penetration is not possible. These loads are identified in Table 2. i Using the pre-determined load path a system walkdown was performed to visually Io-cate and identify all plant equipment in the load paths of all overhead handling i cystems accessible to inspection. The plant equipment identified included components, I l instruments, electrical panels, cable trays and pipe. Each item of plant equipment was evaluated to determine if damage from a load drop could prevent achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown condition. For the overhead load-handling systems which l w re inaccessible to the walkdown inspection due to plant operation or high radiation l l ! - - - . - - _ ._ ~ _ ___. , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ,
d5 sign drawings were reviewed to determin2 if a loco drcp could poten-Tha tiolly damage plant equipment essential to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. walkdown included a general inspection of the above mentioned areas to assure that the as built condition of the plant. th2 design drawing accurately represent Th2 drywell was not walked down on either unit because the ECCS systems have a large enough capacity to mitigate the consequences of any damage caused by a load drop in th2 drywell. The results of this evaluation are presented as response to each parcgraph of Section 2.1, Enclosure 3. Peregraph 2.1.1, Enclosure (3): Rapsrc the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems form which a load drop may result in damage to any system required far plant chutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, tcchincel specifications, operating procedures, or detailed aeructural analysis).
Response
Th2 following overhead load-handling systems were determined to ha"* the potential to damage equipment, essential to safe shutdown or decay heat removal, following o Iccd drop: TABLE 1 l location Item No. Ane HNP-1 HPCI Pump and Turbine HNP-1, reactor building, HPCI room 1. Heist EPN-1, reactor building, NE corner room
- 2. BNP-1 RER Pump and Core Spray Pump Hoist (NE)
EMP-1 RER Beat Exchanger. Boist ENP-1, reactor building, NE corner room 3. (EE) ENP-1, reactor building, SE corner room
- 4. ENP-1 RER Pump and Core Spray Paup Beist ($fE)
ENP-1 RER Beat Exchanger Hoist RNP-1, reactor building, SE corner room 5. (SE) ENP-1, reactor building el. 158'
- 6. INP-1 Racire. Motor MG Set "A" Epist
I TABLE I (continued) Item No. Name Locntion
- 7. RNP-1, Recirc. Motor MG Set "B" HNP-1, reactor building, el. 158' Hoist
- 8. ENP-2 CRD Pucp and Hatch Hoist liNP-2, reactor building, SW corner room, el. 130'.
- 9. ENP-2 RCIC Pump, Turbine and ENP-2, reactor building, NW corner room, Hatch Hoist el. 130'.
- 10. HNP-2 Core Spray Pump "A" HNP-2, reactor building, NE corner room, Hoist el. 130'.
- 11. HNP-2 RHR Pump "A" Hoist HNP-2, reactor building, NE corner room, el. 130'.
- 12. HNP-2 RHR Pump "C" Hoist HNP-2, reactor building, NE corner room, el. 130'.
- 13. HNP-2 RHR Heat Exchanger "A" HNP-2, reactor building, NE corner room, Hoist el. 130'.
- 14. HNP-2 Core Spray Pump "B" HNP-2, reactor building, SE corner room, Hoist el. 130'.
- 15. HNP-2 RHR Pump "D" Hoist ENP-2, reactor building, SE corner room, el. 130'.
- 16. HNP-2 RER Pump "B" Hoist HNP-2, reactor building, SE corner room, el. 130'.
- 17. HNP-2 RHR Heat Exchanger "B" HNP-2, reactor building, SE corner room, Hoist el. 130'.
- 18. HNP-2, HPCI Pump and Turbine HNP-2, reactor building, HPCI room Hoist
- 19. HNP-2, Recire. Pump MG Set HNP-2, reactor building, el. 158'.
"A" Hoist
- 20. ENP-2, Recire. Fump MG Set HNP-2, reactor building, el. ISB'.
"B" Hoist
- 21. HNP-2, Chiller Unit "A" Hoist HNP-2, reactor building, el. 158'.
- 22. HNP-2, Chiller Unit "B" Hoist HNP-2, reactor building, el.158' .
- 23. Diesel Generator "1A" Hoist Diesel Generator Building
- 24.
- Diesel Generator "1B" Hoist Diesel Generator Building
- 25. Diesel Generator "1C" Hoist Diesel Generator Building y 26. Diesel Generator "2A" Hoist Diesel Generator Building l
TABLE 1 (continued) Item No. Name Loca tion
- 27. Diesel Generator "2B" Hoist Diesel Generator Building
- 28. HNP-1, Turbine Building Over- HNP-1 Turbine Buil6ing head Crane
- 29. HNP-1 & 2 Water intake Struc- Water Intake Structure ture Mobile Crane
- 30. HNP-2 Turbine Building Over- HNP-2 Turbine Building head Crane
- 31. HNP-1 Reactor Building Over- Reactor building, refueling floor head Crane
- 32. HNP-1, Refueling Platform Rer: tor building, refueling floor Monorail
- 33. HNP-1 Spent Fuel Pool Jib Reactor building, refueling floor Crane
- 34. HNP-2 Reactor Building Over- Reactor building, refueling floor head Crane
- 35. HNP-2 Refueling Platform Reactor building, refueling floor Monorail HNP-2 Spent Fuel Pool Jib Reactor building, refueling floor 36.
Crane Paracraoh 2.1.2. Enclosure (3) : Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by varifying that there is sufficient physical separation form any load-impact point cnd any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no l h0cvy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.
Response
The following overhead load handling systems are excluded from the category of pcragraph 2.1.1, enclosure (3). The analysis of each overhead handling system evaluated c11, plant equipment which could be potentially damaged following a load drop and datermined there was no impact on safety due to the nature of the equipment located in the load path, sufficient physical separation from safety related equipment,
procedural limitation of lif ting heights, or the use of radundant systans. Tall.E 2 Justification of Exclusion from 1 em No. Ne - _ __ Para. 2.1.1. Enclosure (3) INP-1 MPCI Pump and Turbine Major maintenance would not be undertaken when
- 1. the system is required to be operational. In Boist addition, redundant systems, the RCIC or ADS
"-mtems, could be used in the event of damage to HPCI components.
HNP-1 RHR Pump and Core Spray tlst. of redundant systems 2. Pump Hoist (NE) HNP-1 RHR Heat Exchanger Hoist Use of redundant systems 3. (NE) HNP-1 RHR Pump and Core Spray Use of redundant systems 4. Pump Hoist (SE) ENP-1 RHR Heat Exchanger Hoist Use of redundant systems 5. (SE)
- 6. HNP-1 Recire. Motor MG Set "A" Imposed lift height restrictions Roist
- 7. HNP-1 Recire. Motor MG Set "B" Imposed lift height restrictions Hoist HNP-2 CRD Pump and Hatch Hoist No essential equipment located in load 8.
path HNP-2 RCIC Pump, Turbine and No essential equipment located in load 9. Hatch Hoist path HNP-2 Core Spray Pump "A" Use of redundant systems l 10. Hoist ENP-2 RRR Pump "A" Hoist Use of redundant systems 11. HNP-2 RHR Pump "C" Hoist Use of redundant systems 12.
- 13. HNP-2 RHR Heat Exchanger "A" Use of redundant systems Holst .
BNP-2 Core Spray Pump "B" Use of redundant systems 14 .' Hoist l
- TABLE 2 (continued)
Justification for exclusion from Para. 2.1.1 Item No. Name Enclosure (3)
- 15. HNP-2 RHR Pump '?D" Hoist Use of redundant aystems
- 16. HNP-2 RHR Pump "B" Hoist Use of redundant systems
- 17. HNP-2 RHR Heat Exchanger "B" Use of redundant systems Hoist
- 18. HNP-2, HPCI Pump and Turbine Major atintenance would not be undertaken when Hoist the system is required to be operational. In addition, redundant systems, the RCIC or ADS Systems, could be used in the event of damage to HPCI components.
- 19. HNP-2, Recire. Pump MG Set "A Imposed lift height restrictions Boist
- 20. HNP-2, Recire. Pump MG Set "B" Imposed lift height restrictions Hoist
- 21. HNP-2, Chiller Unit "A" Hoint No impact on safe shutdown equipment.
- 22. HNP-2, Chiller Unit "B" Hoist No impact on safe shutdown equipment.
- 23. Diesel Generator "1A" Hoist Use of redundant systems
- 24. Diesel Generator "1B" Hoist Use of redundant systems
- 25. Diesel Generator "1C" Hoist Use of redundant systems
- 26. Diesel Generator "2A" Hoist Use of redundant systems
- 27. Diesel Generator "2B" Hsist Use of redundant systems
- 28. HNP-1. Turbine Building Over- The limited clearance between the top of head Crane the control building and the turbine buil-ding overhead crane will not permit trans-porting a load over tne control building.
Movement of the Control Building Ventila-tion and Air Conditioning Equipment will be controlled by adherence to our estab-lished safe load psth (Fi;;. 2) and an operational procedure.
- 29. HKP-1 & 2 Water Intake Struc- Movement of plant equipment in this area ture Mobile Crane will require the use of a mobile crane.
Bechtel's evaluation of the plant equip-ment located in this area revealed that a Icsad drop would have no impact on safe
TABLE 2 (continued) Justification for exclusion from Para. Item No. Name 2.1.1. Enclosure (3) shutdown or decay heat removal due to suf-ficient physical separation complete with steel barriers from essential equipment and the use of redundant systems. HNP-2 Turbine Building Over- The limited clearance between tbs top of 30. head Crane the control building and the turbine buil-ding overhead crane will not permit trans-porting a load over the control building. Movement of the Control Building Ventila-tion and Air Conditioning Equipment will be controlled by adherence to our estab-lished safe load path (Fig. 2) and an operational procedure. HNP-1 Reactor Building Over- HNP-1 Reactor Building Overhead Crane has
- 31. been modified to be single-failure proof.
head Crane Use of this crane will be controlled by strict administrative procedures and will follow established safe load paths. Refer to Fig.1. For further information,. refer section 10.20.5 in the HNP-1 FSAR.
- 32. HNP-1 Refueling Platform No impact on safe shutdown equipment. Used Monorail to handle fuel assemblies between the fuel pool and the reactor vessel.
- 33. HNP-1 Spent Fuel Pool Jib No impact on safe shutdown equipment. This Crane 0.5 ton capacity crane is used to assist fuel assembly movement in the spent fuel pool.
HNP-2 Reactor Building Over- Use of this crane is procedurally restricted.
- 34. It will It is not single-failure proof.
head Crane not be used over any equipment required to reach and maintain cold shutdown.
- 35. HNP-2 Refueling Platform No impact on safe shutdown equipment. Used Monorail to handle fuel assemblies between the fuel pool and the reactor vessel.
No impact on safe shutdown equipment. This
- 36. ENP-2 Spent Fuel Pool Jib l
Crane 0.5 ton capacity crane is used to assist l -
- fuel assembly movement in the spent fuel
- pool.
HNP-1 MSIV "A" Holst Plant will be shutdown prior to maintenance in
- 37. this area. A load drop would not impact on essential equipment for safe shutdown or de-cay heat removal. The redundant MSIV's will assure primary system integrity.
L
TABLE 2 (continued) Justification for exclusion from Para. Item No. Name 2.1.1, Enclosure (3) HNP-1 MSIV "B" Plant will be shutdown prior to maintenance in
- 38. Hoist this area. A load drop would not impact on essential equipment for safe shutdown or de-cay heat removal. The redundant MSIV's will assure primary system integrity.
- 39. ENP-1 MSIV "C" Hoist 21 ant will be shutdown prior to maintenance in this area. A load drop would not impact on essential equipment for safe shutdown or de-cay beat removal. The redundant MSIV's will assure primary system integrity.
- 40. HNP-1 MSIV "D" Hoist Plant will be shutdown prior to maintenance in this area. A load drop would not impact on essential equipment for safe shutdown or de-cay heat removal. The redundant MSIV's will assure primary system integrity.
- 41. HNP-2 RWCU Regen. Hz Trolley Sufficient physical separation from load im-pact to essential safety related equipment.
- 42. HNP-2 RWCU Non-reger. Ex Sufficient physical separation from load im-Trolley pact to essential safety related equipment.
- 43. HNP-2 Puel Pool Cooling Ex Sufficient physical separation from load im-Boist pact to essential safety related equipment.
- 44. HNP-2 CRD Repair Area Sufficient physical separati,on from load im-Monorail pact to essential safety related equipment.
- 45. HNP-1 CRD Repair Area Jib Sufficient physical separation from load in-Crane Hoist pact to essential safety related equipment.
- 46. HNP-2 MSIV Bridge Crane Plant will be shutdown prior to maintenance in this area. A load drop would not impact on essential equipment for safe shutdown or d:-
cay heat removal. The rtdundant MSIV's will i assure primary system in;egrity. P,ragraph 2.1.3 Enclosure (3) With respect to.the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the reactor butiding and those load-handling systems identified in 2.1-1 above, provide your cvaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1. Tha following specific information should be included in your reply:
- , s. Drevings or skatebes sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related squipment.
- b. A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load raths, including procedures, if any for deviation from these path..
- c. A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification th2t the handling of each load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(2).
- d. Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3-c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.81(5), are not met, describe acy proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliabliity,
- e. Verificatie,that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been involved with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.
- f. Verifiestion that crane design complies with the guidelines of CHAA Specification 70- and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
3 Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct.
Response
None of the overhead load handling systems analyzed in this report were determined to l hava an impact on plant equipment essential to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown f condi tion. They are excluded from Para. 2.1.3, Enclosure (3) for one of the following rocsons, as delineated in Table "-
- 1. There is sufficient physical separation from the load impact area and the safe shutdown equipment.
- 2. The use of redundant R3R and/or Core Spray Systems.
- 3. The imposing of lift height restrictions on the Recir. Motor Generator Sets.
- 4. The use of a single-failure proof HNF-1 Reactor Building overhead Crane.
- 5. The utilisation of safe load paths and maintenance procedures.
- 6. The installation of electrical and mechanical interlocks.
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